# European Social Psychology and Its Responsibilities: Dignity and Humiliation

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for-profit)

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#### **Short Abstract**

This paper presents the concept of humiliation and describes it as having seven layers. The paper ends with laying out the responsibilities of the field of social psychology in Europe.

#### Long Abstract

In this paper, Evelin Lindner touches upon the 'emotional turn' and the 'relational turn' that can be observed in several academic fields, not just in the field of psychology. She argues that it is important that these trends do not slide into reductionistic definitions of scientificity. She encourages European social psychologists to be aware that social psychology as a field can have humiliating effects on others and even on itself.

The article lays out Lindner's concept of humiliation as having seven layers. At the core of the phenomenon of humiliation is a spatial movement that expresses the universal idea of *putting down* and *holding down*. Then comes a middle layer that is particularly relevant for social psychology. Two evaluations of the practice of 'putting down' stand in opposition to each other: on one side, this practice is treated as *legitimate* and routine, on the other side as *illegitimate* and traumatising. Several layers on the periphery follow, the first pertaining to cultural differences between groups and another four layers relating to differences in individual personalities and variations in individual experiences of humiliation. Even genetic differences may play a role at the individual level, as some people seem to be more prone to feeling humiliated than others. Lindner ends this paper with laying out her views on the responsibilities of the field of social psychology in Europe.

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## Part 1: What is humiliation?

Variations on humiliation discrimination degradation dehumanisation devaluation incrimination demoralisation subjugation intimidation objectification dislocation deprivation mortification — Linda Hartling, adapted from Francisco Gomes de Matos, 13th June 2012

What is humiliation? Relational psychologist Linda Hartling explains that humiliation can lead to very different outcomes — from being cast down to wanting to rise up, either violently or peacefully. From a broad perspective, humiliation can be examined as:

- 1. an internal experience (a feeling, an emotion)
- 2. an external event (such as a degrading interpersonal interaction, bullying, abuse, violent conflict, and genocide)
- 3. as systemic social conditions (such intractable inequality, discrimination, or forced dislocation)<sup>1</sup>

Humiliation is a word that is used for very complex sets of conditions. It is used to describe an act of humiliation perpetrated by an offender as well as for the emotions of a victim who feels humiliated. The same word is used when humiliation is built into a system, as was the case, for instance, in apartheid. An 'offender', however, who is accused of inflicting humiliation might have simply wanted to offer help. When help is felt to be humiliation may also be used exclusively by a third party. The social worker, for example, who wants to 'save' a beaten wife from the humiliation she suffers at the hands of a violent husband, might be rebuked — the wife may assure everyone that her husband expresses his love through beating her, in the spirit of 'whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth'.<sup>2</sup> Marxists spoke of 'false consciousness' when workers failed to feel humiliated and failed to rebel.

At the centre of humiliation is the idea of pushing down, pressing down, holding down to the ground. The core definitional characteristic of the process of humiliation is that the victim is forced into a subordinate position where she is condemned to passivity. Humiliation is the enforced lowering of a person or a group, a process of submission that diminishes the victims' sense of worthiness. To be humiliated means to be brought down, often in a painful manner, into a situation that is lower than one feels entitled to.<sup>3</sup> The act of humiliation often involves coercion, including violence. Humiliators may act out of a sense of superiority towards their victims, 'pushing them down from above', yet it is also possible that humiliators feel inferior to their victims, that they harbour a combination of envy and admiration for their victims, and in that case, bringing down an envied person means 'pulling them down'. The latter case is intensified when humiliators also feel ashamed of their former admiration, ashamed of ever having been envious — the Rwandan

genocide might serve as an example (see also Talk 5 in this symposium).<sup>4</sup> Last, one can also humiliate oneself without being aware of it — for instance, by being blind to the traps of the master-slave dyad.

Humiliation may be overtly visible to all, but it can also be covert, simmering invisibly for the outer world. This is what makes the master-slave dyad so fragile, as already philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has observed.<sup>5</sup> In contexts of large power differences, inferiors may display adulation towards their superiors, while secretly despising them for their humiliating behaviour, and even plotting against them. Fake adulation can be a subtle way to humiliate an arrogant and self-absorbed superior. Employees may be able to respect an abrasive boss as long as they fear him or even hate him. Yet, if the boss were so gullible to think that his inferiors' submissive praise reflects their true love for him, if he were to believe in their words of adulation, if the boss were to go as far and base his own sense of honour and dignity on their feigned admiration, subordinates would no longer 'honour' him even with their hatred, they may simply feel pity: In their eyes, the boss humiliates himself by being blind to the fact that his subordinates essentially humiliate him by their fake friendliness. Unaware of the humiliating effects of his behaviour, the boss will be shocked to face the opposite of adulation in case the power balance shifts, and his employees can afford to show their true face.

The pronoun 'he' for the boss is at its place here, because, indeed, power gradients are often gendered. Prostitution is the most glaring example. Men who believe that 'juicy girls' are authentically 'juicy' and that 'playing hard with them' is 'cool and manly', are looked upon with pity by most women and many men, because those men are not only blind to how they humiliate these girls, but even blind to how they humiliate themselves.<sup>6</sup> The #MeToo movement that began in October 2017 has exposed some of these covert humiliation dynamics by making them overtly visible.

The role of the victim is not always clear either. One might expect that humiliation is avoided, yet there are people who look for humiliation, for example, in sadomasochistic contexts, or in religious rites where people flagellate and humiliate themselves to praise divinity.<sup>7</sup> Other victims may simply laugh off attempts to humiliate them, or proudly refuse to feel humiliated (see also Talk 2 and 4 in this symposium).<sup>8</sup> Yet other victims may feel humiliated even in the absence of any intentional humiliating acts, simply because of misunderstandings, or because of individual or cultural differences in the definition of what respectful behaviour ought to entail. The very notion of equal dignity, for instance, can have humiliating effects on 'higher beings' in social contexts that rank honour in ways that legitimise 'higher beings to preside over lesser beings'. Ranked honour is part and parcel of the *dominator model of society*,<sup>9</sup> where those who believe to be entitled to arrogate superiority are likely to interpret the call for equal dignity as a humiliating infringement on their privileges. Last, a self-proclaimed 'victim' may invent false stories of humiliation to manoeuvre counterparts into the role of despicable perpetrators — 'crybully' is the shortest description of a perpetrator who instrumentalises victimhood.

As to reactions to humiliation, the situation is as complex. Some people react with apathy, inertia, and depression, others develop open aggression, still others hide their anger and plan long-term revenge.<sup>10</sup> A person who plans for revenge may amplify its impact by becoming the leader of a movement — this is the Hitler path out of humiliation. The path of people like Bertha von Suttner, Mahatma Gandhi, Eleanor Roosevelt, Rachel Carson, Martin Luther King Jr., or Nelson Mandela is to transcend and transform anger, to become a leader for constructive social change in the spirit of *conscientisation*, as educator Paulo Freire recommended.<sup>11</sup>

Humiliation has been included in conceptualisations of affect, as has been developed, for instance, by psychologists Jon Trygve Monsen, Ole André Solbakken, and colleagues at the University of Oslo in Norway. They build their affect awareness theory on Silvan Tomkins' work

and include eleven affect categories — interest/excitement, enjoyment/joy, fear/panic, anger/rage, shame/humiliation, contempt/condescension, disgust/revulsion, sadness/despair, envy/jealousy, guilt/remorse, and tenderness/care. Monsen, Solbakken, and their colleagues highlight all those elements that are needed for well-adjusted psychological functioning — as there is awareness of affect, tolerance, emotional (nonverbal) expression, and conceptual (verbal) expression.<sup>12</sup> All these elements will also help victims of humiliation to cope with their feelings (see also Talk 2 and 4 in this symposium).<sup>13</sup>

Complex as it is, the concept of humiliation can be systematically analysed in the spirit of sociologist Max Weber's *ideal-type* approach that differentiates between distinct levels of abstraction.<sup>14</sup>. One way to analyse it is to deconstruct it into seven layers.<sup>15</sup> It could be conceptualised in a two-dimensional way, or, even more comprehensive, in a three-dimensional way, like the layers of an onion, for instance. At the core there is a spatial movement that expresses the universal idea and practice of *putting down* and *holding down*. Then comes a layer that entails two opposed appraisals of such practices, namely, either treating them as *legitimate* and routine (ranked honour) or as *illegitimate* and traumatising (equal dignity). The third layer pertains to cultural differences between groups and another four layers relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experiences of humiliation.<sup>16</sup> Even genetic differences may play a role at the individual level, as it may be possible that people are more prone to feeling humiliated than others.<sup>17</sup> To give an example of how even seemingly basic emotions can vary, the Ifaluk language in Micronesia has no word for anger, and even the experience of anger seems not to be there. There is an emotion called 'fago', meaning interpersonal kindness in the face of suffering.<sup>18</sup>

This conceptualisation could be visualised as in Table 1.

legitimate (in a ranked honour context)

Humiliation is a spatial movement of putting down and holding down

R

illegitimate (in an equal dignity context)  $\bowtie$ 

there are cultural differences between groups

КЛ

there are at least four layers of individual differences

Table 1: The concept of humiliation in layers

# Dignity-humiliation hurts more than honour-humiliation

This paper focuses on the second layer in Table 1 — the one that stipulates that practices of putting down people can be seen as legitimate or as illegitimate. The second layer shows that the appraisal of humiliation follows large-scale geopolitical transformations — debasement has a radically different meaning in social contexts where worthiness is being ranked in 'more' or 'less' as compared to contexts where such rankings are rejected. I choose to use the phrase *honour* for social contexts where some people are placed higher on the ladder of worthiness than others, and I use the phrase *dignity* for contexts that subscribe to ideals of equal worthiness for all in solidarity. By choosing the term *honour* for contexts where 'higher beings' preside over 'lesser beings', I do not wish to humiliate those who hold the notion of honour dear, on the contrary, I rescue the dignity of

honour and the honour of dignity through embedding these concepts in larger historical developments.<sup>19</sup>

This layer is the most significant for society at large, because in times of planetary polycrisis, a predicament that can only be addressed through global cooperation, dynamics of humiliation are the most significant hindrance.<sup>20</sup> All those political actors who believe that humiliation is a legitimate tool to achieve peace and cooperation, particularly when they do so in social contexts where human rights ideals are salient, risk achieving the opposite, namely, hostility and refusal to cooperate.

In my work, I map this situation by differentiating *honour-humiliation* from *dignity-humiliation*. Throughout the past millennia, the dominator model of society was prevalent almost everywhere on the globe, held together by the ethos and emotional coinage of ranking worthiness. Humiliation was accepted even by victims, be it that they saw it as God's due punishment or as nature's unshakable order. The situation changed radically, however, when human rights ideals became salient, as these ideals stand in the way of such legitimising interpretations of debasement — the world of honour provides innumerable justifications for honour-humiliation, while there is no legitimate 'excuse' for dignity-humiliation.

The violation of dignity smarts more than the violation of honour, per definition, because the promise of equal dignity is higher than that of honour, as human rights ideals offer everyone the unconditional right to be considered as equal in dignity just for the sake of being born as a human being — the fall from grace is so much deeper than in an honour context. What makes dignity-humiliation even more hurtful is the disappointment of the promise. If a person is taught to believe the world around her is just, and she wakes up to the opposite reality, her disappointment goes deeper than if she had never heard of a just world.<sup>21</sup> In the same way, when a person is taught by human rights advocates that she is a member of the human family, equally worthy as all others, and she wakes up to the fact that this is empty rhetoric, she is doubly disappointed, first by the deprivation and then by the betrayal. This disappointment is amplified in a shrinking world that brings not only the human rights message to the outermost corners of the globe, but also an unending stream of information about its many betrayals.

*Recognition*  $gaps^{22}$  open when equality in dignity is promised but withheld — *dignity* gaps or *indignity*  $traps^{23}$  — and these gaps are more hurtful than 'honour gaps'. A person who experiences being placed lower than expected in a ranked honour system may feel hurt, still, she is not immediately exiled from the human family.<sup>24</sup> In contrast, being placed lower than expected in a context of equal dignity evicts one from the human family altogether, an experience that assaults the core of one's being — one is deemed to be no longer part of humanity. 'To recognise humanity hypocritically, and betray the promise of equal dignity, humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed'.<sup>25</sup>

Research is usually done in a context where human rights ideals are salient. This research shows that the combination of loss and humiliation (I would specify it as dignity-humiliation) is the strongest predictor of major depression.<sup>26</sup> It also shows that humiliation is the most intense human emotion, leading to the mobilisation of more processing power and a greater consumption of mental resources than other emotions, 'Humiliation is a particularly intense and cognitively demanding negative emotional experience that has far-reaching consequences for individuals and groups alike'.<sup>27</sup> The emotional dimension of social rejection and the victims' responses to rejection can be well understood by using humiliation as a framework (see also Talk 3 in this symposium).<sup>28</sup>

To sum up, as long as practices of degradation are seen as legitimate in a society, as long it is seen as legitimate that an iron hand holds subordinates in subservient humility to thwart potential uprisings, the situation appears to be calm and quiet. The situation changes radically when such practices are deemed to be illegitimate, and this is precisely what happens when human rights ideals of equal dignity become salient (see also Talk 5 in this symposium).<sup>29</sup> This is why dynamics of

humiliation are much more virulent nowadays than before. Whenever equality in dignity is promised but betrayed, whenever resources one feels are necessary are withheld, be they tangible or intangible resources, emotional wounds are created that go deeper than before. This is the reason for why dynamics of humiliation become more relevant for research in social psychology and need more attention from planners of political strategies.

#### Humiliation, apathy, and violence

Wherever and whenever people are conditioned to accept debasement as just treatment, or succumb in apathy or depression, there is little disruption of society at large. However, feelings of humiliation can also involve anger and/or shame, particularly when the victim is unable to redress the degradation that is felt to be undeserved (see also Talk 2, 4, and 5 in this symposium).<sup>30</sup> A Somali proverb says, 'A man deserves to be killed and not to be humiliated'.<sup>31</sup> In other words, a proud and noble warrior culture does not allow humiliation. Norway looks back on an equally proud Viking past that may still shine through in contemporary Norway as its citizens are known to have an 'alarming tendency to quarrel with their neighbours'. This is what a Norwegian insurance company reports, 'It's seen as a matter of honour not to give in to a neighbour's demands, and we expect or hope that the other side will take the initiative for some sort of reconciliation'.<sup>32</sup>

Most people, however, do not live in warrior cultures of proud equals. The dominator model of society has been prevalent throughout the past millennia almost everywhere on the planet, and the longer such a hierarchy was in place, the more people were 'groomed' into accepting humiliation. Protracted cycles of humiliation can engender the capitulation into 'learned helplessness'.<sup>33</sup> Continual humiliation may wear people down to the point that they develop the 'Stockholm syndrome'<sup>34</sup> and identify with their humiliators, becoming their accomplices and executors. While some may develop rage, yet, even they may turn it inward and become depressed rather than assertive or violent,<sup>35</sup> they may descend into apathy and inertia, or cynicism, or depression,.<sup>36</sup> A seemingly 'peaceful' society may be the result, yet, at the price of *structural violence*<sup>37</sup> — the peace is being paid for with the pain of the society's members.<sup>38</sup>

Still today, there are power elites around the world who use humiliation as a tool to force their subordinates into submissiveness. While apathy and depression may be a first reaction to humiliation, and coerced meekness and compliance the outcome, even the most resilient and peace-loving victims admit that subjecting them to continuous experiences of humiliation can drive them into explosive violence — what they call 'madness', losing one's mind', or 'going black'.<sup>39</sup> At some point, feelings of humiliation may explode, and this may be violent. When that happens, rage is no longer turned inward but outward, it becomes hot, desperate, and destructive, bursting into *humiliated fury*, as psychologist Helen Block Lewis has called it.<sup>40</sup> Violent retaliation for humiliation, even if self-destructive, can then be experienced as ultimate liberation from one's shame over one's helplessness at the hands of humiliators. Passionate murder and/or suicide may be the outcome.

Experiences like this are likely to intensify wherever the promise of human rights ideals become salient, the promise of equality in dignity. When equal dignity is promised and at the same time betrayed, feelings of humiliation may occur without feelings of shame. Nelson Mandela refused to feel ashamed even when he was being humiliated and felt humiliated.<sup>41</sup> This has consequences for research on humiliation: Humiliation can no longer be conceptualised as part of a shame continuum, humiliation can no longer be seen as a more intense form of embarrassment and shame.<sup>42</sup>

As the violation of dignity carries the potential to lead to much more intense hurt than the

violation of honour, also the responses are likely to manifest in more extreme forms, both with respect to depression and violence on one side, or social activism on the other side. Feelings of humiliation of one's dignity may lead to depression that is so deep that, even if endured as 'quietly' as in the case of honour-humiliation, it happens for a different reason: While people who subscribe to values of honour may tolerate honour-humiliation in quiet acceptance because they think of this as a legitimate arrangement of relationships, feelings of dignity-humiliation stem from the betrayal of the promise of equal dignity in all relationships, and the very intolerability of this betrayal may cause the silent response of depression, a silence of deep despondence.

In case humiliation entrepreneurs, as I call them in my work, are active, felings of dignityhumiliation, when they manifest in extreme hatred and violence, can escalate into terrorism, war, or genocide. Only Gandhi-like figures can inspire peaceful social action that is consistent with dignity. Rising from humiliation in dignity begins with acknowledging the historical fact that during the past millennia, when the oppressed rose and were successful with revolution, they usually became the new masters and replaced the old masters. This script is typically applied in response to honourhumiliation. In a human rights context, in contrast, this is no longer a legitimate strategy — simply becoming the new oppressors humiliates the humanity also of the revolutionaries themselves. Dignity-humiliation cannot be healed by applying traditional scripts of violence that were once designed to avenge honour-humiliation. Only dignified and dignifying remedies can heal dignityhumiliation. I call it *cross back* when people fall back on scripts from honour-humiliation in their response to dignity-humiliation. In Rwanda, former subordinates who had risen to power, for instance, 'crossed back' to the old script to secure their own position as new masters and attempted to eradicate their former masters, the Tutsi, in a genocide.

Human rights defenders need therefore to be aware that empowerment can go too far. The social worker may empower the beaten wife so she can learn that being abused by a violent husband is humiliating, and she can muster the courage to liberate herself from humiliation. However, the social worker ought not empower the wife to humiliate her husband in return, or even kill him. The self-esteem movement in Western societies might have fallen precisely into this trap. In many cases, it simply democratised arrogance, giving license to everyone to arrogate the former elites' sense of entitlement. By now, a society-wide narcissism epidemic<sup>43</sup> creates a societal climate of chronic indignation and anger entrepreneurship by all against all.<sup>44</sup> I therefore follow relational psychologists Jean Baker Miller and Linda Hartling in using the phrase *sense of worth* in the place of self-esteem.<sup>45</sup> I resonate with family therapist Jesper Juul in his scepticism of the notion of self-confidence.<sup>46</sup>

In my work, I avoid using the term 'empowerment' and replace it with *entrustment*, as entrustment suggests that there are limits to uprisings.<sup>47</sup> When I think of empowerment, Adolf Hitler's rise to dictatorial power or *Machtergreifung* comes to mind, as it is connected with terms such as *Ermächtigungsgesetz* (literally translated 'empowerment law').<sup>48</sup> By using entrustment, I wish to suggest that all participants have to meet in the middle between the top and the bottom of society and shoulder the responsibility for the world together as equals.

Through my work, I aim to invite all people into *mutual entrustment in the spirit of equal worth*. I invite those who come from a mindset of traditional collectivistic honour as lovingly as I invite those who embrace more recent mindsets of individualism. I invite those who got used to their debasement at the bottom of society as lovingly as those who feel entitled to arrogate superiority.

I dedicate my entire life to enabling future generations to embrace humanity's shared responsibility of *mutual entrustment*.<sup>49</sup>

#### Humiliation dynamics in the world

When a few people explode in humiliated fury — literally, as in the case of suicide bombings — this may be of little consequence for society at large. Yet, it is another situation when leaders mobilise entire societies to respond to humiliation with violence. Humiliation entrepreneurs use feelings of latent humiliation brewing in the masses to mobilise collective violent action. Adolf Hitler told his followers they should refuse feeling ashamed of Germany's defeat after World War I, that they had the right to feel wrongly humiliated, that they had the right to fight back. Then he set out to redress this humiliation by inflicting unspeakable humiliation on supposed humiliators, thus unleashing new and horrific turns in the cycles of humiliation.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, when he declared a Caliphate in 2014, said, 'Terrorism is to refuse humiliation, subjugation, and subordination [to the kuffār — the infidels]. Terrorism is for the Muslim to live as a Muslim, honourably with might and freedom. Terrorism is to insist upon your rights and not give them up'.<sup>50</sup>

Adolf Hitler and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi both mobilised others into mayhem — Hitler sought to gain *Lebensraum*, Baghdadi to create a new nation. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, as well, mobilised masses to rise from humiliation. Yet, they mobilised for constructive social change, no longer participating in the tit-for-tat of cycles of humiliation. All cases show that humiliation has immense strength and force — therefore I call it the *nuclear bomb of the emotions* — and this force can be used constructively, as by the Gandhis and Mandelas of this world, or destructively, as by the Hitlers of this world. The anger entailed in feelings of humiliation can be used as a weapon for mayhem or as an energy source for conscientisation and more dignity for all people.<sup>51</sup>

The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda demonstrated this force, and in that case, it was used as a weapon. It also showed how 'cost-effective' this weapon is — the machetes that were used to kill almost one million people were household items turned into deadly weapons by propaganda that disseminated a humiliation narrative from a radio station. Already Hitler's propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels had used the same method. Da'esh's internet platforms recruited also the humiliated of the world as foreign fighters to bring back a glorious caliphate.<sup>52</sup> In all cases, the funds invested were minimal — the force of the humiliation narrative was enough to instigate acts of terror and war. The terror perpetrated by Da'esh may even have served as a weapon in cycles of humiliation, for example, between Saudi Arabia and Iran — Saudi Arabia may have supported terror to weaken Iran's strongest ally in the region, namely, Syria's regime.<sup>53</sup>

#### **Humiliation dynamics in Europe**

The Versailles Treaties at the end of the First World War were intended to humiliate Germany to teach a 'lesson' in subservient humility and make it harmless — this is a historical argument that has found its way into common knowledge. This 'lesson', however, backfired in the most horrible ways, into war and genocide. After the Second World War, Germany was included as a respected member in the European family, and this led to peace.<sup>54</sup> In short, history appears to hold the lesson that humiliation risks leading to war while respect can lead to peace, humiliation may lead to violent backlashes rather than to subservient humility.

The recent rise in populism around the world seems to follow similar scripts, Europe being no exception. Back in 2004, no one was more enthusiastic than the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians about becoming members of the European Union, nobody benefitted more from joining. How ironic, therefore, that now many in those countries elect populists who rage against Brussels, with feelings of humiliation as driving force.<sup>55</sup> Karel Schwarzenberg was the foreign minister of the

Czech Republic when his country joined. He worked hard to transform his country into a reliable European partner. In 2017, he began to see his life's work crumbling, 'We Czechs know what we owe the EU, but we do not feel at home'. Too often, Schwarzenberg reports, Eastern Europeans were treated condescendingly by Brussels, 'When we disagreed, we were told: Become real Europeans first'. Eastern Europeans are sensitive to such a tone, 'We do not appreciate being treated as minors forever, because this is reminiscent of the Soviet era when we always were on the receiving end of directives'.<sup>56</sup>

As it seems, Western Europeans have perpetrated humiliation, wittingly and/or unwittingly, by being too casual in their display of power, and they are therefore now despised as 'arrogant Western elitist know-it-all dominators'. Clearly, the 'we against the elites' slogan is getting louder not just within Europe, it is relevant also in the United States, for instance, where the followership of a Donald J. Trump writes it on its banners. It also brings back the old Cold War fault lines: In the U.S., the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a victory, 'which led to a spirit of triumphalism and a feeling of omnipotence as the "sole superpower".<sup>57</sup> By now, the humiliated 'loser' — Russia — attempts to rise from below, and this not as a friend in good faith but as a distrustful rival.<sup>58</sup>

And then there is the 'inferiority complex', or internalised humiliation. Polish author Ziemowit Szczerek reports, 'The West has always been richer and more powerful', and this has created a sense of inferiority. 'We still see ourselves as Westerners look on us: a little poor, a bit backward, and less efficient'.<sup>59</sup> A rightist PiS voter in Poland and a rightist AfD voter in Germany resemble each other: He is male, and 'he lives in the countryside or in a small town, and even though his income has grown in recent years, he feels that he is under threat. He sees his traditional attachment to religion and his homeland put in question, even his traditional understanding of the role of women and men. Globalisation, immigration, the pluralisation of lifestyles, everything appears as a threat from a liberal elite.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, there are the humiliating experiences that flow not just from isolated acts of humiliation but from systemic humiliation. Polish Piotr Buras is an expert in European politics, and in 2017 he reported, 'The reform ideology of the nineties and early noughties has hit us particularly hard: unlike the West, the East has been given neo-liberalism without having gone through a social democratic era' — there was a lack of institutions that could cushion the hardships of capitalist restructuring, privatisation, and unemployment.<sup>61</sup>

Many in the West are unaware of these facts. Still in 2017, German journalists engaged in condescending psychologisations when they diagnosed 'this new nationalism' as a 'fear reaction', 'The enemy is no longer the neighbouring country. It is now against those up there'.<sup>62</sup> In this way, journalist Jonathan Chait warned, the journalists psychologised a systemic problem rather than questioning their own paradigm. For many in the West, neo-liberalism simply means 'superior capitalism versus inferior socialism'. But, so countered Chait: What kind of capitalism are we talking about? The Washington Consensus represents a particularly laissez-faire approach that changed the lives in many countries not necessarily for the better, 'The shock therapy of mass privatisation applied to Russia after the Soviet collapsed, for example, reduced life expectancy in that country by five years and ensured that Russia was taken over by strong-men and oligarchs'.<sup>63</sup> No wonder that Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán reaps applause when he speaks of 'recapturing politics' and of 'illiberal democracy'. No wonder Poland's PiS party is applauded for introducing a child allowance and lowering the retirement age.<sup>64</sup> In other words, German journalists themselves may be complicit in humiliation when they conceptualise a systemic problem as merely a personal fear reaction.

The two world wars saw the struggle for supremacy of traditional nationalisms fought out on the battlefields of the European continent, and this gave birth to the insight that such mayhem should never happen again. In this way, European unification emerged. Today this achievement, many

warn, may be gambled away by insensitive humiliations. The solution is to heal past cycles of humiliation and prevent new ones.

#### Part 2: The responsibilities of European Social Psychology

I meet many academic colleagues around the world who work hard to secure a career within the university system and do not aim for greater public visibility. I always remind them of the immense potential for influence that they have far beyond their field, even if they do not seek public arenas. I remind them that this potential requires careful protection because it is easily abused. Cambodia's Pol Pot, for instance, studied with Nicos Poulantzas (1936–1979), a Greco-French political sociologist in Paris. Later, Pol Pot turned Poulantzas' academic reflections into rigid ideology, implementing it in his homeland, and Poulantzas, seeing the horror he had set in motion, committed suicide.<sup>65</sup> Fascism drew legitimisation from a number of philosophers.<sup>66</sup> 'Murderous professors' stood behind the Rwandan genocide in 1994.<sup>67</sup> The documentary *Inside job* tries to expose the degree to which academic influence had prepared the ground for what later turned into the devastating economic crisis of 2007/2008.<sup>68</sup>

On my part, I strive to do my utmost to take my responsibility seriously and use academia's potential influence for the benefit of the dignity of all. Taking this responsibility seriously has many aspects, one of them is supporting my American colleagues who call on European academics, including its psychologists, to support them in making the Anglo-Saxon world aware that it needs to change core assumptions. There is, for instance, an overemphasis on individualism, then there is the notion of freedom being misdefined, which, in turn, leads to exploitative economic practices. Researchers within the United States often see the resulting damage earlier and clearer than their colleagues in Europe, many of whom follow American trends with a certain time lag. Noticing the damage, some American researchers have turned for inspiration to earlier psychologists from outside the United States — one example is psychologist Lev Vygotsky, born in 1896 in what is today Belarus.

### The need to emphasise the 'social' in social psychology

In the United States of America, pioneer thinker Jean Baker Miller drew on Vygotsky's insights in her work, as does social psychologist Kenneth Gergen. Their core message is that social psychology needs to become more 'social'.<sup>69</sup> Gergen writes, 'It is from the soil of critical appraisal that new attempts now spring to life, attempts to reconstitute the psychological terrain as a social one'.<sup>70</sup> Gergen points out that such work is inspired by Vygotsky's thesis of higher mental processes and in some degree by post-structural literary theory. Vygotsky made a strong case for mental processes being relocated social processes: One carries out a mental process called 'thinking' in the terms of the community into which one is socialised. Thought is participation in relatedness.<sup>71</sup>

Anthropologists have long acknowledged the *need to belong* as a core characteristic of humanness,<sup>72</sup> with *communal sharing*, the most elementary form of human relating, depending on this need.<sup>73</sup> Psychologists, while acknowledging this need, may still want to go one step further and highlight the aspect of mutuality embedded in this need. John Bowlby, for instance, has sparked important work on what he calls attachment,<sup>74</sup> yet, it might be preferable to speak of *connection* rather than *attachment* to highlight the aspect of mutuality in this process.<sup>75</sup> This is just one example of many that may benefit from shifting the emphasis from the individual to the relationship.

#### The need to enlarge the 'emotional turn'

The 'emotional turn' that is presently unfolding in several fields of inquiry — in international relations theory, for instance, and finally also in the field of psychology itself — may not go far enough.<sup>76</sup> More is needed.

Jean Baker Miller, a pathbreaking psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, social activist, feminist, and author, calls for an emotional-relational turn, which is more than just an emotional turn that is still beholden to Western lone-hero individualism.<sup>77</sup> In her relational-cultural theory (RCT), Miller posits that growth-fostering relationships are a central human necessity and that acute or chronic disconnections in or from such relationships (such as humiliation and human rights violations) cause psychological and social problems.<sup>78</sup> RCT emphasises that all relationships are defined and influenced by the cultural context in which they exist and therefore, the primary focus of study in RCT is relational development, rather than development of the self. Relational being transcends the binary break between the person and the object (mind and world), and therefore, my colleague Linda Hartling, a relational psychologist, and I regard 'the relation' itself as having causal effects.<sup>79</sup> Relational psychologies develop in several ways,<sup>80</sup> and Linda Hartling has written widely on relational-cultural theory, both as Associate Director of the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute at Wellesley College in Boston and as Director of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (HumanDHS).<sup>81</sup>

Along the lines of psychologist Lev Vygotsky and cultural-historical activity theory,<sup>82</sup> Miller examined the impact of power dynamics and dominant/subordinate relationships throughout history, showing how they obstruct the full participation and healthy development of all human beings. Miller suggests that we need new arrangements of power and relationships that will provide for the healthy psychological development and participation of all people.<sup>83</sup>

New arrangements of power are also waiting to happen within the academic world, as Gergen observes — 'academic discourse typically fails to be intelligible or commanding to anyone who is not a member of the academic guild. As often said, it is "elitist" in character'.<sup>84</sup> Gergen warns that the constant pressure to publish keeps researchers from doing out-of-the-box science,<sup>85</sup> and he therefore encourages them to dare explore their potential of multi-being and even expand their forms of expression to poetry, music, dance, theatre, multi-media, and more.<sup>86</sup> British social psychologist Michael Billig, as well, cautions that technical terminology, with its unquestioned faith that reality consists of variables waiting to be reliably measured, is often less precise than simpler language. Following Billig's admonition, I use terms such as 'humiliation', even though this is 'simple language'.

Kenneth Gergen calls for care for relationships to become primary, for stepping outside the individualistic view of the self/other split that the Western predilection for individual agency and entitlements has brought, to step outside the 'narcissism' of 'care of the self' versus 'care of the other'.<sup>87</sup> Gergen enumerates the enormous cost to be paid when the concept of the individual self is seen as a bounded unit, because this 'invites a sense of fundamental separation and loneliness', it 'encourages narcissism at the expense of relationships', it 'generates unending threats to one's person', it 'transforms the self into a marketable commodity',<sup>88</sup> and it makes relationships artificial and threatening.<sup>89</sup>

The field of education throws the cost that Gergen speaks of into stark relief. Even though Wilhelm von Humboldt's model of higher education is widely known, namely, a model of holistic *Bildung* rather than mere *Ausbildung* or training, mainstream education still aims at optimising *Ausbildung* rather than *Bildung*. Even though affective neuroscience is now capable of affirming old insights, among them the insight that emotions are indispensable for learning,<sup>90</sup> and SEL, Social and Emotional Learning is becoming a buzzword,<sup>91</sup> experts warn, that this may happen for all the wrong

reasons. They warn that the necessary consequences fail to be drawn from these findings, and if this is not rectified, Alexa-type surveillance will soon drive the 'SEL fad'.<sup>92</sup>

#### The need to avoid self-humiliation

For the past years, I have observed that, even though many academic institutions around the world honour their duties, economic circumstances make it ever more difficult to do so. I observe an intensifying trend on all continents that undermines academia's relevance for 'real life' — life outside of national and corporate interests — even undermining the very scientificity of science.<sup>93</sup>

The impact of humiliation does not spare the field of psychology itself. Since its inception, the field of psychology is particularly vulnerable to outside influences as it is a relatively young discipline that still strives for respect in society in general and the scientific community in particular. Its history could be recounted as a story of efforts to gain respect and avoid humiliation by appearing to be just as important as the natural sciences — a condition popularly known as 'inferiority complex'. In other words, the field of psychology succumbs to the very psychological problems it is meant to elucidate and solve. The desire to appear as 'scientific' as natural sciences, or 'physics envy', is an invitation to self-humiliation, in a situation, where it is psychology's very *raison-d'être* to study such traps rather than fall for them.

Unfortunately, the desire for significance, when it is blind, can lead to humiliating outcomes. Here is an extreme example: While the American Psychiatric Association refused to be part of CIA interrogations, the American Psychological Association secretly aided the involvement of psychologists.<sup>94</sup> James Elmer Mitchell was one of two psychologists involved in designing interrogation methods for the American secret service,<sup>95</sup> building on psychologist Martin Seligman's research on learned helplessness.<sup>96</sup> Fortunately, the willingness to abet torture programmes has since been openly acknowledged and regretted by the American Psychological Association.<sup>97</sup>

One does not have to revert to such extreme cases to find other examples for psychologists' blindness for their own field's core characteristics, mandate, and ethics. I have met physicists and mathematicians who spoke with enthusiastic love about their research and who did not shy away of showing loving appreciation to colleagues — they do not have to fear being suspected of lack of scientificity, as their fields already entail it beyond doubt. In contrast, I have taken part in conferences in the humanities that almost resembled war zones in their aim to prove scientific legitimacy. Some psychologists have startled me by being seemingly devoid of human kindness, almost robotic, willing to sacrifice basic decency for the sake of appearing scientific — not unlike traditional religious practices to 'deny the flesh'.<sup>98</sup>

More even, the natural sciences' number-crunching calculus-based style is being imitated in the field of psychology even where it is not necessary or even is misleading. Psychology is caught in the contradiction between its own purpose — understanding human beings — and postulates of anti-historical positivism.<sup>99</sup> In the formal sciences of mathematics, geometry, or logic certainty and replication may be achieved, while the fallibility inherent in the social sciences renders it fundamentally different.<sup>100</sup> Even worse, even though correlation has widely replaced causation as explanatory frame, some 'psychology has been trapped by its adherence to causal attributions' while its neighbouring disciplines of chemistry and biology 'have already long time moved into a noncausal systems of explanation'.<sup>101</sup> Psychologist Svend Brinkmann, co-director of the Center for Qualitative Studies at Aalborg University in Denmark, chronicles that even though qualitative psychologists have always been around, they have been marginal,<sup>102</sup> an ironic fact, because qualitative methods in psychology 'meet the demands of the methodology of the natural sciences

more truly than do the methods of mainstream quantitative methodology'.<sup>103</sup> It is not surprising that research findings in the field of psychology are much 'weaker' than claimed: only a third of original studies published in top tier psychology journals can be replicated.<sup>104</sup> Jaan Valsiner, an Estonian-American professor of developmental and cultural psychology, the recipient of the 1995 Alexander von Humboldt Prize for his interdisciplinary work on human development, warns:

Psychology has become an arena for a complex social game of a fashion of appearing 'scientific' at the expense of alienation of the data from the phenomena and the data makers from the theoretical and philosophical issues...<sup>105</sup>

Scandinavian social psychologist Jan Smedslund, as well, cautions social scientists against trying to appear 'scientific' by mistaking 'scientifically looking' methods for sound science in places where core rules are blatantly apparent and studying 'infinite objects' would be silly.<sup>106</sup> Smedslund warns that a lot of psychological research is as pointless as trying to make surveys in order to find out whether bachelors really are unmarried.<sup>107</sup> He argues that human beings create *meta-myths* that are explicable in terms of common-sense psychology or *psycho-logic*.<sup>108</sup> In his work, Smedslund focusses on stable core meanings, rules, and elements that are entailed in ordinary words, and he cautions psychological research against overlooking them.<sup>109</sup> Jaan Valsiner commented in 2014, 'Smedslund has been criticising this aspect of psychology's methodology — its pseudo-empiricism — systematically over the past 40 years — but to no avail. The factory of "measurement" in psychology guarantees its continued pseudo-empiricism well into the 21st century'.<sup>110</sup>

Its insistence on respectability through mathematical modelling may also inform dynamics of humiliation in psychology's relationships with other disciplines, for instance, with that of history. Mainstream academic psychology treats history 'with little more than tolerant civility', these are the words of Michael Billig, and the reason he suggests is that history is messy and 'cannot run experiments to test hypotheses'.<sup>111</sup> Billig calls on the field of psychology to take history more seriously.<sup>112</sup>

#### The need to transcend masculinist models of consciousness

'Physics envy' may not be the only problem of the field of psychology. Hungarian philosopher Ágnes Heller explains that 'masculinist models of consciousness objectify world order, obfuscating how fluid and continuously malleable it in reality is'.<sup>113</sup> Wherever masculinist models of consciousness reign, priority is given to everything that speaks to 'male' rationality, while whatever is 'soft', since it smacks of 'female' irrationality, is undervalued.<sup>114</sup>

In my 2009 book on emotion and conflict, and in my 2010 book on gender and humiliation, I discussed the gender related reasons for why the role of emotions has been understudied for so long, why it was regarded as too 'soft' a topic for 'hard' science, even though its consequences can create the hardest of facts — from hostile polarisation to terrorism to genocide to war.<sup>115</sup> It is telling that emotions become more visible in present-day's research when 'hard' technology is involved, the neuroimaging technique of functional MRI that studies the brain areas that are involved in emotions. Despite some rise in acceptance of qualitative research approaches in the past years, it still is widely seen as an intellectual virtue to define 'hard' categories with a definite technical meaning and psychometric reliability and validity, and then to impose these categories diachronically and synchronically on changing historical realities and on the world's diverse cultural mindsets.

When the cultural script of combative duelling between alpha-leaders afflicts social sciences, it

crowds out mutually enlightening curiosity. It violates the ethos of social sciences when spiteful denigration and disparagement is meted out against those who think differently, far beyond what the scientific discourse warrants. The ethos of social sciences indicates that professional identity ought to be grounded in sound reality testing rather than in ego-driven combat.

Unfortunately, there are indications that the trend is going into the wrong direction. Academic criticism is now increasingly delivered with a strain of 'hatred', with 'critical barbarity', giving 'cruel treatment' to 'experiences and ideals that non-academics treat as objects of tender concern', observes Lisa Ruddick, Professor Emerita of English at University of Chicago.<sup>116</sup> The hermeneutics of suspicion encourage punitive attitudes and turn academia into a war zone, where scholars use theory, or simply attitude, 'to burn through whatever is small, tender, and worthy of protection and cultivation'.<sup>117</sup> French philosopher, anthropologist and sociologist Bruno Latour adds:

Wars. So many wars. Wars outside and wars inside. Cultural wars, science wars, and wars against terrorism. Wars against poverty and wars against the poor. Wars against ignorance and wars out of ignorance. My question is simple: Should we be at war, too, we, the scholars, the intellectuals? Is it really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins? Is it really the task of the humanities to add deconstruction to destruction? More iconoclasm to iconoclasm?<sup>118</sup>

As it becomes clear, under the banner of 'objective detachment from emotions for the sake of scientific impartiality', what might happen is the detachment from certain emotions in favour of others, it may simply mean the rejection of 'soft' and warm emotions in place of 'hard' emotions of combat.

In this unbecoming context, compliant professionals are now being produced for the workplace, individuals who are so alienated from themselves<sup>119</sup> that they will not know when to call out against abuse. British management scholar Ann Rippin reports of professional organisations,<sup>120</sup> where those trained in dehumanising glossy ways of speaking and feeling, 'report feeling unable to bring their whole selves to work', they feel 'obliged to dismember or disaggregate themselves, having to suspend feelings, ethics, values on occasion',<sup>121</sup> into 'cascading workplace cultures of inauthenticity'.<sup>122</sup>

The result is a society that throws out the positive sides of the relational dimension — such as kindness, solidarity, and a sense of worth, all of which flows from embeddedness into nurturing relations and from 'engagement in mutually beneficial relations'<sup>123</sup> — while at the same time failing to protect the vulnerable aspects of this dimension, namely, the need for belonging, from being used for oppression. Covert and collective manipulation makes people believe they are or should be 'self-made' if they want to belong, advertisers inculcate the illusion of godlike selfhood in consumers, as this manipulation empties those selves for the sake of profit maximisation. The African *ubuntu* philosophy states, 'I am because of you', and all aspects are lost: me and you and us. The academic world could come to rescue in this situation, yet it compounds the damage when it fails to nourish the positive sides of the relational dimension plus the self's potential to be an authentically flourishing human being with a sense of worth.

This predicament has motivated me and my colleagues to launch the idea of a World Dignity University.<sup>124</sup> I feel uncomfortable with the combative academic practice of defending or rejecting theories or theoretical concepts, uneasy with dissecting concepts by agreeing or disagreeing with them as if academic inquiry were a war zone. Rather, I like to embrace and learn from all insights, I welcome whatever input might bring light into the blind spots of which I am unaware.

I follow Emmanuel Lévinas, a French philosopher of Lithuanian Jewish ancestry, whose work focusses on the ethics of the Other: The Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object,

as is posited by traditional metaphysics. Seeing the Other, responding to the Other, is beyond justice. Human rights should primarily be rights of the Other, not 'my rights'.<sup>125</sup>

#### The need to protect knowledge as a common good

The most relevant present-day 'captor' of society, of which also academia is a victim, appears to be a nexus of corporate and national interests. I often meet corporate entrepreneurs who look down on academics, saying, 'Academics are cowards and clever rationalisers: they present cowardice as a virtue necessary for "objective detachment".' I must admit that I sometimes feel compelled to agree with these harsh judgements, namely, when I see the 'power/knowledge complex' at work. While taking a step back and attempting 'objective detachment' is a virtue that is indispensable for true integrity — scientific and otherwise — it turns into a violation if it comes in the form of cowardice in the face of abusive power, when it is 'cowardly compliance'.

States, international financial institutions, and NGOs increasingly engage in 'new managerialism' and 'all of these share a lack of humility, a keynote of the development power/knowledge complex', reports Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Professor of Global Studies and Sociology at University of California Santa Barbara.<sup>126</sup> Academic institutions abet and follow this trend of hollowing out quality for the sake of quantity, understandably so, because also scientists, as most others, depend on their position for financial stability. As a result, 'those who stand up are tossed out of the system, today more than ever before, few get tenure, everyone is an adjunct'.<sup>127</sup>

What is sold out, literally, is academic freedom and integrity, vital academic traditions are being sacrificed, as there is, for instance, the tradition of valuing uncertainties and questions as much as answers, and the tradition of transparent cooperation and free sharing of information as a common good for the sake of jointly gaining new insights. The result is a kind of 'academentia',<sup>128</sup> with tremendous amounts of energy being invested into competing for funding and scrambling for the best path to monetisation.<sup>129</sup> 'The current system of research funding and publication not only fails to safeguard us from blunders but actively encourages bad science — with sometimes deadly consequences', warns Scottish psychologist Stuart Ritchie.<sup>130</sup>

As male-exclusive networks prevail in science, just like in the corporate sector, academia still follows the age-old practice of soldiers who cooperate within their own battalion so as to better outcompete the 'enemy'.<sup>131</sup> Wherever business interests are amalgamated with academic inquiry — through corporate underwriting, research funding, or other forms of what could be called institutional bribery — 'duelling' interests are compounded.<sup>132</sup> Conspiracy entrepreneurs profit from this predicament, as they can surf on the widespread suspicion that 'scientists cannot be trusted' and that 'we, the people, are not told the truth'. Conspiracy entrepreneurs then promise 'salvation' through maligning science wholesale.

All this has daunted many scientists, it is the reason for why gloom has set in, for instance, among many climate scientists. 'It is worse, much worse, than you think', they say, and 'if your anxiety about global warming is dominated by fears of sea-level rise, you are barely scratching the surface of what terrors are possible'.<sup>133</sup> As environmentalist Al Gore once pointed out, 'instead of having a well-informed electorate, we have a well-amused audience'.<sup>134</sup> By now, we have more than a well-amused audience, we also have a furious audience, furious deniers of the looming danger who fight furious denouncers of that denial. All feel humiliated by the other side, cycles of humiliation turn hot.

With respect to the field of social psychology, I observe quantifiable 'hardness' being requested by funders, sometimes expressed in the language of honour and status, increasingly also in the language of dignity defined as modernisation and efficiency. When I worked on my book on honour and terror,<sup>135</sup> I understood that the influence of funders has affected terrorism research in particular. Funding agencies were biased in favour of philosophically indefensible quantitative methodologies, hoping to achieve the impossible, namely, social sciences providing 'hard' explanatory models fashioned on the positivistic interpretations of the natural sciences.<sup>136</sup>

Lately, a critical countermovement has set in. A critical 'revisionist view' of psychology increasingly opposes the mainstream positivist view of psychology. The revisionist view of psychology states that 'psychology's utility and role in society has been oppressive just as often as it has fostered social progress'.<sup>137</sup> Dutch psychologist Jeroen Jansz, Professor of Communication and Media in Rotterdam, Holland, summarises:

The positivist view of psychology was based on three basic assumptions: (a) Practical psychology is believed to rest on scientific knowledge developed within academic psychology, (b) this knowledge is further thought to be progressive and value-free, and (c) the application of this psychological knowledge is generally perceived as being beneficial for society and humankind.<sup>138</sup> The opposite view, 'the revisionist view', holds three different basic assumptions: (a) Practical psychology originates from societal forces rather than from academic psychology, (b) psychological knowledge does not necessarily imply progress and is never value-free, and (c) psychology often represses or conceals society's real conflicts.<sup>139</sup>

Psychologist Jaan Valsiner has traced how psychology emerged in the post-Napoleonic era in Germany as a discipline tasked to keep order in communities and order in the minds of people, and how the notion of science emerged later.<sup>140</sup> Somewhere on this path, psychology lost its subject, says Valsiner, namely, the *person*. The person was the core of developmental psychology only from the 1920s to the 1930s, then rats, pigeons, monkeys, and crowds of human beings became substitutes for persons, 'as if they represent the intricacies of the human *psyche*'.<sup>141</sup>

Jaan Valsiner explains that from the viewpoint of semiotics — the study of signs and symbols as elements of communicative behaviour — there is a controlling meta-sign called *scientific* that denotes the common-sense legitimacy of science, and that this legitimacy is subject to historically changing social constraints, meaning that any search for attributions is a form of sign construction aiming to pass through this gate.<sup>142</sup>

'Science starts from intuition', this is Valsiner's message. It starts from the kind of intuition that is 'educated in the process of initiation into social practices of science', in other words, it is not some kind of naïve or 'pure' intuition — 'the educated intuition is in the very core of all science'.<sup>143</sup> Frames of reference are meta-cognitive models, they are 'intellectual telescopes', or windows of opportunity 'to see some features of the object more clearly than others'.<sup>144</sup> Valsiner speaks of the *individual-socioecological frame* as the only frame of reference suitable for psychology.<sup>145</sup> This frame, even though it complicates the elaboration of methodology, fits the human condition best, because it adds the role of 'external guidance by goals-oriented others', persons or institutions, to the *individual-ecological frame* that fits 'biological phenomena and the study of most nonhuman species'.<sup>146</sup>

#### Conclusion

This paper highlights the responsibility of social psychologists to point out to society at large that cycles of humiliation destroy the social fabric of communities wherever they occur, locally and globally. As long as the world was not yet as interconnected as now, instigating new cycles of humiliation could have some utility, as it could turn its instigators into powerful strongmen over

their own people and into victors over their enemies. In contrast, in a highly interconnected world, where in addition human rights ideals have become salient, humiliation strategies hold the potency to drive all of humanity into the abyss. In times of planetary polycrisis, a situation that can only be addressed through global cooperation, dynamics of humiliation are therefore the most significant obstacle.<sup>147</sup>

Humiliation gains particular significance as human rights ideals introduce an expectation that was absent before, namely, that every human being deserves to be treated as equal in worthiness. For instance, millions of Dalits who formerly quietly accepted their lowly position in society, learn that this predicament represents the humiliating violation of their human rights (see also Talk 5 in this symposium).<sup>148</sup>

Humiliation is a complex phenomenon. Humiliation is a word that is used to describe at the same time the act of humiliation perpetrated by an offender and the emotions of the victim who feels humiliated. Humiliation can also be built into a system, as in the case of apartheid. A perpetrator may have the intention to humiliate others without necessarily succeeding; humiliation may be desired and not rejected; a 'helper' may humiliate those she wants to help without meaning to humiliate; a third party may see victims who themselves do not define themselves as victims or may overlook victims who are victims. Finally, accusations of humiliation may be fabricated.

Complex as it is, the concept of humiliation can be deconstructed into layers. First, there is a spatial movement that expresses the universal idea and practice of putting down and holding down. A second layer entails two opposing appraisals of practices of putting down, namely, either treating such practices as legitimate and routine — *honour-humiliation* — or as illegitimate and traumatising — *dignity-humiliation*. The third layer pertains to cultural differences between groups and another four layers relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experiences of humiliation.

Dignity-humiliation is more hurtful than honour-humiliation, and therefore the outcome is potentially more disruptive. Solvable conflicts become unsolvable when humiliation plays a role, as humiliated people do not wish to cooperate. This is particularly relevant for the violation of dignity, as it goes deeper than that of honour, which may at times be more open to calculations. Responses to humiliation may even accept self-destruction, thus belying rational choice theory. Empathy and pity with victims of humiliation may lead to unspeakable cruelty against real or perceived humiliators. As Hannah Arendt warned, 'pity, taken as the spring of virtue, has proved to possess a greater capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself'.<sup>149</sup>

Social psychologists are tasked to urge the international community, the global witness and bystander, including every single citizen, to stand up rather than stand by in the face of humiliation. Everyone who values social cohesion is called to halt cycles of humiliation.<sup>150</sup> Ending cycles of humiliation in a world where equal dignity in solidarity has been promised means keeping this very promise, keeping it by co-creating systemic institutional frameworks that can deliver dignifying living conditions and ensure a decent and dignified life for all.<sup>151</sup>

As to European Social Psychology, one of its responsibilities is to moderate the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on individualism and counter any definition of freedom that has systemic humiliation as its outcome. 'Freedom for the wolves has often meant death to the sheep' — philosopher Isaiah Berlin brought it to the point.<sup>152</sup> Ideologies are dangerous that pretend to protect individual autonomy by discrediting demands for solidarity by declaring them to be infringements on individual autonomy. Political theorist Hannah Arendt observed already in 1951 that lonely minds fall for totalitarian ideology, for its promise of 'all-embracing omnipotence'.<sup>153</sup> When the discrediting of solidarity is adopted by entire nations, the result is alienation and distrust at the national level, and the endgame is global and local *ecocide* and *sociocide* exacerbating each other, the 'killing' (*-cide* Latin killing) of our ecological and social spheres.

At the core of European Social Psychology's responsibility is the need to protect the freedom of academic inquiry from being captured and instrumentalised by ulterior interests. When research funding serves particular national or corporate interests, academic freedom is in danger. Last, masculinist models of consciousness wait to be transcended and this entails overcoming what has been called the 'physics envy' of the field of psychology. It means refraining from imitating natural sciences' number-crunching calculus-based style where it is not necessary or even misleading. The point is not to reject positivism-experimentalism (or whatever name it can be given). As Saulo Fernández has pointed out, 'this way of doing psychological research has also provided us with very valuable knowledge'.<sup>154</sup> The point is to become aware of the psychological motives and practical pressures for doing so, and to find a better balance.

A 'systemic turn' is needed, so that a 'relational turn' can emerge that nurtures an 'emotional turn' that is safe from being instrumentalised by humiliating systemic contexts. Future Gandhis and Mandelas may transform the force of humiliation into encouragement for constructive action.

Through my work, I wish to invite all people into *mutual entrustment in the spirit of equal worth*. If a large enough number of people can be inspired to channel feelings of humiliation into *conscientisation*, as educator Paulo Freire has recommended, large-scale systemic change towards more dignity can be achieved. I have coined the term *dignism* (dignity + ism) to describe a world where every new-born of all species, be it human or nonhuman, finds space and is nurtured to unfold their highest and best, embedded in a social context of loving appreciation and connection. It is a world, where the carrying capacity of the planet guides the ways in which all basic needs are met. It is a world of unity in diversity, where we unite in building trust, where we prevent unity from devolving into oppressive uniformity and keep diversity from devolving into hostile division. It is a world where we unite in respecting every individual's dignity while celebrating their diversity. Dignism means ending cycles of humiliation of the past and preventing new ones from emerging. Dignism means loving care for the common good of all of humanity as co-inhabitants of one single finite habitat. Dignism weaves together all dignifying aspects of all the world's traditions into one decent global village.

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<sup>3</sup> See, among others, Fernández, et al., 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Hartling and Lindner, 2018, p. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Bible, King James Version, Hebrews 12:6-11.

<sup>4</sup> Lindner, 2009b, 'Genocide, humiliation, and inferiority: An interdisciplinary perspective'. See also Talk 5 in this symposium by Jogdand and Reicher, reporting on a corrosive dynamic where inaction made participants feel complicit in their own humiliation.

<sup>5</sup> The master-slave dialectic is a famous passage by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1807/1967, in his Phenomenology of spirit/mind (Geist *in German means both, 'spirit' and 'mind'*). *Herrschaft und Knechtschaft* in German can also be translated into *lordship and bondage*.

<sup>6</sup> See Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

<sup>7</sup> See, for instance, Baumeister, 1997.

<sup>8</sup> In Talk 2 in this symposium, Fernández and colleagues present research showing that empowering participants by enhancing their agentic capacity buffers humiliation via a reduction of the perceived threat to the self that typically underlies humiliation. In Talk 4, Hasan-Aslih and colleagues present data from a longitudinal study conducted among Palestinians in the West-Bank, showing that humiliation increases as oppression escalates, but this increase is buffered by beliefs about the capability of the ingroup to respond to the mistreatment.

<sup>9</sup> Systems scientist Riane Eisler describes the *dominator* versus the *partnership* model of society. See Eisler, 1987. Her most recent books are Eisler, 2007, and Eisler and Fry, 2019.

<sup>10</sup> On the neuroscience of revenge, see Chester, et al., 2018. 'The neuroscience of revenge: Does the pain of rejection magnify the sweetness of revenge?' by David S. Chester Ph.D., *Psychology Today*, 6th November 2018, www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-harm-done/201811/the-neuroscience-revenge.

<sup>11</sup> Freire, 1968/1970, 1968/1973, and Morais, 1979, 1983.

<sup>12</sup> See, among others, Monsen and Monsen, 1999, Solbakken, et al., 2017, and Taarvig and Solbakken, 2018. Jon Monsen and Ole André Solbakken do ground-breaking work at the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo in Norway.

<sup>13</sup> In Talk 2 in this symposium, Fernández and colleagues present research showing that empowering participants by enhancing their agentic capacity buffers humiliation via a reduction of the perceived threat to the self that typically underlies humiliation. In Talk 4, Hasan-Aslih and colleagues present data from a longitudinal study conducted among Palestinians in the West-Bank, showing that humiliation increases as oppression escalates, but this increase is buffered by beliefs about the capability of the ingroup to respond to the mistreatment.

<sup>14</sup> In my work, I apply the *ideal-type* approach as described by sociologist Max Weber, 1904/1949.

<sup>15</sup> Lindner, 2001. Abstract:

This article argues that the concept of humiliation may be deconstructed into seven layers, including a) a core that expresses the universal idea of 'putting down', b) a middle layer that contains two opposed orientations towards 'putting down', treating it as, respectively, legitimate and routine, or illegitimate and traumatising, and c) a periphery whose distinctive layers include one pertaining to cultural differences between groups and another four peripheral layers that relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experience of humiliation.

See also Jean-Claude Abric, 2001, who distinguishes between core and peripheral elements in terms of the centrality and stability of certain beliefs, an approach known as the central nucleus theory.

#### <sup>16</sup> Lindner, 2001:

- 1. The fourth layer relates to differences in stable personality traits and the way these differences pertain to experiences of humiliation,
- 2. the fifth layer relates to deep damage inflicted on children by humiliation altering their overall personality make-up in deeply injurious ways,
- 3. the sixth layer addresses the hurt that is inflicted on adults by incidents that entail humiliation,
- 4. the seventh layer concerns variations in the emotional condition of a person that influence the orientation of the person concerned towards acts and experiences of humiliation.

<sup>17</sup> Minkov and Bond, 2017, present the first study suggesting that national differences in happiness have a genetic component. Nations with the highest prevalence of the A allele in rs324420 of the FAAH gene have the highest percentages of very happy people. The FAAH gene is also called the 'feel good' gene, as it helps the body synthesise a cannabinoid called anandamide, from the Sanskrit word *ananda*, meaning bliss. The highest prevalence of the rs324420 A allele has been found among Amerindians, and next in ranking were the main tribes of Nigeria, the Hausa and Yoruba. Some Arab and East Asian nations exhibited both a low prevalence of the A allele and low happiness scores. Northern Europeans have a higher prevalence of the A allele than Central or South Europeans and also higher happiness scores. However, there are stark exceptions, which shows that genetics only are partly responsible for variations in happiness. Russians and Estonians, for instance, show low happiness scores not due to a deficiency of anandamide, but presumably due the economic and political difficulties connected to a rather sudden and unmitigated capitalist impact. Also in Egypt, the per cent of happy people is falling, arguably due to recent political upheavals and economic difficulties. In Rwanda, in contrast, the per cent of very happy people has risen, presumably in connection with the effects of the 1994 genocide wearing off.

<sup>18</sup> Quinn, 2013.

<sup>19</sup> Lindner, 2024.

<sup>20</sup> See Lindner, 2006, 2009a, 2012, 2017, 2024, Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

<sup>21</sup> See Godfrey, et al., 2019.

<sup>22</sup> Sociologist Michèle Lamont speaks of a *recognition gap*, highlighting 'the centrality of stigmatisation (feeling underestimated, ignored, and misunderstood) over discrimination (being deprived of resources)'. Lamont has studied how marginalised groups gain recognition and cultural membership, and which strategies they employ to win respect. See Lamont, et al., 2016, and 'Addressing the recognition gap: Destigmatisation and the reduction of inequality', by Michèle Lamont in a seminar in the President's Seminar series, part of the Rethinking Open Society project, 4th December 2017, https://youtu.be/VrrHb6mUNAo.

Lamont, 2016, explains that 'the quality of societies is measured not only by questions of distribution (who gets what and how much) but also by questions of recognition, inclusion, and voice':

While political philosophers Nancy Fraser and Honneth, 2003, have alerted us to the importance of recognition, sociological analyses of the process by which groups become less stigmatised remain few (see Clair, et al., 2016). Societies offer different scaffoldings for gaining recognition — for instance, in

the form of cultural repertoires that are more or less effective in promoting diversity and enabling social resilience for a large number of individuals.

<sup>23</sup> El Bernoussi, 2014, p. 379. See also El Bernoussi, 2021.

<sup>24</sup> See, among others, Lindner, 2015–2018. Consider also Larry Brendtro, et al., 2009, who point out that saying 'you no longer belong to our group' amounts to the ultimate form of punishment, namely, social death. I thank Mechthild Nagel, for making me aware of Brendtro's work.

<sup>25</sup> Stephan Feuchtwang in a personal communication, 14th November 2002.

<sup>26</sup> Kendler, et al., 2003.

<sup>27</sup> Otten and Jonas, 2013, p. 33.

<sup>28</sup> In Talk 3 in this symposium, Irene Castro and colleagues conclude that humiliation provides a powerful framework for studying the emotional and behavioural responses to social rejection.

<sup>29</sup> See Talk 5 in this symposium, Jogdand and Reicher show how historically unequal societies may come to understand humiliation.

<sup>30</sup> In Talk 2 in this symposium, Saulo Fernández and colleagues discuss whether enhancing the agentic capacity of potential victims can down-regulate humiliation. In Talk 4, Siwar Hasan-Aslih and colleagues show that, while humiliation increases as oppression escalates, this increase is buffered by beliefs about the capability of the ingroup to respond to the mistreatment. Finally, in Talk 5, Jogdand and Reicher highlight social identity and group membership as important resources for people facing humiliation to envisage a radical transformation of social systems and institutions.

<sup>31</sup> Lindner, 2000.

<sup>32</sup> 'Neighbour quarrels hit new extreme', by Nina Berglund, *News in English*, 11th April 2014, www.newsinenglish.no/2014/04/11/neighbour-quarrels-hit-new-extreme/. Dag Are Børresen of the insurance company HELP Forsikring reports.

<sup>33</sup> See for research on inertia, for instance, Leidner, et al., 2012.

<sup>34</sup> See 'The ties that bind captive to captor', by Frank M. Ochberg, *Los Angeles Times*, 8th April 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/08/opinion/oe-ochberg8. Frank M. Ochberg is a co-founder of the National Center for Critical Incident Analysis and former associate director of the National Institute of Mental Health. See also the book that one of the hostages, Kristin Enmark, 2015, wrote more than four decades after the event. See also Lindner, 2009a, p. 133. See, furthermore, 'How come the world is suffering from Stockholm Syndrome?' by Andre Vltchek, *TRANSCEND Media Service*, 25th February 2019, www.transcend.org/tms/2019/02/how-come-the-world-is-suffering-from-stockholm-syndrome/.

<sup>35</sup> See, among others, Sarraj, 2002, Sayler, 2004, Giacaman, et al., 2007, Elison and Harter, 2007, Walker and Knauer, 2011, Giacaman, et al., 2007, Sarraj, 2002. Protracted cycles of humiliation can lead to the paralysis and apathy that results from *learned helplessness*. See for research on inertia, for instance, Leidner, et al., 2012. According to anthropologist Scott Atran, humiliation is a negative predictor for terrorism, since those who feel humiliated become submissive. However, the situation is different for those who act on behalf of others' exposure to humiliation, such as the second or third generation of Muslims in Britain who believe that their parents were humiliated. See, among others, Ginges and Atran, 2008. See for an illustration, 'Wave of indigenous suicides leaves Canadian town appealing for help', by Liam Stack, *New York Times*, 18th March 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/americas/canada-youth-suicide.html. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.

<sup>36</sup> Leidner, et al., 2012.

<sup>37</sup> Galtung, 1969.

<sup>38</sup> 'Wave of indigenous suicides leaves Canadian town appealing for help', by Liam Stack, *New York Times*, 18th March 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/americas/canada-youth-suicide.html. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article. Hartling writes in a personal communication, on 21st March 2016:

Canada's indigenous populations demonstrate the deleterious effect of continuous humiliation: they are driven into waves of suicide as an outflow of 'cumulative humiliation', of a lingering trauma of colonialism and prejudice, of 'cultural genocide'.

<sup>39</sup> Lindner, 2000.

<sup>40</sup> Lewis, 1971.

<sup>41</sup> Mandela, 1994.

<sup>42</sup> Phillips, 2011. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.

<sup>43</sup> See the work of psychologists Twenge and Campbell, 2009, see also Twenge, 2014. In her book *IGen: Why today's super-connected kids are growing up less rebellious, more tolerant, less happy — And completely unprepared for adulthood — And what this means for the rest of us*, Jean Twenge, 2017, presents the results of four large national datasets on the mental health of teenagers and college students. Baby boomers, Gen-X, and the millennials are all markedly different from iGen, the generation born after roughly 1994, where the rates of anxiety, depression, loneliness, and suicide spike upward. Twenge suggests that social media had a detrimental effect on the nature of social interactions in iGen. See also Curran and Hill, 2017, and Collishaw, et al., 2012.

See also psychologist Carol Dweck and her findings that the challenges of life can be approached better with a *task-oriented learning-mastery* orientation than an *ego-oriented performance* orientation or, or as Linda Hartling would formulate it, better with a mindset of personal *growth* rather than a *fixed* mindset. See Dweck, 1999, O'Keefe, et al., 2018.

See more relevant literature, for instance, in Lasch, 1991, Putnam, 2000, Baumeister, et al., 1996, Bushman and Baumeister, 1998, Baumeister, et al., 2003, Baumeister, 2005, Levine, 2007, Twenge and Campbell, 2009, Wood, et al., 2009, Ehrenreich, 2010, Collishaw, et al., 2012, Twenge, et al., 2012, Twenge and Kasser, 2013, Twenge, 2014, Curran and Hill, 2017, and Storr, 2018. See also how Howard Richards, 2013, includes Foucault, 1961/2006, and Frank, 1961.

<sup>44</sup> A society-wide narcissism epidemic has spread from the United States of America to the entire world. Lately, psychology has developed the concept of the *dark triad*, comprising of the personality traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, a list that is sometimes expanded to the *dark tetrad* by adding sadism. See also chapter 9 of Lindner, 2024, notes 2841 until 2847.

Social psychologists Hilde Nafstad, Rolv Blakar, and their colleagues carried out a longitudinal analysis of

the media language in Norwegian public discourse from 1984 to 2005, and they found that the prevailing 'globalised capitalist market ideology' has increasingly permeated the long-established Scandinavian welfare state. See more in note 996 in chapter 4 of Lindner, 2024.

As to Germany, a large study on the 'narcissists in companies' has shown that young people today are more narcissistic than previous generations, and that this becomes a problem at the latest when filling management positions. See 'Narzissmus in deutschen Führungsetagen: Die Jungbullen kommen', by Marcus Heidbrink, Victoria Berg, and Florian Feltes, *Harvard Business manager*, 5/2021, 19th April 2021, www.manager-magazin.de/harvard/fuehrung/narzissmus-in-deutschen-fuehrungsetagen-die-jungbullen-kommen-a-0ee3251e-0002-0001-0000-000177064950. See also a book by Gilad and Junginger, 2010, titled *Strategische Kriegsführung für Manager*, English *Strategic Warfare for Managers*, to help managers apply power-over strategies in a 'mercenary corporate culture'. See notes 2077 and 2078 in chapter 7 of Lindner, 2024. The work of German psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut's work on narcissism is still relevant. I thank David Lotto, 2017, for reminding me of the following quote describing narcissistic injury, see Kohut, 1972, p. 380:

One sees the need for revenge, for righting a wrong, for undoing the hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting compulsion in the pursuit of all these aims which gives no rest to those who have suffered a narcissistic injury — these are features which are characteristic for the phenomenon of narcissistic rage in all its forms and which sets it apart from other kinds of aggression.

See also Reicher, et al., 2005, for 'entrepreneurs of hate and entrepreneurs of solidarity', and Reicher, et al., 2016, for 'tyranny and leadership'.

See, furthermore, 'How the Western world failed at stopping the pandemic: The West's inaction let Covid spin out of control — and now it's paying the price', by Umair Haque, *Eudaimonia*, 22nd October 2020, https://eand.co/how-the-western-world-failed-at-stopping-the-pandemic-711443a0e081. See also note 341 in chapter 2 of Lindner, 2024.

<sup>45</sup> See the work by Jean Baker Miller, for instance, Miller, 1976/1986a, and Miller, 2008.

<sup>46</sup> Jesper Juul, 2001, differentiates between *self-esteem* (he uses the term *Selbstgefühl* in German) and *self-confidence* (*Selbstvertrauen* in German), and he uses the term self-esteem or *Selbstgefühl* in ways Linda Hartling and I use the term sense of worth. As a family therapist, Juul teaches that the sense of self, or *Selbstgefühl*, is dependent on the quality of the *relationship*, while self-confidence builds on the quality of a child's *performance*. A child's sense of self depends on being perceived and recognised in the family as 'it self', responding to the child's fundamental need to be 'seen' directly and in a non-objectifying way, in recognition of the child as a subject, rather than merely being critically observed and evaluated from a distance. This sense of self of the child is an indicator of the intersubjective constitution and aptitude of a family. I thank Elisabeth Wienemann for making me aware of Juul's work.

<sup>47</sup> Steve Kulich, professor of intercultural communications at Shanghai International Studies University, said at the Second International Conference on Multicultural Discourses in Hangzhou, 13–15th April 2007, 'First I have empowered my students. Then they became nasty people. Today, I no longer use the word 'empowerment'. I use *entrustment*'. See also Lindner, 2007.

<sup>48</sup> The German word *Ermächtigungsgesetz* usually refers to the Enabling Act of 1933, a cornerstone of Adolf Hitler's seizure of power. The Enabling Act of 1933 gave Adolf Hitler plenary powers. See, for instance, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enabling\_Act\_of\_1933.

<sup>49</sup> Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (HumanDHS), of which I am the founding president, is a transdisciplinary academic field and a global community of concerned scholars, researchers, educators, practitioners, creative artists, and others, who all collaborate in a spirit of mutual support to understand the complex dynamics of dignity and humiliation (humiliationstudies.org). We wish to stimulate systemic change, globally and locally, to open space for dignity, mutual respect, and esteem to take root and grow.

<sup>50</sup> 'What did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi say? In his first recorded speech, the Islamic State leader implores his followers to fight the 'perpetrators' of crimes against Muslims', by *Middle East Eye* staff, 5th July 2014, www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-did-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-say.

<sup>51</sup> 'ISIS, Radicalization and Humiliation: Here is why the West can no longer afford to ignore the roots of radicalization', by Nir Eisikovits, *The National Interest*, 20th November 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-radicalization-humiliation-23289.

<sup>52</sup> David Cook is a historian at Rice University, Texas, U.S.A., who studies Muslim *apocalypticism*. See, among others, Cook, 2010. According to Muslim apocalypticism, the battles preceding the Day of Judgment will take place in modern Syria, with a final showdown in the year 1500 of the Islamic Hijra calendar, or A.D. 2076.

<sup>53</sup> *House of Saud: A family at war*, documentary film in three episodes by Michael Rudin, BBC Two, 2018, www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09m53py. The first episode explores the links between the Saudi ruling family and supporters of an ultra-conservative form of Islam. It asks: To what extent have the Saudis supported extremists financially to secure their power?

<sup>54</sup> I thank former President of the Club of Rome Prince El Hassan bin Talal for making me aware of Charles Kindleberger, the intellectual architect of the Marshall Plan, and his argument 'that the disastrous decade of the 1930s was as a result of American failure to provide global public goods after it had replaced Great Britain as the leading global power'. See *Alain Elkann Interviews: HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal*, 1st November 2020, www.alainelkanninterviews.com/hassan-bin-talal/.

In 2015, in Rwanda, my work was misunderstood as a justification of the Second World War, and of war and genocide in general. I explained that my aim is the stark opposite. By trying to understand the dynamics of humiliation, I wish to prevent war and genocide, I do *not* condone it. Understanding is *not* condoning. Humiliation is *not* a legitimate justification for violence. See more in note 608 in chapter 3 of Lindner, 2024, and see also my discussion of c*ross backs* in chapters 8 and 10.

<sup>55</sup> 'Beziehungskrise: Osteuropa', by Jan Puhl and Tobias Rapp, *Der Spiegel*, 16th December 2017, https://magazin.spiegel.de/SP/2017/51/154831722/index.html?utm\_source=spon&utm\_campaign=centerpag e, pp. 80–85.

<sup>56</sup> 'Beziehungskrise: Osteuropa', by Jan Puhl and Tobias Rapp, translated by Lindner from the German original, pp. 81–82:

Karel Schwarzenberg war Außeminister in Tschechien und machte sein Land zu einem zuverlässigen Partner Brüssels. Jetzt sieht er sein Lebenswerk in Gefahr: 'Wir Tschechen wissen schon, was wir der EU verdanken, aber wir fühlen uns nicht zu Hause'. Zu often wurden die Osteuropäer in Brüssel von oben herab behandelt. 'Wenn wir anderer Meinung sind, heißt es gern: Werdet erstmal richtige Europäer', sagt er. Der Osten sein empfindlich was diesen Ton angehe. 'Wir wollen nicht ewig wie Schüler behandelt werden. Das erinnert an die Sowjetzeit, als wir schon einmal Direktiven empfingen'.

<sup>57</sup> 'Why neither Reagan nor the United States won the cold war: Jack Matlock discusses superpower illusions', by Alex Kingsbury, *U.S. News*, 22nd January 2010,

www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/01/22/why-neither-reagan-nor-the-united-states-won-the-cold-war-2# close-modal.

<sup>58</sup> In his 2019 book, the foreign policy adviser of Helmut Kohl and longtime chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Horst Teltschik, offered deep insights into how the opportunities to create a stable international peace order in 1989/90 were squandered and why today's confrontation between NATO and Russia must be defused through a new policy of detente. See Teltschik, 2019. In 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine.

<sup>59</sup> 'Beziehungskrise: Osteuropa', by Jan Puhl and Tobias Rapp. In writer Ziemowit Szczerek's words, translated by Lindner from the German original, p. 82:

'Der Westen war immer schon immer reicher und mächtiger'. So sei ein Minderwertigkeitsgefühl entstanden. 'Wir sehen uns noch immer im Grunde selbst so, wie die Westler auf uns blicken: ein bisschen arm, ein bisschen rückständig und weniger effizient'.

<sup>60</sup> 'Beziehungskrise: Osteuropa', by Jan Puhl and Tobias Rapp. Law and Justice, abbreviated to PiS, is a national-conservative, and Christian democratic political party in Poland. Alternative for Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is a right-wing to far-right political party in Germany. How PiS voters resemble AfD voters, translated by Lindner from the German original, pp. 82–83:

Er lebt auf dem Land oder in der Kleinstadt, sein Einkommen ist in den vergangenen Jahren durchaus gewachsen, doch empfindet er den Wohlstand als flüchtig. Er sieht seine traditionelle Bindung an die Religion und seine Heimat oder auch sein traditionelles Verständnis der Rolle von Frau und Mann infrage gestellt. Die Globalisierung, die Einwanderung, die Pluralisierung der Lebensformen all das, was die liberale Elite begrüßt, empfindet er als bedrohlich.

<sup>61</sup> 'Beziehungskrise: Osteuropa', by Jan Puhl and Tobias Rapp. Translated by Lindner from the German original, p. 82:

'Die Reformideologie der Neunziger und frühen Nullerjahre hat uns besonders hart getroffen. Anders als der Westen, hat der Osten den Neoliberalismus bekommen, ohne vorher eine sozialdemokratische Ära durchlaufen zu haben'. Es fehlten Institutionen, die die Härten des kapitalistischen Umbaus, die Privatisierungen, die Arbeitslosigkeit, hätten abfedern können.

<sup>62</sup> 'Beziehungskrise: Osteuropa', by Jan Puhl and Tobias Rapp. Translated by Lindner from the German original, p. 85:

Der alte Nationalismus war eine Emanzipationsbewegung gegen die morschen Monarchien. Er endete auf den Schachtfeldern der zwei Weltkriege im Kampf um die Vorherrschaft auf dem Kontinent. Die europäische Einigung war eine Konsequenz dieser Kriege. Geboren aus der Einsicht, dass so etwas nie wieder passieren dürfe. Der neue Nationalismus ist eine Angstreaktion. Der Feind ist nicht mehr das Nachbarland. Es geht jetzt gegen die da oben.

<sup>63</sup> "Neoliberalism" isn't an empty epithet. It's a real, powerful set of ideas', by Mike Konczal, *Vox*, 20th December 2017, www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/7/18/15992226/neoliberalism-chait-austerity-democratic-party-sanders-clinton. Article recommended at the book panel of the book *Human rights futures* by Hopgood, et al., 2017, in the International Affairs Building, Columbia University, New York City, on 9th November 2017. See https://sustainable.columbia.edu/events/book-launch-panel-human-rights-futures-cambridge-university-press-2017. See also Stiglitz, 2003.

<sup>64</sup> 'Beziehungskrise: Osteuropa', by Jan Puhl and Tobias Rapp, p. 83.

<sup>65</sup> Kevin Clements in a personal communication, 21st August 2007. It is a privilege to have Kevin Clements as an esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

<sup>66</sup> Sherratt, 2013.

<sup>67</sup> Chege, 1996.

<sup>68</sup> See the *Inside job* transcript, September 2010, www.sonyclassics.com/awards-information/insidejob\_screenplay.pdf.

<sup>69</sup> Schwarz, 1998.

<sup>70</sup> Gergen, 1996, 36.

<sup>71</sup> Vygotsky, 1978.

<sup>72</sup> See, for example, Baumeister, 2000, or Maalouf, 1998/2000.

<sup>73</sup> See Fiske, 1991.

<sup>74</sup> Bowlby, 1969. There is a vast body of literature to draw on.

<sup>75</sup> In replacing the term *attachment* with *connection*, I follow relational psychologist Linda Hartling.

<sup>76</sup> See, for instance, political scientist Simon Koschut's overview over publications relevant for the 'emotional turn' in international relations theory: Åhäll and Gregory, 2015; Bially Mattern, 2011; Edkins, 2003; Fattah and Fierke, 2009; Hall and Ross, 2015; Hutchinson, 2016; Koschut, 2014; Leep, 2010; Ross, 2013; Solomon, 2014; Van Rythoven, 2015; Wilcox, 2015. The narrative of humiliation in the Middle East, for instance, shows the intertextuality of emotions, 'emotions have a history', Fattah and Fierke, 2009, p. 70. See also an interview that Alexandros Koutsoukis conducted with Steven C. Roach on 2nd November 2016, as part of a series of interviews under the motto 'resurrecting IR theory', where Roach discusses affective values in international relations, the value of resilience, and how to theorise emotional actions. See www.eir.info/2016/11/02/interview-steven-c-roach/.

<sup>77</sup> Relational-cultural theory (CRP) evolved from the work of Jean Baker Miller M.D., pioneer in women's psychology. It assumes that humans have a natural drive towards relationships, and it applies a growth-in-connection model of human growth and development to organisational settings. See Miller, 1976/1986b, and for a recent overview, among others, Jordan, 2010.

<sup>78</sup> Jordan and Hartling, 2002.

<sup>79</sup> Donati and Archer, 2015, go beyond the 'plural subject' of analytical philosophers and speak of the

'relational subject'. They treat 'the relation' between people as real and regard relational 'goods' and 'evils' as having causal effects upon agents and their subsequent actions. See the book description:

Many social theorists now call themselves 'relational sociologists', but mean entirely different things by it. The majority endorse a 'flat ontology', dealing exclusively with dyadic relations. Consequently, they cannot explain the context in which relationships occur or their consequences, except as resultants of endless 'transactions'. This book adopts a different approach which regards 'the relation' itself as an emergent property, with internal causal effects upon its participants and external ones on others. The authors argue that most 'relationists' seem unaware that analytical philosophers, such as Searle, Gilbert and Tuomela, have spent years trying to conceptualise the 'We' as dependent upon shared intentionality. Donati and Archer change the focus away from 'We thinking' and argue that 'We-ness' derives from subjects' reflexive orientations towards the emergent relational 'goods' and 'evils' they themselves generate. Their approach could be called 'relational realism', though they suggest that realists, too, have failed to explore the 'relational subject'.

See also Jervis, 2006. See also the work of Muneo Yoshikawa on non-dualism and unity in diversity in chapter 11 of Lindner, 2024.

<sup>80</sup> See an overview in Spencer, 2000.

<sup>81</sup> See, for example, Hartling and Ly, 2000, Hartling and Sparks, 2008, Hartling, 2003, Hartling, 2008, Jordan and Hartling, 2002, Jordan, et al., 2004, Miller and Stiver, 1997, Walker and Rosen, 2004.

<sup>82</sup> Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) builds on the work of Lev Vygotsky, 1978, and Aleksei Leontiev, 1975/1978. Its philosophical premise is that human physical and mental activity is integrally connected to large-scale cultural and historical processes and vice versa. It studies the culturally and historically situated, materially, and socially mediated process by which humans purposefully transform natural and social reality, including themselves. Community is seen to be central to all forms of learning, communicating, and acting, which means that community is central to the process of learning-by-doing, of making tools of all kinds, of communicating, and of making meaning and acting. The term cultural-historical activity theory was coined by Michael Cole and used by Yrjö Engeström for the various lines of work that had been inspired by Vygotsky's work. See for recent publications, for instance, Kaptelinin and Nardi, 2006, Roth, et al., 2012.

<sup>83</sup> See also Anand Giridharadas, 2013, p. 120: We see now 'watered-down theories of change that are personal, individual, depoliticised, respectful of the status quo and the system, and not in the least bit disruptive'.

<sup>84</sup> Gergen, 2009, p. 229. I thank Linda Hartling for sharing her reading of Gergen's book with me.

<sup>85</sup> See, for instance, 'Why stellar research remains under the radar: The phenomenon of "sleeping beauty" papers and the pressure to publish may be averting researchers from pursuing out-of-the-box science', by Dalmeet Singh Chawla, *OneZero*, 22nd May 2019, https://onezero.medium.com/why-stellar-research-remains-under-the-radar-f57d2bee8389.

<sup>86</sup> Gergen, 2009, p. 230. Sociologist of science Michael Mulkay, 1985, in *The word and the world*, showed how abstract theory can be rendered personal. Mulkay pioneered reflexive studies and epistemological diversity. See also a new book by Fathali Moghaddam showing that the roots of experimental psychology are

to be found in early modern literature. He explains it as follows in a message to Louise Sundararajan and her Indigenous Psychology Task Force on 19th September 2021, 'Thought experiments in Shakespeare's plays are examined and interpreted as part of the scientific revolution underway from the 16th century. In more recent developments, some of the greatest scientists, including Albert Einstein, did not carry out actual experiments but relied on thought experiments. Thought experiments could serve as a bridge between science and art in 21st century academia and in the larger society'.

<sup>87</sup> Gergen, 2009, p. 20.

<sup>88</sup> Gergen, 2009, p. 27.

<sup>89</sup> Gergen, 2009, chapter 1: 'Bounded being'.

<sup>90</sup> See, among others, Sylwester, 1994, or Forgas, 2001. See also my book *Emotion and conflict*, Lindner, 2009a.

<sup>91</sup> See, among others, Immordino-Yang, 2016. Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) has become an education trend over the past few years, following the work of António Damásio.

<sup>92</sup> See 'Does social and emotional learning belong in the classroom?' by Peter Greene, *Forbes*, 22nd August 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/petergreene/2019/08/22/does-social-and-emotional-learning-belong-in-the-classroom/#2edacdc4e809.

<sup>93</sup> 'How industry forces have manipulated science to downplay the harm', by Anne Kavanagh, *University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Magazine*, 22nd December 2018, www.ucsf.edu/news/2018/12/412916/sugars-sick-secrets-how-industry-forces-have-manipulated-science-downplay-harm.

<sup>94</sup> See Pope, 2019, and https://kspope.com/apa/crisis.php for a pre-publication version of the article, where Pope describes the step-by-step process by which ethical standards were given up:

On August 21, 2002, the APA adopted a revised ethics code allowing the state's demands to trump ethics. The code made a sharp break with how the APA had previously balanced ethics and state power over the many decades of its history. The APA took an extremely radical stand that whenever our 'ethical responsibilities' cannot be reconciled with state authority, 'psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law, regulations, or other governing legal authority' (APA, 2002, section 1.02, p. 1063). An earlier draft required this abdication of ethics to be 'in keeping with basic principles of human rights' both in the code's introduction and in the enforceable section. However, the APA adopted the new code only after cutting that requirement out of the code's enforceable section.

Pope reports that less than a year after the APA adopted the new code, Dr. Kati Myllymaki, president of the World Medical Association (WMA), issued this reminder:

At Nuremberg in 1947, accused physicians tried to defend themselves with the excuse that they were only following the law and commands from their superiors. This defence was condemned and the court announced that a physician could not deviate from his ethical obligations even if legislation demands otherwise (WMA, 2003).

<sup>95</sup> United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014.

<sup>96</sup> In Seligman's original experiments, dogs 'learned helplessness'. See 'Architects of C.I.A. interrogation drew on psychology to induce 'helplessness', by Benedict Carey, *New York Times*, 10th December 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/health/architects-of-cia-interrogation-drew-on-psychology-to-induce-helplessness.html?\_r=0:

Nearly a half-century later, a pair of military psychologists became convinced that the theory provided a basis for brutal interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, that were supposed to eliminate detainees' 'sense of control and predictability' and induce 'a desired level of helplessness', the Senate report said.

See also Seligman, 1974, or Hoffman, et al., 2015.

<sup>97</sup> 'Saying it again: Psychologists may never participate in torture', opinion editorial by the president of the American Psychological Association, 2009, www.apa.org/news/press/op-eds/bray-interrogations.

<sup>98</sup> See, for instance, Armstrong, 1981.

<sup>99</sup> Lecture Two of Beyond Foucault: The rise of indigenous subjugated knowledges, by Howard Richards in Pretoria, South Africa, 4th May 2013, http://youtu.be/IcilckWWE1Y. See for more Richards, et al., 2015.

<sup>100</sup> 'Failure to replicate: Crisis or Chrysalis for psychological science?' by Lisa M. Osbeck, submitted to the APA Annual Convention in Denver, 4th–7th August 2016, with a Cross-Divisional symposium devoted to the replication crisis in psychology. See Open Science Collaboration (OSC), 2015. Here is Osbeck's summary:

We analyse the meaning of psychology's replication crisis in the context of the broader project of scientific advancement. The metaphor of the chrysalis suggests something that may appear initially as a barrier or constraint, yet from a broader perspective is essential to development. Situating the 'crisis' in the history of philosophy of science, we interpret the 'new instrument' of scientific method as at base a set of practices for generalising from experience in the face of variation and human fallibility. The principal tool is a procedure of meticulous comparison, with the corresponding rule to generalise cautiously and give equal attention to counter-instances. We argue that such comparative analysis applies to all empirical research, though the sources of variation and fallibility are extremely complex in human science. We suggest that failure to replicate experimental results is analogous to a counter-instance variation, one to be taken up and analysed through comparison within the overall inductive project of the science. Therefore replication problems in psychology must be understood within the context of the role of 'failure' in science more generally. Through comparative analysis of our own, we demonstrate how the fallibility inherent in empirical research renders it fundamentally different from the formal sciences of mathematics, geometry, and logic, in which certainty and perfect replication are achieved. Moreover, empirical replication failure functions not only to check or constrain generalisation but enables discovery and facilitates new insights, which we illustrate with a case example from an ethnographic study of laboratory research.

<sup>101</sup> Valsiner, 2014, p. 19:

History of psychology includes earlier efforts to bring the notion of catalysis into the discipline. Back in 1927, Kurt Lewin emphasised the notion of conditional-genetic nature of unitary complex phenomena (*konditional-genetische Zusammenhänge* – Lewin, 1927, p. 403) where through the study of varied

conditions of functioning (*Bedingungsstruktur*) of the system its potentials for transformation into a new state – as well as conditions of its breakdown – could be revealed. Lev Vygotsky's use of the same epistemological mindset led him to the elaboration of the Method of Double Stimulation as the methodological tool for developmental psychology (see Valsiner, 2000, pp. 78–81, 2007; van der Veer, 2009; Wagoner, 2009). That method is in the very core of Vygotsky's methodological credo – coming out from his primary focus on aesthetics, interest in child development in educational settings, and the prevailing atmosphere of dialectics of social turmoils in the world surrounding him in the 1920s and early 1930s.

<sup>102</sup> Brinkmann, 2017.

<sup>103</sup> Harré, 2004, p. 13.

<sup>104</sup> Open Science Collaboration (OSC), 2015. See also the Loss-of-Confidence Project that invites scientists who have lost confidence in their own findings to join and share their story, see

https://lossofconfidence.com/. See also 'Psychology's replication crisis is running out of excuses', by Ed Yong, *The Atlantic*, 19th Novembe 2018, www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/576223/.

See, furthermore, 'Psychological science's human clientele: Beneficiaries or victims?' by Frank Kessel, *Observer*, Association for Psychological Science, November 2018,

www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/psychological-sciencess-human-clientele-beneficiaries-or-victims. I thank Louise Sundararajan for forwarding Frank Kessel's communication to the Indigenous Psychology Task Force.

<sup>105</sup> Valsiner, 2014, p. 4.

<sup>106</sup> Jan Smedslund was the head of my doctoral committee and my gratitude to him and his colleague, my doctoral adviser Reidar Ommundsen, is immense.

<sup>107</sup> Smedslund, 1988, p. 4:

The finding that all bachelors are in fact unmarried males cannot be said to be empiricaL If the data appear to include a few bachelors who are females, we have to conclude either that these are, after all, not bachelors, or that they are not females. The descriptive proposition 'this person is a bachelor and a female' is simply an incorrect and unacceptable description of the world in standard English. Hence, the link between being a bachelor and being an unmarried male is not an empirical finding and requires no empirical research.

<sup>108</sup> Smedslund, 1988. See also Smedslund, 1997b, a, 2013.

<sup>109</sup> Smedslund, 1988, p. 5:

Even though ordinary words have very variable meanings, they also have a stable core meaning, and many partly overlapping words may also refer to the same core meaning. In summary, it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language... A formulation of such a system can only approximate some of the psychologically relevant features of ordinary language and must necessarily ignore others. However, one may envisage successively more complex scientific language, including an ever higher number of psychologically important distinctions.

<sup>110</sup> Valsiner, 2014, p. 15. Valsiner points at Smedslund, 1978, Smedslund, 1980, Smedslund, 1997a, Smedslund, 2009, and Smedslund, 2012.

<sup>111</sup> Billig, 2008, p. 10, as quoted in Tileagă and Byford, 2014, p. 2.

<sup>112</sup> See also Lindner, 2005, and the paper 'Psychohistory and the psychodynamics of humiliation', presented at the conference 'Nürnberg '01: The Historical Motivations Congress in Europe', at the German-American Institute (DAI), and the Lutheran University for Applied Science, Nuremberg, Germany, on 5th July 2001. See also, among them, Michael Britton, 2010, Hélène Opperman Lewis, 2016, Brian D'Agostino, 2014, or David Lotto, 2006. See also Lifton, 1970.

<sup>113</sup> Philosopher Ágnes Heller, 1984. See also 'A star philosopher falls, and a debate over sexism is set off', by Jennifer Schuessler, *New York Times*, 2nd August 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/arts/colin-mcginn-philosopher-to-leave-his-post.html.

<sup>114</sup> Gergen, 2009, p. 360. See also my book *Gender, humiliation, and global security*, Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010. See, furthermore, 'The sexism problem: Harassment drove me out of physics 30 years ago and little has changed. Why is scientific sexism so intractable?' by Margaret Wertheim, *Aeon*, 31st May 2016, https://aeon.co/essays/why-is-scientific-sexism-so-intractably-resistant-to-reform.

<sup>115</sup> See Lindner, 2009a, and Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

<sup>116</sup> 'When nothing is cool', by Lisa Ruddick, *The Point*, 2015, http://thepointmag.com/2015/criticism/whennothing-is-cool, an abridged version of an article in Bammer and Boetcher Joeres, 2015. See also Jones, 2009. See also Jameson, 1991, and Latour, 2004. Ruddick asks why academia has not been able 'to shift away from norms that make ruthlessness look like sophistication', and she writes:

Some years ago Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick touched on this complex in her well-known essay on paranoid reading, where she identified a strain of 'hatred' in criticism. Also salient is a more recent piece in which Bruno Latour has described how scholars slip from 'critique' into 'critical barbarity', giving 'cruel treatment' to experiences and ideals that non-academics treat as objects of tender concern. Rita Felski's current work on the state of criticism has reenergized the conversation on the punitive attitudes encouraged by the hermeneutics of suspicion. And Susan Fraiman's powerful analysis of the 'cool male' intellectual style favoured in academia is concerned with many of the same patterns I consider here.

I thank Michael Britton for making me aware of this article.

<sup>117</sup> See the note above.

<sup>118</sup> Latour, 2004, p. 225.

<sup>119</sup> Carveth, 2013. See also Carveth, 1994, for his discussion of Heidegger, Winnicott, Freud, Klein, Lacan, Mahler, and St. Paul with respect to what Winnicott, 1965, would call 'true self'.

<sup>120</sup> Rippin, 2013.

<sup>121</sup> See note 212 above.

<sup>122</sup> Linda Hartling in a personal communication on September 3, 2016.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> World Dignity University initiative, www.worlddignityuniversity.org/joo/.

<sup>125</sup> Lévinas, 1968/1990, Lévinas, 1982/1994, and Lévinas, 1963, 1976/1990.

<sup>126</sup> Pieterse, 2000, p. 182.

<sup>127</sup> Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 28th June 2019.

<sup>128</sup> 'Academentia: The organization insanity of the modern university', by Thomas Klikauer and Meg Young, *Counterpunch*, 28th July 2021, www.counterpunch.org/2021/07/28/academentia-the-organization-insanity-of-the-modern-university/. See also the book by Thomas Klikauer, 2013, *Managerialism: A critique of an ideology*. See, furthermore, 'Universities feel the brunt of a market-driven agenda: The dangerous rise of neo-liberal universities', by Wachira Kigotho, *University World News*, 9th November 2018, www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20181108130628468. See also Raimondi, 2012.

<sup>129</sup> Economy professor Kamran Mofid, founder of the Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative (GCGI), asks on 28th October 2017, 'The Big Question now surely must be: Why is it that in Brexit Britain and Trump's America, academic freedom, universities, scholarship, knowledge, wisdom, empathy, kindness, respect, dialogue, acceptance... have all come under attack by the right wing demagogues?' Mofid recommends, 'Leftie? Yes, and proud to be among those upholding enlightenment values', by Will Hutton, *The Guardian*, 28th October 2017, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/28/leftie-yes-and-proud-to-be-upholding-enlightenment-values?CMP=share\_btn\_link.

<sup>130</sup> Ritchie, 2020.

<sup>131</sup> See Massen, et al., 2017, Abstract:

Humans are considered to be highly prosocial, especially in comparison to other species. However, most tests of prosociality are conducted in highly artificial settings among anonymous participants. To gain a better understanding of how human hyper-cooperation may have evolved, we tested humans' willingness to share in one of the most competitive fields of our current society: academia. Researchers were generally prosocial with 80% sharing a PDF of one of their latest papers, and almost 60% willing to send us their data. Intriguingly, prosociality was most prominent from male to male, and less likely among all other sex-combinations. This pattern suggests the presence of male-exclusive networks in science, and may be based on an evolutionary history promoting strong male bonds.

<sup>132</sup> See 'When the end of human civilization is your day job', by John H. Richardson, *Esquire*, 7th July 2015, www.esquire.com/news-politics/a36228/ballad-of-the-sad-climatologists-0815/. See also Gillam, 2017, for the way scientists are being denigrated and have their reputation blackened. I thank Linda Hartling for making us aware of this book and taking notes for us, and for sending us also the article on integrated weed management by Harker and O'Donovan, 2017. See also the book review 'Whitewash: The story of a weed killer, cancer, and the corruption of science', by Joan Baxter, *Medium*, 27th October 2017, https://medium.com/@joan\_baxter/book-review-whitewash-the-story-of-a-weed-killer-cancer-and-the-corruption-of-science-4d8652a54e80. See what Gillam, 2017, says in the Preface of her book on 'whitewash', pp. xiii–xiv:

But over the years, as my research and reporting expanded to include doubts about the benefits of genetically modified organisms and the risks associated with the chemicals used on them, I became a

target of Monsanto's ire. Company representatives and industry surrogates alternately sought to bully me, charm me, intimidate me, and cajole me to write news stories in ways that parroted industry talking points. They told me there was no justification for reporting both sides of the debates over Monsanto's crops and chemicals because the science was settled, all was well, and anyone who questioned that was thwarting Monsanto's mission to 'feed the world'. When I would not adopt the desired narrative, surrogates attempted to assault my character and credibility and made efforts to derail my career. Monsanto executives and representatives from Monsanto-funded organisations sought unsuccessfully to convince my editors to yank me off my beat, to block further coverage of the issues. They could rarely, if ever, find errors in my reporting. The problem, they would complain, was one of 'bias'. As you'll see in reading this book, the only bias I hold is for the truth. What I've learned, what I know with certainty, is that when powerful corporations control the narrative, the truth often gets lost, and it's up to journalists to find it and bring it home.

<sup>133</sup> Wallace-Wells, 2019, book description.

<sup>134</sup> See 'Mainstream under-reporting of the climate crisis', by John Scales Avery, *TRANSCEND Media Service*, 27th May 2019, www.transcend.org/tms/2019/05/mainstream-under-reporting-of-the-climate-crisis/. It is a privilege to have John Scales Avery as an esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies community.

<sup>135</sup> Lindner, 2017.

<sup>136</sup> Psychologists McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014.

<sup>137</sup> Madsen, 2014, p. 610. The Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists was adopted by the Assembly of the International Union of Psychological Science in Berlin on 22nd July 2008. See www.iupsys.net/about/governance/universal-declaration-of-ethical-principles-for-psychologists.html:

Psychologists recognise that they carry out their activities within a larger social context. They recognise that the lives and identities of human beings both individually and collectively are connected across generations, and that there is a reciprocal relationship between human beings and their natural and social environments. Psychologists are committed to placing the welfare of society and its members above the self-interest of the discipline and its members.

<sup>138</sup> Jansz and Drunen, 2004, in Madsen, 2014.

<sup>139</sup> Jansz and Drunen, 2004, p. 247, in Madsen, 2014, p. 610.

<sup>140</sup> Valsiner, 2012. See also the work of psychiatrist Suman Fernando, and his overview over the historic context of psychiatry and psychology, Fernando, 2017, p. 14.

<sup>141</sup> Valsiner, 2015, p. 7. Italics in original. See also Bergman and Lundh, 2015. See also Valsiner, 2014, p. 9:

If we look at psychology from the historical viewpoint, it is the intra-individual (intra-systemic) reference frame that has been used in the emerging discipline since the 18th century. Psychology is a discipline that has focussed on the psychological functions and faculties that are projected to be inside of the persons. Our thinking, feeling, and perceiving we consider to be 'in' us — using the body as the boundary of the 'in'/'out' distinction. Beyond that the efforts to localise different psychological functions have been widely and wildly dispersed, ending up with phrenology of localising such characteristics in the form of

the skull, or in the functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) images of the brain. Starting from approximately the 1920s, psychology at large adopted the inter-individual (inter-systemic) reference frame that radically changed the social practices of research. Instead of analysing psychological phenomena within individual cases — over time (i.e. relying on comparisons within the given person), the differences between persons became the axiomatic domain for study. The hope for generalisation was now delegated to comparison of samples selected by some criteria and turned into 'random' ones. The belief was that through sufficiently large number and randomly selected set of subjects would warrant the treatment of the obtained differences in averages of the samples as if these would represent the generic individuals of the compared classes.

<sup>142</sup> Valsiner, 2015, p. 10. Italics in original. See also Smedslund, 2016, 'Why psychology cannot be an empirical science'.

<sup>143</sup> Valsiner, 2014, p. 13.

<sup>144</sup> Valsiner, 2014, p. 10.

<sup>145</sup> Valsiner, 2014, p. 10.

<sup>146</sup> Valsiner, 2014, p. 10.

<sup>147</sup> See Lindner, 2006, 2009a, 2012, 2017, 2024, Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

<sup>148</sup> See Talk 5 in this symposium titled "Fire Under the Boiler of Social Change": Appraisal and Response to Humiliation among Untouchables (Dalits) in the Indian Caste System', by Yashpal Jogdand and Stephen Reicher. Short abstract: In an interview study, we examined the experience and response to humiliation in the Indian caste system. We show that stigmatised groups in historically unequal societies such as Indian Untouchables/Dalits can experience humiliation as a painful yet formative experience underpinning social change.

<sup>149</sup> Arendt, 1963, p. 89.

<sup>150</sup> Staub, 1989, 1993, 2015. See Fischer, et al., 2011, for a meta-study on the bystander effect.

<sup>151</sup> Margalit, 1996.

<sup>152</sup> 'Freedom for the wolves', Berlin, 1969, p. xlv. See also Berlin, 1958b, a. The 2017 documentary film *Freedom for the wolf* by Rupert Russell takes its title from Isaiah Berlin. It is about the idea of freedom and how it can be hollowed out by the 'wolves'. At the same time, people all over the globe — from Tunisian rappers to Indian comedians, from America's #BlackLivesMatter activists to Hong Kong's students — struggle to regain freedom for the 'sheep'. See www.freedomforthewolf.com. I thank Nicklas Viki for making me aware of this film.

French philosopher Denis Diderot (1713–1784) had a lifelong preoccupation with questions of life, liberty, and purpose, and his definition of liberty as 'freedom to do whatever the law does not forbid' has deeply influenced the American view on freedom.

Consider also historian David Hackett Fischer, 1989, differentiated four 'British folkways in America' and their radically different notions of liberty, namely, the Puritan, Cavalier, Quaker, and Scots-Irish notions. The values of the Virginia Cavaliers 'caused the unusual brutality of the American system of Black enslavement', as for them, 'Freedom was defined by what it wasn't. It wasn't slavery. It was the freedom to

enslave. It was a freedom, granted to the plantation masters, to indulge themselves, gamble and debauch'. See 'Joe Klein explains how the history of four centuries ago still shapes American culture and politics', by Joe Klein, *New York Times*, 4th October 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/10/04/books/review/joe-klein-explains-how-the-history-of-four-centuries-ago-still-shapes-american-culture-and-politics.html. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.

See also a critical discussion in *Whose freedom?* by cognitive linguist and philosopher George Lakoff, 2006, who surveys the political landscape in the U.S.A. and offers a map of the 'Republican battle plan' that has 'captured the hearts and minds of Americans', shows how progressives may reinvigorate this 'most beloved of American political ideas'. See the description of Lakoff's book:

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has relentlessly invoked the word 'freedom'. Al-Qaeda attacked us because 'they hate our freedom'. The U.S. can strike pre-emptively because 'freedom is on the march'. Social security should be privatised in order to protect individual freedoms. The 2005 presidential inaugural speech was a kind of crescendo: the words 'freedom', 'free', and 'liberty', were used forty-nine times in President Bush's twenty-minute speech.

#### See also Orr, et al., 2020.

*Minarchism* — min(imal) + -archy (government) + -ism (system) = 'system of minimal government' and maximum freedom — became a popularised concept in the 1960s through the American philosopher Robert Nozick, 1974, and had nineteenth-century Britain as main proponent. See also note 2206 in chapter 7 of Lindner, 2024, about the difference between the Anglo-Saxon realm and continental Europe. Professor of mathematics Bruce Boghosian and his colleagues used a mathematical model to mimic a simplified version of the free market and found that wealth becomes increasingly more concentrated, and inequality grows until almost all assets are held by an extremely small percentage of people. Therefore, free markets cannot be stable without redistribution mechanisms, indicating that reality on the ground manifests the opposite of what market fundamentalism teaches. See, for instance, Devitt-Lee, et al., 2018. See an accessible summary in 'The mathematics of inequality', by Taylor McNeil, *Tufts Now*, 12th October 2017, http://now.tufts.edu/articles/mathematics-inequality:

While economists use math for their models, they seek to show that an economy governed by supply and demand will result in a steady state or equilibrium, while Boghosian's efforts 'don't try to engineer a supply-demand equilibrium, and we don't find one', he said... Over time, they added three parameters to the model, he said. 'One is for how redistributive the society is, another is for how biased the transactions are in favour of wealthier agents, what we call the wealth-attained advantage, and the third one measures how far 'underwater' the poorest agents are', meaning the extent to which their debts exceed the value of their assets, like real estate. It's easy to imagine how wealth-attained advantage works in real life. 'The people with that advantage receive better returns on their investments, lower interest rates on loans, and better financial advice', said Boghosian. 'Conversely, as Barbara Ehrenreich famously observed, it is expensive to be poor. If you are working two jobs, you don't have time to shop for the best bargains. If you can't afford the security deposit demanded by most landlords, you may end up staying in a motel at inflated prices'.

See also 'It is expensive to be poor', by Barbara Ehrenreich, *The Atlantic*, 13th January 2014, www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/it-is-expensive-to-be-poor/282979/.

<sup>153</sup> Arendt, 1951/1973, p. 352.

<sup>154</sup> Saulo Fernández in a personal communication, 24th May 2023.