How the Human Rights Ideal of Equal Dignity Separates Humiliation from Shame

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Abstract

Usually, science, at least until recently, has been dominated by Western scholars. Therefore, much research is situated in Western cultural contexts. A Western scholar typically begins research within his or her own cultural setting and then makes some allowances for historic and cultural variations. In the case of research on emotions, the focus is usually on affect, feeling, emotion, script, character and personality, while larger cultural contexts and an analysis of historic periods in human history are less emphasized. Dialogue and bridge-building with other academic fields and other cultural realms are not easy to achieve even in today’s increasingly connected world.

The author of this article has lived as a global citizen for more than thirty years (due to being born into a displaced family) and has thus acquired an understanding not just for one or two cultural realms, but for many. The result is that she paints a broad picture that includes historic and transcultural dimensions. In this article the usual approach is inverted: Larger cultural contexts as they were shaped throughout human history are used as a lens to understand emotions, with particular emphasis, in this article, on humiliation and shame. This is not to deny the importance of research on affect, feeling, emotion, script, character and personality, but to expand it.

Subsequent to the conclusion of the doctoral dissertation on humiliation in 2001, the author has expanded her studies, among others, in Europe, South East Asia, and the United States. She is currently building a theory of humiliation that is transcultural and transdisciplinary, entailing elements from anthropology, history, social philosophy, social psychology, sociology, and political science.

The central point of this article is that shame and humiliation are not a-historic emotional processes, but historical-cultural-social-emotional constructs that change over time. Humiliation began to separate out from the humility-shame-humiliation continuum around three hundred years ago, and there are two mutually excluding concepts of humiliation in use today around the world, one that is old, and one that is new.
Introduction

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As mentioned above, the point is not to put one approach against another, but to expand them and strive for more comprehensiveness. The approach of this article fits into the orientation of today’s new cohort of emotion researchers who employ a multi-layered approach that conceptualizes elaborated emotions as comprehensive packages of meanings, behaviors, social practices, and norms that crystallize around primordial emotions.¹

In Evelin Gerda Lindner (2001e), I deconstruct the concept of humiliation into seven layers including a) a core that expresses the universal idea of “putting down,” b) a middle layer that contains two opposed orientations towards “putting down,” treating it as, respectively, legitimate and routine, or illegitimate and traumatizing, and c) a periphery whose distinctive layers include one pertaining to cultural differences between groups and another four peripheral layers that relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experience of humiliation.

The article is organized as follows: First, a brief introductory historical overview is given, which is then expanded upon in the second section that is entitled “The historic transition of human history and its relevance for shame and humiliation.” Thereafter a

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brief overview over research done by other scholars is given, before rounding up this paper with concluding remarks.

**Brief historical overview**

Homo Sapiens apparently has populated planet Earth starting from Africa, first colonizing Africa and then the rest of the world (except for the Americas, which came much later). The parent of humankind (Last Common Ancestor, LCA) was probably born in Africa 100,000 - 40,000 years ago. Population geneticists believe that the ancestral human population was very small – a mere two thousand breeding individuals.

For the first ninety percent of human history, humans populated the planet, or at least its easily reachable areas, always wandering off to the next valley of untouched abundance, living in small bands of approximately two hundred hunter-gatherers who enjoyed remarkably high qualities of life. Then, about ten thousand years ago, a deep shift occurred. The climate changed, this was one reason. However, planet Earth’s surface is not limitless, and humankind also increasingly met what anthropologists call *circumscription* – the next valley was no longer untouched but already populated by other humans. One had to make do with the land under ones feet. Human kind’s response was *intensification*, or agriculture, which, until very recently, dominated almost everywhere on the planet. No longer was the pie of resources ever expandable by merely wandering off. The overall frame of the human condition transmuted from a rather benign win-win to something much more malign, namely a win-lose frame – see William Ury (1999).

During the past ten thousand years, humankind was held in the brutal stranglehold of this win-lose logic and its consequence, namely what political science calls the *security dilemma*. *International relations theory* uses this term to describe how arms races and war were almost inevitable in this atmosphere of fear of attack from outside one’s community – Barry Posen (1993), and Russell Hardin (1995) discuss its emotional aspects.

The security dilemma can be stronger or weaker for different communities, depending on many factors; however, its essence is always that it is built on fear and that it fosters fear – “it is either you or me, only one can own this land.” As a result, all other emotions were instrumentalized and commodified in the service of this fear, in the service of surviving the security dilemma. Ruling elites coerced underlings into extending love and hatred “spontaneously” to the “correct” objects: One had to love ones ingroup and hate ones outgroups, one had to love ones designated superiors, be faithful and loyal to them or be chastised, and lack of love for God was punished by penalties like inquisition. Love was regarded as a feeling, a feeling opposite to hatred, both to be felt qua duty.

“Routine humiliation” was the core tool of ranked honor systems, however, without being labeled as humiliation in its contemporary sense. In the context of ranked honor, being shown down to one’s due lowly place was regarded as “honorable lesson.” The pain of such lessons was regarded as beneficial and no violation at all – it is only in the world of human rights that the act of degrading people transforms into a violation.

The security dilemma is a tragic dilemma, and it tragically mutilated human minds and hearts. As a result, a mutilated concept of emotions emerged, which still holds sway in many walks of human life around the world today.

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Then, a couple of hundred years ago, another transition began, as deep as the transition from hunting-gathering to agriculture ten thousand years ago. Humankind, at present, finds itself in the middle of this second profound historic transition. A progressively more interdependent world, increasingly using knowledge and not land as a resource for livelihood, is today pushing towards one single global village. This undermines the fault lines that formerly pitted the many hierarchically organized local villages against each other in reciprocal fear and hostility. In tact with knowledge as resource, replacing the old win-lose frame with a win-win frame, combined with increasing global connectedness, the security dilemma weakens. This is oxygen for an ideal that has been part of many religions and philosophies around the world throughout history but had little space to flourish so far, namely the ideal that all human are equal in dignity, an ideal that also represents the core of the human rights message. Principles such as unity in diversity receive a chance to gain visibility – away from old divided uniformities (internally uniform local villages being divided among each other).

In times of transition, typically, the situation is blurred. The present transition from the traditional paradigm of ranked honor to a novel paradigm of equal dignity is no exception. It plays out in an incoherent and messy one-step-forward-and-two-steps-back fashion. The old and the new mix, overlap, cancel each other out, confront each other, hinder each other. Therefore, when we speak of human-rights based societies in this paper, we do so in the spirit of a Weberian ideal-type approach – see for details Lewis A. Coser (1977). Perhaps we will see truly human rights based societies in one or two hundred years – so far, we see only seeds – however, these seeds merit our attention nonetheless, since they show important trends.

The significant trend, for this article, is that a globally connected knowledge society opens space for affect, feelings, emotions, and scripts to be liberated from being instrumentalized in the service of the security dilemma. It opens space, for example, for Martin Buber (1944) and his concept of loving I-Thou relationships characterized by mutual respect for equal dignity – no longer love and hatred as commodified tools to survive the security dilemma. It also opens space for recovering the prosocial aspects of shame in fundamentally new ways, “prosocial” no longer being equated with docile subservience of underlings, but with relationships of mutuality between equals.

And – and this is the main point of this article – it separates humiliation from shame in crucial ways. Indeed, humiliation, humility, shame, and guilt are related concepts. Until about 250 years ago, humbling, shaming, and humiliating were regarded as similar, as legitimate, and most often as prosocial. Humiliation was not seen as antisocial. For millennia, until very recently, people around the world believed that it was normal and morally correct to have masters and underlings, and that masters were entitled to be treated as higher beings and underlings deserved to be shown “where they belonged.”

However, the transition that began a few hundred years ago has introduced a deep cleavage into this continuum. In the English language, the verb to humiliate differentiated from the verb to humble in 1757. William Ian Miller (1993) informs us that “the earliest recorded use of to humiliate, meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone, does not occur until 1757” (Miller, 1993, p. 175, italics in original). In other words, around three hundred to two hundred fifty years ago, humiliation began to acquire something new, the taste of violation.
The transformation of the meaning of “to humiliate” in the English language, occurred just prior to the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776), the French Revolution (August 4, 1789), the emergence of the individuated self, and in the midst of a growing awareness that planet Earth is the home of One humankind. These were also the times when the canonization of human rights ideals began.

In other words, around three hundred years ago, humiliation began to transmute into a case of undue, illegitimate, and coercive violation that ought not be perpetrated. What is important to note is that as soon as humiliation is defined as coercive violation, feeling humiliation does no longer by definition entail feeling shame. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1994) was humiliated during his twenty seven years in jail, he indeed felt humiliated, however, he was not ashamed. The secret of his resistance was precisely that he kept up his dignified self-respect and sense of worth. It would have been misplaced to call upon him to “own his shame.” Indeed, he would have most probably have felt ashamed if he had allowed humiliation to diminish his sense of dignity and introduce shame (Nelson Mandela’s constructive strategies are treated as an idealized model here).

A contemporary definition of humiliation is a definition that is based on the human rights ideal of equal dignity for all. The first paragraph of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, reads: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” In this context, humiliation is the enforced lowering of any person or group that damages their equality in dignity. To humiliate is to transgress the rightful expectations of every human being and of all humanity that basic human rights will be respected.

I call the first ninety percent of human history the era of pristine pride. The past ten thousand years, I label as the era of ranked honor. The human rights vision for the future is the era of equal dignity, which, however, is not yet in sight. At the current historic point in time, humankind lives a transitional phase, struggling at the cusp of the tipping point between the traditional order of ranked honor and an envisaged future of equal dignity for all.

To conclude, today, humankind is faced with two normative and cultural universes, the traditional world of ranked honor and the new era of equal dignity, one that carries humiliation as legitimate tool at its core, in the form of honor-humiliation, and the other one that outlaws it as illegitimate dignity-humiliation. These two irreconcilable normative and cultural frameworks stand at the two outer poles of today’s transition. The two poles are diametrically opposed; it is not a gradual transition but a qualitative leap, like changing from right-hand driving to left-hand driving. Ranking people and unranking them cannot coexist, as much as right-hand driving and left-hand driving cannot coexist. Therefore, terms such as conflict resolution, reconciliation, harmony, peace, love, or humility, shame, and humiliation are treacherous. They all entail interpretations at their heart which stem from these incompatible worlds. Conflict resolution, reconciliation, harmony, peace, love, or humility, shame, and humiliation can be understood in the frame of the docile subservience of underlings, or of successful calibration of mutuality between equals. It is therefore that we need to qualify these terms further when we use them. The old concepts, from the point of view of human rights, have a humiliating effect, while the new definitions liberate. Forcing slaves into subservient humility, asking them to feel
ashamed of their lowliness, requesting them to interpret their painful situation as “prosocial,” from today’s perspective, is humiliating. A slave deserves to be liberated, empowered, and respected as equal in dignity.

Today, human rights advocates around the world aim to invite formerly higher and lower beings to meet in the middle, at the level of equal dignity. In the course of this large-scale transformation that is taking place at the current point in historic time, what is unmasked is to what extent the ranking of people’s worthiness had a mutilating effect. Relegating fellow humans to the category of tools or cogwheels, mutilates them. By being demoted to the level of tools, living beings are robbed of the fullness of their capacities. This was not an overly apparent problem as long as humans lived on land as their main resource. An agrarian world does not stop functioning when lords give obedient underlings orders. Underlings toiling in the fields did not have to enjoy their work to fulfill their roles. However, this changes in a modern knowledge society that depends on creativity. A cogwheel, a human being that is reduced to being a tool, cannot be very creative. The ever growing need for creativity at the current point in historic time exposes the problem of mutilation that is part and parcel of ranking humans as higher and lesser beings.

The transition to human rights opens space to heal the wounds of ten thousand years of mutilation. Shame can regain its salutogenic function (Webb, 2005), while legitimate honor-humiliation transmutes into illegitimate dignity-humiliation.

The historic transition of human history and its relevance for shame and humiliation

Prior to ten thousand years ago, as long as Homo Sapiens did not yet face circumscription, a rather benign win-win frame reigned. Dissatisfied members of a community still had the option, in principle, to wander off and find untouched land (where no other humans lived) with abundant resources. Even though it would be misguided to blindly idealize this period in human history, it indeed was a time of comparably egalitarian societal structures and high quality of life.³

Archaeologists inform us that there is no evidence of crushed skulls, no signs of organized violence and war. Jonathan Haas (1998) states that the Hobbesian view of humans in a constant state of “Warre” is simply not supported by the archaeological record. The available archaeological record allows for the educated hunch that organized killing started later, and that human nature does not force humans unavoidably into destructive Hobbesian competition. On the contrary, older evolutionary roots seem to have favored relationships and cooperation – the very cooperation that is needed in the interdependent world of the 21st century, the very reciprocal altruism that merits being included into today’s definitions of social well-being.

Just in the past years, research has uncovered to what extent Homo Sapiens is a social animal that thrives on connection and cooperation rather than isolation and confrontation – see, for example, Amy Banks & Judith V. Jordan (2007) and their article “The Human Brain: Hardwired for Connections.”⁴ Having friends (rather than money) is at the core of happiness. Rediscovering the truth of human nature, as it evolved during the first ninety percent of its history, has catapulted positive psychology into the limelight.⁵

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The issue of shame is part of this trend. Today, scholars such as Thomas J. Scheff re-discover what has evolved in the comparably benign context of the first ninety percent of human history, namely shame as part of “a whole universe of cognates for shame, such as those that are used to name reactions to rejection or feelings of failure or inadequacy. What unites all these cognates is that they involve the feeling of a threat to the social bond” (Scheff, personal email message December 7, 2006)

Clearly some kind of hierarchy might have existed among hunter-gatherers prior to ten thousand years ago, but if, then it most probably was extremely mild, and qualitatively different to the kind of hierarchy that evolved later, and also qualitatively different from the social and societal structures of contemporary non-sedentary people. Following Ury, we cannot compare today’s non-sedentary people with people prior to ten thousand years ago and simply equate them. As mentioned above, at the moment humankind’s “populating campaign” of the planet reached the planet’s limits, a profound shift occurred. Everything changed fundamentally, from win-win to win-lose. As long as early Homo sapiens had reason to believe that untouched resources were infinitely available by merely wandering off to the next valley, the entire frame of the situation did not lend itself to the building of deep hierarchies. This was spurred only when agriculture, a win-lose frame, and the security dilemma, forced humankind into hierarchy. We find a clear qualitative difference here, not just a continuum from less to more hierarchy.

Ury’s argument entails a suggestion that alternative explanations for what may be at the root of the human condition, for example, primate behavior, are secondary to more basic dynamics. Primate behavior is very varied; both cooperative and confrontational behaviors are expressed by primates. The same is valid for territorial sense. It is likely that the large-scale shift from a win-win frame for the human condition to a win-lose frame, in its wake, favored and fostered confrontation and a sense of borders. Agriculture, a win-lose frame, and the security dilemma, forced territorial sense and confrontational behavior to the fore, both of which had little place prior to circumscription.

As mentioned above, the sense of cooperation seems to be more hard-wired than the urge for confrontation, perhaps due to the fact that agriculture lasted only for the last ten percent of human history, while hunting-gathering lasted for the first and formative ninety percent. The last ten percent of history, a period during which the security dilemma forced humankind into confrontation, make us believe that “human nature” is aggressively predatory. However, this seems to be a myth. Killing others is not easy; it does not come “natural” for humans. Not without reason are soldiers trained not to look their victims into their eyes, lest this stops them from killing, and the adolescents used as militia forces all over the world are typically being drugged. Incidentally, this is also why feelings of humiliation have the potential to grow so strong that they can have an addictive drug effect, which in turn, overrides psychological barriers that otherwise would hinder mayhem.
The first large-scale transition of ten thousand years ago

During the past ten thousand years, when land had become the resource of survival, a malign win-lose frame forced humankind into the security dilemma. Fear of attack became the inescapable all-defining emotion, Hobbesian fear of surprise attacks from outside one’s nation’s borders. In response, ranked honor emerged as the structuring principle for societies. Stereotyped fear of outgroups (for example, of other nations) permeated ingroups. Constant preparations for war drained societal resources. Everybody had to be on alert, continuously, led by their leaderships and governmental organs. For millennia, this fear became manifest in societal, social and cultural institutions, from “Ministries of War” or “Defense” to identity constructs such as patriotism, including gender division – see Joshua S. Goldstein (2001), and how he links war and gender division.

The security dilemma has been widely described by political scientists in international relations theory. The term “security dilemma” itself was coined by John H. Herz (1950), to explain why states that have no intention to harm one another may still end up in competition and war. Its very essence is one of tragedy. The security dilemma forces bloody competition to emerge out of mutual distrust, even as nobody is interested in going to war in the first place. The threat of preemption with preemption is the ultimate and seemingly inevitable outcome of the traditional security dilemma.

Since no empty land was easily accessible anymore subsequent to about ten thousand years ago, dissatisfied underlings usually did not have the option of merely wandering off (except for very short historic periods, when the “new world” received an influx of people, first from what today is Russia and, in more recent history, subsequent to Columbus’s journeys). The choice left to the majority of people was to either acquiesce to their masters’ domination, or attempt to replace their masters. Dissatisfied masters, on their part, had the option to force their underlings into further submission, and, in addition, conquer neighboring groups.

In this way civilizations emerged in Mesopotamia, along the Nile, and in many other places. In his book Early Civilizations, Bruce G. Trigger (1993) reminds us that “because of the pervasiveness of inequality, no one who lived in the early civilizations questioned the normalcy of this condition. If egalitarianism was known, it was as a feature of some of the despised, barbarian societies that existed beyond the borders of the ‘civilized’ world” (Bruce G. Trigger, 1993, p. 52). During long stretches of human history that inequality – the vertical ranking of human worth – was much more than a reluctantly tolerated evil; it was hailed as the very core of civilization. Equality was “barbaric.”

In The Chalice and the Blade: Our History, Our Future, Riane Eisler (1987) explains in great detail how otherwise widely divergent societies, from the Japan of the Samurai to the Aztecs of Meso America, were characterized by hierarchies of domination and a rigidly male-dominant “strong-man” rule, both in the family and state. Hierarchies of domination were maintained by a high degree of institutionalized or socially accepted violence, ranging from wife and child beating within the family to aggressive warfare on the larger tribal or national level.

In the context of the security dilemma, which brought to the fore hierarchies of domination and a rigidly male-dominant “strong-man” rule, the human desire for what Scheff calls a secure social bond, or what Linda Hartling calls a secure connection was
instrumentalized to build hierarchical societies of ranked honor. (Linda Hartling writes in a personal message on July 22, 2007, “…the term ‘social bond’ is not my favorite term. Why not call it ‘relationship’ or ‘connection,’ rather than ‘bond’? I always think of ‘bondage’ when I hear the word ‘bond.’”) Masters engaged in the conquest of neighbors and in the domination of their underlings by way of reinforcing their subjugation, on certain occasions relegating them further down, or excluding them entirely by exiling to the peripheries of their empires or killing them. Underlings, who succeeded in replacing their masters, adopted their ways.

The “art” of domination

In the course of the past ten thousand years, the “art” of domination became ever more refined. First, it was mere brute force that was used, however, increasingly the human desire for connection and the need to belong, together with emotions such as love, hatred and shame, were instrumentalized in ways that made domination “easier,” and the actual application of brute force less necessary.

In order to keep underlings subservient and reinforce their subjugation, in order to maintain their status as tools in the hands of their masters and keep them from disobeying, masters routinely kept underlings in fear of losing their lives and frustrated the underlings’ desire for a secure bond. Underlings were coerced into living in ever ongoing fear, fear to lose their lives and their bonds. Fear was the “fuel” masters used to keep their underlings docile, and therefore masters attempted to always keep it looming, so as to have it handy when needed. Religion and fear of God were used to legitimize this strategy with divine authorization.

One way for masters to instill fear was to threaten underlings with violence and terror, from torture to killing, however, often continuous humbling, shaming, and humiliating (honor-humiliation, the form of humiliation that is seen as legitimate) was “sufficient,” particularly when underlings had learned to feel ashamed at failing their master’s expectations. In a system of domination/submission, the bond is most often not the bond from one human being to another, but the bond between the master’s orders and the underling’s self-effacing acquiescence to be but a tool.

Learning the underling’s version of shame was part of what Norbert Elias (1994) describes in his seminal book *The Civilizing Process.* Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and historians such as Marc Bloch developed similar lines of reasoning. To become useful as underlings, it was preferable that they learned to feel ashamed at even contemplating disobedience. Underlings were kept from surpassing their role as tools in the hands of their masters with shame marking the limits. Haughty underlings needed brute force to be kept docile, shame-prone underlings not, they were much easier manipulated into humility, in short, “civilized.”

Elias explains how the process of subjugation had a “civilizing” effect on rough and haughty knights, lords, and commoners. He studied the French court and how feudal lords were seduced into bowing to the absolute ruler. Unruly, proud local warlords were “civilized” by being taught the lessons of shame and “social anxiety.” The *civilized habitus* that Elias describes could also be called the “successfully humiliated habitus” – see Dennis Smith (2001). The French court, the Indian caste system, the Chinese system
of kowtowing, and the Japanese bow all express and reinforce strong hierarchies, all constructed around practices of ritual humbling.

I am writing this text in Japan, a country of unparalleled politeness, or, more precisely, of modesty in relation to self, and consideration towards others, with a strong element of vertical respect, as my Japanese friends explain to me. I cannot help seeing an imaginary sword hovering above their heads, a sword instilling perpetual fear, the sword of the Samurai, who had the right to kill any peasant who offended them. Even though the Shogunate ended in 1868, it still permeates Japanese souls. Their politeness is imbued with fear of death.

The majority indeed had to fear for their lives, only the small minority of the ruling elite not. And these differences are still visible today. Two of my Japanese friends made me particularly aware of this. Both are doctoral students, both in their early thirties, one the son of a former Samurai family, the other the son of a former farming family. The former Samurai family’s son carries his head high, both physically, and mentally; he thinks rather independently. The former farming family’s son has a tendency to bow and acquiesce. The difference is astounding. They themselves did not notice it until I discussed it with them. Once I asked them: “Will you get married?” The Samurai said, “Yes!” The farmer said nothing more but, “My parents expect me to.” Or, I asked: “What is your view on the vision of a world with equal dignity for all?” The Samurai said: “Yes, this is what we need!” The farmer said: “I like hierarchy, and I like to be an underling. Underlings have a quiet life and do not have to carry too much responsibility.” This happened in 2006, more than one hundred years after the end of feudalism.

Johan Galtung (1996) forged the notion of penetration, or “implanting the topdog inside the underdog” (p. 199), illustrating the fact that acceptance of subjugation may become a culture of its own. Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Eds.) (1988) use the term subaltern. Also the colonization of the lifeworld, a term coined by Jürgen Habermas (1987), may lend itself to describing this “seduction to accept domination.” More recently, Patricia Hill Collins (2000), describes controlling images as being imposed by a dominant culture, images that are voluntarily or involuntarily accepted by thus disempowered subordinate groups. Theodor W. Adorno et al. (1950) studied the authoritarian personality, and how easily people slide into subservience and follow superiors. Alice Miller (1983) studied childrearing methods, and now they facilitated the rise of Hitler’s Nazism. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson (1999) describe the underlying pedagogical framework that produces obedient inferiors with what they call the Strict Father model, as opposed to the Nurturant Parent model. Concepts such as méconnaissance (misrecognition) and naturalization are used, among others, by Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault.

While shame between equals is a signal that a bond of mutuality is threatened, shame between unequals signals that a bond of domination/submission is threatened. In a system of domination/submission, shame is equal to dishonor, to losing rank, or even life, thus a truly terrifying signal. During the past ten thousand years, underlings were coerced into continuous humility, into a permanent state of shame, and fear of more shame and dishonor, both being defined as lack of deference or usefulness to masters. Whoever forfeited their usefulness as tool descended in rank, was dishonored, and not seldom punished by torture and death.
And many underlings learned the lesson so well that they ended their own lives when they brought shame upon themselves and their folks (Schmach und Schande, in German). Many Samurai have taken their own lives—and this was even ritualized—when they failed to defend their masters, or fell into dishonor in any other way, even if only by accident. And wherever female chastity was made to symbolize male honor, many a raped girl has “voluntarily” committed suicide, even though she was the victim of aggression and not the perpetrator.

As noted earlier, turning people into tools has deeply mutilating effects, at macro and micro levels, to the point of losing and taking life. The “art of domination” turned this mutilating effect from involuntary mutilation to voluntary mutilation; it victimized its victims doubly by co-opting them into becoming co-perpetrators. In Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney (2002) introduces the reader into the eerie way in which young and brilliant Japanese students were coaxed into dying as suicide bombers in World War II (this is the term we would use today; their operations, however, were termed tokkotai operations in Japan, and in the West they became known as kamikaze operations). Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney was motivated to write her book because she was deeply moved by the diaries of these young students. These diaries show how these highly educated young men, doomed to die, were torn. Most did not want to die. Ohnuki-Tierney analyses how they were “persuaded” to “volunteer” by ways of méconnaissance, which, one could say, is an even subtler method to form obedient underlings than teaching them shame.

What Ohnuki-Tierney explains, in detail, is how, among others, the aesthetics of Japan’s cherry blossom symbolism were used—or, more precisely, abused. Cherry blossom symbolism originally signified life and birth—rather than death. Aestheticization was used to make ugly cultural practices appear visually and conceptually beautiful. Slowly, in a step by step fashion, the more militaristic the country became, the cherry blossom symbolism was circumspectly transformed to aestheticize death. Another notion that was used to aestheticize deaths on the battlefield was the image of “a shattering crystal ball” (gyokusai). The term originated in The Chronicle of Beiqi, a chronicle completed in 636 during the Tang dynasty in China. The term refers to the beautiful way in which a crystal ball shatters into hundreds of pieces. The Japanese military government adopted the term to encourage mass suicide when faced with a hopeless situation. The expression began to appear as early as 1891 in a school song that declared that Japanese soldiers would fight until they died like a shattering crystal ball, irrespective of how many enemies there were. The most dramatic use of this term of aestheticization occurred when the Japanese military headquarters decided to abandon their men on an island, which was too heavily surrounded by American ships for them to be able to send in support. Except for twenty-nine who were captures, 2,638 died or committed suicide (there were 550 American casualties).

Clearly, even today, intricate methods are used to create obedient underlings in the hands of masters. Ishmael Beah (2007), a former child soldier, wrote an autobiography explaining his ordeal, A Long Way Gone. In Sierra Leone’s vicious ten year civil war, both government and rebel forces coerced children into fighting. Drugged with a mixture of cocaine and gunpowder Ishmael found himself capable of being a truly terrible killer. He says the numbers he killed were too many to count.

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The “fuel” to keep obedience going, in the case of child soldiers, is the child’s vulnerability, the child’s need to belong, and the child’s openness to be manipulated so as not to lose their commanders’ favor. Ishmael was subsequently rescued, however, initially was enraged to be taken away from his “family” of commanders and co-killers.

How gender difference was ranked

As alluded to earlier, the security dilemma, the fear of being attacked, entails a push toward a division of gender roles. A community in the grip of the security dilemma had little choice but to send primarily men into death and not women. It is more conducive to survival of groups to let males “do the early dying”; they are “redundant” at an earlier age, seen from the point of population politics. And as soon as a community decided to use males for defense, male dominance was almost inevitable. The security dilemma creates continuous fear of surprise attacks and affected communities have no choice but to be continuously prepared for emergency. Yet, emergency trumps maintenance. Even our bodies follow this protocol. When we are in danger, adrenaline pours into the blood stream and pushes the maintenance tasks of the body into the background. The security dilemma represented a similar push, a push to make males take the role of adrenalin and take precedence over women and their role as maintainers.

Related to women not being actors, but “substrate” for male honor, is that women typically were “spared from the spear,”10 and not to be killed or molested in war. Only battle-aged men were “worthy” enemies, worthy to defend humiliated male honor with the sword, and worthy of being killed in honorable battles or duels. Women were not “worthy” of being killed in such ways or invoke humiliation. There was no “female honor” similar to “male honor,” except that women were expected to accept lowliness and subjugation with deference and display chastity.

Not least the practice of honor killings is embedded into this context. I worked as a clinical psychologist and counselor in Cairo, Egypt from 1984 to 1991, and was confronted with cases of honor killing in certain traditional segments of society (not all segments; Egyptian society entails very diverse communities, including fervent human rights advocates). In honor societies, typically, men represent the “head” of the “body” of the family, tribe, or village – men are the ones entitled to thinking, strategizing, leading, steering, showing the direction, and enjoying privileges in return. Women represent the “limbs” of the “body.” Women’s worth lies primarily in embodying the proof that their men could protect them against hostile male intruders – for example by displaying an intact hymen. Women are not regarded as actors, but as “substrate” and were supposed to serve as “valuable gifts” to be given in marriage to other men, and to be killed when they were “rotten.” Indeed, the explanation that I received for why the raped girl had to be killed was that a raped daughter represents “a rotten part of the body” that has to be “cut out.”

During my fieldwork in Somalia in 1998, a gynecologist lamented to me that values were falling apart in today’s Somalia; no longer would mothers routinely check the vaginas of their daughters when they came home.

Victoria C. Fontan carried out fieldwork in Iraq and gave a report at the Second Annual Meeting of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (12th - 13th September
How the Human Rights Ideal Separates Humiliation from Shame

2003, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme de l'Homme, Paris, http://www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/annualmeeting02.php), She explained that honor in Iraq can be described with three words: sharaf, ithiram and ird.11

1) Sharaf refers to the nobility or high rank obtained at birth (sharaf can also be acquired through charitable activities).

2) Ithiram signifies honor derived from the power of coercion and violence (an example is the Saddam regime). Victoria C. Fontan (2004) explains that ithiram “refers to the respect emanating from someone’s monopoly of physical force, such as the police or the army under Saddam. The ownership of a weapon can also account for an expression of ithiram” (Fontan 2004, p. 5).

3) Ird refers to the preservation of a women’s shame, to honor associated with the preservation of a woman’s purity. In Iraq, the image of the woman is as someone who cannot control herself. If she is not controlled from outside, she will impose shame on the whole family. If a woman shows her hair or erogenous zones, this will be perceived as an invitation to a sexual act, and men will “attack.” As Sana'a Al-Khayyat (1990) explains, “[m]others, fathers, brothers and other adults controlling girls within the family all work towards the same end: to protect male honour within the family” (Al-Khayyat, 1990, p. 34). (The Baath party tried to change this view. It indicated that it will be the man’s responsibility to restrain himself in the presence of women who do not wear a covering.)

Serious drawbacks are connected with the traditional male/female division, with potentially mutilating and even live-threatening effects for all involved. There is a high price to pay. The body breaks down under conditions of constant emergency when essential maintenance is too-long neglected. Heart attacks – the typical emergency trouble shooter disease – result. Similarly, a world under the grip of the necessity of continuous male prowess is bound to live in constant danger of collapse. Such a setting is potentially malign, damaging the very human survival that the gender division supposedly is to protect.

Another unintended self-defeating side-effect is that as soon as men have more power, they are treated with subservience and sometimes even pampered like children. This entails the danger that they remain in a permanent state of child-like immaturity, which, in turn, makes them unfit to wield power responsibly – again, the entire project of survival is undermined. Indeed, wherever I go, be it Japan or Egypt, women tell me that they regard most men as perpetual children, even though they are the ones to wield power, and that women are well advised to adapt to that fact and make the best of it by shrewdly manipulating men, rather than resist. There is an Egyptian proverb saying that “the woman is the neck and the man the head,” and the explanation I received was that the woman is in control of the position of the “head” inside the home by turning his neck, meaning telling the husband what she wants him to represent outside.

On the other side, women being kept inside the house cannot make informed decisions either. They become irrelevant and cannot compensate for male immaturity. Lesley Downer (2000), in her book on the Geisha world in Japan, nicely explains this phenomenon, and how it is relevant even in contemporary Japan. One evening, she went out to visit the Geisha quarters with a friend, Kurota. She asked him where his wife was.
“At home, sleeping,” he replied. Downer describes her astonishment: “Here I was in the great modern city of Tokyo with two well-traveled cosmopolitan television producers. Yet, apart from the old geisha, I was the only women in the whole place. Kurota set out to describe the situation of his wife in more detail:

“She was a magazine editor until we got married. Then she said, ‘I can’t be bothered to work any more.’ That’s the way it is with Japanese wives. She stays home, has children and brings them up. Her world is very narrow the PTA (Parent Teachers Association) and the parents of our children’s friends; that’s about it. I go out and enjoy myself, hen get home late and wake her up and she gets angry. She says, ‘Why did you wake me up?’ and goes back to sleep. In the west, people go to the pub for a drink, then go home, get changed and go out with their wives. But we Japanese can’t do that, our homes are too far away” (Lesley Downer (2000), p. 303).

When we speak about the mutilating effect of ranked honor, not only communities in their entirety suffer and undermine their survival by their very efforts to protect it. Masters and underlings pay a high price as individuals as well. The tragedy of the security dilemma forces everybody into mutilation. Masters and underlings have to abandon the fullness of their capacities as human beings in order to function as dominators and inferiors. All have to avoid connecting with as fellow human beings and often have to mutilate their very humanity in the course of their “duties.” I remember a family whose daughter had been raped. The dilemma was heart-wrenching. Humiliated family honor called for her death, while deep bonds of mutual love called for saving her. However, this love had no legitimate place in a world of honor; it had to be “mutilated.” The designated “dominators” of the family, the father, uncles, and brothers of the girl, who were supposed to do the “operation” of freeing the family of their “rotten limb,” were heart-broken at the fact that they could not escape their duty. And the girl was crushed by being drawn between the wish to live, love and be loved, and her perceived “duty” to free her family from her shameful presence and thus remedy its humiliated honor.

Indeed, bonds of love across rank more often than not had to be maimed in honor settings, lest the couple was ready to die for their love. Lesley Downer (2000) explains how in traditional Japan love did not lead to marriage but often to death. She writes, “Often the only solution was death. In fact, to die together came to seem so hugely romantic that many couples yearned to express their love for each other in this way, like Romeo and Juliet. The great dramatist Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653-1724), often described as the Shakespeare of Japan, created a whole genre of kabuki plays about double suicide, of which the most famous was The Love Suicides at Sonezaki, inspired by a real-life incident in 1703” (Downer, 2000, p. 320).

Morton Deutsch (2002) points out the advantages of leaving the distorted selves of the past behind – dominators must withdraw from processes of domination and re-own and resolve their feelings of vulnerability, guilt, self-hatred, rage and terror, and undo the projection of these feelings onto the oppressed, while, so Morton Deutsch expounds, “psychologists, in their roles as psychotherapists, marriage counselors, organizational consultants, and educators have a role to play in demystifying the psychological processes involved in the dominators. So too… do the oppressed, by not accepting their
distorted roles in the distorted relationship of the oppressor and the oppressed” (Deutsch, 2002, pp. 35-36).

The second, presently unfolding large-scale historic transition

Two contemporary trends: Ingathering and human rights

At the current point in historic time, the rules of the past ten thousand years are on the move. The vision for the future that many share today is a global knowledge society with equal dignity and dignifying living conditions for every global citizen. Human rights indicate that societies ought to transform in a Mandela-like fashion so as to offer enabling living conditions to all citizens, so that they can enjoy equality in rights and dignity. This entails a call to regard all humankind as one single family of equals. Anthropologists call this coming-together of humankind the ingathering of the tribes of the Earth.12

Indeed, with the emergence of the reality and imagery of one single ingroup, of one family of humankind, ingroup/outgroup delineations become increasingly blurred and even irrelevant. In the face of the single emerging ingroup of an interdependent and intertwined global village, the reality and imagery of outgroups vanishes.13

Undeniably, the term global village is currently acquiring a life of its own, beyond McLuhan’s initial connotations. Citizens increasingly relate to each other across borders, states are losing their status as more or less isolated entities that constrain and define their citizens’ global relationships. For the first time since the origin of our species, humanity is in touch with itself” (Ury, 1999, p. XVII).

A global “supranational We-feeling” is in the making, and the “struggle for recognition” by individuals alongside that of states is emerging as a force at the system level – this is being discussed by scholars such as Alexander Wendt (2003a), p. 519 – see also Lars-Erik Cederman (2001), and the term epigenesis by Amitai Etzioni (1963). At times, indeed, Wendt’s stage three, World Society, sometimes feels nearby, a “Kantian culture” of collective security or “friendship,” giving an inkling of an imminent world state that benignly curbs Hobbesian anarchy (Wendt, p. 520, italics in original). The Politics of World Federation are discussed, for example, by Joseph Preston Baratta (2004). Various aspects of this trend have been described and analysed by many, among them by Manuel Castells (1996), and more recently, Thomas L. Friedman (2005).

The reach of morals is called the scope of justice. Peter T. Coleman (2000) expresses this as follows, “Individuals or groups within our moral boundaries are seen as deserving of the same fair, moral treatment as we deserve. Individuals or groups outside these boundaries are seen as undeserving of this same treatment” (Coleman, 2000, p. 118). Human rights could be conceptualized, at least partly, as “inside ethics,” or how groups typically organize their internal dealings, only that human rights no longer address one in-group among surrounding out-groups, but the one single ingroup that is left, all of humanity inhabiting one single global village. As soon as a sense of one single human family emerges, what could be called “inside ethics” expands to the entirety of the human family.

More so. Human rights ideals not only represent traditional “inside ethics” expanded onto all humanity, but also what I call the first continuous revolution in human history. What made globalization possible – technology that brings us closer together – makes
also a permanent uprising of underlings possible. In former times, revolutionaries, those coming up from below, when successful, typically replaced the master and preserved the hierarchical structures. Nowadays, a continuous push from below does not permit masters to settle in their privileged seats; this push calls for the dismantling – not only of the tyrant, or the master – but of the very hierarchical social and societal structures. Those coming-up-from-below are women, blacks, the poor, in other words, all those who formerly were assigned lowly places. Human rights bestow equal dignity on all and call for the global villagers to work for enabling environments for all, including men and women.

In other words, parallel to the ingathering of humankind, there is an increasing awareness of human rights ideals. Millions hope that human rights calls will soon represent more than empty rhetoric and will render equal dignity to all citizens in the one single interdependent global village that serves as humankind’s homeland.

Human rights delegitimize the traditional system of ranked honor that was accepted during the past ten thousand years as core characteristic of most of the world’s societies as long as they were caught in the security dilemma and pitted against each other. An increasingly connected global knowledge society opens space for unranking formerly hierarchical societies. Human rights express this new normative frame. They turn the lowliness of underlings into utterly illegitimate dignity – humiliation, or exclusion – humiliation (see Table 1).

With the advent of human rights ideals, the notion of humiliation changes its attachment point. It moves from the top to the bottom of pyramids of power, from the privileged to the disadvantaged. In honor environments, humiliation is usually evoked by elites; typically, male aristocrats were called upon to defend humiliated honor in duels, for example. In dignity contexts, in contrast, feelings of humiliation are encouraged to emerge in the downtrodden; those who formerly were expected to quietly bow in subservience.

In a true human rights framework, the downtrodden underling is given the right to feel humiliated (the beaten wife, the girl who wishes to decide on her life herself, etc., no longer her husband or father). The masters, on the other side, are called upon to humble themselves, and they are no longer given permission to resist this call by labeling it as humiliating. Elites who arrogate superiority lose their age-old right to cry “humiliation!” when they are asked to descend and humble themselves.

The human rights revolution could be described as an attempt to collapse the master-slave gradient to the line of equal dignity and humility. The practice of masters arrogating superiority and subjugating underlings is regarded as illicit and obscene, and human rights advocates invite both, masters and underlings, to join in shared humility at the line of equal dignity. Feelings of humiliation, felt by the downtrodden and those who identify with them, serve as the “fuel” for the human rights revolution.

It is important to note that equal dignity for all or the horizontal ranking of human worth and value is what is discussed here, not sameness as antidote to inequality, hierarchy, or stratification. The significant point of this discussion is not the absence or presence of hierarchy, inequality or stratification, but whether human worthiness is ranked or not. Functional hierarchies are still needed, and under conditions of equal dignity, difference and diversity can be celebrated. The human rights revolution calls for a new ranking of dealing with human value and worthiness. Primary is our shared
humanity; differences can only flourish when regarded as secondary, otherwise easily become destructive.

The horizontal line in Figure 1 is meant to represent the line of equal dignity and humility. This line does not signify that all human beings are equal, or should be equal, or ever were or will be equal, or identical, or all the same. This horizontal line is to represent a worldview that does not permit the hierarchical ranking of existing differences of human worth and value. Masters are invited to step down from arrogating more worthiness, and underlings are encouraged to rise up from humiliation, up from being humiliated down to lower value. Masters are humbled and underlings empowered.

The Historic Transition to Egalization

Figure 1: The historic transition to egalization
I coined the word egalization\textsuperscript{15} in order to match the word globalization and at the same time differentiate it from words such as equality, because the main point is not equality. The point is rather equal dignity, even though there is a connection between equality and equal dignity. (The connection is “hidden” in the human rights stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect human dignity.)

The term egalization is meant to avoid claiming that everybody should become equal and that there should be no differences between people. Equality can coexist with functional hierarchy that regards all participants as possessing equal dignity; egality can not coexist, though, with hierarchy that defines some people as lesser beings and others as more valuable.

If we imagine the world as a container with a height and a width, globalization addresses the horizontal dimension, the shrinking width. Egalization concerns the vertical dimension, reminiscent of Hofstede’s power distance. Egalization is a process away from a very high container of masters at the top and underlings at the bottom, towards a flat container with everybody enjoying equal dignity.

Egalization is a process that elicits hot feelings of humiliation when it is promised but fails. The lack of egalization is thus the element that is heating up feelings among so-called “globalization-critics.” Their disquiet stems from lack of egalization and not from an overdose of globalization. What they call for is that globalization ought to marry egalization.

Thinkers who are steeped in the honor culture of the past ten thousand years doubt that egalization is a viable concept. They believe in a primordial “desire to dominate” – see, for example, James Waller (2002) – or an “inherent will to power” – Friedrich Nietzsche (1989)/1887 – or an “animus dominandi” – Hans Morgenthau (1946). Many theories about human evil mistake the past ten thousand years and their cultural scripts to represent human nature.

However, these characteristics may appear to be elemental to human nature only during the relatively short historic period of complex agriculture, not before and not subsequent to it, particularly not in current times of ingathering. Instead of accepting “evil” as “unexplainable,” or resort to “pathological narcissism,” or to a “desire to dominate” – all rather daunting diagnoses – it may pay to first ask whether not humans may have a “desire to relate,” or, more precisely, “a desire to mutually connect and be recognized in a context of equal dignity,” with feelings of humiliation emerging in case of disappointment, with “evil” as possible response. This view is not only more amenable to “treatment,” but seems more appropriate in current historic times.

\textit{Humiliation becomes more hurtful}

The more human rights permeate a society, and the entire world, humiliation becomes more hurtful as compared to before because it transmutes into an obscene violation. Therefore it also gains importance as a topic for research and more relevance than before for public policy planning. This is because the \textit{four} basic kinds of subjugation or honor-humiliation known to honor cultures become conflated into \textit{one} kind of dignity-humiliation.
Let me explain. Subjugation in honor societies can be categorized in four variants, see Dennis Smith (2001), and Evelin Gerda Lindner (2006j). A ruling master elite uses *conquest subjugation* to subjugate formerly equal neighbors into a position of inferiority. When the hierarchy is in place, the master uses *reinforcement subjugation* to keep it in place. The latter may range from seating orders and bowing rules to brutal measures such as customary beatings or killings. A third form of humiliation, *relegation subjugation*, is used to push an already low-ranking underling even further down. *Exclusion subjugation* means excluding victims altogether, exiling, or even killing them.

In honor societies, all of these four variants are regarded as legitimate tools. The taste of violation that the word humiliation carries in contemporary’s language is incipiently present solely in relationships among equal aristocrats, and it is not the attempt to subjugate that represents the violation. The attempt to debase others is always legitimate in a ranked society, since, inherently, a ranked structure invites everybody who dares to try “might is right.” However equals will oppose such debasement and respond to it with duel-like measures, while unequals will quietly succumb.

Human rights turn all four types of subjugation into utterly illegitimate *exclusion humiliation* because attempts of subjugation, of whatever kind, are now regarded as a human rights violations that exclude the victims from humanity. This situation produces intense pain and suffering; losing one’s dignity means being excluded from the family of humankind altogether. Importantly, in the absence of moderating Mandela-like forces, this pain entails the danger to lead to violence, including genocide and terrorism, see Table 1.

### Four Variants of Humiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Honor humiliation</th>
<th>Human rights dignity humiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conquest humiliation</strong>: When a strong power reduces the relative autonomy of rivals, previously regarded as equals, and forces them into a position of long-term subordination. Creation of hierarchy or addition of a new upper tier within a hierarchical order.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relegation humiliation</strong>: When an individual or group is forcefully pushed downwards within an existing status hierarchy.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reinforcement humiliation</strong>: Routine abuse of inferiors in order to maintain the perception that they are, indeed, inferior.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusion humiliation</strong>: When an individual or group is forcefully ejected from society, for example through banishment, exile or physical extermination.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Four variants of humiliation
The more societies are touched by the human rights ideal of equal dignity, the more salient feelings of humiliation become, not only for underlings but also for masters. Masters resist the call for humility by labeling it as illegitimate humiliation and are prone to react with shame when they find themselves stripped of their privileges. As soon as they bypass this shame, as Thomas Scheff argues, this may lead to atrocious violence. See more on the avoidance of shame further down.

For underlings humiliation become more salient in a three-fold way. First, underlings feel more humiliated in a system where supremacist elites no longer are accepted as benevolent patrons, but gain the label of evil oppressors. Second, underlings may feel inferior to their masters (former or current) and feel ashamed of such feelings. Third, underlings may feel ashamed that they ever admired their elites and bowed to them voluntarily. All three elements may be translated into unspeakable mayhem, in the absence of Mandela-like influences, into the urge to “cleanse away” shame and humiliation together with the people who are seen to trigger these feelings – see “Genocide, Humiliation, and Inferiority” by Evelin Gerda Lindner (2007b).

Feelings of humiliation, when respect is felt wanting – and this is compounded in a human rights context – represent the “nuclear bomb” of the emotions (I coined this term). “Humiliated fury” is a related term forged by Helen Block Lewis (1971). It may transform people into wise Mandela-like elders, in the very best case – however, it may also render atrocious humiliation-entrepreneurs such as a Hitler, or the instigators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, or people engaging in terror acts.

Feelings of humiliation have the force to create and deepen fault lines that hamper what is most needed in the global village, namely cooperation. For Lindner, in an increasingly globalizing and interdependent world, in a world that at the same time wakes up to the call for equal dignity, no longer is it the fear entailed in the security dilemma, but feelings of humiliation which play a key role. They entail the potential to turn human beings into creators and users of “weapons of mass destruction,” and into perpetrators of terrorist acts.

And, what makes feelings of humiliation particularly salient – as we have seen both in genocides and terrorist acts – people who have set their minds on humiliating their perceived humiliators, do not need much military training or expensive equipment. Instigating feelings of humiliation in followers is far more “cost-effective.” Household knives and machetes were sufficient to “cut down” almost a million neighbors (the former elite who were perceived to be arrogant humiliators in Rwanda). And simple passenger airplanes were highjacked and turned into missiles to “bring down” and humiliate the symbols of pride of the world’s allegedly “arrogant” superpower (September 11, 2001).

Two irreconcilable definitions are around today

Humiliation is a word that is used in many ways, it is used in connection with acts of humiliation, with institutions that humiliate (institutions as acts turned into rules), it connotes the affect, feeling, and emotion of humiliation, and it stands for attitudes of and identifications with humiliation (either qua personality or culture). At a minimum, the word humiliation signifies first an act, second a phenomenon that includes affect, feeling,
How the Human Rights Ideal Separates Humiliation from Shame

and emotion, and, third, a process: “I humiliate you, you feel humiliated, and the entire process is one of humiliation.” (In this paper it is expected that the reader understands from the context which alternative is the one applied at a given point, since otherwise language would become too convoluted.)

Humility, shame, and humiliation, as they flow into affects, feelings, emotions, and acts, all entail a spatial orientation, namely a downward orientation. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson wrote a book entitled The Embodied Mind, where they explain how our body and mind are linked by way of spatial metaphors.16

“Being down” is a state of being that carries basically three evaluations: first, it can be “just right,” second, “too far down,” or third, “not sufficiently far down.” “Just right” is when a person is guided by a dignified sense of worth embedded into wise humility, “too far down” is when self-deprecation and a sense of worthlessness depress a person, and “not sufficiently far down” is when arrogance, supremacist hubris and haughtiness reign. All three states are defined in profoundly different ways in honor societies as compared to dignity societies. Human-rights based societies endorse that people ought to relate to each other in ways that secure their bonds as equals, as equals in dignity and rights. Feeling unworthy of equality in dignity is “too far down,” arrogating superiority is “too far up,” only a bond of mutual reciprocal equality in dignity is “just right.” In an honor society, the rules for masters differ from rules for underlings. Underlings can almost never be “too far down,” are kept routinely warned to avoid being “not sufficiently down,” and will be at their “right” place wherever their masters deem placing them.

The same is valid for acts and institutions that humble, shame, and humiliate; acts and institutions that entail humiliation are defined in profoundly different ways in honor societies as compared to dignity societies. The most striking difference is that in an honor context, humbling, shaming, and humiliating are all legitimate acts when employed by masters on underlings. White supremacists in times of Apartheid were entitled, by law, to humble, shame, and humiliate blacks. In a human rights context of equal dignity, however, the domination/submission gradient is dismantled, and humiliating others is no longer legitimate. Humiliation is separated out as an illegitimate act. Shaming and humbling still preserve some utility, however, only if applied in dignified ways and for worthy causes, staying clear of humiliation. In post-Apartheid South Africa, for example, corporations may be shamed into complying with their ethical standards, and over-zealous politicians, who are in danger to arrogate supremacy for example, black supremacy), may be humbled. However, nowhere is humiliation legitimate, not as spontaneous act, not as routine act, and not as institutionalized act.

Freeing shame and restoring its prosocial function

In fact with the contemporary trend that larger normative and cultural frames increasingly favor and legitimize relationship of equality in dignity, away from inequality in worth, space is opened to free emotions from their former instrumentalization. In the new context of equal dignity for all, former underlings can be liberated from being coerced into continuous “voluntary” self-mutilating shame.17 Today we can set out to heal the hurt of the past ten thousand years, the mutilating instrumentalization of human emotional and cognitive apparatus. We can call upon people to acknowledge shame, not
bypass it, and help them recognize that it is not necessary to live in continuous shame and fear of shame. All this becomes possible in a normative context that declares secure bonds between equals to be the legitimate and desirable norm for how relationships should be formed, rather than bonds of domination/submission with shame as weapon in the hands of masters.

See a short overview over the historic transition of human history and its relevance for shame and humiliation in Table 2.

**The Historic Transition of Human History and Its Relevance for Shame and Humiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Large-scale frame</th>
<th>Relevance for shame and humiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior to 10,000 years ago</strong></td>
<td>Wild food as recourse for livelihood, no circumscription yet, win-win</td>
<td>Shame and humiliation developed as part of “a whole universe of cognates that … involve the feeling of a threat to the social bond” (Scheff, personal email message December 7, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>During the past 10,000 years</strong></td>
<td>Land as resource for livelihood, security dilemma, win-lose</td>
<td>The human desire for a secure social bond was instrumentalized to build hierarchical societies of ranked honor. Humility, shame and honor-humiliation form a continuum that is put at the service of ranked honor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vision for the future: Global knowledge society with equal dignity for every global citizen</strong></td>
<td>Knowledge as resource for livelihood, global interdependence, win-win</td>
<td>Dignity-humiliation is illegitimate and no longer part of the humility-shame continuum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The historic transition of human history and its relevance for shame and humiliation

Thomas J. Scheff’s concept of shame as a threat to the secure bond profoundly links up to being treated with equal dignity and made feel welcome in the human family. I am writing this in Japan. I have now spent about three years in Japan, where child murderers have shocked the nation. A girl slid the throat of another girl because the other girl was more popular. Most of the children who killed others in Japan, felt they were nothing – they were without bonds.

When I feel ashamed, I accept that I fall short. I blush when I break wind inadvertently; I can be ashamed even if nobody notices it. As mentioned earlier, Norbert Elias places the emerging “skill” of feeling shame at such transgressions at the center of his theory of civilization. Being able to feel shame is prosocial, as is the capability to feel guilt. When I feel guilty, I accept that I have committed a moral transgression (guilt may be defined as moral shame, shame over moral shortcomings). Somebody, who is not capable of feeling shame and guilt, is seen as a “shameless” monster with an
How the Human Rights Ideal Separates Humiliation from Shame

unacceptable contempt for law. We all hope that shame will deter our neighbors from lying to us and that our neighbor will feel guilty and not try to have, for example, an affair with our spouse. In other words, we all hope that shame and guilt will safeguard social cohesion and foster humility before social and legal rules. We deem humility as a virtue – see June Price Tangney (2002) – and shame and guilt as immensely valuable. Guilt supersedes shame, argue June Price Tangney & Ronda L. Dearing (2002), through leading to greater empathy and sensitivity toward others.

Guilt can indeed be remedied by interventions such as punishment, remorse, apology, forgiveness, or restorative justice, however, it is important to keep in mind that this can be achieved in dignifying ways only within a human-rights based context of equal dignity, because punishment, remorse, apology, forgiveness, or restorative justice all tend to have a profoundly mutilating effect in a context of ranked honor. Human rights call for healing, healing of the integrity of humanity in individuals and societies as it evolved in the first ninety percent of human history, while ranked honor norms call for the maintenance of domination/submission by all means, including torture and execution, as it was the practice during the past ten thousand years.

Arne Næss, among the most renowned Norwegian philosophers, summarized the human-rights approach to remedying guilt as follows: “There are no murderers; there are only people who have murdered.” He explained his point at length at the Second Annual Meeting of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (12th - 13th September 2003, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme de l'Homme, Paris, http://www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/annualmeeting02.php). Næss described in rich detail how he would invite convicted murderers from prison into his philosophy class at Oslo University so as to demonstrate to his students that even murderers are human beings who deserve and need to be dignified. He was adamant that only when I feel my bond to humanity secured, can I admit to crime and murder, feel guilty, and show remorse. As long as I feel that I am not a human being, who cares.

In other words, as soon as the human rights ideal of equal dignity for all serves as larger legitimizing frame, space is opened for scholars such as Thomas J. Scheff and Tony Webb, who bring the message into the world that unmasking shame and learning the language of empathy is very important. Room opens up for Tony Webb (2005) and his salutogenic rather than a pathogenic view of shame, and the insight that there is a “need to re-evaluate the pathological (unhealthy, dysfunctional) aspects of shame and see them as the result of both personal/developmental, and cultural distortions – built on experiences where the natural shame process was blocked – unresolved shame sequences” (Tony Webb, in an email on May 16, 2005). No longer attacking others or self, no longer hiding from others or self, is a healing step. While it was understandable that people wanted to hide from shame during the past ten thousand years since shame was used to enforce submission, today, relationship bonds that are embedded into equal dignity benefit from acknowledged shame.

In the case of the former child soldier Ishmael Beah, he received help from a nurse, called Esther. Esther untiringly repeatedly to Ishmael “it is not your fault!” Her selfless compassion rekindled the humanity that Ishmael could no longer trace in himself. He recounts in an interview:
Well, after I’d been at the rehabilitation centre for quite some time, you know. I think it was you know the people who came into my life. There was a particular nurse at the centre called Esther who was just…patience and selfless and compassionate and was willing to look at me just a child regardless of what I had been through. I would tell her the most vicious stories I could think of during the war just to kind of deter her from talking to me and that didn’t go the way I wanted and she became closer and closer to me and because of her willingness to just look at me over and over as a child, it began to sort of make me feel that there was something more to me that even I had failed to see you know, that she was seeing (interview with Andrew Denton, retrieved from on July 4, 2007, from http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s1968333.htm).

Tony Webb (2005) has developed an experiential education workshop entitled “Working with Shame” (as an inherently healthy normal human emotion rather than seeing it, as so many therapists do, as something pathogenic). He extended his model into the field of emotions generally, adding to the ideas he developed in his doctoral thesis – Tony Webb (2003). He provides “a scaffolding for understanding emotion” by explaining affects, feelings, emotions, and scripts as follows:

1. Affects – physical signals or the “body-language” of emotion, anger, distress, disgust, fear, surprise, excitement enjoyment, and shame, elicited by a stimulus and responded to by “what I do” (behavioral), “what I think” (cognitive), and “what I feel” (emotional)
2. Feelings – awareness of the affect
3. Emotions – feeling plus memory of similar past experiences (emotional and cognitive)
4. Scripts – patterns of acting thinking and feeling laid down by past experience – the best I knew at the time
5. Character & Personality (Tony Webb, 2005, adapted from PowerPoint slide no. 31)

For Webb, the unlearning of harmful ways of dealing with emotions can be achieved by way of therapies that address the cognitive, emotional and behavioral realms in various ways. Webb conceptualizes shame as a “moderator” emotion, an emotion that guides to the zone between over- and under-arousal or excitement and enjoyment. The responses to unacknowledged shame, and the social crises connected to them, generally fall into one of four categories, which Tony Webb (2003) spells out in greater length in chapter six of his dissertation – building on the work of Silvan S. Tomkins (1962) and followers:

- Attack other – including anger, “defence,” aggression, violence in various forms, criticism (of others), and self-justification
- Attack self – including depression, suicide, self harm, self criticism, some aspects of prolonged or “defensive” grief
- Hide from other – withdraw, hide, run away, go quiet, become invisible

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In his 2005 Workshop, Webb places the four major shame-masking emotions fear, anger, distress, and disgust on the compass of shame-avoidance. He situates anger between “attack other” and “hide from self,” disgust between “hide from self” and “attack self,” distress between “attack self” and “hide from other,” and fear between “hide from other” and “attack other.”

Webb ends his workshop with Exercise #5 entitled “Unmasking shame and the empathic response.” He invites one participant to first choose one of the ways he/she traditionally avoids shame, and then to dare to move towards the feeling of shame and stay in it, aided and supported by the rest of the group. Webb reports, “At this point the affect change can be quite profound – people often describe it as a lifting of the heavy/oppressive weight of shame. There is often surprise, curiosity (interest) and a smile (joy) – the transformation from shame to pride” (Webb, 2005, p. 14). The group often reports that they see authentic pride emerge – “it has still a visible element of shame – shame-modesty or humility rather than ‘up-himself’ pride” (Webb, 2005, p. 14).

Yet, not only the shame of underlings that lingers on from times of traditional honor can be overcome in exchange for more humanity, also the arrogance of masters can be transcended, both the arrogance of traditional masters, and the contemporary arrogance of what I call ruthless individualism. Underlings, in a context of human rights, have two basic choices when they rise up, they can try to emulate former masters, or learn true equality in dignity. Human rights call for the second, Western ruthless individualism resembles the first. Ideals of ruthless individualism in some Western cultural spheres represent a culture of former underlings attempting to behave as autocratic as masters do in a world of honor, everybody trying to playing the role of master. Western ruthless individualism represents an uprising from oppression that still follows traditional honor scripts, an uprising that goes too far from the point of view of human rights. Ruthless individualism has still to mature into ideals of true equal dignity for all, and its adherents have still to connect with fellow human beings in the context of equality in dignity and mutual care and consideration.

Somalia is the country of proud nobility. In the major clans, every man above a certain age is a sovereign. Somalia thus showcases relationships between fiercely proud masters in a system of honor. To understand the world of honor, on December 3, 1998, I was a guest in a khat chewing “focus group” session in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland. Such sessions typically last for many hours, starting in the afternoon and running through half of the night (typically, such meetings are not attended by “respectable” women; I tried therefore to keep “decent” by at least not chewing khat myself…). I asked the men in the round about humiliation or quudhsiga (belittling = humiliation). The hours were well invested and yielded many proverbs, such as the following: “Hadellic xun ayaa ka xanuun kulul xabada,” meaning “Humiliation is worse than killing; in times of war words of humiliation hurt more than bullets” or “Rag waxaa ku maamula agaan ama ku maamuuusi,” meaning “I can only be with people who are equal,” or “Masse inaanu nahay oo tollim meerto no tahay,” meaning “A man deserves to be killed and not to be humiliated.”
Hassan Keynan, former Secretary General of the Somali National Commission (1985 - 1988), explained (in an interview on November 15, 1997, in Oslo, Norway) that ceeb is the opposite of honor, meaning being steeped in shame and dishonor, while sharaf is dignity. Keynan believes that clan membership is all encompassing and stultifying, and that the only liberation is to disown clan identity and rather adopt Somali identity, or even better, a global multi-identity, because also national identity is as aggressive as the clan identity.

Western ruthless individualism resembles Somali fierce pride and carries the same negative side-effects that can be observed in contemporary Somalia, namely the self-destructive devaluation and negligence of the caring and nurturing that is necessary to keep a society functioning in a dignified way. What Thomas J. Scheff (2005b) describes as hypermasculinity, is expressed in almost pure form in Somalia and is not much different from contemporary ideals of super-maleness in the West. Martha Albertson Fineman (2004) wrote a book entitled The Myth of Autonomy, where she highlights that “families bear the burdens of dependency, while market institutions are free to operate as though the domestic tasks that reproduce the society were some other institution’s responsibility” (Fineman, 2004, p. 203). Fineman concludes that by “invoking autonomy, we create and perpetuate cultural and political practices that stigmatize and punish those among us labeled dependent (p. 31). Linda Hartling identifies this practice as one of the root source of destructive humiliation (personal communication, September, 9, 2005).

In contrast to a context of traditional honor or contemporary ruthless individualism, in a context where equality in worthiness is legitimate as structuring principle of relationships, shame can play an important role in maintaining and developing both personal and social health. Webb suggests that acknowledging shame, not masking it, and using it constructively to maintain the bond, will bring about not just personal change, but can indeed help hasten culture change towards a world of mutual respect for equality in dignity. He suggests that unmasking shame, changing scripts and patterns of reacting to shame, needs to be placed as an integral part of any personal growth work in present times. The new concept of shame needs to be part of everyday relationships at home and in the community, according to Webb. Relationship counseling needs to unmask shame in a wide range of fields and issues, including divorce and separation, domestic violence, school discipline, conflict education, bullying, restorative justice, conflict resolution, anger management, drug, alcohol and other addictions, recovery from trauma, suicide prevention, men’s and women’s support groups – the list is long. All levels are affected, from micro to macro levels, from changing patterns of male-female relations and stereotypes of masculinity and femininity, to workplace and industrial relations, to inter-community/racial interactions, international conflicts, and, at last, peace and reconciliation at global levels.

Webb proposes that the deep cultural change he advocates can also be beneficial for the corporate sector. For example, the airline industry would benefit from a shift away from a guilt and blame culture (in the sense of traditional honor norms), toward a culture where pilots are encouraged to report errors rather than hiding them. Or, the medical industry could be encouraged to leave behind its culture of guilt, blame and denial of “negligence,” its culture of fear of loss of reputation and income, which only adds to the trauma inflicted on patients and relatives, toward a constructive shame culture, where errors can be acknowledged as a basis a basis for personal and collective learning.
Incidentally, masking or unmasking shame may be found at the very core of the two theories of intelligence that seem to be in use among the wider population – see Carol S. Dweck, Jennifer A. Mangels, & Catherine Good (2004), p. 42, and Juan Pascual-Leone & Janice Johnson (2004), p. 222. Some people believe that their intelligence is fixed (they adhere to an entity theory of intelligence), while others think that their intelligence is malleable (they adhere to an incremental theory of intelligence). Out of these two beliefs grow two kinds of goals, namely ego-oriented performance goals versus task-oriented learning-mastery goals. People with performance goals wish to look smart and avoid mistakes, in other words, they have an ego orientation and try to satisfy high expectations of others by performing well. Those with learning-mastery goals, on the other hand, desire to learn new things, even if they might get confused, make mistakes, and not look smart; in other words, they have an intrinsic motive towards achieving mastery in the task.

The research results show – see, for example, Carol S. Dweck, Jennifer A. Mangels, & Catherine Good (2004) – that students with mastery goals are basically more successful, they “are more likely to search for and to find successful transfer strategies than are those with concerns about validating their ability” (Dweck, Mangels, & Good, 2004, p. 43). In extension, a task orientation is preferable to an ego orientation, and constructively tackled shame may be the core ingredients for a successful task orientation.

Healing humiliation and preventing it

In contrast to shame, the coercive violation that is at the core of dignity-humiliation cannot be translated into constructive channels by acknowledging shame. The way out of been coerced into humiliation is not to acknowledge shame. Should Mandela have learned to feel ashamed and to acknowledge feeling ashamed, when humiliated? No. Humiliators want their victims to feel ashamed and resilience means precisely to resist feel ashamed. And not feeling ashamed, keeping up ones sense of self-worth, in the face of humiliation, has nothing to do with masking shame.

Linda Hartling writes (in a personal message, July 22, 2007): “Perhaps, as Scheff seems to imply, ‘some’ working-class clients have more difficulty acknowledging ‘shame’ because their shame is actually humiliation (unjust degrading mistreatment)?? Perhaps members of the working classes have difficulty acknowledging shame because they have been beaten down by the daily humiliation and demoralization of living in a society that exploits the working class and the poor? Perhaps it is the upper social classes who are more likely in need of ‘acknowledging their shame’?”

Succumbing to humiliation, not resisting humiliation, allowing it to have a shaming effect, is among the most unbearable kinds of shame. I have spoken with people in Rwanda (and also in Germany, with respect to Nazi-Germany), who say that the worst suffering, the most painful form of humiliation, is being forced to choose between those two loves, and after having chosen one allegiance, recognizing that it was the wrong choice. In Kenya, I heard stories of Hutu genocidaires who were in hiding and needed psychotherapy because they could not eat without seeing the small fingers of children on their plates. Instead of facing punishment, they became “insane.” Many Hutus had been forced to kill their own families, their Tutsi spouses and Tutsi-looking children, to show
their allegiance to the Hutu cause. The International Panel of Eminent Personalities confirms: “Hutu women married to Tutsi men were sometimes compelled to murder their Tutsi children to demonstrate their commitment to Hutu Power. The effect on these mothers is also beyond imagining” (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events (2000), chapter 16, paragraph 4).

The humiliation of being forced into decisions no human being should be exposed to, and the shame of not having chosen death, can be so unbearable that unmasking this shame is almost impossible.

What are the response pathways for a person who considers herself a victim of undue humiliation (in contrast to due shaming or humbling) at the hands of other people also has basically the following options:

1) A person who considers herself a victim of undue humiliation, in case she has no means to resist within herself and/or outside of herself, may turn her rage inwards and become depressed, apathetic and even turn to drug abuse (like the depressed wife suffering from psychosomatic symptoms), and may in addition feel ashamed of doing so, which will compound depression.

2) If, however, this person chooses to turn her rage outwards, we have several other outcomes, as follows:

a) This person may explode in hot desperate and self- and other-destructive rage, no longer considering “rational” long-term self-interest in her own survival as guiding principle. Passionate murder and/or suicide might be the result.

b) This person can go down the Hitler-path and organize large-scale humiliation entrepreneurship. Hitler attempted to redress humiliation by inflicting humiliation on the supposed humiliators, achieving but another spiral in the cycle of humiliation. In Rwanda feelings of humiliation were systematically incited; contemporary terrorists attract followers with humiliation narratives. There is no need to buy expensive weapons when feelings of humiliation are hot, neighbors kill neighbors with knives (Rwanda), and civil planes are turned into missiles (9/11). Therefore I labeled feelings of humiliation the “nuclear bomb of the emotions.” Vamik D. Volkan (2004) in his theory of collective violence, in his book Blind Trust, puts forth that when a chosen trauma is experienced as humiliation and is not mourned, this may lead to feelings of entitlement to revenge and, under the pressure of fear/anxiety, to collective regression. I would add that both in Germany and Rwanda, genocide was perpetrated not only as revenge but to avoid and prevent imagined future humiliation. Eberhard Jäckel (1991) reports how Hitler thought – in Hitler’s last words during his last conversation on April 2, 1945 – that “the world will be eternally grateful to National Socialism that I have extinguished the Jews in Germany and Central Europe” (Jäckel, 1991, 64).

c) Mandela, in contrast, made constructive use of the energy entailed in his rage for social change. He facilitated the birth of a new social order based on respect for individual dignity. Central to his effort was the inclusion of the humiliator, the white upper class, as co-protectors of human rights. In other words, Mandela solved the conflict by peacefully but firmly making Frederik Willem de Klerk and

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his followers understand that the old order was dying. Mandela attempted to attain *shared humility* without *humiliation*.

**The pro-social role of the ability to feel humiliation**

There is, however, also a pro-social role of the ability to feel humiliation. The argument can be summarized as follows (see also Table 3): From developing the *ability* to feel humiliated (defining humiliation as illegitimate violation), to feeling *humiliated* by the state-of-affairs of the contemporary world, *conscientization*\(^{20}\) may foment local and global *systemic change* in a *Unity in Diversity* fashion, made operational by *dialogical harvesting* from the diverse cultural wisdom of this world.

The Role of Feelings of Humiliation for Conscientisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects of humiliation on victims</th>
<th>The horizon</th>
<th>The role of feelings of humiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depression and apathy</td>
<td>Depression and apathy, in reaction to being on the receiving end of humiliating acts, is associated with a narrow, self-referencing horizon, with “tunnel vision.” If anger is felt, it is turned inwards. There is little or no resilience on the side of the victim, however, the immediate social environment of the victim, as well as society at large stay undisturbed and experience “calm and quiet.”</td>
<td>Feelings of humiliation play an anti-social role, particularly for the victim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot retaliation</td>
<td>Hot retaliation, in reaction to being on the receiving end of humiliating acts, is associated with the narrow horizon of tunnel vision, however, with anger projected anger outwards. This may translate into more subjective resilience for the victim, through a short-term release of tension (which may explain the perseverance of, for example, domestic violence), but the immediate social environment of the victim and society at large are negatively affected. This could be called “hard resilience.”</td>
<td>Feelings of humiliation play an anti-social role, particularly for the immediate social environment of the victim and society at large. Here feelings of humiliation play the role of the “nuclear bomb of the emotions,” a term coined by Evelin Gerda Lindner (2006j).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Cold” retaliation (Hitler/terrorism)</td>
<td>“Cold” retaliation (Hitler/terrorism), in reaction to being on the receiving end of humiliating acts, is associated with a wider horizon; larger spans of history and larger groups are included</td>
<td>Feelings of humiliation play a disastrously anti-social role, particularly for society at large. Also here feelings of humiliation play the role of the “nuclear bomb of the...”</td>
</tr>
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into the planning of reactions that resemble hot retaliation, only to be more effective and large-scale. This may generate a high degree of subjective resilience within the victim, who may, as Hitler did, even feel elated, however, the door is opened for large-scale destruction. This could be called “hard resilience.”

The ability to feel humiliated, on behalf of oneself and others, plays the prosocial role of a fire sensor and fire alarm (humiliation sensor and alarm). The presence of a fire alarm does not mean that fire (humiliation) is prosocial, on the very contrary. However, the ability to sense fire (humiliation) and call the fire brigades is profoundly prosocial. The ability to feel humiliated fuels conscientization, see Cristina Jayme Montiel (2006).

### Constructive psychological, social, and cultural change (Mandela)

Larger spans of history and larger groups are included into the planning of large-scale constructive change of psychological, social and cultural scripts, particularly the significance of relationships. This path presupposes and generates a high degree of subjective resilience within the victim. As a result, the victim’s immediate social environment and society at large, become more resilient. The Jean Baker Miller Institute, and Linda M. Hartling (2003), through advocating the significance of relationships, plays the role of Mandela, since large-scale change of psychological, social, and cultural scripts, in a positively self-enforcing spiral, fosters more resilience. This could be called “hearty resilience.”

The ability to feel humiliated, on behalf of oneself and others, plays the prosocial role of a fire sensor and fire alarm (humiliation sensor and alarm). The presence of a fire alarm does not mean that fire (humiliation) is prosocial, on the very contrary. However, the ability to sense fire (humiliation) and call the fire brigades is profoundly prosocial. The ability to feel humiliated fuels conscientization, see Cristina Jayme Montiel (2006).

### Constructive large-scale systemic change at the institution level (Mandela, Margalit’s decent society)

Global horizon, larger spans of history and larger groups are included into the planning of large-scale constructive systemic change, particularly with respect to the creation of non-humiliating institutions (a *decent* society, Avishai Margalit (1996). This path presupposes and generates a high degree of subjective resilience within the victim. As a result, the victim’s immediate social environment and society at large, including global society, become more resilient. The Jean Baker Miller Institute, through advocating the significance of relationships, plays the role of Mandela, since large-scale change of cultural scripts, in a self-enforcing spiral, fosters more resilience at the

The ability to feel humiliated is the very fuel of the human rights movement, which entails the promise to constructively reshape our psychological, social, cultural, and institutional environments. “Hearty” resilience is the psychological, social and cultural pre-condition that enables new “hearty” institution building. As soon as “hearty” institutions are in place, in a self-enforcing manner, they nurture “hearty” resilience in the psychological, social and cultural realms. While the ability to feel humiliated resembles the fire sensor and fire alarm, the building of “hearty” institutions resembles the construction of safer buildings (HumanDHS!). The path evolves from the ability to feel humiliated, to conscientization, to

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level of psychological, social, and cultural scripts. This “hearty resilience” is the very pre-condition and force behind the vision for constructive local and global institution building. “Hearty resilience” not only stimulates the creation of new visions, it furthermore provides the strength and motivation to implement these visions (HumanDHS!).

global institution building, made operational by dialogically harvesting from world-wide cultural wisdom.

Table 3: The role of feelings of humiliation for conscientization

Resistance to the transition to human rights

The starting point for my research on humiliation was European history and the widely-shared hypothesis that Germany’s humiliation through the Versailles Accords (“The Treaty of Shame”) after World War I provided Hitler with the “fuel” for World War II. Marshal Foch of France said, in 1919, about the Versailles Treaties: “This is not a peace treaty – it will be a cease-fire for 20 years.”

I set out to study the link between humiliation and violent conflict, such as war and genocide in a doctoral research project entitled The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties, from 1997 to 2001 – see Evelin Gerda Lindner (2000b). I carried out 216 qualitative interviews in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi addressing their history of genocidal killings. From 1998 to 1999 the interviews were carried out in Somaliland, Rwanda, Burundi, Nairobi, Kenya; and Egypt. I also conducted interviews in the same period in Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Belgium. Some of the interviews were filmed (10 hours of film and images of Somaliland and Rwanda), others were taped (over 100 hours of audiotape), and in situations where this seemed inappropriate, I made notes. The interviews and conversations were conducted in different languages; most of them in English (Somalia) and French (Great Lakes), many in German or Norwegian.

Since the conclusion of the doctoral dissertation on humiliation in 2001, I have expanded my studies, among others in Europe, South East Asia, and the United States. I am currently building a theory of humiliation that is transdisciplinary and entails elements from anthropology, history, social philosophy, social psychology, sociology, and political science. I am the Founding Manager of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (HumanDHS, http://www.humiliationstudies.org) and develop this network of academics and practitioners globally since 2001.

My experience indicates that both shame and humiliation are thorny issues, because they are embedded in the current transition from ranked honor to equal dignity. Traditional elites feel entitled to supremacy and resent being labeled oppressors, violently bypassing shame when they lose superiority, while underlings are caught between docile humility and angry humiliation.
Adherents to the traditional order of honor typically perceive the call for humility as humiliation. For example, some perceive the claim that human rights are universal as a humiliating form of imperialism in which powerful rich Western countries dictate which rights they consider most important. Or, “Employees need to be humiliated, otherwise they do not work! Humiliation is an important tool of high utility in the workplace! It teaches people the right work ethics! Don’t take this tool away from us!” is an argument frequently voiced in the corporate sector in many parts of the world. I was reprimanded in this way by a celebrated Indian economy professor in 2002, or a renowned Chinese organizational consultant in 2006. In the same vein, some contemporary researchers still place humiliation into the traditional humility-shame-humiliation continuum. William Miller (1993) might take the position that humiliation is necessary for “ego-deflation” to diminish arrogant attitudes and behavior, and Maury Silver et al. (1986) may claim that humiliation functions as a form of social control, which could be used positively or negatively.

Basically, the more a person identifies with “right-wing” political positions, the more this person will either reject research on shame and humiliation or try to instrumentalize it. This is valid for the political spectrums within countries and even between countries. It is no accident that my research on humiliation was initially funded in Norway where the ideal of equal dignity represents an age-old cultural value, and human rights therefore have a particularly strong anchoring. Altogether, the political spectrum of Europe, particularly of Scandinavia, is located “left” of that of the United States. In the United States, even many of those labeled “left” would fit into the “right-wing” spectrum in Scandinavia. Thus, research on shame and humiliation, for its own merit, and not in the service of honorable confrontations, is much more welcome in Scandinavia than elsewhere.

The right-wing resistance to research on humiliation that I met among, for example, the right-wing political spectrum in the United States of America, those who pride themselves of a “no kidding” approach to life, ridicules research on humiliation as either “dreamy” or “dangerous.” They subscribe to the view that it is a person’s own fault – a weak psyche – to cause him or her feel humiliated. From this perspective, humiliation is an outflow of envy; the values and power of the United States, for example, are presumed to trigger envy and feelings of humiliation in those, rather pitiable souls who are not tough enough and do not have the guts to work their way up and be successful – humiliation as an easy way out of laziness so to speak. From that point of view, people who do research on humiliation cater to these disgraceful souls, put bandages on their wounds and, by “understanding” why they become “lazy and cowardly” terrorists, humiliation researchers contribute to condoning terror: in sum, from this perspective, research on humiliation is abominable. From this point of view, research on shame is what is needed – research on how such lazy free-riders can be made feel ashamed of their misguided conduct – how they can be made to acknowledge their own weakness and be ashamed of evading their responsibility to work hard by accusing others of humiliation. In other words, advocates of the “no kidding” approach reject research on humiliation and welcome research on shame.

In conclusion, as far as my experience indicates, both, research on humiliation and research on shame are called for, or rejected, depending on whose interest is at stake. Those who feel wrongly accused to be humiliators call for research on shame to make

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crying victims go away and face up to their own responsibilities. And certainly, this
approach is at times very much to the point. Accusing others of humiliation to avoid
acknowledging own shame is certainly nothing to be encouraged. Conversely, those who
feel wrongly debased, call for research on humiliation, to make the perpetrators learn to
be ashamed. Also they often have a very valid point. Apartheid fell when the call became
doier for white supremacists to acknowledge that their system indeed represented
institutionalized humiliation, something to be ashamed of, rather than proud.

In short, research on shame and humiliation are important, both are difficult, and both
have their supporters and critics, depending on their place in the game. Alleged
oppressors and humiliators rebuke accusations by calling for research on shame, and
unhappy underlings call for research on humiliation.

In 2002, I recommended that Thomas J. Scheff be honored by being invited to give the
prestigious annual Eilert Sundt Lecture at the University in Oslo. The title of his lecture
was “Emotions and Politics” (October 24, 2002). He made a passionate case for bypassed
shame leading to rage and humiliated fury and thus being the driving motor of all
violence. He was moved to tears when he called upon men to acknowledge shame rather
than bypass it and turn it into violence. To my view, indeed, the problem of bypassed
shame for males, and their resistance to acknowledging it, is heightened in the course of
the current transition toward equal dignity norms. In old times male supremacy was
prescribed; it was deeply embedded into male identity formation. In tact with the current
large-scale shift of the entire normative context of humankind, the cultural scaffolding for
the old script for maleness weakens. This leaves the individual male struggling with the
fact that the old script is increasingly unsupported, while women increasingly “violate”
old norms of subservience, and new scripts for maleness are not yet on offer and certainly
not yet safely embedded into male identity formation.

To me, the term humility is central. When I write about the need for humility, what I
write about is, among others, the need to acknowledge shame and not bypass it. For me,
humility and acknowledged shame are closely linked.

Linda M. Hartling commented this discussion as follows (in a personal message,
September 9, 2007):

You seem to be describing an intriguing “shame/humiliation self-interest bias.” Here
are a few of my thoughts about this:

1. As you suggest, people who have gained advantages or profited from existing
   systems may be more likely to call for research on “shame,” which places an emphasis
   on internal-individual experience. Perhaps some prefer using “shame” as the unit of
   study because internal-individual experiences are easier to measure? Or, perhaps
   some clinicians and researchers have an underlying, self-serving desire to cure shame
   in order to avoid their own and others’ feelings of shame arising from benefiting from
   unjust social systems, practices, and arrangements?

The bias for “individual and internal” conceptualizations of human experiences
conveniently reduces one’s sense of responsibility for changing external-interpersonal
factors that contribute to development of these experiences. Furthermore, why would
one want to fix the larger social system if one has benefited from the existing system?
When professionals focus on the pathology of “others,” such as shame, they can provide a treatment that serves their own interests, while not doing much about the social-cultural conditions that may have triggered the pathology - see, for example, Arie Nadler & Samer Halabi (2005), and their study of providing help in ways that serves one’s own interests.

I suspect that psychologists and psychiatrists have advanced the study of shame (while virtually ignoring humiliation) because the construct fits with the field’s focus on individual-internal experiences of the “self” – see, for example, Philip Cushman (1995). Clinicians make money by fixing individuals, for example, by describing, researching, and treating individual problems such as shame. Therefore, it makes sense for clinicians to view the internal-individual construct of shame as more significant than external-interpersonal construct humiliation.

2. As you suggest, dear Evelin, people who have been disadvantaged or harmed by existing social arrangements may see a greater need for studying humiliation. The study of humiliation requires that we focus more attention on external-interpersonal dynamics. Unfortunately, as you know, some people think focusing on external-interpersonal dynamics of humiliation encourages a victim mentality and lack of personal responsibility.

Americans disparage those who complain about external-interpersonal (social, political, economic, etc.) dynamics that have harmed them or placed them at an unfair disadvantage. Individuals who recognize and name their humiliation risk greater humiliation if they dare to describe their victimization (Do you call this “double humiliation,” dear Evelin? It is a helpful term).

In theory, Americans are supposed to be self-determined and self-sufficient. They are suppose to “pull themselves up by the bootstraps” (even though no one pulls him or herself up without the help of others, for example, parents, teachers, friends, etc.). This cultural myth implies that if one is strong enough, one will not be humiliated.

I have had the opportunity to question a couple of humiliating practices with colleagues recently. I noted that the "humiliator" avoided taking any responsibility for the problem by saying “we shouldn’t talk like victims” and by suggesting that “we shouldn’t make a mountain out of a mole hill.”

When you and I emphasize the significance of humiliation with those who are heavily invested in the shame-bias perspective, perhaps we trigger similar responses? Shame-biased scholars suspect we are discouraging individual responsibility by our efforts to articulate the profound impact of humiliating victimization, and/or perhaps they believe we are making a mountain out of a mole hill. I think you have noted all of these dynamics in your papers, dear Evelin.

At any rate, like you, dear Evelin, I think both shame and humiliation are important experiences that need to be studied! We don’t need to study these experiences in

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competition with each other (Linda M. Hartling in a personal message, September 9, 2007).

Current state-of-the-art

Research in fields related to shame and humiliation

Thomas L. Friedman (2003), *New York Times* columnist, states, “If I’ve learned one thing covering world affairs, it’s this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation.”

Aaron Lazare (2004) writes: “I believe that humiliation is one of the most important emotions we must understand and manage, both in ourselves and in others, and on an individual and national level. This belief, particularly as it relates to international affairs, is supported by the writings of Robert Jay Lifton, Jessica Stern, Thomas Friedman, and even the 5th-century B.C. historian Thucydides” (Lazare, 2004, pp. 262-263).

Until very recently, few researchers have studied humiliation explicitly. Mostly, the phenomenon of humiliation figures implicitly, for example in literature on violence and war. If humiliation is treated explicitly, then it is often used interchangeably with shame and conceptualized as a variant of shame—see, among others, Silvan S. Tomkins (1962), and Donald L. Nathanson (1992).24 Tony Webb (2003) built on Tomkins and followers in his doctoral dissertation entitled *Towards a Mature Shame Culture*.

Robert L. Hale (1994), furthermore, explored the subject in his book *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder*. Humiliation has been studied in such fields as love, sex and social attractiveness, depression, society and identity formation, sports, history, literature, and film.

Scheff and Retzinger extended their work on violence and the Holocaust, studying the part played by humiliated fury—a term coined by Helen Block Lewis (1971)—in escalating conflicts between individuals and nations—see Thomas J. Scheff (1997).

Dennis Smith (2006) was introduced to the notion of humiliation through my research and incorporates the notion into his work. Vamik D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius, & Joseph V. Montville (Eds.) (1991) carried out important work on psychopolitical analysis of intergroup conflict and its traumatic effects. And, as already mentioned earlier, Vamik D. Volkan (2004) explains the link between humiliation as a chosen trauma and the feeling of entitlement to revenge.

In the realm of psychology, sociology and trauma, Ervin Staub’s work continues to be highly significant—see, among others, Ervin Staub (2003), Ervin Staub (1999). See also the special issue of the journal *Social Research* in 1997 that was stimulated by the book *Decent Society* by Avishai Margalit (1996). Staub makes the point that bystanders need to stand up—and not by—when humiliation is being perpetrated on their neighbors, while Margalit draws our attention to the fact that we need to stand up not just against singular acts of humiliation but that we have to build societies with institutions that do not humiliate their citizens.

The notion of honor and humiliation is addressed, for example, by Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen (1996). They refer to the form of honor that operates in more traditional
branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds. Bertram Wyatt-Brown (1982) studied the history of American Southern Honor and humiliation, while William Ian Miller (1993) wrote a book entitled Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence, where he linked humiliation to honor as understood in historical and literary classics like The Iliad or Icelandic sagas.

Hegel’s discussion of the struggle for recognition is the subject of an extensive literature in contemporary political theory, see, among many others, Axel Honneth (1997), and Axel Honneth (1995), or Zygmunt Bauman (2001). German philosopher Max Scheler (1912) set out related issues in his classic book Ressentiment [similar to resentment]. Max Scheler (1913) stated that a person at her core is a loving being, ens amans, who may feel ressentiment (comparable to resentment) when not recognized. The philosophy on the politics of recognition, building on Scheler, supposes that it may lead to violence when people suffer humiliation as a result of non-recognition. North American individualistic struggle for recognition and “need for positive self-regard” – see Steven J. Heine et al. (1999) – may actually “explain much of the realpolitik behavior, including war, which Neorealists have attributed to the struggle for security,” says Alexander Wendt (2003a) (pp. 510-511), see also Erik Ringmar (2002). In “The Politics of Recognition,” Charles Taylor (1994) argues that identity politics is motivated by a deep human need for recognition, with injurious effects of various forms of misrecognition. Charles Taylor (1990) links the Romantic idea of authenticity and the authentic self with Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant, for the modern notions of equality and dignity.

More complex cases of humiliation are those that could be called self-humiliation, such as identification with the oppressor, or Ranajit Guha’s (1988) understanding of the term subaltern – see Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Eds.) (1988). Liah Greenfeld uses the example of Ethiopia and Eritrea and suggests that ressentiment plays a central role in nation building – see Liah Greenfeld (1992); Liah Greenfeld (1996), and read also Michael Hechter (1992) on the dynamics of secession.

The relationship between guilt, shame and aggression has been addressed, for example, by June Price Tangney et al. (1992) as has the relationship between anger and aggression, for example, by James R. Averill (2001). Culture differences have been highlighted as well.25

According to Erving Goffman, face is the positive social value a person wishes to attain for herself in a social interaction. Humiliation can be described as a loss of face; the picture one wishes to present is suddenly discredited – see, for example, Erving Goffman (1953), and Erving Goffman (1967).

Facework is a term associated with the work of Stella Ting-Toomey (1994), see, for a recent publication Tomoko Masumoto et al. (2000). Face and face-saving is often particularly associated with Asian culture – see Susan J. Pharr (1990). Indeed, shame is a powerful and prevalent emotion in Asian cultures, and even though shame in Chinese culture is an emotion of disgrace or humiliation, as in most cultures, it is also a moral discretion and sensibility that people desire to develop, argue Heidi Fung (1999), Heidi Fung & Eva Chian-Hui Chen (2001). Shame and guilt shade into each other, suggest Jin Li & Kurt W. Fischer (2004), and both emotions “direct people into self-examination in social situations in order to recognize their own wrong doings, as well as to motivate people to improve themselves” (Li & Fischer, 2004, p. 411). Li and Fischer report how
one respondent revealed that “he would feel guilty toward his family. They provided all help he needed at all costs, but he failed to learn with his heart and mind. How can he face his family? He’d hurry to change himself!” (Li & Fischer, 2004, p. 411).

The link between humiliation and aggression has not received much attention among researchers so far. Among the few scholars addressing this topic are Louise Foo & Gayla Margolin (1995), who found that feelings of humiliation serve as a justification for dating aggression. Walter Mischel & Aaron L. De Smet (2000) explain that rejection-sensitive men may get “hooked” on situations of debasement where they can feel humiliated.

Philosopher Avishai Margalit (2002) highlights the significance of the memory of such emotions and suggests that some people may become attached – almost addicted – to this emotion, as this secures the “benefits” of the victim status and an entitlement for retaliation. Humiliation and rage can therefore be classified as moral emotions, since they motivate moral behavior – in the case of humiliation in a negative way – such as violence or aggression.

Similarly, Arie Nadler (2002b) shows that victimhood may serve as an “exemption” from having to take responsibility for being a perpetrator. Jennifer S. Goldman & Peter T. Coleman (2005) posit that a humiliated person might feel morally justified to act aggressively against others: “To give up the status as a humiliated person would mean that the aggression would no longer be morally justified, and no further pleasure or catharsis could be derived from it. It would also mean having to face the reality of one’s own perpetration, and one’s own responsibility for the other’s pain” (Goldman & Coleman, 2005, pp. 15-16).

There is also a link between help and humiliation. Helping can be both, an expression of caring and a demonstration of superiority. Helping can be an effective instrument of dominance in the hands of a more advantaged group. As a result, help may be resented by low-status groups – see Arie Nadler (2002a), and also Sidney Rosen (1983). Applied to international development, trade may advance peace more than aid, among others because it does not entail humiliation – see for trade and conflict John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett (1999), James D. Morrow (1999), and Håvard Hegre (2000), see also Mary B. Anderson (1999).

Malignant narcissism has been linked to humiliation. Jerrold Post, psychiatric expert on Saddam Hussein, suggests that the Iraqi dictator suffered from a childhood trauma of rejection by his mother and that his wounded self turned him into a murderous tyrant. Post identifies malignant narcissism as a vicious outburst of a wounded self. Thomas J. Scheff (2002) stipulates that tyrants such as Hitler suffer from three symptoms: first, unacknowledged shame; second, a master obsession (in the case of Hitler, the belief that Jews planned to conquer the world and had to be preemptively eliminated); and third, isolation from very early age (in the case of Hitler from the age of six). Sigmund Karterud (2001), Norwegian psychiatrist and specialist on malignant narcissism, suggests that humiliation leads to a partial fragmentation of the self and activates the grandiose self in people so disposed. The grandiose self, once activated, reacts with narcissistic rage and perpetrates revenge in order to restore itself. Karterud reports a higher propensity for narcissistic rage among individuals with personality structures of paranoid, antisocial, borderline and narcissistic type.

Blema S. Steinberg (1991) suggests that feelings of humiliation and shame may lead to narcissistic rage and acts of aggression meant to lessen pain and increase self-worth.
Steinberg analyses political crises and cautions that international leaders, when publicly humiliated, in some cases, may instigate mass destruction and war – see Blema S. Steinberg (1991), and Blema S. Steinberg (1996)).

At a societal level, Avishai Margalit (1996) calls for institutions that do not humiliate. His book *The Decent Society* stimulated a special issue on humiliation by the journal *Social Research* in 1997.

**Definitions and categorizations of humiliation and shame**

As mentioned earlier, the approach of this article fits into the orientation of today’s new cohort of emotion researchers who employ a multi-layered approach that conceptualizes elaborated emotions as comprehensive packages of meanings, behaviors, social practices, and norms that crystallize around primordial emotions.

However, we might be interested to know how humiliation has been inserted into categorizations of primary affect. Tony Webb (2003) compiled an overview of categories for primary affects, see Table 4.
### Table of Suggested Categories for Primary Affects by Author and Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enjoyment</td>
<td>love, mirth, happiness</td>
<td>coyness, happiness, joy</td>
<td>complacency, pleasure</td>
<td>Happy</td>
<td>happiness</td>
<td>enjoyment</td>
<td>joy, high spirits, love, tender feelings, devotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest</td>
<td>attentiveness, expectancy, anticipation</td>
<td></td>
<td>expectancy, interest</td>
<td>attention</td>
<td>interest</td>
<td>interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surprise</td>
<td>surprise, amazement, astonishment</td>
<td>surprise, amazement, bewilderment, awe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>surprise</td>
<td>surprise</td>
<td>surprise, astonishment, fear, horror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>apprehension, fear, terror</td>
<td>fear, horror</td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distress</td>
<td>suffering</td>
<td>pensiveness, sorrow, grief</td>
<td>boredom, sadness, sorrow, despair</td>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>sadness</td>
<td>sadness</td>
<td>low-spirits, anxiety, grief, dejection, despair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anger</td>
<td>anger, determination</td>
<td>annoyance, anger, rage</td>
<td>anger, rage, stubbornness, determination</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>anger</td>
<td>anger</td>
<td>ill-temper, sulkiness, determination, anger, hatred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disgust</td>
<td>disgust</td>
<td>tiresomeness, disgust, loathing</td>
<td>annoyance, disgust, contempt, scorn, loathing</td>
<td>Disgust</td>
<td>disgust/contempt</td>
<td>disgust/contempt</td>
<td>distain, contempt, disgust, guilt, Pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shame</td>
<td>acceptance, incorporation</td>
<td>pity, distrust, anxiety</td>
<td>calm, bitter, pride, irony, insecure, scepticism</td>
<td>shame</td>
<td>shame, shyness, Guilt</td>
<td></td>
<td>self-attention, shame, shyness, modesty, blushing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Suggested categories for primary affects by author and date, Tony Webb (2003), p 74, in his doctoral dissertation *Towards a Mature Shame Culture*.26

See in Table 5 the shame-related part of his compilation:
How the Human Rights Ideal Separates Humiliation from Shame

Shame and Humiliation in Categories for Primary Affects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shame-humiliation</td>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>self-attention, shame, shyness, modesty, blushing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Shame and Humiliation in Categories for Primary Affects, adapted from Tony Webb (2003), p 74, in his doctoral dissertation *Towards a Mature Shame Culture*.

W. Gerrod Parrott (2001) places humiliation as tertiary emotion within his tree structure of emotions, see Table 6:

**Humiliation as Part of Emotions Categorized Into a Tree Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary emotion</th>
<th>Secondary emotion</th>
<th>Tertiary emotions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sadness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sadness</th>
<th>Suffering</th>
<th>Agony, suffering, hurt, anguish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>Depression, despair, hopelessness, gloom, glumness, sadness, unhappiness, grief, sorrow, woe, misery, melancholy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disappointment</td>
<td>Dismay, disappointment, displeasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>Guilt, shame, regret, remorse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neglect</td>
<td>Alienation, isolation, neglect, loneliness, rejection, homesickness, defeat, dejection, insecurity, embarrassment, <strong>humiliation</strong>, insult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>Pity, sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Humiliation as part of emotions categorized into a tree structure, adapted from W. Gerrod Parrott (2001)

There is not sufficient space here to discuss these categorizations in more depth; they are intended to give the reader a taste of past research.

As to definitions of humiliation, I have laid out my view above that there are two fundamentally contradictory definitions of a whole host of terms around, humiliation.
How the Human Rights Ideal Separates Humiliation from Shame

included. One definition is embedded into a larger normative and cultural frame of ranked honor, while the other has meaning only within a human-rights based context.

Julian L. Stamm (1978) proposes that humiliation is experienced when one feels “belittled or slandered, lowered in the eyes of others or in his own eyes” (Stamm, 1978, p. 425). Paul Gilbert (1997) suggests and that humiliation occurs when one feels “criticized, degraded, and abused by a bad other” (Gilbert, 1997, p. 134). He proposes that in cases of humiliation to occur, the other is seen as bad, and not the self (as in shame).

Currently, Jennifer S. Goldman & Peter T. Coleman (2005) are bringing humiliation research “into the lab.” They define humiliation as follows:

Humiliation is an emotion, triggered by public events, which evokes a sense of inferiority resulting from the realization that one is being, or has been, treated in a way that departs from the normal expectations for fair and equal human treatment. The experience of humiliation has the potential to serve as a formative, guiding force in a person’s life and can significantly impact one’s individual and/or collective identity. Finally, the experience of humiliation can motivate behavioral responses that may serve to extend or re-define previously existing moral boundaries, leading individuals to perceive otherwise socially impermissible behavior to be permissible (Goldman & Coleman, 2005, p. 11).

Let me conclude this section with a short summary. As mentioned earlier, humility, shame, and humiliation are often conceptualized as part of a continuum, with intensity increasing from humility toward shame, and reaching its peak with humiliation. To my view, two profoundly different fundamental (ideal-type) conceptualizations are to be found in all cultures, one prior to the 1757 change of the meaning of “to humiliate” (with this conceptualization lingering on also today in many segments of world society), and the other conceptualization subsequent to the 1757 change of the meaning of “to humiliate.” The 1757 point of change is not only relevant for the English language, it is relevant for the rest of the world as well: It connotes the shift away from ranking people habitually into “higher” and “lesser” beings toward regarding everybody as deserving of equality in dignity – and this shift is far from being finalized, neither in English-speaking communities, nor anywhere else.

People who adhere to the first conceptualization (embedded into what I call the normative universe of ranked worthiness, of ranked honor) use humility, humbleness and humiliation rather interchangeably. All three are usually “prescribed” to “lesser” beings, in relation to their superiors and divine figures, while the rulers, the masters, the “higher” beings reject all three, except in front of their divine lords, who, they believe, have endowed them with supremacy over their underlings. This fundamental cultural template reigned almost everywhere in the world prior to around 1757, and is still reigning in all societies that are permeated by the ranked honor code. I came into intense contact with the honor code during my seven years of psychotherapy in Egypt, where various segments of society, to various degrees, follow the traditional honor code (of course, the situation is much more complex, notions such as haram, sharaf, etc., in the Arabic context, as mentioned earlier, would need to be discussed).

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People who have internalized the human rights ideal of equality in dignity (who are embedded into what I call the normative universe of unranked worthiness, or equal dignity) use a profoundly different conceptualization. For me personally, for example, humility is not part of the same spectrum as shame and humiliation – to my personal sense, treating humility as a “weak” form of shame and humiliation would amount to confounding two conceptualizations that are irreconcilable. Ranking people’s worthiness into “higher” and “lower,” and unranking human worthiness toward equality in dignity, cannot be combined – those two normative frames and practices are mutually exclusive. Including humility would mean to keep alive, inappropriately, a remnant of the old traditional spectrum in a contemporary conceptualization that is informed by the profound shift to equality in dignity.

I resonate with the view that shame is something I do to myself and something I accept, while humiliation is imposed on me and something I reject (or should reject, as in the case of self-humiliation, where I impose humiliation on myself, perhaps unwittingly, that I should not). However, I personally would not reckon that there is a difference in intensity between shame and humiliation. I remember feeling as acutely smarting when affected by shame as by humiliation. The difference would lie in attributing responsibility to different “perpetrators” and, as in the case of shame, having “perpetrated” a hurt to myself may even elevate the intensity of the pain I feel. However, even though I have learned to disengage from feelings of humiliation and guide them toward constructive efforts to address the situation, I am able to put myself into the shoes of people who are caught in obsessive feelings of humiliation, in obsessive rage, and an obsessive urge to retaliate in kind: Here lies the task of the Mandelas of this world, namely to promote and teach the Mandela-way out of humiliation so as to liberate the world from homicidal and suicidal cycles of humiliation.

In case of shame it would be in its place to attend to myself, since I am the perpetrator, not to blame myself, but to nurture myself out of self-blame toward a new level of maturity, and it would be misguided to avoid such self-care and self-development by simply lashing out at others. In the case of humiliation, the situation would be reverse. Ideally, I would not blame myself, but turn to the outside world, since the authorship of the perpetration lies there. I would attend to humiliating social and societal structures, as we knew them, for example, from Apartheid, and I would ideally not lash out at others in anger and rage, but nurture a more mature social and societal system in a Mandela-like fashion, a social and societal system that dismantles the gradient of “lesser” and “higher” beings and extends equality in dignity to everybody.

**Mirror neurons and real physical pain**

Important new research on mirror neurons illuminates the case of humiliation. Humiliation appears to be mapped in the brain by the same mechanisms that encode real physical pain – that is the insight researchers draw from recent research on human mirror neurons. “Social emotions like guilt, shame, pride, embarrassment, disgust and lust are based on a uniquely human mirror neuron system found in a part of the brain called the insula, Dr. Keysers said” – reports Sandra Blakeslee (2006), p. 3.
How the Human Rights Ideal Separates Humiliation from Shame  

Naomi I. Eisenberger & Matthew D. Lieberman (2005), wrote a chapter, “Why It Hurts to Be Left Out: The Neurocognitive Overlap Between Physical Pain and Social Pain” where they state, “Social connection is a need as basic as air, water, or food and that like these more basic needs, the absence of social connections causes pain. Indeed, we propose that the pain of social separation or rejection may not be very different from some kinds of physical pain” (Eisenberger & Lieberman (2005), p. 110).

Let me intersect a passage from Linda M. Hartling (2005):

In an effort to illuminate the factors that make humiliating experiences enduring and an impetus for violence, I propose that we stretch our conceptual maps by exploring the neurobiology of humiliation. Recent research on social pain—“the distressing experience arising from the perception of psychological distance from close others or from the social group” (Eisenberger & Lieberman, in press, p. 6)—may help to explain both the acuteness and the enduring nature of humiliating experiences. Most of us would agree that humiliation provokes social pain. Eisenberg and Lieberman reviewed studies of animal and human behavior and conducted neuropsychological and neuroimaging research, to formulate a theory about how the brain processes social pain—and, presumably, the pain of humiliation: Social Pain/Physical Pain Overlap Theory (SPOT)...proposes that social pain, the pain that we experience when social relationships are damaged or lost, and physical pain, the pain that we experience upon physical injury, share parts of the same underlying processing system. This system is responsible for detecting the presence or possibility of physical or social damage and recruiting attention once something has gone wrong in order to fix it....Based on mammalian infants’ lengthy period of immaturity and their critical need for substantial maternal contact and care, it is possible that the social attachment system, the system that keeps us near close others, may have piggybacked onto the pre-existing pain system, borrowing the pain signal to signify and prevent the danger of social separation. (p. 4) Eisenberg and Lieberman observe that social pain triggers some of the same mechanisms and responses in the brain as physical pain. Could this be one of the reasons the pain of humiliation is so enduring? (Hartling, 2005, pp. 2-3).

Concluding remarks

In the traditional world of ranked honor, the reason for why people bypassed shame was diametrically antithetical in masters and underlings:

1) In the traditional world of ranked honor, masters bypassed shame they happened to harbor because they deemed it shameful to feel shame; they had been socialized to reckon that masters ought not to bow and ought not to accept shame because it would mean humiliating themselves. In contemporary contexts, we find this behavior, for example, wherever hypermasculinity is venerated.

2) In the traditional world of ranked honor, underlings bypassed shame they happened to harbor because they wished to avoid being lowered even more. In contemporary contexts, the participants in Tony Webb’s workshop, for example, were socialized into the underling’s way of believing that acknowledging shame meant identifying with it and bowing even deeper. In today’s world, many former underlings do not yet
dare to accept the human rights message that underlings have gained the option to free themselves from shame and carry their heads high.

Hitler and Mandela led their people out of shame using two diametrically antithetical ethical and moral frames, the frame of ranked honor versus the frame of equal dignity:

1) Hitler attempted to lead Germans out of shame into the traditional honorable master’s way of handling humiliation. Hitler urged Germans to feel ashamed at accepting humiliation from the victors of WWI and from what he saw as the “future humiliation” emanating from a World Jewry. He asked Germans to come out of the shame that underlings typically take for granted and become masters by assuming their supposed Aryan master race essence. He asked them to get angry, and reject being humiliated by subjugating their enemies, as masters do, not by accepting shame from them, as underlings do – see, for example, Evelin Gerda Lindner (2006f), Evelin Gerda Lindner (2000c).

2) Mandela led his downtrodden brothers and sisters out of shame into the way human rights adherents handle humiliation. Mandela himself did not feel ashamed and therefore did not have to acknowledge bypassed shame, even though he was being systematically put down and humiliated. Mandela had freed himself from the master’s message that he ought to bow. He carried his head high, even though he was the target of humiliating treatment and felt humiliated. He did not translate humiliation into shame. He rejected humiliation, like a master, however, he refrained from walking the traditional path of honor, he did not subjugate the white elite of South Africa into submission, but humbled them into equality in dignity. He rejected humiliation by translating it into a force for profound constructive social change within the context of human rights call for equal dignity for all. And he taught his followers to do the same.

Clearly, today’s world needs Mandelas. Mandelas have transcended the narrow confines of the fear that the security dilemma had instilled for millennia and the stark alternatives of either losing or winning. He embedded his strategy within the much wider scope of the human rights ideal of mutuality.

Living globally, I indeed observe an increasing widening of humankind’s horizon both in depth (more detail) and width (larger scope), away from the former tunnel view of fear. I observe increasing awareness and hope connected to two phenomena, first, the rising awareness of the fact that there is one humankind inhabiting a tiny planet, and, second, an increasing salience of human rights ideals of equal dignity for all.

A note on my personal stance in relation to human rights is necessary here, because it is easily misperceived. I indeed strongly associate myself with the idea of equal worthiness and dignity for every human being (and extensions beyond the human world). However, Westerner arrogance is not my game. To my opinion, people who endorse honor codes, wherever in the world, may not be looked down upon. As laid out in this paper, my conceptualization is that honor codes had their place in a world that did not yet experience the coming-together of humankind into one single unit. I also believe that the ideal of equal dignity is not an exclusive Western idea, but has always been part and parcel of many religions and philosophies around the world, however, that it is only now that this ideal receives space to flourish. The point is that we live in a new reality today
and that human rights represent a normative framework that is better adapted to an emerging global knowledge society with its shared global challenge to achieve ecological and social sustainability. It is therefore that I wish to encourage every inhabitant of the globe to abandon “we/them” differentiations and define themselves as “we,” as “we humanity,” who, instead of pointing fingers at each other, together searches for the best ways to provide our children with a livable world. I identify with all humanity as my family and I call upon us all to move ahead together. When I speak about genocide of honor killings, I do not wish to blacken the reputation of fellow human beings but wish to help us all to transcend the malignity of our past together.

Around 1994, stimulated by my cross-cultural global observations, I asked, “What is the strongest obstacle to peace, to social cohesion, and to willingness to cooperate in our newly emerging interdependent world? What is the strongest force that disrupts, creates fault lines, and fuels destructive conflict in the new interconnected world we live in?”

My response, grounded in my international work, is that the current coming-together of humankind, together with the human rights revolution, has consequences for the balance of emotions felt by everybody at macro, meso and micro levels, and that humiliation gains unprecedented salience in the new context.

Today, in the aftermath of the 1757 shift in meaning of the word to humiliate, the practice of humiliating people can no longer serve in prosocial ways. Only shaming and humbling can still be applied in such ways; and indeed, companies and countries around the world currently face activists who attempt to shame them into keeping their promises as protectors of the environment and human rights. Humbling and shaming still works prosocially, however, not humiliation. We do not wish to have shameless people as neighbors; indeed, we wish to be surrounded by confident and humble people, yet, not by humiliated underlings. Mandela did not humiliate the white elite in South Africa; he humbled them. This new illegitimacy of the practice of humiliation marks a profoundly significant shift, and it has to do with the human rights revolution, which renders the ranking of human worthiness illicit and humiliating. The only prosocial role left to humiliation is the ability in people to feel humiliated, similar to the function of a fire-alarm. The ability to feel humiliated provides the necessary emotional driving force to conscientization, which in turn powers the human rights movement.

Clearly, humankind is far from having arrived in a world where everybody enjoys equal dignity. Old honor norms and related feelings of humiliation are still alive and well, in contradiction to new equal dignity norms and their respective emotional expressions. Both moral universes are often diametrically opposed and currently render fertile soil for violent conflict. Therefore it is important to understand both.

So-called “Realists” doubt that humankind can come together and create world peace, since, in their view, the world is caught in Hobbesian anarchy, which condemns humankind to endless conflict and war.28 So-called “Liberals” are more optimistic; they argue that international cooperation can create peace within anarchy.29 I am both more optimistic than many Liberals and more pessimistic than many Realists. I am more optimistic, because I believe that the historically unprecedented ingathering of humankind into one single unit, namely the emerging imagery and reality of a global village, represents a profoundly benign force. At the same time, I am more pessimistic than Realists because, according to my view, dynamics of humiliation, if not taken seriously, may have malign effects that could cancel out the benign tendencies.
Optimism appears justified in the face of the power of the human desire to connect, bond, belong, cooperate, and receive recognition and acknowledgement, and its potential to bring people together. As explained above, human history teaches that “human nature” is not inevitably “aggressive” but hard-wired for cooperation and mutual bonding. Optimism can also flow from observing how people today learn to consider all humankind as jointly responsible for humankind’s survival on earth. Optimism may emanate even from “nuclear one-worldism” — the growing destructiveness of military technology that makes it functional for states to do what individuals do, namely submit to a common power, which, in the case of the global village, would mean viable global super-ordinate institutional structures that overcome Hobbesian anarchy. Also Self-organization theory indicates optimism – Alexander Wendt (2003b) argues that the coming-into-being of a world state is “inevitable” by ways of the “interaction between a self-organizing, bottom-up process and a structural, top-down one: struggles for recognition mediated by technological change at the micro-level, conditioned by the logic of anarchy at the macro” (Wendt, 2003b, p. 4).

We can indeed observe many processes of coalescence, both historic and current, to differing degrees and at various speeds. The United States of America went through such a historic process and Europe is currently undergoing one. European Union (EU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Latin American common market MERCOSUR, or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), these are all examples of processes in which certain elements of sovereignty are placed at a higher level than the local one and are slowly and carefully transferred to commonly accepted super-ordinate structures. United Nations institutions are at the highest level of super-ordinate institutions ever formed; even though they have not yet given much chance to mature by their jealously sovereign members, they represent the first embryonic seeds, if nurtured constructively, for future arrangements to secure good governance at the highest global level.

And optimism can also flow from the fact that building a better world is not utopian. This is being explained by many authors, for example, Fredrik S. Heffermehl (Ed.) (2001). The ways to secure global sustainability, ecologically and socially, are all surprisingly simple and even inexpensive. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/) are not impossible to reach. What is lacking so far is “merely” the political will to decisively embark on those solutions, while what is needed is “simply” that the broad masses abandon their belief in their powerlessness. Change is possible when every citizen of the world grasps that in today’s connected world everybody has enormous power, the power to transform themselves into terrorist “weapons of mass destruction,” or voices that force political will to stand up to the global challenges that humankind faces. The task is difficult, but difficulty ought to heighten efforts, not diminish them. Indeed, just these days, global awareness of the need to protect the Earth’s climate has risen dramatically; what we still need is the same attention extended to social sustainability, for example, to the global tariff negotiations in what is called the Doha Development Round.

Pessimism, on the other side, seems at its place as well, not least because the strength of the desire for recognition is also its weakness, particularly in the new globalizing context which is permeated by the human rights call for equal dignity for all. Thwarted desire for recognition, disappointed expectations when respect for equal dignity is
wanting, creates feelings of humiliation, which in turn have the potency of a “nuclear bomb of the emotions.”

To conclude, we find ourselves in times of transition, a transition from hierarchical rankings of human worthiness to equal dignity as stipulated in human rights ideals. “Globalization critics” burn for globalization that is infused with egalization and oppose globalization which lacks egalization. The transition that causes hot feelings is the transition towards egalization – and among the hottest feelings are feelings of humiliation that are felt by those who perceive themselves or identify with the downtrodden.

Let us build a world of global unity in diversity, where we embed diversity into caring unity by way of applying the subsidiarity principle. It would most probably be suicidal for humankind to allow unity to become uniformity or diversity to become division – forcing everybody into uniformity in a global dictatorship, or into divisions between hostile fragments, would doom humankind. The application of the subsidiarity principle provides due room for diversity and avoids global tyranny and monoculture (the subsidiarity principle is prominent in the design of the European Union; it states that matters ought to be handled by the smallest or lowest competent authority).

I believe that we can harness globalization with egalization. We have a chance to build a decent global village, following the call for a decent society by Avishai Margalit (1996). The way is to stop waiving our hands in the air in despair or turn our thumbs in skepticism. In times of emergency, any hands-off approach guarantees demise. The only viable approach is hands on, even if we fail – in times of emergency there is no try. The reward will be much more benign than the past ten thousand years – a world were men and women together can engage in nurturing relationships of secure bonds and caring connections embedded into mutual respect for equality in dignity.

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2 See, for example, Harold Bloom (1999), John O. Lyons (1978).
3 Mark Nathan Cohen (1977) writes: “The earliest visible populations of prehistory … do surprisingly well if we compare them to the actual record of human history rather than to our romantic images of civilized progress. Civilization has not been as successful in guaranteeing human well-being as we like to believe, at least for most of our history” (p. 131). See also Evelin Gerda Lindner (2007c).
4 Even rats are capable of generalized reciprocity, not just direct reciprocity, see Thomas Pfeiffer et al. (2005).
5 See the works of Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman (2002), of Martin Martin E. P. Seligman (2002), or Norbert Schwarz, Daniel Kahneman, & Ed Diener (Eds.) (1999), and others who spell out the make-up of happiness.
6 The topic of the security dilemma has been expanded upon by many other authors. See Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, & Janice Gross Stein (1985), or Richard K. Betts (Ed.) (2005). Jack Snyder (1985) defines the security dilemma as one state requiring the insecurity of another (see also Jack Snyder & Barbara Walters (Eds.) (1999), while Alan Collins (2004) defines it as a state-induced security dilemma.
7 See also Norbert Elias (2000).
8 See, for example, Michael Haugh (2004).
9 In his work on mythology (1954-1956), Roland Barthes (1972) discusses socially constructed reality and how it is perceived as “natural” – see also work on ideology by Terry Eagleton (1991). Barthes describes how opinions and values are introduced by a certain power group and then held up as “universal truths.” As a result, those who try to question this socially constructed reality (what Barthes calls le cela-va-de-soi) are ridiculed and rejected. They are accused of lacking “bon sens.” Power relations are thus glossed over, and their political threat is obscured. Barthes thus exposes the artificiality of “realities” which disguise their historical and social origins.

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Pierre Bourdieu (1977) proposes a theory of practice. According to him, social behaviour is the continual accomplishing of actions. Bourdieu writes on the naturalization of the arbitrariness of an established order and how an entire system of schemes of perception, appreciation, and action constitutes what Bourdieu terms the habitus. It is this habitus, explains Pierre Bourdieu (1979), that lends order to customary social behaviour by functioning as “the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices” (p. vii). In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault (1977) exposes the naturalization of the “criminal character.” Brenton Faber (1999), discusses Intuitive Ethics where he suggests that intuition is the naturalization of dominant values and beliefs. He bases his theory of intuition on the sociological terms of habitus as used by Bourdieu, as well as routinization by Anthony Giddens (1984), and naturalization by Norman Fairclough (1992).

11 See also Michael Johnson (2001).
14 See, for example Catherine A. Lutz & Lila Abu-Lughod (Eds.) (1990), Lila Abu-Lughod (1986).
15 See Evelin Gerda Lindner (2003a).
16 George Lakoff & Mark Johnson (1999).
17 See the work done by scholars such as Donald L. Nathanson (1992), Thomas J. Scheff (2005a), Thomas J. Scheff (1997), or Tony Webb (2003).
18 See related work by Howard Zehr (1990), Howard Zehr (2002).
20 See, for example, Cristina Jayme Montiel (2006).
22 World War I, as well, has been viewed through the humiliation lens; Mary Allerton Kilbourne Matossian (1962) made the point that late developing industrial nations, experiencing military and imperial humiliation, as a response developed belligerent, bellicose and nationalistic ideologies and regimes as a protective shell for modernization.
24 Shame has been addressed from a wide range of angles, see, for example, Rosamund Dalziell, David Parker, & Iain Wright (Eds.) (1996), Sally S. Dickerson & Margaret E. Kemeny (2004), Suzanne M. Retzinger (1991), Gabriele Taylor (1985), Gabriele Taylor (1995), Carl D. Schneider (1992), Lewis B. Smedes (1993), Bernard Williams (1993).
25 See, among others, Peter Bevington Smith, Michael Harris Bond, & Ciðdem Kaðitçibasi (2005), Flora Lim, Michael Harris Bond, & Mieko Kuchar Bond (2003), Michael Harris Bond, Flora Lim, & Mieko


28 See, for example, Kenneth Waltz (1979).

29 See, for example, Robert O. Keohane (1990).


31 Self-organization thinking is very inter-disciplinary; for social psychology, see Robin R. Vallacher & Andrzej Nowak (1997). See furthermore John Stuart Kauffman (1995), and Bruce Weber & David Depew (1996), on its relationship to neo-Darwinism, as well as Niklas Luhmann (1995), Joshua Epstein & Robert Axtell (1996), Ulrich Witt (1997), Russ Marion (1999), and Michael Macy & Robert Willer (2002). What cannot be subsumed in “the struggle for recognition” is the “logic of capital” (Nancy Fraser 2000), Nancy Fraser & Axel Honneth (2003), however, also here, it is argued, a world state may be in the cards (Christopher Chase-Dunn & Thomas D. Hall (2004), Christopher Chase-Dunn (1990), Martin Shaw (2000).