

Seventeen Early Peace Psychologists

By Floyd Rudmin

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Summary

Peace psychology has a history that is both long and prominent. However, that fact is little known and little appreciated, even among contemporary peace-activist psychologists. This article presents 17 brief biographies of psychologists who are part of this important heritage: Pythagoras, Jeremy Bentham, Franz Brentano, William James, August Forel, Ivan Pavlov, Sigmund Freud, James McKeen Cattell, Mary Whiton Calkins, Alexander Chamberlain, Alfred Adler, William McDougall, Edward Tolman, Gordon Allport, Gustav Ichheiser, Margaret Mead, and Charles Osgood.

It is important that more recognition and appreciation be given to the long and prominent history of psychology in peace research and peace activism. Historical and biographical perspectives on psychological theories of peace and war help us to evaluate their political utility in achieving present-day goals. However, the history of peace psychology is most important for present-day psychologists themselves. It can help us learn from past experiences and

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can also legitimize peace research and peace activism by providing a heritage and a set of role models with which to identify.

Indeed, one of the lessons of this history is that psychologists have often perceived themselves as acting alone, as pursuing their peace research in isolation, unaware of similar efforts in the past or in the contemporary period. Such isolation may contribute to the belief, apparently held by many psychologists today, that expressing a concern for peace taints them as unprofessional, unrealistic, unpatriotic, or otherwise unbecoming. Morawski and Goldstein (1985) even argued that peace psychology is faddish, manipulated, and self-serving, although a closer historical look puts those claims in doubt (Rudmin, 1986). Throughout the history of psychology and certainly into the contemporary period, many psychologists have used their professional skills and offices to promote peace, sometimes at great personal and professional cost. Their commitment and contributions should not be allowed to disappear from our past only because we are rushing into the future.

The following biographies highlight the careers of prominent peace-activist psychologists and briefly explain their thinking on peace and war. References are identified for further reading and research. These brief biographies were written over the past 4 years and early drafts have appeared in the irregular newsletters of the Canadian and U.S. Psychologists for Social Responsibility. They are collected here to make the ad hominem argument that many of the founders and leaders of modern psychology considered peace to be a central issue for psychology. The biographies are ordered chronologically.

Pythagoras¹

Although the focus of this article is on modern peace psychologists whose work has not been adequately appreciated, a history of peace psychology must go back at least 500 years before Christ, to Pythagoras (570 B.C.-490 B.C.). Even then, at the very origins of Western civilization, peace was an important topic for psychological theory and activism. Pythagoras is one of the earliest recorded psychologists, but he is known only through secondary sources (Vogel, 1966). He is famous for his mathematics and in the history of psychology is also noted for studying the psychophysics

of pitch and rate of vibration (Murray, 1988). But there is more to his psychology (Vogel, 1966). For example, Pythagoras argued that disease is due to behavior, not fate. He advocated music therapy and dance therapy for such psychological conditions as grief, fear, and depression. He conceived of life span development as a 7-stage progression, with a crisis at each transition. On gender differences in prosocial behavior, he noted that women were more sharing than men. And Pythagoras put peace, harmony, and friendship as the highest principles of individual development and social behavior.

Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos in the Aegean Sea. He studied first with Thales and Anaximander and then did “graduate studies” in Egypt. For his “postdoc,” he went to Babylon, reportedly arriving as a prisoner of war (Vogel, 1966). At the age of 40, he settled in Croton, on the southeast coast of Italy, and began his teaching career.

According to the Orphic mysticism that Pythagoras studied in the Middle East, all life shares a common divine spirit that is separated, entrapped, and confused in the material world (Cornford, 1912). Thus Pythagoras emphasized the equality of individuals (including women, children, slaves, and animals) and the importance of individual development toward self-control, reason, and transcendence. Vogel (1966) argued that this is the origin of Western humanitarian values: “It is here that the basic principles were found for a doctrine of the rights of man as a rational-moral being, and thence for international law” (p. 159). Pythagoras opposed all killing, including animal sacrifices and livestock for meat. War, he said, follows from want of self-control. He urged people “never to be abusive, not even to defend oneself against abuse” (Vogel, 1966, p. 138) and “to show themselves friendly to their enemies as soon as possible” (Vogel, 1966, p. 81). In nature, friendship is the expression of cosmic harmony and the unity of life, and Pythagoras urged the “friendship of people of different nations by a correct understanding of nature” (Vogel, 1966, p. 150).

Although unequalled in abstract, theoretical matters, Pythagoras was very practical about peace. Citizens and ruler alike attended his lectures and were persuaded by him. Neighboring tribes and cities sought his council. As a result, the ancient historians praised Pythagoras, not for his mathematics, but for his success as a peacemaker:

Porphyry and Iamblichus both report that Pythagoras appeared as the “liberator” of the Greek cities in Southern Italy and Sicily . . . these cities, which had been subjected by each other, some for many years, and others since recently, he filled with the spirit of liberation . . . Furthermore, we learn that Pythagoras put an effective stop to all strife, not only in the circle of his own followers, but also amongst their descendants for many generations, and in general in all cities in Southern Italy and Sicily, both within the cities themselves and in their relations to each other. (Vogel, 1966, p. 148).

That is good beginning for peace psychology.

Jeremy Bentham²

The life goal of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was to be the “Newton of Legislation”, that is, to base civil law and social order on psychological first principles (Everett, 1966). In this task, he tried to classify and quantify motivations and thus developed utilitarianism. This is the theory that we seek pleasure, broadly defined, and avoid pain, and that moral behavior is that which allows the greatest amount of pleasure for the largest number of people (Everett, 1966; Murray, 1988). Utilitarianism was a major part of the British empiricist tradition of psychology and moved into U.S. psychology as Thorndike’s Law of Effect and more recently as Skinner’s theory of operant reinforcement (Murray, 1988).

Needless to say, Bentham’s psychology was applied psychology, and Bentham was very much a social activist. In 1789, when England and France were the world’s superpowers, Bentham published his *Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*. Although the historical and technological contexts of his ideas are vastly different from those of our present day, it is surprising how unchanging are the issues and how up-to-date are his observations and proposals.

First, for Bentham, psychological theory is inherently egalitarian and internationalist. The concern is for the good of the human species, not just particular individuals or particular social groups. Bentham differentiated national populations from national governments and presented historical and economic arguments that any presumed benefits of war were far outweighed by the real economic and human costs to the populations involved. In place of war, he argued for the utility of mutual service, that is, trade. But

the trade he advocated was free trade, not that secured by force or by privileged treaty.

Second, Bentham coined the expression international law and was the first to propose a world court, or “Common Court of Judicature” as he called it. The psychological importance of a common court is that nations might make concessions to one another without affront to national pride. “Establish a common tribunal, the necessity for war no longer follows from differences of opinion. Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiters will save the credit, the honour of the contending parties” (Bentham, 1789/1939, p. 27). Bentham extended this idea to include the more visionary goal of a European federation, modeled on the Swiss League or the American Confederation. That vision is now becoming reality.

Third, Bentham also argued that military alliances lead to war more often than they prevent war. He called for international disarmament, based on multilateral, balanced limitations on military and naval forces, and he made a case for unilateral steps toward disarmament, not unlike Osgood’s graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension-reduction (GRIT) strategy.

Fourth, Bentham argued that foreign colonies, like our present-day Third World client states, are in fact economic liabilities. Claims to foreign lands increase the opportunity for disputes, and they lead to war “by men caring less about wars when the scene is remote than when it is nearer to home” (Bentham, 1789/1939, p. 13). He also argued that domination of foreign lands threatens the home nation’s government with corruption in its civil and military services.

Bentham’s psychology of international relations is remarkably modern. For example, prejudice is cognitive and projective:

Vulgar prejudice, fostered by passion, assigns the heart as the seat of all the moral diseases it complains of. But the principal and more frequent seat is really the head. . . . This is fortunate; for the power of information and reason over error and ignorance is much grater and much surer than that of exhortation. . . . It is because we do not know what strong motives other nations have to be just, what strong indications they have given of the disposition to be so --how often we ourselves have deviated from the rules of justice-- that we take for granted, as an indisputable truth, that the principles of injustice are in a manner interwoven into the very essence of the hearts of other men. (Bentham, 1789/1939, p. 28).

And Bentham turned another psychological argument in showing that security cannot be achieved by military force and fear. These lead only to disrespect, distrust, insecurity, an arms race, instability, and war:

Conscious or not conscious of your own bad intentions, you suspect theirs to be still worse. Their notion of your intentions is the same. Measures of mere self-defense are naturally taken for acts of aggression. The same causes produce, on both sides, the same effects; each makes haste to begin for fear of being forestalled. In this state of things, if on either side there happen to be a Minister, or a would-be Minister, who has a fancy for war, the stroke is struck, and the tinder catches fire. (Bentham, 1789/1939, p. 43).

Finally, Bentham argued that secrecy in international relations is a major cause of war, something we are relearning with the Iran-Contra affair: “It is mischievous. Over measures of which you have no knowledge you can apply no control. Measures carried on without your knowledge you cannot stop, how ruinous soever if you knew them” (Bentham, 1789/1939, p. 32). After-the-fact cessations of hostilities or punishments of the offending government officials are not remedies:

On what grounds could a Minister be punished for a war, even the most unsuccessful, brought on by any such means? “I did my best to serve you,” he would say. . . . “Against us other nations have no rights. If, according to the rules of judging between individual and individual, we are right, we are right by the rules of justice: if not, we are right by the laws of patriotism, which is a virtue more respectable than justice.” Injustice, oppression, fraud, lying, whatever acts would be crimes, whatever habits would be vices if manifested in the pursuit of individual interests, when manifested in pursuit of national interests become sublimated into virtue. (Bentham, 1789/1939, p. 34-35).

Thus Bentham anticipated Oliver North 200 years ago.

Indeed, Bentham was a good a psychologist of peace and war as exists today, or at any other time in history. And certainly he was more prominent and more widely read than most. His ideas of international law and a world court stand as remarkable successes. Yet his peace plan first appeared in 1789, prior to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and it was reprinted in 1939, all with little apparent effect.

Franz Brentano³

Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was one of the founders of modern psychology. He is considered the fountainhead of the schools of Gestalt psychology and phenomenological psychology (Wertheimer, 1987). His students included Sigmund Freud and Edmund Husserl, and those strongly influenced by his writings included Kulpe, Ward, and McDougall. Brentano was also perhaps the first avowed psychologist to actively advocate peace and to include it as one of the goals of psychology.

Brentano argued against the physiological and psychophysical trends of his contemporary psychology. Rather, he favored a psychology that focused on human consciousness and that addressed important social issues:

For the individual and even more for the masses, where the imponderable circumstances which impede and promote progress balance each other out, psychological laws will afford a sure basis for action. We may, therefore, confidently hope that psychology will not always lack both inner development and useful application. Indeed the needs which it must satisfy have already become pressing. Social disorders cry out more urgently for redress than do the imperfections in navigation and railway commerce, agriculture and hygiene. (Brentano, 1874, p. 24).

Brentano was trained as a Catholic priest, and his preparation in psychology was deeply historical, focusing on Aquinas and through him to Aristotle. It is probable that Brentano's antiwar principles derived more from his studies of Aristotle than from his church vocation. Consider his presentation of Aristotle's criticisms of Alexander the Great: "Bent on conquest, Alexander pursued nothing but war and ever greater expansion of his empire. But Aristotle declares that all states whose institutions are designed mainly with a view to war are ill conceived in principle" (Brentano, 1911, p. 2).

On many occasions in life, Brentano acted on moral principles, often to his own personal disadvantage. Even in his old age, he refused to live in a belligerent country and thereby compromise his pacifist principles. At the onset of World War I, he moved from his retirement home in Italy to Zurich, where he became ill and died (Wertheimer, 1987). Although not well known in North America, Brentano deserves more recognition for both his psychology and his principled activism.

William James⁴

William James (1842-1910) is probably still the foremost psychologist from the United States. His writings continue to be cited, and he remains a good entry point for research on most psychological topics, including peace. His ideas are well expressed and remarkably current: “When whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction views in intellectual refinement with the sciences of production, I see that war becomes absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity” (James, 1911a, p. 280).

James’ antimilitarism was focused on U.S. suppression of Philippine national independence (Allen, 1967; Perry, 1935). He wrote to the popular press, he translated a French officer’s diary of the invasion of Manila, he served as vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League, and he joined peace conferences. Although peace activism could not stop the momentum for war, James was satisfied with the establishment of a civil commission on the Philippines, and he worked toward such practical goals as the setting of a date for U.S. departure.

However, his more general analysis of militarism is pessimistic, based on the evolutionary theory that present-day societies have been selected for pugnacity. “Dead men tell no tales, and if there were any tribes of other types than this they have left no survivors. Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and a thousand years of peace won’t breed it out of us” (James, 1911a, p. 272). This instinct for pugnacity manifests as a popular demand for the excitement and the social discipline of war. James argued that populations want war and are fascinated by the horrors of war. Moreover, the motivation for war is now confounded by the rationalization that war is for peace.

“Peace” in military mouths today is a synonym for “war-expected.” The word has become a pure provocative, and no government wishing peace sincerely should allow it ever to be printed in a newspaper. Every up-to-date dictionary should say that “peace” and “war” mean the same thing. . . It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive *preparation* for war by nations *is the real war*, permanent, unceasing. (James, 1911a, 273-274).

James felt that pacifists fail to appreciate the full psychological reality of militarism. He argued that it is futile to try to root it out, but that efforts could be made to either divert or to delay war. The

first requires “a moral equivalent of war.” Heroism, discipline, and hardihood need to be expressed in socially positive projects. The second requires indefinitely postponing war by ad hoc actions: “We do ill, I think, therefore, to talk much of universal peace or of a general disarmament. We must go in for preventive medicine, not for a radical cure. We must cheat our foe, circumvent him in detail, not try to change his nature” (James, 1911b, p. 304).

August Forel⁵

August Forel (1848-1931) is almost unknown among North American psychologists. However, in the Europe of his day, his renown was such that, in honor of his 70th birthday, a whole issue of *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie* was devoted to articles on his work. He made significant contributions to many fields. In entomology, he discovered many species of ants, with particular interest in ant slavery and ant fungus farming. He was a correspondent with Darwin on this work and an early practitioner of comparative psychology, especially invertebrate sensory physiology and social psychology. In neuroanatomy and brain histology, he made the first microscopic sections of the brain. In 1886, 3 years before Ramon y Cajal, he described the neuron theory. In psychiatry, he was director of Zurich’s Burgholzli Asylum (1879-1898) where he was Bleuler’s mentor. Forel was a recognized authority on hypnosis and founded the *Journal für Psychologie und Neurologie*. However, his hospital experience made him realize midcareer that efforts would be more fruitful in preventative public health care, particularly for alcoholism (Forel, 1937).

Forel became publicly active on other reformist concerns, including socialism, feminism, sex education, eugenics, and a world language (Esperanto). Of importance here was Forel’s pacifism and antiwar political activism. As a Swiss-French student in a Swiss-German medical school during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, he felt personally the power of the repeating cycles of nationalistic arrogance and humiliation that provide the emotional fuel for war. He organized a makeshift field hospital to care for the wounded of a battle near the Swiss border, and encountered firsthand the realities of war. However, his focus on international peace did not really take hold until the onset of World War I,

although he was then handicapped by a hemiparesis from a stroke. He published widely on peace, and in 1914 his articles in the pacifist journals *Demain* and *La Voix de l'Humanité* were reprinted as *Les Etats-Unis de la Terre* (Forel, 1914). He argued for a world federalism, but with an emphasis on people rather than nations. Forel was among the first to link peace with individual human rights:

What is needed is not the protection of the so-called nationalities, but the protection of the elementary rights of every individual, women and children included, as well as the rights of every minority existing within every nation or State. (Forel, 1937, p. 316)

Forel was adamant about his pacifism, and in 1919 when elected for the Academy of the Russian Soviet, he declined “unless the deeds of violence ceased immediately” (Forel, 1937, p. 323).

The 1915 Anti-War Council in Holland adopted most of Forel’s ideas for a world order and included his call for guarantees of minority equality before the law, religious liberty, and the free use of minority languages. This success was repeated at the International Peace Congress in Berne. Throughout this period, Forel wrote widely for European newspapers on peace and in 1916 had a 50-page piece entitled “Supra-national Peace” published in a Hague newspaper. In 1917 in Berne, he organized a combined meeting of the Swiss Peace Societies, which led to the founding of the “Avant-Project d’une Societé des Nations,” which led in turn in 1919 to the League of Peoples’ Peace Congress. However, Forel was extremely disappointed with the eventual peace terms of World War I and considered the League of Nations, headquartered in Switzerland, to be “the very caricature of a genuine World League of Peoples” (Forel, 1937, p. 326). Forel’s disappointments did not daunt his hopes. He concluded his last testament thus: “We dead can do no more to alter the past; you living can give the future a different form. Courage, then, and to work!” (Forel, 1937, p. 343).

Ivan Pavlov⁶

Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) is another of the 19th century founders of psychology (Babkin, 1949). However, he did not make public statements in opposition to war until so encouraged by Einstein,

who, in the period between the two world wars, labored to organize an international moral force to oppose the arms race. As expressed in his correspondence with Freud, Einstein's goal was to recruit those who "combine the qualities of critical judgement, earnestness and responsibility. . . who are highly respected for their personal achievements. . . .to give moral power for action to many personalities whose good intentions are today paralyzed by an attitude of painful resignation" (Einstein, quoted in Nathan & Norden, 1968, p. 187). Ivan Pavlov was one of those who joined Einstein in that endeavor.

Throughout his long life, Pavlov was a Russian nationalist, especially in matters of culture. He was a man of high integrity and felt moral passion to be indispensable to science. Politically, he was a lifelong moderate liberal. Pavlov was very disturbed by the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and he opposed the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917. However, his strongest public antiwar statement came late in his career. In 1930, following the Kellogg-Briand Pact, outlawing war, he was an early and prominent promoter, along with Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Mann, and others, of a peace petition that concluded:

That the present armament policies do not furnish any safety to the peoples of the world and, in fact, lead all nations to economic disaster.
 That this policy makes a new war inevitable.
 That the declarations of peace in behalf of governments remain futile as long as these governments keep on delaying disarmament, which should be the logical sequel to renouncing war. (Nathan & Norden, 1968, p. 106)

Sigmund Freud⁷

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is perhaps the most renowned of all psychologists, with a powerful and continuing influence on modern thinking. Although Freud began his career as a neurophysiologist, his clinical psychiatric practice led him to interpretative social analysis, including issues of peace and war (Watson, 1978). Freud stands in the tradition of sociobiology, in which social and historical events are explained by individual psychology, which is explained

by biology. Thus his approach to peace entails the paradox of requiring populationwide psychotherapy to change individual psychology, but within the unchangeable confines of biological imperatives. This “Freudian peace paradox” – cautiously hopeful for the individual but pessimistic for the population – still inspires and plagues much of today’s peace research and peace activism.

Freud’s writing on peace and war are concentrated in three publications. “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (1915/1957a), *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930/1957b), and “Why War?” (1933/1957c). These were consolidated in 1939 by Rickman. The first paper, written 6 months into World War I, is curiously less concerned with the psychological causes of war than with the psychological causes of antiwar sentiment. These are disillusionment at the breakdown of civilization and discomfort at having to confront and accept the necessity of death. Freud derived his idea of the death instinct from biology and from 19th century German dialectic philosophy in which an instinct for life must be balanced by an instinct for death.

In *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), he argued that the sociopolitical structures and the neurotic socialization processes of civilization restrain the death instinct and make possible a tense, debilitating, and temporary peace. Freud concluded:

The fateful question for the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbances of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction. Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man. They know this, and hence comes a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness and their mood of anxiety. And now it is to be expected that the other of the two “Heavenly Powers,” eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary. But who can foresee with what success and with what result? (Freud, 1930/1957b, p. 145)

In 1932, following a League of Nations proposal, Einstein asked Freud “to suggest educative methods” to eliminate “certain psychological obstacles” to peace (Nathan & Norden, 1968, p. 188). Freud’s response, although couched within the inherent pessimism of sociobiology, had some positive offerings: (a) Permanent peace can be achieved only when all peoples and nations unite and transfer power to a central control, which would have both supreme judicial

authority and supreme executive force; (b) to endure, such a union must have minimal internal stratification of power and must be welded together by shared community sentiment as well as by brute force; (c) war has many motivations, moral and base, conscious and unconscious, and simple psychological theories will not explain war; (d) since the complete suppression of man's aggressive tendencies is impossible, every effort must be made to divert them to outlets other than warfare; (e) because the opposite of Death is Eros, evocation of sentiments of love, union, community, identity are antidotes to war; (f) Plato's utopian ideal of a class of rational, dispassionate scientist-rulers needs to be revived and instituted.

However, Freud was pessimistic that such measures as these had enough time to succeed: "They conjure up an ugly picture of mills that grind so slowly that, before the flour is ready, men are dead of hunger" (Freud, quoted in Nathan & Norgen, 1968, p. 200).

James McKeen Cattell⁸

In the history of U.S. psychology, few can match the record of success of James McKean Cattell (1860-1944). He studied with Lotze, Wundt, Hall, and Calton, was a charter member and president of the American Psychological Association (APA), edited at least six journals, and chaired Columbia's psychology department from 1891 to 1917 (Watson, 1978). His reputation is well known, but few know that he lost his academic position for expressing antimilitarist views (Gruber, 1972, 1975).

Cattell had long opposed militarism and its impositions on individual rights. Prior to U.S. entry into World War I, he had urged a cease-fire and negotiations. However, when the United States did enter the war, he joined the psychology committee of the National Research Council to promote national efficiency. One of Cattell's sons enlisted in army, but the other was arrested in May, 1917, for distributing antidraft pamphlets. In August of 1917, Cattell wrote to his congressman in support of "a measure against sending conscripts to fight in Europe against their will" (Gruber, 1975, p. 196). Cattell had acted with intention. Columbia's President Butler had earlier threatened faculty about antiwar activism. Cattell's letter to Congress carried his Columbia return address

although he had always made it a principle not to link the university with his politics. On October 1, 1917, the trustees of Columbia dismissed Cattell for “sedition, treason, and opposition to the enforcement of the laws of the United States” (Gruber, 1975, p. 204). In his defense, Cattell challenged the view that the war was a great crusade:

I opposed the German Kaiser and his military bureaucracy when Theodore Roosevelt was dining with him, the trustees of Columbia University were naming a chair in his honor, and Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler [president of Columbia] was saying that “he would have been chosen monarch – or chief executive – by popular vote of any modern people among whom his lot might have been cast.” (Cattell, quoted in Gruber, 1975, p. 196)

Of Columbia’s faculty, anthropologist Franz Boas was the only one of prominence to come to Cattell’s defense. John Dewey, for one, did not. Cattell was hurt by the dismissal and sued the president and trustees for libel. He won a large out-of-court settlement but was never again able to obtain an academic position. However, his sacrifice helped secure freedom of expression for university faculty, even in times of war.

Mary Whiton Calkins⁹

Although women are rare in the early history of academic psychology, it is heartening to note that the first women to complete a Ph.D. in psychology also spoke out against militarism. Mary Calkins (1863-1930) began her studies with William James in 1890 (Calkins, 1930). Edmund Sanford and Hugo Munsterberg were two of her other teachers. Although her dissertation was accepted by Harvard’s Department of Philosophy and Psychology, the University refused to award a Ph.D. to a woman. Nevertheless, Mary Calkins went on to found a psychology laboratory at Wellesley College and to build a successful career around her work on self psychology and on classical philosophy.

In 1917, at the height of World War I, she published a paper entitled “Militant Pacifism.” She acknowledged that humans unfortunately had an instinct for pugnacity, but argued, like James before her, that that did not make the abolition of war a hopeless

ideal. Her ideas clearly foreshadowed the more recent “frustration-aggression” hypothesis.

Pugnacity is always incited by opposition. Animals and men alike fight when they are thwarted or balked in the free play of any instinct, or (if we confine ourselves to human pugnacity) in the exercise of any volitional activity. (Calkins, 1917, p. 71)

She argued further that pugnacity was especially potent when combined with instincts of acquisitiveness, fear, or maternal and social protectiveness.

She also discussed the appeal of the martial virtues of vigor, courage, devotion, selflessness, and sacrifice. Martial virtues may seem to be little appreciated in some present societies, but they are still important and appealing to many people in many societies. They should not be dismissed out-of-hand. For a solution to the problem of war, Calkins advocated the redirection or the subordination of the instinct of pugnacity to goals of fighting “human ignorance, human injustice, and the great nature-evils” (Calkins, 1917).

Alexander Chamberlain¹⁰

Alexander Chamberlain (1865-1914) was an ethnolinguist and developmental psychologist at Clark University (Boas, 1914; Gilbertson, 1914; Wilson, 1914). In 1892, he received the first ever Ph.D. in anthropology, but his interest in the “generic universals” of human behavior led him to developmental psychology, then called “the anthropology of the child.” Chamberlain’s productivity was legendary. In his 28-year career, he published over 700 titles, covering a wide range of topics. He compiled an annual bibliography of anthropology, edited the *Journal of American Folklore* and the *Journal of Religious Psychology*, and was the most prolific contributor to *Pedagogical Seminary*, the forerunner of the *Journal of Genetic Psychology*.

Although Chamberlain supported such populist, democratic causes as the single tax, women’s rights, labor unionism, and prohibition, it was his anti-imperialism that was uniquely linked to this academic work in anthropology and child development. The militarists and imperialists of his day, as well as the Fascists of the 1930s and 1940s, justified themselves with natural selection the-

ories of “the survival of the fittest.” Chamberlain stood those arguments on their heads: Continuing adaptability and survival require the cultivation of diversity, not its destruction. Children and “undeveloped” or “primitive” peoples are the gene pool, in today’s terms, underlying cultural and political-economic evolution. He wrote extensively on beneficial cultural transfers from the so-called “lower” races to the “higher” races. In public lectures, in the popular press, and in political meetings, he argued passionately against the destruction of diversity in the world cultures by imperialist conquest and imperialist mass education. His most forceful and accessible statement of this type was his 1902 article entitled “The Contact of ‘Higher’ and ‘Lower’ Races”:

Empires of conquest carry with them into the world at their birth the poison that destroys them sooner or later . . . The After-effects of war more than cancel its immediate seeming benefits. In the end, war accomplishes nothing of evolutionary value . . . The retort of the Spaniard, “Why don’t you Americans make Russia behave herself?” reminds us of the boy’s remark to the adult who sought to rule him by physical force, “Why don’t you take on somebody your own size?” But as a mere matter of human evolution, the nation that resorts to war loses in the long run. The survival of the fittest must now be achieved by the fittest means. America in the twentieth century A.D. cannot survive by means that failed to keep alive Babylonia in the twentieth century B.C. (Chamberlain, 1902, p. 510)

The core of the real imperialist education is not to let the pupil be free to act according to his knowledge . . . In such circumstances education is a delusion and a snare. Education, no more than a nation, can exist half slave and half free, - its motto, too, is liberty or death . . . A Malay by evolution means something higher than an American by the nickel-in-the-slot-process. Human being made by nature, not those unmade by man, give the world the variety by which it lives. (Chamberlain, 1902, p. 519)

Although Chamberlain was writing in the context of U.S. suppression of Philippine national independence, his analyses apply equally well to the present-day policies of many large and powerful nations toward minority groups and neighboring societies.

Alfred Adler¹¹

Alfred Adler (1870-1937) was a member of the original small group whom Freud invited in 1902 for weekly discussions on

neurosis. However, Adler's earlier interest in public health from a social science perspective was in marked contrast to Freud's interest in neurology from a natural science perspective. Thus Adler was developing a humanistic ego psychology while Freud was focused on the mechanistic dynamics of libido and repression. In 1911, Freud forced Adler from the Psychoanalytical Society, and nine others left with him.

Adler was a social activist in theory and in practice. He opposed violence of all forms and promoted social interest in the individual and in the group. To him, mental health implied "socially affirmative action" (Adler, 1929, p. 35) and social responsibility was fundamental to the practice of psychology.

The honest psychologist cannot shut his eyes to social conditions which prevent the child from becoming a part of the community and from feeling at home in the world, and which allow him to grow up as though he lived in enemy country. Thus the psychologist must work against nationalism when it is so poorly understood that it harms mankind as a whole; against wars of conquest, revenge, and prestige; and against unemployment which plunges people into hopelessness; and against all other obstacles which interfere with the spreading of social interest in the family, the school, and society at large. (Adler, 1956, p. 454)

In 1928, Adler contributed an article to a volume entitled *Violence and Non-Violence: A Handbook of Active Pacifism*, edited by Franz Kobler (1928) for War Resisters International. Among the 43 contributors from 12 countries were Mohandas Gandhi, Romain Rolland, Norman Thomas, and Stefan Zweig. Adler wrote:

War is not the continuation of politics with other means, but the greatest social crime against the solidarity of humanity . . . The typical ideal of our time is still the isolated hero for whom fellow human beings are objects . . . Social feelings require a different ideal, that of the saint, purified, to be sure, from . . . belief in magic. (Adler, 1966, p. 171)

Adler (1956) proposed several original and, even today, provocative ideas concerning war. For example, he theorized that it was war, with its high valuation on physical strength, that led to the original subjugation of women, and he claimed that "the inequality of women is greater in warlike countries" (p. 452). Another of his arguments that merits critical consideration today is that national populations should not be burdened with punitive reparations and collective war guilt. Populations are misled and coerced into war,

and those who volunteer, do so for reasons of immaturity and personal difficulties.

It is not the people who should be asked to do servitude and penance; but those who thought up this degradation, materialized it, and participated in it with forethought who should be held responsible for it. Let us rather ask forgiveness of the people and let us consult how the harm done them can be made good. (Adler, 1956, p. 458)

As a social democrat, Adler set himself apart from the Bolshevik revolution right from the start because of its violence:

The rule of Bolshevism is based on the possession of power. Thus its fate is sealed. While this party and its friends seek ultimate goals which are the same as ours, the intoxication of power has seduced them. Now the terrible mechanism is automatically released in the unprepared minds of men whereby attacks are answered by counterattacks, without regard for the goals of society, only because the mutual will to power is threatened. Cheap reasons are given to justify action and reaction. Fair becomes foul, foul becomes fair! (Adler, 1956, p. 457)

In an expanded version of the same article, he likened Bolshevism to a puppet without a soul, and argued that it will be worthless if it succeeds and “if it fails, it will have compromised socialism and rendered it unpalatable” (1919/1982, p. 29).

In the end, Adler suffered personal tragedy from political violence. His eldest daughter, Valentine, who had moved to Russia after the Nazis came to power in Germany, was arrested in February 1937, during the Stalinist purges, never to return. Adler tried without success to intervene on her behalf. In April, 1937, he wrote, “Vali causes me sleepless nights. I am surprised how I can endure it.” A few weeks later, “I cannot sleep and cannot eat. I do not know how much longer I can endure it” (Manaster, Painter, Deutsch & Overholt, 1977, pp. 23, 20). A few days later, on May 28, while on a lecture tour in Scotland, Adler died on the street of heart attack.

William McDougall¹²

William McDougall (1871-1938) was the first well-known social psychologist. He turned from medicine to social psychology as a result of an anthropological expedition to Borneo (McDougall, 1930). It was there, too, that he saw the successful sublimation

of combat to competition, as modeled by the Olympic Games (McDougall, 1899). During World War I, he worked as a clinical psychologist in a British military hospital. After the war, he applied himself to the analysis and promotion of peace strategies (McDougall, 1924, 1927, 1931).

McDougall's peace activism was marked by political realism. First, he saw that continuing peace requires economic and social justice and well-being. Second, nations would never totally disarm. Third, arms reduction talks are just public show unless the underlying belligerency between nations is addressed. Fourth, discoveries in science and technology cannot lead to security.

And if some physicist were to realize the brightest dream of this kind and teach us to unlock the energy within the atom, the whole race of man would live under the threat of sudden destruction, through the malevolence of some cynic, the inadvertence of some optimist, or the benevolence of some pessimist. (McDougall, 1931, pp. 44-45)

Finally, he saw that America would be crucial to a successful peace and he was very concerned that the American citizen, "lapped in comfort and security," did not understand the realities of war. Based on his hospital experiences, McDougall described numerous vignettes of war brutality and admonished American: "Multiply these scenes and these figures a millionfold, add the tears and terrors of a hundred million women and children, and you will still have an inadequate picture of the Great War" (McDougall, 1927, p. xiii).

McDougall found some truth in claims that war was due to political-military-industrial leadership, to arms buildups, to population pressures, to economic rivalries, and to nationalism. But he concluded that war is caused by nations fearing aggression by other nations. He faulted most peace plans, including pacifism, international law and arbitration, disarmament and arms reductions, economic pacts, and world federalism. Instead, hearkening back to the social psychology of Hobbes, he argued that a League of Nations alone should be allowed to maintain an air force, to be used to enforce World Court decisions.

Edward Tolman¹³

Edward Tolman (1886-1959) is well known for his cognitive behaviorism, with its focus on molar behavior and purposiveness.

However, social activism was also an important part of his career (Crutchfield, Krech, & Tyron, 1960). For example, he served on the national board of the ACLU and successfully opposed loyalty oaths at Berkeley during the McCarthy era. As a Quaker pacifist, Tolman opposed war, not absolutely, but pragmatically. For example, during World War I he was fired from Northwestern because, he believed, he had supported a student pacifist publication. Yet he did not refuse his draft call-up late in the war, and during World War II he did join the Office of Strategic Services (Tolman, 1952).

It was during World War II that Tolman made his strongest efforts to recruit psychology to the cause of peace (Tolman, 1941, 1942, 1943). In his chairman's address to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues in 1941, Tolman began: "There has come a frenzy in the tides of men. Social forces whose powers we have not understood . . . have sucked us into a dark whirlpool. What, as psychologists, ought, or can, we say at such a time?" (Tolman, 1941, p. 205). He realized, however, that whatever might be said about war would not be objective.

War is horror, cruelty, death; but it is also selflessness, devotion, exaltation . . . And each of us, according to his temperament, tends either to minimize the horror and the agony and to magnify the devotion and exaltation or, conversely, to minimize the devotion and the exaltation and to magnify the horror and the agony. When, then, anyone seeks to analyze the nature of war and to determine the psychological reasons behind it, the conclusions he arrives at are bound to be in part but an expression of his own bias. (Tolman, 1942)

For himself, it was with "an extreme and even neurotic disgust with, and horror at, war" (1942, p. x) that he analyzed it with the goal to preventing it.

I shall rush in where angels fear to tread. Knowing but little sociology, economics, history or political science, I, as a mere psychologist, will adapt concepts derived from the behavior of rats and chimpanzees, combine them with certain Freudian notions, and then attempt to apply the result to the most central and the most grievous problems of human society. But perhaps the times are such that any sincere attempt, however bizarre, to throw further light upon our present darkness is to be accepted. (Tolman, 1942, p. xii-xiii).

Tolman's analysis was a combination of the frustration-aggression, the authoritarian personality, and the ethnocentrism theories of war. He argued that humans have biological and social drives,

which if frustrated, lead to drive-conversions and violence. War is the neurotic product of self-abasement and repressed hostility toward parents and superiors that becomes projected onto outgroups.

Tolman's recommended solution was that we must put aside our civilization's earlier ideals of "Spiritual Man," "Intellectual Man," "Economic Man," and "Heroic Man," and create instead a new ideal of the "Psychologically Adjusted Man." This would require three practical goals:

- (A) We must evolve an economic order which will abolish too great biological frustrations.
 - (B) We must invent an educational and social system which encourages and makes possible easy identification with parents or other acceptable authorities.
 - (C) We must create a supranational state to which individuals, wherever they may be, can become more loyal than they will be to their narrower national groups.
- (Tolman, 1942, p. 102).

He later (1943) emphasized the need to replace ethnocentric nationalism with supranational identification and political organization. Specific proposals were (a) a common world language and a common basic education curriculum, (b) a world flag, anthem, currency, and postage, (c) world goals of eliminating war and of more evenly distributing the world's wealth, (d) the organization of an international government, with a secretariat, legislature, court, and executive head, and (e) somewhat controversial, the creation of a common enemy, such as minority groups that might seek to break ways from the world state.

Innis (1989) argued that Tolman's efforts had little effect. However, he was one of the leading organizers of a 1945 statement by psychologists entitled "Human Nature and the Peace," which was supported by most of the APA membership, and which was sent to all U.S. Congressmen and many U.S. newspapers. These ideas were carried into UNESCO's program by Gordon Allport (1945).

Gordon Allport¹⁴

Gordon Allport (1897-1967) is known for his social psychology and personality theory. He was also deeply concerned that psychology make a significant contribution to a lasting and effective peace

(Allport, 1967). At the close of World War II, he organized the preparations of a statement that was supported by most of the APA membership (Allport, 1945). Ten points were developed, generally arguing that war was not innate to human nature, that peoples can be educated and socially engineered to minimize prejudice and nationalism, that group aspiration should be respected, and that postwar isolationism should be avoided.

Allport later joined the UNESCO project to study the international tensions that lead to war (Allport, 1950a, 1950b). He argued (a) that individual aggressiveness cannot explain war since wars are nationally organized and employ nonpugnacious individuals, and (b) that capitalist social organization cannot explain war since noncapitalist societies of all types have waged war. Rather, he felt that “the indispensable condition for war is that people must expect war and must prepare for war, before, under a war-minded leadership, they make war” (Allport, 1950a, p. 48). He recommended the promotion of internationalism through work camps, world symbols, and world health projects. The Common Statement of the UNESCO report (1950a) incorporated most of his APA petition points.

Allport was successful with the APA membership and with the UNESCO forum. While both the *Economist* (Nov. 20, 1946) and the *New Yorker* (Dec. 11, 1946) endorsed the UNESCO effort to define “a minimum area of working agreement between opposing ideologies,” they were skeptical that it would be effective. However, Allport’s recommendations against vengeful treatment of vanquished peoples and against postwar isolationism were widely accepted and were applied. Allport’s own assessment was that “our formula for peace may seem somewhat quixotic, but it still stands as a tribute to the social ideals of our profession” (Allport, 1967, p. 17).

Gustav Ichheiser¹⁵

Gustav Ichheiser (1897-1969) was a Jewish Polish-Austrian social psychologist who developed early cognitive theories of personality, person perception, social attribution, occupational psychology, and ethnic relations (Rudmin, Trimpop, Kryl, & Boski, 1987). He should be known, for example, for cognitive dissonance and for the fundamental error of attribution. However, he is

virtually unknown because cognitive theories were not acceptable in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, and because he was socially isolated by a tragic career. Three telling events in his life were (a) losing his entire family in Nazi Poland and yet being stigmatized as an anti-Semite because he argued that stereotyping is normal, functional, and unavoidable, (b) losing his job in a Chicago publishing firm in 1941 because he said at a public psychology meeting that winning World War II would not bring permanent peace, and (c) being confined to a state mental hospital for more than a decade because of his poverty and suspiciousness. A Rockefeller Foundation grant to write on the social psychology of war and peace led to his release from psychiatric supervision, but the resulting monograph was not published and seems to have been lost. In 1969, Ichheiser committed suicide.

Ichheiser's work on international relations was an extension of his theory of misperception in interpersonal relations (Ichheiser, 1941). He argued that ethnocentric, stereotyping, and outgroup hostility are psychologically adaptive, socially functional, and historically shaped cognitive processes. Although a source of misperception, they are necessary and inevitable, and cannot be explained away or "therapized" away by well-intentioned psychologists. In line with his realism, he warned against ideological biases in peace research, for example, confusing "peace" with an unjust status quo, as happens when psychologists define all reactions to frustration as aggression (Ichheiser, 1950, 1970). Ichheiser also thought it important to unmask unconscious nationalisms that parade behind democratic, egalitarian, humanitarian, or internationalist ideals.

First, it is a basic fact and fate of mankind that it is sub-divided into ethnic and similar groups. This fact and fate must be recognized and acknowledged. Men are not simply "human beings."

Second, since people *are* in fact nationalists, that is, since their perception of social reality is profoundly influenced by their cultural-national background, it would be better if they would at least be aware of this state of affairs.

Third, we should discard our naively optimistic presupposition that there is some kind of a "pre-established harmony." . . . We should rather recognize the fact that tensions, antagonisms, conflicts, misunderstandings among various cultural groups are a normal state of affairs.

Fourth, I also suggest that we cease lamenting and denouncing the “irrational factors” in personality and society . . . A society without irrational beliefs is an unknown entity and in practical terms a complete impossibility.

Finally . . . we should establish a committee, or a research group, in which social scientists (including psychologists, of course) of different cultural backgrounds . . . would tell each other frankly what they consider in each other to be a bias, false silent assumption, blind spot, culturally distorted interpretation, prejudice, and the like. For, obviously, not only the common man but also the social scientist is profoundly affected by his cultural background . . . The illusion of a culturally independent objectivity is probably the most serious occupational disease of social scientists. (Ichheiser, 1970, pp. 129-131)

Margaret Mead¹⁶

Margaret Mead (1901-1978) is not commonly known as a psychologist. However, she completed an M.A. in psychology at Columbia and, in her own words, “left psychology to live, in many ways, always within its precincts” (Mead, 1974, p. 295). This is well exemplified in her career-long concern with issues of war and peace, which she often addressed from a psychological perspective (Mead, 1950, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1968a, 1968b). Of particular interest are her still controversial views on violence and sex temperament and on human factors in attempted solutions to the East-West nuclear confrontation.

First, Mead believed that sex differences in violence are very largely socialized. In the Arepesh, she found a society in which men were caring and warfare was unknown. However violence was present. She concluded that “belief that women are naturally more interested in peace is undoubtedly artificial, part of the whole mythology that considers women to be gentler than men.” (Mead, 1935, p. 315). On the contrary, if there were biological differences, women would be the more violent. “The female characteristically fights only for food or in defense of her young, and then fights to kill, and may be without the built-in checks on con-specific murder that are socially or biologically present in males” (Mead, 1968a, p. 220).

However, Mead made a clear distinction between violence and war. The latter was organized, socially sanctioned, and out-group directed. War was a cultural invention with definite social func-

tions and was feasible as long as it was limited. However, all of that changed with the advent of weapons of mass destruction.

Once we knew that it was possible for a people to destroy the enemy, themselves, and all bystanders, the world itself changed. And no sentence written with that knowledge of man's new capacity could be meshed into any sentence written the week before. (Mead, 1965, p. xii)

Without a future for anyone, anywhere, human life loses its meaning. There is no rationale for the simplest act, no reason to save or to plan or build; no reason to vote or to sit in committees; no reason to plant or to pray. (Mead, 1962, p. 135)

Mead argued strongly that success in international negotiations and in restructuring our international social world for peace would require consideration of our cultural and psychological needs and inertias. She insisted that the functions of war much be understood and allowed alternative courses. She noted that different cultures posed different standards of success in negotiations – for example, for Russia: “Did I put forth my full strength?”; for the U.S.: “Did I win or lose?” Finally, Margaret Mead noted that hope for international peace may come from the very motivation for war:

This means that warfare, especially warfare in which the total population is involved, is based not on man's impulse to destroy but on his desire to protect. This makes the problem of how to establish psychological equivalences to war a much easier one. For every society – and a world-wide society more than any other – depends for its continued existence on the active vigilance and the cherishing care of its citizens. (Mead, 1962, p. 137).

Charles Osgood¹⁷

Although many psychologists have invested themselves in peace issues, few have used their professional skills and offices with the strategic acumen of Charles Osgood (born 1916). His efforts and methods may be good models to follow (Osgood, 1980).

Osgood made his reputation in psycholinguistics. However, he also developed a de-escalation strategy for backing away from a global nuclear war. This strategy he called graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension-reduction (GRIT). It calls for small, unilateral steps by one side away from confrontation, with the

expectation that the other side will respond in kind (Osgood, 1962, 1980).

Osgood's promotion of GRIT is remarkable. His APA presidency provided speaking invitations that he used for this purpose, and it paid his trips to Washington where he lobbied Congressmen and White House aides (Osgood, 1980). He was a prolific writer and speaker, making an effort to disseminate widely his de-escalation strategy (see Osgood, 1980, for a list of references). He sent a copy of his book on GRIT (Osgood, 1962) to President Kennedy. He was a consultant for the Pentagon and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, while running seminars for the American Friends Society (Osgood, 1980). He testified before two congressional foreign relations committees (Osgood, 1966a, 1973). He organized three policy conferences, to which he invited people from academics, government, and the mass media (Osgood, 1980). He wrote *Perspective in Foreign Policy* (Osgood, 1966b), then published and distributed it himself to oppose as fast as possible new arguments and plans to fight and win a nuclear war.

Osgood did achieve some success. GRIT was used in the de-escalation from both the Berlin and Cuban crises. Kennedy also used it in his "Strategy for Peace" when he unilaterally halted U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing. Khrushchev responded by halting production of a line of strategic bombers. Perhaps Osgood's greatest success is the adoption of GRIT strategies by the current Soviet government. However, the use of GRIT in U.S. foreign policy ended with Kennedy's assassination in 1963, and escalation strategies dominated since then. Osgood felt that he had made an impact on the study of conflict resolution and that he had influenced the Kennedy administration. However, he was generally frustrated with the resistance of political and military leaders to policies of de-escalation and felt that they had too much interest in the military-industrial complex and in the promotion of geopolitical confrontation.

Conclusion

This is by no means an exhaustive account of psychologists who have been active in the promotion of peace. Numerous others, both renowned and unknown, from distant history and from recent de-

caedes, have made similar efforts and equally significant contributions. Among those deserving of recognition are Franz Alexander, Norman Agnell, Francisca Baumgarten, John Bowlby, Jerome Bruner, Hadley Cantril, Noam Chomsky, Edouard Claparede, Martin Conway, Morton Deutsch, Leonard Doob, D. D. Droba, George Dudycha, Knight Dunlap, E. F. Durban, Charles Ellwood, Erik Erickson, John Flugel, Jerome Frank, Morris Ginsberg, Edward Glover, Ralph Gundlach, Fritz Heider, Leonard Hobhouse, Immanuel Kant, Daniel Katz, Herbert Kelman, Otto Klineberg, Eugene Lerner, Gustave LeBon, Robert Lifton, Rensis Likert, Kurt Levine, Mark May, George Mead, Karl Menninger, Gardner Murphy, Theodore Newcomb, Thomas Pear, Luigi Petrollo, Anatol Rapoport, Carl Rogers, M. Brewster Smith, Herbert Spencer, Ross Stagner, Harry Stack Sullivan, George Stratton, Wilfred Trotter, Robert Waelder, Ralph While, William While, and Quincy Wright. And this list, too, should not be considered exhaustive.

Also, the method of biographical survey is not the only method of historical analysis, or indeed the best method. For example, Jacobs (1989) recently focused on the efforts of U.S. psychologists during the post-World War II period. What the biographical method gains in personal reality and humanistic appeal, it pays for by losing the historical contexts of the psychological theories and of the propagation of those theories into social and political action.

If anything, these biographies emphasize the isolation of the individual psychologists in their efforts, their sacrifices, and their successes. Indeed, one of the most noticeable features of the early peace psychologists was their individual isolation. They thus stand relatively independent of one another in their thinking. This allows a kind of “biographical factor analysis” of psychological thought about peace and war. Consider some of the common threads in these 16 biographies:

Peace depends on human rights & social justice.	Pythagoras, Bentham, Forel, Chamberlain, Cattell, Adler, McDougall, Tolman, Allport, Ichheiser
Prejudice & outgroup hostility are errors.	Bentham, Forel, Freud, Chamberlain, Adler, Tolman, Allport, Ichheiser, Mead
Committed personal action is necessary.	Brentano, James, Forel, Pavlov, Chamberlain, Cattell, Adler, Osgood

World court and/or a federation of nations is necessary.	Bentham, Forel, Freud, McDougall, Tolman, Allport, Mead
War corrupts societal & individual integrity.	Pythagoras, Bentham, Brentano, Freud, Cattell, Chamberlain, Adler, Tolman
War's virtues need consideration.	Bentham, James, Freud, Calkins, Tolman, Mead
War is technologically obsolete.	James, Pavlov, Freud, McDougall, Mead
Innate pugnacity needs to be diverted.	James, Freud, Calkins, Tolman, Mead
War is caused by its preparation.	Bentham, James, Pavlov, McDougall, Allport

Finally, the historical depth of these biographies suggests that peace psychology has not been as unsuccessful as commonly believed. Certainly, it is discouraging to look for the impact of individual peace psychologists in the few years or decades after their work. But there is no reason to presume that psychologists or anyone else can change national values, beliefs, or policies in such short time spans. However, looking at centuries and half centuries, there may be reason to be optimistic, even proud. Some of the successes for which psychologists might take some credit include (a) the World Court, (b) the United Nations, (c) the European Parliament, (d) nonvengeful treatment of defeated nations, (e) emphasis on human rights and on social and economic justice, (f) use of de-escalation strategies by the United States and the Soviet Union, (g) the right of university faculty to publicly oppose war, (h) belief that prejudice is an error, (i) belief that war is increasingly obsolete, and (j) belief that international competition sublimates war. That is a good beginning for peace psychology. For a start.

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¹ This and succeeding notes give the reader sources for the author's preliminary investigation of the psychologist noted. For Pythagoras, see Rudmin, F. W. (Submitted 1989). *Psychologists for Social Responsibility Newsletter*.

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