

Dignity, Humiliation, and Peace Psychology

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March 17, 2010

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Introduction

If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then
he becomes your partner.
—Nelson Mandela

A man deserves to be killed, not to be humiliated.
—Somali proverb

The central question of this paper is: “What can psychological theory and research contribute to the promotion of *harmonious, sustainable peace*?” I was invited by Morton Deutsch to consider how negative emotions and destructive interactions can flow from the frustration of basic needs can lead to, and how the fulfillment of basic needs can foster positive emotions and peaceful interactions.

In response to this invitation, this paper begins with the following questions:

1. What is harmonious, sustainable peace?
2. Does the fulfillment of basic needs and the fostering of positive emotions always lead to peaceful interactions?

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3. If not, can certain circumstances be identified that make this connection work?

This paper argues that, at the current juncture in humanity's history, the third question points at the most pressing issue that has to be studied and solved if world peace is to be achieved: the large-scale geohistorical and geocultural frames within which peace and the fulfillment of basic needs are conceptualized.

To illustrate this argument starkly, a suicide bomber is hailed as a freedom fighter by his own people for heroically sacrificing his life for helping secure the fulfillment of their basic needs and for gaining self-actualization in his own afterlife. At the same time, he is deplored as a terrorist by his victims and foes. In other words, the pathway to the fulfillment of basic needs through violence can foster extremely positive emotions and a grand sense of self-actualization in one camp, while failing to create harmonious, sustainable, and peaceful interactions between both camps. Worse even, this pathway will even severely deepen mutual enmity and exacerbate the absence of peace for all.

Not only the language of martyrdom/terrorism, also the language of war is permeated with narratives of heroism that connect the grandest of self-actualizations with killing and dying. The Somali proverb that opens this paper expresses this by saying, "A man deserves to be killed and not to be humiliated." I gathered this phrase in Somalia in 1998 when I did research on humiliation and war (Lindner, 2000, 268).

At its current point in history, humankind faces the dilemma that victors and oppressors can indeed be perfectly successful, over long periods of time, in satisfying their own human needs through violence and exploitation, while denying the fulfillment of the very same needs to the conquered and the downtrodden. Not least the economic crisis that broke in 2008 has thrown into stark contrast to what extent a few can blissfully maximize conspicuous consumption, successfully co-opting world culture to support their strategies, while millions do not even have clean water to drink. Also on the side of the downtrodden and humiliated, as mentioned above, violence—in form of uprisings and terrorism, for example—can provide a deep sense of self-actualization that outweighs even the loss of own life. Under certain circumstances, more violence may even foster more positive feelings and a grander sense of self-actualization.

I lived for seven years in Cairo, Egypt (1984-1991), where I worked as a psychological counselor and clinical psychologist at the American University in Cairo, and had my own private practice in Cairo from 1987-1991. I offered counseling in English, French, German, Norwegian, and, in time, also in Egyptian-Arabic. My clients came from diverse cultural backgrounds, many from the expatriate community in Cairo. Americans, Europeans, Scandinavians, Palestinians, and citizens of other African countries, as well as from the local community, both Western-oriented, and traditionally-oriented Egyptians were my clients.

Palestinian students came to me as clients who suffered from depression because they felt they should help their pained families in Palestine, instead of studying in Cairo, preparing for a happy life. Farida, a young woman, not yet 20 years old, was deeply torn:

My father wants me to study, get married, and have a normal life. But I cannot smile and laugh and think of happy things, when my aunts and uncles, my nieces and other family members face suffering in Palestine. Their suffering is a heavy burden on me. I feel it in my body. Sometimes I cannot sleep. I feel tortured.

I know Palestinians my age who do not care. They go to the discotheque and dance – they even drink alcohol. I think this is disgusting. Our people are suffering and we should stand by them. If we cannot help them directly, we should at least not mock them by living immoral lives or be heartless and forget them altogether. I feel I have no right to enjoy life as long as my people suffer.

I respect my father and I try to obey him and concentrate on my studies. If it were not for him, I would go to my homeland, get married, have as many sons as possible, and educate them in the right spirit. I would be overjoyed to have a martyr as a son, a son who sacrifices his life for his people.

I feel that suicide bombers are heroes, because it is hard to give your life. I want to give my life. I want to do something. I cannot just sit here in Cairo and watch my people suffer and be humiliated. I feel humiliated in their place, and feel that I humiliate them more by not helping them. I feel so powerless, so heavy; sometimes I can hardly walk (Lindner, 2006c, 113-114).

Also some male Palestinian students sought my advice. They dreamt of giving their lives for Palestine in violent resistance. None of these young students was driven by any “will to power” or inherent “hatred.” They were driven by desperate empathy with their families back home. However, the solutions they envisaged were shortsighted, impatient, and counter-productive. In other words, their starting point, empathy for others’ sufferings—a *noble*, *sincere*, and *valuable* suffering—contrasted starkly with their *destructive* strategies for action, destructive for these young people, as well as for the social fabric of a world of nonviolence. They had the highest of standards for their personal self-actualization, they did not wish to be bribed into selfishly overlooking the pain of their loved-ones. They were loving and caring young people, who knew everything about how to be empathic and how to make peace—indeed they were the peacemakers within their families. I was very aware that these bright young people were vulnerable to being recruited by cynical leaders who could use their empathy for acts of destruction. I advised them strongly to raise their level of ambitions even higher and seek more inclusive paths to relieving their suffering: not only embracing their own extended families, but humanity as a whole as their family.

This paper argues that harmonious and sustainable peace can only be achieved if all players develop a willingness to consider everybody’s basic needs in an inclusive manner and co-create shared conceptualizations of pathways to their fulfillment, and that this insight has to inform systemic change.

Peace psychologist Daniel J. Christie lays out the contemporary scope of peace psychology as follows: “In particular, three themes are emerging in post-Cold War peace psychology: (1) greater sensitivity to geohistorical context, (2) a more differentiated perspective on the meanings and types of violence and peace, and (3) a systems view of the nature of violence and peace” (Christie, 2006).

The paper underpins its stance with theory and research ranging from archeology to anthropology and political science, and presents psychological theory and research that supports this argument.

Basic Human Needs and Harmonious, Sustainable Peace

In 2007, I organized a conference on dignity and humiliation in Hangzhou, China.¹ The term “harmonious society” was continuously emphasized by our Chinese hosts and participants (in other world regions, for example, in Europe, the term “social cohesion” is used more²). What the conference demonstrated, was that the Chinese definition of “harmony”—as informed, among others, by a revival of *Confucianism*—only partly overlapped with the European definition of “social cohesion.” The conclusion was unavoidable that the world community operates with two very different versions of harmony and cohesion. The conference also demonstrated that both versions can work sustainably if all participants subscribe to them. Even much starker approaches to social harmony as proposed in China can be sustained over long periods of time, as demonstrated by the fact that a country like North Korea, for instance, is not torn apart by inner strife.

Both approaches entail a commitment to the fulfillment of basic human needs for the in-group and value similar sets of psychological skills, ranging from courage and solidarity to empathy and humility. What differentiates both concepts is their scope: “Individuals or groups within our moral boundaries are seen as deserving of the same fair, moral treatment as we deserve. Individuals or groups outside these boundaries are seen as undeserving of this same treatment” (Coleman, 2000, p. 118). In other words, what differentiates both concepts is the scope within which human needs are defined and fulfilled, and how courage, solidarity, empathy, and humility are embedded into the larger geohistorical frames that inform how people feel about feelings (or cultural scripts of meta-emotions; see, for example, Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1997).

In one paradigm, the aim is to try to find inclusive win-win ways of living together for all. In the other paradigm loving one’s friends and hating one’s enemies is the definitorial script. Empathy (not sympathy) are to be invested in relationships with in-group members as well as with enemies, in both cases with the aim to facilitate one’s in-group’s victory. In a zero-sum fashion, victory means that my human needs are fulfilled by denying or curtailing the fulfillment of yours.

Terms such as “harmonious” and “cohesion” lend themselves to supporting both paradigms, and also positive emotions can underpin both approaches. Harmonious cohesion can be achieved when all participants subscribe to norms that allow elites to define their needs in ways that are systemically frustrated in subalterns with impunity, including the definition of what is *basic* about “basic needs.” Apartheid systems, dominator societies (Eisler, 1987), societies of large power differentials between “higher” beings presiding over “lower” beings, are societies where inequality in dignity is institutionalized. Such systems are not necessarily unsustainable. A number of psychological mechanisms, for example, those based on instilling fear in underlings, or teaching them helplessness, lend themselves to making such systems sustainable.

In contrast, in contexts that promote the human rights ideal of equality in dignity, such rankings of definitions of needs are not regarded as legitimate. Every human being is seen to deserve the chance to create living conditions for herself that allow her to satisfy a spectrum of needs that is regarded as common to all humans.

The most widely used conception of basic human needs is Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of human needs (Maslow, 1943). In order of priority, he identified the following basic needs.

- Physiological needs: for air, water, and food, and the need to maintain equilibrium in the blood and body tissues in relation to various substances and the type of cell. Frustration of these needs leads to apathy, illness, disability, and death.
- Safety needs: for security, freedom from fear and anxiety, shelter, protection from danger, order, and predictable satisfaction of one's basic needs. Here, frustration leads to fear, anxiety, rage, and psychosis.
- Belongingness and love needs: to be part of a group (a family, a circle of friends), to feel cared for, to care for someone, to be intimate with someone, and so forth. Frustration produces alienation, loneliness, and various forms of neurosis.
- Esteem needs: for self-esteem (self-confidence, mastery, worth, strength, and the like) and social esteem (respect, dignity, appreciation, and so on). Feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, helplessness, incompetence, shame, guilt, and the like, are associated with frustration of these needs.
- Self-actualization needs: to become the kind of person one is most suited to become; to realize one's full potential in relatedness to others, in developing talents, and in participating in one's community. The need for self-actualization also includes such meta-needs as truth, curiosity, justice, beauty, aliveness, playfulness, and the like.

Maslow considered the first four in this list to be deficiency needs, arising from a lack of what is needed. Once these basic needs are all reasonably satisfied, we get in touch with our needs for self-realization and pursue their satisfaction. Although Maslow initially postulated needs as hierarchically ordered, he later accepted the view that in reality some people violate the hierarchy—say, putting themselves in danger and going hungry to protect someone they love or a group with whom they identify. This stance was supported by Chilean economist and philosopher Manfred Max-Neef, who also argued that fundamental human needs are non-hierarchical, and are ontologically universal and invariant in nature—part of the condition of being human (see, for example, Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1991).

Maslow's theory, or variations of it, has been taken up by several subsequent theories. It is, for example, the foundation of the human needs theory of John Burton and his colleagues and students (Burton, 1990a). The fundamental thesis of this approach is that a conflict is not resolved constructively unless the parties' basic human needs are brought out and dealt with to the satisfaction of each party. The application of this idea to conflict is called the "problem-solving workshop." Burton initially developed it, while he was serving as a consultant in the Cyprus conflict between Greeks and Turks; subsequently, it was systematically developed by Kelman and his colleagues (Kelman, 1990). It entails creating conditions that enable the participants to express their real needs openly and honestly, and then try to work out a resolution that meets the basic needs of both sides.

From negotiation handbooks we can learn what *real needs* may be. We learn that we need to focus on "interest" and not on "position" to attain an optimal outcome (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991). If two people fight over an orange, for example, sharing it equally would solve the conflict, however, not optimally. The optimal solution would be to ask

more detailed questions and consider, for example, that one person wishes to use the skin of the orange for a cake while the other wants to extract the juice from the fruit meat. As a result, the outcome would be that both have 100 percent of their interest served, not just 50 percent. Not that such a positive outfall can be guaranteed—sometimes a situation simply does not entail the potential for win-win solutions—but by not searching for such potential win-win solutions, those solutions are overlooked and untapped.

At the present juncture of human history, the most significant problem for global peace is that people who sit together in negotiations and workshops in good faith have already done the very first step that inclusive peace requires, namely recognizing the *real need* of humankind for co-creating a shared conceptualization of possible pathways to satisfying everybody's basic needs. They have already abandoned the mindset delineated by the Somali proverb.

A remarkable interview illustrates this point most provocatively. It was given by an Egyptian physician, Taufik Hamid, who went through a transformational process from an Al Qaeda Jihadist to a peacemaker and reformer of Islam. Dr. Hamid reminds me of the Palestinian clients I introduced earlier. He warns: "Never do concessions to radicals. The more you do concessions, the more they attack you."³

Most probably, Dr. Hamid's former Jihadist friends will not read this book, let alone attend workshops of conflict resolution. The fact that this book risks speaking only to the camp of the converted, illustrates the most pressing contemporary problem with world peace. My own research in Somalia has exposed to what extent people may refuse to sit together in workshops, or, more precisely, their leaders refuse, and even if they do, they may not do so in good faith. The international community is tired of arranging conferences for Somalia. It is frustrating to see warlords blissfully collecting their per-diem, having forgotten their promises of peace already at the door, while women and children on the ground continue to suffer and world peace is put at risk (Marshall, 1999).

The path to reaching world peace is for all of humankind to co-reflect, in the atmosphere of mutual respect that I attempt to model in this paper, on the real needs of all of humankind in its present historical circumstances. Therefore this paper begins with Nelson Mandela's words, "If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner." His words point at what is needed most urgently, namely a dialogue about which definitions of peace and which pathways to the fulfillment of basic human needs are the most appropriate for today's world, and why, and to search for psychological theories and research that can facilitate this dialogue and the transition from one paradigm of peace to the other.

When contrasting Mandela's saying with the Somali proverb, it becomes evident that they connote two profoundly different "cultures of peace" (to use UNESCO's term "culture of peace"⁴): Mandela's peace is about *the courage and skill to learn to live together even with enemies, and consider an inclusive win-win approach to the fulfillment of the human needs of all*, while the Somali peace is about *the courage and skill to kill and die in the face of enemies, and secure their resources for the fulfillment of one's own human needs*. As noted earlier, both kinds of peace can be sustainable and even harmonious, namely, when all players subscribe to them and define as "collateral damage" or "price that has to be paid for peace" what the other camp would deplore as "lack of peace." Both cultures of peace draw on similar sets of psychological theories and skills, those of courage and solidarity, for example, but, as noted above, are embedded

into different theoretical conceptualizations of geopolitical frames and related versions of *Realpolitik*.

In former times, the Somali view represented the dominating approach between groups—be it between tribes, clans, ethnic groups, nations, or classes. Nowadays, the Mandela approach to peace has gained visibility. As a result, both definitions of peace have their advocates on today's global stage. The Somali approach is informed by a code of male honor that tends to be contemptuous of the Mandela path. For them it smacks of weakness and lack of manly backbone. "Showing strength" is what counts. Friends are those who are duly impressed by this strength and thus motivated not to consider opposition or to give it up. Enemies are those unwise enough to underestimate this strength and are therefore to be taught lessons of "shock and awe."

In other words, this kind of peace is captured by narratives of strength, combat, and surrender. Adherents of this approach range from former administrations of the United States to extremist Jihadists. The nation-state system inherently supports this script—professor of ancient history, Donald Kagan, attests that a passion to retain a state's "honorable" standing applies in today's world no less than it did earlier, even when national honor is no longer invoked as openly as in the past and partly masked by human rights rhetoric (Kagan, 1998; see also Wyatt-Brown, 1982). In the above-mentioned interview by Dr. Hamid, he attests to the depth with which traditional concepts of male honor inform this approach—he explains that the very first "enemy" of Jihadists are women's rights.

The Mandela path to peace, in contrast, is delineated by narratives of "waging good conflict" (Miller, 1986), within inclusive *boundaries of compassion* (Clements, 2011), embedded into mutual care and respect for equality in dignity, implemented through dialogical collaboration, cooperation, and creative nurturing of unity in diversity. "Cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition," this is the gist of Morton Deutsch's *crude law of social relations* (Deutsch, 1973, 367).

Dialogue is needed not only between the two opposing camps of radicals and Mandela-inspired moderates. But more clarity is also required within the Mandela camp. *Just war, nonviolence, nonkilling, or policing*, just to name a few terms, are buzzwords that suffer from being caught in false dichotomies. The criticism that the Nobel Peace Prize committee received for awarding this prize to Barack Obama in 2009 was indicative of this predicament. Obama's engagement in Afghanistan was branded as war-mongering by critics from within the peace camp, while he declared peace through better policing to be his aim. In his Nobel lecture in Oslo on December 10, 2009, he said, "We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified" (Obama, 2009).

Aside from the very important question of which wars are just, or which approaches to policing are suitable to create peace, this stand-off exposed the problems with conceptual clarity at the core of the Mandela-inspired peace camp itself. Not only that. The stand-off was also rather violent, even though only verbally—"disgusting" was among the milder expressions to be found in blogs and list serves of peacemakers. This showed to what degree the male culture of combat is embedded even at the core of a peace movement that professes to overcome this very culture (Lindner, 2006b).

This paper argues that the term *war*, even the term *just war*, together with phrases such as *enemy*, *soldier*, *victory*, and dichotomies such as “war versus peace” become outdated and dysfunctional the more the world moves toward a reality and imagery of One World. Worse even, using such language hinders the transition toward a peaceful *global village* (beyond the initial connotations by Herbert M. McLuhan, 1962).

This paper makes the point that *nonhumiliating global institutions of continuous sustenance of the cohesion within the global community* is the only terminology that opens the path to the fulfillment of basic human needs for every world citizen and fits a *decent One World* (following the definition of *decency* by philosopher Avishai Margalit, 1996), and that such sustenance may sometimes entail policing that uses coercion that may appear violent.

Peace through Preparedness for War: The Context of the Security Dilemma

This paper takes its starting point from the insight that to make peace in an interdependent world harmonious and sustainable, the in-group definition must be made to stand alone, while the in-group versus out-group definition is adapted to a disappearing past and must therefore be left behind. Transitional periods are typically hampered by cultural lag, and helping to overcome this cultural lag is the most important task of peace psychology.

To underpin this stance, this past will now be described and contrasted with the new frame for a future of One World.

Archeological evidence suggests that prior to ten thousand years ago, there was no organized war. Jonathan Haas, an anthropological archaeologist with over 30 years of field experience in both North and South America, confirms, “The Hobbesian view of humans in a constant state of ‘Warre’ is simply not supported by the archaeological record” (Haas, 2001, 334; see also Ferguson, 2004). In the introductory paper of this book, Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman refer also to other literature that debunks the argument of innate human aggressiveness (among others, they point at work by Douglas P. Fry and Graham Kemp).

Anthropologist William Ury drew up *a simplified depiction of history* whose core elements are widely accepted by the academic community (Ury, 1999, 108; see also Flinders, 2002, Giorgi, 2001; Berman, 2000). Ury bases his conceptualization on elements from anthropology, game theory, and conflict studies. He describes three major types of society: (1) *simple hunter-gatherers*, (2) *complex agriculturists*, and (3) *knowledge society*.

Prior to 10,000 years ago, humans were wanderers, populating planet Earth in small groups (see for a visual presentation based on genetic evidence Oppenheimer, 2003). These groups were characterized by coexistence and open networks, within which conflicts were negotiated, rather than settled through coercion. This lasted for the first 95 percent of human history (if we use the Middle Paleolithic about 200,000 BP as the approximate starting point for modern *Homo sapiens sapiens*). As long as the limits of planet Earth were not reached, the abundance of wild food represented an expandable pie of resources that represented what game theory calls a win-win paradigm. A simple hunter-gatherer approach was feasible to attend to basic human needs—the next valley

with all its resources was untouched, waiting to be used. (In contrast, contemporary hunter-gatherer cultures can exhibit significant levels of violence. The archeologist Lawrence H. Keeley examined casualty rates among contemporary hunter-gatherers and found that the likelihood for a man to die at the hands of another man ranged from a high of 60 percent in one tribe to 5 percent at the most peaceable end.⁵)

A crucial turning point occurred around 10 millennia ago. What is called *circumscription* began to be felt. Circumscription means reaching limits. Latin *circum* means “around” and *scribere* means to “write.” Circumscription theory has been developed by anthropologist and curator of the American Museum of Natural History in New York, Robert Leonard Carneiro (see, among others, Carneiro, 1988). By definition, at some point, *homo sapiens* had to face the fact that planet Earth is small and gives the illusion of being unlimited only as long as one has not yet approached its limits. The problem built up slowly over many prehistoric millennia, and reached a critical moment, very roughly, about 10,000 years ago. Jonathan Haas explains:

When any hunter-gatherer is faced with such a situation, there are always four choices: (1) move away to other locations with fewer people/better resources; (2) intensify production (the route to agriculture); (3) limit population by some form of birth control, including female infanticide; (4) Go to war. The first choice seems to have been the favored option when it was available, and this is the time when we see people moving into all corners of the globe. But when moving isn’t an option because you are surrounded by other populations or inhospitable environs, then people chose one of the other three options” (Haas, personal communication, January 22, 2010).

In the wake of circumscription, hierarchically structured *civilizations* based on *complex agriculture* emerged in Mesopotamia, along the Nile, and in most other places. In some of the less arable regions, alternative cultures of *raiding* developed. Somalia represents a contemporary example (the present economic system has been characterized as a descendent of European raiding culture; see Mann, 2000). Land is either mine or yours and thus represents a fixed win-lose pie of resources—a condition that is inherently more difficult to tackle than a win-win situation (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1999). As a result, when communities moved geographically close enough for mutual conquering and raiding, but remained too far apart to build good communication and trust, the *security dilemma* made itself felt.

The term *security dilemma* was coined by international relations scholar John H. Herz (Herz, 1950; see also Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, 1985 and Betts (Ed.) 2005) to explain why competition and war can occur even when actors have no intention of harming one another. The very essence of the security dilemma is one of tragedy, forcing bloody competition to emerge out of mutual (and inevitable) distrust. The threat of preemption with preemption is the ultimate and seemingly unavoidable outcome.

The security dilemma is built on fear and fosters fear: “I fear you but will defend my land against you! Fear me!” Political scientists Barry Posen and Russell Hardin have discussed the emotional aspects of the security dilemma (Posen, 1993; Hardin, 1995). The security dilemma means fear of attack from out-groups (other tribes, other feudal communities, other nation-states) continuously affecting in-groups. Love for out-group members, commiseration or empathy, have little chance to take center stage.

Complex agriculturalism and the security dilemma created a world of enemies outside one's borders and ranked coercion within. Agriculturalists led their lives within closed hierarchical pyramids of power on

As a result, the past 5 percent of human history were characterized by what Riane T. Eisler calls a "strong-man" *dominator model* of civilization rather than a *partnership model* (Eisler, 1987). Almost all over the globe, Apartheid-like societies emerged with large power differentials between "higher" beings presiding over "lower" beings. Inequality in dignity and rights was maintained through a high degree of institutionalized and socially accepted violence. Domestic chastisement was not yet called domestic violence, and war was still a path to fame and power.

Among the most important differentiations with regard to war and peace were those of good versus bad leadership and just versus unjust war. Philosopher Henrik P. Syse is an expert on just war theory. His article "Plato, Thucydides, and the Education of Alcibiades" (Syse, 2006) illustrates this differentiation by contrasting Plato as someone having the common good at heart and advising leaders to go to war only when unavoidable, with Alcibiades, who did not shy away from instigating war even if it served only his power interests and not his people's common good.

Contemporary charismatic leadership theories follow similar differentiations. *Personalized charismatic leaders* (PCLs) act in self-interest, exploit others, disregard others, and reject others who do not comply with the leader's agenda (House & Howell, 1992). In contrast, *socialized charismatic leaders* (SCLs) serve collective interests, develop and empower followers, are follower oriented, and tend to be altruistic (House & Howell, 1992). These individuals have a socialized power motive, which reflects a concern for the group and a focus on group goals, an understanding of others, and exercising influence for the benefit of others.

To conclude this section, in a fragmented world, during the past ten millennia, peace was defined as success with keeping hostile out-groups out, and relationships within ranked hierarchical in-groups stable, calm, and quiet. Good leaders had the common good at heart, however, the common good was defined not in globally inclusive ways, but in ways that were dictated by the tragedy of the security dilemma in a fragmented world.

Peace through Nonhumiliating Global Institutions: The Context of One World

As globalization—or, to use an anthropological term, the global *ingathering* of the human tribes—brings a formerly fragmented world into mutual interdependence, One World emerges. The classic out-group disappears. What is left is one global in-group. This is a historically unprecedented situation. "For the first time since the origin of our species, humanity is in touch with itself" (Ury, 1999, XVII). This change is so dramatic that it has not yet been fully understood, even not within the Mandela-peace camp:

What is being overlooked is the most scientific insight of all, and at the same time the most uplifting one, namely that the coming together of the human family in a globalizing world offers a unique historic chance for humankind to unite in understanding our joint responsibility for our home planet. Within this new context all aspects of our lives can be given more dignity and humanity. However, currently, this

potential is not sufficiently recognized and acted upon. It is as if prison doors open and the prisoners do not leave, timidly staying within their prison walls instead of walking into freedom (Lindner, 2010, 11).

The ingathering of the human tribes offers a number of liberations. In a world of one single human family, dehumanizing young men to become killers of “enemies” is no longer required. This does not mean, evidently, that the world will be freed of conflict and misbehavior—like in all villages, the rule of law and due policing is also needed in the global village. However, the weakening of the tragedy of the security dilemma through global interconnectedness opens unprecedented space for peace, space that was absent for the past ten millennia. Global interconnectedness thus represents a tremendous opportunity.

Another liberation is the liberation from rank. The ingathering of the human family offers the opportunity, for humankind, to exit from collectivist and ranked social models in which a few masters turn underlings into tools in the service of the security dilemma.

What changes, are the boundaries for the definition of the common good—no longer is it the common good of my in-group in its context of potentially threatening out-groups, but the common good of one single global in-group devoid of out-groups (except for imaginary aliens from other galaxies).

Currently, we already witness many related transitions of language. The traditional notion of the *soldier* is presently changing to connote *peace keepers* and *peace enforcers* (Snyder, 2000). The *warrior-soldier* who left home to reap national and personal glory, fame, and triumph is increasingly becoming obsolete. Furthermore, there is a movement away from the word *enemy*, toward the word *terrorist*. *Terrorists* are *inner enemies*, *very bad neighbors*, the only subgroup close to enemies that can exist within a village, including the global village (Lindner, 2006c, 44; Keen, 1986).

The more the world interconnects, the more war becomes irrelevant. “War versus peace” loses its foothold in reality. In an interdependent world, “negative peace versus positive peace” (Galtung, 1969), with negative peace fraught with direct, structural, and cultural violence (Galtung, 1990⁶), become definitorial. Somalia is a stateless quagmire. Central America is among the most violent regions in the world. “‘Normality’ and ‘peace’ now read gross homicide rates in the high forties, fifties and sixties per 100,000 inhabitants for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, compared to an average of around 1.5 for Western Europe, and 12–13 for Nicaragua” (Bergmann, 2009, 9). In sum, from the point of human rights, the very definition of peace can fall victim to cultural violence.

The boundaries of compassion (Clements, 2011) and the *scope of justice* (Coleman, 2000) have indeed been widening throughout the past decades, in resonance with the ingathering of the human tribes. Also the first psychologists were part of this widening process. Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, for example, are peace psychologist. Altogether seventeen eminent early peace psychologists were brilliantly portrayed (Rudmin, 1991).

Raymond Wacks, Emeritus Professor of Law and Legal Theory at the University of Hong Kong, describes the evolutionary development of the concept of rights (Wacks, 2006):

Human rights have passed through three generations. The first generation were mostly the negative civil and political rights as developed in the 17th and 18th centuries by English political philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and Mill... They are negative in the sense that they generally prohibit interference with the right-holder's freedom.... The second generation consists in the essentially positive economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to education, food, or medical care. The third generation of human rights are primarily collective rights which are foreshadowed in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration which declares that 'everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights set forth in this declaration can be fully realized'. These 'solidarity' rights include the right to social and economic development and to participate in and benefit from the resources of the earth and space, scientific and technical information (which are especially important to the Third World), the right to a healthy environment, peace, and humanitarian disaster relief (Wacks, 2006, 58).

The most striking enlargement of boundaries of compassion was demonstrated by eminent Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov (1921–1989). He developed the hydrogen bomb and created the 50MT Tsar Bomba, the largest, most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated (October 1961 in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago), and the most powerful explosive device ever created. This test illustrated the peak of human destructiveness. Sakharov believed that his work was necessary for the balance of power with the enemy, and thus crucial for world peace. Soon after, however, he became a dissident and human rights activist. In the early 1970s, he began to formulate his famous "Sakharov doctrine" on the indivisibility of human rights and international security. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975.

Psychological Theories and Research

What must be learned, by humankind, at the current historical juncture, is not so much how to make peace. People always knew how to make peace within in-groups. The creation of harmony was typically the task of women and is an integral part of the female role description. The very concept of basic human needs is "female" insofar as nurturing and catering to basic human needs always was at the core of women's tasks. The problem, throughout the past ten thousand years was that female concerns for basic human needs were frequently trumped by the "higher needs" of male honor in the service of the security dilemma. The skills of women were made invisible and devalued. However, these skills always remained functional and now offer a pool of knowledge that can be tapped and lifted into visibility.

When we scrutinize emerging initiatives, it becomes apparent to what extent they are indeed informed by traditional female scripts. Not only do peace makers from John W. Burton to Herbert C. Kelman and John Paul Lederach bring people together in workshops with less hierarchy and more creativity, teaching them empathy and humility, how to take the adversaries' personal feelings and emotions seriously, and how to recognize the importance of human dignity. Also modern management trainers have "discovered" so-called "soft" assets such as "human capital." The list of terms is long: multitrack, "track

II” citizen-based diplomacy; keeping communication going between warring parties; talking behind the scenes; taking opponents in a conflict out of their usual environment; setting up mediation teams; installing “truth commissions;” using psychology at macro levels; allowing warring parties to feel the world community’s care, respect, and concern; and so on (Lindner, 2010, 159).

What has to be learned, at present, is how to define and live peace in One World, which means, without enemies threatening from out-groups, without a culture of male honor, and without giving legitimacy to *rankism* (the abuse of rank, Fuller, 2003). Nothing new has to be learned. The traditional female script has only to be applied globally. The skills are already there. Men have to put their traditional script of projecting force at the service—no longer of the security dilemma, since it is waning—but at the service of the nurturance of peace inside a united global community.

What must be implemented, by humankind, at present, are decent structural and cultural systems that institutionalize, globally, the insight that conflict is opportunity and that peace is a never-ending transformative cultural, societal, social, and psychological process. A great transition is required—locally, but more urgently globally—a transition of social and societal structures and institutions. And this has to be done fast. Luckily, culture is not fixed but negotiable. This negotiability is valid in the lifetime of a person, a community, a world region, and humankind at large. We, as humankind, are free to create almost any culture we want within the limits of our biosystems.

However, there are certain traps to be avoided. Transitional periods are typically hampered by these traps, and helping to overcome them is the most important task of contemporary peace psychology.

Cultural Lag

Biologists Paul and Anne Ehrlich, in their book, *The Dominant Animal*, provide evidence that social evolution could result in a harmonious relationship with the natural systems upon which humankind’s survival depends. But time to change is short — perhaps as little as 10 years (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2008).

What will be done in these 10 years? Philosopher Glen T. Martin writes: “There is no one at the helm: no responsible persons constructing a decent future and acting to avoid unspeakable disaster. We must act now from our love of the Earth and our love of life, and we must actualize the moral obligation that we have to all other persons and the Earth’s other living creatures” (Martin, 2010a, 286).

However, there is cultural lag. The term *cultural lag* was coined by sociologist William F. Ogburn in 1922 (Ogburn, 1922).

The problem of cultural lag is compounded by several other factors, for example, the factor of momentum. The well-known anecdote about how to cook a frog illustrates this. If Mr. Frog were suddenly dropped into a saucepan of hot water, he would swiftly jump out; the water is hot and he does not want to be cooked. But if Mr. Frog is placed in a saucepan of comfortably warm water that is heated very slowly, he does not notice that he is being cooked. Likewise, when dangerous change occurs in relatively moderate speed, this can mask its significance. Humankind is like frogs; we are being “cooked” without knowing. The process of change is slow enough to make us miss how dramatic it is, but powerful enough to affect our lives in ways we must avoid. It is much easier to

react to a short-term crisis, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for example, than to the much more significant consequences flowing from the degradation and destruction of climate, biodiversity, and cultural diversity.

Cultural lag is also compounded by the historical fact that citizens have been systemically passivized throughout the past ten millennia. In dominator societies, inferiors lived in structures where they were taught helplessness (Seligman, 1975). Even though the modern state system—in the wake of the 1648 Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, following Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—was tufted on a “social contract” that endows citizens with rights and duties, it still regarded citizen as passive objects and the state as active subject. More recently, the state was marginalized in favor of the market, resulting in a passive citizenry, who, together with a passive state, is exposed to the whims of an active market (Bergmann, 2009, 102).

Activist Peter Block argues that what is needed, today, on the part of citizens, is a willingness to acknowledge that they have participated in creating, through commission or omission, the conditions that they wish to see changed, to see themselves as cause, rather than being coerced into or wishfully dependent on the transformation of others (Block, 2008, 110).

Human Bias

The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior is a telling title of a book which shows how rational action is undermined—from the desire to avoid loss to a failure to consider all the evidence (Brafman & Brafman, 2008). *Attribution errors*, *loss aversion*, and *just world thinking* are perhaps the most salient biases that riddle the human mind and hamper paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962) that are overdue.

The term *loss aversion* connotes the tendency of people to dislike losses significantly more than they like gains, plays into these psychological preferences—we don’t mind sharing equally in the future, but we do not like to lose what we have (Ross & Jost, 1999). These psychological phenomena strengthen conservative stances, leading people to evaluate those who want another distribution of resources as aggressors.

The fundamental attribution error and the actor-observer bias refer to the tendency to attribute others’ behavior (for example, hostile remarks) to the other’s personality dispositions rather than to transient circumstances (such as your belittling remarks) while attributing our own hostile remarks to circumstances (such as his hostile remarks) rather than our own dispositions. During a contentious conflict this may lead each side to overestimate the other’s hostility as well as one’s own benignness (Ross, 1977). The fundamental attribution error becomes the ultimate attribution error when people grant members of their own group the benefit of the doubt, and assume the worst from members of other groups (Pettigrew, 1979). We usually share much more common ground with our adversaries than we think.

Attribution errors may even hamper the work of peace researchers and practitioners, when they believe that “unlearning hatred,” as significant as it is, is the most important intervention. Throughout the 35 years of my global life, I have always been impressed how peacefully supposed arch-enemies can live together when they meet outside of their conflict areas. Croats and Serbs could live together in harmony in Europe, while their families slaughtered each other in the Balkans. Israelis and Palestinians could quickly

become best of friends in workshops in Norway, until they returned home. Among my clients in Egypt were many European women who had led happy marriages with their Egyptian husbands in Europe, until they moved to Egypt and their husbands “changed beyond recognition.” The so-called *contact hypothesis*, or the hope that contact will foster friendship, seems to work best at micro-levels that are removed from larger geocultural frames (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Particularly in regions of conflict, people become more dependent on their in-group. *Concurrence seeking* is close to the concept of *groupthink* (Janis, 1982) Members of a decision-making group agree with the other members and set aside reservations, thus facilitating potentially perilous group decisions (Stern & Sundelius, 1994; Turner & Pratkanis, 1997; Hart, Stern, & Sundelius (Eds.) 1997).

Belief in a *just world* causes people to blame the victim. This belief gives the more privileged an alibi to be blind to the sufferings of the less privileged, because “everybody deserves what he gets.” People who hold the just world belief are indifferent to social injustice not because they have no concern for justice but because they see no injustice (Lerner, 1980; Lerner, 2003).

Global geopolitical frames need to be changed to make the contact hypothesis fulfill its promises. Psychologists such as Stanley Milgram, Philip Zimbardo and Lee D. Ross have shown through their experiments how important it is to create systems that allow people to behave ethically, rather than limit efforts to reform individuals within unsupportive systems (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 1971; Zimbardo, 2007; Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004). New studies in political science underpin the preeminent role of systemic structures. Within nations, economic, ethnic, and regional effects have only modest impact on political stability (Goldstone & Ulfelder, 2005).

It can even amount to irresponsibility to target vulnerable individuals and burden them with the task of peace making, when larger frames antagonize them. Even the United Nations was not strong enough to protect Sérgio Vieira de Mello and his colleagues. He was a Brazilian United Nations diplomat who worked for the UN for more than 34 years, earning respect and praise around the world for his efforts in the humanitarian and political programs of the UN. He was killed in the Canal Hotel Bombing in Iraq along with 20 other members of his staff on 19 August 2003 while working as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Iraq. His story stands for many others around the world that receive much less visibility. Leaving larger contexts in a malign state of affairs, while exposing vulnerable individuals, is not in the spirit of responsible peace making.

Human Vulnerability to Manipulation

Concepts such as *méconnaissance* (misrecognition) and *naturalization* were used by Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault (among others). Michel Foucault has elaborated the concept of *naturalization* (Foucault, 1975). Related terms are *intuitive ethics* (Faber, 1999), *routinization* (Giddens, 1984), or *controlling images* (Collins, 2000).

All these conceptualizations point at the human dependence on *tacit* knowledge, which, in turn, makes humans inherently vulnerable to *méconnaissance*. These concepts address how power structures use the concealed nature of *habitus* to manipulate not just

overtly but covertly and stealthily, making it much more difficult to rid oneself of these manipulations. Among the latest expressions of this manipulation in contemporary politics, is *spin*.

Méconnaissance can be efficiently enforced by the manipulation of emotions and meta-emotions.

Whoever has sufficient power-over leverage will find it advantageous to introduce ranked honor as master manipulation, because it makes might seem right, and inferiors susceptible to more manipulation. If done cleverly, these manipulations will penetrate, and underlings will debase their dignity, damage their health, and risk death “voluntarily.” The overall strength of emotions and the human need for belonging and recognition figure as powerful liabilities in this process... This need makes people vulnerable to being malignly and stealthily turned into handicapped and thus harmless inferiors in ranked systems—if people believe that they can increase their sense of belonging by climbing up the ladder in a ranked system, even at the cost of mutilating themselves, they may fall for this trap and do so (foot binding as stark example). I call this process voluntary self-humiliation to highlight that it can be unmasked and undone, even though I am aware that it would be more correct to say that people are unwittingly manipulated into self-humiliation (Lindner, 2009a, 133).

Dynamics of Humiliation and Humility

Dynamics of humiliation require particular attention because they may lead to what James E. Jones, scholar in world religions, calls the *post victim ethical exemption syndrome* (Jones, 2006). For example, America suffered utter humiliation at the hands of Somalia—in 1993, the dead body of the American soldier was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by an angry crowd.⁷ This humiliation “killed” 800,000 people: when the genocide started in Rwanda in 1994, the international community left Rwandans to slaughter each other because nobody wanted a “second Somalia” (O'Halloran, 1995).

Similarly, feelings of humiliation lingering on from the Cold War may cost humankind its future if not false choices are transcended fast (such as those between socialism and capitalism, or left and right). Feminist Jean Baker Miller advises to create *alternative arrangements* rather than stay caught in *false choices* (Miller, 2006).

What is needed is *conscientization*—the laborious venture of patching together a growing *awareness of self in context* (Lederach, 1995, 119).

Incidentally, the ability to feel humiliated drives conscientization—or the expansion and fine-tuning of our sense of what we think should be defined as right and wrong—which, in turn, entails the potential to initiate systemic change toward a more dignified world (Montiel, 2006).

Article 1 of the of the Human Rights Declaration states that every human being is born with equal rights and dignity (and ought not be humiliated). Consequently, scores of disadvantaged, downtrodden, and oppressed people around the world—lower class people, underlings, inferiors, or subalterns, whatever label—together with those who identify with them, “learn” to feel humiliated by conditions that formerly were often

accepted as normal. Indeed, feelings of humiliation in victims, and those who witness their plight, are the very fuel of the human rights movement.

Following Margaret Mead's words, "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has," conscientization must be invested into *empowerment, articulation, mobilization, and organization*.

John Paul Lederach describes a framework for empowerment:

1. People in setting are a key resource, not recipients.
2. Indigenous knowledge is a pipeline to discovery, meaning, and appropriate action.
3. Participation of local people in the process is central.
4. Building from available local resources fosters self-sufficiency and sustainability.
5. Empowerment involves a process that fosters awareness-of-self in context and validates discovery, naming, and creation through reflection and action (Lederach, 1995, 31).

At the above-mentioned conference in China in 2007, Steve Kulich, professor of Intercultural Communications in Shanghai, explained how he had empowered his students for years, however, how, to his chagrin, many of them later turned out to become very arrogant and "nasty people." He coined the word *entrustment* and prefers it to empowerment.

What Kulich points at, is the need for humility (Lindner, 2010, 157-158). The problem is that unabated empowerment entails the potential to lead into the traditional male culture of combat, domineering behavior, or worse. The genocide in Rwanda was perpetrated not by a long-established elite, but by newly empowered subalterns (Lindner, 2009b; Lindner, 2006b).

Earlier, leadership theories were alluded to. Interestingly, the *Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies* recently published an article titled "A New Look at Humility: Exploring the Humility Concept and its Role in Socialized Charismatic Leadership" (Nielsen, Marrone, & Slay, 2010). Indeed, the present economic crisis has exposed how the sense of empowerment of a few can overshoot. Nielsen's article advances humility's role in socialized charismatic leadership and proposes humility as an "important but overlooked" antecedent to effective socialized charismatic leadership. The article expounds how humility "prevents excessive self-focus and allows for an understanding of oneself, in addition to perspective of one's relationship with others" (Nielsen, Marrone, & Slay, 2010, Abstract).

Humility is greatly advanced by what is called *task-oriented learning-mastery goals*. Social psychologist Carol S. Dweck and her colleagues found that two opposing implicit theories about intelligence and learning are widespread: some people believe that intelligence is fixed (the entity theory of intelligence); others think that intelligence is malleable (the incremental theory of intelligence) (Dweck, Mangels, & Good, 2004, 42; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2004, 222). These two beliefs precipitate two kinds of goals—ego-oriented performance goals versus task-oriented learning-mastery goals. People with performance goals aim to look smart and avoid mistakes; they have an ego orientation and try to satisfy high expectations of others by performing well. Those with learning-

mastery goals, on the other hand, desire to learn new things, even if they might get confused, make mistakes, and look less than smart; they are intrinsically motivated toward achieving mastery in the task. Research results show that students with mastery goals are generally more successful, because they are more likely to search for and find successful alternative strategies “than are those with concerns about validating their ability” (Dweck, Mangels, & Good, 2004, 43). This indicates that a task orientation is preferable to an ego orientation.

Insights in emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal and suppression, and automatic emotion regulation can be put at use for peace making. Implicit theories about the general malleability of groups are significant for peace. A belief that groups are malleable can decrease levels of hatred toward a specific out-group (the Israelis or the Palestinians) and increase willingness to reconcile with out-group members (Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2010).

Project Implicit is a Virtual Laboratory for the social and behavioral sciences designed to facilitate the research of implicit social cognition: cognitions, feelings, and evaluations that are not necessarily available to conscious awareness, conscious control, conscious intention, or self-reflection.⁸ Project Implicit comprises a network of laboratories, technicians, and research scientists at Harvard University, the University of Washington, and the University of Virginia.

Psychologist C. Richard Snyder developed hope theory; it partially overlaps with theories of learned optimism, optimism, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and coping (Snyder, 2002). Snyder recommends the building of cultural and institutional frames that incorporate insights from hope theory, such as sound democratic institution building: “When laws are implemented so as to allow a maximal number of people to pursue goal-directed activities, then citizens should be less likely to become frustrated and act aggressively against each other” (Ibid., 261).

If we connect emotion research and organizational studies with the above mentioned research on just war, than also today, the common good must come first, but now in the form of the common good of all of humankind rather than of only one community: we, as humankind, cannot afford Alcibiadeses at the steering wheel of the human family. To get there, it is helpful to point out how malleable culture can be. This can create hope for the future of humankind.

Concluding Remarks

Show, by your actions, that you choose peace over war, freedom over oppression, voice over silence, service over self-interest, respect over advantage, cooperation over competition, action over passivity, diversity over uniformity, and justice over all.

—Marsella, 2006, 131

Morton Deutsch calls on psychologists, in their roles as psychotherapists, marriage counselors, organizational consultants, and educators, to demystify the psychological processes involved in domination. Dominators, Deutsch explains, must withdraw from processes of domination, reown and resolve their feelings of vulnerability, guilt, self-hatred, rage, and terror; and undo the projection of these feelings onto the oppressed. “So

too, I believe do the oppressed, by not accepting their distorted roles in the distorted relationship of the oppressor and the oppressed” (Deutsch, 2002, pp. 35-36).

When reflecting on Nelson Mandela’s words that open this paper, we recognize that he followed Deutsch’s script. He started out with having enemies (in line with my argument not to use the term enemy anymore, I would prefer to call them *foes* or *opponents* or *partners in conflict*). Mandela had foes he was not supposed to have, since he was expected to bow in humility to oppression.

Mandela could have chosen to bow in subaltern obedience to the apartheid system, and there would have been calm and quiet. Yet, Mandela did not meekly succumb to the white elite in South Africa. Mandela’s kind of peace was not quietly accepting structural violence or negative peace. His harmony was not the harmony of subalterns who humbly accept inferiority. He had the resolve and the resources to consider apartheid as a violation and their supporters as his foes. To do that, he risked death and had his human needs attended to in prison. He put in danger his physiological and safety needs by giving priority to his needs of belongingness and love, esteem, and self-actualization. This is conscientization: following one’s conscience can involve the subversion of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

However, in refusing to bow, Mandela did not turn on his humiliators in arrogance and vengefulness, but took down not only enemies, but also enmity itself. Some of Mandela’s prison guards even became his friends (Mandela, 1996). He included the white elite of South Africa into a comprehensive solution rather than subjecting them to a genocide as was the fate of the former elite in Rwanda. Mandela used inclusive boundaries of compassion (Clements, 2011), and his actions were tufted on the values of human rights.

This is the script for all of humankind at its present historical juncture. For humankind, the lesson is that for peace to emerge, the first task must be to clearly identify violations, rather than passively be complicit with them. The next challenge is to refrain from trying to win victories over one’s enemies, but to turn them into partners.

What does that mean for humankind as a whole? The French Revolution’s slogan was *liberté, égalité, fraternité* (today, we would say brotherhood and sisterhood). Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) reflects this motto in its first sentences: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”

The most significant task standing before humanity, at the present juncture in its history, is that liberty, equality, and fraternity must inform global institutions (Lindner, 2006a; Lindner, 2010). Vertical and horizontal fragmentation must be overcome. A more dignified world of *unity* in *diversity* needs to be created, rather than the humiliation stemming from too much *uniformity* on one side and too much *division* on the other side. The satisfaction of human needs must be defined and sought within a frame of global unity that protects and nurtures local diversity.

Two transitions wait to be brought about:

1. The boundaries of compassion must include all of humankind and its biosphere (global unity and fraternity). The reality of One World must be fully embraced and translated into global solidarity.
2. Apartheid ended. Also the exploitation of the many by a few in One World must end. The price of inequality is too high, both in terms of the damage inflicted on

the relationships with our selves (Wilkinson, 2005), as well as the damage on the relationships with each other (violent uprisings, terrorism; see Marshall, 1999), and our biosphere (destruction of biodiversity and biobalance, and depletion of resources).

This has to be achieved in two steps (Lindner, 2006b):

- a. No longer allowing people to profit from and maintain systems of oppression, and
- b. abandoning also systems of oppression, replacing them with globally inclusive institutions that guarantee equality in dignity and rights (global liberty and equality that nurtures local diversity).

Mandela's humility is no meek humility but proud humility. He models entrustment (Steve Kulich's coinage explained earlier) rather than empowerment. Another novel linguistic coinage is the word *provention*, or moving beyond prevention toward the creation of conditions that are conducive to sustained, cooperative interaction between peoples and states (Burton, 1990b). On April 13, 2010, Demetrios A. Theophylactou, from the European Studies Centre at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, held a lecture on "An EU Perspective of Conflict Resolution, Prevention and 'Provention'" at Columbia University in New York. In this presentation, he explained how supranational legal institutions can promote trust and induce cooperative behavior both within states and across borders.

Today, it is more urgent than ever to achieve provention, not just in the European Union, but globally. Luckily, the chances are better than ever. In the aftermath of the economic crisis that broke in 2008, even the most self-serving protectors of bankers call for regulations to be global, saying that the best regulations are infeasible if they are not global, because if they are only local, they disadvantage that very locality.⁹

This argument can be replicated for all other areas of world affairs. What this argument addresses is the *tragedy of the commons* (Hardin, 1998): the common good can only be protected when all commit to share the burden of this protection and nobody is allowed to free ride for personal gain. This means also that, as long as the royal path to self-actualization is the maximization of profit at the cost of depleting the commons, the satisfaction of human needs will degrade to a race to the bottom (Fiske & Fiske, 2007).

Douglas Hurd, a former diplomat and conservative foreign secretary in the UK, explains in an interview¹⁰ and in his new book (Hurd, 2010) how multilateral institutions (UN, World Trade Organization, NATO) are failing. The opportunity was missed in 1989 of recreating the big institutions of the world, he warns. The world community needs institutions that can deal with climate change, and institutions that can sort out when to intervene in other people's affairs and when to stay out. These are the "loose canons" that were not settled at the last great settlement in 1945. They must be settled now, Hurd urges.

Many voices would merit to be heard at this point in this paper. Let me choose Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies and Chairperson of the program in Peace Studies at Radford University in Virginia, Glen T. Martin. He calls for "planetary maturity" that involves a general awakening of human beings to authentic communicative speech, compassion, and mutual respect. He doubts that this can evolve fast enough on a cultural level by trying to convince the peoples of the world to embrace a culture of

holism (including the holisms of freedom, justice, and sustainable economic equity) and believes that a global body-politic of planetary democracy must be established (Martin, 2010b).

Martin writes, “Of all the constitutions written to date, and of all the world federalist initiatives undertaken during the past 60 years, none except the *Earth Constitution* comes even close to actualizing this “third generation of human rights” promised and “foreshadowed” by Article 28 of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Martin, 2010a, 26). Unity in diversity is a major theme for the *Earth Constitution* that aims at creating *the holistic dynamic of unity in diversity essential to our survival*. To speak of a holism of human relationships on Earth without the universal democratic rule of law constitutes a naïve idealism of the worst kind. Holism must be institutionalized and embodied in our political and economic systems, just as presently fragmentation and division are institutionalized in our non-democratic planetary systems” (Martin, 2010b, 293). Martin’s book carries the title *Triumph of Civilization*. It means a conversion, not only of thought, but of economics and politics to holistic principles. It means the founding of an Earth community.

At the outset of this paper peace psychologist Daniel J. Christie advocated a systems view of the nature of violence and peace. Glen Martin stands for many voices advocating a systems view of the global change that is required at the current juncture in human history. As Douglas Hurd explains, the discussion on global institutions was more active after 1945. It needs to be revived now. It is time to act in concert again. Morton Deutsch’s research on cooperation of over six decades has never been needed more than now.

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¹ See www.humiliationstudies.org/howeare/annualmeeting09.php.

² See, for example, www.chinacsr.com/en/2007/10/11/1744-china-plans-harmonious-society-measurement-standard and ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/jrep_en.htm.

³ See www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2wvqDfitLY.

⁴ See www3.unesco.org/iycp.

⁵ See www.uic.edu/depts/anth/faculty/keeley.html.

⁶ The term *structural violence* describes phenomena such as, for example, patriarchy, slavery, or age discrimination, while the term *cultural violence* connotes, for example, sexism, racism, ageism.

⁷ On December 9, 1992, *Operation Restore Hope* had been launched by the United States of America, as a response to the failure of the first United Nations operation *UNOSOM*. However, *Operation Restore Hope* failed, as did *UNOSOM II*.

⁸ See www.projectimplicit.net/about.php.

⁹ See, for example, “UK’s Darling—Bank Regulation Must Be Global,” *Reuters*, January 28, 2010, in reuters.com/article/bankingfinancial-SP/idINLAK00254220100128

¹⁰ BBC World News *HARDtalk* with Stephen Sackur, February 23, 2010, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/8530106.stm.