Round Table 1: How is humiliation relevant to destructive conflict?

Comments from Presenters:

**Morton Deutsch:** I’m going to give you a six-minute summary of my career. I came out of World War II, after serving as a combat navigator, being strongly against war. When I became a student at MIT and when I started to do my dissertation, I had a vision of a UN Security Council cooperating or competing. I did a study on the effects of cooperation and competition and found out that cooperation is better. A cooperative approach to a conflict results in more constructive and better outcomes for the parties involved. A competitive approach produces the opposite with more harm to participants.

That led to study of conflict. I came out with a simple conclusion: The typical effect tends to induce that social relation when that situation is not already strongly structured. The typical effect of cooperation enhances cooperation. The typical effect of competition – suspicion, hostile attitudes, and the desire to put others down and enhance differences – tends to induce competition.

Then I came to the conclusion that one of most important sources of conflict is injustice. Those in high power putting down those in lower power leads to destructive conflicts and often leads to humiliation. How do you change such situations?

A joke: It is 1910 in Berlin, before World War I. A Jew is walking down the street. He accidentally brushes against the overcoat of a Prussian officer, who indignantly turns to the Jew and says, “Swine.” The Jew clicks his heels, bows and says, “Cohen.” The point of that story: you don’t have to accept being humiliated; you have a choice. The Jew decided not to accept the invitation.

In terms of humiliation, it’s important to realize that humiliation and the fear of humiliation is a big obstacle to social change. It is one of the reasons that they stay gripped onto power so tenaciously. Mandela is an illustration of how you don’t have to humiliate those in power; if you don’t, and if you don’t feel humiliated, you may establish a change, a transition that is peaceful. I believe that is very important. One other thought: I’ve thought of aristocracies and the women of the world, who are often humiliated and go on strike against humiliation. They have a power that’s very strong, could unite womanhood, and may be able to bring about social change.

**Clark McCauley:** When I started thinking about humiliation, it occurred to me to ask: 1) is this an emotion? 2) is it a new emotion, or a blend of emotions that we already know about?

My first thought is that it’s a forced lowering, seen as illegitimate. In Aristotle’s theory on anger, disrespect produces anger and a tendency toward vengeance. But in humiliation, anger has to be suppressed because of imbalance. The victim is not able to respond with anger or vengeance.

Reading Evelin’s book, there’s a heavy burden of shame in these stories. A woman connived her boyfriend’s bad treatment, felt ashamed of the role she played in her own abasement. Maybe humiliation is more than a sub-case of anger, more than suppressed anger: maybe it’s a blend of suppressed anger and shame. The whole focus of anger is to triumph over another. The good thing about anger as an emotion is that it’s a net transfer of power from perpetrator to victim in the long haul. In Evelin’s book, a reference to Aristotle, it is a slavish and ignoble person who doesn’t respond with anger. Yes, humiliation is suppressed anger but there’s
shame, too; a “real” man is going to strike back despite the cost. So humiliation might fit into the existing psychology of emotions.

The levels are an empirical issue – individual and intergroup levels. This person humiliated me as an individual; this group humiliated my group. It’s not the same thing. We can’t project the individual on the intergroup level.

Then there’s another ugly problem: emotions are transitory; they go by in a hurry. You would never try to measure the eliciting of emotion more than three to four minutes after it’s happened. Humiliation and anger aren’t chronic conditions; we have to worry about the time signature. The psychology of emotions has to work toward longer-term understanding. Or those working on intergroup emotions will have to cut loose of the psychology of emotions.

**Arye Rattner:** I’m going to take us from the macro to the micro level. Several people have been talking about feelings of injustice and humiliation. These [PowerPoint] slides are the tip of the iceberg of a big study of one-hour personal interviews, almost completed, in Israel and several other countries, including Germany, Spain, Chile. What I’m going to do here is give some examples between two groups. I’m only talking about Israeli citizens, not the occupied territories. There are differences between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs.

Some findings of the study:

- **How often is there a lack of opportunities?** The most important thing is the gaps, discrepancies. Two categories – more than 75% of Arabs say it’s the lack of opportunities for reason of poverty.
- **How often is injustice as a result of religious beliefs?** More than 50% of Jews said never. Close to 50% of Arabs said very often, and often injustice has been inflicted.
- **How often is injustice because of social background?** Different social backgrounds, segregation of cities and areas, lead to strong feelings that social background is one reason that Arabs feel stronger in terms of injustice.
- **How often is injustice because of the region in Israel you’re coming from?** For Arabs, answering very often and often, close to 50% feel strongly about injustice.
- **How often is injustice based on ethnic or national background?** More than 70% of Arabs say it’s one reason for injustice. Much fewer Jews say so.
- **To what extent do you think the government is acting for the benefit of all people?** Arabs answering to some extent, to large extent, close to 50% say government is not acting for all.
- **People have equal opportunities to advance themselves.** More than 70% of Arabs do not agree that there are equal opportunities in education, employment, etc.

Some of these things have been said earlier today. This study is an attempt to construct a model. The more we get people animated, the stronger the feelings of injustice, they have fewer normative commitments to the society in which they live. Those are the major reasons they feel have the right to develop conflict and take the law into own hands. This model gives us a feeling we can explain. The Jewish-Arab conflict – if we try to understand the riots in 2000 in Israel… Local Israeli Arabs, on the contrary, their feelings of injustice and the experiences of local Arabs reflect what we’re seeing in this model, their willingness to take the law into their own hands to defend their rights.
The findings, just the tip of the iceberg, reflect: 1) the Machiavellian saying: those who steal a country become dukes, but those who steal a handkerchief go to jail; 2) Shaw: our systems are like a spider web; the big insects get through, but the small ones get caught in the web. My major wish is to see if, based on this study (already international), we can think about a joint effort to develop a scale cross-culturally to show or advance the idea of injustice and humiliation among social groups, nations, countries, etc.

**Bertram Wyatt-Brown:** Evelin’s achievement is to enrich our understanding of humiliation. We could say academic conferences could be a source of humiliation. Ever since Achilles dragged Hector’s body, people have known how to humiliate. It’s part of universal history. During the Iraqi war, military forced detainees to perform humiliating acts. Humiliation psychologically destroys the moral compass of victims; it’s an exercise of sheer raw power.

*Mario and the Magician:* Thomas Mann explores the psychology of shame, order and convention against disorder. Mann suffered self-humiliation and the dangers of gratification and ruin. Homosexuality was involved, as in *Death in Venice.* This fiction concerns a German who takes his wife and two kids to Italy. The family runs afoul of domineering hypnotist – fascist ways. The family leaves. The performance was super patriotic, a Mussolini-like Italian, pompous, the personification of nationalistic arrogance and contempt for others. Hypnotized… Children were enchanted… Good looking waiter at café – kids idolize him. At the moment of Mario’s bliss, one sound becomes audible… Melancholy and rival meeting… In the scenes there is awe and admiration for the manipulator of emotions. The crowd howls delight and approval. Two detonations: one dead, and the perpetrator is arrested. Horror over the scene.

Humiliation is a central feature of the fascist phenomenon. Blind obedience to authority is a mystical shift from one being to another. How does it transform rational people to acts of hatred? Dissociation takes place. One is aware only of the non-human nature of the other, seen as a cockroach or something equally unappealing. There is an unconscious dimension, a change in moral consciousness, shifting of boundary lines. Is this a cause of cruelty or a consequence? Is it a means to avoid thinking of what one is doing? A lapse of conscience? The object of contempt is not deemed human anyway. There is satisfaction of making the outsider into a beast or a fool, a violent animal. In the late 1920s, Hitler was a second-hand Mussolini. Notoriety after “Mario” published, based on the hidden and sexual urgings of followers. It involved the terrors of evil.

**Anne Wyatt-Brown:** In the period before World War II, Hungarian Christianized Jews may have had more illusions about their roles in society than other Jews, a circumstance that explains why they felt especially betrayed by the Holocaust. They couldn’t imagine that Hungarian Christians would turn against them. In My Brother’s Image, two-thirds of the narrative addresses issues of humiliation and family experiences. One-third involves reconciliation and healing. It shows how entangled and time-consuming the process of healing could be.

This book describes the dilemma the writer faced as the son and nephew of survivors. His relatives, twin brothers, were baptized Christians brought up in rural Hungary. They attended Catholic schools but were aware that they were of Jewish extraction. Before the war, his father, Miklós, thought he would become a priest but instead became a lawyer. The other, Gyuri, did become a priest. Just after Hitler invaded Poland, Gyuri developed kidney stones and went to Italy to recover his strength. The Church let him go; it didn’t know how to treat a Jewish priest. He lived in Italy, protected by Padre Pio, a saintly character, for 17 years. Miklós stayed behind in Hungary. Protected by his baptism, he was assigned to sweeping streets, a common task for
Christianized Jews. Then he learned that his wife (by birth an American citizen) was being taken to a concentration camp. She had undergone a recent baptism to no avail. Miklós had a letter from a cleric attesting to his status, which could have protected him from being taken to a camp. Preferring to share his wife’s fate, he ate the letter and went to camp. When he left the train, Christians lined the streets, yelling at the prisoners – calling them dirty Jews who deserved to be slaughtered. That experience destroyed his Christian identity. As a result he was left without any sense of religious belief.

The last third of the memoir takes place in America, where the family relocated. We see the observations of the boy, Eugene, who realized that his father and uncle were not on good terms for religious reasons. The uncle priest felt his brother was an apostate. Miklós, the boy’s father, was upset that his brother, Gyuri, could not understand his feelings. Eugene, the son, became convinced that he had to be the savior for his family, by asking gentle but probing questions. He became a clinical psychologist when he grew up. His father was his most difficult patient, but eventually he convinced Miklós to travel to Hungary. The first time the father refused to set foot in Szarvas, the town where he had grown up. Four years later, father and son visited the town. Before that journey, the family had learned that his grandmother had died in a gas chamber, a believing Christian. In Budapest Eugene visited the basilica on his own. He stood in front of a painting of Christ on the cross, asking the image of Christ to honor the memory of his grandmother. As Jews, Eugene told the Christ figure, their only immortality lay in the memory of others. Afterwards he went with his father to the cemetery in Szarvas where his grandfather was buried and his grandmother had a headstone. His father asked him to say the Kaddish over the grave, and he did so. This moment provided an opportunity for Miklós to tell his dead parents that he was a Jew again, which was the right thing for them. Thus the memoir ends with a spirit of reconciliation. The memoir is remarkable for how helpful and healing psychological insight can be, even when dealing with almost intractable family problems.

Nick Martin: I’m going to try to encapsulate Michael Kimmel’s work, *Men, Masculinity, and the Role of Humiliation*. My affiliation is with the University for Peace, and China is my other passion. Kimmel begins with the premise that we don’t really study men as emotional creatures. Men are emotionally out of touch. We study works of men, history, but we don’t think of them as we would in terms of feminism. Masculinity and homophobia: men are most afraid of other men emasculating them – humiliation in its essence. Men exert energy to try and counteract that, to prove themselves in the company of other men.

I spent a lifetime playing sports, which is the ultimate proving ground for masculinity. From a pedagogical standpoint, coaches use humiliation as an accepted practice. In the classroom, in some respects we’ve moved away from that. Humiliation on the field has actually increased, to “toughen up” a guy on the field, especially when we’re dealing with the sensitive psychology of men. What are the consequences off the field, teaching them to be as people?

We also see it in fraternity culture, the “right of passage” to be a brother, which is almost exclusively contingent on navigating the pledge process, full of horror stories. This is relevant to the field of humiliation and what we are telling men to do. With certain aspects, there is not enough attention to intervention (in academia) to counteract these practices. It is not just in the classroom, as it happens well outside a teacher’s domain.

Morton Deutsch: I just want to say something about emotions. Clark, I disagree with you. In the lab, the situation is of temporary emotions, then the situation changes... If you’re in a
situation that provokes or evokes emotion, and the situation persists, the emotion persists. Maybe it is not the same intensity, and it may take different forms. The lab is a temporary situation, and for many people, their experience is being in a more pervasive, enduring, oppressive humiliating situation. To not accept humiliation is to not accept the rights of others to inflict humiliation on you.

**Clark McCauley:** It’s a very good point raised here. The question is how to conceive of a continuing relationship with a continuing emotion. Psychology is not easily translated into long-term relationships. Mort, what is the difference between perceived injustice and humiliation?

**Morton Deutsch:** No, not every perceived injustice is humiliation. Not every attempt to humiliate is expressed as humiliation. You may not experience injustice as humiliation if you don’t accept the right of the other to inflict injustice upon you. There are probably other reasons, as not every perceived injustice is really purposeful, is not perceived to be the kind of situation of pain, and is not humiliation.

**Arye Rattner:** Not every perceived injustice is considered humiliation. But if we look at the accumulation overall, we get a sense of perceived injustice within a certain group or community. Yes, we get humiliation, not a single sense of injustice. The aggregated result is humiliation.

---

**Additional Comments from Supporters:**

**Michael Perlin:** Social psychologist Tom Tyler says it’s important we’re taken seriously, rather than whether we win or lose, and I think this is something that needs to be considered in this context.

I’ve been listening to presenters speak from the perspectives of psychology, sociology… I’m law-centric. There is little in the legal literature on law and humiliation. There is a lot on law and violence, law and emotion… There are different areas where humiliation and the law connect: shaming sanctions (with regard to convicted felons), sex offender zoning laws (offenders are limited as to where they can live or travel). These are laws condoning or encouraging humiliation.

There are cases where the law ignores humiliation. My background is in human rights law, and I see how governments condone the ongoing humiliation of persons institutionalized because of mental disability. At truth and reconciliation hearings, the law uses the remediation of humiliation to try to deal with the situation; it is something the law is seeking to do. There are many more examples. If a woman is sexually assaulted and has to testify at her rape trial, that can be humiliating. For any victim, watching the trial can be humiliating, civil as well as criminal. There is nothing in the legal literature about it. I’d like to expand this idea into an article for lawyers.

**Floyd Webster Rudmin:** Usually humiliation is conceived as something done by one person to another person, such that humiliation is a state of victimhood. But we do have phenomena of reflexive humiliation. I used Google as a corpus of linguistic data to examine reflexive humiliation and found the following:
Thus, in English, reflexive humiliation is possible, and it is dramatically in the singular. Collectives do not do humiliation to themselves. But this seems not to be the case in non-reflexive humiliation. Again, going to the Google corpus:

"I humiliated": 16,200 hits
"You humiliated": 12,900 hits
"He humiliated": 37,100 hits
"She humiliated": 11,900 hits
"It humiliated": 12,700 hits
"We humiliated": 640 hits
"They humiliated": 20,600 hits

In this tabulation, humiliation is rarely attributed to one’s own collective (we) but is attributed to others’ collectives (they). Furthermore, humiliation is more likely done by males than by females. The following tabulation shows that males are easily perceived as victims of humiliation, in contrast to the predominance of females in reflexive humiliation. Gender differences should be an aspect of humiliation research.

"humiliated me": 51,500 hits
"humiliated you": 31,200 hits
"humiliated him": 74,000 hits
"humiliated her": 46,000 hits
"humiliated it": 23,500 hits
"humiliated us": 28,000 hits
"humiliated them": 42,000 hits

One other consideration is Roger Brown’s last work about the rules of etiquette: the status of the audience and the participants has a big role. We now see Chavez in the news mocking Bush. Is Bush humiliated? I’d guess not. Chavez is not his peer. If Chirac or Putin did it, that would be humiliating. Status is important. Can a three-year-old humiliate me? Probably not. We have to think about status roles and the social drama of humiliation.

Arie Nadler: There is a point at which humiliation moves to feeling with intergroup relations, to part of social identity. I can’t define the process. At some point people become collectively victimized. It affects how they perceive the world. Collective guilt can also overtake groups and populations and dictate group actions. When a feeling becomes part of identity, it’s a problem. Part of two participants’ identities drives the relationships between them. Feelings are transient,
but with a number of people involved, at some point in time, their feelings become involved and part of identity. In the story about the coach, he was intending to motivate, not humiliate. When yes and when no? It depends on the degree of control in situation. Humiliation becomes a problem when it’s a case of the powerless. With a lack of power, humiliation drives forward negative effects and amplifies a sense of humiliation.

**Sibyl Ann Schwarzenbach:** Clark, Aristotle questioned how you can distinguish emotions if you see emotions as having a cognitive element. If you hold fundamental beliefs, you may let go of the belief and the emotion disappears. Nick, you didn’t mention military, Virginia military institute, as humiliating. It is seen as bonding, motivation.

**Clark McCauley:** Love is not an emotion; it is an extreme form of positive identification.

**Arye Rattner:** We see the same thing with other institutions – mental, psychological…

**Don Klein:** Humiliation of medical students: they become full-fledged physicians, then unknowingly humiliate the next generation and also their patients. There is a mixed case against the pro-social use of humiliation in regard to education of medical students. One could make an argument against all, what people do once they’ve been humiliated and then find themselves in a space of power.

We’re talking about labels, not facts. There are diff ways to look at emotions, different categorical systems.

**Bertram Wyatt-Brown:** Many examples... The First World War: the archduke was assassinated. The Austro-Hungarian empire felt it was humiliating act and sent a humiliated telegram. It was war over honor. On 9/11, we were humiliated by the lack of premonition it was going to occur. Last time, nothing much happened. This time it was so threatening we felt humiliated and felt we must assert national honor – it was part of the reason for the reaction of war. We chose to be humiliated. There were political implications as well, if the administration had decided not to be humiliated.

**Tony:** I’d like to consider Clark’s comments on the dynamics of humiliation and the thoughts on medical schools, which present empirical questions: To what extent is humiliation transitive or complementary? How much I’m humiliated may affect how much I humiliate others. On the positive side, is being recognized and empathized also transitive? I think the people we have the most opportunities to humiliate are those lower on the power structure. This has real implications for interventions. We focus a lot on the humiliated. We look at how to break that cycle. But if there’s this transitivity, it may mean we need to focus on interventions at those higher in power structure, not just the environment or those who are humiliated. We can look at the highest and how that happens. An example of transitivity: as a servant who is beaten, does it make me more likely to go home and beat on my family? What is the critical link: minimizing damage to those lower, or looking at the source? These interventions can be critical for any outcomes, and having an evidence base will strengthen it.

**Rosita Albert:** Looking at the transmission of harm, it was found that people were very likely to harm another when the person who harmed them had been a good person. They could imitate
them without fear of being seen as horrible. When the person who harmed them was a beast, they didn’t imitate them. This is a warning about people who seem good. Compared with retaliation, there are almost the same findings.

We know from social psychology studies that in order to unite people, it is often best between groups, the best way is to have an overarching goal or an external enemy. Unfortunately, an external enemy is not something we wish to create. How do we deal with this to prevent violent conflicts?

**Dana:** If you think about a peace tent with Arab and Israeli women, the point wasn’t so much the work that they do. Rather, it was the hard road to the peace tent, the threat of violence, along with very little media attention. They take huge risks, but nobody pays much attention. Be mindful of efforts that don’t get lots of media. Don’t assume not much happens. What if it were men coming together to advocate peace under adverse conditions? This speaks to gender-political invisibility.

Nick’s comment on coaching: there is a complementary development process for men and women, a piece of entitlement. For the privileged gender, notion of having sex with women to prove you’re not gay, as a right of passage, is an important piece of sexual violence. When you have privilege, there is a unique vulnerability to the experience of humiliation when something rightly yours taken away. Micro acts of humiliation—we talk about experiencing humiliation more than we talk about humiliating others. When you pay attention, it’s overwhelming to see differences.

**Michael Britton:** A word in for being in love with oneself, spouse, people... When you are in love with something, you have identity mixing with imagination and feeling – this is the kind of family, culture, etc. I feel joy about. When that is deliberately pushed down, made not worthy to exist, this family/culture/people, that’s when some of the most intense feelings of humiliation happen. These pieces of being in love with something re-engage in the real world. Once the dream starts to happen, crushing it is felt more intensely, and there is more engagement of “I will not let that happen.”

**Beth Fisher-Yoshida:** Thinking about the role of mediation, a facilitated process, what can we do in our roles so we don’t perpetuate system of humiliation while being impartial?

**Olga Botcharova:** It seems to me that we often use words like “shame” and “humiliation” as synonyms. I would like to clarify this terminology. One of the greatest poets of the 20th century, Joseph Brodsky, once said: “Freedom is when you forget the name of your tyrant.” Being a phenomenally free spirit whose poetic genius and broad education allowed him to live through the cultures and times in his artistic expressions, he automatically became a danger to the communist state and, as such, was persecuted severely. Not only was he deprived of the possibility to publish his writing, but Brodsky became a subject of numerous professionally staged public humiliation campaigns organized by the state during his life in the Soviet Union, including a shameful trial that labeled him as a criminal and sentenced him to forced labor in exile and isolation. Yes, Brodsky was humiliated and victimized. But did he accept it? Did he feel ashamed? Did he allow the sense of victimhood and bitterness overpower his sense of self-respect and dignity? Did he allow the justified anger to destroy his identity and rule his life? Evidently not. He refused to accept the humiliation imposed on him and he refused
to turn this humiliation into misery and shame. His human and professional dignity could not be shattered by humiliation imposed on him.

Dostoevsky called one of his novels “Humiliated and Insulted (or Offended).” One of the characters of the novel explains that poverty itself is not a shame, but when poverty is extreme and there is not a piece of bread to feed a crying child, it deprives human beings of any dignity and becomes a shame. One of the issues that the novel explores is whether we have a choice or not to feel ashamed when humiliation is inflicted on us, and what can be done to preserve human dignity.

In my understanding there is a difference between “humiliation” and “shame.” While humiliation might be imposed on us, it is still our choice of how we deal with it. Too often humiliation victimizes us and makes us feel deeply ashamed, lose our identity, become emotionally vulnerable and dependable, live with anger and nurture revenge. The other choice is to find the strength to refuse feel and live as a victim and turn the energy of anger into preserving dignity. It is about letting the anger go and not allowing shame to destroy one’s life. To my mind, the degree of inflicted humiliation, the amount of it, if you wish, can be crucial factor, as well as other circumstances (how unexpected it was, etc.). How soon, how complete, with what kind and what amount of efforts humiliation can be processed and not turn into shame and self-destruction? Is it possible to develop mechanisms that help us to deal with it? All these questions became of particular emergency when I worked with leaders of the hostile communities, refugees, raped women and other war victims helping the sides to get into the dialogue on reconciliation.

There is one more distinction that I would like to bring to your attention. I think that humiliation is totally unacceptable practice and attitude that unfortunately still plays role in the socio-psychological texture of human relationships and interaction on different levels. To me, humiliation is something purely negative. Yet shame is of different nature. I perceive shame as the most powerful tool in destructing one’s identity, and, thus, it is the most powerful tool of transforming the identity. I would like to see that shame is recognized as a true punishment for the perpetrator with understanding that the identity of a perpetrator is destroyed through shame. In other words, there is no more “perpetrator” but a human being fully aware and ashamed of the wrongdoing that he/she committed.

I remember once watching on TV an episode of what we call restorative justice practiced by a district community somewhere in Washington, DC at the time. A person who was caught shoplifting was given a choice to spend a certain amount of hours in front of the shop in the neighborhood with a poster indicating his/her crime or to go to jail (I can’t remember for how long, but certainly, for months or years, not hours). A person was forced to take full responsibility for the wrongdoing via the punishment of shame with the hope that identity of this person as a criminal would be destroyed and then the person could be integrated into the community again. I also remember that not all shoplifters chose the public shame over the jail.

Shame is a cruel punishment but it doesn’t mean it is unjust. I believe that humiliation doesn’t have to be imposed to invoke that shame that might be necessary for healing of both, wrongdoer and the victim. The other power that can evoke shame in wrongdoer is forgiveness of the victim, as paradoxical as it may sound, but here we step into another fascinating and big topic.
Sara Cobb: It’s not clear to me what the location of the observer does to all of this. You can imagine humiliation embedded in life processes, and from the outside, it is not easy to see. I was working with Pamela Creed, an ICAR student, the other day, and our conversation turned to President Bush and whether or not he’s humiliated. If yes, he is humiliated, then perhaps he launches this narrative of 9/11, beats the drums of war, readiness and revenge, because he is humiliated, but I’m not sure from within whether he’s humiliated or not. There’s some kind of vulnerability involved in saying, “I’ve been humiliated.” And some may not want to claim or reveal humiliation. But is it appropriate to then define folks from the outside as being humiliated?

Arye Rattner: I think we are close to a tautological question: how do we define humiliation on a micro/individual level? To what extent can we take the aggregation of various individuals and say what we have here in our hands is indeed a kind of humiliation, or does the total of those individuals construct the concept of humiliation on macro level? Something needs to be defined to deal with these issues.

Monty Marshall: As a political scientist, most of the discussion is on the individual level, about individual responses. In my work, the individual is already lost. We’re interested in individual ideas on a group continuum. Humiliation is really an issue of a divide brought up earlier, in relation to conflict in general, constructive and destructive conflict, also constructive and destructive forms of humiliation. Humiliation is individuation – drives the individual within self, drives into self-destructive behaviors. In a form of leadership, we can talk about emotional content. Leadership can exaggerate one’s own emotional response. Beyond the level of leadership, those leaders who are able to translate it into some other emotional response, something more cohesive, can lead toward political level of change. How can strong individualized emotions be channeled into political action that can affect the nature of political relationships?

Clark McCauley: Public opinion isn’t just a summation of what everyone thinks and feels. It’s about meta opinions, or opinions about opinions. Developing the perception that everyone feels that everyone else feels… This is crucial for political action.

Evelin Lindner: One thing to study is Rwanda. They instigated genocide in a few weeks via radio, an amazing example of how to move masses into one direction could draw another lesson – how to draw people in another direction. Talking with a wealthy woman, encouraging everyone to buy Fox News, make a campaign, her argument was to approach Oprah to buy it. We can analyze Rwanda and the success of propaganda. There is a difference between shame and humiliation: you are ashamed, no bus ticket, I don’t have a ticket, ashamed. Conductor says it’s ok. The other story: he asks for your identity card, announces to all that you didn’t pay, and now you’re humiliated. It’s one step too far. You might stop feeling ashamed. Humiliation can be without shame. Human rights groups shaming corporations, etc.

Julie Strentsch: I am a community counselor, and I’m coming here as a person trying to fight the war against shame and humiliation. I work largely with a population of male Hispanic adjudicated youth experiencing a cyclical pattern of shame, and I’m working to create a space to change that dialogue. One way of looking for a way to do this in a social setting: considering
social agencies, and those in a judicial setting are in power over the type of situation, which perpetuates shame. How do I work with both my hands and fight that battle? How do we apply this theoretical background?