

Culture Change: A Practical Method with a Theoretical Basis

by Howard Richards and Joanna Swanger

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A culture of peace can be defined, and has been defined in United Nations Resolution A/RES/52/13, as a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior, and ways of life. It follows that to move toward a culture of peace; or to strengthen those elements of a culture of peace that already exist; it is necessary to change human behavior, cognition, and emotion. Stated in a more anthropological and sociological idiom, it is necessary to change social norms. A norm can be thought of as having three components: A social norm is an observed regularity in human behavior (at least to some extent –the existence of a norm need not imply complete or even nearly complete compliance). A social norm is a standard humans use to think about and guide their behavior. It is also a standard humans use in criticizing each other's behavior, and norm-violation frequently carries with it some form or other of embarrassment, shame, guilt, or punishment. "Norm" is thus a broad term. It sometimes replaces or overlaps with "custom," "rule," or "convention." Sometimes it is the umbrella term embracing all three, and usually it also embraces "law" (in the sense in which a legal norm is a kind of social norm, not in the sense of a law of physics or chemistry). Some social scientists prefer to use the word "norm" rarely or to discard it altogether in favor of terminologies which feature a logic of practice, discursive and non-discursive practices, relations, performances, codes, frames, routines, symbolic structures, or (in the case of Pierre Bourdieu and his followers) habitus.

Transformations from warlike and violent cultures, to cultures that "reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation" (as the same UN definition of "culture of peace" continues); can be conceived (admittedly in a somewhat old-fashioned Durkheimian way -- but without discarding, and indeed while seeking, the insights to be gained from conceiving culture change from a variety of perspectives employing a variety of vocabularies) as norm-change. Examples can be drawn from the eight aspects of a culture of peace:

1. When people come to see themselves as peaceful people who resolve conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence, they change their norms, adopting or strengthening peaceful ones.
2. A culture of peace moves away from the norms of *machismo* and patriarchy, and toward those of gender equality and nurturance.
3. It moves away from social disintegration and towards norms that prescribe solidarity, and the inclusion of all individuals and groups.

4. Democratic participation and respect for the right to advocate one's views freely become norms; they become regular, expected, approved.
5. Where corruption and press control were the norm, norms change so that transparency, accountability, and open communication become the rule rather than the exception.
6. Respect for human rights becomes the normal practice. The government rules with and by legitimate authority, that is to say with and by authority derived from the cultural strength of the norms, as distinct from exercising power based on the physical strength of the instruments of violence.
7. The government increasingly supports and participates in the international observance of juridical norms, rather than competing for military power.
8. Norms change so that development is driven and measured less by narrow accounting norms of financial efficiency; and more by norms of social efficiency that value equity and environmental sustainability.

Given that building cultures of peace is, largely if not entirely, a matter of changing norms, it remains to ask what can be learned from the social sciences concerning how norms change—how they have changed in the past; how they can be expected to change in the future; and what actions those of us who aspire to be peace builders can take that will facilitate culture change in positive directions away from a culture of war and toward a culture of peace.

These are not innocent questions, guided by no ethics and presupposing no epistemological commitments. A commitment to working for a culture of peace—not only as a faith commitment to transcendent principles, but as a commitment carrying and carried by a belief that one's work will have some effect and will achieve some good—already implies taking stands on some controversial issues. It implies that there is such a thing as culture—something that distinguishes humans from other species, something guiding human behavior that is distinct from genetically coded instincts and drives. There is such a thing as *a* culture—something that distinguishes one human group from another, and with this implication we are already seeing the modern West as one culture among others, or as one set of cultures among others, whose norms are not necessarily better or worse than those of non-modern or non-Western cultures. Since we are working for cultures of peace in the midst of a violent and unjust world, we are, moreover, already assuming that cultures can be deliberately improved—they are not, at least not entirely, products of blind historical forces beyond human control. Further, since it is precisely culture that we seek to change, we are affirming that culture is an important determinant of human behavior; it is not a mere frill or superstructure; it is not, as Vilfredo Pareto would have it, a mere derivative, which is not to be counted by scientists when they measure the causes that produce social effects. Culture has consequences. Not all

cultures are cultures of war. Those whose norms prescribe and generate violence can be changed. Therefore, another world is possible. Peace is possible.

Regarding a culture of peace as a realizable ideal already sidesteps ways of seeing history and social science that posit development as a modernization process, in which the developing countries are seen as treading a single inevitable path in a single inevitable direction, a path already trodden by the developed countries; which it is the task of social science to map in order to guide the developing countries so that they can tread it faster. A culture of peace, glossed as having eight bases, is frankly a desired ideal; it expresses a consensus of the nations, as represented in the United Nations, concerning what humanity wants. A culture of peace is not inevitable, but it is desirable. To ask how cultures change, and how desired change can be facilitated, is to ask how ethical choice can have causal powers.

Michel Foucault briefly and helpfully summarized much thinking that attempts to give a rational account of how cultures have changed in the past and how they can be expected to change in the future when he wrote:

“Formerly, the rationalization of the empirical was done through and thanks to the discovery of a certain relation: the relation of causality. One thought that one had rationalized an empirical domain when one could establish a relation of causality between one phenomenon and another. And now, thanks to linguistics, one discovers that the rationalization of an empirical field does not consist only in discovering and being able to ascribe the precise relation of causality, but in bringing to light a whole field of relations that are probably of the type that are logical relations. Now these latter do not deal with the relation of causality. Therefore one finds oneself in the formidable presence of rationalization of reality, that of the analysis of relations, an analysis that is probably formalizable, and one has realized that this rationalization of reality, so fruitful, no longer passes through the ascription of determinism and of causality. WEbelieve that this problem of the presence of a logic that is not the logic of causal determination is currently at the heart of philosophical and theoretical debates.”

It is, obviously, beyond the scope of a short paper that outlines a practical method for facilitating culture change to review the debates to which Foucault refers, however much one may recommend to practitioners in the field that they find time in their busy schedules to study social theory. But we think we need to locate the premises of the following practical guide by saying that they take a page from causal analysis and a page from linguistics. They follow the school of thought known as critical realism by ascribing causal powers to cultural meanings. Norms are causes. The cultural meanings the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire identifies as “themes” in a “thematic universe” have causal powers. Themes guide, orient, and thus move behavior. Instead of backing away from traditional causal analysis of phenomena in the light of contemporary linguistics, in the light of its analogues in structural and post-structural anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis, and in the light of Foucault’s own work on the histories of discursive practices; critical realism expands causal analysis. Economics itself, and therefore those economic histories that portray the modernization of culture as a

consequence of the globalization of the European world-system, is seen as a cultural process in which the norms presupposed by economic analysis (the laws governing property, contracts, and so on) drive events. Cultural norms are causes and not just consequences.

Taking as granted the premises just stated, we suggest that the study of the history of successful culture change movements and projects yields the maxim that success depends on grounding. (See Glaser and Strauss) It depends on how the new cultural form grows out of the old one. For example, the suffragette movements that established norms prescribing a higher degree of equality of women drew on the theme of “motherhood,” a positive value solidly rooted in the already existing norms. “Motherhood” is perhaps less attractive as an ideal to cultivate now than it was then, but that only confirms the point. Finding existing norms lending themselves to growth and transformation, which culture change movements and projects can nurture to create cultures of peace, is an empirical project. It is an inquiry into an historically given culture, as it exists at a time and in a place. [Adding Latin American material will support saying “in a place.”]

Successful culture change, when it is accomplished by peaceful means, also tends to be consensus-seeking. When it is confrontational, especially when it posits what Lewis Coser calls “absolute conflict,” i.e. conflict in which the parties share no common normative framework within which dialogue is meaningful, change tends to be violent, or frustrated, or both. (Coser) Examples can be found in doctrines of class struggle which hold that there can be no common interests or common values uniting the upper class and the lower class, which are found in some versions of Marxism, in some caricatures of Marxism by anti-Marxists, and in some followers of Nietzsche. *Realpolitik* provides other examples.

The achievements of the labor movement and of social democracies in Western Europe in the mid twentieth century can be regarded, on the whole, as examples of consensus-seeking successful culture change. To be sure, they made some advances with rather confrontational methods, but on the whole they avoided absolute conflict by appeal to norms of democracy, to norms derived from religious traditions, and to the ideals of the Enlightenment (Myrdal), which made it possible to seek consensus within normative frameworks shared by virtually all western Europeans at the time. Further, social democratic norms did not become hegemonic in Western Europe until the period of World War II and its aftermath when Keynesian economics became mainstream. It taught that high wages, full employment, and social security were beneficial not only to workers but to society as a whole. (Keynes, Beveridge) However, one should not regard the labor movement and the welfare state movement as unqualified successes, because for several decades now the gains they achieved in the mid-twentieth century have gradually been undermined and eroded. We have dealt at length elsewhere with the debilitation of social democracy and its potential reinvigoration. (Richards and Swanger 2006)

In the following pages we outline a somewhat systematic approach to culture change which we somewhat bravely call a method. It provides a lens for viewing the data of history, but it is mostly a practical guide for organizing work to build cultures of peace. It is based not only on our studies but also on our experience as participants in and/or evaluators of culture change movements and projects. The proposed practical method can be thought of as having five steps, which are to be understood as conceptual divisions useful for policy making and planning. They are not to be understood, at least not rigidly understood, as temporal steps prescribing the sequential programming of projects. As a mnemonic device for the sake of clarity, and at the expense of accurate attention to detail, each step is identified by a tag word placed in parentheses at the beginning of its description. .

1. (Themes) The first step has already been briefly alluded to. It is what Paulo Freire calls the codification of a thematic universe. In more simple terms, one begins by "...researching the vocabulary of the groups with which one is working." (Freire 1969 p. 49) The reason for using the more abstract term "theme" instead of the less abstract term "word" is that a theme may also be an image, a gesture, a type of clothing or way of wearing one's hair, a musical refrain, and so on. A theme is a meaningful element in the culture of a milieu. Typically it is a word. Freire continues: "This research is carried out during informal encounters with the inhabitants of the area. One selects not only the words most weighted with existential meaning (and thus the greatest emotional content), but also typical sayings, as well as words and expressions linked to the experience of the groups in which the researcher participates." (id.) The themes can be recorded in a card file, or in a computer file, and can be classified in various ways. One useful classification is the following one:

Generative themes. Freire initially identified generative words as those whose syllabic elements could be recombined to form new words and thus to generate a whole language. His initial project was promoting empowerment and consciousness-raising through adult literacy programs. He found that fifteen to eighteen generative words were sufficient to present the basic phonemes of the Portuguese language. In generalizing Freire's approach to make it the first step in culture change, we think of generative themes as themes that lead toward a culture of peace. They are good starting points for dialogue and negotiation. Jorge Zuleta of the Centro de Investigacion y Desarrollo de la Educacion (CIDE) of Santiago, Chile, has suggested that as part of this step the researcher also identify "generative persons." They are persons in the community who are already agents of cultural change.

At this point, even before continuing to suggest ways to classify themes, more must be said about the person Freire sometimes identifies as the "researcher," and sometimes calls the "educator being educated." That person might have any number of other names depending on the context, including among others, "volunteer," "facilitator," "teacher," "professional," "leader," "change agent," "cultural creative," "missionary," "cadre," and sometimes, following Antonio Gramsci, "organic intellectual." An indispensable part of the codification of a thematic universe is reflection on the meaning in the milieu of the person who is doing the codifying. That

meaning is sometimes called the person's "insertion." Whether a person is able to act in a given cultural setting as a facilitator of the emergence of a culture of peace depends to a great extent on how that person is perceived by others; on whether that person is accepted or rejected, treated as an insider or treated as an outsider. Sometimes it is better to withdraw and to leave cultural change work to people who have better "insertion," i.e. to people who are more "organic" members of the community, deciding to make one's own contribution to building a culture of peace in some other way or in some other place, perhaps in a place where one has better credentials as an insider. For example, one of our students who was not comfortable participating in many settings, because people in many settings were not comfortable with him, had been a motorcycle enthusiast for many years (a "biker"). He proved to be adept at promoting culture change in motorcycle gangs.

Invader themes. Freire characterizes cultural invasion as anti-dialogical. A typical invader theme shuts off dialogue because it asserts the intellectual and social superiority of the speaker and disqualifies the listener. For example, an agronomist might refer to plants by their Latin names when talking to peasants, thus demonstrating his knowledge and their ignorance. In general, it is important to avoid invader themes and to promote cultural change within the limits of a thematic universe people understand and feel confident in.

Hinge themes. Nonetheless, to move from a culture of war to a culture of peace one must facilitate culture change, "comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable," and not merely acquiesce in a low level of consciousness in which people accept existing symbolic structures, such as those Walter Wink calls "the myth of redemptive violence," as if they were inevitable and natural. The problem is similar to that presented in Piagetian educational psychology of finding the right balance between "assimilation" and "accommodation." An invader theme too foreign to the milieu cannot be assimilated; it can serve to intimidate, but it cannot serve to elicit dialogue. Growth and transformation, on the other hand, require the "accommodation" of existing symbolic structures to new experiences that provoke a certain amount of disequilibrium. They require experimenting with new ideas and behaviors. A "hinge theme" is like the hinges on a door. It permits the door to open so that one can go through it to another room. It connects the existing culture of the milieu with learning one or more of the elements of a culture of peace. For example, the high price of gasoline can be a hinge theme. It is a theme that is readily familiar in milieus where people customarily purchase gasoline. It can lead to dialogue in which people explore together the implications of an experience that requires accommodation. It can permit the "educator being educated" to import some "friendly invader themes" that are invited, metaphorically speaking, by the hinge theme, and are invited, literally speaking, by the participants in a conversation who express a willingness to learn about features of what Betty Reardon calls the "war system" connected with the high price at the pump. The hinge theme permits the "educator being educated" to step out of her role as facilitator and to assume her role as resource person.

Losable themes. These are themes that lend themselves to cultural change through conversation. They are called “losable” because they tend to fall away and disappear whenever people have an opportunity to reflect on them consciously and to engage in dialogue with others about them. It is not necessary to provide background information beyond what people already know. Losable themes can often be presented as images, using a flip chart or a power point presentation to show a group a picture; inviting them to comment on what they see. It is often not necessary or desirable to ask questions or to make suggestions about what to say about the image. For example, pictures of men changing diapers usually generate spontaneous conversation on losable themes regarding *machismo* and patriarchy. Clips from popular television shows and from television commercials can generate conversation on losable themes regarding many elements of a culture of violence; which in turn lead on to such elements of a culture of peace as nonviolence, inclusion, and solidarity. Indeed, television is a gold mine for culture change because the marketing research to determine what images captivate viewers has already been done by the sponsors who pay for it. It is also a gold mine because television exhibits so many losable themes. The very process of talking back to the tube can be empowering. It can be an experience of democratic participation where the norm that everyone has a right to advocate one’s views freely is nurtured. Thus both the processes and the products of television criticism can contribute to building cultures of peace.

We have drawn on Paulo Freire and his followers to illustrate some practical aspects of Step One, which we call, following Freire, the codification of a thematic universe. The general idea is to establish communication. It is to learn to speak the language of the milieu as an active participant in it, who understands and is understood. Other methods can also be used to serve the purpose, including participant observation, ethnographic research using methods developed by cultural anthropologists (e.g. Spradley), focus groups, and cultural studies of what Wilhelm Dilthey called a culture’s “objective spirit.” Dilthey reasoned that although one cannot get inside of other people’s heads, one can learn about what is in their heads by observing what goes into them (for example, updating Dilthey, the images broadcast by television programs with a mass audience, the themes of religious ceremonies many people participate in, or those of sporting events whose spectators fill stadiums).

2. (Energy) Step two postulates that culture change will not happen unless the move from old norms to new norms is fuelled by energy of some kind or other. The distinction between themes (step one) and energy (step two) is drawn from Anthony Wilden’s suggestion that scientific explanations divide without remainder into meaning explanations and energy explanations (Wilden). The distinction corresponds to Foucault’s in the passage quoted above between linguistics (meaning, themes) and causality (dynamics, functional dependence of y on x, impacts of factors on outcomes). It roughly corresponds to Saussure’s distinction between synchronic and diachronic analysis, provided that one can assume that wherever there is a diachronic pattern of change there is a pattern of causation that explains it.

(Although with Wilden we lump the sort of science that relies on statistical analysis of datasets into the broad category of energy explanations, along with Wilden and appropriately cautious statisticians WE regard statistical tests of significance as at most suggestive indicators of causal relationships or the lack of them. In general we are not persuaded by Humean or Kantian accounts of causality, and we are persuaded by Rom Harre and other critical realists who attribute the production of effects to causal powers that the collective labor known as “science” has gradually achieved insight into. Like Harre, we do not believe it is helpful to speak of a “scientific method” as anything different from the history of what people called scientists have done and achieved.) (Harre, Bhaskar, Bunge, Kuhn ...)

From a practical point of view, step two counsels that it is often wise for those who seek to build cultures of peace to stop what they are doing, or thinking of doing; abandon it; and look for something else to do. If there is no energy, there is not going to be any culture change. The search for effective ways to build a culture of peace is to a large extent a search for cultural growth points that generate enthusiasm, participation, ongoing commitment, and resources to work with. Would-be peacemakers are frequently in danger of pursuing private passions, or passions shared by small groups, that are unlikely to change society.

Asking about “energy” is a contemporary approach to the old question, “What is the motor of history?” to which the answers are sometimes given, “class struggle,” or “will to power”; and which Hannah Arendt answers by pointing out that in the twentieth century the motor of historical change was, time and time again, the awakened conscience of youth. (Arendt) (For a review of theories about economic, political, military, and religious forces that have been said to move historical change see Giddens 1987) The point of connecting “energy” and “culture change” is a dual one. On the one hand, envisioning culture as a concept that names a vital force capable of changing the war system into a peace system affirms that norms have causal powers. Whatever else moves history, culture does; the basic normative frameworks that organize human action can be thought of as cultural structures. On the other hand, in response to the further question what changes cultural norms, using the very general term “energy” leads to an approach that is comprehensive and open-minded. In a given situation, the answer to the question what is driving history and what might fuel culture change, the best answer is often, “We don’t know.” It may be economic self-interest. It may be fear of an impending ecological catastrophe. It may be ethnic identity. It may be deep-seated anger produced by real or perceived past wrongs. What combination of energies is potentially available to support moving toward the norms of a culture of peace is always something to investigate, although not something to investigate naively as if history had not happened and as if a number of insightful theories concerning why it has happened as it has happened were not already on offer in the world’s libraries.

Naming the energies at work in a given historical (cultural) situation, and judging their strength, is harder than codifying themes. A theme is a social convention. It is like a token that passes from hand to hand and has the same significance no matter what hand it is in. Collecting the themes of a milieu and classifying them is like learning a

language. Humans can know languages because humans make them up. Gaining insight into the energetic forces that drive behavior is different. It requires voyaging into the physical realities that underlie and surround culture, with the aid of whatever scientific tools one can muster. Two plus two is sure to be four because conventional cultural structures say so. But two cups of water and two cups of alcohol do not add up to four cups of liquid. Finding out what they do add up to requires venturing into the risky area where common sense might be wrong, and in the last analysis any prediction might be wrong. Energy is in the risky area.

An example regarding political ads on television may help to show how the idea of “energy” applies to peace building. Culture change is to a considerable extent participation in politics, and politics is to a considerable extent trying to win elections. Trying to win elections, in turn, is to a considerable extent a matter of spending money on television spot announcements. Three questions immediately arise: whether it is possible to move people with money to contribute to paying for the ads? Whether it is possible to move the political (cultural) institutions to grant access to television with little or no money? Whether the ads to be run will move the voters?

All three questions came up in the Chilean plebiscite of 1988 when the voters were asked to cast either a “Yes” vote to continue the Pinochet dictatorship, or a “No” vote for democracy. Supporters of the dictatorship controlled virtually all the media, but the cultural norms defining a fair election (supported by international public opinion) were strong enough that the “No” supporters got the same amount of time (15 minutes) on a national TV hookup as the “Yes” supporters each evening on the days just prior to the election. The question for the “No” supporters became, what to broadcast in their fifteen minutes? The pro-democracy cadres were for the most part victims who had been tortured and/or driven into exile, and who had lost friends and relatives who had been killed or who had simply disappeared. For understandable reasons, they tended to harbor bitterness and anger, in spite of their best efforts to recover from trauma. For equally understandable reasons, they tended to project their own feelings and to assume that they were widely shared. However, studies done by pro-democracy sociologists and psychologists showed that the bulk of undecided voters had negative emotional reactions to bitter and angry messages. At the level of energy, cheerful messages were needed to move them into the “No” camp.

“Energy” is about determining feasibility. It is about planning deliberate culture change in order to transform the cultures of violence that have grown up over a relatively *longue durée* into cultures of peace in a relatively *courte durée*. The primary emotions fuelling human behavior cannot be expected, on the whole, to be much different in the future than they have been in the past, but hopefully increasing intelligence, applied in the concrete circumstances of a given time and place, will make it possible better to direct them toward constructive ends. Concerning any given culture change project it is necessary to ask whether there are potential resources potentially available to carry it out. Step two lumps together the question whether the proposed project will attract public support with the question whether donors and decision makers will support it with funds

and authorization. (The prior question whether people will understand it has already been dealt with in step one.)

At least three cautions need to be observed in asking whether a proposed project for building a culture of peace has energy behind it.

One caution is that one resist the temptation to let energy-talk slide into the assumption that human life is more exciting and emotional than it really is. The attitudes and behaviors that constitute and cement into place the war system are to a large extent the dull plodding routines of everyday practice. Every day people follow customary norms and make customary calculations in socially constructed realities they regard as natural realities; and every day many of the standard customs people routinely follow are part and parcel of a war system. One must avoid sliding into the assumption that changing the psychodynamics of human personalities away from what Erich Fromm calls necrophilia (love of death) and toward love of life will in itself change the myth of redemptive violence into a collective belief that as peaceful people we resolve conflicts by dialogue, negotiation, and nonviolence. One must avoid sliding into the assumption that such a psychodynamic change in the flow of human energies will in itself change the cold logic of capital accumulation into a warm logic of democratic solidarity. Norms must change. Routines must change. Conventional attitudes and behaviors must change. (Cox)

A second caution is that efforts to gain insight into the forces at work in human history, or in some bounded segment of it, should not lead one to underestimate the weight of the reasons many people have for embracing principled nonviolence; and for believing that in the long run the most effective way to change culture is to be a faithful witness to an ideal.

A third caution counsels avoiding what Betty Reardon calls mistaking what is doable for what is worth doing. If one finds that one's projects are funded, that they draw large crowds, and that participants rate one's workshops as excellent when filling out evaluation forms; if one finds that one is tapping huge reservoirs of latent energy and mobilizing vast resources; then one may be tempted to not to ask whether one is contributing to building a culture of peace. The eminently doable may not be worth doing because it is not changing the basic cultural structures that need to be changed.

3. (Transformation) The word "transformation" names a third step and speaks of a change of form. There is a form, and then it changes into another form. It is useful to regard thinking about possible and impossible transformations as a step in thinking about how to promote the eight elements of a culture of peace.

The idea of transformation serves as a reminder that a change from one norm to another requires an existing cultural theme as a point of departure. For example, when Martin Luther proclaimed the priesthood of all believers he transformed an existing normative concept, priesthood. He enlarged its domain. Similarly, when Immanuel Kant declared in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that every rational being

has a dignity (*Würde*) beyond price, thus defining a concept of human dignity that plays major roles today in United Nations documents and other authoritative texts, he and others who were doing the same thing during the same time period, transformed a set of norms that already existed: those defining the dignity of a dignitary, a person of rank. Like Luther, Kant transformed a hierarchical concept into a democratic one.

Thinking about transformation as a step in planning projects to facilitate cultural change also serves as a reminder that not every cultural change is possible. The possible new norms are transforms of existing norms. Examples of poorly planned cultural change efforts are the attempts to decree the equality of women in Afghanistan in the 1990s and the more recent attempt to impose democracy on Iraq by military force. (We omit discussion of other motives for the wars of religion and the Iraq war.) Gender equality and democracy may be possible in Afghanistan and Iraq, but if they are possible—as attitudes and behaviors engrained in the culture of the people and not merely as submissions to edicts—they will be possible because the existing cultures contain growth points that make such cultural changes understandable and attractive; that is to say, because they contain established norms that lend themselves to being transformed. A positive example of facilitating cultural change by building on existing cultural resources is provided by Jawaharlal Nehru’s advocacy of democracy in India. In touring India before independence, speaking in over a thousand towns and villages, he referred to democracy as *panchayat raj*. The people could understand and participate in the transformation of colonial India into the kind of modern social democracy Nehru advocated by thinking of the latter in terms of the *panchayat*, the traditional village council.

Let it be remembered that “norm” was defined at the beginning of this chapter as three things at once: an observed regularity in human behavior; a standard humans use to think about and guide their behavior; and a standard humans use in criticizing each other’s behavior. Seeing norms as this definition proposes implies that a transformation toward new norms will produce new regularities in human behavior, new standards humans use in thinking about and guiding their behavior, and new standards humans use in criticizing each other’s behavior. It follows—at least it seems to me to follow—that promoting cultural change by peaceful means eliciting the active, conscious participation of the people whose culture is changing. The very identity of people’s selves and communities is at stake. The change process must be dialogue, not monologue, not only for ethical reasons, but also because only through dialogue and other processes that engage the inner person is it possible to change the way people think about and guide their own behavior, and to change the standards applied in the social relationships in which mutual criticism occurs. Cultural change is necessarily personal change.

Facilitating change in attitudes and behaviors is one of the areas in which contemporary psychology draws on ancient and non-western wisdom. Journaling, for example, is a practice recommended in many self-development courses and workshops. But journaling is an ancient spiritual practice. Athanasius, for example, writes, “Let us each take note of and write down the actions and movements of our souls as though to make them mutually known to one another.” (Athanasius) The same can be said of

meditation, of the interpretation of dreams, retreats, the attachment of a novice to a *guru* as a spiritual guide and many other practices that are both contemporary and ancient. It is also ancient wisdom that values change by doing, not only by talking –a principle put to work in contemporary experiential education.

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