Attack, Disapproval, or Withdrawal?
The Role of Honor in Anger and Shame Responses to Being Insulted

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Abstract

Insults elicit intense emotion. This study tests the hypothesis that one’s social image, which is especially salient in honor cultures, influences the way in which one reacts to an insult. Seventy-seven honor-oriented and 72 non-honor oriented participants answered questions about a recent insult episode. Participants experienced both anger and shame in reaction to the insult. However, these emotions resulted in different behaviors. Anger led to verbal attack (i.e., criticizing, insulting in return) among all participants. This relationship was explained by participants’ motivation to punish the wrongdoer. Shame, on the other hand, was moderated by honor. Shame led to verbal disapproval of the wrongdoers behavior, but only among the honor-oriented participants. This relationship was explained by these participants’ motivation to protect their social image. By contrast, shame led to withdrawal among non-honor oriented participants.

Keywords: insult, honor, anger, shame, social image, verbal attack, disapproval, withdrawal
The Role of Honor in Anger and Shame Responses to Being Insulted

We all have experienced the pain of insult. An insult is a negative, derogatory comment or gesture about who we are, what we think, or what we do (Bond & Venus, 1991). Because an insult implies that another person does not value us, being the target of an insult often elicits intense feelings of anger and shame (see e.g., Averill, 1982, 1983; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwartz, 1996; Mesquita, 2001; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). Earlier research on insult and emotion has mostly focused on the intensity of anger and shame feelings in response to insults (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). In the present paper we examine what people are motivated to do and actually do when they feel anger and shame about an insult.

Furthermore, research has shown that insults elicit anger and shame across cultural groups that differ in their cultural value orientation. People who endorse individualistic values (e.g., independence, autonomy, mastery) feel as angry and ashamed about an insult as people who endorse collectivistic values (e.g., honor; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). However, do feelings of anger and shame lead to the same motivations and behaviors in different cultures? We address this question by comparing cultural groups that differ in their honor orientation. Honor is especially relevant to the study of insult. Because honor is based on the protection of social image, an insult needs to be confronted in order to prevent dishonor (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Cohen et al., 1996; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000; Stewart, 1994).

Honor Cultures: The Protection of Social Image

Honor is a form of collectivism based on social image or reputation (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Gilmore, 1987; Jakubowska, 1989; Peristiany, 1965; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000; 2002a; Triandis, 1989). As a collectivist type of culture, honor cultures encourage the maintenance of strong family ties, social harmony, and interdependence (e.g., hospitality; Triandis, 1989; 1994). Social image or reputation refers to the representation that others have of us and to how much they value us (see e.g.,
Abu-Lughod, 1999; Emler, 1990; Gilmore, 1987; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000; 2002a; Peristiany, 1965). Social image is different than ‘face,’ a concept originally developed by Goffman in the context of Anglo-American culture (Goffman, 1959). According to Goffman (1959), we often try to project a positive impression of ourselves in our interactions with others. ‘Face’ is this positive impression. Goffman analysed the strategies and techniques people use to manage the impressions they give to others. He called this group of strategies or techniques ‘impression management’ (Goffman, 1959). Thus, Goffman’s theory of face was a theory of impression management and the concept of ‘face’ is rooted in an impression management framework. Ting-Toomey and collaborators developed face-negotiation theory on the basis of Goffman’s theory of face (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Face-negotiation theory has been mostly applied to impression management in conflict situations. Thus, face is about self-presentation. Social image is, by contrast, about how others think about us and how much they value us.

The centrality of social image in honor cultures has important implications for psychological processes. First, social image strongly influences self-image in honor cultures. Whereas a certain degree of separation between private and public self, or self-image and social image is common in cultural groups that emphasize individualism (Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi & Yoon, 1994; Kitayama, Markus & Lieberman, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1994), there is a greater ‘fusion’ between social image and self-image in cultures of honor (Abu-Lughod, 1999). Second, the protection of social image in social relations is a core psychological concern in honor cultures. This means that social situations in which the self is negatively evaluated by others, as in insult situations, pose an especially strong threat to social image. Moreover, this threat to social image needs to be responded to. Indeed, doing nothing or withdrawing in response to an insult leads to dishonor (see e.g., Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1967).

Differences between honor and non-honor cultures in responses to insult should therefore be most apparent in relation to how much and how social image is protected. In response to the insult
people from honor cultures should want to protect their social image more than people from non-honor cultures. Furthermore, people from honor cultures should be more likely to confront the person who insulted them as a way of protecting their social image.

*Anger and Shame in Insult*

People from both honor and non-honor cultures feel more intense anger than shame in response to an insult (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). This is because insult is a prototypical elicitor of anger. Anger typically arises when we perceive that others have wronged us (e.g., Averill, 1982, 1983; Evers, Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, & Manstead, 2005; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Kuppens, Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Ortony et al., 1988; Sabini, Garvey, & Hall, 2001; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Solomon, 1993). In contrast, shame is a self-conscious or self-reproach emotion: A negative judgment of the self is at the heart of this emotion. Shame is typically felt when we have violated an important moral or social standard, or when we perceive ourselves to be inferior to others (Lewis, 2000; Ortony et al., 1988; Tangney, 1992; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Miller, Fliscker, & Barlow, 1996; Sabini et al., 2001; Smith, Parrott, Webster, & Eyre, 2002). In these situations, we feel shame because we judge ourselves negatively.

However, we can also feel shame when others judge us negatively and we have done nothing wrong. Indeed, insults also lead to shame in both honor and non-honor cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). In an insult situation, a negative image of the self in the eyes of others is at the heart of shame. We feel shame because others hold a negative view of us and we see ourselves through their eyes. In this case, shame is reflective of how others think of us. The notion that experiences of shame reflect others’ images of us is present in Cooley’s concept of ‘looking-glass self’ (Cooley, 1902). Cooley (1902) related experiences of being ‘lower’ in others’ eyes with shame. Moreover, the idea that an emotion can be elicited by changes in our image in the eyes of others is consistent with a wealth of research in social psychology on the role of others in the construction of
the self-concept. We construct, seek to validate, and verify our self-concept in our relations with others (see e.g., Baumeister, 1999; McNulty & Swann, 1994; Schrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Swann, 1987). If others’ views of us are central to our self-concept, others’ views of us should also be powerful elicitors of emotions.

Motivations and Behaviors Associated with Anger and Shame

Anger and shame should lead to different motivations and behaviors in response to insult. Because anger is based on blaming others for wronging us, it is closely tied to wanting to punish, reprimand, or antagonize the wrongdoer (Averill, 1982, 1983; Evers et al., 2005; Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Shaver et al., 1987). This desire for punishment can be expressed in a variety of ways. Indeed, anger can lead to physical or verbal aggression, displaced aggression, non-hostile confrontation, talking to a neutral party about the anger eliciting event, or even engaging in some calming activity to forget about our anger (Averill, 1982). The social context determines which behavior follows feelings of anger. Insults situations usually elicit retribution (e.g., return insults) on the part of the target of the insult. This has been shown to be the case in both honor and in non-honor cultures (Bond & Venus, 1991; Evers et al., 2005; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). Thus, people from honor and non-honor cultures are not likely to differ in what they do when they feel angry about an insult.

People from honor and non-honor cultures are more likely to differ in what they do when they feel shame as a result of an insult. This is because shame has different consequences for the self-concept and for social relations in the two types of culture. A wealth of research among European-Americans and ethnic Northern Europeans (non-honor cultures) has consistently shown that shame in these cultures is associated with psychological weakness, a flawed self, and lowered self-esteem (Lewis, 2000; Tangney, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996; Smith et al., 2002). In these cultures, shame is also detrimental for one’s relations with others. This is most clearly revealed in the social sharing of shame. Shame experiences
are shared with other less in these cultures than in honor cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). Indeed, shame is the least socially shared emotion among ethnic Northern Europeans (Finkenauer & Rimé, 1998). It is therefore not surprising that shame leads to withdrawal in non-honor cultures (Lewis, 2000; Tangney, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995).

Withdrawal as a result of feeling shame is, in contrast, less common in honor cultures. In honor cultures, people share their shame experiences more with others (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000) and have more positive beliefs about the expression of shame (Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999) when compared to non-honor cultures. Furthermore, shame in honor cultures is strongly related to the protection of honor and social image (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). There is even a personality attribute in honor cultures that represents the importance of shame to honor: ‘having a sense of shame’ (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a;). ‘Having a sense of shame’ refers to an inner disposition or attribute of someone who is concerned with honor and protects social image. Having a sense of shame is so important in honor cultures that it is even thought of as a moral virtue (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Peristiany, 1965; Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers, 1992). Thus, there should be a stronger association between shame and the protection of social image in response to insult among people from honor cultures than among people from non-honor cultures. In addition, people from honor cultures should be more likely to respond to an insult than to withdraw when they feel shame.

Two different research literatures suggest that verbal disapproval of an insult protects social image. Disapprove means to ‘pass unfavorable judgment on,’ ‘refuse approval to, ‘condemn,’ or ‘reject’ (Merriam-Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985). Thus, to express verbal disapproval is to condemn or reject what another person has done or said. Research on honor in cultural anthropology has shown that disapproval is indeed a common response to insult in honor cultures (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Peristiany, 1965). Because the motive is to change the negative image
that another person has of us, expressing disapproval is more effective than more retaliatory forms of confrontation (e.g., returning an insult). This is especially the case when the person who insulted us is a close or important other (Abu-Lughod, 1999). Further, research on reintegrative shaming has also shown that disapproval is an effective and constructive way of responding to important or close others’ wrongdoings (Braithwaite, 1999). Because disapproval is less antagonistic and less relationally excluding that more retaliatory forms of confrontation, it reduces the likelihood of escalation. At the same time, disapproval communicates clearly that the wrongdoing is unacceptable. Thus, disapproval serves to correct the wrongdoer’s behavior and as a deterrent to future wrongdoings.

Overview of Present Study
We studied insults among two groups of people living in the Netherlands: Moroccan and Turkish people, who have a strong honor concern, and ethnically Dutch people (i.e., members of the white Dutch majority), who are less concerned with honor (Fischer et al., 1999; Pels, 1998; Mesquita, 2001; Nijsten, 1998; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, 2002b; Werf, 1998). We first asked participants to complete an honor value scale, in order to verify that honor is indeed more important among the Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch than among the ethically Dutch participants. Next, we asked participants to report a recent situation. Because research on honor and insults has already examined emotional reactions to insults delivered by strangers or unspecified others (see e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a), we asked participants to report an insult delivered by a person whom they knew. No further instructions were given to participants. Thus, participants chose the insult situation they reported. We measured anger, shame, wanting to punish the wrongdoer, wanting to protect social image, verbal attack, verbal disapproval, and withdrawal in response to the insult.

We had two sets of hypotheses. The first set related to mean differences in the measures. Anger should be a more intense response to insult than shame, for all participants. Because social
image is the basis of honor, Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants should want to protect their social image more than ethnically Dutch participants. Further, in response to the insult participants should be more inclined to disapprove of the wrongdoer’s behavior than to attack the wrongdoer.

Participants reported insults delivered by someone they knew. We expected this relationship context to constrain participants’ behavioral responses to the insult such that participants would be more likely to engage in the less antagonistic behavioral response. With regard to gender differences, previous research has shown that women and men feel equally angry and ashamed about an insult (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). In addition, women and men do not differ in how they respond to insults (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). 3 We therefore did not expect gender differences in emotional responses to insult.

A second set of hypotheses concerned relationships between the measured constructs. We reasoned that there would be three possible ‘emotional pathways’ mediating response to an insult. The first is the anger pathway. Anger should predict wanting to punish the wrongdoer: The more intense the participants’ anger, the more they should want to punish the person who insulted them. Wanting to punish the wrongdoer should in turn predict verbal attack. The more participants want to punish the wrongdoer, the more they should engage in verbal attack. Wanting to punish the wrongdoer should mediate the relationship between anger and verbal attack. Honor should not moderate this pathway. Thus the anger pathway should emerge for both the more honor-oriented group, i.e., Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch, and the less honor-oriented group, i.e., the ethnically Dutch.

A second pathway is the shame-disapproval pathway, which we anticipate will be moderated by honor. Among Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants, shame should predict wanting to protect social image. The more intense these participants’ shame, the more they should want to protect their social image. Wanting to protect social image should predict verbal disapproval, but only among Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants. The more these participants want to protect their social image, the more they should engage in verbal disapproval. Thus, wanting to protect social image should
mediate the effect of shame on verbal disapproval. Because this mediation should only emerge for the more honor-oriented participants, we expected a moderated mediation for the shame-disapproval pathway. The third pathway relates to shame–withdrawal. Shame should predict withdrawal, but only among ethnically Dutch participants. The more intense these participants’ shame, the more they should withdraw from the insult situation.

In summary, we expected the anger pathway to emerge for both groups: the relationship between anger and verbal attack should be mediated by wanting to punish the wrongdoer for both the Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch and the ethnically Dutch participants. Shame, however, should lead to opposite behaviors for the two groups. Shame should lead (through wanting to protect social image) to verbal disapproval among the Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch. Shame should lead to withdrawal among the ethnically Dutch. These expectations have implications for the association between anger and shame within each group. As both anger and shame are expected to lead to a confrontation with the offender among the Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants (i.e., anger should lead to verbal attack through wanting to punish and shame should lead to verbal disapproval through wanting to protect social image), these two emotions should have a positive association with each other (i.e., a positive correlation) within this group. By contrast, anger is expected to lead to verbal attack (through wanting to punish) and shame is expected to lead to withdrawal among the ethnically Dutch participants. Thus, anger and shame should have a negative association with each other (i.e., a negative correlation) within this group.

Method

Participants

A total of 149 respondents participated in the study: 77 Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch (49 women, 28 men) and 72 ethnically Dutch (40 women, 32 men). Participants’ average age was 24 years. Participants were either university students or had a university degree. We recruited participants
from different disciplines and universities in the Netherlands. Participants with a university degree worked mainly in the commercial or service sectors.\(^4\)

**Research Materials**

We first asked participants to complete a short honor value scale. The items in this scale focused on how important it is for participants to be positively evaluated or respected by others. The scale also included items focused on family social image (e.g., *how others think of my family is important to me*). Participants were asked to indicate the importance of each item on a 5-point scale from (1) *not at all* to (5) *extremely important* (please see Table 1 for the actual five items of the honor scale).

After completing the honor scale, participants were asked to recall and describe a recent episode in which a person they knew insulted them. To ensure that participants reported insults that were significant to them, we assessed two core markers of the psychological significance of an insult: devaluation of self (Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, & Evans, 1998) and unfairness (Bourdieu, 1965). Participants rated the extent to which they perceived the insult to be an expression of the offender’s lack of appreciation toward them, and the extent to which they thought the insult was unfair. Responses to these and all remaining items were made on a 5-point scale ranging from (1) *not at all* to (5) *very much*. Participants’ emotional reaction to the insult was measured by asking participants to rate how much *anger* and *shame* they felt about the insult.

We also assessed two types of motives: wanting to punish the wrongdoer, and wanting to protect one’s social image. Participants rated how much they *wanted to punish the wrongdoer* and *believed that the wrongdoer should be reprimanded*. They also rated how much they wanted to protect what others think and feel about them and to show that they ‘have pride’ (see Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000).

Next, we asked participants what they did after the insult. Verbal attack was measured by the items *I insulted the wrongdoer*, and *I criticized the wrongdoer*. Verbal disapproval was measured by the items *I told the wrongdoer I did not like what (s)he did* and *I told the wrongdoer that (s)he went*
too far. The measures of verbal attack tap negative evaluations of the wrongdoer’s character, whereas the measures of verbal disapproval tap negative evaluations of the wrongdoer’s behavior. Verbal attack is also a more retaliatory response to being insulted than verbal disapproval. Finally, withdrawal was measured by the items *I withdrew from the situation*, and I did nothing.

Procedure

Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch research assistants collected data from Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch respondents. Ethnically Dutch research assistants collected data from ethnically Dutch respondents. Research assistants were blind to the hypotheses of the study. They recruited participants within their own social network, at universities, and through non-political, non-religious organizations that represented the participants’ ethnic groups. Because the questionnaire was in Dutch, care was taken to ensure that Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants were fluent in Dutch and considered Dutch to be (one of) their mother tongue(s). All participants completed the questionnaire individually.

Results

Group Difference in Honor

We performed a multivariate analysis of variance on the items of the honor scale, with group and gender as the independent variables. Only the multivariate main effect of group was reliable (i.e., statistically significant), $F(5, 138) = 21.24, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .43$. Table 1 shows the adjusted means, standard errors, and univariate effects. All univariate effects were reliable. As expected, Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants scored higher on all items of the honor scale. Honor was more important among Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants than among ethnically Dutch participants. We refer from now on to the Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch participants as the high honor group, and to the ethnic Dutch participants as the low honor group.

Content Analysis of the Insults Reported by Participants

Each participant was asked to report a recent situation in which they were insulted. Each participant described only one insult situation. Participants provided a description of the insult in the form of a
short narrative. These insult narratives were content analyzed by the first author and a research assistant. The goal of the content analysis was to identify common themes in the insults reported by the participants.

One coder read first all the insult narratives. This coder developed a preliminary coding system by identifying two types of insult described in the narratives: (1) insults to competence, and (2) interpersonal neglect. Next, the two coders met to discuss this preliminary category system. In this meeting, we defined the criteria that we would use to code an insult narrative into each of these categories. It was decided that an insult would be coded as an ‘insult to competence’ when the participant reported a joke or a derogatory comment about his or her intelligence, cognitive skills, or social skills. Further, it was decided that an insult would be coded as ‘interpersonal neglect’ when a participant reported being ignored, not taken seriously, or rejected by another person.

Next, the two coders coded all insult narratives separately. The insult that was reported by the participant was coded into the most appropriate category. For example, one participant reported the following insult: ‘a friend told me that I am not so smart because I never get good grades.’ This insult was coded as an ‘insult to competence’ as it clearly was a derogatory comment about the participant’s intelligence and skills. Another participant reported that ‘I and two female friends of mine were searching for an apartment for three people. One of my friends called me one afternoon to tell me that they found a two-bedroom apartment. And, she made clear that there was no place for me in the apartment.’ This insult was coded as ‘interpersonal neglect’ as it clearly indicates interpersonal rejection. The majority of insults were easily coded into one of these two categories. Only a few disagreements emerged (less than 5% of the cases) and these were resolved through discussion between the two coders. We provide in the Appendix examples of insults that were coded into each of the categories (see Appendix).

Furthermore, the content analysis revealed that participants reported insults delivered by important and close others: family members and friends. Within the high honor group, 42
participants reported insults delivered by a friend, 21 participants reported insults delivered by a family member (i.e., a spouse or partner, a parent, a brother or sister, an aunt or uncle), and 14 participants reported that a ‘close, important, or intimate other’ insulted them without specifying who this person was. Within the low honor group, 34 participants reported insults delivered by a friend, 27 participants reported insults delivered by a family member (i.e., a spouse or partner, a parent, a brother or sister, an aunt or uncle), and 11 participants reported that a ‘close, important, or intimate other’ insulted them without specifying who this person was. Thus, the high honor group was as likely to be insulted by friends or family members as the low honor group. Further, participants reported two types of insult. One type was insults to participants’ competence or skills. Narratives that described derogatory jokes or comments about the participant’s intellectual (e.g., not being smart enough to perform a task) or interpersonal skills (e.g., being backward in interpersonal interactions) fell into this category. The second type described interpersonal neglect. This type of insult involved others’ expressions of not caring about the participant (e.g., not wanting to spend time with the participant).

Forty of the high honor narratives and 39 of the low honor group narratives were coded as insults to competence. Thirty-seven of the high honor group narratives and 33 of the low honor group narratives were coded as interpersonal neglect. Thus, both groups reported approximately the same number of the two types of insult. We include type of insult in all analyses reported below, to take into account its potential role as moderator of participants’ responses.

Psychological Significance of the Insult

We performed a multivariate analysis of variance on devaluation of self and unfairness. Group, gender, and type of insult were the independent variables. The main effects of group, $F(2, 138) = .41, p > .10$, partial $\eta^2 = .006$, gender, $F(2, 138) = 1.63, p > .10$, partial $\eta^2 = .023$, and type of insult, $F(2, 138) = .48, p > .10$, partial $\eta^2 = .007$ were not reliable. None of the interactions was reliable. Table 2 shows the adjusted means, standard errors, and univariate effects for group. Participants
experienced the insult as very unfair and as implying strong devaluation of self (see Table 2). These show that all participants reported insults that were very significant to them. Potential group differences in emotional responses to the insult can therefore not be attributed to differences in the psychological significance of the insult to participants.

Measurement Equivalence Across Groups

Measurement equivalence across groups is a core concern in cross-cultural research (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). We tested measurement equivalence through confirmatory factor analysis (Kline, 1998; Maruyama, 1998). The constructs we measured are represented in Figure 1: motive to punish the offender, motive to protect social image, verbal attack, verbal disapproval, and withdrawal. These constructs are represented by ellipses in Figure 1. Each construct is measured by multiple items. These observed variables are represented within squares adjacent to the construct they are intended to measure. Anger and shame are exogenous, observed variables in the model.

In structural equation modeling, measurement equivalence involves a comparison of the magnitude and reliability of the indicators’ factor loadings across groups. Measurement equivalence is established if (1) the magnitude of the indicators’ factor loadings is invariant across groups, and (2) the indicators’ factor loadings are reliable for all groups. To test for measurement equivalence we needed to compare a model in which the indicators’ factor loadings were not constrained to be equal across groups (i.e., unconstrained model) with a model that imposed an equality constraint on the indicators’ factor loadings across groups (i.e., constrained model; Byrne, 1994; Byrne & Watkins, 2003; Kline, 1998; Maruyama, 1998). The models tested were evaluated using both a modeling and a statistical rationale (Little, 2000). A modeling rationale involves an examination of goodness-of-fit indices of each tested model (i.e., unconstrained and constrained). These indices determine the overall adequacy or fit of the model. We report the following goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2$, $\chi^2/df$ ratio, $GFI$, $CFI$, $NNFI$, $SRMR$, $RMSEA$ (Kline, 1998; Hu & Bentler, 1995, 1999; Maruyama, 1998; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger & Müller, 2003). A statistical rationale involves comparing the
difference in fit between the unconstrained and the constrained models. The difference in the $\chi^2$ goodness-of-fit statistic is a test of the equality restriction. This difference also follows a $\chi^2$ distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the degrees of freedom of both models. If the test is not reliable, the statistical evidence points to no between-group differences in the parameter estimates that have been constrained to be equal.

The unconstrained model provided an excellent fit to the data. The $GFI$, $CFI$, and $NNFI$ indices were .93, 1.00, and 1.00, respectively. The $\chi^2$ value was not reliable ($\chi^2 = 71.42$, $df = 72$, $p > .10$). The $\chi^2/df$ ratio was lower than 1. The $RMSEA$ and $SRMR$ values were .00 and .07, respectively. Thus the model shown in Figure 1 fits the data well. The constrained model also provided an excellent fit to the data. The $GFI$, $CFI$ and $NNFI$ indices were .92, 1.00, and 1.00, respectively. The $\chi^2$ value was not reliable ($\chi^2 = 74.65$, $df = 77$, $p > .10$). The $\chi^2/df$ ratio was lower than 1. The $RMSEA$ and $SRMR$ values were .00 and .08, respectively. Moreover, the statistical difference between the unconstrained and the constrained model was not reliable, $\Delta \chi^2 (5) = 3.23$, $p > .10$. This means that the magnitude of the indicators’ factor loadings is statistically invariant across the two groups. Moreover, all factor loadings were reliable for both groups. Thus, these analyses established measurement equivalence.

**Multivariate Analyses: Effects of Group, Gender, and Type of Insult on Mean Levels of Emotional Response**

On the basis of the confirmatory factor analyses, we created composite scores of the two motives and the three behavioral responses. Composite scores were the averaged scores of the indicators of each construct. Table 3 shows the adjusted means and standard errors for all measures per group.

**Anger and shame.** In order to compare the intensity of anger and shame, we performed a mixed design analysis of variance using emotion as a repeated factor and group, gender, and type of insult as between-subjects factors. There was a reliable main effect for emotion, $F (1, 140) = 130.09$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .48$. Participants experienced more anger ($M_{adj} = 4.17$, $SE = .10$) than shame
(Madj = 2.36, SE = .13) in reaction to the insult. This effect was qualified by two interaction effects: emotion x group x gender, F (1, 140) = 9.06, p < .01, partial η² = .06; and emotion x group x type of insult, F (1, 140) = 4.45, p < .05, partial η² = .03. Further analyses revealed that the emotion x group x gender interaction reflected the fact that group interacted with gender in the case of shame, F (1, 144) = 6.71, p < .02, partial η² = .04, but not in the case of anger, F (1, 145) = 3.28, p > .05, partial η² = .02. However, simple main effects revealed that the main effect of group was not reliable within either level of gender.

Although the emotion x group x type of insult interaction was reliable, further analyses revealed that the interaction between group and type of insult did not reach significance for either shame, F (1, 144) = 2.25, p > .05, partial η² = .01 or anger, F (1, 145) = 2.42, p > .05, partial η² = .01.

Motives. In order to compare the importance of each motive, we performed a mixed design analysis of variance using motive as a repeated factor and group, gender, and type of insult as between-subjects factors. There was a reliable main effect for motive, F (1, 140) = 59.59, p < .001, partial η² = .30. Participants were more motivated to protect their social image (Madj = 3.04, SE = .11) than to punish the wrongdoer (Madj = 1.98, SE = .11). This effect was qualified by two interaction effects: a motive x group interaction, F (1, 140) = 5.44, p < .03, partial η² = .04; and a motive x group x gender interaction, F (1, 140) = 4.05, p < .05, partial η² = .03.

The motive x group interaction reflected the fact that group only affected wanting to protect one’s social image, F (1, 146) = 8.80, p < .01, partial η² = .06, and not wanting to punish the wrongdoer, F (1, 146) < 1.00, p > .05, partial η² = .00. The high honor group wanted to protect their social image more than the low honor group (see Table 3).

Although the motive x group x gender interaction was reliable, further analyses revealed that the interaction between group and gender did not reach significance for wanting to punish the
wrongdoer, $F(1, 145) = 2.77, p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, or wanting to protect social image, $F(1, 144) = 1.87, p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$.

**Behavioral responses.** In order to compare each behavioral response, we performed a mixed design analysis of variance using behavioral response as a repeated factor and group, gender, and type of insult as between-subjects factors. This revealed a reliable main effect for behavioral response, $F(2, 139) = 78.43, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .53$. Participants engaged more in verbal disapproval ($M_{adj} = 3.48, SE = .11$) than in verbal attack ($M_{adj} = 2.11, SE = .09$) or withdrawal ($M_{adj} = 1.68, SE = .07$) in reaction to the insult. The interaction between behavioral response and gender was also reliable, $F(2, 139) = 4.17, p < .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. However, male and female participants’ scores did not reliably differ for verbal attack, $F(1,147) = 1.87, p > .05$, verbal disapproval, $F(1,146) < 1.00, p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$, or withdrawal, $F(1,147) = 2.08, p > .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$.

**Summary.** Neither type of insult nor gender influenced how much anger and shame participants felt, how much they wanted to protect social image or punish the wrongdoer, or how much they verbally attacked the wrongdoer, disapproved of the wrongdoer’s behavior or withdrew from the situation. As predicted, group influenced the motive to protect social image. The high honor participants were more motivated to protect their social image as a reaction to being insulted.

**Testing the Three Emotional Pathways to Insult**

Figure 1 depicts the hypothesized anger, shame-disapproval, and shame-withdrawal pathways. The arrows in the models are *paths*. We tested for differences and similarities in the magnitude and reliability of paths across the two groups. These are tests for structural equivalence (Byrne, 1994; Byrne & Watkins, 2003; Maruyama, 1998; Vijver & Leung, 1997). We first tested a model with an equality constraint on all the paths. Our hypotheses would be confirmed if this model were to show a poor fit to the data because we expected differences in paths between the two groups. Indeed, this model fitted the data poorly. The $\chi^2$ value was reliable ($\chi^2 = 114.15, df = 93, p = .06$). The GFI, CFI
and NNFI indices were .88, .94, and .92, respectively. Furthermore, this model showed a
deterioration in fit when compared to the model in which the paths were freely estimated, $\Delta \chi^2 (16) = 39.50, p < .01$. This shows that some of the paths in this model are different across the two groups. We therefore inspected the standardized parameter estimates for all paths generated by SEM to examine where the differences lay.

The standardized parameter estimates are shown in Figure 2. Dashed lines indicate paths that are not reliably different from zero. The parameters for six paths showed clear differences between the two groups: (1) shame is a positive predictor of wanting to protect social image, but only for the high honor group; (2) wanting to protect social image is a positive predictor of verbal disapproval, but only for the high honor group; (3) shame is a positive predictor of withdrawal, but only for the low honor group; (4) anger is a positive predictor of verbal attack, but only for the low honor group; (5) anger is a positive predictor of verbal disapproval, but only for the low honor group, and (6) anger is a negative predictor of withdrawal, but only for the low honor group.

Following recommendations for structural equivalence analyses (see e.g., Kline, 1998; Maruyama, 1998), we examined whether these group differences in parameter estimates were statistically reliable. We tested the goodness-of-fit of a model with an equality constraint on all paths except for these six paths. This model yielded an excellent fit to the data. The GFI, CFI, and NNFI indices were .91, 1.00, and 1.00, respectively. The $\chi^2$ value was not reliable ($\chi^2 = 86.33, df = 87, p > .10$). The $\chi^2/df$ ratio was lower than 1. The RMSEA and SRMR values were .00 and .08, respectively. These goodness-of-fit indices are strikingly different than the ones for the model in which all paths were constrained to be equal. Moreover, the statistical difference between the partially constrained model and the model in which all paths were freely estimated was not reliable, $\Delta \chi^2 (10) = 11.68, p > .10$. These analyses therefore established partial structural equivalence for the model.

**Interpretation of the model.** The parameter estimates shown in Figure 2 are consistent with our hypotheses. Anger predicted wanting to punish the wrongdoer but did not predict wanting to
protect social image. Likewise, shame predicted wanting to protect social image did not predict wanting to punish the wrongdoer. Furthermore, wanting to punish the wrongdoer predicted verbal attack but did not predict verbal disapproval or withdrawal, whereas wanting to protect social image predicted verbal disapproval but did not predict verbal attack or withdrawal. This means that each emotion was associated with its predicted motivation, and each motivation was associated with its predicted behavioral outcome.

As expected, the anger pathway emerged for both groups. Anger predicted wanting to punish the wrongdoer. The more intense the participants’ anger, the more they wanted to punish the person who insulted them. Wanting to punish the wrongdoer in turn predicted verbal attack. The more participants wanted to punish the wrongdoer, the more they criticized and insulted the wrongdoer. Furthermore, wanting to punish the wrongdoer mediated the effect of anger on verbal attack. This mediation was full or partial depending on whether the direct effect of anger on verbal attack was reliable (i.e., statistically significant) or not. Although Baron and Kenny’s (1986) original guidelines for assessing mediation indicated that a presumed predictor should in principle be related to the outcome for a mediator to explain their relationship, this guideline has recently been assessed and changed in the light of recent methodological research and findings. Thus, Baron and Kenny have demonstrated that this step is not required for mediation to exist (see e.g., Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). This means that a variable X does not need to predict a variable Y for a mediator M to mediate or explain their relationship. This is indeed the case for the high honor group. As stated above, anger predicted verbal attack, but only for the low honor group. This means that wanting to punish the wrongdoer was a partial mediator of the effect for the low honor group. The size of the mediated effect was .13. In the case of the high honor group, wanting to punish the wrongdoer was a full mediator of the effect. The size of the mediated effect was .21. Thus, the anger pathway emerged for the two groups. The only difference was whether wanting to punish the wrongdoer was a partial or full mediator of the effect of anger on verbal attack.
We also found the expected moderated mediation for the shame-disapproval pathway. Wanting to protect social image mediated the effect of shame on verbal disapproval, but only for the high honor group. The more intense these participants’ shame, the more they wanted to protect their social image. Further, the more they wanted to protect their social image, the more they verbally disapproved of the wrongdoer’s behavior. Moreover, wanting to protect social image fully mediated this effect. The size of the mediated effect was .17.

Also in keeping with our hypotheses, the shame-disapproval pathway did not emerge for the low honor group. Among these participants, shame did not predict wanting to protect social image. Neither was wanting to protect social image a predictor of verbal disapproval. The group difference for this latter path was striking: The parameter estimate of this path was .48 for the high honor group, and close to zero for the low honor group. Thus, the shame-disapproval pathway was specific to the high honor group. In contrast, the shame-withdrawal pathway was specific for the low honor group. Shame predicted how much these participants withdrew from the situation. The more intense these participants’ shame, the more they withdrew from the insult situation.

Further, anger emerged as a more important predictor of behavior for the low honor than for the high honor group. Anger predicted verbal disapproval and withdrawal among the low honor participants. The more intense these participants’ anger, the more they verbally disapproved of the wrongdoer’s behavior and the less they withdrew from the situation. These are direct effects unmediated by either of the two motives.

The two motives were not reliably correlated with each other for either group. Verbal attack was positively and moderately correlated with verbal disapproval for both groups. Verbal attack and verbal disapproval were negatively and moderately correlated with withdrawal for both groups. Thus, we found a similar pattern of correlations between the constructs of the model for the two groups. As expected, anger and shame had a different pattern of relationship for the two groups.
Anger and shame were correlated -.28 among the low honor participants and .38 among the high honor participants.

Finally, we carried out additional SEM analyses to examine whether the anger, shame-disapproval, and shame-withdrawal pathways applied to both types of insult. We carried out the same type of structural equivalence analyses with type of insult as a moderator. We found no differences in paths or correlations across the two types of insult. Thus the three emotional pathways to insult shown in Figure 2 replicate for insults concerning competence and insults concerning interpersonal neglect.

Discussion

Research on culture and emotion has to date focused primarily on mean differences across cultures, i.e., on differences in ‘how much.’ There is a need, however, for more research on the processes by which culture shapes emotion (Bond & Tedeschi, 2001; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2004). In the present research we have focused on both means and processes with respect to emotional responses to insult.

Cultural Differences and Similarities in the Mean Level of Emotional Responses to Insult

We studied insults that were highly significant for the participants. This was reflected in participants’ ratings of the insult as very unfair and as implying strong devaluation of self. These insults were delivered by important and close others: family members, partners, spouses, boyfriends/girlfriends, and friends. As expected, participants felt very angry after being insulted. These findings are in line with previous research on the relationship context of anger. Anger is most likely to be elicited when an important or close other mistreats us (Averill, 1982, 1983). Indeed, we care most about how important and close others think of us.

The intensity of felt anger was not moderated by honor. Thus, both honor-oriented (Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch) and less honor-oriented (ethnic Dutch) participants felt equally angry about being insulted. These results are in line with earlier research on the role of insult in anger.
elicitation. Insults are prototypical antecedents of anger, and elicit intense anger in both honor cultures and non-honor cultures (see e.g., Averill, 1982, 1983; Cohen et al., 1996; Evers et al., 2005; Ortony et al., 1988; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000, 2002a; Shaver et al., 1986).

Moreover, we also did not find any gender differences in the intensity of felt anger. In similar vein, we did not find gender differences in how much participants wanted to punish the offender, or how much they verbally attacked the wrongdoer or disapproved of the wrongdoer’s behavior. These findings provide further support for the notion that gender differences in angry, antagonistic, and confrontational responses are not evident in the context of close relationships and when the anger-eliciting situation involves a clear provocation (see e.g., Archer, 2000, 2004; Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000, 2002a).

Participants also felt shame in response to the insult. Although participants felt more intense anger than shame, they still reported moderate levels of shame. As expected, honor did not moderate the intensity of shame. Shame following an insult reflects our discomfort about a negative social evaluation. Because how others think of us is central to the development of the self-concept (see e.g., Baumeister, 1999; McNulty & Swann, 1994; Schrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Swann, 1987), insult should elicit shame independently of cultural value orientation. This is indeed what we found in an earlier study comparing shame reactions to insult in an honor and a non-honor culture (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). Participants from both cultures felt the same degree of shame in response to being insulted.

This shows that shame can be elicited by negative social image. Previous research on shame has mostly focused on two other antecedents of shame: inferiority of self (e.g., judging myself as less intelligent than others) and the violation of norms (e.g., stealing; Lewis 2000; Ortony et al., 1988; Sabini et al., 2001; Tangney, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Smith et al., 2002). There is a clear difference between these antecedents and negative social image. In the cases of inferiority and violation of norms, negative self-evaluation elicits shame. We feel that we do
not measure up to others, or that we have done something wrong in relation to important social and moral norms. In other words, we blame ourselves and we feel shame. In the case of negative social image, others’ negative evaluations of us elicit shame. They blame us and we feel shame (see also Cooley, 1902).

Honor influenced how much participants wanted to protect their social image in response to the insult. As expected, those participants who cared more about their honor (Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch) wanted to protect their social image more than did those who cared less about their honor (ethnically Dutch). Thus, the greater importance of honor translated into a stronger motive to protect social image in the insult situation.

Three Different Emotional Pathways to Respond to Insult: Attack, Disapproval, or Withdrawal

Anger and shame were associated with different motivations and behaviors in response to the insult. In other words, anger and shame triggered different processes in response to the insult. For all participants, anger predicted wanting to punish the wrongdoer. The angrier participants felt, the more they wanted to punish the wrongdoer. Anger did not predict wanting to protect social image for either group. Further, wanting to punish the wrongdoer predicted the extent to which participants engaged in verbal attack. The more intense was participants’ desire to punish, they more they criticized and insulted the wrongdoer. Moreover, the relationship between anger and verbal attack was partially (for the low honor group) or fully (for the high honor group) explained by participants’ desire to punish the wrongdoer. This was the anger pathway to insult. It was not moderated by honor or type of insult. Thus, anger led all participants to verbally attack the person who insulted them because they wanted to punish him or her for either devaluing their competence or neglecting them.

By contrast, how important honor was to participants moderated shame-related processes in response to the insult. Among the low honor participants, shame led to withdrawal. The more intense was these participants’ shame, they more they withdrew from the situation. This finding is in line with previous research on shame in non-honor cultures. Shame is associated with a flawed self, is
less socially shared than other negative emotions, and leads to withdrawal in such cultures (Lewis, 2000; Finkenauer & Rimé, 1998; Fischer et al., 1999; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000; Tangney, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). This earlier research showed that shame is linked to withdrawal when the shame-eliciting situation involves inferiority of self or violation of norms. Our findings add to this literature by showing that people from non-honor cultures also withdraw when they feel shame as a result of being devalued by others.

The shame felt by the high honor participants led them to react in a very different way to the insult. They confronted the wrongdoer by expressing verbal disapproval. This relationship between shame and disapproval was fully explained by these participants’ desire to protect their social image. These results therefore support the expected moderated mediation for the shame-disapproval pathway. This suggests that those participants who were strongly concerned with honor disapproved of the wrongdoers’ behavior when they felt shame because they wanted to protect their social image. Shame did not predict wanting to protect social image; nor did this motive predict verbal disapproval among the low honor participants.

Shame can therefore trigger two different processes in response to an insult. One is characterized by disengagement from the situation, in the form of withdrawal. The other is characterized by engagement with the situation, in the form of disapproval. Cultural value orientation determines which process is likely to occur. Among people who are strongly concerned with honor, the shame–disapproval process is more likely to occur. Among people for whom honor is not a core cultural value, the shame–withdrawal process is more likely to occur. These different processes suggest that shame is a more empowering emotion in honor cultures than in non-honor cultures, in that it motivates people to act and confront a person who is mistreating them.

This conclusion is also supported by the correlations between anger and shame. Anger and shame were negatively correlated among the low honor participants, whereas they were positively correlated among the high honor participants. Thus anger and shame tended to be ‘either/or’
emotions among the ethnically Dutch. This was also reflected in the behaviors associated with the emotions. Among the ethnically Dutch, anger and shame led to different behaviors. Shame was uniquely associated with withdrawal; anger was associated with verbal attack (partly via motive to punish the wrongdoer) and verbal disapproval. Thus, anger was an empowering emotion for the low honor group in that it motivated them to confront the wrongdoer in two different ways: verbal attack and verbal disapproval.

For the more honor-oriented Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch, both anger and shame were associated with confrontational responses. Anger was linked (via motive to punish the wrongdoer) to the more antagonistic type of confrontation: verbal attack. Shame was linked (via motive to protect social image) to the less antagonistic form of confrontation: verbal disapproval. Thus, shame and the protection of social image empowered these participants to oppose being devalued by another person. They defended their honor by saying ‘I do not like what you did.’

Final Reflections

We asked participants to report a recent insult situation. This autobiographical, narrative method allowed us to study real insults that were significant to participants, thus enhancing the ecological validity of our results. This method also allowed us to examine participants’ insult narratives in detail via content analysis. In this way, we could account for the potential moderating effect of type of insult on emotional responses.

We regard the present research as advancing knowledge of emotional responses to insult in five important ways. First, shame can result from negative social image. Second, insult can onset three different type of emotional processes: an anger process, a shame-disapproval process, and a shame-withdrawal process. Third, these emotional processes replicate across two different types of insult: insults to one’s competence, and interpersonal neglect. Fourth, honor orientation moderates shame-related but not anger-related processes in insult. Finally, earlier research on insult and culture
has mainly focused on insults delivered by strangers or unspecified others. We have extended this research by studying insults in the context of intimate relationships.
References


Author Note

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Footnotes

1 Social image is also important in non-honor cultures. The terms ‘honor cultures’ and ‘non-honor cultures’ do not describe opposite poles with regard to the cultural importance of honor and social image. We use the terms ‘honor cultures’ to refer to cultures in which honor is a core cultural value and a core psychological concern. We use the terms ‘non-honor cultures’ to refer to cultures where honor is a less important cultural value and a less important psychological concern. Further, although honor is not the opposite of individualism, non-honor cultures usually emphasize individualistic values such as independence, autonomy, and mastery (Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b; Schwarz, 2004).

2 The protection of honor can in some cases involve the use of aggression. This is likely to happen when male honor is threatened. Research comparing U.S. Northern males with their Southern counterparts has shown that honor-oriented Southern men are more likely to use aggression in response to provocations or insults that (a) portray their female relatives as lacking sexual shame; or (b) threaten their masculinity (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Thus, threats to male honor can be met with aggressive responses. In this paper, we do not focus on male honor. We asked participants in our study to report a recent episode in which they had been insulted. None of the participants reported insults to male honor. Moreover, we asked participants whether they engaged in different forms of aggression in response to the insult: physically attacking the offender or damaging something that belonged to him or her (e.g., a car). None of the participants used either type of aggression to respond to the insult.

3 Gender differences in anger or shame intensity were only found when the content of an insult violates the masculine or the feminine honor codes (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). The masculine and feminine honor codes are sets of values and norms that define appropriate behaviors for the maintenance of men’s and women’s honor, respectively (see e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1999; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965).
From the 1960s until the mid-1970s, the Dutch government launched a campaign to recruit cheap labor in Mediterranean countries. Moroccan and Turkish nationals (mostly men) migrated to the Netherlands as a result of this campaign. After a few years, these migrants brought their families from their home countries. They represent the first generation and their children the second generation Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch (Werf, 1998). For this study, we recruited second-generation Moroccan/Turkish-Dutch. Moroccan-Dutch represent 1.88% (306,219) and Turkish-Dutch represent 2.16% (351,648) of the total population of the Netherlands (16,292,516; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; http://www.cbs.nl).

An important concern in this study was the language of the questionnaire. Moroccan-Dutch are usually fluent in Dutch and Moroccan-Arabic or the Berber language (Tamizight). Turkish-Dutch are usually fluent in Dutch and Turkish. We carried out a pilot study and consulted Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch persons about the most appropriate language for the questionnaire: Moroccan-Arabic, Tamizight, Turkish, or Dutch. All consulted participants agreed that the questionnaire should be in Dutch.

The standard method for estimating parameters in SEM is maximum likelihood. The constructs do not have a scale, a metric. In order to estimate a model all constructs need to be scaled. We did that by fixing the loading to 1.0 of one randomly chosen indicator per factor. Standard deviations and Pearson product-moment correlations among the indicators are available upon request from the first author.

The $\chi^2$ statistic has a significance test. When the p value associated with the $\chi^2$ value is larger than .05, model fit is considered to be adequate. Because the $\chi^2$ statistic is strongly dependent on sample size and affected by violations of multivariate normality, it is important to evaluate the goodness-of-fit using other indices. One of these indices is the ratio $\chi^2$ value by its degrees of freedom. The smaller the ratio, the better the fit. It is recognized that a value below 2 is a good fit. Further, it is generally accepted that a $SRMR$ value of $< .10$ and a $RMSEA$ value of $< .05$ is indicative
of a good fit. The $GFI$, $CFI$, $NNFI$, and $IFI$ range from 0 to 1, a higher value indicating a better fit.

For both indices, it is recognized that a value equal to or higher than 90 is indicative of good fit, and a value equal to or higher than .95 is indicative of excellent fit.
Table 1

*Honor value scale: Adjusted means, standard errors, and univariate effects*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morrocan/Turkish-Dutch (n = 77)</th>
<th>Ethnic Dutch (n = 72)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others see me as someone</strong></td>
<td><strong>Others regard me as someone</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj M SE</td>
<td>Adj M SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.35 .12</td>
<td>2.57 .12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F(1, 142) partial η²</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.65*** .13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. ***p ≤ .001.
Table 2
*Unfairness and devaluation of self: Adjusted means, standard errors, and univariate effects*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High honor group (n = 77)</th>
<th>Low honor group (n = 72)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M_{adj}$</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfairness</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devaluation of self</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
*Adjusted means and standard errors per group*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High honor-oriented group $(n = 77)$</th>
<th>Low honor-oriented group $(n = 72)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M_{adj}$</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting to punish the wrongdoer</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting to protect social image</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal attack</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal disapproval</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure Caption

*Figure 1.* Model of insult. The measurement aspect (i.e., constructs with indicators) and the structural aspect (i.e., paths) are represented in the Figure.

*Figure 2.* Model of insult with standardized parameter estimates for each path and group. Parameter estimates for high honor group / parameter estimates for low honor group. Dashed lines = parameter estimates not reliably different from zero. * = parameter estimate reliably different from zero.

Parameter estimates that are different across groups in bold.
Paths not represented in the model but estimated:
- Anger - verbal disapproval
- Anger - withdrawal
- Shame - verbal attack
- Wanting to punish the offender - withdrawal
- Wanting to protect social image - withdrawal
Parameter for paths not represented in the model:
Anger – verbal disapproval : .16 / .60*
Anger – withdrawal : .03 / .45*
Shame – verbal attack : .12 / .10
Wanting to punish the wrongdoer – withdrawal : .02 / .24
Wanting to protect social image – withdrawal : .27 / .24
Appendix
Types of Insult: Examples

Insults to competence
‘A family member told me that I would never be able to get a good job and that I would end up working in a bad place because I always get bad grades.’

‘I was having a heated discussion with a friend and this person asked me if I ever had my own opinion and if I was able to reflect about important issues. I found this insulting because it suggested that I am stupid.’

Interpersonal neglect
‘A good friend of mine lives abroad and did not have any time to visit me that last time she was in the Netherlands. But she had time for others and these people should be, in my eyes, less important to her.’

‘I was supposed to get together with a very good friend of mine, but then my friend found out that her boyfriend was free the afternoon we were supposed to meet. So she went to her boyfriend’s house but did not cancel her appointment with me. She only send me a text message telling me that she would call me later. She did not call me. She did not even call the day after we were supposed to meet, despite the fact that she always tells me how important I am to her.’