Gendercide and Humiliation in Honor and Human-Rights Societies

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Introduction

Why is the concept of gendercide interesting? Why did the definition of the concept of gendercide start with “femicide”—in other words, why was the emphasis placed on women (as opposed to men) when the concept first emerged? Why has the selective killing of men, especially men of “battle age,” long been neglected in scientific research? Is it because men are not regarded as sufficiently “worthy” victims, and are therefore discriminated against?

Such questions regarding gendercide will be linked in this chapter to the gendering of suicide: Why do three times more young males than young females commit suicide in Western countries (like Britain)? Why, in contrast, do more young women commit suicide in traditional China? Why are suicide numbers approaching Western levels in the westernized parts of China? And why are numbers of female suicides rising in the West (though they are still lower than the figure for males)?

Many of these questions converge and overlap with the important issues to which Adam Jones has drawn attention in Chapter 1. He has attempted to
locate genocide within the broader context of male-female relations, and this has elicited some controversy. This chapter locates not only Jones’s insights, but also the controversy his work has produced, within a broader context: that is, the long-term historical transformation under way between the honor code and the ideology of human rights. This transformation from honor to human rights as the standard for evaluating human behavior is itself located within an even broader framework: namely, the part played by humiliation in societal structure and historical change. Humiliation, I will argue, is a force that underlies both the killing of others (for example in war), and the killing of oneself (suicide).

I define humiliation as the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will, or in some cases also with your consent, often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down, or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless. However, the role of the victim is not necessarily always unambiguous. A victim may feel humiliated in absence of any humiliating act—as the result of a misunderstanding, or as the result of personal and cultural differences concerning norms of what respectful treatment ought to entail—or the “victim” may even invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of a loathsome perpetrator.

My object is to scrutinize societal structures in their historical contexts by using the concept of humiliation. I hope, in this way, to shed more light on both gendercide and gender-specific patterns of suicide. In both cases, my concern is equally with patterns of causation (Why does the phenomenon occur?) and patterns of evaluation (What is its significance?).

In Chapter 1, Jones introduces the term “gendercide” and reports that it was first coined by Mary Anne Warren in her 1985 book Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection. Jones praises Warren’s book for attending to the basic idea, but criticizes Warren for gender discrimination: namely, that much of her book “concerns itself exclusively with female-selective killing: female infanticide, the witch-hunts in Europe, suttee or widow burning in India, female genital mutilation, ‘the denial of reproductive freedom’ (to
women), and ‘misogynist ideologies.’” Jones reports further: “Much of the remainder of her book is devoted to the subject of the sex selection of children as a form of gendercide against women.” Continuing with his critique, he writes: “Whatever the merits of extending the framework this far (or to the genital mutilation of women or men), gendercide, for all practical purposes, is limited in Warren’s analysis to ‘anti-female gendercide.’”

Jones then reminds the reader that “noncombatant men have been and continue to be the most frequent targets of mass killing and genocidal slaughter, as well as a host of lesser atrocities and abuses.” He states further “that gendercide, at least when it targets males, has attracted virtually no attention at the level of scholarship or public policy. As such, it can be classed as one of the great taboo subjects of the contemporary age.” He concludes: “I hold, nonetheless, that an inclusive understanding of gendercide carries powerful implications for the emerging field of comparative genocide studies.”

The present chapter has two anchoring points, namely the gender-selective killing of others (gendercide), and the gender-selective killing of oneself (suicide). Recent research on suicide carried out at the University of Southampton by Colin Pritchard shows that typically in Britain more men than women kill themselves, the ratio being 3 to 1. Five times more young men than young women between fifteen and twenty-four die in this way, and more die in urban than in rural areas. However, Pritchard’s research on patterns of suicide in China shows that “their suicide is the very opposite of that in the West: Chinese women kill themselves more than do men. Young women die at double the rate of young males, and more people die in rural than in urban areas.” Significantly, the research “also found that in ‘westernized’ Chinese societies, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan, patterns of suicide followed trends in the rest of the developed world, which points to social factors as key determinants of suicide.”

Pritchard’s research gives plausibility to the suggestion that patterns of suicide (and, perhaps, by implication, patterns of gendercide) alter as societal structures change over time. I want to add another dimension by proposing that one of the key transmitting agents that communicates the pressures leading to gendercide and gender-specific suicide is humiliation. As patterns of humiliation change in the course of the transition from the honor code to the human-rights code, so patterns of gendercide and suicide may also be transformed, although the lines of causation are neither simple nor one way.
The reasoning presented in this paper draws upon evidence collected in two contexts. The first is a research project conducted at the University of Oslo entitled *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts*, and subtitled: *A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*. A total of 216 qualitative interviews were carried out from 1998 to 1999 in Africa (in Hargeisa, capital of “Somaliland”; in Kigali and other places in Rwanda; in Bujumbura, capital of Burundi; in Nairobi, Kenya; and in Cairo, Egypt), and from 1997 to 2000 in Europe (in Oslo, various places in Germany, Geneva, and Brussels). The topic has been discussed with about four hundred researchers working in related fields. The chapter also draws upon my experience as a clinical psychologist and consultant in Germany (1980–84) and Egypt (1984–91).

**The Historic Transition from Honor Societies to Human Rights Societies**

During the past two hundred years, and especially during the last half-century, the spread of the ideology of human rights has popularised the principle that all human beings should expect to receive respectful treatment solely on the grounds of their humanity, without reference to gender, ethnicity or other “secondary” criteria. Human rights are, for example, oriented to the principle of equality between males and females, unlike the honour code that assumes a fundamental inequality between them.

The principles of human rights with their strong egalitarian emphasis have become so omnipresent, especially in the West, it is easy to overlook that they developed in reaction to a traditional honor code. Dov Cohen and Richard Nisbett examine honor-based societies in their research and writings. The honor to which Cohen and Nisbett refer is the kind that operates in the traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds. Adam Jones has also cited other evidence relating to the blood feud.

William Ian Miller in *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence* examines honor as understood in the Iliad or Icelandic sagas. He explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Miller suggests “that we are more familiar with the culture of honor than we may like to admit. This familiarity partially explains why stories of revenge play
so well, whether read as the *Iliad*, an Icelandic saga, *Hamlet*, many novels, or seen as so many gangland, intergalactic, horror, or Clint Eastwood movies. Honor is not our official ideology, but its ethic survives in pockets of most of our lives. In some ethnic (sub)cultures it still is the official ideology, or at least so we are told about the cultures of some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, and so on. And even among the suburban middle class the honor ethic is lived in high school or in the competitive rat race of certain professional cultures.”

I am familiar with all shades of the traditional honor/blood-feud scenario as a result of my work as a psychological counselor in Egypt (1984–91). It was here that I learned about the role of humiliation and its significance for the key difference between the honor/blood-feud scenario and the scenario associated with human rights. Within a blood-feud culture, it is honorable, perfectly legitimate, and highly “obligatory” to “heal” humiliation by killing a targeted person. The opposite is true in a society where universal human rights are recognized; “healing” humiliation means restoring the victim's dignity by empathic dialogue, sincere apology, and finally reconciliation.

**The Link between Honor, Dignity, and Humiliation**

The notion of humiliation links the concepts of honor and human rights in an enlightening way, providing a framework both for ideologies and for the transition between them. “The idea of humiliation contains three elements, which entered the cultural repertoire [of humankind] in three phases that coincided, approximately, with advances in technological and organisational capacity and shifts in the balance of power between humankind and nature and between human groups. During the first phase, the idea of subjugating nature entered the repertoire. In the next phase, the idea of subjugation (or ‘putting/keeping/striking down’) was extended to human beings. During the third phase, the idea became widespread that subjugating human beings was illegitimate, morally wrong.”

The introduction of agriculture extended the previously existing technology of making small tools to the production of the digging stick and the plough. But agriculture did not stop there. The surplus produced by agriculture provided the material means for subjugating not just nature but also people. The instrumentalization of some human beings (the “slaves”) by others (the “masters”) was “invented.”
The pyramid of power that evolved over the next centuries gave everybody a rank and a certain definition of honor attached to it:

For example, in medieval and early modern Europe, armed combat among members of the most “honourable” class, the aristocracy, was a means of defending or enhancing family honour. Defeat in a duel lowered the loser's rank in the scale of honour. Small humiliations could be borne by those who had fought bravely. However, a cowardly response to a challenge could mean that all honour was lost. Furthermore, it was not possible to accept defeat by an opponent one did not respect. In extreme cases where no road back to honour existed, suicide was preferable. The main point is that within “honour societies,” humiliation and violence were regarded as normal means of managing tensions. For the most part, people accepted them and got on with their lives. Violence did not have the strong connotation of “violation” it has since acquired.13

In his book *Getting to Peace: Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the World*, anthropologist William Ury argues that the transition to hierarchy from the relatively egalitarian social structures of hunting-and-gathering societies occurred around ten thousand years ago, and that humankind is currently “returning” to egalitarian nomadic structures in the specific form of the global information society. It may be hypothesized that the egalitarian notion of human rights, with its acceptance of equal dignity for every human being, is one aspect of this transition.

Changes in international relations theory also reflect the transition.14 “Classical and Structural Realism saw the world as being guided by ‘anarchy’—anarchy as the ‘state of nature’ (Hobbes)—with an ensuing ‘Security Dilemma’ within which only states are actors. Liberalism, on the other hand, considers firms, NGOs, and international organizations as also being actors and proposes that through cooperation the ‘Security Dilemma’ may be overcome.”15

Human rights introduce a fundamental turning point in the chain of social changes. They transform “normal” traditional practices into illegitimate abuses. They place followers of the old code in direct confrontation with adherents to the new code. People from the human-rights camp in the international community, for instance, are appalled by the practices of dictators who believe in honor codes. However, regimes that gain from the old code hesitate to let go of it and find reasons to keep it alive. International criticism of human-rights abuses, for example in Southeast Asia, may be
opposed as intrusive, humiliating, and arrogant breaches of Asian sovereignty in the name of alien Western values.16

How does the mechanism of humiliation present itself within a human-rights context as compared to an honor context? Dennis Smith writes in “Organisations and Humiliation: Looking beyond Elias”: “The human rights revolution—especially the core principle that all human beings are equally worthy of respect—has a dramatic effect upon the experience of humiliation. Once this revolution has occurred, the casual blows and insults . . . that used to serve as a routine proclamation of the hierarchical status quo become transformed in the mind of the victim into an outrageous forced expulsion from the community of equals. . . . (‘How dare you deprive me of my freedom?’; ‘how dare you make me less than I am?’).” Smith continues: “In a human-rights society people still get scorned, spat upon, ignored, turned away and forced to kow-tow to authority. Humiliation is present whenever someone is made to feel fundamentally inferior and less worthy of consideration than others. Human rights do not abolish humiliation. On the contrary, they intensify the experience. In a human-rights society, we do not accept humiliation as a ‘normal’ mechanism built into the bone and muscle of society. Instead, we reject its legitimacy.”17

In other words, humiliation, already hurtful in an honor society where it is used routinely as a means to put people down or keep them down, becomes many times more hurtful when it occurs in a human-rights society. In a human-rights context, humiliation acquires an explosive potential. Along with Suzanne Retzinger, Thomas Scheff has studied the part played by “humiliated fury” in escalating conflict between individuals and nations.18 Retzinger and Scheff show that the suffering caused by humiliation is highly significant, and that the bitterest divisions have their roots in shame and humiliation.19

**Definition of “Male” and “Female” in Honor Societies and in Human Rights Societies**

In an honor society, the man is defined as the principal actor, no matter how functionally important female activities might be. He is the “subject,” she is the “object.”20 He is the defender of honor against humiliation. He is defined as being responsible, self-reflexive, and rational. He is expected to protect “his” women, at least as long as he values them as a “resource,” for example, as prizes and symbols of his honor, or as mothers of “his” children.
A woman who lives in an honor society learns either that she is not regarded as a human being at all, or that she is a lowly human being. In the first case, she is perceived as a passive recipient of male actions, as “material” to be either used or thrown away by him; she is on the same level as household items or domesticated animals. In the second case, she is also seen as a passive recipient, but also as a human being whose rank is lower than a man’s; in this case, she is on the same level as children or slaves.

To illustrate the argument, it may be mentioned that some honor cultures in the Arab world and in Africa regard the woman’s hymen as a symbol of the family’s honor, and for this reason they practice female genital mutilation—on the grounds that in this way the family’s honor (in which she shares) is being “protected.” In many traditional honor societies, a female is a token, or representative, of the family or group to which she belongs; daughters are needed for marriage into families “her” males want as allies. In Latin American “macho” cultures, the “conquest” of many women is taken as a proof of male prowess. In honor cultures, where property is inherited by the owner’s male offspring (and where the male is informed of the basic biological facts that his genes live on in his children), the male will value the bearer of “his” children, their mother. In all these cases women will be “protected” by “their” males.

On the other side, however, a father will resent having to “invest” in a daughter who later will contribute only to another man’s household and future: China and India come to mind. Furthermore, in all militaristic cultures, where the male is trained to be tough and fearless when facing death in battle, he may resent women because they remind him of desires that he deems unmale or female: for example, his desires to be cared for, to be emotional, or to be weak. In all such cases, women will be in danger of receiving hostility rather than protection from “their” males.

Another context for male hostility toward women is war. Women are captured, raped, and/or killed. As argued previously, masculine ferocity is functional for the male role as warlike defender of the group in the “anarchic” world described by Hobbes, whose global model became the basis for classical realism in international relations theory. It is evident that an honor society encourages its men to be aggressive in war situations—an aggression that includes a sexual element. This means also that the same society may have problems controlling this fierceness when the soldiers come home, giving rise to “protective institutions” such as gender segregation or veiling.

However, rape was not necessarily part of war. For example, in Somalia and other blood-revenge societies, women traditionally are not systemati-
cally raped or killed in wars or periods of violent reprisals, a fact noted by the International Committee of the Red Cross Somalia Delegation. Wars and blood revenge are carried out between men, and women can move around freely. They are, so to speak, “invisible.” According to Kari H. Karamé of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, during the years of fighting in Lebanon there was a kind of contract between the warring parties not to rape each other’s women. She recounts: “It just happened twice, when fighters from ‘outside’ came, for example Palestinians. But a lot of sexual violence happened in connection with men; they were castrated, died of that, etcetera.”

The recent upsurge in war rape may very well be a new phenomenon. War rape, especially rape in public, draws women into the “game” more than previously. During my fieldwork in Somalia and Rwanda (1998–99), I learned that rape in front of husband, children, and neighbors during genocidal onslaughts was perceived as the “atomic bomb for emotions,” the very peak of humiliation and thus the most “efficient weapon.” This represents, so to speak, an evil “democratization” of war—a transition from combat among a select group of honorable warriors to torturing, raping, and slaughtering everybody. It is possible that leaders who want to create the conditions for spontaneous mass mobilization for war might see war rape as a cheap way to minimize the cost of getting willing soldiers, because in populations that have humiliated each other enough, for example, through rape in public, the divisions and hostilities run so deep that war fever infects the whole population.

Rape of women in an honor context, especially when committed publicly, may well be aimed primarily at humiliating the enemy’s males, who are forced to watch helplessly, unable to protect “their” women. Somali men explained to me that they could not live with their raped wives, precisely because they could not stand being reminded of their humiliation. This means that the humiliation does not last only as long as the incident, but lingers on in the memory of the humiliated men (and, of course, women). The utmost embodiment of this humiliation within the honor code is the creation of children of rape. The author monitored a pledge from women in Sierra Leone that Western women should adopt their rape babies, since they could not take them to their villages, as much as they loved them as mothers—or more accurately, because they loved them.

Helen Smith has written about the same tragedy in Kosovo in the UK Guardian; her article is entitled “Rape Victims’ Babies Pay the Price of War.” Such children are a living reminder of utmost humiliation, as understood in an honor framework—of the enemy males’ inability to protect
“their” women. The article includes the statement that Serb rapes in Kosovo were "about power and control, humiliation and revenge. And what better way to damage the enemy's morale than to hit at his family? 'Our society is a traditional one where Albanian men are brought up to see themselves as breadwinners and protectors,' [Sevdije] Ahmeti points out. 'Once you touch the woman, you touch the honour of the family and you provoke the man to react. The Serbs knew this. Belgrade had, for years, put out propaganda that the only thing Albanian women could do was produce like mice. So daughters were gang-raped in front of their fathers, wives in front of their husbands, nieces in front of their uncles, mothers in front of their children, just to dehumanise, just to degrade.'" Another quote describes Kosovar Albanian women as “the property of men, to be bought, sold and betrothed before birth” and “sacks to be filled.”

To summarize, in an honor society women are “material” for demonstrations of the male “power play.” By contrast, in a human-rights society, males and females are actors in the social world, and keen defenders of their personal dignity against humiliation. Both are defined as being responsible, self-reflexive, and able to combine rationality with mature emotions. Both are seen as endowed with an inner core of dignity on the grounds of belonging to humanity, without reference to gender, ethnicity, or other “secondary” criteria.

The Incompatibility between Human Rights and Honor Codes

Males may be found both as advocates of traditional honor codes and as promoters of human rights. The same can be said for females. However—and this is a key difference between males and females—men and women make the transition to the new egalitarian human-rights code from different starting points. Males “come down” to the level of equality, from their previous level of superiority within the pyramid of power, while women rise up.

That males traditionally inhabited the higher ranks within hierarchies and thus were the “dominators” makes them easy targets for the “risers,” namely the women who want to liberate themselves from unwanted domination. Some women may commit the error of confounding biological maleness with social maleness. In other words, they may forget that not all males dominate, and that males may also be victims of domination. It may be quite understandable, psychologically, that during a hard-fought struggle to rise
up, the “enemy” may be painted in very stark terms without making subtle distinctions. But this does not contribute to accurate analysis, and it does not lead to a fair representation of the nature of the struggle or its desirable outcome. Men—Adam Jones, for example—may quite justifiably tell women that they do not enjoy being overlooked as victims just because they happen to share the same biological makeup as some of the unjust masters against whom women rightly protest.

In a society ruled by an honor code, a male is “worthy” when he can defend his own and his people’s honor against the threat of humiliation. This is well expressed in the ideal of knights who successfully defend fortresses and slay dragons, as related in the innumerable fairy tales that still form children’s view of the world to a great extent. The fearless, brave, and glamorous prince who undergoes difficult trials and wins the hand of the princess at the end remains the blueprint for male success, even today. However, in an honor society, a male is liable to be cast out or killed if he fails to meet the “knightly” standards just described. The unsuccessful warrior faces humiliation and death, perhaps by his own hand.

It is important to realize how strong an influence these traditional values were on a leader such as Hitler, who presented himself as someone seeking “honorable” vengeance for the insults that the German people had been forced to endure in the past. As is well known, when his failure became impossible to deny, Hitler committed suicide. He paid the price for his dishonor. Similarly, in a very traditional honor context, all men of “battle age” lose their right to live if they are incapable of defending themselves. This is because to be a male is to be a warrior; the concept of the noncombatant male does not exist in such societies.

Adam Jones, in “Gendercide and Genocide,” Chapter 1 of this volume, rightly deplores the behavior and attitudes just described, since they cannot be defended in terms of his human-rights point of view. But he may not realize how tightly people may hold onto such structures of meaning. In my practice in Egypt, I had clients—young Palestinian men and women—who showed signs of severe depression because they had been sent by their families to study in Egypt. What they strongly wished to do instead was to take up arms and die for their people—many males thought this a most holy duty, not to be neglected—or to get married and give birth to as many future warriors as possible, which many females felt to be their equally holy duty. They felt that they were utterly betraying their people by enjoying life far away from danger, accumulating knowledge as if nothing was amiss. Their only
consolation was the hope that they were safeguarding the traditions and interests of their families and helping them to survive into the future.

In an honor society, a female is “worthy” with reference to the interests of her male protector, her husband. Her task is to give birth to “his” children, and serve as symbol and prize for “his” male honor. This is the traditional ideal of the “proper” woman. It was an ideal nourished not only by the men, but also by the women themselves. As Jones reports in Chapter 1, those who accused women of being witches, in other words of failing “proper” standards, were often other women: In the last years of Queen Elizabeth I up to 53 per cent of all cases fell into this category.

As a consequence, in an honor society a female is regarded as “unworthy” and of little account if she cannot give her husband children or otherwise enhance the honor of his family. There are many variants of this theme. For example, Chinese families, especially those in rural areas with traditional belief sets, hope for sons because only a male heir is able to perform the rites that give honor to ancestors. This is a serious problem especially under current circumstances, in which China seeks to limit birth rates and fertility is restricted by government fiat. In such a context, the birth of a girl may be seen as a heavy burden. Such considerations may lie behind many cases of infanticide or suicide and help to answer the question asked in the beginning of this chapter about why so many more girls than boys in rural China commit suicide. A girl who “understands” and internalizes that she is a burden on the family, and that her mere existence may deprive her family of a much-yearned-for son, may conclude that she must relieve her family of her existence.

Turning to human-rights societies, all human beings, male or female, are considered “worthy” if they have the capacity to work and live as mutually respectful and supportive members of creative teams or networks consisting of equals. This standard is applied both at work and in the home. To be able to function in such a team is the ideal of the modern human being, as presented in modern management seminars and therapies for personal growth.

However, males and females are “unworthy” in a human-rights society, and consequently at risk from the hostility of others or themselves, if they cannot meet or fail to acknowledge the standards just set out. Uneducated young men in the West have particular problems with the transition to the new ways and find themselves without a respectable role. They are humiliated in terms of both the honor code and the human-rights code. They feel humiliated in the old context because they cannot earn a living, care for a
family, and be a worthy patriarch. They feel humiliated in the new context because their male prowess, their bodily abilities, their capacity to frighten people, are all of little worth in a global information society. They may despise the “geeks” who achieve success, but they cannot emulate them. Unless such a young man manages to become a sports star, few careers are open to him. In extreme cases, he may become a hooligan, a member of a violent gang, an alcoholic, a drug user—or suicidal.

Turning to the female case, uneducated young women in the West also have specific problems related to the transition to the new ways and, like their brothers, find themselves without a respectable role. They, too, are humiliated in both the old and new contexts. An uneducated young woman may choose to become a mother, even at a very young age (witness the high numbers of pregnancies of very young girls in England, for example), but this will consign her to the margins of society, with little money or recognition, since the old role model of the “protected” woman loses its credibility in a human-rights society. As the honor code weakens its grip, fewer people are prepared to give a young woman acknowledgment and praise for her dutiful motherhood. However, lacking education and self-confidence, she is not prepared to make her way successfully in the new context of human rights. As in the case of her brother, she finds that the old way to gain respect is disappearing, while the doors to the brave new world remain closed. For some, suicide may seem the only way out.

In fact, the situation is even more complicated, since a person (or group of persons) may be defined differently by her relatives, neighbors, and friends than she defines herself. A Turkish girl living in Germany, for example, may want to live like German girls and have a boyfriend, while her family is appalled because they conceive of her in a very different way. A similar dilemma is confronted by a man who advocates human rights while his family expects him to defend their honor. I became familiar with such cases in Egypt, where blood feuds from the home village may reach men who live in Cairo, are highly educated, and have almost forgotten about their background.

A brief example: Dr. Hamza (the name is changed) came to me in 1988. He had been studying abroad, led a cosmopolitan life, wore Western clothes, spoke English perfectly, and was very much a member of the international elite. His family background and roots were in Upper Egypt, south of Cairo. This is the area of Egypt that has the strongest Arab-nomadic influence, as opposed to the broad Nile delta in the north where time seems to have stood
still since the pharaohs disappeared some two thousand years ago. The north is felt by many to be more “Egyptian,” while the south is perceived as more Arabic, with the Nubians even farther south at the point where Egypt merges into Africa.

Upper Egyptians are said to be fiercer than those in the north. Northerners think of themselves as more civilized, better able to talk and reconcile conflicts by using sophisticated communication strategies. They look down upon the southerners and ridicule them in innumerable jokes that express the cliché that the Upper Egyptian does not talk much but is ready to shoot fast.

Upper Egypt is a land of blood feuds. The blood feud has a simple logic: The next male in line has to be killed by the opposing family, which has the duty of avenging the murder of one of its own men, who previously may also have died as part of the cycle of revenge. Such cycles may go on for centuries and decimate the males of entire families.

Dr. Hamza was a little piece in one such long-lasting cycle. One day he received unexpected visitors wearing long galabiyas, the dress of the villagers, in his fancy urban apartment. They informed him that he was the next one due to be killed. Dr. Hamza had grown so distant from such practices, so accustomed to another world that he initially did not take their words seriously: “Stupid hopeless villagers,” he thought. He knew that long peace negotiations with the dishonored family who sought satisfaction were a possible way out. He also knew that his own family was the one most opposed to such negotiations. However, he did not even bother to think about this until the first attempt to kill him. The end of the story is not relevant to the main point, which is that Dr. Hamza confronted a deadly serious dilemma. He was caught between two worlds: the world of honor and the world of human rights.

The same dilemma affects whole groups, even nations. For example, few people with political power in Europe during the 1930s were prepared to believe that Hitler actually aimed at archaic domination, a form of domination legitimized by the honor code and hostile to human rights. Germany’s neighbors, tired of war and longing for continued peace, chose to believe that he as well wanted peace and cooperation.

Jones recognizes that “patriarchal” culture, the culture of the honor code, may play a role also in gendercide. He writes in Chapter 1 of this volume:

Gendercide against men and women—but particularly men—may be seen in this light as one of the more common forms of genocide. Can we
go a step further and hypothesize what *types of* genocide or genocidal massacre are most likely to exhibit a gender-specific and/or gender-selective dimension? Female infanticide, the rape-killings of women through history, and mass murders for witchcraft (of which the European case stands alone in history) should probably be so characterized. On the other hand, mass purges and “politicides,” such as Stalin’s massacres and the Cultural Revolution in China, could be expected to be weighted disproportionately or overwhelmingly against males. The related phenomenon of “eliticide” could be similarly classed. Finally, the most militarized genocides —those carried out against a backdrop of partisan or rebel activity, or heavily masculinized dissidence—seem to exhibit the most pronounced gendering against male victims. A correlation is often evident with “patriarchal” culture, as this might be manifested in patterns of community organization and family roles.

In effect, Jones belongs to the camp of male human-rights advocates who assert the need to treat all human beings as having an equal claim to justice and dignity. In the concluding paragraph of chapter 1, he states that he has “sought to establish the empirical proposition that gendercide exists.” He “derives two normative propositions from the historical record: first, that the framing should be an inclusive one, encompassing the experiences of both women and men; and second, that recognition and amelioration of the phenomenon is long overdue, and a matter of the highest urgency.”

In an earlier article, “Engendering Debate,” Jones responds to a critique of his work by Terrell Carver and others entitled “Gendering Jones.”26 Jones makes it clear that he wished to “entrench” the subject of gender within the mainstream of the international relations discipline. He writes: “I am trying to incorporate feminism’s basic theoretical perspectives and normative concerns, while giving balanced consideration to both sexes.” Then he explains to the reader how he suffered unfair treatment from his adversaries, Carver and others.

Even so, after assailing me for my “odious and otiose” arguments and my “obvious immaturity,” Carver *et al.* acknowledge that I have come up with “a dozen or so important topics that might be investigated in IR.” Not an unpromising start in the four pages of text they cite, I would have thought. Perhaps next time, the authors will set aside their reflexive hostility towards my project, and engage with a few of these “important topics” from their own vantage points. . . . This could only promote the more “stimulating and supportive” environment for such investigations that they, and I, desire.27
This little duel shows how an advocate of feminism—a man, Adam Jones—may be perceived as being on the wrong side, or at least this reaction may be hypothesized, since his opponents react with what he calls “reflexive hostility.” A sociologist who now writes on gender issues has told me about his own experience of being ostracized from “proper” sociology in 1997. It seems to him that he is getting the message: “A man does not engage in gender research!” Thus, both men and women seem to have great difficulties in dealing with a man “on the wrong side.”

This indicates that the most significant fallacy, one that hampers clear analysis and increases misunderstandings, is the confounding of categories. During my fieldwork in Africa, I met Rwandan Hutu who had suffered greatly when they opposed the genocide that was carried out against Tutsi in 1994 by Hutu extremists. Many moderate Hutu were killed; I spoke with some of the survivors. They gave accounts of the bitter incidents of humiliation that they faced throughout Africa, simply because they were Hutu. The word “Hutu” had acquired the connotation of “génocidaire.” So a Hutu who actually opposed the genocide, and suffered greatly for it, was accused of perpetrating the act he had painfully opposed. The resulting bitterness was great and profoundly disempowering.

The same fallacy happens when maleness is equated with the old honor code, and women “occupy” the new normative stance of human rights in an exclusive manner, not allowing males to be a part of it. Wherever this happens, it means that men are locked in their role as dominators in oppressive patriarchal systems and are not allowed to be victims, since women have claimed a monopoly in this sphere.

Many of the difficulties and dilemmas just described illustrate the particular stage in which the human-rights revolution currently finds itself. The former “underlings,” women, have dared to raise their heads and develop what was called “feminism.” The social environment started opening up for such a number of years ago. In my piece “Women in the Global Village: Increasing Demand for Traditional Communication Patterns,” I argue that the driving agent of the human-rights revolution, including women’s rights (see the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995), is the formation of a global village consisting of neighbors, not enemies. The trend toward turning enemies into neighbors is breaking down the earlier division between “male warriors” and “female carers.” In a global village of neighbors, this division, together with strictly gendered pyramids of power, is becoming dysfunctional, and egalitarian relations between men and women become
functional. This fact is gradually being understood by humankind—at first only by a few male and female feminists, and only now also by advocates for men’s need to change their position.

More egalitarian relations mean that women may rise, while men must descend from unequal power positions. However, rising is perhaps easier than descending. A woman who raises her head and becomes a feminist has little to lose, but much to win—at least as long as she avoids having her head chopped off, although even that fate might not make her so much worse off than she was previously. By contrast, a man like Adam Jones who argues that the gendercide of “battle-age” men should be acknowledged, bemoaned, and stopped may be accused of selling out on traditional male superiority without good cause. This is because the killing of “battle-age” males is a sign of respect for *males in a traditional honor society*: These men are treated as “dangerous” and therefore “worthy” enemies within an honor context.

So the response dictated by an honor code is: “A real ‘man’ should take defeat without whimpering! This Jones is crying like a woman!” This would be the comment of a traditional male who has difficulties understanding that Jones rejects honor codes altogether and claims the status of victims for men as much as for women within an opposing code, namely the human-rights code. Here Jones finds himself in a similar situation to the westernized Egyptian lawyer in Cairo, who at first laughs when being informed that he is the next male on the list of blood feud in his village. He stops laughing after the first attempt to kill him. To be more explicit, it is slightly shocking for a man who demonstrates his thorough commitment to the principle of equality in a human-rights code to experience the emotional force of residual honor-bound thinking among colleagues.

As mentioned, it is comparatively easy for women to become feminists, because they are rising from a lowly position to the level of equality. Not surprisingly, it is much more difficult for a man to “descend” from a position of superiority to the level of equality. His move may be interpreted, within an honor context, as an attempt to humiliate malehood altogether. And women may misunderstand his move as the shrewd attempt of a male to weep about victimization in order to hide his factual domination.

Now the first question posed in this chapter can be revisited in conclusion. Why is the concept of gendercide interesting? My answer is that gendercide—especially as emphasized by Jones, namely the selective killings of males—is a concept that is only likely to emerge when the human-rights revolution has been accepted and understood by a sufficiently large number
of people. Or, put the other way around, its arrival marks a certain advance of human rights—namely, a change in the self-image of people, in this case especially Western scholars. It is a self-image that has for a long time remained relatively untouched, and perhaps did not expect to ever come in conflict with human rights.

The concept of maleness that Jones addresses may not have been scrutinized sufficiently in the light of human rights. Its first advocates, those who have already understood its fuller implications, have a heavy task of explaining to do. Jones is such an advocate. He has raised the cry “But don’t you see!” and has been met with silence or hostility. But his advocacy is, perhaps, more important than many a feminist’s endeavor.

Notes

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2. Margalit defines humiliation as the “rejection of persons of the Family of Man,”


4. Jones defines gender in Chapter 10 of this volume as “a continuum of biologically given and culturally constructed traits and attributes and socially constructed gender.” He defends this approach against criticism that accuses his gendercide definition of not distinguishing clearly enough between gender and sex.

5. The description of the research, issued by the public affairs office of the University of Southampton in August 1996, can be found at www.soton.ac.uk/~pubaffrs/1996/suicide.htm.


7. The title of the project indicates that three groups had to be interviewed, namely both conflict parties in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, and representatives of third intervening parties. These three groups stand in a relationship that in its minimum version is triangular. In cases of more than two opponents, as is true in most conflicts, it acquires more than three corners.

Both in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi representatives of the “opponents” and the “third party” were interviewed. Those who have not yet been interviewed are the masterminds of genocide in Rwanda, those who planned the genocide. Many are said to be in hiding in Kenya and other parts of Africa, in Brussels and other parts of Europe, or in the States and Canada. Some are in the prisons in Rwanda and in Arusha, Tanzania. The following categories of people were interviewed:
Survivors of genocide, that is, people belonging to the group targeted for genocide. In Somalia this was the Issaq tribe, in Rwanda the Tutsi, in Burundi also the Hutu. The group of survivors consists of two parts, namely those who survived because they were not in the country when the genocide happened—some of them returned after the genocide—and those who survived the ongoing onslaught inside the country.

Freedom fighters (only men). In Somalia these were the SNM (Somali National Movement) fighters who fought the troops sent by the central government in Mogadishu; in Rwanda these were the former Tutsi refugees who formed an army, the RFP (Rwandese Patriotic Front), and attacked Rwanda from the north in order to oust the Hutu government that carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; in Burundi these were also Hutu rebels.

Some of the many Somali war lords who have their retreat in Kenya, interviewed there.

Politicians, among them people in power before the genocide whom survivors secretly suspected of having been collaborators or at least silent supporters of perpetrators.

Somali and Rwandan/Burundian academicians, who study the situation of their countries.

Representatives of national nongovernmental organizations who work locally with development, peace, and reconciliation.

Third parties, namely representatives of UN organizations and international nongovernmental organizations who work with emergency relief, long-term development, peace, and reconciliation.

Egyptian diplomats in the foreign ministry who deal with Somalia; Egypt is a heavyweight in the OAU.

African psychiatrists in Kenya who deal with trauma and forensic psychiatry. In Kenya many nationals from Somalia and also Rwanda/Burundi have sought refuge, not only in refugee camps, but also on the basis of private arrangements.

8. From 1980 to 1984, I worked as a clinical psychologist in collaboration with the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Hamburg, employing Carl Rogers’s nondereictive methods. I also led sessions with groups of women with oral problems, for example anorexia nervosa and obesity, at the university’s Institute of Psychology. From 1984 to 1987, I was a psychological counselor at the American University of Cairo. My clients included students of all nations and teaching staff, and their languages ranged from English through French, German, and Norwegian to Egyptian Arabic. Most of the clients were young Egyptian students who had problems either with their parents or with their studies. These cases gave me strong insights into Egyptian culture as it related to gender issues.
Between 1987 and 1991, I had a private psychological practice in Cairo, in collaboration with the German embassy physician. Clients came from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. They were Egyptians (some Western-oriented, others more traditional) and non-Egyptians of all nations, including members of Western embassies, institutes, and schools; managers of Western companies; partners in mixed marriages and their children. Many Western women are married to Egyptian husbands, and together with their children they embody a meeting point between cultures, especially cultural views on gender. Also, my doctoral thesis in medical psychology addressed related questions, comparing the definitions of quality of life in Egypt and Germany.¹ See Evelin Gerda Lindner, Lebensqualität im Ägyptisch-Deutschen Vergleich. Eine Interkulturelle Untersuchung an Drei Berufsgruppen (Ärzte, Journalisten, Künstler) (Hamburg: University of Hamburg, 1994). My cross-cultural work as a clinical psychologist, counselor, and researcher in social psychology gave me insights into the intense conflicts engendered by the transition from traditional honor codes to the modern human-rights code, especially with respect to the way male and female roles and relationships are defined.


11. Mention should also be made of Avishai Margalit’s much-discussed argument that the distinguishing characteristic of a “decent society” is that its institutions “do not humiliate people” (Margalit, The Decent Society, p. 1). Margalit’s work sparked a debate reflected in the special issue of Social Research (64:1 [1997]) devoted to a consideration of his approach to the “decent society.” See, for example, the articles by Lukes, Quinton, Ripstein, and Schick, all of which take up the theme of humiliation. The present chapter also draws upon the conceptualization of long-term social processes advanced by Norbert Elias in his explorations of the “civilizing process” (see Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, 2 vols. [Oxford: Blackwell, 1994]), especially as revised by Dennis Smith in his work on the “humiliation process” (see Dennis Smith, “Organisations and Humiliation: Looking beyond Elias,” Organization. 8: 3 [2001], pp. 537–60).


13. Lindner, “What Every Negotiator Ought to Know,” p. 12. To put it another way,


16. Mohamad Mahathir, the Malaysian prime minister, is one of the advocates of this view.


25. I owe this reference to Adam Jones. See www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,1943666,00.html.