Abstract
This project report combines findings from face-to-face interviews with academic research to systematically consider possibilities for a greater UPEACE role in China. To that end, it begins by examining the present political, economic, diplomatic, and environmental dimensions of China, and provides an in-depth look at the country’s system of higher education. Afterwards, it proposes a series of entry points in higher education for UPEACE, offers the UPEACE charter and the Chinese Ministry of Education’s statement regarding foreign participation in higher education as normative frameworks, and profiles the work of nine other like-minded organizations and institutions in China. Based on the body of research conducted, the UPEACE expectations for the region, and face-to-face meetings with UPEACE community members and Chinese professionals, this project report concludes by generating six potential functions and three logistical scenarios for UPEACE involvement in the country.

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts, Peace Education
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Part I
GENERAL OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE
Chapter 1  Introduction

Last summer before coming to the University for Peace (UPEACE), I worked and lived in Xi’an China as an English language and American classroom pedagogy professor at Xi’an Teachers College. This experience exposed me to a variety of issues and realities facing Chinese higher education as well as a range of successful pedagogical techniques that Chinese educators use in Chinese classrooms. It also instilled in me a love for the Chinese people and country. While I was in Beijing, I had the privilege of having lunch with Maurice Strong, the president of the UPEACE Council. We had a conversation about UPEACE and China and I left the country determined to write about Chinese higher education for my UPEACE thesis. After several more exchanges with professors and administrators at UPEACE last fall, I decided to add a practical dimension to my approach and think strategically about a potential role UPEACE could play in China. Consequently, I focused my topic to Exploring Possibilities for UPEACE in China.

This experience has been educationally meaningful for me and I hope it will be institutionally valuable for the university. Over the course of this academic year, I have had over 25 meetings with staff and faculty at UPEACE. I also had the privilege of going to China with my father in April and again meeting with Mr. Strong and a variety of educators and professionals in China. In these interviews I tried to gauge, among other things, what a UPEACE partnership with China might contribute to the university, to China, and to the world, what it might attempt to do in terms of more specific functions, and how it might find a distinct space in the arena of Chinese higher education. Additionally, I attempted to ascertain how it might maintain sensitivities to the Communist ideals, what institutions and individuals might be willing and worthwhile to partner with, and finally how plausible a relationship like this might be, given the financial realities of the university. I kept detailed notes of all of my sessions and have interspersed these recommendations throughout this project report.

There were a variety of provocative and significant threads that surfaced in these interviews. Some stressed the fact that the Chinese are eager to learn and can afford to pay for their education and furthermore that the privatization of higher education in
China has created a space for up-and-coming institutions to quickly and efficiently implement programs in ways that are both educationally meaningful and financially successful. Some reiterated that notions of peace studies are still somewhat unknown in China, but suggested that it is possible approach these issues under the umbrella of education for sustainable development. Others maintained that as China’s willingness to engage with the international community increases, it will become only more necessary for the U.N. and its various organs to meet these emerging interests with well-conceived educational architecture. And finally, all seemed to agree on the importance of embracing a process of co-development with Chinese individuals, institutions, and universities in conceiving a UPEACE regional partnership with China.

In addition to these interviews, I conducted a fair amount of background research on the Chinese context in order to support and enrich the face-to-face interview portion of my work. It is my hope that with and a more thorough command of the landscape and nuances of China and its system of higher education, and a more comprehensive understanding of individuals and institutes already at work in the fields of peace studies and sustainable development in China, the university will be better positioned to find an appropriate and distinct niche in the Chinese arena of higher education.

With that in mind, I will offer a brief roadmap for the project report. I have divided my report into three parts and nine chapters: part 1 (chapter 1) outlines the overview and rationale for the project. Part II (chapters 2, 3, and 4) provides background research and contextual information on China and Chinese higher education. It also examines some potential entry points for UPEACE and indicates where the university is well equipped to attend to existing needs. Part III (chapters 5,6,7,8, and 9) considers the potential implementation and logistical analysis of a UPEACE China strategic partnership. Included in the final part are profiles of nine organizations, institutions and universities working in the fields of peace, education for sustainable development, and other UPEACE related fields, a list of six potential functions based on the synthesis of recommendations and research, and three different scenarios for UPEACE implantation.
I know the decision about whether or not UPEACE can or should be involved in China is not up to me, but my hope for this document is rather to pool research from hard academic sources as well as from faculty and administration in the UPEACE community to help those who are the decision-makers, better understand the complexities and possibilities surrounding institutional involvement in China. Consequently, in chapter 8 of this document, I have generated several scenarios (low, medium, and high) that may be used for consideration. These scenarios range from including a greater focus on China in the existing Asia and Pacific Regional programme, to the creation of a full-fledged UPEACE university. I hope this more panoramic and holistic presentation of possibilities allows the UPEACE community to make more informed choices given a variety of determining factors.

1.2 What might UPEACE attempt to do in China?

Below is a brief sketch of a handful of potential objectives for UPEACE activity in China. These suggestions will be elaborated upon in chapter 7. UPEACE could:

1. **Co-Develop** and disseminate distance learning materials for Chinese schools and universities in cooperation with the UPEACE Sharing Knowledge for Peace programme (SKP) and Chinese partner institutions.

2. **Administer** conferences, short courses and develop curriculum for Chinese teachers, professionals, students, and local community members. UPEACE initiatives like this are already underway in many parts of the world, but many of the activities are based out of the headquarters in Costa Rica, Geneva, Ethiopia, and Canada.

3. **Establish** a network with other domestic and international organizations working in China in the fields of peace and sustainable development such as LEAD, UNESCO, UNDP, Earth Charter, etc.
4. **Encourage** cross-cultural partnerships with Chinese universities and create opportunities for student/professor exchanges with the UPEACE campus in Costa Rica and other worldwide programmes.

5. **Serve** as an Asian base to compliment the many other important UPEACE offices worldwide.

6. **Fundraise** for regional activities as well as for UPEACE at large.

1.3 **Why might it be necessary and beneficial for all parties?**

In this section of my overview I would like to provide a brief landscape of some of the realities at work in China that suggest a need for a UPEACE initiative in China and why UPEACE is well-suited to assist in addressing these conditions. This segment will also consider how Chinese pedagogical techniques, educational approaches, and cultural traditions might enrich UPEACE practices, curricula, and perspectives on global issues. Many of these themes will be revisited later in this report.

The acceleration of the Chinese economy has been tremendous, but while this success has earned them the economic respect of their international constituents, many would agree that severe impediments to peace still remain in the country. China’s deeply emotional and volatile relationship with Taiwan and its bitter and longstanding antagonism towards Japan are two examples explored in this report. China’s human rights record and its history of environmental degradation are also dealt with in more detail. In terms of higher education, existing manifestations of peacelessness include standards and testing and the financing and distribution of wealth in China. However, Chinese religious traditions, the current elements of the education for sustainable development movement, and the emerging interest among Chinese students in the United Nations denote some measure of promise for potential UPEACE activity in China.

I hope to demonstrate through my research and analysis that there is a clear need for education, and in particular higher education, to serve as a critical medium for supporting
future generations of Chinese students in their desire to participate in global affairs and international discourses and that there is a need for domestic and foreign parties to come together and think critically about the consequences that this type of unprecedented development has on the country and foster solutions for more sustainable practices through education.

Given these realities and needs, what might UPEACE be able to offer China?

UPEACE is unique in that it is the only institution in the U.N. system able to confer degrees at the masters and doctoral levels. It has a broad and inspiring mandate and a network-based organizational structure that makes it distinct from other universities. Furthermore, although it is headquartered in Costa Rica, UPEACE is truly an international university in that it is not restricted by state politics and not governed by the UN and its policies. This allows it to operate with a great degree of freedom and flexibility. Indeed, many of the Chinese professionals and academics I had the privilege of meeting in China said that the UN needs an increased presence in China, a presence that goes beyond poverty reduction initiatives to incorporate educational infrastructure as well. UPEACE, with its U.N. affiliation, is appropriately situated to accommodate this possibility as well as satisfy the emergent enthusiasm of a generation of Chinese students who want to take part in the United Nations and study international relations. Furthermore, education for sustainable development is just beginning to take shape in China and UPEACE could add to the quality of this movement with its professional expertise and network of cooperating institutions.

How might UPEACE learn from China and enrich its own practices?

Indeed there is also a significant amount that UPEACE community can benefit from a relationship with and understanding of China. There is a rich historical and cultural tradition in China that is largely underrepresented in the discourses of global affairs, especially considering that 1 in 5 people in the world are Chinese. Even though the country remains largely secular today, Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucius, philosophies, grounded in peaceful practices and lifestyles, continue to pervade modern Chinese culture. These eastern understandings of peace could certainly enlarge UPEACE concepts of
peace and human rights, which many believe to western at their core. Furthermore, China is the only country in the course of human history to have ever been a communist political state driven by a market economy. This has created fascinating circumstances for education, and there is much UPEACE, and the rest of the world, can learn from Chinese innovations and achievements, especially in the fields of education and sustainable development. An elaborate and extensive relationship with China clearly has advantages for the University as well.

A joint partnership between UPEACE and China can also be useful for thinking about funding that could originate from China. Just to give an interesting example, the same afternoon we visited Peking University, the President of Google was on campus to give a 500 million dollar check to the University. Incidentally, his meeting with the Provost was just after ours. So clearly resources do exist, but perhaps it is a matter of tapping into the right channels. In a recent conversation with Rector Julia Marton-Lefève, she noted that UPEACE must continue to stay dynamic if it is to continue to attract funding and provide its students with substantial and relevant educational opportunities. An institutional relationship with China could allow for this.

I know that the UPEACE Asia and Pacific regional programme has been active since 2000, and I was also interested to learn recently that discussions are underway to change the name of the ‘regional programme’ to ‘strategic international partnerships.’ Regardless of the terminology, I was interested to discover over the course of my research that few attempts to include China in UPEACE plans have been made and none seem to be on the horizon. Given the fact that UPEACE already has programmes on the ground in Africa, Europe, and Latin America and needs a regional base for its Asia and Pacific activity, and given the number of countries in Asia that are both concerned about China’s global impact and tied to its development, I would hope that this project report helps to direct some regional attention to a country that has become so incredibly important in Asia and in the world. Moreover, given the hundreds of thousands of students from all over the world have decided to study in China, I hope this report also
demonstrates that this country has become one of the most important centers for international education in the world.

With the legitimacy of the United Nations behind it, and the respect that Julia Morton-Lefèvre, Maurice Strong, Martin Lees, and others enjoy from the upper echelons of Chinese political leadership, the University for Peace is in a great position to have a programme in China. Moreover, for a university that prides itself on the serving humanity and cultivating a climate of international respect and diplomacy, it is almost impossible to imagine a future that doesn’t include some kind of relationship with what will be this century’s most important country. I hope my research underscores these sentiments and helps to incite some consideration of these truly exciting possibilities.
Part II
BACKGROUND RESEARCH AND CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
Chapter 2  The Chinese Context

As China is such a vast and complex country, I have tried to focus my research on areas that I feel are particularly relevant to the creation of a UPEACE strategic partnership with China. In Chapter 2, I explore approaches to domestic governance and foreign policy, as well as manifestations of peace and peacelessness in political, social, economic and environmental domains. In chapter 3, I focus my discussion to the realm of higher education in China, assessing the current climate, relevant trends and challenges to peace in education. These two chapters comprise my problematique. In chapter 4, I highlight several entry points for UPEACE in China and attempt to understand existing educational approaches used to tackle the problems of the previous two chapters as well as the remaining needs. This chapter serves as my gap analysis. In examining these realities at work in the Chinese context, I will begin to identify rationales for a UPEACE presence in the country, in preparation for the latter half of the project report.

While doing my research I was limited not only by the availability of resources on campus, but also by the accuracy and credibility of sources related to the Chinese context. Due to these constraints I obtained the vast majority of my research from web-based journals, online articles, and organization websites. I have attempted to draw from a variety of sources, both native and non-native scholars and publications, in order to achieve a range of opinions and stimulate critical discourse. As a side note, it has been difficult to distinguish authors writing from within China who are genuinely critical from those simply paying lip-service to the Communist constituency. Moreover, many of the scholars I reference in this document seemed to agree that the availability of accurate information about China in English was and is hard to come by. This is due in part to significant language barriers that complicate the translation process and in part to continued government scrutiny and censorship. All things considered, I have done my best to capture the essence of the Chinese context in all its intricacy, in order to pave the way for the potential implementation framework in part III of the document. Let me also say that I look forward to continuing this research over the next few months and will attempt to identify areas that I feel I would like to explore in more depth in part III of the document.
2.1 **Brief History of China**

In order to situate this report, I want to begin by providing a brief historical context of China. For hundreds of years China stood as a leading civilization, outpacing the rest of the world in the arts and sciences, but in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the country was beset by civil unrest, major famines, military defeats, and foreign occupation. After World War II, the Communists under Mao Zedong established an autocratic socialist system that, while ensuring China's sovereignty, imposed strict controls over everyday life (CIA World Factbook 2006). However, the death of Chairman Mao in 1978 marked the end of the so-called Cultural Revolution and the beginning of a new era in Chinese history. Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping and his administration reoriented party policies to reflect the growing need for China to participate in market-oriented economic reform. The economy flourished under this new approach, but the political leadership remained steadfast to its socialist ideologies. This tension is explored in more detail in the following section.

2.2 **Communist Political Structure vs. Market Economy**

In the past 27 years, the GDP of The People’s Republic of China has quadrupled to 7.2 trillion and in the last 10 years, the US-China trade deficit has increased seven fold (CIA World Factbook 2005). China’s 9.9% growth rate in 2005 (China Daily 2006) has vaulted the country to the vanguard of international attention. In an article entitled *the Rise of China*, Swarthmore College Political Science Professor James Kurth (2005) had this to say about the Chinese economy,

> The extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy is generating waves which have already reached other economies at the farthest ends of the earth. In a way reminiscent of the British economy in the nineteenth century and America’s in the twentieth, China in the twenty-first century has become “the workshop of the world,” the core of the global manufacturing sector. In doing so, it has hollowed out and flattened the economies of dozens of once-developing countries and little workshops around the world.

Indeed, the rest of the world has taken notice of China’s economic ascension. Klaus Schwab, the founder World Economic Forum more than three decades ago, announced at the opening day of the 2006 annual meeting in Davos that the growing importance of
China and the rest of Asia has led to his decision to establish a parallel session in China starting in the summer of 2007 (CNN 2006). According to Schwab, the reason for this decision was because "China will be the home of many of the companies" that are expected to emerge on the global scene” (CNN 2006).

However, with the substantial growth of the economy, little has changed in the political sphere. In an article published in the Financial Times in February of 2006, Minxin Pei a Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, characterizes this stress between the market economy and the political ideology as a “trapped transition.” According to Pei (2006),

since its transition began in 1979, per capita income has increased 10 times and foreign trade has exploded from $20bn in 1978 to $1,000bn in 2005; but growth and globalization have not brought democracy. Instead of liberalizing the political system, the ruling Communist party has vowed never to adopt a western-style democracy. Even as China enters the information age, Beijing is busy closing outspoken newspapers, jailing dissidents and coercing Google and Yahoo to help police the internet. (Pei 2006)

Axford (1995) makes sense of Pei’s ‘Trapped Transition’ in more global terms. He asserts that “the current age is witnessing two parallel developments: a trend towards more global cooperation and interdependence on the one hand and the continuing importance of nationalism and the enduring myths of statehood on the other” (p. 211). It would seem that China is an appropriate case and point for this notion of parallel and perhaps contradictory development. However Cheng Li, a Chinese scholar now teaching at Hamilton College in the United States and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, argues in a recent article, One Party, Two Factions: Chinese Bipartisanship in the Making? (2005), that the Communist party is beginning to divide not only into two conventional factions based upon personal cliques, but into two competing alliances of different social and economic interests. Li speculates that if this process continues to develop and eventually becomes institutionalized, the course of Chinese party politics in the coming years could bear some resemblance to the evolution of the political systems of Western countries, particularly during the nineteenth century.
One also has to wonder what part the people of China will play as the country continues to transition. Nicholas Kristoff, in an op-ed for the *New York Times* (2006) observes a host of issues facing the Chinese people, including rising labor costs, prolonged job shortages, and the rapid aging of China’s population. He also perceives what he calls a “growing boldness spreading across the land” among everyday Chinese citizens. Many are taking to the streets to protest their situation and he contends that this reaction will only continue to accelerate in the coming years. Kristoff (2006) goes onto say that he “senses more fragility in the system than at almost any time in the 23 years that [he has] been visiting or living in China.” Kristoff’s article raises some interesting questions about the role of the Chinese people in the transition process and the growing resilience they seem to collectively possess. However, it is still too early to gauge whether that will translate into any substantial form of resistance against government rule.

Others still speculate that this transition is not something that western cultures can accurately anticipate or gauge simply because no western country, especially of this size, has evolved from a communist state with this type of market economy. When I sat down with Vedrana Spajic-Vrkas, a visiting professor in the peace education programme from Croatia, she cautioned me against using a western lens to understand the nature of transition that China is undergoing. According to her, one should look to the people in the countries of Eastern Europe and other countries that have undergone political transitions for a better understanding of this shift, before getting too carried away with ‘western’ analysis and logic. Regardless, this tension between the politics and the economics has produced a very interesting set of circumstances for China, and almost all agree that some change is on the horizon in the coming years. Whether that change is a modified version of Communist rule, a bipartisan democracy, or somewhere in between, and whether the people will play a part in this change, waits to be seen.

2.3 China’s Peaceful Rise

I want to shift my discussion from the internal political and economic climate to consider China’s relationship with the rest of the world. Chinese foreign policy over the past ten years has been anything but hostile and threatening. Avery Goldstein, a political science
professor at the University of Pennsylvania, had this to say in an essay for the Foreign Policy Research Institute (2005),

A new foreign policy approach was adapted in China in 1996. This grand strategy was not announced with a formal declaration, or even given a clear name. In the last few years, some in China did begin referring to their approach as the strategy of “peaceful rise,” a term more recently shunned in favor of “peaceful development.” Whatever label one uses to describe it, China has adopted a strategy that aims to facilitate China’s rise by reducing the likelihood its growing capabilities will alarm others or provoke them to oppose China.

From their taking a lead role in assuaging tensions in the North Korean conflict, to their multi-pronged effort to facilitate cooperation with the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, evidence of this strategy can be seen in a variety of contexts. Even President Hu’s latest visit in April of 2006 to Washington was replete with peaceful and cooperative rhetoric. At a dinner hosted by US-China Business Council and the US Chamber of Commerce, Hu stressed that “China must pursue a path of peaceful development if it is to meet the goal of modernizing itself. The path of peaceful development embodies the national trait fostered in the Chinese culture over several thousand years and accords with the lofty pursuit of the Chinese people who love and value peace” (China Daily 2006).

Wu concluded by saying that China plays a “responsible and constructive role in promoting world peace and development (China Daily 2006). Certainly this type of language from the government is positive and encouraging, especially when considering the prospects for a UPEACE initiative in China, but one must also wonder about how long this strategy will endure.

At the conclusion of his essay, Avery (2005) raises one of the most critical concerns of this century with respect to world stability and the role of China.

In itself, China’s current grand strategy, a strategy that seeks a “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development,” raises few concerns. It is important, however, to recognize that this is explicitly a strategy for a period of transition, designed for the decades it will take China to rise. What happens after China rises? Will it continue to embrace the current policies that make it basically a responsible status quo power? Or, once it has amassed greater capabilities, will China demand changes in the international order that signal its arrival as a disruptive, revisionist power determined to alter the international system to its advantage?

Consequently, the importance of a greater UN presence in China, especially in the form of educational infrastructure, seems crucial to ensuring that this rise continues to remain
peaceful. A UPEACE initiative could help to incite an ethos of responsibility for the newly achieved power and allow for harmonious relationship building to occur through education.

2.4 China and the United Nations

China’s relationship with the United Nations is also of great importance for this project and an understanding of it will help to better understand the nuances of Chinese foreign policy introduced in the previous section. This is also particularly relevant given the UPEACE affiliation to the United Nations and I will provide a more detailed portrait of the UNDP work being done in China in chapter 6 of my project report.

China did not officially assume its Security Council seat until 1971. Prior to that, the Republic of China (ROC), more commonly known as Taiwan, assumed the seat, claiming to represent all of China (Bell 2001 p. 510). As the balance of power began to shift in the General Assembly to include more developing countries, Resolution 2758 was passed which withdrew recognition of Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, and recognized the Peoples Republic of China, as the sole government (Reference.com 2006).

Historically, China has been relatively passive in the UN despite expectations otherwise. It has only been active in issues related to its national interests and has used its veto power in the Security Council a total of four times. However, it is worth noting that since the end of the Cold War, China has not used the Security Council and the UN as a counterbalance against the United States, as both Russia and France have done. In more recent UN affairs, China has deepened its relationship with Russia on the grounds that the both oppose the perceived ‘new world order’ spearheaded by the United States (Bell 2001 p. 562). They have come together to challenge the threat of sanctions for Iran in the debate over the Iranian nuclear weapons program. China has been and continues to be the centerpiece of diplomatic negotiations in the North Korean six party talks. While the process has been a ponderous one, the Chinese have taken a lead role in these ever-important diplomatic negotiations and in Kofi Annan’s visit to China in 2004 he praised the country for its support of the global body and urged its continued commitment to the
international peacekeeping community. Clearly the Chinese value diplomacy and are beginning to play more of a role in the global processes that determine the direction and health of the world.

What is more, the UN represents a tantalizing glimpse of what an interstate culture of peace could be (Boulding 2000); even in all its bureaucracy and inefficacy, it gives us hope of a genuine global culture living in harmony with the earth and without weapons. China has shown recent positive signs of embracing the ideologies of this world body, and that is why I believe a UN-affiliated university presence that affords the Chinese deep respect for their culture and traditions, while serving to enrich the vision of a global society would be extremely successful.

2.5 States of Peacelessness in Present Day China

All states have a number of domestic and international manifestations of conflict and China is no different. I have chosen four areas in particular to focus on – Taiwan, Japan, environmental degradation, and human rights - though there are many more that deserve attention as well. I believe these four represent a cross-section of relevant issues related to international peace studies/conflict resolution, sustainable development, and intentional law - all areas of focus for the UPEACE community at large.

2.5.1 Relationship with Taiwan

Several key political divisions remain at the vanguard of diplomatic discourse in China, but perhaps the most significant tension that could escalate into a large-scale military conflict is China’s relationship with Taiwan. In 1895, military defeat forced China to cede Taiwan to Japan. Taiwan then reverted to Chinese control after World War II. Following the Communist victory on the mainland in 1949, 2 million Nationalists fled to Taiwan and established a government using the 1946 constitution drawn up for all of China. Over the next five decades, the ruling authorities gradually democratized the entire island of Taiwan (CIA World Fact book 2006). Still outraged at Taiwan’s declaration of independence, the Chinese have demanded its reunification with the mainland for many years. In his visit to the United States, President Hu reiterated his
country’s stance with respect to the Taiwan issue, “China will continue to make every effort to work together with Taiwan compatriots with every sincerity to ensure the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations and China's peaceful reunification, but China will never allow the Taiwan independence secessionist forces to split Taiwan from China under any name or in any form” (China Daily 2006). It would seem the language of reunification and the emotional timbre of the issue are as strong as ever.

A 2005 study by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) recognizes Taiwan as one of the three flash points for interstate conflict in the region along with the two Koreas, and India-Pakistan. All have the potential for nuclear exchanges and wars in either of the first two dyads are likely to prompt large-scale military responses by the United States (Marshall and Gurr 2005). As much as the United States does not want the stand-off to degenerate into violence, it has pledged unwavering loyalty to Taiwan and many speculate that it would be drawn into the conflict should it become hostile. James Kurth (2005) agrees that “the most dangerous point of conflict between an expanding China and a hegemonic United States is, of course, Taiwan. As small as it is, Taiwan could be the Archimedean lever that could one day move, or rather shake, the world.” Certainly, one would hope that enough diplomatic mechanisms are in place to avoid large scale military fallout, but a greater UN presence in the region in concert with educational opportunities for exchange and dialogue on the issue, would contribute to alleviating these deep-seeded antagonisms. As such, UPEACE resources, conflict resolution techniques, and educational practices could be of use in helping to diffuse this deeply emotional and complicated enmity.

2.5.2 Relationship with Japan
Another tension that receives less of the limelight in the give and take of international political discourse is the relationship between China and Japan. A spate of historical circumstances has left these two counties at ideological odds. A New York Times article entitled “Ill Will Rising between Japan and China” (2005) said that “the two countries find themselves playing out old grievances in a new era of direct rivalry for power and influence. Never before in modern times has East Asia had to contend with a strong
China and a strong Japan at the same time, and the prospect feeds suspicion and hostility in both countries.”

The Chinese see the Japanese as brutal and unwilling to apologize for atrocities of antiquity. The more recent whitewashing of textbooks about Japanese military conduct during WWII has also contributed to Chinese resentment towards Japan (Onishi and French 2005). Meanwhile according to the Japanese, events which strengthened the idea that China posed a threat include China’s rapid economic expansion, its increase in defense expenditure over the years and lack of transparency concerning its military modernization programme, China’s testing of nuclear weapons, and the land debate over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands. (Yee and Storey 2002, p. 153) In an interview with Financeasia.com (2005), President Clinton elucidated a genuine concern he has over the Chinese military build up with respect to Japan, “perhaps China is basically being nice now but some day, once they get the most modern military equipment in the world, [they might] provoke some sort of a showdown with Japan, which will draw [the U.S.] in, and throw the world into a turmoil” (Wozniak 2005).

On a personal note, last summer I went to Japan after living in China, but when talking about my trip beforehand I received many questions and occasional criticisms from Chinese people about going to Japan. I also got the sense that state controlled media had played a significant role in helping to engender this distrust and animosity. I also came away convinced that just as with the Taiwan conflict, opportunities for multicultural education and empathy-building in the form of UPEACE trainings, conferences, and educational exchanges, would help to build solidarity between these two important nations.

2.5.3 Environmental and Sustainable Development Issues

There are several challenges to sustainable development that are particular to the Chinese context. These include among other things, overpopulation and migration, overdependence on coal, water pollution and desertification. Luken and Hesp (2003) in a recent book entitled, Towards Sustainable Development in Industry Reports from Seven
Developing and Transition Economies, had this to say about the panorama of sustainable development issues in China.

The fact that such large numbers of people live on a limited area of fertile land by itself indicates that achieving sustainable development in China is a daunting task. Deforestation and erosion have long been serious problems. The central planning system paid little attention to pollution caused by economic activity. And while big strides were made in birth control and sanitation in the past decades, contributing to family welfare and public health, rapid urbanization and the expansion of car ownership have created new problems (p. 45).

Many of the statistics related to air quality, desertification and coal use are particularly alarming. According to the results of air quality monitoring in 338 Chinese cities in 2000, the air quality in 215 cities failed the national standards for ambient air quality (Luken and Hesp 2003, p. 45). In terms of desertification, official statistics in China indicate that desertified land covers 3,327 million km2 or roughly 34% of the country and the amount of desert is rapidly increasing (Brauch, Liotta et. al 2002, p. 677). Finally, China’s vast coal resources, used to generate 75 percent of the country’s energy, and the earlier emphasis on heavy industries have caused serious damage to the natural environment and clean water is becoming a scare resource in many areas as a result (Luken and Hesp 2003, p 45). There are many more disquieting facts and figures about environmental degradation in China, but I believe it might be more useful to consider some of the underlying motivations for these challenges, as well as the complexities surrounding potential solutions.

Elizabeth Economy, Senior Fellow and Director of East Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, offers some perspective on the scope and complexity of environmental problems facing the country in her recent book, The River Runs Black: the Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. According to Economy (2004) “underpinning China’s current environmental challenge is a deeply rooted cultural tradition that accords little value to some of the core elements of effective environmental governance: independent scientific inquiry, a transparent political system, and accountable leadership” (p. 27) Aside from having to work against these longstanding historical approaches and psychologies, there are also tremendous economic trade-offs to responsible environmental practices. For example, Economy (2004) observes that “deforestation
contributes to biodiversity loss, soil erosion, and flooding. Yet with pressures to maintain employment in both rural and urban areas, protecting forested land puts millions of loggers out of work” (p. 89). Certainly however a more holistic approach is needed, because even if the government is looking at these issues in purely financial terms, there is widespread agreement among environmental economists that the total cost of environmental degradation and resource scarcity to the Chinese economy is between 8 and 12 percent of GDP annually (Economy 2004, p. 88). The consequences have been and will continue to be severe unless more is done. In chapter 4, I will consider in more general terms the education for sustainable development movement in China and in chapter 6 I will highlight specific efforts already underway in China to raise awareness and curb degradation through education for sustainable development.

2.5.4 Human Rights in China
The issue of human rights in China is an enormously volatile and deeply political subject and it would take a substantial amount of time to do justice to the entirety of this debate. However, to not discuss it would also be a mistake so I would like to briefly profile some of the nuances of this issue.

In 1989 the world witnessed one of the most devastating responses to peaceful protest in the Tiananmen Square massacre. According to a BBC news article (1989), “Demonstrators, mainly students, occupied the square for seven weeks, refusing to move until their demands for democratic reform were met.” After several failed attempts by the government to reach a solution to the peaceful standoff, tanks were called in to end the protest and several hundred civilians were shot dead by the Chinese army during the military operation (BBC 1989). This was perhaps the most salient human rights transgression in China and provoked an international debate about state sovereignty and international human rights. Johan Galtung’s framework for violent conflict helps to better understand this manifestation of violence. He would characterize this as ‘direct violence’ because “it is defined in person, social, and world spaces and is intended, by individuals acting singly or inside collectives” (Galtung 2001 p.31). However its deeper motives can be traced back to what he calls ‘cultural violence’ – the symbolic, religious
and ideological forces at work in language, art, science, media and education which legitimate direct violence. According to this lens, the political leadership used the communist ideology to legitimate the violence when it perceived a threat to its survival. In chapter 3, I will look more closely at how Galtung’s notion of ‘structural violence’ manifests itself in the Chinese Context.

Foreign influence and foreign control has long been of central concern to the Chinese people and government. Eva Brems wrote a book called *Human Rights: Universality and Diversity* in 2001, which addressed among other things China’s struggle with Human Rights. According to her research, in the early and mid 1980’s Chinese leadership referred to human rights disdainfully as “spiritual pollution” and “bourgeois liberalism” (p. 51), but with the massive international criticism of its human rights record after the Tiananmen incident, China could no longer maintain that position. In November of 1991 the Beijing Review published a document entitled *Human Rights in China* that was produced by the Information Office of the State Council of China. It was presented as a brief account of China’s basic position on and practice of human rights and it was intended to help the international community understand the human rights situation as it is in China. Among other things this document questioned the legitimacy of the notion of universal human rights. As Brems (2001) asserts, ‘human rights’ is a “... western creation. Even though the rest of the world participates in the development of international human rights law, this historical heritage remains” (p. 8). Matua (2001) supports these claims stating that the “human rights corpus, while well meaning, is fundamentally Eurocentric and promotes a Eurocentric ideal” (p. 3). So the Chinese are accurate in challenging the ‘universal’ origins of these concepts.

At the crux of the Chinese human rights debate is the issue of state sovereignty. The Government document *Human Rights in China* (1991) states that “despite its international aspect, human rights falls by and large within the sovereignty of the each country. China advocates for mutual respect for this principle and is opposed to interfering in other countries’ international affairs on the pretext of human rights” (p. 42). But it is also important to note that China benefits from having a permanent seat in the
Security Council which decides, among other things, whether or not to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs and conflicts. Kent (1999) asserts that “for each state there is a complicated matter of steering between the benefits for sovereignty that membership of international organizations entails and the potential threat to sovereignty that it implies. For China, whose dramatic improvement in international status coincided with its entry into the United Nations in 1971, the dilemma is relatively recent” (p. 27).

China has made some decisions in the past few years which represent a willingness to cooperate with the international community in the arena of human rights. According to an article by Washington Post columnist Edward Cody (2004), “China amended its constitution [in March of 2004] to include formal guarantees of human rights and private property, laying down a new marker in the nation's swift march away from the doctrinaire Communism of its founders.” Even though no reference to Tiananmen square was made in this announcement, Premier Wen Jaobiao stressed that “unity and stability are of overriding importance” and Ying Songnian, director of the law department at the National School of Administration, said the amendment also could offer increased protection to farmers and other small landowners whose property is confiscated by local governments eager to please big developers. Even more recently, China sent a delegation to the newly formed UN committee on Human rights this past June. Still though, many complexities and disagreements remain in this ongoing debate over human rights in China and again perhaps a non-partisan educational institution with UN credibility might be able to help facilitate non-invasive, non-accusatory dialogue on the issue and among young people. In chapter 4, I will discuss the emerging interest in the United Nations among university students in China to further illustrate this point.
Chapter 3  Higher Education in China

In order to determine an effective and useful place for UPEACE in China, I would like focus my discussion by providing a panorama of the higher educational arena. Section 3.1 offers a brief history of higher education in China, 3.2 lists current statistics related to higher education; Section 3.3 profiles three recent trends in higher education relevant to UPEACE; and section 3.4 shares several cases of peacelessness in Chinese higher education.

3.1  Brief History of Chinese Education

China has had a rich and elaborate history with respect to education, but for the purposes of this report I would like to focus primarily on the 20th century. From 1949 to 1979, the Communist party actively used education as a means of political control and indoctrination. Education was primarily an instrument for maintaining political loyalty in order to prepare children for the tasks of national construction (Nwok and Kwong 2002 p. 163). In an article on Higher Education Reform in China, Wuhan University professor Ouyang Kang (2004) characterized higher education during this period “as the weapon of revolution and the method of opposition against bourgeois influences. Its ideological function was greatly magnified but its educational function was greatly ignored” (p. 144)

In the years leading up to 1979, the Chinese political leadership began to realize that it lacked the necessary financial instruments and economic structures to keep pace with neighboring Asian countries. Japan and Korea in particular were benefiting from full participation in global markets and the Chinese foresaw the impending danger of continuing to maintain isolationist ideologies. Finally, when United States and the World Bank started applying pressure on the Chinese government to open up its market, China relented. Higher education was consequently drastically redesigned to meet the demands of a new economic system.

3.2  Current Statistics

I believe it is also useful to provide a brief statistical understanding of higher education in China. In 2002, there were all together 2003 higher education institutions (Ministry of
According to the education report published by the Ministry of Education in 2002, there were 16 million students enrolled in higher education institutions. In this decade the proportion of 18-22 yr olds in higher education is expected to increase from 9% to 15%, compared with 3% in 1990 (Zhou and Ross 2004). In addition, universities and research institutions enrolled 202,600 postgraduates, 37,400 more than in the previous year. The total number of postgraduates at school reached 501,000, which is 107,800 more than in the previous year. The number of universities empowered to train postgraduates reached 728 (King 2004). So based on these statistics, it would seem that going to university is a more realistic and more desirable possibility for up-and-coming generations of Chinese students.

The most popular majors among Chinese Students include economics, finance, English, math, computer science and engineering. Foreign language and computer competencies tend to be more attractive because they are marketable’ and as such a vast majority of universities in China cater to these interests the expense of the humanities and social sciences (Ross and Lou 2005 p. 239). These tendencies will be revisited later in the report as a UPEACE presence in China is conceptualized.

3.3 Relevant Trends in Higher Education

There are three major trends occurring in higher education in China that deserve attention in this section of my thesis because they particularly are relevant to UPEACE activity in China; they are the marketization, decentralization & amalgamation, and internalization. In many ways these three aspects of educational reform are interrelated and overlapping, but each category is distinct enough to warrant its own critical attention.

3.3.1 Marketization

Several years after 1979 and the inception of the Open Door Policy, Chinese leaders realized that simply embracing a market economy was not enough and that generations of students were not adequately prepared for the increasing demands that globalization placed on the workforce. According the Ministry of Education’s website (2006) “the state undertook too many responsibilities and the schools lacked the flexibility and autonomy to provide education according to the needs of the society, with central departments and
local governments providing education separately, the structure of education was irrational and segmented.” As a result, “market-oriented economic reform became the driving force behind the restructuring of Chinese education” (Ngok & Kwong 2002, 164) and the ministry implemented a series of educational initiatives to account for this disparity.

As the principles of a market economy - the law of value, the ethos of free enterprise, the valuation of individual initiative, and the pursuit of profit – were introduced into the context of higher education, many changes occurred. According to Ngok and Kwong (2002), this move precipitated the introduction of multiple channels of financing for education, the increasing diversity of educational laws and provisions, the changing of curricula to meet market needs, and the introduction of competition in the educational sector with the purpose of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of educational services (p.166). This meant that the idea of education for personal advancement and personal fulfillment was no longer condemned.

The reorientation and restructuring of Chinese higher education to meet the emerging needs of a global economy was a major ideological transition for the Communist party. But while political indoctrination has since diminished somewhat in Chinese educational systems, the government has not abandoned its commitment to socialism and embraced the free market ideology integral to the economy (Nwok and Kwong 2002). According to Ministry of Education’s website (2006) one of the crucial goals of Chinese higher education is “to always adhere to the socialistic direction. The profound task of education is to improve the quality of our nation, and to produce the successors with overall development in intelligence, morale and physics for the socialistic undertakings.”

This rhetoric is particularly compelling when juxtaposed with a recent study conducted by The Hebei University Youth Research and Development Center. According to Epoch Times article (2006) a nationwide survey about Chinese students' outlook on life targeting 11 universities in China found that 64.5 percent of the students believed in having a successful career and a satisfying life and only one percent wanted to struggle
for the cause of communism. While I think that the one percent statistic might be somewhat low, I did sense while I was in China the spirit of individualism and desire for social mobility among Chinese university students. This tension between what the government seems to want for its students and what the students are starting to want for themselves is another powerful manifestation of the clash between market forces and the socialist state as described in the previous chapter. Above all, it seems to suggest that the Chinese government cannot continue to have it both ways forever and that serious change is on the horizon.

3.3.2 Decentralization and Amalgamation

Another significant development that has occurred gradually over the past 20 years is the transferal of power from the Ministry of Education to the local and university level. According to Xin-Ran Duan (2003) in an article in for the *Academe*, “the Ministry of Education is still the supreme educational administrative body in China. In addition to administering some leading universities, the ministry is responsible for implementing education-related laws, regulations, guidelines, policies, nationwide programs and initiatives, and international educational cooperation and exchange.” However, the 1985 Decision, as it is commonly referred to, dramatically reduced the ministry’s scope of control. This policy initiative recognized the inefficiency of the central government in administering educational policy for the country and proposed a series of measures aimed at empowering local and regional school boards and bodies. As a result, a two-level administration system has been introduced in which the central government (Ministry of Education) shares responsibility for educational governance with local governments (provincial bureaus of education (Xin-Ran 2003).

As part of the 9th 5 year plan, the Chinese government has also embarked on a plan to create 100 world class ‘carriers’ of higher education in the 21st century, by ‘amalgamating’ existing universities and improving the institutional capacity of these universities. The initiative, referred to as Project 211, is “primarily aimed at training high-level professional manpower to implement the national strategy for social and economic development” (China Internet Research Center 2002). The focus of Project 211 seems to be more on science and technology and places a significant emphasis on
reducing redundancy. However, according to Ngok and Kwong (2002) the driving instinct behind this initiative is to introduce the free-market force of competition for government resources to enhance efficiency and effectiveness into the arena of higher education (p. 178).

The moves to decentralize and amalgamate Chinese universities have also generated, among other things, additional potential and freedom for private universities in China. The gap between the great demand for higher education and the incapability of public institutions to satisfy it built a solid market niche for private education and substantially stimulated its growth (Ross and Lou 2005 p.240). At the end of 2005, China had 252 private higher education institutions, around 20 more than the total number of state-run colleges, according to figures issued by the Shanghai Educational Science Institute (2006). These private universities still have trouble establishing themselves as legitimate; some are corrupt, others lack quality teaching resources, in part due to the speed with which they have grown. So while devolution of authority in the governance of higher education has increased educational opportunities and flexibility, it has also allowed the state to pass the buck on stubborn social justice issues (Ross and Lou 2005 p.247).

This represents a genuine potential for a UPEACE joint programme or university in China for several reasons: (1) there is tremendous demand for higher education, (2) many existing private universities lack a mission and are not considered trustworthy, whereas UPEACE has a deep sense of purpose and a solid commitment to social justice (3) UPEACE has a ‘brand name’ in the United Nations and that gives it an extra sense of legitimacy, and (4) UPEACE has the potential to attract quality professors and educational resources because of its vast network and existing infrastructure. I will revisit these ideas in chapter 8 as I offer some more specific scenarios, but I wanted to be sure to begin addressing them in this chapter.

### 3.3.3 Internationalization

Chinese higher education has been shaped dramatically by foreign influence over the past twenty years and for the most part that change has been appreciated and embraced. Mr.
Ding Hongyu, the Director of the Office for International Cooperation and Exchange at the Beijing Municipal Education Commission is quoted as saying, “we want to bring in foreign investment and want to bring in educational expertise” (Broitman 2003). So, why has this approach shifted, especially in light of China’s prior commitment to isolationist policies? According to the Ministry’s website (2006) “by opening to the outside world, we broadly learn the useful foreign experience, promote the reform and development of our higher education and enhance mutual understanding and friendship between China and other countries.” Yang (2002) believes “China’s internationalization initiative is motivated by its own goal to become an integral part of the world higher education community,” and by many critical estimations, China has become just that.

China has become one of the most popular and important destinations for generations of globally-minded students and educators. According to the Ministry of Education’s website (2006), “In the past 20 years, China has established educational cooperative and exchanges with 154 countries and areas, sent 300,000 students aboard for study to more than 100 countries and areas, received 210,000 foreign students from 160 countries, sent 1800 teachers and experts to teach aboard and employed 40,000 foreign teachers and experts.” These statistics testify not only to the Chinese desire to participate in an increasingly interconnected world, but also to the fact that China has become a hub of international importance for academia. In the words of one author, “China has become the most important centre in the world in the globalization of education” Broitman (2003).

Finally, I think the following quote by Ouyang (2004) in an article on Higher Education Reform in China Today, captures the essence and importance of internationalization for the Chinese and their international counterparts,

> Internationalization is an obvious goal for Chinese higher education; [Chinese] universities try to learn from different kinds of universities and combine their advantages in order to create their own model and characteristics in future. International cooperation is essential and the best way to ensure the development of all Chinese universities (p. 148)

This statement is commensurate with what many professionals in the UPEACE community have identified as an essential foundation of co-development. Furthermore, I
believe the prevalence of this trend and others addressed in this chapter suggest a powerful demand for the kind of education that UPEACE provides - a multicultural and international learning community committed to hard work, intellectual curiosity, and the peaceful exchange of ideas, especially given the current climate of higher education. These ideas will be taken into account in the following chapter and in the latter half of this project report as more concrete notions of implementation are explored.

3.4 Peacelessness in Higher Educational Contexts

I want to begin this portion of my thesis by saying that the Chinese have had many successes in the educational arena. Certainly educational policies around the world can be improved upon significantly and China has lots to offer the international community in this respect. For instance, the Chinese have often been praised for fostering a remarkable drive to learn in their students and hard work is consistently referred to as a benchmark of the educational system. I found the following comparison quite relevant, “while Chinese educators praise U.S. schools for nurturing individual student ability and capacity for independent research, U.S. teachers praise Chinese schools for cultivating achievement oriented students whose firm grounding in fundamental knowledge is sustained by a pervasive cultural belief in education as the vehicle for social mobility and self-cultivation” (Zhou and Ross 2004). So clearly the Chinese deserve tremendous credit for their education achievements to date.

However, there have been quite a few negative consequences directly related to the adaptation of market-oriented policies mentioned in the previous sections of this document. For the sake of the scope of this report, I have chosen to focus on two areas in particular: (1) competition and standards, and (2) financing, the distribution of wealth, and tuition costs. My hope in doing so is (1) to shed some light on a few of the structural shortcomings of the higher educational system that UPEACE would have to be mindful of, if it were to have a greater presence in China and (2) to indicate places where UPEACE educational know-how and intellectual capital might be of use to address these issues.
3.4.1 Competition and Standards
With so many students vying for limited educational opportunities, competition in China is fierce. There are around 2000 colleges and universities which seems like a lot but when compared to the 3000 in the United States, and considering that China has a population nearly 4 times that of the U.S., the numbers are staggering. (U.S. Department of Education Website 2006) The psychological consequences that this reality entails, the pressures that parents place on their children, and the fact that each family only has one child, all seem to exacerbate this need to excel.

Standardized tests are emphasized heavily in the Chinese educational system. All students hoping to attend a university must take The National University Entrance Exam (NUEE). Zwick (2002) states that this is a “brutal government sponsored test that lasts three days; their scores and not their high school grades determine which, if any colleges they are eligible to attend” (p. 43). According to Broitman (2003) this experience “represents the most imposing and anxiety riddled challenge for China’s teenagers.” It should come as no surprise that pedagogical practices like this that emphasize testing reinforce notions of what Paolo Friere deems “banking education” where rote memorization and teacher-center learning reproduce inequitable power hierarchies and oppressive structures (Toh, Swee Hin 2004). In China these oppressive structures manifest themselves in the incredible competition students feel once they enter the university, and again why they contend for limited employment opportunities. Many scholars discuss the high unemployment realities facing graduates (Kristoff 2006, Radio Free Asia 2006). According to CERNET (2006), “nearly 930,000 college students failed to sign working contracts in 2005 upon graduation, accounting for about 27.6 percent of the 3.38 million in total.” This culture of standards and competition and how an institution might work against it, is something that any university operating in China must consider.

Just as it has done in the United States and elsewhere, the trend towards an overwhelming emphasis on standards has left the assumption that there are right answers in all academic arenas and that those answers should not be questioned. In China however, the interplay
between the Communist cultural values and the role education has created a very interesting pedagogical space worthy of further consideration. China’s emphasis on collective and testable knowledge is antithetical to notions of deconstruction and pluralism (i.e., many ways to read texts, truth meaning hard to derive singularly) and in the end it smothers creativity. This approach instead tends to foster incredibly hard working students. Zhu Qingshi, president of the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), told his peers at a recent conference that “Higher education in China is still teacher-and-curriculum oriented. As a result, students are heavily burdened with demanding curricula and their innovative curiosity is stifled” (Gu 2006). Gu Binglin, president of Tsinghua University, is also critical of this system. “Speaking to China Education TV on July 16, he pointed out that the Chinese education system is too much about rote learning. The core of education is not how much information a student can absorb, but whether the student is making constant progress through education” (Gu 2006). So while those in higher education channels are starting to support a more student-centered approach to academic learning, more is certainly needed.

I also believe that this culture of standards and competition invites discussion on the educational philosophies of the University for Peace and what types of skills and knowledge it might hope to foster in Chinese students, should it someday have a want to teach courses or trainings in China. My sense is that a UPEACE education is more concerned with having its students think critically about notions of peace, law, education and environmental sustainability in a multicultural context, than it is about is about preparing students for the job market. But meeting basic human needs is also important. I will consider in more detail, what types of activities and possibilities might make sense for UPEACE to undertake in China and look at the UPEACE mission and educational ethos as well in part III of this paper.

3.4.2 Financing, Distribution of Wealth, and Tuition Costs
The emphasis on market-oriented reform has not come without a social toll and one arena in particular where that is most certainly the case is in the financing of schools. According to John Bryan Starr (2001) the most pressing issue facing China’s schools is
inadequate funding. With expenditures on education totaling only 2% of the Gross National Product, China lags behind the world average of 5% and many developing countries spend more on their schools. China has pledged to raise that number to 4% (CERNET 2006); however some scholars believe that the lack of financing for education is not as significant as the unequal distribution of wealth. Xudong Zhang (2001) states that,

while money pours into real estate speculation, creating economic bubbles in Chinese Urban centers, more and more urban dwellers can no longer afford health care and education for their children, not to mention the rural dwellers – still compromising more than 70 percent of the population – who are left to fend for themselves. Social tensions now are created not only from aspirations for greater individual and political freedom, but increasingly from the unequal distribution of wealth and power (p. 12)

In addition, as local governments shoulder more of the financial burden of education, the potential for disparities to emerge in terms of resources also increases. According to Nwok and Kwong (2002) the federal funding has dropped from full support prior to 1976, to nearly 60% and falling in the 1990’s (p. 165). Bill McKibben, a prominent author on environmental issues, wrote an article about the rapid industrialization of China for Harpers Magazine in 2005. He writes that most of the prosperity in China is concentrated in the urban capitals and along the factory-speckled coasts and in the urban capitals and that many of the rural areas have devastated local economies because of the size of individual plots of farmland and the widespread effects of pollution and desertification. Furthermore, economic opportunities in cities are fueling one of the largest labor migrations in history. People are attracted to the prospect of living one to two degrees further up the socioeconomic scale, but because there are so many governmental restrictions on travel, once those laborers move they lose access to benefits and can oftentimes be further exploited in their new cities (McKibben 2005, p. 6). All of these examples are manifestations of what Galtung refers to as ‘structural violence’ - indirect violence that is build into the person, social, and world spaces and is unintended (Galtung 2001 p. 31). In other words, the system has produced these violent circumstances unintentionally and the solutions become increasingly more complex. Many of these new instances of structural violence can also be traced back to a shift in the social values of the ruling party.
Nwok and Kwong (2002) in their article entitled *Globalization and Educational Restructuring in China*, address the difference between the pre-reform era and the post-reform era in terms of approaches to equality and efficiency. They argue that

the priorities given to equity and efficiency have actually been reversed in the post reform era. In the past, Communist leaders emphasized the principle of equity and took deliberate measures to provide equal educational opportunities to children of both genders and from all backgrounds. Large amounts of resources from richer areas were transported to poorer ones. In the post-Mao era efficiency reigns supreme, which invariably means developing education in urban sectors as opposed to rural ones (p. 166).

This unequal distribution of wealth has tremendous consequences for the financing of higher education. In a book released by the OECD (2001), the authors note that “scarcely any conversation on education in China will last very long before problems of funding are raised. The expansion of enrollment, the restructuring of institutions, the redesign of courses to make them more relevant, to the new demands of a high technology knowledge based society, the salaries of a growing body of teachers, professors, and researchers all exert ineluctable pressure on funding arrangements” (p. 11)

This has meant that individual families must foot a growing portion of the bill in terms of tuition costs. According to the Chinese Educational Research Network (CERNET 2006), “from 1990 to 1997, the tuition fees of China’s institutions of higher learning increased by an average annual rate of over 20 percent.” In 2001, they rose by a still wider margin. At present, the average public university tuition fee is between 4,200 and 6,000 Yuan a year (500 – 7200 dollars a year). Private schools charge much higher rates of tuition and miscellaneous fees than their public counterparts, typically ranging from several thousands to several dozens of thousands of Yuan (3000 to 7000 dollars).

This might not sound like a tremendous amount of money, but consider that in 1999, the per capita income of urban residents in China was 5,854 Yuan (around 700 dollars). Moreover, as is the case for most developing countries, for the poor the foregone earnings often are more substantial than the direct cost of higher education (World Bank 1997, p. 159). The prospect of higher education is made even more unappealing by the difficulty
of finding employment post graduation. All things considered, this means that it has become a heavy burden for many families to support a university student (CERNET 2002). According to a survey by China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF), there are approximately 1.78 million impoverished students in China today who are unable to pay college tuition fees (Epoch Times 2006). Certainly, the effects of market policies have created conditions for structural violence and they raise many questions about the effects of such reform.

I believe these issues represent tangible opportunities to bring UPEACE conflict prevention and peace-building workshops, trainings, short courses and networking capacities, to the Chinese context. They also denote some of the obstacles to financing educational activities in China, but yet as the example of Google and Peking University from the introduction demonstrates, clearly resources do exist. As my project report continues, these manifestations of peacelessness in cooperation with the relevant trends in higher education and the proposed entry points in the following chapter will inform the generation of potential functions for UPEACE in China as well as practical models for implementation.
Chapter 4 Normative Frameworks and Entry Points

My hope is that this chapter will provide a bridge between the research on the Chinese context and higher education in China from chapters 2 and 3, and the more specific implementation possibilities for UPEACE, which I will present in chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. To that end, I begin by offering two normative frameworks for this project. These frameworks will provide the values-based vision for the project and its implementation. Afterwards I will identify three areas in Chinese culture and trends in Chinese higher education that (1) have been previously applied to address the problematique and (2) are commensurate with UPEACE educational philosophies and current intellectual resources.

4.1 Normative Frameworks

I have chosen two documents or statements to serve as my normative frameworks (1) the UPEACE Charter and (2) the statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Education welcoming foreign participation in higher education. Other official documents were considered and certainly help inform the project, like the Chinese Constitution, Chinese official statements on environmental protection, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Earth Charter, and so forth, but these two are the most central in defining the social purposes of my project. The UPEACE Charter states that the larger mission of the university is to provide humanity with an international institution of higher education for peace and with the aim of promoting among all human beings the spirit of understanding, tolerance and peaceful coexistence, to stimulate cooperation among peoples and to help lessen obstacles and threats to world peace and progress, in keeping with the noble aspirations proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. To this end, the University shall contribute to the great universal task of educating for peace by engaging in teaching, research, post-graduate training and dissemination of knowledge fundamental to the full development of the human person and societies through the interdisciplinary study of all matters relating to peace. (As amended on 20 April 2001).

I believe this charter connects UPEACE to the education for peace movement at large while instilling it with a unique mandate. Based on this charter, the values that help to give foundation to my project are: cooperation, understanding, peaceful coexistence, all of which are crucial to addressing the needs of the previous chapters. However, simply
using the UPEACE charter as my guiding framework neglects the Chinese perspective which I believe is also imperative to this project’s central aim of co-development. That is why I want to synthesize it with the Chinese Ministry of Education’s statement in English welcoming foreign participation in higher education (2006),

The Chinese government attaches great importance to the international cooperation and exchanges of higher education. Since the reform and opening up to the outside world in 1978, international cooperation and exchanges of higher education have become more and more active and achieved fruitful results... By opening to the outside world, we broadly learn the useful foreign experience, promote the reform and development of our higher education and enhance mutual understanding and friendship between China and other countries.

These two frameworks together represent a clear union of interests and values between UPEACE and the government of China and serve as the vision for my project. In the next three sections, I will begin to explore places where these notions of cooperation, mutual understanding, friendship, and peace between China and UPEACE are possible based on existing educational approaches/traditions and remaining needs of Chinese higher education.

4.2 Entry Points

The following are three potential entry points for UPEACE in China. I believe that these categories - religious influences, education for sustainable development and the United Nations - serve as positive indicators for greater UPEACE involvement in China and help to identify available resources for peace in the country. My analysis of these entry points is my ‘gap analysis’ in that it considers the space between what currently exists in China as far as higher education and where China could be based on the normative frameworks. Based on this assessment of the gaps between the vision and the reality I will develop a rationale for implementation.

4.2.1 Religious Influences (Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist Traditions)

Although peace studies is not a formal academic field in China, ancient Chinese religious philosophies resonate deeply with many of the themes and values of a peace studies programme. In that sense, understanding these traditions might help to lay a practical foundation for the work of peace studies and education for sustainable development in
China. Since the Cultural Revolution in 1949 religion has largely been branded as backward and antithetical to the modern state. However, in many aspects of everyday Chinese life, these traditional roots are still manifested.

I want to provide some brief glimpses of these religious philosophies in order to underscore their connection with peace studies. According to Fang, “Confucius’ vision of social organization emphasized the importance of morality, propriety, and social harmony” (p. 66). The cornerstone of the philosophy was ‘the five relationships’: parent to child, husband to wife, elder sibling to younger sibling, elder friend to junior friend and ruler to subject. If the first subject in each relationship set an example for the other then harmony and freedom of conflict were assured. Taoism was less structured and less morality based than Confucianism. As one scholar notes, the Taoist creed in modern terms was “let Nature take its course! Be yourself! Relax and enjoy life” (Hucker 1975 p. 91). Taoism stressed the value of living in concert with nature and embracing simplicity. Buddhism came to China via India in the second century and encouraged reverence of nature by introducing the notion of equity between humans and other creatures (Mao 1994 p. 45). Buddhist monks were practicing vegetarians and did not kill animals. There are several more historical religious traditions in Chinese history, but hopefully this brief landscape is sufficient for consideration.

Let me also say that I don’t want to paint an over-idealistic portrait of these worldviews. Confucianism for instance, helped to foment the notion that nature existed to fulfill man’s needs, which may have contributed in part to the environmental degradation of the 20th century (Economy 2004, p. 36). However, I do think that these religious doctrines represent potential entry points for the field of peace studies to take root in China and for a potential UPEACE programme that might want to connect the study of peace and conflict resolution to the Chinese context and its history.

As far as the relevance of these worldviews to Chinese higher education today, I believe the following quote bears significantly on this discussion,
China’s reform and opening era has been characterized as a struggle to balance the needs of two civilizations, one spiritual, one material. Education is conceptualized as part of spiritual civilization, and an underpinning of a new social ethos that could ameliorate the negative social, moral, and environmental consequences of the strong nation, get-rich-is-glorious forces of market socialism (Ross and Lou 2005 p. 249).

Although the spiritual and service oriented ideologies have been challenged by both the Cultural Revolution and the introduction of the market, they are deeply embedded in Chinese culture. Consequently, there is a need to cultivate and enrich these historical traditions, and because they resonate deeply with the values-based and social responsible ethos of UPEACE, the university is well-equipped to assist with this.

Other small but encouraging developments indicate some potential not only for UPEACE but for the field of peace studies in China. A recent comparative survey of academics indicated that relative to their counterparts worldwide, university professors in China have “a stronger sense of professional obligation to apply their knowledge to serve society” (Ross and Lou 2005 p.250). Secondly, although it has received very little attention, China came up with a plan in 1999 to build up key national bases for humanities and social sciences research in regular higher education institutions. Just over 100 leading research centers were identified for the plan, which is creating new multidisciplinary programs to study some of China’s most pressing social needs (Ross and Lou 2005 p. 237). So these examples suggest that (1) the Chinese are thinking along the lines of social needs and peace studies already and (2) perhaps there is space for UPEACE to learn from these trends, as well as the ancient philosophies, while enriching the Chinese education with the study of peace and conflict in an academic manner.

### 4.2.2 Environmental Education & Education for Sustainable Development

The environmental education (EE) movement in China began over thirty years ago and is perhaps another entry point for UPEACE in China. According to the government (2004), “as early as in the 1970s, popular science textbooks on environmental protection were compiled or translated into Chinese to widely introduce environmental protection knowledge and enlighten the people on such knowledge.” Since that time, many advances
have been made to encourage environmental sensitivity among teachers and students in China. At a policy level, the Information Office of the State Council (2004) regards environmental education as “a strategic task to actively develop environmental publicity and education and to raise the nation's consciousness about the importance of environmental protection in China.”

Environmental education has also begun to take root in the Chinese higher education system and in the past 15 years substantial developments have been made to improve the quality and scope of the movement in academia. According to the Information Office of the State Council (2004),

A total of 140 colleges and universities, including Beijing University, Tsinghua University, the People's University of China, Beijing Normal University, Nanjing University, Tongji University and Wuhan University, all have departments of or majors in environmental studies. There are master's degrees in 51 majors concerning the environment, and 39 majors for PHD students approved by the Academic Degrees Committee under the State Council. Furthermore, more than 40 secondary schools and over 100 vocational high schools also offer environmental courses.

In the 1990s, environmental education in China became regarded as a part of education for sustainable development (ESD). Although the two share many of the same characteristics as far as the environment is concerned, ESD is a more holistic approach to education as it also includes emphases on basic human needs, social justice, good governance, etc. It is also important to note that beginning in 2005, the United Nations declared that this coming decade is the decade of education for sustainable development. According to the widely used definition provided by the Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987), “sustainable development means meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The Earth Charter Guidebook for Teachers (2005) offers the following definition for ESD, “education for sustainable development seeks to develop the knowledge skills, perspectives and values which will empower people of all ages to assume responsibility for creating and enjoying a sustainable future” (p. 41). ESD is also concerned with ways of integrating humanities, social sciences, and the arts into environmental education, which has traditionally been seen and practiced a branch of
science education (Fien 2003 p. 4). Again while the two are similar, the definition for ESD goes beyond environmental protection and sensitivity to encompass a much more expansive notion of responsibility.

The ESD field, as compared with the EE movement, represents a potential for UPEACE to become active in China because the holistic approach is more consistent with the ethos and mission of the university. Moreover, there is also a need to develop the ESD movement in China. Pingsha Huang (2001) conducted surveys at three universities to assess the state of education for sustainable development in China for a recent study. He found that (1) increasing educator capacity to provide up-to-date education on sustainable development is urgently needed; (2) teaching methods and materials need for ESD to be improved; (3) the core courses in Environmental Engineering/Environmental Science are too focused on natural science, technology, and end-of-pipe pollution control approaches and humanities and social science-related courses and ability-oriented courses are missing; and finally that (4) the current programs contain too many compulsory courses and too few electives for students to fulfill their special interests; Only ten percent of Chinese universities offer environmental courses as electives for non-environmental majors. Another survey conducted by Kamemura (2001) suggests that there is a great need in China to encourage students to participate in environmental activities and to provide training to teachers so that they can understand the ideas of sustainable development.

These findings demonstrate a clear and present need for universities like UPEACE to get involved in the ESD movement in China. UPEACE’s particular focus in connecting the peace and peace building dimension of education to environmental security, education, gender, law, international relations, and media studies, and other disciplines, provides the humanities and social sciences approach to environmental issues that seems to be lacking in China. Ross and Lou (2005) support this claim, stating that humanities and social sciences are almost universally neglected in China (p. 242). The flexible and interdisciplinary approach is at the core of a UPEACE education; just to give an example, the peace education programme includes courses on law, peace studies, media and
language, sustainable development, research methods, and gender issues in addition to its concentration on education. These findings also seem to bode well for UPEACE’s academic expertise in meeting the needs of the ESD movement in China as the university remains on the cutting edge of its fields. Finally, UPEACE’s UN affiliation provides it with additional legitimacy and networking potential to address some of these needs of ESD.

There is also much that UPEACE can learn from Chinese practices and environmental approaches that, because of their incredibly large scale, involve more complexities and trade-offs, as mentioned in chapter 2. As I hope this section indicates, the foundation that environmental education has established in China and the need for more support and infrastructure for the emerging field of education for sustainable development, together represent a very promising entry point for UPEACE to work in China.

4.2.3 The United Nations in Chinese Higher Education

In chapter 2, I discussed China’s growing participation in the United Nations and the active role it is beginning to play in world affairs. However, this interest in the United Nations is not limited to government officials and diplomats; it is also beginning to spread to Chinese university students. According to an article in Peoples Daily (2004), “more than 200 students from 30 well-known Chinese universities gathered in Beijing to participate in the 2004 Model United Nations (UN) Conference. The two-day Model UN simulated the UN Commission on Human Rights, and focused on the subject of human rights.” An official with the organization committee said the Model UN promoted China's human rights education and raised the awareness of human rights among the masses, especially among university students. A delegate from Sichuan International Studies University said that through experiencing the everyday agenda of the Model UN Conference, he got to know the operation method of the UN, which might be very useful to his future job (Peoples Daily 2004).

While on my visit to China I had the privilege of sitting down with Guo Peiyuan, a PhD candidate studying corporate responsibility and sustainable finance/development at
Tsinghua University. He reiterated this emergent interest among Chinese students in the United Nations. He noted, along with several others, that while the United Nations is sometimes understood to be effective only in certain spheres like poverty reduction, there is a tremendous degree of credibility that comes with the name, especially as far as education is concerned. To that end, he also said that there would certainly be an interest among Chinese students to study at a university affiliated with the United Nations. I was also fortunate to meet with Mr. Khaid Malik, who is the Resident Coordinator of the UNDP in China. He noted that the UN as a whole needs greater visibility in China and in that sense the challenge for UPEACE is not dissimilar to the general challenge of the UN. He also said that a greater UN presence in China is needed and UPEACE would be well served to contribute to that end through education. I will discuss his thoughts about UPEACE in China in more detail in chapters 7 and 8.

These various expressions of a growing interest in the United Nations among young people in China suggest an exciting entry point for UPEACE activity in the country. However, more research would have to be done, most likely on the ground in China, to further gauge the prevailing attitudes of Chinese students with respect to the international community. In chapter 5, I will begin to shift my focus to the implementation phase of this project report by looking at the UPEACE expectations for its regional programmes and its current activities in Asia and China. However as I progress further, these entry points will help to ground the functions and scenarios for actual UPEACE involvement in China.
Part III
POTENTIAL UPEACE IMPLEMENTATION AND LOGISTICS
Chapter 5  UPEACE

So far this report has reflected on topics and elements of the Chinese context and Chinese higher education. It has also identified normative frameworks for the project as well as entry points for a potential UPEACE presence in China. In this chapter I will begin thinking about how the UPEACE charter is achieved through its regional programmes. To do so, I will first explore the intentionality, importance, and function of UPEACE regional programmes and their relationship to the charter of the university, as articulated in official UPEACE documents. Afterwards, I will consider previous UPEACE projects, short courses, conferences, partnerships and planned activities for the future in Asia at large. Finally, I will look more specifically at what UPEACE has done in China and the relationships that UPEACE community members already share with the Chinese.

5.1  Relevance of Regional Programmes to Mission and Ethos of UPEACE

Before I talk about UPEACE in Asia and UPEACE in China, I would like to consider the concept behind the ‘regional programme’ and the intention behind ‘regional partnerships’. UPEACE regional programmes, in conjunction with face-to-face teaching and distance learning, are one of the three pillars of the organizational structure of the university. They extend the influence of UPEACE worldwide and have been developed for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Central Asia, and Canada. According to the report ‘UPEACE System: Enhancing our Impact’, “The driving objective behind this strategy is the realization that the work carried out in Costa Rica, while important, would only be able to make a small impact and that the regional presence adds an important multiplier effect to the efforts of the University” (p. 8).

Regional partnerships with existing universities and institutions also increase the impact UPEACE impact beyond its Headquarters campus in Costa Rica by:

1. Strengthening the capacities of partner institutions in peace and conflict education and research
2. Providing opportunities for joint research and the delivery of UPEACE courses in various locations reaching more individuals

3. Enriching UPEACE curriculum development through case studies of on-the-ground realities from all parts of the world. (Annex on Partner Institutions 2006)

These partnerships in concert with the regional programmes are critical components of the work the university does. I know there is talk of changing the name of the regional programmes to “international strategic partnerships” because, with the exception of the Africa programme, the regional programmes are often individuals or small groups of people working from satellite locations. I believe that more reflection on UPEACE’s motives, aspirations, and capacity like this is important and would be vital before launching into any regional work in China. In a meeting with Mr. Khalid Malik, the UNDP Resident Coordinator in China, he raised a question which also concerns the UPEACE Community at large, namely where would UPEACE realistically want to or be able to fit in, recognizing that it is young and China is so broad and complex. From my perspective as a student, UPEACE is a young organization, but one with enormous potential. Certainly though, more exploration of a UPEACE mission in China would need to be conceptualized and hopefully this report will incite dialogue to that effect.

5.1 UPEACE in Asia

In 2000, UPEACE established a regional programme for Asia and the Pacific. According to the report, ‘UPEACE System: Enhancing our Impact’ in the first phase of development, “UPEACE mobilized a network of over 40 Asia-Pacific Universities and Institutions for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (APCP). This cooperative has translated into capacity building workshops, trainings, and opportunities for curriculum development throughout the region. Just to give some examples, UPEACE faculty were invited to take part in a curriculum development workshop in conjunction with Jawaharlal Nehru University and Jamia Millia Islamia in India in February 2005. UPEACE also delivered a Conflict Resolution course at the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS),
in Sri Lanka in July. The UPEACE System report (2006) states that the outcomes of all these consultations revealed that there is a tremendous demand for assistance to strengthen education for peace, with the support of UPEACE. A body of knowledge has been accumulated on the practical obstacles, educational needs and aspirations, and training and research on peace-related issues in the countries visited (p. 10).

As far as future plans in the region, exploratory discussions have taken place with various Korean stakeholders to establish a UPEACE Centre in the Republic of Korea. A Korean delegation visited the Costa Rican campus earlier this year to consider this possibility more concretely. In the Philippines, discussions are in progress with a Japanese donor to establish a UPEACE Campus for Japanese and other Asian students and to work on a dual campus basis in the field of International Peace Studies. It would seem several interesting projects are clearly in the works for the next few years in the region (UPEACE System 2006, p. 18).

The following goals have been outlined for the regional programme for next three years:

1. Establish a small secretariat in the Region, hosted by a partner university, as is the case for Africa, by September 2006.

2. Conduct in consultation with regional partners at least two curriculum development workshops on subjects related to peace and conflict studies.

3. Conduct the planned training of short courses for various sectors of society in geographically diverse parts of the region.


5. Conduct two action research case studies every year with regional partners on issues defined collaboratively.

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6. Increase by 10% every year the number of students from Asia and the Pacific taking degrees at UPEACE and returning to their home institutions to establish similar programmes in cooperation with UPEACE.

7. Develop partnership arrangements with Asian and the Pacific universities, with which links have already been formed (as described in Annex 2). These include:

   i. Dhaka University, Bangladesh
   ii. Jamia Millia Islamia, India
   iii. Banaras Hindu University, India
   iv. Karachi University, Pakistan
   v. Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
   vi. University of the Philippines.

In addition, the Network of Asia Pacific Universities and Institutions for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (APCP) will continue to be strengthened and brought into close contact with other parts of the UPEACE system (UPEACE System 2006 p. 16). Based on the sentiments expressed in these documents, it would seem that UPEACE has chosen to prioritize and cultivate its regional activity in Asia on the whole, but has no plans to develop the relationships and programmes in China.

5.3 UPEACE in China

China and its 1.2 billion people and 2000 universities seem somewhat absent from future UPEACE plans, no doubt for many of the obstacles I mention in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report. When I met with Narinder Kakar last fall he was also somewhat discouraging about pursuing work in China, citing that things in China take a long time and UPEACE Asia and Pacific programme was primarily concerned with working in India, Korea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

Indeed, UPEACE has not been very involved in China as of yet, but I did discover that in May of 2002 there was a conference in Beijing hosted by UPEACE and Mahidol
University entitled, 'Second Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Network of Universities and Institutions for Collaboration on Education, Training and Research for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building'. The event was co-hosted by Tsinghua University's Center for Environmental, Resources and Energy Law in Beijing, and held in collaboration with the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs with funding support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

According to the Mahidol University Website (2002), “the Meeting's focus was on three thematic areas in conflict prevention and education for peace: environment, resources and sustainable development; culture, ethnicity and religions; and post-conflict and disaster operations.” Professor Brenes has told me that Nay Htun was instrumental in facilitating this conference. Nay Htun was director of Asia and Pacific regional programme before Narindar Kakar took over last summer. I have met him before in New York and I know that he continues to collaborate with Maurice Strong on the UPEACE North Korean work. I would like to follow up with Nay Htun about this conference and his work at some point in the near future.

Even though UPEACE has done few things on an institutional level in China, a number of upper level administrators and members of the UPEACE community have many experiences and elaborate networks in the country. The Rector Julia Marton Lefèvre is a member of the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development, a high level non-governmental advisory body with the purpose “to further strengthen cooperation and exchange between China and the international community in the field of environment and development” (CCICED Website 2006). She also has an enormous network spanning the international and sustainable development communities with a number of contacts in China. The former Rector Martin Lees also has a vast network in China and helped to initiate the China Council at the request of Premier Zhao Xiyang. And Council President, Maurice Strong spends a great deal in China and is involved in number of projects related to environmental sensitivity and sustainable development in China.
Despite these promising relationships, there is very little mention of China in UPEACE documents and discussions. Understandably, UPEACE cannot expect to have partnerships with every country in the world, and there are significant barriers to entry in China that have already been discussed in this report, but for a country of its size, which faces severe environmental degradation, regional peacelessness, and human rights issues, and for a university that wants to be on the cutting edge of education for peace, it would seem crucial to have some sort or relationship with what many agree will be this century’s most important country. As a result, chapter 6 attempts to identify the places for relationships with international and Chinese institutions and universities at work in China in the fields of peace and education for sustainable development. As China goes, so goes the world.
Chapter 6  Organizations, Institutions, and Universities in China

This chapter looks specifically at the various projects and institutional operations of nine organizations and universities in China. I have tried to attain a balance between foreign and native institutions working in China, but information in English about Chinese environmental and educational organizations has been hard to come by. I have chosen to focus primarily on the field of education for sustainable development (ESD) and hope to build off the general introduction provided in Chapter 4. I have chosen ESD because it seems to be the most feasible entry point, and the most developed. I have however, included other academic areas that fall within the scope of UPEACE academic interests as well as organizations that are part of or related to the UN system. I believe it is important to consider in specific terms the landscape of work being done in China for two reasons: (1) to begin thinking about how UPEACE, with its expertise, resources, and unique mission, might be able to compliment the work being done in China by these organizations (2) to determine which organizations might be candidates for formal partnerships and collaborative projects.

For each of these organizations, I briefly profile their operational scope in China, in particular their activity in the arena of higher education. Then I discuss what the work of the organization means for UPEACE, i.e., what the status of the relationship is, how a relationship might be created, why types of support might UPEACE be able to expect from them and visa versa.

6.1 UNDP

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) operation in China is rather extensive. It is headquartered in Beijing. Khalid Malik, a very interesting Pakistani man and close friend of Maurice Strong, heads the nearly 600 person organization. According to their website (2006) “UNDP started its operations in China in September 1979. Since then, [it] has completed over 900 projects, assisting in a diverse set of fields ranging from agriculture to industry to energy to public health to poverty alleviation to economic restructuring, and many more in-between” UNDP has outlined three goals for the current phase of development: (1) reduction of poverty and
people's vulnerability caused by the rapid social and economic transition process, especially due to entry into WTO; (2) promotion of economic growth with social equity and clear legal and regulatory frameworks making extensive use of information technologies; and (3) combination of economic growth with sound environmental practices, especially in the Western region (UNDP China Website 2006).

**What this means for UPEACE:** I had the privilege of meeting Mr. Malik in April on my trip to China, and as mentioned in chapter 4, he welcomed a greater UPEACE presence in the country. He was open to the idea of working with Mr. Strong to enable both funding and a programme to be established in Beijing. Mr. Malik also noted that he just received 30 million dollars for a UNDP poverty reduction programme and felt confident that if a UPEACE strategic partnership could be established, then opportunities for financial resources would emerge. Mr. Strong responded favorably to Mr. Malik’s comments and both agreed that a visit by the Rector at some point in the future would provide a good opportunity to perhaps expand on these possibilities. In addition, Mr. Malik noted that one such opportunity might be Kofi Annan’s visit to China later this year. I also think that such a trip would be beneficial and I know the Rector is interested in trying to make it work logistically.

Assuming that a UPEACE China masters programme were someday a reality, Li Lailai, head of LEAD China believes that UPEACE, with its UN affiliation, is well positioned to work with UNDP to help set up a practice-based internship programme for its students. Providing practical experience for students is essential and would distinguish UPEACE from other more conventional degree programmes.

**6.2 UNESCO**

I also thought it would be important to include the work that UNESCO is doing in China since UPEACE has worked closely with them in the past. China joined UNESCO in November of 1946 and is part of the *Education for All* initiative. Rural education was indicated as a priority consideration in the Memorandum
of Understanding signed between the People’s Republic of China and UNESCO in 2003. This has led to the creation of a Training center for Rural Education a collaborative project between these two parties. There are 16 UNESCO Chairs at various Universities in China ranging from gender issues, to environmental education, to Water management, to Teacher Training. There is a Chair in Higher Education at Peking University which might be of some help to this project.

UNESCO has also implemented an Education for Environment, Population, and Development programme (EPD) that is being practiced in over 1000 schools in China, 200 of which are located in Beijing. Over 10,000 teachers across the country are using experiential learning and inquiry-based approaches in this EPD project and millions of students are benefiting from the project's cooperative and student-centered activities. This project has also contributed much to promote worldwide education on sustainable development through such activities as the First International Forum on ESD held in China in November 2003 (UNESCO Beijing Website 2006).

The EDP movement has drawn the attention of Premier Wen Jiabao. He said recently that "It is necessary to provide education on environment, health and sustainable development to the public, especially the youth. This education should be integrated into moral education for citizens and quality education for students; this education should also be regularized and institutionalized." In Paris, October 2003, through the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with China's Minister of Education, Mr. Zhou Ji, UNESCO Director-General Mr. Koichiro Matsuura committed UNESCO to provide continuous support and assistance to further promote EPD in China as a "Flagship" Project.

**What this means for UPEACE:** Swee Hin Toh, a listed visiting professor in the Peace education programme, is familiar with several of the leading members of UNESCO in China and has agreed to put me in touch with them. I am curious to find out more about UNESCO’s operational scale in China, in particular this EPD programme, because I think
UNESCO would be a good contact for this project and a good potential partner for UPEACE.

6.3 Earth Charter Initiative and the Environmental Educator’s Initiative

Since its creation five years ago, The Earth Charter has been increasingly influential in various arenas of Chinese Education. In the new book, *The Earth Charter in Action*, there is an inspiring testimony by a woman named Yunhua Liu, who works for the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in China. She writes about how influential and important the Earth Charter has been in providing a framework for training teachers in sustainable development and environmental sensitivity. She notes that The Earth Charter helped to lay a theoretical foundation for the WWF sponsored program, Environmental Educator’s Initiative (EEI). EEI is national network of Education for Sustainability Centers that consists of over 21 colleges and universities throughout China.

EEI, in turn, developed the National Guidelines for Environmental Education in primary and secondary schools across the country. Teachers, students, NGO’s, and Government officials spent four years dialoging and exchanging ideas before a consensus was reached on these national standards. Yunhua Liu (2005) writes that “the Earth Charter helped all those involved to clarify the ethical framework of sustainability. Secondly, the process of the Earth Charter’s formulation provided a model for the process of achieving goals for environmental education, and specifically provided inspiration to overcome difficulties that at times seemed insurmountable.” Now, according to Yunhua these standards are in place for the nearly 200 million primary and secondary students in China. Moreover, and perhaps most relevant to potential UPEACE involvement in China, a masters programme for environmental education is in the process of being developed, although I am not sure where it will be based. This programme aims to facilitate national adoption of a range of environmental education resource materials, including guidelines for environmental education and a set of K-12 environmental education activity guides (China Daily 2006). The extent to which these national guidelines have had an impact on raising consciousness of issues related to sustainable development in China remains to be seen,
but certainly this has been an important step towards engendering care and respect for the environment.

The National Guidelines for Environmental Education also represent some notable changes in pedagogy that resonate with peace education. In this testimony, Yunhua Liu states that “Instead of the traditional approach of students being passive recipients of instruction, the reformers planned for the guidelines to promote a new way of learning that was inquiry-based, student-centered, interactive, relevant to the lives of the students, and linked to their cultural traditions.” This pedagogical shift resonates with what the what many of the University Presidents indicated is necessary for the future Chinese education in chapter 3, and bodes very well for UPEACE educational programmes that encourage multicultural and critical modes of thinking.

**What this means for UPEACE:** Li Lailai and Song Li are members of the Earth Charter Board who represent China. Li Lailai is the director of LEAD international in China and Song Li is a senior specialist on China issues at the World Bank. They have both been very supportive thus far in helping me with my research and providing me with contacts. According to Mirian Vilela, director of the Earth Charter’s Center for Education, the Earth Charter Initiative is looking to expand its efforts in China in terms of producing educational materials based on the Charter. Her hope is that these practical materials will complement the more abstract and theoretical foundation of the Earth Charter. Perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration between the Earth Charter Initiative and UPEACE in China to assist with this production and dissemination as Earth Charter does not have a base in Asia either.

6.4 Earth Council Alliance

Before the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the first Earth Council was formed. This group was established with the task of ensuring that the results and the networks of the conference were sustained through citizen groups, NGO’s and other organizations at the grassroots level.
Consequently between 1992 and 1888 more than 80 National Councils for Sustainable Development in developing countries were set up. According to the ECA website (2006), The Earth Council Alliance (ECA) seeks to coordinate the activities of these regional earth councils in order to “foster a sustainable global society founded on the principles of respect for the Earth and life in all of its diversity, economic, and social justice, and a culture of peace and non-violence in accordance with the principles set out in the Earth Charter.”

ECA has recently launched a China Initiative and intends to spend at least 50% of its energies on sustainability efforts in China because it recognizes that China can take a decisive leadership role in international environmental support for the goals of sustainability, and honors the important efforts underway (ECA Website 2006). An ECA delegation in the fall of 2005 spent four weeks in Beijing and other parts of China to establish collaborative working relationships with Chinese NGOs and leaders in the fields of sustainable development and environmental protection in China. These visits included meetings with the Dr. Kiang and the College of Environmental Sciences at Peking University, Mr. Khalid Malik and the UNDP, Earth Council – China, Oriental Environmental Institute (OEI), Environmental Management College of China (EMCC), and the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA).

**What this means for UPEACE:** Maurice Strong’s involvement in this initiative suggests that there could be a potential for UPEACE to help support the work of ECA and visa versa. In fact, UPEACE is listed on the ECA website as a partner institution already. On their website it seems that ECA, like Earth Charter Initiative, is also interested in the educational potential for the Earth Charter, only ECA is more interested in online learning. In that sense, ECA could help to provide networks and infrastructure in the Chinese context for UPEACE and UPEACE, in turn, could support their efforts to introduce teaching toolkits based on the Earth Charter framework.
Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD) is one of the most dynamic organizations at work in the world of sustainable development today. According to their website (2006), LEAD has 15 years developing and validating leadership modules and courses in the field of leadership and sustainable development. It has trained more than 1,600 LEAD fellows in more than 80 countries through programmes that challenge traditional notions of leadership with progressive participatory techniques like experiential learning, multi-stakeholder dialogue, systems thinking, and inclusive cross-cultural processes (Lead 2006). These fellows are business executives, government officials, academics, NGO directors, activists, educationalists and media professionals.

LEAD has a China office that works to train leaders for ESD. It works in partnership with the Institute for Environmental Development (IED) in Beijing. I met Li Lailai, the woman in charge of LEAD on my last trip and she is an incredibly capable and experienced professional. She has a team of around 10 people working in her office and IED recently partnered with an organization called Fuping Development Institute. They also work closely with the World Resources Institute (WRI) that is based in Washington. LEAD is also working in cooperation with Shell foundation in China to develop curriculum and teaching kits that focus on renewable energies for elementary and secondary school children. Li Lailai also mentioned that IED has a formal partnership with a school in England called Forum for the Future. They apparently design the curriculum and IED implements it for Chinese Master’s Students. It is a two year degree programme, but in general Masters Degrees tend to be three years.

Just to give an example of the types of training that LEAD conducts in China I will share some details about a conference they held last summer. According the LEAD-China website, “in order to meet the demands of young people who are interested in sustainable development, LEAD-China office held the 7th ‘Leadership in Sustainable Development Training Course’ on May 17th of 2005. The main theme of this training course was ‘Ecosystem Approach to Health’. Well known Chinese experts from the sustainable
Development field were invited to the training course to discuss the challenge that China faces and the corresponding strategies” (LEAD 2006). The cost of the training was 2000 RMB (~160 dollars) for a five day course that includes housing. This is very expensive by Chinese standards and comparable to about 6 months of university tuition.

**What this means for UPEACE:** Li Lailai was very excited to meet me when I came in April and has said she would be happy to help in any way possible. She suggested the possibility that I come to China again and connect with LEAD fellows around the country and see different types of higher educational contexts in China in order to do more hands-on research. In addition, because the Rector was the executive director of LEAD for a number of years and has an elaborate of understanding of LEAD’s potential and current infrastructure, perhaps there are possibilities for collaboration in the near future. She is also quite close with Li Lailai. As an annex (annex 3) to my project report, I have included a UPEACE/LEAD sample leadership training module for the Chinese context to demonstrate the types of smaller-scale projects that UPEACE could facilitate with the help of LEAD.

**6.6 Peking University**

Many consider Peking University to be the best school China. It is the choice school for millions of high school graduates and is the hub for creative and intellectual energy in China. Peking is located in Beijing and consists of 30 colleges and 12 departments, with 93 specialties for undergraduates, 199 specialties for master’s candidates, and 173 specialties for Doctoral candidates. According to the Peking University Website (2006), “while still laying stress on basic sciences, the university has paid special attention to the development of applied sciences.” At present, Peking University also has 216 research institutes and research centers.

As illustrative of his deep relationship with China, UPEACE council President, Maurice Strong has been made an Honorary Professor at Peking University. Through Mr. Strong, my father and I were able to make contact with the Provost and also the two Deans of the Environmental Studies and International Studies Schools, Dr. C.S. Kiang, and Dr. Wang.
Jisi on our trip in April. Incidentally, Dr. Wang Jisi had an article published recently in Foreign Affairs and is a close advisor to the Communist Party. Peking University is interested in a continuation of Mr. Strong and UPEACE’s effort to find sustainable energy solutions for the complicated problems in North East Asia, which would include support for a resolution in the six party talks. With Mr. Strong’s help, they are collaborating to start a joint center at Peking University for peace and sustainable development in the Korean Peninsula.

During our visit to the university, we had the chance to have dinner with two students and the Dean of the Environmental Studies School. In these informal discussions with Peking University members there was a great deal of interest in the mission and purpose of UPEACE, as well as enthusiasm from the students for the subjects of sustainable development and peace studies. I am still in touch with both of these students and they have helped me to better understand sustainable development from a Chinese perspective.

What this means for UPEACE: Maurice Strong’s close relationship with Peking University opens up promising possibilities for UPEACE and there was preliminary interest expressed in a small student exchange. While these were only initial discussions, there is clearly room for a follow up discussion, on a step-by-step basis. Peking University is one of the leading Universities in Asia and as such it carefully selects its partners. I know Mr. Strong does not want to be position to over-promise a relationship with UPEACE, however, as this report indicates, the interest in peace studies and the United Nations is growing in China and UPEACE may well be of appropriate prestige and interest to partner with.

6.7 Other Chinese Universities

Tsinghua University is considered by many to be the leading University for Science and Technology in China. It has over 20,000 students, including 12,000 undergraduates, 6,200 master's
degrees candidates and 2,800 doctoral candidates. According to its website (2006), “with strong support from the nation and in the face of unprecedented opportunities, Tsinghua University is poised to become a world-class university in the 21st century.”

Tsinghua University Law department has a joint MA programme in International Law with Temple University in the United States. According to Temple’s Website (2006), “The Program's curriculum is designed to equip Chinese lawyers and other legal professionals with the knowledge and skills essential to handling legal matters in a global context. The primary objective of the Program is to educate the next generation of lawyers for international legal practice.” From what I can tell however, this law programme is primarily concerned with corporate law and focuses more on the comparison between U.S. and Chinese law, rather than the United Nations and its special courts as the UPEACE master’s programme in International Law does.

**What this means for UPEACE:** As far as the possibilities for partnership with Tsinghua are concerned, I think many of the sentiments expressed in the previous section about Peking also apply. Certainly, more dialogue would be worth having though. I also want to say that there are hundreds of universities that would make good candidates for partnerships other than Peking and Tsinghua, the two leading ones. I had the privilege of going to these two in particular and have written about them for that reason, but one of the things I would like to do next fall is continue to research about other university programmes that have commensurate interests with UPEACE and might make for potential partners.

### 6.8 United Nations University

The United Nations University (UNU) was established in 1973. Following a proposal by the then Secretary-General, the United Nations recommended that a new type of university was needed to promote international scholarly cooperation, undertake problem-oriented, multi-disciplinary research on urgent global concerns and strengthen research and training in developing countries (UNU Website 2006). The University
Headquarters in Tokyo is the main coordinating centre. Research and training facilities have been created by the UNU in various parts of the world to focus on specific problems; and links have been made with existing universities, national research centers and other organizations located mainly in developing countries.

UNU has organized something called the Environment and Sustainable Development Programme (ESD). According to Itaru Yasui, the Vice Rector of UNU (2006), “the ESD programme at UNU is one of two academic programmes of United Nations University Centre (the other is the Peace and Government Programme). The programme focuses its activities on four broad themes: (1) Natural resources management, (2) Water crisis and disaster, (3) Environment governance and information, and (4) Sustainable urbanization and industry. However, because UNU is network for academics doing post graduate research, this programme is not like the NRSD or Environmental Security programmes that UPEACE administers. The UNU brochure (2005) states that “postgraduates must be recommended by their home institutions, work in an area of concern to UNU, and must be committed to returning to work at their home institutions”.

China is part of UNU’s ESD programme and there is a UNU Software Technologies for Development programme in Macau China, which among other things engages in university-level software curriculum development. The UNU annual report (2005) states that the following universities and institutions in China have partnered with UNU: Chinese Academy of Sciences, East China Normal University, Guizhou University, Nanjing University, Peking University, Te Hua University, Tianjin University of Technology, Tongji University, University of Macau, Xidian University, Yunnan Agricultural University, Yunnan University, and the Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Environmental Protection. Based on the upcoming conferences and trainings scheduled in China for this year, it seems the UNU’s activity in China is primarily concerned with water management, desertification and dry land resource management, and technology and software development.
What this means for UPEACE: It is important to note that the ESD programme functions more or less as a think tank or consortium of researchers who hold conferences, lead trainings, and conduct research rather than facilitate formal degree programmes. In that sense, UNU’s institutional mission and its academic structure are noticeably distinct from UPEACE’s and UPEACE masters programmes, short courses, and training workshops could complement UNU’s focus on research. Perhaps there is also space for collaboration with UNU in the fields of distance learning in China. I am going to try and get in touch with Academic Programme Officer Liang Luohui, who seems to be spearheading the conferences and initiatives in China for UNU. I do think however that, in general, UPEACE should endeavor to delineate itself from UNU, especially in the eyes of potential donors.

The tension between Japan and China discussed in chapter 2 is also significant because UNU is heavily subsidized by Japan and based in Tokyo. As such, it does not have the same degree of freedom to operate in China as UPEACE. Even though UPEACE does not have the same amount of capital that UNU has, it does have a strategic advantage in that it is not financially allied/obligated to Japan. UNU has an endowment of over 250 million dollars, over 150 million dollars have been given by the government of Japan and China has given around 5 million dollars thus far (UNU annual Report 2005).

6.9 Transcend Peace University

Johan Galtung, the person credited with founding of the field of Peace Studies created an Online Peace Studies University called Transcend. Their website (2006) states that “since 1996, TRANSCEND has provided more than 400 on-site training programs for 8000 participants in 46 countries world-wide. Today, TPU has Course Directors from 20 countries, and provides the world's most comprehensive range of courses in the field of peace studies.”

Galtung gave a speech at Nanjing University in June of 2005. In this address, he offered the Chinese an introduction to the field of peace studies, using language that was commensurate with their historical traditions and policy approaches. He noted that China,
as the world’s biggest country, with one of the world’s largest economies, as well a rich Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist traditions, would be well served to think about peace as an academic field of study (Galtung 2005). Based on this speech and my subsequent dialogues with the Transcend community, it would seem they are very interested in developing the study of peace in China.

**What this means for UPEACE:** I got touch with Transcend through the peace education Visiting Professor Alicia Cabezudo, and have since connected with Fred Dubee and the Vice Rector, Sarah Horowitz. I was amazed at how quickly and elaborately these people responded when I indicated that I was doing research on Peace Studies in China and that I was from UPEACE. Perhaps there are possibilities for collaboration in terms of e-learning. In any event, they have all expressed an interest in helping to create peace studies programme in China and would be willing to offer support and guidance, should UPEACE ever decide to take the next step.
Chapter 7 Specific Objectives for UPEACE in China

Based on the current economic, political, and environmental climates presented in chapters 2 and 3, the entry points assessed in Chapter 4, the UPEACE regional programme expectations in Chapter 5, the current national and international projects already underway in education for peace and sustainable development in China from chapter 6, and the face-to-face interviews I have had with UPEACE administration and faculty over the past year, I have identified six potential functions for UPEACE in China. Rather than offer a separate and potentially overwhelming synthesis of the recommendations from the UPEACE interviews, I will intersperse them into their corresponding potential function. Some recommendations will also be included in the next chapter on potential scenarios. A complete Plan of Action with a list of interviews and the month in which they were conducted is attached as Annex 1. Depending on the extent to which the university decides to invest, both financially and intellectually in China, the relevance and importance of these potential functions may vary.

7.1 Co-Develop and Disseminate Distance Learning Materials with SKP

The Sharing Knowledge for Peace Programme (SKP) is the third pillar of the organizational structure of the university and it is designed to use e-technologies and distance learning to disseminate educational packages and knowledge to reach even more people in all parts of the world (UPEACE System 2006). It is scheduled to begin in January of 2006 and it will offer an online degree in International Peace Studies. The UPEACE System Report (2006) states that,

The overarching goal of the UPEACE Sharing Knowledge for Peace Programme was, up to now, to share teaching materials (referred to as “Toolkits for Teaching”) with educational institutions in the developing and transition countries, in a form that can be readily used in difficult and restricted conditions. Now however, that goal has transitioned and is now new stage by expanding the production and distribution of the Toolkits for Teaching; offering a distance learning MA degree as well as a UPEACE Book Series publications programme, and
if funding permits, a Distinguished Lecture series, all aimed at reaching beyond the confines of the Headquarters campus and the regional programme offerings.

China is fast becoming the country with the most internet and computer users in the world. The Brookings Institute (2005) quoted the number at over 100 million users, whereas Natalie Pace (2006) from Forbes.com observed that recent studies have actually estimated that there are between 150 million to 200 million internet users in China, and what is more, the Chinese spend nearly two billion hours online each week (~16 hours per person), while the U.S. audience logs on for 129 million hours per week. With internet and computer use becoming more and more popular among everyday Chinese citizens and students, opportunities for effective e-learning also emerge.

Many in the UPEACE community believe that there is demand for this type of learning in China as well. Martin Lees said that said that UPEACE distance learning packages with the Millennial Development Goals, Earth Charter initiatives, and the UN seal of approval could be very successful in China. Fred Dubee, head of the UN Global Compact for Asia, said that the Chinese are attracted to degrees and degree programmes and a UPEACE online degree programme could be very successful in China. In developing e-learning curriculum and resources for any context the notion of co-development is very important. Mr. Strong stressed the importance of listening carefully to the Chinese and understanding their concepts of peace studies and sustainable development, as well as studying methods that they already have in place for overcoming social inequality. Given such a consideration, it is vital to Mr. Strong that any relationship between China and UPEACE be two-way. Virtually everyone I interviewed reiterated the sentiments and stressed whatever is produced should be inherently Chinese in nature and not imposed externally.

Guo Peiyang, the PHD student from Tsinghua, suggested that if UPEACE were interested in putting courses online in China, an intermediary company called Transtech would be a good host. He said it would take roughly 10,000 US dollars to get an online programme started. That estimate is for a certificate training course with incentives as opposed to a
degree programme. All things considered, I believe further exploration of the possibilities for e-learning in China is certainly worthwhile and beneficial for the university.

7.2 Establish a Network with Domestic and International Organizations

As Chapter 6 indicates, the importance of understanding the work of existing organizations coupled with establishing a network based on comparative advantages and collective resources is essential. Certainly, many of the aforementioned organizations would make for good potential partners. What is more, many of the people I interviewed have said that doing things and China takes a long time and that is why building relationships and taking time with those relationships is crucial, even more so important than in other countries. Interestingly, I learned while in China last summer that the Chinese use the same word, ‘guanxi’, for relationships/networking and for importance.

In my interviews, I asked people to discuss the possibilities for UPEACE in the world and the vision they have for the future of the university. Thomas Turay, visiting professor in the peace education programme, said that what excites him about UPEACE is its networking potential. Similarly, Rolain Boreil observed that his future goal for UPEACE would be to have many partner institutions worldwide, like a UPEACE franchise of sorts, where students can take a UPEACE course at a variety other universities around the world. Dean Amr Abdalla noted that in all of his extensive travel he has come to realize just how much people rely on UPEACE and how much potential there is for partnership. He has also received quite a few requests from professors to do their sabbatical here. Like Mr. Boreil, Dean Abdalla’s vision for UPEACE is to have it become a web of programmes with many modalities, where, for example, students can take courses both in UPEACE affiliated institutions and return to their contexts to complete work and where professors and teachers are trained in non violent techniques and approaches. So among visiting faculty, resident faculty and those in the administration, there seems to mounting enthusiasm for UPEACE and the structural possibilities it affords for networking.

Many of the community members I interviewed shared my belief that it is vital to ensure that this ‘network’ not only reaches, but flourishes in China. Fred Dubee is the head of
the UN Global Compact for Asia, a non-profit subsidiary of the UN dedicated to ensuring that companies adhere to an ethic of environmental and social responsibility in their dealings, was very excited to hear about my research and spent several hours of his time discussing the nuances of Chinese higher education and strategies for implementation based on his experience. He believes that UPEACE is in a great position to take on a project of this scope and could be very successful in creating an effective and instrumental network in China. I also received many emails over the course of my research from interested organizations and universities who were curious about the project. Based on these exchanges and the conversations so far with various international and national organizations and institutions presented in chapter 6, it would seem UPEACE is in an excellent position to facilitate a network of this scope and importance.

### 7.3 Administer Conferences and Short Courses

A UPEACE strategic partnership with China could also hold trainings, workshops and conferences as one of its primary functions. Again, just as in the SKP development of online materials, it would be essential to embrace a principle of mutual participation in the design of curriculum and the administration of short courses. According to an internal document, *Annex 3 on Short Courses* (2006), “since 2000, UPEACE has organized some 60 courses in many parts of the world, reaching nearly 2000 individuals. These courses are often carried out jointly with partner institutions and have been aimed at various target audiences, including teacher trainers; UN employees; youth groups; military personnel; academicians; the media; and NGOs. Participants have remained a part of the growing UPEACE Network, and many of them work within institutions with which we are establishing priority relations.”

Former Rector Martin Lees was also very encouraging about getting UPEACE more involved in China. He said it would not take long to have a serious programme because demand is so high, but he also stressed that UPEACE or anyone cannot go to China half fast so to speak. According to Mr. Lees, one must go at full institutional strength because the Chinese have very little patience for inefficiency and slow results/poor performance.
Natural Resources and Sustainable Development Professor at UPEACE, Ronnie de Camino said that for UPEACE to do something in China is both exciting and important. He said that from an education for sustainable development perspective, the University would need to consider differences for both rural and urban contexts. The Urban context is more westernized and focused on consumption whereas in the rural context, education for sustainable development would need to focus more on resource management. Ronnie was instrumental in helping me to conceptualize what actual leadership training in China might look like if UPEACE were to commit to play some role in China in the future. The sample short course module is included in Chapter 8 and involves a partnership with LEAD.

7.4 Encourage Cross-cultural Educational Partnerships

Creating opportunities for educational exchanges might be a good way to begin establishing a UPEACE China strategic partnership. What if UPEACE were to invite a Chinese professor to teach as a visiting professor? Chinese students love to go abroad to study, so perhaps we could recruit a few students to come for the UPEACE January Institute, for special projects related to environmental security and Latin America, or even for a full master’s programme.

As far as having more Chinese students attend the Costa Rican Campus, Guo suggested it might be helpful to talk to the Ministry of Education because one of the problems UPEACE faces is that is that embassies are the intermediaries that facilitate the recruitment of students to international universities through job fairs. However, because China and Costa Rica do not share diplomatic relations, this makes this kind of recruitment difficult.

Maurice Strong also proposed the idea of having scholarships in his distant Aunt’s name (Anna Strong was apparently a close friend of Chairman Mao). The scholarships could help send Chinese students to UPEACE and Peking University students to other countries, but this would depend on available financial resources. He also raised the idea of
launching some kind of professor exchange. This idea is explored further in chapter 8 in the section on joint partnerships.

### 7.5 Create an Asian UPEACE Base

As I mentioned in chapter 5, discussions are already underway with the Korean Government to conceptualize a UPEACE regional programme in Korea and UPEACE hopes to have a regional office established by September somewhere in Asia, but I want to make a case for China as an Asian base for the regional programme.

As I hope Chapter 3 has illustrated, China is fast becoming an intellectual hub not only for many students and professors from other Asian countries but also for those from the rest of the world. I imagine they are attracted, as I was, to its energy and warmth. What is more, many of China’s Asian neighbors are worried about what the emergence of a China as a superpower will mean for their economies, political systems, regional disputes, etc. Having a programme or partnership that is centered in China would allow the bulk of the focus to be on these pressing concerns that the surrounding countries share with respect to China’s growth, while allowing opportunities for dialogue to emerge through short courses, conferences, joint trainings, etc. Moreover, with the North Korean conflict escalating and political instability in the peninsula, perhaps Korea is not the optimal place for a programme. Mr. Strong had said that he would like to help create peace center on the DMZ line, but that would be contingent on North and South Korea reaching a peace accord. So there seems to be both a strategic advantages to having the programme centered in China. Expanding the Asia and Pacific regional programme to include China is also addressed in the next chapter.

### 7.6 Fundraise

Finally, I also believe that a greater UPEACE presence in China might help to mobilize funds, not just for its own operations in China, but also for the UPEACE system at large. With so much private capital being poured into the Chinese economy, there is certainly a space to benefit from the financial possibilities of a growing China. Moreover, many of the people I interviewed believe that it is important for UPEACE not to get too mired in
financial uncertainty and curb efforts to remain innovative. Many agreed that new and dynamic projects are actually what end up attracting more donors in the long run. The Rector has been very supportive of this project and confident that if it were packaged appropriately, that the funding would follow. It seems to me that simply being able to say to potential donors that UPEACE is working in China, on however small a scale, is incredibly worthwhile.

I know the Rector is interested in thinking broadly about funding that could originate from China. Mr. Lees also had several additions in terms of fundraising. He mentioned that that China is a rich country and that money can probably be procured from Chinese philanthropists. All of these potential functions represent exciting possibilities for UPEACE, but I would also like to take the next step and envision how they might be logistical and practical implemented. Chapter 8 examines three scenarios of varying commitment through which these functions could be carried out.
Chapter 8  Three Different Scenarios

In order to ground the functions explored in chapter 7 in practical terms, I will examine three potential scenarios for UPEACE in China: (1) the expansion of the already existing Asia and Pacific strategic partnership to include activity in China, (2) a joint partnership with a Chinese university, and (3) a full-fledged UPEACE university in China. My hope is that these three options begin to give actual texture to the implementation of a strategic partnership with China and provide the decision-makers with more of a logistical analysis to support the theory of this project report. Let me also say that these strategies are not mutually exclusive and can also be considered in sequence. For each, I will demonstrate how they might contribute to offsetting the illustrations of peacelessness outlined in chapters 2 and 3 and I will list some indicators for assessment, even though evaluation is somewhat difficult to conceive at this stage. At the end of the chapter I will also provide a rough estimate of projected costs in table 8a. Obviously, I would like the university to become as invested in China as it can, but I am also sensitive to other realities that might obstruct that possibility. That is why I have chosen a scenario-based approach.

8.1 Minimal Commitment: Improving the Existing Strategic Partnership

At a very basic level, UPEACE could think about ways to incorporate China into its regional plans through Narindar Kakar’s office in New York. As chapter 5 indicates, the current outlook for the Asia and the Pacific region in UPEACE documents contains no mention of China. The documents do however state that the creation of a regional programme office is set for September of 2006. I am not sure if this office is up and running, but if and when it is, then perhaps it could make China part of its focus. That might mean holding occasional conferences and running short courses for the Chinese context based on UPEACE conflict resolution techniques that address the examples of peacelessness in chapter 2. For instance, UPEACE could offer a short course on Sino Japanese relations or a host a model United Nations conference for university students.
similar to UPMUNC that addresses human rights. Certainly UPEACE would have to mindful of the sensitivity of these issues, but because it is not obligated to any state politics it can be a more effective mediating body. With the help of Ronnie de Camino, I have also designed a UPEACE/LEAD ESD leadership training module specific to the Chinese context to demonstrate the type of training that UPEACE could administer in the country. It is included as Annex 2. One positive aspect of LEAD trainings is their multiplier effect, because the training workshops are conducted for the trainers and they, in turn, go out into communities and train local people. A strategic partnership could also help to create a network of likeminded institutions and also work to develop and dissipilate distance learning materials in China as mentioned in chapter 7.

**Assessment:** One way to evaluate this report with respect to this scenario would be to develop quotas for trainings and workshops in China within the proposed expectations for the Asia and Pacific programme. Success would then be determined by whether or not the quotas are met. To begin with, one conference, training, or workshop per year might be a tenable possibility. As far as assessing the quality of courses and trainings that UPEACE might conduct in China, current university standards, such as those created by the Academic Development Committee, can be used to monitor them. The educational goals of the individual trainings in concert with the feedback from participants could be used as specific criteria for assessment. Ongoing sustainability of trainings is also an element considered in more specific terms in my sample ESD module.

This minimal commitment strategy is perhaps the most feasible given the short-term financial capacity of the university; it allows for a greater focus on China without draining too many existing resources and without having to negotiate the web of government approvals for joint partnerships. It does however lack the advantage of physically being in China. I know how busy Mr. Kakar is, so I would love to help in any way I can with the Asia and Pacific regional programme during my time on staff this upcoming academic year.
8.2 Medium Commitment: Joint Venture with a Partner Institute

In chapter 6, I looked at nine different like-minded organizations, universities, and institutions that are working in China and the various opportunities for formal partnerships with UPEACE. I would like to build off of these profiles and logistically conceptualize a joint partnership scenario with a Chinese university or organization. Although there are restrictions placed on foreign institutions in China, a joint partnership could be exciting for a number or reasons. In addition to performing many of the functions from the first scenario, a joint venture could help to facilitate student exchanges, perhaps even lead to a dual campus programme; it could co-develop distance learning materials and pilot them in Chinese classrooms; and it could help to mobilize funds from within China. Most importantly, having a formal partnership with a Chinese university, institution, or organization would allow UPEACE to operate from within China as opposed New York, Costa Rica, or somewhere else in Asia.

Dr. Swaran Singh, a professor in the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University started a Center for Disarmament in China at Peking University with the help of a woman named Han Hua, who I have not been unable to get in touch with despite numerous attempts. Dr. Singh said that it is difficult to start something new in China and that there are often lots of legal impediments, but it is easier to start working with someone else’s institute, center, or office in a university that has already been established. He has pledged his support to this project and said that a joint partnership would be an important opportunity for UPEACE and for China.

In order to give additional shape to this scenario, I want to elaborate on the idea of facilitating student exchanges in cooperation with a university. Certainly it would have to be small to begin with a few students on scholarship who could intern and conduct research at UPEACE regional offices or participate in courses in Costa Rica. I believe that giving Chinese students who are interested in international relations and the United
Nations a chance to travel and spend time outside their country is very important and would help to address the areas of peacelessness present in Chinese society, not only with Taiwan and Japan but also with other countries as well. In time, the joint partnership could grow to allow for a dual campus masters programme. This could mean for instance, a dual campus masters in environmental security or international law that looks at Latin America and China as comparative cases for study. I was surprised to learn that of the nearly 250 UPEACE graduates only one has been from China, so clearly more can be done to recruit Chinese students and arrange for these exchanges.

Let me also say that I do not think it would be difficult to find a partner or several partners. Just to give an example, while I was conducting my research, I received emails from several deans and department heads from universities in China who had gotten wind of my project and wanted to be considered for partnership. I politely responded by saying I was just doing preliminary research for a student thesis, but clearly this demonstrates the potential for finding partner. However, the challenge then becomes choosing the right one or ones because as Fred Dubee pointed out, affiliating with a university or organization may close doors rather than generate opportunities.

The hierarchy of government approvals is also elaborate and I have included the information in Annex 3. Again, I am not sure to what extent UPEACE, as an international treaty organization, is restricted by these conditions, but I briefly characterize the seven or so steps to legalize and accredit a partnership with a Chinese university. Chinese laws and regulations are such that evaluation and approval procedures may take upwards of one year (Wang 2003).

**Assessment:** Success of this report concerning the joint programme scenario could be determined by a number of factors, the most significant being the singing of a consensual agreement with one or several universities, organizations, or institutions. Completing the spate of governmental approvals, recruiting students and arranging external funding would be secondary indicators of success specifically for student exchanges and dual campus programmes. In terms of evaluating the programme once it is functional, the
same UPEACE mechanisms in place to evaluate UPEACE campus programmes, like student feedback and the ADC committee evaluations could be used. Additionally, the creation of an alumni network for the programme that corresponds with or is part of the UPEACE alumni network is also an important mechanism for ensuring long-lasting connectivity and multiplier effects.

Many of the top universities in the world all have partnerships and cooperative agreements with Chinese institutions and I believe that UPEACE would benefit from having one as well. This medium commitment alternative ensures greater on-the-ground operational capacity than the first scenario, while still keeping costs low through the sharing of office space and resources of the partner institution.

8.3 **Substantial Commitment: Asian UPEACE**

Having considered both a small-scale and a mid-level option for UPEACE, I would like to also present a more substantial possibility for institutional involvement in China. The third scenario is a full-fledged UPEACE university in China. Even though this would require a fair amount of financial and intellectual resources, I was surprised at just how many people were open to this idea. Mr. Malik for instance, in a conversation with Mr. Strong, observed that it is difficult to do things incrementally in China and that because the Chinese tend to think big, it would be more useful to think in terms of creating a university. Mr. Strong was receptive to the possibility of a UPEACE University in China at some point in the future.

That said, starting a university in China would take somewhere between 10 to 15 million dollars according to Mr. Strong. Furthermore, according to Mr. Strong and Mr. Malik, for UPEACE to officially change its headquarters it would require General Assembly approval and that might be difficult, so it would make more sense, if this were ever of interest, to create a separate Asia UPEACE and coordinate its activity with the campus in Costa Rica. It could be structured similarly to the Costa Rica campus with a number of separate master’s programmes or it could have one master’s programme in international peace and conflict studies with different concentrations. As has been mentioned several
times, perhaps the most reasonable and popular master’s programme would be one similar to the existing environmental security and peace or natural resources and sustainable development programmes; this would certainly help to bring a more social science-based approach to curbing environmental degradation. Human rights would be the most difficult of the existing programmes to implement in China, but the fact that there was a model UN conference on the issue suggests that even this course, with time, great thoughtfulness, and a name change could work. Typically, Master’s programmes in China tend to last 3 years so I would imagine that as long as students feel the degree is legitimate, a one year alternative could be very attractive. This university could draw from traditions, case studies, values, etc., specific to the Asian context to enhance the study of peace, in much the same way that Latin America provides UPEACE in Costa Rica with regional perspectives and experiences that enrich a more global vision of peace.

As far as its student body, a UPEACE university in Asia could attract students from all over the world, but might want to draw primarily from Asia because it is much more difficult for Asian students to get to Costa Rica (many have visa issues and some have paid upwards of four thousand dollars for their airfare). Recruiting students from a variety of Asian countries would help to build solidarity in the region through dialogue and education, and address conflicts between China and Japan, China and Taiwan and a range of other regional antagonisms just as it has done in Costa Rica. The campus could be slightly larger, around 200 to 300 students, to account for the greater number of people in that part of the world, while still maintaining intimate learning environments inherent to UPEACE education for peace pedagogies. On that note, UPEACE courses could be based on learner-center pedagogies and a more flexible holistic approach to testing and standards to challenge traditional troupes of assessment that Chinese university professors and presidents in chapter 3 have identified as a critical for higher education.

Also worth reiterating is the fact that China has become one of the most popular study abroad destinations in the world. Many students from Korea, Japan, and other countries in Asia are going to China to study. Statistics released by the Ministry of Education showed that in 2005, 141,000 overseas students came to China to study, up 27.28 percent
from the previous year (Xinhua 2005). Moreover, Mandarin Chinese is also becoming one of the most important languages of this century and more and more companies in Asia and the rest of the world are requiring it, so hundreds of thousands of foreign students are enrolled in Chinese language programmes in China (China Daily 2006).

The following example of a very successful private university in China shares many facets of UPEACE education in Costa Rica:

One well-known private university in Shaanxi Province, aspiring to a position of leadership and eventually to numbering among one of China’s prestigious universities, has gone farther than most private universities in this process. The university’s short term aim is to provide its students a general education and a campus culture that creates for students a “happy home.” The institution’s three-pronged strategy includes: (1) placing limits on quantitative development (the rapid expansion of enrollment to bring in tuition income that was the key to their survival in the past decade) in favor of quality; (2) emphasizing market-oriented professional and low-cost majors, while trying to provide students with a general education that includes concentrations in the arts and sciences; and (3) balancing the desires of parents and students and the regulatory hand of the state in order to create a safe, yet relaxed, campus culture that allows for student exploration and self-management (Ross and Lou 2005 p.245)

Again, this suggests that the type of education which UPEACE provides both in terms of pedagogy and content could thrive in China. A safe, intimate, and relaxed environment, an emphasis on quality as opposed to rapid expansion, a holistic approach to education that compliments more specific market-driven majors, and opportunities for students to self-manage and explore, all resonate deeply with peace education philosophies.

**Assessment:** An indicator of success for this option of the report, (and for all options) would be for the Rector to visit China and dialogue with relevant parties about this possibility. Beyond that, initiating the formal steps to create the many of the aspects of a university, including going through the appropriate Channels for government approval, recruiting students, hiring staff, developing a reputation as a legitimate institution, etc. It is very difficult to discuss these at this stage without many of the formal structures in place, but many of the terms of evaluation from the other two strategies also apply to this scenario, only on a larger scale.
Understanding the nuances and current trends of higher education as well as the hierarchy of government restrictions and policies presented in Chapter 3 is particularly relevant to this scenario. Even though UPEACE is an independent and autonomous entity, and “the government encourages and promotes the entry of enterprises, institutions, social groups, and both domestic and foreign businesses and individuals into the area of founding and running schools and universities in China (Wang 2002 p. 64), there are still many considerations that would have to be taken into account. However, based on all the research I have done I truly believe that a UPEACE university in China could flourish; I hope that even if this scenario is unlikely, there are enough positive indicators to at least consider it.
### 8a: Budget Projections in U.S. Dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCENARIO I: EXISTING PROGRAMME EXPANSION</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Salaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>45,000 (two staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Workshop Administration</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>110,000³</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance Learning Curriculum Dev.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>185,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingencies 5%</td>
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<td>3,500</td>
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<thead>
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<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Workshop Administration</td>
<td>5,000 (just planning)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student Exchanges (tuition)⁶</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Travel</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultant Fee¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dual Campus Masters Programme</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>SCENARIO III: ASIA UPEACE⁹</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Planning, Consulting, and Travel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff and Faculty Salaries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities¹⁰</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching Materials</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>10,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies 5%</td>
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<td>10,000</td>
<td>512,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>10,782,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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¹These numbers are based on lots of contingencies, especially given the stage of project.
²These estimates are in addition to existing operating costs for the Asia and Pacific Programme.
³This staff member could work in a part time basis for free in year one, until funds are generated in year two to work from China or wherever the regional office may be.
⁴This includes, workshop facilitators, materials, travel, and space, for a conference similar to Tajikistan.
⁵This number is based on a large scale conference like the upcoming one for the Hague. Eugenia helped me with these conference estimates.
⁶This figure assumes that no government or institutional scholarships have been attained for Chinese student study at UPEACE campus or at internships other satellite locations.
⁷Consultant fee to assist with government approvals for joint partnership and Chinese language.
⁸This estimate is the total cost of what it would take to start a dual campus programme with a Chinese Parnter University and includes travel and tuition for 12 students.
⁹This figure is based upon budget projections for Costa Rican face-to-face teaching in the UPEACE system document.
¹⁰This includes operating costs and taxes.
Chapter 9  Plan for the Future

I have loosely identified four areas where I would like to expand on the findings, research, and recommendations of this project next fall. As a supplement to this thesis, I will develop a more comprehensive strategy in August to help guide my thinking and planning, but for the purposes of this report I offer the following brief sketches:

1. Conduct meetings in August with individuals at a variety of institutions and organizations based in the United States - United States Institute for Peace, Council on Foreign Relations, World Resources Institute, American University, Swarthmore College, the State Department and others - in an effort to continue to better understand the complexities considered in this project and raise the profile of UPEACE as well. I have already made several contacts at these institutions and will continue to make connections after I submit my project report.

2. Continue to do academic research from UPEACE campus in Costa Rica next fall and purchase books and resources in the United States that I was unable to use while in Costa Rica.

3. Continue to network in China from Costa Rica and help to plan a trip for the Rector, if she is interested in going and can make it work logistically.

4. Write grants and develop a funding strategy to spend a year in China, perhaps working on this project, or simply working in the field of higher education in China.

I am excited to have the opportunity to stay at UPEACE and look forward to an exciting year working on this project and assisting with the peace education programme.
Annex 1: Action Plan

1. Conduct preliminary meetings with UPEACE staff and faculty members
   - Martin Lees Former Rector (October 2005 and February 2006)
   - Abelardo Brenes Professor (PE) (Ongoing)
   - George Tsai Vice Rector (October 2005)
   - Narindar Kakar Head of New York Office/Asia Pacific (November 2005)
   - Swee Hin Toh Visiting Professor (PE) (November 2005)
   - Mohit Earth Charter Secretariat (February 2006)
   - Vedrana Visiting Professor (PE) (February 2006)
   - Julia Marton-Lefevre Rector (March 2006)
   - Sawaran Singh Visiting Professor (IPS) (March 2006)
   - Alicia Cabezudo Visiting Professor (PE) (April 2006)
   - Jennifer Hazen Professor (IPS) (April 2006)
   - Mirian Virela Earth Charter Secretariat (April 2006)

2. Trip to Beijing, China during Semana Santa (April 8-15)
   Trip Preparation
   - Sent letter to Maurice Strong, President of the Council
   - Sent letter to Li Lailai, Head of LEAD in China
   - Had phone conversation with Fred Dubee, Head of the U.N. Global Compact Asia
   - Sent letter to Guo Peiyuan, PHD candidate at Tsingwha in Sustainable Finance
   - Sent letter to Khalid Malik, the UNDP resident coordinator in China

   Meetings
   - Maurice Strong President of the Council (April 2006)
   - Khalid Malik UNDP Resident Coordinator (April 2006)
   - Dr. C.S. Kiang Dean of Environmental School Peking U. (April 2006)
   - Guo Peiyuan PHD candidate at Tsingwha U. (April 2006)
   - Li Lailai Head of LEAD in China (April 2006)
   - Song Li Sr. Environmental Sp. World Bank (April 2006)
   - Tingting Du Masters Student at Peking U. (April 2006)

   Post Trip
   - Prepare trip report and meeting notes for Rector

3. Second Wave of UPEACE Meetings
   - Julia Marton Lefevre Rector (May 2006)
   - Eliana Carvalho Professor (PE) (May 2006)
   - Ronnie de Camino Professor (NRSD) (May 2006)
4. Research Phase
- Problematique (January, February, May 2006)
- Normative Frameworks (February and May 2006)
- Peace Education Programme Implementation (May 2006)
- Gap Analysis (May 2006)
- Service Learning Paper (May 2006)
- Additional Research for Final Project (June, July, August 2006)
- Develop Implementation Framework (July and August 2006)

5. Plan for Next Fall
- Continue dialogues with various academics, professionals, and institutions in China and at UPEACE about the possibility of collaboration between UPEACE and China.
- Explore alternative sources of funding for a UPEACE China strategic partnership

6. Take Second Trip to China (with Rector) (2006-2007)

Initial Contacts
- Song Li, Sr. Environmental Specialist, World Bank
- Li Lailai, Director IED/LEAD-China
- Liu Yunhua, Director of Education and Capacity Building Program, WWF China
- Yang Liu, Green Student Organization Society
- Kangsheng Zhang, Executive Director, UNEP-Infoterra
- Chen Kun, Under Secretary-General, Chinese Society for Sustainable Development
- Han Hua, Associate Professor, Center for Arms Control and Disarmament at SIS
- Dennis Pamlin, World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
- Zhou Dadi, Director General, The Energy Research Institute
- Fred Dubee, Senior Officer, U.N. Global Compact
- Randy Kritkausky, Executive Director, Ecologia
- Maurice Strong, Chairman of the Council, UPEACE
- C.S. Kiang, Dean of Environmental Studies School, Peking University
- Naiban Zhang, Associate Professor, International Studies, Peking University
- Guo Peiyuan, PHD Student in Sustainable Finance, Tsinghua University
- Martin Lees, Former Rector, UPEACE
Annex 2: Sample LEAD/UPEACE ESD Leadership Training Module for China

Educational for Sustainable Development (ESD) is already taking shape as a veritable movement in China. In attempting to determine which type of module would be most practical and perhaps possible in China, I had a conversation with Ronnie de Camino about LEAD. He has embarked on a UPEACE project in conjunction with LEAD and Capacity 2015 to train 1,000 local leaders in Latin America. The framework they have developed for this project I believe is something that UPEACE could replicate in the Chinese arena with particular sensitivity to the contextual differences. Ronnie Camino recently said that having good local leaders is crucial to any type of sustainable development initiative.

I am trying to approach this sample training more as an exercise to focus and think practically about what a UPEACE programme in China might do, while understanding the challenges to implementing something like this. Below I have included what I believe to be a rough outline of how a LEAD ESD leadership module could be implemented in China on a reasonable scale. I do think that the fact that technology can be discriminatory, the project is only designed to reach such a small fraction of people in China, the potential language barriers involve are all critical realities facing the implementation of this kind of project. I would like to continue to improve upon this foundation next year. To that end, I would also like to dialogue with the Rector about her experience with LEAD and what types of leadership modules might have the most success in China.

LEAD, UPEACE, and Capacity 2015 Initiative in Latin America.

Ronnie was kind enough to share with me the proposal document for the project in Latin America and I thought I would include some of its basic principles, background, methodologies to help set the stage for the ESD module in China. This project is entitled “Empowering Responsibility: Leadership for Local Development in Latin America.” The triad of partner organizations, LEAD, UPEACE and Capacity 15, identified that there was a need to “capture local best practices, which are often isolated, by linking
local projects with municipal, regional, and national policies.” Furthermore, they believe it is vital to connect leadership, local sustainable development and the Millennium development Goals (MDG). In that sense, “the main hypothesis is that local leadership can be a strategic input towards development effectiveness and achievement of the MGDs at the local level.”

The document also characterizes the participating organizations as having the following strategic advantages and experience. “LEAD has 15 years developing and validating leadership modules and courses in the field of leadership and sustainable development. It has trained more than 1,600 lead fellows in more than 80 countries. UPEACE department on Environment, Security and Sustainable Development, has been in action for the last 20 years. It has a strong theory-practice relationship with local sustainable development and it provides state of the art theory on concrete project implementation. Capacity 2015 is the natural continuation of capacity 21 and has ten years experience in the field of local sustainable development in implementing projects it is currently develops and validates tools for implementation of MGDs at a local level.” Equitable contribution of resources is stressed among the partner institutions.

I don’t want to elaborate in too much detail the specifics of the project but I will share a few elements. They propose to develop “six capacity building modules adapted for Latin America and for local community leaders (Leadership, Systems thinking, Ethics, Negotiation, Communication and Networks) that will ultimately be tailored to the Latin American context to include themes of democracy, solidarity, sustainable development, power, management, etc. They propose to train 1,000 local leaders in Latin America mostly by sub-regions of women, indigenous and rural communities and expect to have 100 trainers. The trainers are trained will be trained in three courses in three different countries, then the modules are developed, interventions are carried out in the form of 40 multinational capacity building workshops (25 people per training) and two international exchange symposiums. After which, monitoring and evaluation takes place and a single person is paid to run the network for 60 months/ 5 years. The program has a budget of around 2.8 million dollars for 5 years.
Potential Plan of Action for a LEAD - UPEACE Module in China

I have drawn from the objectives of the Latin American Project because I think the implementation strategy is an effective model for my module but I have tried to tailor them to the Chinese context.

Length of Time: 3 years.

Objectives for Regional Programme:

- To develop an operational programme for training local community members in best practices and leadership skills

- To identify facilitators based on selective criteria and train them in intensive programmes in order to have a multiplier effect

- To develop modules in cooperation with facilitators so that they are in line with the needs of the community and context specific to China or the particular Chinese province.

- To create a network of people who can learn from and teach each other so that problems can be more efficiently and fluidly dealt with after the two week workshops are over

- To maintain sensitivities to the communist government at the local regional and national levels and determine ways to support their own local leadership initiatives

Objectives for Two-week Workshops:
• To have participants gain greater knowledge about consequences of agricultural practices on environment
• To have participants learn leadership skills to return to community and implement best practices
• To have participants see the value and benefit of using a network to solve and assist others with problems.

Phases of Implementation:

1. **Train core group of trainers:** the first stage of this module would be to train roughly 35 trainers who will in turn eventually train around 500 people. Preferably these are already local leaders in their respective communities who have a familiarity with their context and an active interest in improving the quality of the environment. Ronnie’s project in Latin America calls for roughly 70 trainers for 1000 people. These trainers must also be organized according to regions so that a network can be created and a more extensive range of people reached. During the trainer training phase it is crucial to conduct a needs assessment for the training modules, i.e. what are the most pressing issues facing the local people in China and how those needs might vary based on rural/urban contexts. Some themes that could emerge: slash and burn agriculture, the effects of market economy on agriculture, living in solidarity/harmony with not only other citizens of China but of people in the world, reforestation, pollution in cities, etc.

2. **Create modules:** after the needs assessment is conducted, the facilitators and trainers identify four or five modules to train local leaders. These modules are context specific but also holistic in nature. For example, in Ronnie’s project they are democracy, solidarity/harmony, community organization, and sustainable development. These modules are co-developed not only with input from the trainers but also with partner organizations in China like WWF, IED, UNESCO, etc depending on their interest level and available resources. LEAD modules also tend to incorporate a variety of types of knowledge – Systems thinking, Ethics, Negotiation, Networking, etc.
3. **Deliver tools:** once the modules are developed and partner organizations are selected to help administer trainers, they are implemented in 20 two-week training courses with 25 participants each. These modules have the possibility for one-week follow-up extensions for deepening issues with a select group of participants. In this phase it might make sense to have several pilot programs first and they fine tune them based on the critical feedback and run the next wave of training programs.

4. **Network:** after the training has been facilitated, perhaps the most important step is to create a network of local community members so that as problems emerge, they can pool together their collective knowledge and help each other solve problems efficiently and effectively. For instance, say a farmer has a problem with a particular type of parasite that is destroying his crops and he is unfamiliar with how to handle the situation. If a system were in place to allow him to connect with others who might be experiencing or who have experienced the same problem he could send problem in an email or message board to the network and the network could help. The only shortcoming here is that his strategy is technology dependant and even though China is fast becoming the most web-friendly country in the world, there are still hundreds of millions of people with no familiarity of or access to the internet. Ideally, this network could be coordinated by a full time paid employee with technological expertise.

5. **Monitor:** finally, it is also essential for this type of leadership program to have a constant system of evaluation in place. This monitoring can and probably should be carried out by the trainers and participants themselves to ensure that that course and training is adequately meeting their needs.
Annex 3: Steps to Establishing a Partnership with a Chinese University

Step 1. Assuming that a partner is necessary for UPEACE to launch a programme, the Partner institution, a UPEACE delegation would have to visit and determine if the partnership is tenable.

Step 2. If both parties are in agreement then they each sign a collaborative agreement based upon the mutually agreed upon terms.

Step 3. If the Chinese university belongs to a ministry of the central government their international cooperative program needs to be reported and evaluated as well as approved by both the educational department and the foreign affairs department of the central ministry.

Step 4. Since the university is under dual administration of the central ministry and the province where the ministry is located, the program also needs to be reported to and evaluated as well as approved by the educational commission of the provincial government.

Step 5. After obtaining approvals from the central ministry and the provincial government, the program needs to be reported to the Department of International Cooperation and Exchange at the ministry of education for approval.

Step 6. The ministry then needs to report it to the Office of Academic Degree Commission of the State Council for evaluation and approval.

Step 7. The approval document is then sent to the ministry of education. The ministry of education will then draft of another approval document to inform the Education Commission of the provincial government. The provincial Educational commission will draft another approval document to inform the university, the university will inform the
central ministry which it belongs to and then the university will finally be able to inform the partner university about the approval.

List of References


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