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History and Humiliation
The Washington Post, March 28, 2003
Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy
As
the battle for Baghdad begins and public opinion in the Middle East is further
inflamed, the prevailing view in Washington remains that military victory will
fix everything in the end. Two notions drive this view: that the defeat of
Saddam Hussein will put the militant forces in the Middle East on the defensive
and that the overwhelming exercise of American power will command respect, thus
compliance, in the region, even if it doesn't win hearts. Neither is supported
by historical trends.
It
is reasonable to argue that forces of militancy in the Middle East went on the
defensive after the 1991 Gulf War. At that time, those hoping for radical
change in the region had pinned their hopes on the power of states such as
Iraq. The sense of Arab vulnerability after the demise of the Soviet Union
created a vacuum of power that Saddam Hussein sought to fill. But the defeat of
Iraq in 1991 dashed the aspirations of those seeking radical change.
Today
militancy in the Middle East is fueled not by the military prospects of Iraq or
any other state but by a pervasive sense of humiliation and helplessness in the
region. This collective feeling is driven by a sense that people remain
helpless in affecting the most vital aspects of their lives, and it is
exacerbated by pictures of Palestinian humiliation. There is much disgust with
states and with international organizations.
Few
in the Middle East believe Iraq has a serious chance in its war with the United
States, and pictures of overwhelming American power exercised against an
inferior Iraqi army have only reinforced the belief that Iraq is a helpless
victim. Unfortunately, the inspirations for overcoming weakness are non-state
militant groups, which serve as models that many hope to emulate. The defeat
and occupation of Iraq are likely to exacerbate the sense of humiliation and to
increase militancy in the region.
It
is instructive to look back at similar moments in regional history, when states
failed to deliver. The collective Arab defeat by Israel in the 1967 war left
Arabs in despair after they had put their faith in the potential of Egypt's
president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. It was non-state militant groups that revived
hope for change. Within months independent Palestinian groups emerged and began
operating within and outside the region. An episode in 1968 was especially
telling. As Israeli forces raided a Palestinian stronghold in the town of
Karameh in Jordan, they suffered more casualties than expected, and the
operation was seen as a failure. News of the Palestinian success was quickly
contrasted with the devastating failure of Arab states. Karameh, which
coincidently means "dignity" in Arabic, became a metaphor for
restoring regional honor. Within days, 5,000 recruits signed up to join the
Palestinian groups in refugee camps.
The
notion that the overwhelming exercise of power can achieve peace in areas of
protracted conflict is not supported by the modern history of the Middle East.
To be sure, power can prevent one's defeat and inflict significant pain on the
enemy, but rarely can it ensure long-term compliance. In its confrontation with
Lebanon, Israel's overwhelming military superiority over the weakest of
neighbors has not translated into the power to compel the Lebanese to accept
Israel's terms or eliminate militancy. The Palestinians, after 35 years of
occupation, are less resigned to their fate than ever. In fact, studies of
conflict and cooperation among different parties in the region show that
conflict goes on despite the inequality of power as the weaker party's
threshold of pain increases with every blow. The asymmetry of power is often
balanced by an asymmetry of motivation.
Dignity
has sometimes been a factor even in the calculations of states, despite
significant imbalances of power. In explaining the reasoning for Egypt and
Syria's launching a war against a superior Israel in 1973, former secretary of
state Henry Kissinger put it this way: "Our definition of rationality did
not take seriously into account the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore
self-respect." It is unlikely that Egypt's president, Anwar Sadat, would
have been able to extend his hand to Israel four years later without having
restored his people's dignity.
Besides
the defeat of Iraq in 1991, one reason the militants in the region were put on
the defensive was the emergence of a plan that raised hopes for a fair,
negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. That some such plan will be
even more necessary after the war with Iraq is clear. The prospects for it are
not. It is improbable that Arab-Israeli peacemaking will become the Bush
administration's top priority after the collapse of the regime in Baghdad.
Defending thousands of troops in Iraq, maintaining Iraq's unity, addressing the
North Korean challenge, focusing on the economy—all these will surely be
higher priorities. It is certainly possible, though not likely, that Arabs and
Israelis will decide to move forward on their own for reasons unrelated to the
United States. But it is not possible to imagine that the issue will go away,
that the region will deem it less important than before, or that the exercise
of overwhelming force will command compliance and reduce militancy—even
if the region is stunned into a temporary lull.
To
honor the sacrifice of young American (and British) soldiers, and the many
innocent victims in Iraq, we must begin at home by challenging faith in the
overwhelming use of force as a primary instrument of foreign policy—even
as we hope for a quick and decisive end to the Iraq war.
©
Copyright 2003, The Brookings Institution
Note: The
views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the staff, officers or trustees of the Brookings Institution.
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