Peace and Dignity: More than the Absence of Humiliation – What We Can Learn from the Asia-Pacific Region

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Abstract

In an interdependent world, peace is not optional, it is compulsory, if humankind is to survive. Local conflicts, particularly protracted conflicts, are inscribed into, and taken hostage by larger global pressures, and vice versa, and this diffuses insecurity.

Peace is more than resolved conflict. What is needed is the pro-active creation of global social cohesion. In an interdependent world, security is no longer attainable through keeping enemies out but only through keeping a compartmentalised world together.

How do we, as humankind, keep a disjointed world together in a pro-active way? And how can Asia contribute to this task? This is the topic of this paper.

At the current point in human history, there is a window of opportunity. Never before have humans understood how small and vulnerable their habitat is. Combining the strengths of all cultures in a pro-active way is what is needed to build a harmonious global society.

This paper suggests that the most significant way for Asia to contribute to this task may lie in helping to create a new metaphysical orientation for the world, a new consciousness, one of nondualism. Asia is a cradle of nondualistic ontologies and can thus significantly contribute to creating novel designs for large-scale systemic change. The wide-spread Asian emphasis on harmonious societies entails great potential (when designed in nondualistic ways).
Introduction

In an interdependent world, peace is not optional. If humankind is to survive, it is compulsory. Local conflicts, particularly protracted conflicts, are inscribed into, and taken hostage by larger global pressures, and vice versa. Insecurity does not stay isolated; it typically gets diffused, locally and globally (Marshall 1999).

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Yet, what is peace? Peace is more than ‘calm and quiet’ or ‘stability and order.’ It is more than the quiet acquiescence of subalterns. Positive peace is more than negative peace, or the cessation of violence. Positive peace creates the conditions that eliminate the causes of violence. Positive peace is more than resolved conflict, like love in a marriage is more than solved quarrels. ‘Successful conflict resolution isn’t what makes marriages succeed’ is the message recent research results transmit (Gottman & Silver 1999, 11).

Peace could perhaps best be described as ‘comprehensive long-term global social and ecological sustainability’ in what philosopher Avishai Margalit would call a decent world (Margalit 1996). Margalit points out that it is not just singular acts of injustice or humiliation we have to attend to, but that we have to build decent societies in which institutions do not humiliate their citizens (and this includes also the protection of the human habitat).

What is needed is the pro-active creation of a harmonious global society (harmony is the term used in Asia) characterised by social cohesion (in Europe, social cohesion is the important term2). What is needed is a harmonious cohesive global society that is capable of the cooperation that is necessary to attain comprehensive peace with itself and its habitat. To say it differently, in an interdependent world, social and ecological sustainability are no longer achievable through keeping enemies out, but only through keeping a compartmentalised world together.

How do we, as humankind, keep a disjointed world together in a pro-active way? The maximum we can hope for is that we learn Mandela’s ability to turn enemies into friends (after 27 years in prison, some of his prison guards had become his friends; see Mandela 1994).

Yet, this may be too ambitious a goal, at least for most of us, most of the time. But there is also a minimum goal. At a minimum, we have to succeed in what in case of divorce is called shared custody for children. This metaphor applies because humankind cannot escape shared custody of its home planet, even if people hate each other to the point of divorce. There is no other planet to which a country or community could move to if it no longer wanted to live with the rest.

Pro-actively creating harmonious global social cohesion, notwithstanding existing divisions and even mutual hatred, this is the task at hand for humankind at the current point in time. And this is also the obligatory minimum for survival, not a naïve wish of some peace researchers in ivory towers.

As to the urgency of global problems, the human sociosphere and biosphere need more than tinkering, they need thorough systemic change to become sustainable. Michio Kaku, renowned physicist with Asian background, makes the situation utterly clear:

The generation now alive is perhaps the most important generation of humans ever to walk the Earth. Unlike previous generations, we hold in our hands the future destiny of our species, whether we soar into fulfilling our promise as a type I civilization [meaning a civilization that succeeds in building a socially and ecologically sustainable world] or fall into the abyss of chaos, pollution, and war. Decisions made by us will reverberate throughout this century. How we resolve global wars, proliferating nuclear weapons, and sectarian and ethnic strife will either lay or destroy the foundations of a type I civilization. Perhaps the purpose and meaning of the current generation are to make sure that the transition to a type I civilization is

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a smooth one. The choice is ours. This is the legacy of the generation now alive. This is our
destiny (Kaku 2005: 361).

Kaku’s summary of the threats to the human socio- and biospheres is more comprehensive
than the focus that is en-vogue these days, namely the economic crisis that broke in 2008. There
is much more at stake than an economic crisis. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon
made a list of the world’s perils: ‘We face a global financial crisis. A global energy crisis. A
global food crisis. Trade talks have collapsed, yet again. We have seen new outbreaks of war and
violence, new rhetoric of confrontation. Climate change ever more clearly threatens our planet.’

Creating harmonious global cohesion requires two core innovations in two steps, first a new
level of inclusive global awareness, within the human psyche, which, in turn, must drive
systemic change out in the world. This is the first step. As soon as new institutional frames are in
place, they will, if designed appropriately, stabilise new kinds of awareness in a self-reinforcing
fashion. This is the second step.

Experts agree that, while many solutions are on the table, at least in theory, what is lacking, at
the present point in historical time, is the political will to implement them in practice. Ban Ki-
Moon identified the world’s single most destructive problem: The biggest crisis, he said, is a lack
of global leadership. His speech was entitled ‘A Call to Global Leadership.’

In other words, the citizens of this world have yet to seize the power needed to turn the
situation around, they have yet to become sufficiently aware of the responsibility they carry, they
still have to translate awareness into action and drive global systemic change. At present, too
many people leave the state of affairs to a few power elites who do not necessarily have the
common good of humankind at heart. Scholar and strategist David J. Rothkopf contends that
small number (circa 6,000) of largely unelected powerful people around the globe have shaped
the world during the past decades in ways that the financial meltdown became possible
(Rothkopf 2008). These elites’ power considerations have so far neglected long-term survival to
the degree of self- and other-destruction.

Psychologist Ervin Staub has extensively written about the Holocaust and he highlights the
fact that bystanders stood by, instead of standing up (Staub 1989). Today, every single individual
on the globe is a bystander who needs to stand up, if humankind is to avoid its demise. Every
single individual has to invest in creating a different world, a decent world.

‘There are no passengers on spaceship earth. We are all crew,’ this quote from Marshall
McLuhan is written in huge letters on a wall of qm, the Queensland Museum South Bank, in
Brisbane, Australia, where I saw it on 10th August 2007.

Healing only the individual psyche and hoping for bottom-up initiatives will not suffice, nor
rigid top-down approaches. Processes and strategies must be interwoven into complex webs.

Merely achieving ‘resilience’ within the status quo is certainly insufficient. A de-
contextualised clinical trauma-based approach does not address the systemic and endemic factors
of collective violence (even though it is true that well-functioning people and communities are
essential for the kind of cooperation that is required to build legitimate political and economic
institutions; see Christie 2006: 11; Wessells 1999). It would be equally wrong-headed to impose

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3 United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon addressed the 63rd session of the General Assembly

4 SNorway’s ambassador to the United Nations, Mona Juul, has accused Ban Ki-Moon himself of
weak leadership. See her confidential letter (in Norwegian) of August 19, 2009, disclosed at
www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/article3223154.ece.
systemic social change only in the name of abstract rights. M. Anne Brown, Research Fellow at the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, in her discussion of the ‘Asian way debate’ (see more further down), advocates dialogue, dialogue that takes its starting point from suffering, not from top-down monologist preaching of universal values (Brown 2002).

What is needed, among others, is conscientisation, or an advancement in our sense of right and wrong, as a mediator of antecedent conditions and pro-democracy movements (Montiel 2006). Cristina Montiel, Professor at the Ateneo de Manila University’s Psychology Department, explains how active non-violent movements in the Philippines became increasingly powerful in resonance with conscientisation becoming broadly networked.

In short, the problems of the world require a quantum leap of human consciousness and awareness to reach a higher level of conscientisation so as to drive systemic change – we can call it post-individual consciousness (Heard 1963), or unity consciousness (Hollick 2006).

How do we achieve a quantum leap of human consciousness, global conscientisation, so as to arrive at the local and global institutions that will give us the harmonious global social cohesion we need? And how do we achieve it quickly enough? Clearly, at the current juncture in history a multitude of crises presses for quick action.

In this dire predicament, so-called Western ways alone cannot save the situation. This is Asia’s moment. Asia’s contributions are urgently needed. Explaining why Asia’s input is so important is one of the aims of this paper.

This paper is organised as follows: The first section highlights the current unease in the world, and the quest for alternative metaphysical foundations for how we should conceptualise reality. Then a brief introductory historical overview is given, which provides a large-scale frame for the global systemic change that is required at the current point in history. The term of egalisation is introduced – a term that I coined to match the word globalisation and to indicate that globalisation needs to be humanised by implementing equality in dignity for all. Third, the current state-of-the-art of humiliation research is summarised. A point already made above is emphasised, namely that in order to humanise globalisation through egalisation, global conscientisation is required. The ability to feel humiliated, on behalf of oneself and others, is presented as the emotional driving force for conscientisation. Fourth, it is discussed how globalisation could be humanised, i.e., how egalisation and pro-active global cohesion-building could be approached.

1. **Current unease, and the quest for different conceptualisations of reality**

So-called modern science, at least until recently, was dominated by Western scholars. Therefore, much research is situated in Western cultural contexts. A Western scholar typically begins research within his or her own cultural setting and then makes some allowances for historic and cultural variations. Dialogue and bridge-building with other academic fields and other cultural realms are not easy to achieve even in today’s increasingly connected world. Unfortunately, this state-of-affairs is ongoing even though there is an urgent need to re-conceptualise a host of concepts, including that of peace and security (Clements & Foley 2007).
1.1. Current unease

The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (ACPACS) is among those institutions that warns against the pitfalls that academia creates – for itself and the world – by allowing academic disciplines to discipline their scholars into overly narrow specialisations and conceptualisations. Academia simply loses its relevance in the world when it accumulates ‘blind spots.’ ‘The fragile states discourse and the state-building approach have certain blind spots’ (www.uq.edu.au/acpacs/towards-effective-and-legitimate-governance), this is the starting point for one of ACPACS projects, entitled ‘Towards Effective and Legitimate Governance: States Emerging from Hybrid Political Orders.’

The researchers, who participated in this project, were Kevin P. Clements, Wendy L. Foley, M. Anne Brown, Anna Nolan, and Volker Böge. Case studies included were Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and East Timor.

Where did the researchers identify the blind spots in mainstream academic discourse on fragile states? They found them in the predominance of a focus on government institutions, in the fact that relatively little attention is given to issues of citizenship and legitimacy, and in the application of a model of the state that is too closely tied to today’s OECD states. The APCACS researchers caution that particularly in the Pacific region, these blind spots have to be overcome, since governance is a complex mix of liberal institutional and customary mechanisms. In their project, they therefore explore the relations between state and non-state governance functions, with the aim to arrive at more contextualised recommendations.

Also peace psychology has a Western background, including blind spots – it emerged in the context of the Cold War. Peace psychology is currently in the process of recognising its shortcomings and is on the move: ‘In particular, three themes are emerging in post-Cold War peace psychology: (1) greater sensitivity to geohistorical context, (2) a more differentiated perspective on the meanings and types of violence and peace, and (3) a systems view of the nature of violence and peace’ (Christie 2006: 3).

What would be the most significant blind spot we can identify? Is there a kind of ‘master’ blind spot? I suggest there is. I suggest that dualism is a core culprit. Let me explain: Dualism-Manichaeanism-Armageddon (the DMA syndrome) is decried by peace researcher Johan Galtung as the core path from conflict to war (Galtung, Jacobsen, Brand-Jacobsen, & Tschudi 2000). Psychologist and educator Lawrence LeShan warns that creating and firing up Manichaean self/other and good/evil dualisms in people prepares them for violence and convinces them that wars are worth fighting (LeShan 1992). Not only peace researchers decry dualism. Sociologists and economists look for alternatives to dualism as well. Some economists suggest the notion of duality as possible alternative to dualism (Jackson 1999), duality as derived from sociology’s structuration theory (Giddens 1984): two elements are interdependent and no longer separate or opposed, although they remain conceptually distinct. Already cyberneticist Gregory Bateson (1904-1980) argued that the dualism of Western thought creates serious problems for the individual and society (Bateson 1972).

What is dualism? Dualism holds that ultimately there are two kinds of substances. René Descartes’ dualistic view of a mind-body dichotomy is perhaps the most widely known expression of dualism. Also the dominant Western spree of conquering the rest of the world over the past centuries as colonisers was underpinned by dualism. Dualistic views still linger on in many world regions and many spheres of life – not least expressions such as ‘the axis of evil’ can serve as evidence.
Dualism is a notion in metaphysics, the branch of philosophy that reflects on the study of being, in Greek ontology (Loux 2006). Philosophy of mind is the ontology of the mind, of mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain (Beakley and Ludlow (eds.) 2006).

Dualism is to be distinguished from pluralism, which holds that ultimately there are many kinds of substances. Dualism must also be differentiated from monism, which is the metaphysical and theological view that all is one, either the mental (idealism) or the physical (materialism and physicalism). Physicalism is thus a monist concept, holding that that there are no kinds of things other than physical things. Dualism is also to be distinguished from nondualism (more further down).

Contemporary scientists usually are no longer dualists, but physicalists. Yet, also physicalism may not hold all the answers. Indeed, we do not have to search far to find proof that physics cannot provide the safe foundation that many may hope for. Among many sources of uncertainty, in quantum physics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle forces us to abandon the assumption by earlier scientists that the physical state of a system can be measured exactly and that future states can be predicted unambiguously. Psychologist Imants Barušs suggests that materialists overlook that materialism cannot even explain matter, let alone anomalous phenomena or subjective experience, however, that it remains entrenched in academia largely for political reasons (Barušs 1993; Barušs 2001). Philosopher Carl Gustav Hempel points out that currently physics are too limited to offer a comprehensive explanation of mentality (Hempel 1969). And we cannot hope to save physicalism by putting our expectations on some future ‘ideal’ physics, because then physicalism becomes the circular claim that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because physics properly defined is whatever explains all phenomena.

Some avant-garde social scientists, for example, Alexander Wendt, propose quantum social science to solve the mind-body problem that represents such a serious difficulty for all branches of social science and their basic ontological and epistemological assumptions (Wendt 2005). Wendt suggests that a quantum connection, justifying a participatory epistemology in social inquiry, would give additional force to critiques of the subject-object distinction, such as postmodernists or feminists. ‘Human beings are in effect “walking wave particle dualities,” not classical material objects’ (Wendt 2005: 7). ‘We know we have experience from, well, experience itself, but there is no apparent way to reconcile this fact with modern science. By rights it seems consciousness should not exist, and as such neither should meaning, which presupposes consciousness’ (Wendt 2005: 10).

1.2. The quest for new conceptualisations of reality

Where do we go from here? In the current situation of unease, given the need for a quantum leap in awareness, not just in a few people, but in as many people as possible, and as fast as possible, many look for examples of sudden paradigm shifts from which one could learn. Indeed, leaps can occur and tipping points can be observed (Gladwell 2000). However, they are often associated with extreme experiences, for example, with after near-death experiences (Ring 1980). Neuro-anatomist Jill Bolte Taylor, for instance, attained a deep change of her outlook on life and the world in general through a brain injury (Taylor 2006; see also related, albeit controversial views on the way the brain has evolved historically by Jaynes 1976). Also overwhelming suffering may bring about a deep paradigm shift. Michelle Bachelet, now President of Chile, felt very angry and bitter for many years after her father was imprisoned and
tortured by the Pinochet regime and died in custody (and she herself was tortured). But then came a moment, and she cannot explain why and how this happened, when these feelings transmuted into a desire to build a more constructive future where what happened in the past would not happen again. Now, she wants an entire country, her homeland Chile, to turn hate into love (BBC World HARDtalk interview with Gavin Esler on 7th April 2008).

There are other examples. Hassan Butt’s mental state ‘turned’ when carnage happened too close to home. He was born 1980 in Luton as a British Pakistani. He was a former spokesman of the radical Islamic group al-Muhajiroun. He now calls on Muslims to ‘renounce terror’ (Butt 2007a). He says he left his network after the London bombings in 2005, when an already lingering unease mounted in face of witnessing the killing of people he no longer could regard as innocent and deserving of death (Butt 2007b).

However, we ask, are there other ways, ways that can be used by people in larger numbers, and more quickly? After all, present crises will not be so merciful and wait until the human psyche has made the necessary leaps. We do not wish to increase the suffering in the world by creating violence, terror, and war only to teach ourselves the lesson that we’d better find alternative ways of living together. And inflicting brain damage to achieve leaps of consciousness would be as unethical and impractical.

Perhaps a more collective approach is needed, cultural paradigm shifts that frame reality in ways that steer people’s actions and reactions in more benign directions?

Such a collective approach could be achieved by a cultural shift toward nondualist approaches (Katz (ed.) 2007). To the nondualist, reality is ultimately neither physical nor mental, but an overwhelming state or realisation beyond words. There are many variations of this conceptualisation, at its core the view that while different phenomena are not the same, they are inseparable, or that there is no hard line between them. We see this approach in mystical traditions of many religions, particularly traditions originating in Asia.

Until the mid-19th century, Kashmir comprised the valley surrounded by the Great Himalayas and the Pir Panjal range, and, indeed, this unique valley is the very place where we meet the leap of consciousness that would be beneficial today at a global scale, and we meet it in the form of a spontaneous recognition. Kashmir Shaivism can be divided into three fundamental traditions, one of them Pratyabhijna Sastra, which emphasises realisation and recognition (of Anuttara, the Supreme; see Sharma 2007). The Pratyabhijna school, in Sanskrit spontaneous recognition, does not require any upayas (means), that is, there is nothing to practice. Recognising ‘who you are’ is all that is needed.

India’s wisdom has been affected by globalization and much has been lost. However, recently, interest in approaches that allow for rapid changes in awareness is rising in the West. Dennis Genpo Merzel, for example, based in the United States, explains this in his book Big Mind, Big Heart (Genpo Merzel 2007). Similar to the Pratyabhijna school, he is cautious with upayas, particularly when they transmute from means to ends. Meditation, for instance, can miss its goal and instead reify or aggrandise the practitioner’s own limited egocentricity (what Carl Gustav Jung would call psychic inflation).

The ultimate nondual reality has many names. Some may it called God, or Shunyata (Emptiness, especially emphasised in Mahayana Buddhism), or Brahman (see the Indian philosopher Shankara, possibly 788 – 820 CE). Spirit is another term (Indian thinker Sri Aurobindo, 1872-1950, and Integral Advaita; see McDermott (ed.) 1974; see also Wilber 1996),
as is The Self (see Tamil sage Ramana Maharshi, 1879-1950; see, for example, Goodman (ed.) 1985), or The Dao (see the Chinese philosopher Lao Zi).5

Zen Buddhism and the Indian system of Advaita Vedanta, a sub-school of the Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy, are two of the strongest traditions of nonduality in the East (with Advaita Vedanta’s version of nondualism conceptually dissolving the object into the subject, and Buddhism vice versa; see Loy 1988). Advaita Vedanta holds that we form an identity based on the content of the mind (feelings, sensations, hopes, dreams, thoughts), however that our true identity or nature is the seer, the witness, or the Self – that which observes our feelings, sensations, hopes, dreams, thoughts.

The latter relates to Western research on the psychology of emotions. Already psychologist William James (1842–1910) spoke of a doer-watcher duality (James 1950). Also according to neuroscientist António Rosa Damásio, there is a duality at the centre of the phenomenal self: We can perform a task and at the same time be aware that we are performing it (Damásio 2000; Damásio 1999). Psychiatrist Arthur Deikman calls the component of the psyche that is aware of our actions the observing self (Deikman 1982). Psychologist Jean Piaget posited cognition and affect within this duality (Piaget 1981; Piaget 1950).

Also mystical traditions such as Sufism or the mystical Christianity of Meister Eckhart (ca. 1260-1328; see McGinn 2001) can be labelled as nondualistic, as well as the work of French philosopher and Jesuit priest Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955; see Chardin 1955). Chardin’s nondualism undermined the doctrine of original sin developed by Saint Augustine, and not surprisingly, the Roman Curia, as an institution part of a dualistic world, could not afford to lose this doctrine, irrespective of its potential inconsistency with the original Christian teachings, and Chardin was reprimanded. The discovery in 1945 of the Gospel of Thomas has since led some scholars to believe that Jesus’ original teachings were in fact nondualistic and that this was later suppressed (DeConick 2005; Asgeirsson, DeConick, and Uro (eds.) 2006; Pagels 2003).

Christian religious denominations such as the Quakers (the Religious Society of Friends, founded in England in the 17th century) hold as their central concept the Inner Light or God within, according to which each individual is encouraged not only to develop individual religious beliefs, but also translate them into action and live by them; see a paper by the ACPACS Director Kevin P. Clements (Clements 2004). Hilary Summy, an ACPACS affiliate, brought to us the life Margaret Thorp, a Quaker activist and ‘peace angel’ of World War I (Summy 2006).

Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) and his notion of the mysterium is related as well (Otto 1917). In his view, an experience of a mysterium tremendum et fascinans (fearful and fascinating mystery) underlies all religions. It is an experience of a Wholly Other (mysterium), that we perceive with wonder, combined with a sense of our own nothingness in contrast to divine power (tremendum), however, which we find attractive in spite of our fear (fascinans). Otto’s numinous experience, while still a form of otherness or alterity, can also be characterised as the nondualistic breakdown of subject-object dualism and also be understood in non-theistic terms (Ware 2007).

Agape is a term relevant in this context, an adjective and adverb that means, in Greek, ‘gaping, as with wonder, with expectation, or with eager attention.’ As a noun, we can translate agape into ‘spiritual love for God and humankind.’ Philia, Greek ‘love between friends,’ is another relevant word. All these words mean that we can touch the beauty and mercy of the

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5 Chinese tradition suggests that Lao Zi lived in the 6th century BCE. However, historians disagree as to whether Lao Zi is a synthesis of multiple historical personalities, or whether he is a mythical figure, or whether he actually lived in the 4th century BCE. He is being credited with writing the central Taoist work the Daodejing (Tao Te Ching).
universe, beyond all religious explanations, and even though we can neither grasp nor understand this beauty, we can humbly and lovingly pour it into our lives and relationships. Martin Buber (1878–1965), with his concept of loving I-Thou relationships (as opposed to I-It relationship), views meeting a fellow human being in a real dialogue as a reflection of the human meeting with God (Buber 1944).

The Greek ‘gaping,’ as well as Otto’s notion of the mysterium relate to the experience of awe and wonderment that Donald C. Klein (1923–2007), one of the fathers of community psychology, expounds. Klein criticises psychology for being a psychology of projection (Klein & Morrow 2001; see more at www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/don.php). He speaks of awe and wonderment, and the human ability to live in awe and wonderment not just in front of a beautiful sunset or the majesty of the ocean, but always. We can live in a state of awe and wonderment, says Klein, by leaving behind the psychology of projection. The psychology of projection is like a scrim, a transparent stage curtain, where you believe that what you see is reality only as long as the light shines on it in a certain way. However, it is not reality. It is a projection. And in order to live in awe and wonderment, we have to look through this scrim and let go of all the details that appear on it, in which we are so caught up. Then we can see the beautiful sunset, the majestic ocean in everything and always.

As we see, nondualism can theistic, but also nontheistic. Consider, among others, ‘The All’ by philosopher Plotinus (circa 205–270 BCE, born in Egypt, later teaching in Rome; see Plotinus, MacKenna, & Page 1956), The Absolute or, more precisely ‘history as a self-disclosing revelation of the Absolute’ by German philosopher Schelling (1775–1854; see Schelling 1800; Schelling 1978), who was influenced by German writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), or simply The Nondual by British philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924; see Bradley 1893).

We find similar thoughts in various branches of psychology and psychotherapy, with Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961; Wittine 2003) coming to mind, or Gestalt therapy (Leupnitz & Tulkin 1980). Transpersonal psychology can be mentioned as well, with Erich Fromm (1900–1980) and his focus on being as opposed to having (Fromm 1976), and above-mentioned Arthur Deikman and his concept of an observing self (Deikman 1982).

Also recent forms of ecopsychology and transpersonal ecology hold that the ordinary experience of ourselves as separate autonomous beings is incomplete and inaccurate and that the split between planet and self must be healed (Winter 1996). The fall of humans from nonduality into dualism, nihilism, and overshoot (exploitation) is being decried (Bender 2003). Bender draws on Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss and his work on deep ecology (late Arne Næss participated in the 2003 Annual Conference of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network in Paris; see www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/annualmeeting02.php and see for a recent edition of Næss’ work, Næss 2005). Bender interprets Næss’ declaration ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement’ (Næss 1972) as expounding a nondualistic worldview.

The main five traditions that have stimulated the rise of nonduality in the West are Advaita Vedanta, Kashmir Shaivism, Zen Buddhism, Vajrayana Buddhism, and contemplative Taoism. In agreement with Mahayana Buddhism, contemporary Western thinker Ken Wilber believes that reality is ultimately a nondual union of emptiness and form (Wilber 1996). Wilber describes the history of philosophy in general, especially of the West, as a continuous swinging between two poles of ‘truth’ – be it subject-object, mind-body, culture-nature, or individual-group. While the West always tended to conceptualise those dualities as solid, separate opposites, the East tended
to see them rather as a continuum, arising simultaneously and mutually like a concave/convex line (Wilber 1979: 25).

The term process thought refers to similar conceptualisations. It is connected to the name of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), an English mathematician and philosopher (Hartshorne & Peden 1981). Process thought focuses on event metaphysics rather than traditional Western substance metaphysic. Related terms are, among many others, inter-relatedness, mutual transformation, person-in-community, pantheism, and panexperientialism.

Also the principle of Unity in Diversity (Bond 1998) describes a nondual experience, in which both unity and diversity are real, but connected, or Diversity within Unity (Banks, Cookson, Gay, Hawley, Irvine, Nieto, Schofield, & Stephan 2001).

Muneo Yoshikawa, an expert on the Japanese mindscape, has developed a double swing or Identity in Unity model, whereby unity is created out of the realisation of differences (Yoshikawa 1980, Yoshikawa 1987). The model is graphically presented as the infinity symbol, or Möbius Strip (∞). Yoshikawa draws upon three sources, firstly on Buber 1944’s idea of dialogical unity in I and Thou, the two-fold movement between the self and the other that allows for both unity and uniqueness. Secondly, he builds on Soku, the Buddhist logic of Not-One, Not-Two, emphasising that the dialogical unity does not eliminate the tension between the contradictions between potential unity and apparent duality. The third source of Yoshikawa’s model is Judith Martin, Thomas Nakayama, and Lisa Flores’s dialectical approach, which emphasises the processual, relational, and contradictory nature of intercultural communication (Martin, Nakayama, & Flores 2002).

Earlier, I mentioned post-individual consciousness (Heard 1963), or unity consciousness (Hollick 2006), and, indeed, at the current point in history, many feel a ‘Kantian culture’ of collective security or collective friendship coming closer (Wendt 1999, pp. 298–299), even a world society (Wendt’s stage three), and an imminent world state that benignly curbs Hobbesian anarchy (Wendt 2003: 520; see also Baratta, 2004).

And Unity in Diversity is already being achieved, even in political institutions. Diversity can be embedded into unity by way of applying the subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity principle is prominent in the design of the European Union; it states that matters ought to be handled by the smallest or lowest competent authority (Estella 2002). The subsidiarity principle protects unity from degrading into uniformity and diversity from transmuting into division.

At the end of this section, the question arises as to why nondualistic views were suppressed and dualistic views promoted during the past millennia. I suggest, we widen the scope of this exploration and look at brief historical overview over human history to place this discussion within a wider frame.

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6 Also Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven (1892-1978), a reformational philosopher, categorised philosophers throughout the ages according to their philosophical ‘types’ and on the ‘time-currents’ within those types (see a recent new edition of Vollenhoven’s work in Bril and Boonstra (eds.) 2000; see also Friesen 2005).
2. A brief historical overview

Archaeologists inform us that prior to 10,000 years ago there is no evidence of crushed skulls, no signs of organised violence and war. ‘The Hobbesian view of humans in a constant state of “Warre” is simply not supported by the archaeological record’ (Haas 2001: 334). The available archaeological record allows for the educated hunch that organised killing started later, and that human nature does not force humans unavoidably into destructive Hobbesian competition. On the contrary, older evolutionary roots seem to have favoured relationships and cooperation – the very cooperation that is needed in the interdependent world of the 21st century, the very reciprocal altruism that merits being included into today’s definitions of social well-being (Giorgi 2001). It seems that early humans, when they still were hunter-gatherers, approached their world in nondualistic ways – as a field of relations (Ingold 1996; read more on hunter-gatherers, for example, in Johansen 1982, Weatherford 1988, and Weatherford 1991; for a discussion of native Indians in North America; see Wasilewski & Harris 2004).

2.1.1. Human nature is prosocial

Currently, positive psychology is catapulted into the limelight (Kahneman 2002; Seligman 2002; Schwarz, Kahneman, and Diener (eds.) 1999). Having friends rather than money is at the core of happiness. Stumbling on Happiness (Gilbert 2006) won the 2007 Royal Society Prize for Science Books. On reflection, positive psychology seems nothing but the rediscovery of human nature as it evolved during the first 95 percent of Homo sapiens’ history, enough time to become hard-wired, at least to a certain extent. Indeed, in the past years, research has uncovered to what extent Homo sapiens is hard-wired as a social animal that thrives on connection and cooperation rather than isolation and confrontation (Banks & Jordan 2007).

Homo sapiens has apparently populated planet Earth starting from Africa, first colonising Africa and then the rest of the world (except for the Americas, which came later). Mitochondrial “Eve” is estimated to have lived about 140,000 years ago and Y-chromosomal “Adam” around 60,000 years ago (Dawkins 2004). Population geneticists believe that the ancestral human population was very small – a few thousand breeding individuals – meaning that the apparent variety of contemporary humans should not mislead us to believe that we are not all descendants of a very small population.

For the first 95 percent of human history, humans populated the planet, or at least its easily reachable areas, always wandering off to the next valley of untouched abundance, living in small bands of a few hundred hunter-gatherers. A rather benign win-win frame reigned (Ury 1999). Dissatisfied members of a community always had the option, in principle, to wander off and find untouched land (where no other humans lived) with abundant resources. It would be misguided to blindly idealise this period in human history and create a myth of a noble savage (Pinker 2002). If we take Ury’s analysis seriously, we cannot simply equate today’s non-sedentary people with people prior to 10,000 years ago. Some contemporary hunter-gatherer communities exhibit considerable levels of violence, while, as mentioned earlier, prior to 10,000 years ago,

7 The archeologist Lawrence H. Keeley examined casualty rates among contemporary hunter-gatherers and found that the likelihood for a man to die at the hands of another man ranged from a high of 60 percent in one tribe to 15 percent at the most peaceable end; see Keeley 1996; Keeley & Keeley 1997. Experimental psychologist and cognitive scientist Steven Pinker wrote: “The chance that a European or
there is no evidence of crushed skulls, no signs of organised violence and war. The period prior to 10,000 years ago seems to have been a time of comparably egalitarian societal structures and high quality of life (Cohen 1977: 131). Some kind of hierarchy might have existed, but if so, then a milder and less rigidly institutionalised kind of hierarchy compared to what evolved later. I call the first 95 percent of human history the era of pristine pride.

Unfortunately, today, the body of cultural and environmental knowledge that the few remaining indigenous societies still possess, is in the process of disappearing. Only slowly it is understood how important it is to preserve and investigate specialised indigenous knowledge, not least with regard to the resources of the natural environment with which indigenous knowledge is associated. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly only on 13th September 2007, during its 61st session at UN Headquarters in New York City.

With respect to Asia, Indigenous Australians have maintained many aspects of humankind’s earliest lifestyles since at least 40,000 years, until Australia was declared to be terra nullius in 1788. M. Anne Brown explains how ‘Terra nullius became the international legal basis for the British assertion of sovereignty over the land of what became Australia and a statement of the legitimacy of British occupation’ (Brown 2002: 623).

I learned about Indigenous Australian views in 2007, when I spent time in Queensland. Michael Williams, Director of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Unit at the University of Queensland, recommended that I should read about ecological humanities as recently developed by Deborah Bird Rose and her colleagues (Rose 1996; Rose & D’Amico 2002; see also www.ecologicalhumanities.org, and Williams 2000 and Williams 1991). Ecological humanities bridge the divides between the sciences and the humanities, and between Western, Eastern and Indigenous ways of knowing the need to submit to ecological laws and to see humanity as part of a larger living system. Williams also recommended that I take to heart films such as Exile and The Kingdom (1993), where Aboriginal peoples’ ways of life and their painful history of the last 150 years are documented.

2.2. The first large-scale transition toward ranked honour of 10,000 years ago

About 10,000 years ago, everything changed. Planet Earth’s surface is not limitless, and humankind increasingly met what anthropologists call circumscription – the next valley was no longer untouched but already populated by other humans. At some point, in some regions, people began to make do with the land under their feet and engaged in what anthropologists call intensification, or agriculture. Historically rather quickly, agriculture dominated almost everywhere on the planet.8

American man would be killed by another man was less than one percent during the 20th century, a period of time that includes both world wars. If the death rate of tribal warfare had prevailed in the 20th century, there would have been two billion deaths rather than 100 million, horrible as that is,” see Pinker 2009.

8 Göbekli Tepe, the oldest stone temple in the world, constructed as early as 11,500-11,000 years ago by hunter-gatherers just prior to the rise of agriculture in southeast Turkey, is regarded as a key location for understanding the origins of agriculture. The excavations at Göbekli Tepe are directed by archaeologist Klaus Schmidt (University of Heidelberg), who speculates that the social organization needed for the creation of these structures went hand-in-hand with the organized exploitation of wild crops (Schmidt 2001).
This adaptation came with a price. As soon as people attach themselves to a fixed plot of land, as opposed to wandering off to yet untouched abundance, life changes profoundly. What international relations theory calls the *security dilemma* is intensified. Dependency on land lends itself to becoming afraid of one’s neighbours: ‘Do my neighbours wish to respect my borders and cooperate with me, or do they secretly plot to throw me out and steal my land? What are their intentions? Perhaps I have to get some weapons for defence, or, even better, I may preemptively attack my neighbours so as to stop them from amassing weapons and attacking me? Or, perhaps I am not strong enough for such boldness, and better bow to a mighty protector?’ If foragers must be afraid of neighbours when circumscription becomes salient, agriculturalists are even more affected, since they have to stay put if they want to harvest what they have sown.

The security dilemma is an unavoidable dilemma for agriculturalists. It makes their lives much harder than that of their hunting-gathering predecessors who were not yet exposed to circumscription. Life under such conditions is indeed ‘nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes 1651: 91). *Anarchy* is what Hobbes calls this experience. Hobbes’ analysis was correct for the past 10,000 years, however, lacking the wider horizon provided by present archaeological and anthropological insights, he erroneously generalised this state to be the universal *state of nature*.

A piece of land represents a fixed pie of resources, in contrast to abundant wild food; no longer was the pie of resources expandable by merely wandering off. Living in a win-lose situation is much less benign than living in a win-win situation. An environment that is formed as a win-win situation brings people together into cooperation, while zero sum circumstances increase the likelihood of divisions between people (Gaertner & Dovidio 1999).

In other words, the overall frame of the human condition transmuted from a rather benign win-win to a much more malign win-lose frame roughly 10,000 years ago (Ury 1999). As soon as some people turned to intensification as a way of increasing the output of a given piece of land, raiding them became an attractive option for some of their neighbours. Indeed, in the course of human history outsiders regularly intruded; from Vikings to Huns, raiders caused people to build walls and fortresses, seek powerful protectors and accept their domination. Life became basically characterised by constant fear of attack. While hunter-gatherers feared predator animals, bad weather, and were adapted to moving on when too much adversity came their way, sedentary farmers had all those problems but had to go to war when enemies attacked.

During the past 10,000 years, humankind was held in the brutal grip of this win-lose logic and its consequence, the security dilemma. International relations theory uses this term to describe how arms races and war were almost inevitable in this atmosphere of fear of attack from outside one’s community.

The security dilemma has been widely described by political scientists in international relations theory. The term *security dilemma* itself was coined by John H. Herz (Herz 1950). He tried to explain the tragedy of why states end up in competition and war even if they have no intention to harm one another. The tragedy is that mutual distrust may lead to war in a situation where nobody is interested in going to war. The threat of pre-emption with pre-emption is the ultimate and seemingly inevitable outcome of the traditional security dilemma.

In the context of the security dilemma, hierarchically structured societies of honour, or better, of ranked honour emerged. As long as early *Homo sapiens* had reason to believe that untouched resources were infinitely available by merely wandering off to the next valley, the entire frame of the situation did not lend itself to the building of similarly deep hierarchies. This was spurred only when agriculture, a win-lose frame, and the security dilemma, forced humankind into
hierarchy. I believe, we find a clear qualitative difference here, between hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists, not just a continuum from less to more hierarchy.

I label the past 10,000 years as the *era of ranked honour*.

Fear of out-groups (for example, of other nations) permeated in-groups. Social and societal resources had to be set aside constantly for preparations for war. Everybody had to be on alert, continuously, particularly leaders and governmental organs. For millennia, this fear became manifest in societal, social and cultural institutions, from *Ministries of War or Defence* to identity constructs such as patriotism (including gender segregation; see Elshtain 1995 or Goldstein 2001, and how they link war and the division and ranking of gender roles).

Even though the security dilemma can grow stronger or weaker, depending on many factors, its essence is always that it is built on fear and that it fosters fear: ‘it is either you or me, only one can own this land.’ Fear is the reigning emotion (Posen 1993; Hardin 1995).

As a result, all other emotions were instrumentalised and commodified in the service of this fear and survival under the security dilemma. Inferiors, underlings, subalterns, those with less power, were coaxed into extending love and hatred ‘spontaneously’ to the ‘correct’ objects: One had to love ones in-group and hate ones out-groups, one had to love ones designated superiors, be faithful and loyal to them or be punished. Since religion often was instrumentalised as ultimate legitimiser of such an order, also lack of love for the prescribed religion was punished; the inquisition is only one example among many. Love was regarded as a feeling, a feeling opposite to hatred, and both had to be felt qua duty.

In this way what was called *civilisations* emerged in Mesopotamia, along the Nile, and in many other places. Also in Asia, large ancient empires evolved. China, later also Japan, or Korea are important examples. In those civilisation, inequality – the vertical ranking of human worth – was not merely a reluctantly tolerated evil: it was hailed as the very core of civilisation. Equality was ‘barbaric.’ In his book *Early Civilizations*, archaeologist, anthropologist, and ethnohistorian Bruce G. Trigger writes: ‘because of the pervasiveness of inequality, no one who lived in the early civilisations questioned the normalcy of this condition. If egalitarianism was known, it was as a feature of some of the despised, barbarian societies that existed beyond the borders of the “civilized” world’ (Trigger 1993: 52).

Social scientist and activist Riane T. Eisler, in her book *The Chalice and the Blade: Our History, Our Future* (Eisler 1987) explains in great detail how otherwise widely divergent societies, from Japan of the Samurai to the Aztecs of Meso America, were characterised by hierarchies of domination that were maintained by an institutionalised or socially accepted violence, ranging from wife and child beating within the family to aggressive warfare on the larger tribal or national level. A rigidly male-dominant *strong-man* rule, both in the family and state, held all these societies together.

2.2.1. *Fear of attack and dualism*

I learned about aggressive cultural scripts first hand. The research project that was the basis for my doctoral research on humiliation was entitled ‘The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Great Lakes Region, between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties’ (Lindner 1996). Somalia today is among the most instable regions in the world. For my fieldwork, I went to the relatively quiet north of Somalia, ‘Somaliland’ (not recognised as independent state by its neighbours). However, even in comparably peaceable Somaliland, my
own guards, former freedom fighters, found it fit to ambush me in the middle of the semi-desert, just outside of the capital, on my way to the airport, to request more pay from me, with their guns pointing at me. Had they asked for more pay when we parted earlier, they would have received it. However, from their point of view, the use of force was both necessary and legitimate, perhaps even a question of honour.

I had immersed myself sufficiently into Somali culture to understand the logic of honour. Somalia is a country of proud nobility, its pride unequalled in the rest of the world. In the major clans, every man above a certain age is an elder, a sovereign. Somalia thus showcases relationships between fiercely proud masters in a system of honour. To understand the world of honour, on December 3, 1998, I invited myself as a guest into a *khat* chewing ‘focus group’ session in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland. Such sessions typically last for many hours, starting in the afternoon and running through half of the night. Such meetings are not attended by ‘respectable’ women – I tried to keep ‘decent’ by at least not chewing *khat* myself. I asked the men in the round about humiliation or *quudhsiga* (belittling = humiliation). I learned many proverbs, such as the following: ‘Hadellca xun ayaa ka xanuun kulul xabada,’ meaning ‘Humiliation is worse than killing; in times of war words of humiliation hurt more than bullets’ or ‘Rag waxaaa ku maamula agaan ama ku maamuusi,’ meaning ‘I can only be with people who are equal,’ or ‘Masse inaanu nahay oo tollim meerto no tahay,’ meaning ‘A man deserves to be killed and not to be humiliated.’

Manichaeism, one of the major dualistic religions, conceives of two previously coexistent realms of light and darkness which become embroiled in conflict, owing to the chaotic actions of darkness. As a result, certain elements of the light became entrapped within darkness. The purpose of material creation is to regain these elements so that at the end, the kingdom of light can prevail over darkness. Manichaeism originated in Sassanid Persia, the third Iranian dynasty and the second Persian Empire (226–651), during a period of struggle against Muslim conquest. It draws on older Zoroastrianism, which arose in a society of nomadic pastoralists with tribal structures about 1,000 BCE. In other words, both Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism arose in historic contexts that were characterised by belligerent antagonisms, those that form the core of pastoralist nomadic cultures and those that affected the history of Sassanid Persia. Or, to formulate it differently, dualistic approaches seem to have arisen in the context of the security dilemma, where it was vital to be continuously prepared for attack *against* enemies.

Manichaeism can only be overcome through replacing enmity with cohesion. Hassan Keynan, former Secretary General of the Somali National Commission (1985 - 1988), strongly makes this point when he explains (in an interview on 15<sup>th</sup> November 1997, in Oslo, Norway) that he believes that clan membership is too all encompassing and stultifying, and that the only liberation is to disown clan identity and adopt a more inclusive general Somali identity, or even better, a global multi-identity, because also national identity is as aggressive as the clan identity.

2.2.2. *Routine humiliation and the ‘art’ of domination in ranked honour systems*

The security dilemma is a tragic dilemma, and it tragically mutilated human minds and hearts. As a result, not only did dualism acquire enough clout to trump other metaphysical orientations, also a unhelpful concept of emotions emerged that holds sway in many walks of human life around the world until today.

*Routine humiliation* was the core tool of ranked honour systems, however, without being labelled as humiliation in its contemporary sense. In the context of ranked honour, being shown
down to one’s due lowly place was regarded as ‘honourable lesson.’ The pain of such lessons was viewed as beneficial and no violation at all – it is only in the world of human rights that the act of degrading people signifies a violation.

In the course of the past 10,000 years, the ‘art’ of domination became ever more refined. First, it was mere brute force that was used, however, increasingly the human desire for connection and the need to belong, together with emotions such as love, hatred and shame, were instrumentalised in ways that made domination ‘easier,’ and the actual application of brute force less necessary.

One way to perfect the ‘art’ of domination was for masters to instil fear in their underlings by keeping up a continuous threat of violence and terror, from torture to killing. However, an even more advanced technique was to bond underlings to their master through the duty of love and to teach them to feel ashamed at ever failing their master’s expectations. Through this manipulation, the bond between the master’s orders and the inferior’s self-effacing acquiescence was given primacy over the bond from one human being to another among the oppressed. This turned involuntary bondage in a context of open oppression into voluntary bondage in a context of covert oppression. When this was achieved, continuous humiliating, shaming, and humiliating (honour-humiliation, the form of humiliation that is seen as legitimate) was often ‘sufficient’ to keep inferiors inferior.

Fear was the emotional driving force masters used to keep their underlings docile even in the absence of open oppression, and therefore masters attempted to always keep it looming, so as to have it handy when needed. Fear kept underlings subservient, reinforced their subjugation, and maintained their status as tools in the hands of their masters. Masters routinely kept underlings in fear of losing their lives and frustrated the underlings’ desire for a secure bond. Underlings were coerced into living in ever ongoing fear, fear to lose their lives and their bonds. Religion and fear of God were used to legitimise this strategy with divine authorisation.

Learning the inferior’s version of shame was indeed part of what Norbert Elias describes in his seminal book *The Civilizing Process* (Elias 1994). Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and historians such as Marc Bloch developed similar arguments. Elias studied the French court and how feudal lords were seduced into bowing to the absolute ruler. Elias explains how the process of subjugation had a ‘civilising’ effect on proud, self-important, and haughty knights, lords, and commoners. Unruly and proud local warlords were ‘civilised’ by being taught the lessons of shame and social anxiety. The French court, the Indian caste system, the Chinese system of kowtowing, and the Japanese bow all express and reinforce strong hierarchies, all constructed around practices of ritual humbling.

The *civilised habitus* that Elias describes could also be called the *successfully humiliated habitus* (Smith 2001). To become useful as underlings, it was simply preferable that they learned to feel ashamed at even contemplating disobedience. Underlings were taught to keep from surpassing their role as tools in the hands of their masters with shame marking the limits. While haughty underlings needed brute force to be kept docile, shame-prone underlings not, they were much easier manipulated into humility, in short, ‘civilised.’

Many labels and names have been devised for this social-psychological manipulation. Johan Galtung pointed at the fact that acceptance of subjugation may become a culture of its own and coined the term *penetration*, or ‘implanting the topdog inside the underdog’ (Galtung 1996: 199). The term *subaltern* comes to mind (Guha and Spivak (eds.) 1988). Ashis Nandy speaks of *hidden or disowned selves*, or *subjugated selves*, selves that represent both the non-West and the
West and their encounters (Nandy 1998). Nandy asserts that all these selves must take part in cross-cultural dialogue if dogmatism, fundamentalism, and ultra-nationalism are to be avoided.

Also the term *colonisation of the lifeworld* may lend itself to describing this ‘seduction to accept domination’ (Habermas 1987). Concepts such as *méconnaissance* (misrecognition) and *naturalisation* have been used, by, among others, Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault (see, for example, Barthes 1972, Bourdieu 1977, and Foucault 1977). *Controlling images* are being imposed by a dominant culture, images that are voluntarily or involuntarily accepted by thus disempowered subordinate groups (Collins 2000). The *authoritarian personality* has been described (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford 1950), illustrating how easily people slide into subservience and follow superiors (see also Milgram 1974; Zimbardo 1971; Zimbardo 2007). Childrearing methods have been studied, and how they facilitated, for example, the rise of Hitler’s Nazism (Miller 1983). The underlying pedagogical framework that produces obedient inferiors has been called the *Strict Father model*, as opposed to the *Nurturant Parent model* (Lakoff & Johnson 1999).

While shame between equals is a signal that a bond of mutuality is threatened, shame between unequals signals that a bond of domination/ submission is threatened. In a system of domination/ submission, shame is equal to dishonour, to losing rank, or even life, thus potentially a terrifying signal. During the past 10,000 years, underlings were coerced into continuous forced humility, into a permanent state of shame, into constant fear of more shame and dishonour, defined as lack of deference or usefulness to masters. Whoever forfeited his or her usefulness as tool descended in rank, was dishonoured, and not seldom punished by torture and death.

Many underlings learned the lesson so well that they ended their own lives when they brought shame upon themselves and their folks (*Schmach und Schande*, in German). Many Samurai have taken their own lives – and this was even ritualised – when they failed to defend their masters, or fell into dishonour in any other way, even if only by accident. And wherever female chastity was made to symbolise male honour, many a raped girl has ‘voluntarily’ committed suicide, even though she was the victim of aggression and not the perpetrator.

### 2.2.3. An Asian perspective

M. Anne Brown describes the intricacies of what I call the ‘art’ of domination by drawing on the work of Ashis Nandy and his notion of ‘disowned selves’ (Brown 2002). Ashis Nandy is a widely known Indian political psychologist and sociologist of science and has worked on cultures of knowledge, visions, and dialogue of civilisations.

Japan is a country of unparalleled politeness, or, more precisely, of modesty in relation to self, and consideration towards others, with a strong element of vertical respect (Haugh 2004). While living in Japan (2004–2007), I could not help seeing an imaginary sword hovering over the majority of its citizens’ heads, a sword instilling perpetual fear, the sword of the Samurai, who had the right to kill any peasant who offended him. Even though the Shogunate ended in 1868, to my perception, this fear still permeates Japanese souls palpably. Japanese politeness is imbued with fear of death.

The majority of Japan’s population had to fear for their lives, only the small minority of the ruling elite not. And these differences are still visible today. Two of my Japanese friends made me particularly aware of this. Both are doctoral students, both in their early thirties, one the son of a former Samurai family, the other the son of a former farming family. The former Samurai family’s son carries his head high, both physically, and mentally; he thinks rather independently.
The former farming family’s son has a tendency to bow and acquiesce. The difference is astounding. They themselves did not notice it until I discussed it with them. Once I asked them: ‘Will you get married?’ The Samurai said, ‘Yes!’ The farmer said nothing more than, ‘My parents expect me to.’ Or, I asked: ‘What is your view on the vision of a world of equal dignity for all?’ The Samurai said: ‘Yes, this is what we need!’ The farmer said: ‘I like hierarchy, and I like to be an inferior. Underlings have a quiet life and do not have to carry too much responsibility.’ This happened in 2006, with highly educated young men, more than 100 years after the end of feudalism.

As noted earlier, turning people into tools has a deeply mutilating effect, at macro and micro levels, to the point of losing and taking life. The ‘art of domination’ turned this mutilating effect from involuntary mutilation of others to the voluntary mutilation of one’s own self; it victimised its victims doubly by co-opting them into becoming their own perpetrators. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, in *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms* (Ohnuki-Tierney 2002) introduces the reader into the eerie way in which young and brilliant Japanese students were coaxed into dying as suicide bombers in World War II (this is the term that would be used today; their operations, however, were termed *tokkotai* operations in Japan, and in the West they became known as *kamikaze* operations). Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney was motivated to write her book because she was deeply moved by the diaries of these young students. These diaries show how these highly educated young men, doomed to die, were in despair. Most did not want to die. Ohnuki-Tierney, analyses in minute detail in her book how they were ‘persuaded’ to ‘volunteer’ by ways of *méconnaissance*, which, one could say, is an even subtler method to forge obedient underlings than teaching them shame.

What Ohnuki-Tierney explains is how aesthetics were abused, as there were, for instance, the aesthetics of Japan’s cherry blossom symbolism. Cherry blossom symbolism originally signified life and birth – the opposite of death. But precisely this symbolism was used to make ugly cultural practices appear visually and conceptually beautiful. Slowly, in a step by step fashion, the more militaristic the country became, the cherry blossom symbolism was transformed to aestheticize death on the battlefield. Other symbolisms were abused as well, one of them was the image of ‘a shattering crystal ball’ (*gyokusai*). The term refers to the beautiful way in which a crystal ball shatters into hundreds of pieces. It originated in *The Chronicle of Beiqi*, a chronicle completed in 636 during the Tang dynasty in China. The Japanese military government adopted the term to encourage mass suicide when a hopeless situation could not be saved militarily. The expression began to appear as early as 1891 in a school song that declared that Japanese soldiers would fight until they died like a shattering crystal ball, irrespective of how many enemies there were. The most dramatic use of this term of aestheticisation occurred when the Japanese military headquarters decided to abandon their men on an island, which was too heavily surrounded by American ships for them to be able to send in support. Except for twenty-nine people, who were captured, 2,638 died or committed suicide (while there were 550 American casualties).

### 2.3. The second large-scale transition to equality in dignity

The first paragraph of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, reads: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’
These human rights ideals inform the work carried out by the ACPACS researchers, and they inform this paper. Our work is part of the large-scale historical transition that resonates with these ideals and unfolds worldwide at the current point in history. Our work is affected by, and affects the transition towards a hoped-for *era of equality in dignity*, where every global citizen can live a dignified life. Evidently, this vision is not yet a lived reality; at the current historic juncture, humankind struggles with the transitional phase.

This transition began long before 1948, and it is as deep as the transition from hunting-gathering to agriculture 10,000 years ago. It can be described as the second dramatic transition that humankind faces in its history.

This transition has to do with dignity, or, more precisely, with equal dignity for each individual (see for a more detailed description Lindner 2006g). The term *dignity* has its root in the Latin words *decus* and *decorum* (Sanskrit *dac-as*, ‘fame’). Masculine beauty, for Cicero, had *decorum*. However, until the Renaissance, the concept of dignity was not an internally consistent set of ideas, not in classical and Christian antiquity and not in the Middle Ages in Europe. As suggested earlier, ruling elites favoured worldviews that made it easier to bond underlings into ranked collectives. Many religions, such as Christianity and Islam, do entail ideals of equality; however, these ideals were frequently co-opted into hierarchical structures and thus rendered powerless. Medieval Christianity, for example, stressed the concept of *homo viator*, the human being as a traveller from the misery and suffering of earthly existence toward rewards that could at best be expected in afterlife.

Italian Renaissance Florence has often been described as the birthplace of modern individualism. It is important to reflect why Renaissance Florence was such a paradigm shifter. The historical research of recent decades shows that not all segments of Renaissance Florence’s society were involved. The space for individual thought and action did not widen everywhere and most people remained caught in a web of relationships of family, neighbourhood, guild, patronage, and religion. The protagonist of Florentine history was its merchant elite (Connell (ed.) 2002). Giannozzo Manetti (1396-1459), born in Florence as son of a rich merchant, and later Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), another Florentine humanist, as well as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), gave philosophical and theological form to the importance of this-worldly dignity in contrast to the concept of *homo viator*. Human beings’ this-worldly dignity and achievements became prominent in the context of the increasing secularism manifested in the expanding economic, political, and social activities of late medieval Europe and the experience of Florence as a republic (by 1415).

The paradigm shifting power of trade is particularly interesting in the context of the argument presented in this paper. Already the Minoans of Crete, from 1700 BCE onward, primarily a mercantile people engaging in overseas trade, allowed their men and women to hold rather equal social status (Eisler 1987), just as the mercantile city of Florence nurtured the Renaissance with its emphasis on humanism and dignity. To rephrase the description of this set of cultural figurations, as soon as a web of relationships is woven that bridges borders, the security dilemma weakens, and equal relationships find space to emerge. Whoever took to trade during the past millennia, began weaving the web of global interdependence that characterizes contemporary world affairs. Traders during all times experimented with what Eisler calls the “partnership model” of civilization (Eisler 1987) that the world needs to adopt today, in contrast to the

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9 His 1486 *Oration on the Dignity of Man* has been called the ‘Manifesto of the Renaissance’ (Pico della Mirandola 1948).
“dominator model” of rigidly ranked communities that define themselves in enmity against out-groups.

Even though the ideal of equality in dignity has long-standing historical roots and has been “tried out” earlier, it did not move to the forefront of Western consciousness until about 250 years ago, marked by the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) and the French Revolution (August 4, 1789), both rallying points for the development of the human rights movement.

In short, at present, humankind finds itself in the middle of its second profound historic transition. A progressively more interdependent world, increasingly using knowledge and not land as a resource for livelihood, is today pushing towards one single global village. This undermines the fault lines that formerly pitted the many hierarchically organised local villages against each other in reciprocal fear and hostility. The security dilemma weakens. Knowledge as a resource replaces the old win-lose frame with a win-win frame. Combined with increasing global connectedness, this is oxygen for the ideal that all human are equal in dignity. Principles such as Unity in Diversity receive a chance to gain visibility – away from the old world of Uniformity vis-à-vis Division (the divided uniformities of internally uniform local villages being divided among each other).

In times of transition, typically, the situation is blurred. The present transition is no exception. The transition from the traditional paradigm of ranked honour to a novel paradigm of equal dignity plays out in an incoherent and messy two-steps-forward-and-one-step-back fashion. The old and the new mix, overlap, cancel each other out, confront each other, hinder each other, and even exist alongside each other while contradicting each other. Therefore, when we speak of human-rights based societies in this paper, we do so in the spirit of a Weberian ideal-type approach – see for details Coser 1977. Perhaps we will see truly human rights based societies in one or two hundred years – so far, we see only seeds. However, these seeds merit our attention nonetheless, since they show important trends.

The human rights revolution could be described as an attempt to collapse the master-underling dynamic of the past 10,000 years to a midpoint of equal dignity and humility (see Figure 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Historic Transition to Equal Dignity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elites in the old honour order (arrogation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New human rights order of humility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlings in the old honour order (humiliation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: The Historic Transition to Equal Dignity
The horizontal line in Figure 1 is meant to represent the level of equal dignity and humility. This line does not signify that all human beings are equal, or should be equal, or ever were or will be equal, or identical, or all the same. This horizontal line is to represent a worldview that does not permit the hierarchical ranking of existing differences of human worth and value. Master elites are invited to step down from arrogating more worthiness, and underlings are encouraged to rise up from being humiliated, and having their worth and value degraded and lowered. Masters are humbled and underlings empowered.

I have coined the word egalisation to match the word globalisation and at the same time differentiate it from words such as equality or sameness, because the main point is not equality or sameness. The important point is equal dignity (even though there is a connection between equality and equal dignity; the connection is ‘hidden’ in the human rights stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect human dignity).

The term egalisation is meant to avoid claiming that everybody should become equal and that there should be no differences between people. Egality can coexist with a functional hierarchy that regards all participants as equal in dignity; egality cannot co-exist, though, with a hierarchy that defines some people as lesser beings and others as more valuable higher beings.

When egalisation is neglected, when it is promised but not delivered, this elicits intense feelings of humiliation. Lack of egalisation is the very element that incenses globalisation-critics. Their disquiet stems from egalisation that is wanting and not from an overdose of globalisation. Globalisation is not inherently negative: the coming together of the human family can also create the much needed sense of global unity and global responsibility. What globalisation-critics criticise is when globalisation humiliates, when it exploits our social environment and destroys our ecological habitat. They call for globalisation to marry egalisation. They call for global solidarity to overcome the lack of egalisation that currently humiliates all of humanity.

In my work, I call for a Moratorium on Humiliation (similar to the Moratorium On Trade In Small Arms, or the Moratorium On Commercial Whaling – Patten & Lindh 2001).

2.3.1. Equality in dignity: Humiliation is no longer regarded as prosocial

The most significant historical process of present times is that an emerging globally connected knowledge society opens space to liberate ideals, metaphysical concepts, cultural and psychological scripts, feelings, and emotions from being instrumentalised to serve the security dilemma. This process opens space, for example, for Martin Buber’s concept of loving I-Thou relationships characterised by mutual respect for equal dignity to replace the old concept of love and hatred as commodified tools to survive the security dilemma. This process also opens space to recover the prosocial aspects of shame in fundamentally new ways, the notion of ‘prosociality’ no longer being equated with docile subservience of underlings, but with relationships of mutuality between equals.

Until about 250 years ago, humbling, shaming and humiliating were regarded as similar, as legitimate, and most often as prosocial. Humiliation was not seen as antisocial. For millennia, until very recently (and still today in many world regions), people believed that it was normal and morally correct to live in a world of masters and underlings, and that superiors were entitled to be regarded as higher beings and underlings deserved to be shown down ‘where they belonged.’

Humiliation, humility, shame, and guilt are related concepts. However, the human rights ideal of equality in dignity separates humiliation from shame in crucial ways. Ideals of equal dignity
introduce a deep cleavage into the shame continuum. In the English language, the verb *to humiliate* differentiated from the verb *to humble* in 1757. ‘The earliest recorded use of *to humiliate*, meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone, does not occur until 1757’ (Miller 1993: 175, italics in original). In other words, around 300 or 250 years ago, humiliation began to acquire something new, namely, the taste of violation.

Around 300 years ago, humiliation began to transmute into a case of undue, illegitimate, and coercive violation that ought not be perpetrated. As soon as humiliation is defined as coercive violation, feelings of humiliation do no longer entail feelings of shame by “prescription.” Nelson Mandela was humiliated during his twenty seven years in jail, he indeed felt humiliated, however, he was not ashamed (Mandela 1994). The secret of his resistance was precisely that he kept up his dignified self-respect and sense of worth. It would have been misplaced to call upon him to ‘own his shame.’ Indeed, he would have most probably have felt ashamed if he had allowed humiliation to diminish his sense of dignity and pour shame into his soul (Nelson Mandela’s constructive strategies are treated as an idealised model here).

With the advent of human rights ideals, the notion of humiliation changes. A contemporary definition of humiliation embedded into the human rights ideal of equal dignity for all is different to the definition of humiliation in a context of ranked honour. In a human rights context, humiliation is the enforced lowering of a person or group that damages their equality in dignity. To humiliate is to transgress the rightful expectations of every human being and of all humanity that basic human rights must be respected.

Human rights ‘democratisation’ humiliation. Human rights endow every single human being with what formerly was the privilege of equals among elites, namely, an inner core of equal dignity that ought not to be debased. This means that the notion of humiliation changes its attachment point. It moves from the top to the bottom of the pyramid of power, from the privileged to the disadvantaged. In a human rights framework the downtrodden acquire the right to feel unduly humiliated. The human rights revolution turns the formerly legitimate humbling of underlings into illegitimate humiliation. The beaten wife is informed by human rights defenders that ‘domestic chastisement’ as it was enshrined in law (until 1868, for example, in Norway) is no longer legitimate, but has turned into illegitimate domestic violence. Formerly, a male aristocrat invoked humiliation as a violation of his honour and went to duel or duel-like responses, while his beaten wife and children were not permitted to invoke humiliation as a violation; they were taught to quietly swallow humiliation and welcome it as a lesson in due humility. This set of affairs changes wherever human rights ideals gain significance. The beaten wife is encouraged to invoke humiliation as a violation. The masters, the elites, the husband, the father, on the other hand, are called upon to humble themselves. They are no longer given permission to resist this call by claiming superiority and branding their underlings’ protests as undue arrogance and as humiliation of elite honour that requires duel-like clamp-downs.

Humiliation is at the core of the current human rights revolution and the transition from ranked honour to equal dignity. Feelings of humiliation in the face of undue violations of dignity among the downtrodden are no less than the very ‘fuel’ of the human rights revolution. The linguistic shift in the meaning of the word *to humiliate* in 1757 attests to the fact that human rights ideals have conquered the core of the discourse of English speakers (and many other languages are in a similar situation). In the aftermath of this triumph of the human rights message, the practice of humiliating people can no longer serve prosocial purposes. The overall discursive frame no longer allows for that. Only shaming and humbling can still be applied in such ways; and indeed, human rights activists around the world busily confront companies and
countries in the attempt to shame them into keeping their promises as protectors of the
environment and human rights. While humbling and shaming still work prosocially, humiliation
does no longer. Shame remains a crucial element for social cohesion; we do not wish to have
shameless people as neighbours, indeed, we wish to be surrounded by humble people who
respect the law. Yet, we do no longer endorse societies filled with cowed underlings who accept
humiliation as prosocial lesson of humility.

Applying humiliation turns obscene once human rights ideals become truly salient. The new
illegitimacy of the practice of humiliation marks a profoundly significant shift that has to do with
the spirit of human rights that renders the ranking of human worthiness illicit. The worldwide
reaction to practices of humiliation at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq represents a case in point.
Even bringing down perpetrators of humiliation, such as dictators and their followers, if done
with humiliation, no longer is regarded as true peace-making. Nelson Mandela did not humiliate
the white elite in South Africa; he humbled them.

In short, today, humankind faces a transition between two normative and cultural universes
that are irreconcilable: on one side there is the traditional world of ranked honour and on the
other side the new era of equal dignity; on one side there is a worldview that carries humiliation
as legitimate tool at its core in the form of honour-humiliation, and on the other side a worldview
gains significance that outlaws the very same practices as illegitimate dignity-humiliation. These
two normative and cultural frameworks are diametrically opposed and stand at the core of
today’s transition. They clash head-on. This is therefore not a gradual transition but a qualitative
leap, like changing from right-hand driving to left-hand driving. Ranking people and unranking
them cannot coexist, as much as right-hand driving and left-hand driving cannot coexist.

The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in its very first sentence, speaks
of “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family” as “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” This means that one
cannot rank the essence of some people as higher in worthiness and value and others as lower
beings and at the same time treat them as equal in dignity. Rankings can no longer apply to the
essence of human beings, only to the periphery of a person’s identity – an influential or non-
influential role in society can no longer be translated into the superiority or inferiority of the
essence of the bearers of those roles. A road sweeper is equal in dignity with the president of the
country and a comedian may play jokes galore with the help humiliation, still, nobody’s inherent
equality in dignity may be touched.

Therefore, terms such as conflict resolution, reconciliation, harmony, peace, love, or humility,
shame, and humiliation are treacherous. North Korean elites describe Korean society as peaceful
and husbands around the world cow their women by invoking their sovereign right to protect
domestic peace. The above-listed terms all entail interpretations at their heart which stem from
incompatible worlds. Conflict resolution, reconciliation, harmony, peace, love, or humility,
shame, and humiliation can be understood in the frame of the docile subservience of underlings,
or of successful calibration of mutuality between equals.

It is therefore that we need to qualify these terms further when we use them. The old concepts,
from the point of view of human rights, have a humiliating effect, while the new definitions
liberate. Forcing cowed subalterns into the ‘peaceful harmony’ of subservient humiliation, asking
them to feel ashamed for requesting equality, asking them to interpret their painful situation as
‘prosocial,’ from the human rights perspective, is humiliating. A slave deserves to be liberated,
empowered, and respected as equal in dignity.
The acceptance of the term ‘structural violence’ (Galtung 1996) shows to which degree the human rights ideal of equality in dignity has succeeded to permeate the global peace discourse by now. Australia offers many illustrations of this development. Australians become increasingly aware of the structural violence that has been experienced by their indigenous people (see, e.g., Bretherton & Mellor 2006, or Brown 2002), to name just one of many examples. Peace researcher Johan Galtung lives globally. Through designing his life as a global citizen, he is touched by globalisation in ways that are more intense than it would be the case for people who live sedentary lives or who have a base from which they travel. It is therefore that he also at the forefront of egalisation. Both his stance against dualism in the metaphysical realm, and his coinage of the term ‘structural violence’ affect and are affected by globalisation and egalisation.

Today, human rights advocates around the world invite formerly ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ beings to meet in the middle, at the level of equal dignity. This transformation unmasks to what extent the ranking of people’s worthiness had mutilating effects. Turning fellow humans into subaltern tools or cogwheels in a ranked society mutilates their psyches. By being demoted to the level of tools, living beings are robbed of the fullness of their capacities. As long as humans lived on land as their main resource, the damage was not overly apparent. An agrarian world functions also when lords give obedient underlings orders who do not enjoy toiling in the fields. However, this changes in a modern knowledge society that depends on creativity. A cogwheel, a human being that is reduced to being a tool, cannot be very creative. The ever growing need for creativity exposes the mutilation that comes with ranking humans as higher and lesser beings and the obsolescence of such rankings, not just normatively but also practically.

This means that the transition toward a world defined by human rights ideals opens space for a culture that can heal the wounds of 10,000 years of mutilation. Shame can regain its salutogenic function (Webb 2005) when legitimate honour-humiliation transmutes into illegitimate dignity-humiliation. The current trend to seek nondualistic Unity in Diversity is yet another marker of the healing power of this paradigm shift. The trend to interpret humiliation not as ‘prosocial medicine’ but as ‘antisocial violation,’ and the rise of thus defined feelings of humiliation around the world in the face of direct and structural violence, is the emotional footprint of the opportunities for large-scale healing that characterise our time.

2.3.2. An Asian perspective

2.3.2.1. The Asian problem with human rights:

Dualism helped the West to draw ‘optimal gain’ from the security dilemma, by conquering and enslaving the world as colonisers. At the current point in history, the West still draws on accumulated power from colonial times in many ways (from unfair global trade rules to using up the world’s resources – the list is long). However, times have changed. Conquering others is no longer the name of the game in an interdependent world – cooperation increasingly gains significance. Dualism is no longer appropriate, not for the West, and not for the East. In an interdependent world, cooperation among equals is a more constructive frame.

Robert Axelrod explored computer models of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (which gives two players the chance to cooperate or betray one another) and formalised the evolutionary tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod 1990). Axelrod’s key finding is that the evolutionary tit-for-tat strategy – also known as reciprocal altruism – is remarkably successful and defeats all other strategies, increasing the benefits of cooperation over time and protecting participants from
predators. In *Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations*, Morton Deutsch stipulates that ‘cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition’ (Deutsch 1973: 367).

Research indicates that three conditions must be fulfilled for successful cooperation. We must (1) identify with *common superordinate goals* that are (2) *realistically reachable*, and (3) *social inequality must be avoided* in the process (see, for example, www.intractableconflict.org/docs/appendix_6.jsp).

In other words, honour codes had their place in a world that did not yet experience the coming-together of humankind into one single family. However, we live in a new reality today and human rights ideals of *equality in rights and dignity* may represent a normative framework that is better adapted to an emerging global knowledge society everywhere, be it West, East, North, or South.

However, there is a problem with human rights in Asia. There is an ‘Asian way’ debate (Brown 2002: 111-120):

The ‘Asian way’ debate is shaped by many historical and political factors: the broader history of colonialism and processes of cultural decolonisation underway throughout much of Asia, the economic success (until recent problems) and consequent self-assertion of East Asia, regional politics within East Asia itself, the standard political dynamics generated by using human rights platforms as a means of competing for international prestige, some governments’ need for a self-righteous fig-leaf to cover abusive activities, plus the natural friction between areas of genuine political and social difference. But the debate is also shaped by the fact that, despite efforts to the contrary, human rights promotion internationally is coloured with the evangelical assumption that the ‘West’ is the holder of a unique truth which it must impart to the ‘East’, groping in darkness (Brown 2002: 113).

2.3.2.2. Three ways to reject human rights

When people face new ideas and new visions, what are the options they have to react? One possible reaction is to embrace the new vision, and implement it. Another possible reaction is to close one’s eyes and deny that new ideas exist altogether. Or one can acknowledge these ideas’ existence and reject them. Three main reasons for rejection come to mind: First, one can reject a new vision because one understands it only too well and is not ready to accept its consequences; second, one can reject a new idea, while instrumentalising its very arguments in the service of rejecting it; and third, one can understand the new vision better than some of its advocates and reject its implementation when it is done in ways that undermine its own spirit. Since the term ‘harmonious societies’ is currently writ large in Asia, I included those three cases in Table 1 and relate them to the concept of harmony.
Three Ways to Reject Human Rights Advocacy, and their Relationship with Harmony

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rejection of human rights advocacy</th>
<th>Harmony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Human rights advocacy is being rejected outright.</td>
<td>Harmony is regarded as being attained, in a context of ranked submission/domination, when underlings behave in a quiet and subservient manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Human rights advocacy is being rejected for one’s own underlings, while human rights arguments are invoked in a double-bind, self-refuting way to keep human rights advocates at bay.</td>
<td>Harmony is regarded as being attained, in a context of ranked submission/domination, when underlings behave in a quiet and subservient manner, while human rights activists are held at bay by their own arguments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Human rights are accepted, however, self-refuting ways to advocate human rights are being rejected.</td>
<td>Harmony is regarded as being attained, in a context of equality in rights and dignity, when the fashion in which human rights are being promoted is consistent with the human rights message, and, as a result, people engage in dialogue that is embedded into mutual respect for equality in dignity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Three ways to reject human rights advocacy, and their relationship with harmony

If we analyse the ‘Asian way’ debate, we can observe all three kinds of rejection of the new ideal of equality in dignity.

2.3.2.2.1. Rejection one – outright rejection of human rights advocacy

As to the first reaction, as Brown formulates it, the ‘Asian way’ debate may be evidence not for a relativist ‘clash of civilisations’ but for a resurgent conservative convergence (Brown 2002: 114). To formulate it differently, for power elites, equality in dignity means giving up supremacy and privileges. Even though an egalised society advances the well-being of everybody, the human weakness called loss aversion (Ross & Jost 1999) makes the transition painful, particularly to elites – they may try to hold on to their arrogation of supremacy as long as they can even if they endanger the long-term survival of their own communities. Countries like Bhutan are an exception; in Bhutan, the king himself initiated the end of his very own absolute rule (see more further down). In other parts of Asia, instead of Bhutan’s wisdom, we find the same clinging to the belief that it is legitimate for superiors to dominate inferiors that also characterised the rest of the world throughout the past 10,000 years. As everywhere else, also in Asia we see the broad masses being dominated by a few ruthless elites. China presently targets African raw materials with the same hunger that also European colonisers displayed. The list is long of examples that show how East and West, North and South, share a tradition of domination and exploitation, how they attempt to legitimise it by labelling it as ‘this is our forefathers’
culture that needs to be respected,’ and how they share resisting the true implementation of human rights beyond superficial rhetoric. Riane Eisler’s work was mentioned earlier. She illustrates how otherwise widely divergent societies everywhere on the planet followed what she calls a “dominator model” rather than a “partnership model” during the past millennia.

Brown criticises how the reification of culture is being used to turn it into a weapon (by elites to prolong their supremacy). She cautions not to overplay differences, and not to peddle stark dualisms:

The dichotomies in terms of which the debate is standardly cast are those of the individualist West versus the communitarian East, political rights and ideals of freedom versus economic rights and goals of development, and national cultural and political autonomy (often seen as giving priority to models of harmony) versus global or modern culture (often identified with conflict). However, rather than being drawn into questioning or defending the primacy of either the contending values proposed: the individual or the collective, or harmony or conflict of interest and so on, it is worth considering the circumstances within which the juxtaposition is being placed on any occasion and questioning the apparent naturalness of each pole of the dichotomy. The purpose of this is not to remove the differences but to shift them away from the zone of timeless oppositions into that of more concrete political problems (Brown 2002: 118).

For my doctoral dissertation in social-psychological medicine (Lindner 1993), I compared Germany and Egypt and what these two countries regard as core priorities for good quality of life. And indeed, I learned that the both have more in common than is apparent at first glance. Both value social cohesion. All yearn for social cohesion balanced with individual freedom. In the West, threats to social cohesion such as divorce, or lack of compassion, are deeply regretted as unwanted side effects, a price to be paid for the transition toward more personal freedom, authenticity, and flexibility. In the same vein, Egyptians, in turn, value individual freedom and regret the need to curtail it as a sad side effect, as a price to be paid for social cohesion.

Regrettably, in a world inspired by dualism, biases run particularly high. Essentiaisation, attribution error (fundamental, ultimate), reactive devaluation, false polarization effect – the list of biases is long. Simplified, we tend to grant ourselves and members of our own group the benefit of the doubt, while we tend to assume the worst from members of other groups. We easily dismiss positive behaviour by out-group members, merely because they are out-group members. This means also that side effects occurring in our own group are turned into the other’s evil essence when observed in the other’s camp, while commonalities – such as universality of the appreciation of social cohesion that must be balanced with individual freedom – are underplayed (Lindner 2006f: 72).

In my work, I suggest that the dualistic idolisation of diversity and otherness is particularly detrimental in instances where cultural differences stem from humiliation or cause humiliation (Lindner 2000a). This is valid, not least, for Western cultures of extreme individualism that regard themselves as bulwarks against the potential humiliation emanating from ‘socialism’ and thereby overlook their own shortcomings even more than they might otherwise. Extreme individualism could be described as but another way of ranking human worthiness, only with new masters, those who elbowed their way up in a context of ‘freedom for the individual,’ and are then legitimised by a might-is-right philosophy.
Martha Albertson Fineman, scholar of legal theory and family law, who wrote a book entitled *The Myth of Autonomy*, where she highlights that ‘families bear the burdens of dependency, while market institutions are free to operate as though the domestic tasks that reproduce the society were some other institution’s responsibility’ (Fineman 2004: 203.). Fineman concludes that by ‘invoking autonomy, we create and perpetuate cultural and political practices that stigmatize and punish those among us labelled dependent’ (Fineman 2004: 31). Linda Hartling identifies this practice as one of the root source of destructive humiliation (personal communication, September, 9, 2005).

As it seems evident, both, ranked honour and ruthless individualism have yet to mature into fulfilling ideals of true equal dignity for all and both need to be transcended. A world of communion must be created, a world of global solidarity in which everybody enjoys equality in dignity.

Brown sums up,

The ‘Asian way’ debate is one of the sharper political expressions of the polarisation of universal and relative truth, and indeed of a range of dichotomies – political versus economic, individual versus collective, East versus West – that explicitly or implicitly mould international rights talk. In particular it may have grown out of the moment of judgement – of we the virtuous and clean facing you the unclean – in which so much discussion of human rights becomes trapped. Rather than bringing clarity, however, these terms often seem to entrench our understanding and construction of rights more unreflectively into the patterns of alternating competition and convergence, the shifting strategic alliances that make up the emerging hegemonies of the global political economy. Thus they obscure the problems of identifying and responding to the infliction of injury and suffering (Brown 2002: 120).

2.3.2.2.2. Rejection two – self-refuting rejection of human rights advocacy

The second reason for rejecting human rights is related to certain variants of moral relativism. Human rights are invoked incompletely and spuriously, when respect is requested for ‘all cultures’ in the name of equality in dignity, while disregarding when those ‘cultures’ at the same time deny equality in dignity, for example, to their own women.

I participated in the International Congress of Somali Studies, 6-9th August 1998 in Turku, Finland. A young Somali woman decried the practice of female genital cutting (FGC) as follows, ‘I feel that my culture humiliates me!’ (Lindner 2000a). Some older male Somali participants defended this practice and demanded respect for Somali culture, in the name of human rights. They did not appreciate that their female colleague redefined Somali culture as one that should not entail FGC. The older males derided the suffering of their young female colleague; they asked her not to side with the ‘enemy’ and not to shame Somali culture.

Also in the case of Tostan (www.tostan.org), a nongovernmental organisation based in Senegal, which has been highly successful in eliminating FGC, those villages who pledged to end FGC were accused of causing ‘shame’ to their own culture (Polden 1999).

Women like the young Somali scholar urge the international community to refrain from ‘respecting’ Somali culture that allows for FGC. They wish the international community to instead acknowledge her new and alternative definition of Somali culture. Her point is not to peddle Western values. She asks the world to help her explain human rights and female dignity in more comprehensive and inclusive ways to her fellow sisters and brothers who, in essence, use
human rights arguments (requesting equal respect) to defend the abuse of human rights (practices such as FGC), and accuse those of ‘shaming’ their own culture who won’t join this double standard.¹⁰

As to Asia, New Caledonia, an overseas territory of France in the southwest Pacific Ocean, provides an interesting case. Nic Maclellan explained it in his presentation at the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (ACPACS) Seminar on 7th August 2007 (Maclellan 2007; see also Maclellan 2005). Kanak women (Kanaks are the indigenous Melanesian inhabitants of New Caledonia) have succeeded in using ‘Western’ values to nudge the call for more respect – more respect for Kanak culture – to include something that their Kanak brothers find difficult to accept, namely more power for women.

The French Constitution was amended in April 1999, mandating that women must constitute fifty percent of the electoral lists for certain elective offices. Interestingly, this law had much less impact in France than in New Caledonia. In the executive government of New Caledonia, as well as in local and provincial bodies, this law produced a significantly increased representation of women. For the first time in the post-contact period, two women were elected to the two most important and powerful positions in the executive government.

Marie-Noëlle Thémereau (born 1950), for example, is the former president of the government of New Caledonia. She is a member of the loyalist (i.e. anti-independence) Future Together party (‘Avenir ensemble’). This party supports the maintenance of political and administrative ties with France and believes in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural future for New Caledonia. It wishes to transcend the ethnic oppositions of the previously dominant parties of New Caledonia (White anti-independence parties versus Kanak pro-independence parties).

Dewe Gorodey, Vice President of New Caledonia, explains:

It’s a question of power. Men are worried about and afraid of parity or of women who speak out publicly, who are political activists – it’s a question of power. I think also that it’s not surprising. Men have reigned for millenniums, so naturally they don’t want to give up their power without a struggle. It’s like that in all societies. I hope that women won’t fall into the same traps; I hope they won’t be drawn into the negative aspects of power-corruption, dishonesty... Kanak men know that they’ve lost their power with respect to Europeans because of colonisation. So if they insist that parity is contrary to our custom, it’s because up till now the power they still had was customary power. I think that’s why they’re worried about parity. But there is no need to worry, because parity has nothing to do with custom. Parity doesn’t come from customary society. That’s why I said before that we mustn’t mix things (statement of Dewe Gorodey, quoted from her Interview with Berman 2005).

It was perhaps precisely the lack of a strong feminist movement in New Caledonia that enabled women to unite on pragmatic grounds, on the recognition that female voices are important for issues of concern to all women in New Caledonia – for example, domestic violence, rape, incest, alcohol abuse, unemployment and female autonomy (Berman 2005). Indeed, ethnographic investigation shows that a majority of Kanak women no longer regards rape or physical violence as legitimate, also when their partner is the perpetrator. ‘The now-widespread challenging of such violence from an ideological standpoint by the youngest Kanak

women, and by urban Kanak women, indicates that new openings are emerging for women at the individual level and that there is a renegotiation of gender relations in New Caledonia’ (Salomon & Hamelin 2008, Abstract).

2.3.2.2.3. Rejection three – rejection of self-refuting advocacies of human rights

Then, there is the third reason for rejecting human rights, or, more precisely, not human rights themselves, but certain ways of promoting them. The rejecter understands the new vision better than some of its promoters and rejects it when human rights ideals are applied in ways that undermine their very spirit.

The human rights message introduces two core transformations, (a) dismantling the tyrants of our world and (b) dismantling and transcending, in addition, all tyrannical systems and their ways of defining human conduct, as well as all tyrannical behaviour (Lindner 2000a; Lindner 2006e). In former times only (a) was carried out, not (b). Underlings rose up, replaced the tyrant, and kept the system in place.

In my work, I give the label of extremists to those who continue turning cycles of humiliation instead of ending them. Among them are those who limit themselves to carrying out solely (a), either intentionally, or because they have not yet understood the full scope of the human rights message. I give the label of moderates to those who are willing and able to perform both human rights transitions, (a) and (b). Moderates have achieved the leap in consciousness discussed earlier, they possess the intellectual and emotional resources for applying self-reflexivity (Nagata 2005), and thus to end cycles of humiliation.

Clearly, the attempt to implement human rights with aggressive methods is inherently inconsistent with the very spirit of human rights. Those who advocate such approaches have not fully understood the essence of human rights or they deliberately misrepresent them. And those who feel humiliated by such approaches are justified in rejecting them.

The debate that accompanied the 2003 Iraq war may serve as an example. The argument was that democracy cannot be achieved by bombing those who are to be persuaded. The same argument forms also one of the strands of the ‘Asia debate.’ In other words, human rights are not only about rights, they are also about the way those rights are implemented. Human rights are not only about a what, but also about the how.

The term revolution often means dismantling tyrants (a), but not necessarily dismantling tyranny-related structures and behaviours (b). Reform is often more amenable to combining (a) and (b). Asia offers several examples of reform-versus-revolution debates. In Philippine history, for instance, José Rizal, was a proponent of institutional reforms by peaceful means rather than by violent revolution, a stance more connected with Andrés Bonifacio. Also the Indian Naxal movement was part of this debate (Singh 1995).

My doctoral research on humiliation and armed conflict included Somalia (quasi-genocide in 1988), and Rwanda (genocide in 1994), on the background of Nazi-Germany. All those genocides were conceptualised, by their instigators, as liberation from humiliation (a). Those genocides attest to the disastrous results to which ‘liberation from humiliation’ may lead when (b), or the how is framed as the application of humiliation to liberate from humiliation.

Interestingly, Western influence always played a key role, even in non-Western cases, tragically, sometimes with the loftiest of intentions. At the first anniversary of his military coup in 1969, for instance, Somali leader Siad Barré drew on German thinker Karl Marx and

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proclaimed that Somalia was a socialist state (even though the country had no history of class conflict in the Marxist sense).

For purposes of Marxist analysis, therefore, tribalism was equated with class in a society struggling to liberate itself from distinctions imposed by lineage group affiliation. At the time, Siad Barré explained that the official ideology consisted of three elements: his own conception of community development based on the principle of self-reliance, a form of socialism based on Marxist principles, and Islam. These were subsumed under ‘scientific socialism,’ although such a definition was at variance with the Soviet and Chinese models to which reference was frequently made (Somalia History and Country Study, www.somalinet.com/library/somalia/?so=0035).

In the case of Rwanda, Belgian influence played a significant role. Initially, Belgian colonisers favoured the ruling Tutsi minority elite, however, during the 1950s, a new generation of Belgian Catholic priests and administrators arrived, who were more open to egalitarian ideas of democracy, and the Hutu majority was increasingly favoured by the Belgian state and the Belgian Catholic Church (Southall 2006: 202; see also Logiest 1982).

In the case of Asia, in Cambodia, the year 1975 was conceived as ‘Year Zero,’ as a restarting of civilisation in analogy to the Year One of the French Revolutionary Calendar. Pol Pot (1925–1998), leader of the Khmer Rouge, was set on killing particularly intellectuals and other ‘bourgeois enemies’ and imposed a version of agrarian collectivisation. City dwellers were sent to the countryside to work in collective farms and forced labour projects. The number of victims is estimated at approximately 1.7 million Cambodians between 1975-1979, including deaths from slave labour (Cambodian Genocide Program, Yale University's MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, www.yale.edu/cgp/index.html).

In Cambodia French influence has played a key role. Nicos Poulantzas (1936-1979), a Greco-French Marxist political sociologist in Paris, was one of Pol Pot’s teachers. Seeing what he had instigated, he later committed suicide (personal communication with Kevin P. Clements, 21st August 2007).

Mneesha Ilanya Gellman served as the Conflict Management and Cooperative Learning Trainer at the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) from 2006 to 2007, designing training curricula for Cambodian volunteers and Commune Councillors, training the NGO trainers in communication and teaching methodology, and studying the potential to blend indigenous and Western dispute resolution mechanisms in Cambodia. She reported on her insights (together with Josh Dankoff) in the weekly ACPACS talk, on 21st August 2007, entitled ‘Conflict, Memory and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: An Analysis of Reconciliation in contemporary Cambodia.’ In her talk she explained how memory is being lost in Cambodia, and how the younger generation is incredulous of what their parents and grandparents tell them about the genocide. She showed the documentary film Seeing Proof (Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) 2003). The film presents a young man who had refused to believe his mother’s stories about the Khmer Rouge. The film then shows how his visit to a stupa, a Buddhist holy site, with a collection of several hundred skeletal remains unearthed from near-by mass graves, profoundly changes his attitude. ‘Most young people in Cambodia do not have a frame of reference for the atrocities committed under the Khmer Rouge’ (Gellman & Dankoff 2007). Gellman suggests capacity building techniques that could help Cambodian NGOs operate in a more productive manner, including exemplifying
the behavioural models of democracy they seek to implement at a governance level (Gellman 2008).

Currently, building a harmonious society is the officially declared aim of the Chinese government that is explained and presented by many voices. For instance, Jianhong Ma, Vice-Head of the School of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences at Zhejiang University, and Executive Director of the Center for Human Resources and Strategic Development Studies, as well as Deputy Director of the Institute of Applied Psychology at Zhejiang University, explained the concept of a harmonious society at the 9th Annual HumanDHS conference, where he hosted, together with Hora Tjitra, the interactive workshop on ‘Collaborative Learning Environment Characterised by Mutual Respect’ on 16th April 2007 (www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/annualmeeting09.php#programme2).

Another voice is that of Fan Zhou, Associate Professor at the School of Management at Zhejiang University, who discusses the difficulties that present themselves on the path to harmony (Zhou 2009). Michael Harris Bond, Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (see his homepage ww3.psy.cuhk.edu.hk/~mbond/), canvasses the intricacies of Chinese psychology in its interplay with Chinese culture and history in the second edition of The Oxford Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Bond (ed.) 2010).

The so-called 2008 ‘Tibet crisis’ unfolds while I write this sentence in March 2008. Clearly, two definitions of harmony clash, one in the context of ranked submission/domination, and the other in the context of equality in dignity.

Harmony has to do with happiness. As noted earlier, Bhutan offers a unique example in this context. Ex-king Jigme Singye Wangchuck sought to steer Bhutan into the modern world, while preserving its unique identity, and decided to focus on Gross National Happiness (GNH) rather than Gross National Product (GNP). Jigmi Y. Thinley, the then Minister of Home and Cultural Affairs, Bhutan, addressed the question ‘What does Gross National Happiness (GNH) mean?’ in a keynote speech (Thinley 2005). At present, Bhutan is being carefully and cautiously brought into a globalising world by royal decree (see the official website of the Election Commission of Bhutan at www.election-bhutan.org.bt/module.php?Menu=Top&View=KASHO).

2.3.2.3. Human rights are not only about rights

Bhutan is at the forefront of guardedly calibrated change, change that egalises society by dismantling hierarchical structures in a fashion that aims to respect the dignity and humanity of everybody involved (not everybody is satisfied; see footnote 11). And, interestingly, this is done top-down. The ruler did not wait to be ousted in a violent revolution by downtrodden underlings who can no longer bear humiliation. He was wiser than that. Not surprisingly, in the elections of 24th March 2008, the party widely perceived as most loyal to the monarchy won by a landslide.

Not all elites are as wise as the Bhutanese royals. More often than not, suffering victims, or those who identify with their plight, are the drivers of the transition to more equality in dignity. Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela spoke from the perspective of the downtrodden. Also M. Anne Brown inquires about alternative paths to human rights that begin with the empathic perception of the suffering of victims:

11 Not everybody is satisfied, though. ‘Tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese, who used to live in Bhutan, were forced to take refuge in camps in Nepal more than a decade ago. Their status is still in dispute’ (BBC NEWS, news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/south_asia/7313325.stm, 25th March 2008).
Must the bundle of things we mean by ‘rights’ flow only from liberal models of the individual and the state or may there be a number of paths, in practice, along which social requirements for levels of mutual respect, political participation and the restraint of systemic harm can develop? The real complexities of the social evolution of such practices are easily lost, however, once discussion slides into airy judgements about ‘East’ and ‘West’ with implicit or overheated assertions of cultural (and national) superiority very close behind (Brown 2002: 115).

Asians have suffered in the past, and they suffer also today. Anna Nolan is an anthropologist and colleague of M. Anne Brown at ACPACS in Brisbane. Prior to that, she worked with the Aboriginal People in the north of Australia. She was saddened when she witnessed the inhumane medical treatment they received. In other words, Anna Nolan had a deeply empathic perception of the suffering of Indigenous Australians. In 2007, the Australian federal government introduced the Northern Territory National Emergency Response (also referred to as ‘the intervention’) as a package of welfare reform, law enforcement and other measures, to address child sexual abuse in Northern Territory Aboriginal communities. Anna Nolan made me aware of how the ‘intervention’ measures can also be perceived as an attack on land rights, other human rights, and community rights, while having no clear connection to preventing child abuse. Nolan sent me a letter, entitled ‘Lack of respect will not help indigenous children,’ written on 14th August 2007 by Banduk Marika, a highly respected and well-known Aboriginal woman, a leader of the Yolngu people of Northeast Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory. One hundred Indigenous and non-Indigenous organisations wrote a similarly disapproving open letter to Mal Brough, Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs on 26th June 2007 (www.acoss.org.au/News.aspx?displayID=99&articleID=2683).

During the time I spent in China (starting in 1983), I learned about Chinese writer and intellectual Lu Xun (Lu Hsun; real name Zhou Shuren), who dissected feudal systems and criticised its humiliating effects and how they victimise people. Lu Xun is being considered the founder of Modern Chinese literature. He was a writer and intellectual, author of short stories, poems, essays, and literary criticism. Born in 1881 (he died in 1936), into an educated but impoverished Chinese family, Lu Xun was concerned with China’s liberation from foreign imperialism, with the abandoning of oppressive and superstitious traditions, with issues of social and economic justice, the plight of the poor and the peasants, as well as with the problems of war, violence and the exploitation of others. Call To Arms (Na-Han) (1922) was his first collection of stories (Lu Xun 1981). It contains his most celebrated stories, such as ‘Diary of a Madman’ (1918) and ‘The True Story of Ah Q,’ where he depicts an ignorant farm labourer, who goes through a series of humiliations and finally is executed during the chaos of the revolution of 1911.

In my paper for the Second International Conference on Multicultural Discourses, 13th-15th April 2007, at the Institute of Discourse and Cultural Studies and Department of Applied Psychology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China (Lindner 2007b), I discuss the critical paradigm that guides the field of Multicultural Discourses. In this paper, I make three points. First, I reflect on the larger historical context, into which the emergence of the critical paradigm is embedded (in line with section 2. in this paper). Second, I explain how feelings of humiliation

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12 I thank Professor Shi-xu for showing me, in 2006, where Lu Xun lived and worked in Shanghai.
have become the marker of the critical paradigm. Third, I make the point that giving voice to the voiceless is as important and potentially life-saving for humankind as protecting biodiversity and that this endeavour ought to be carried forward as a joint effort of the global community and with caution. The paper concludes with a discussion as to how multicultural discourses can be instrumental to constructing meaning both for each world citizen individually, but also with respect to public policy planning at societal levels. I conclude the paper as follows:

In the case of China, this would perhaps mean to merge the voice of Lu Xun and Shi-xu with the voice of Confucius, and bring these voices into the larger world. The message would go as follows: ‘A wide diversity of voices needs to be given space, however, not in the service of mutual destruction, but in the service of a sustainable future for all.’ In many parts of the West, in the United States of America, for example, liberation from past oppressive collectivism has been misunderstood as license to becoming ‘rugged individualists.’ However, ‘rugged individualism’ is a detour that should be avoided on the way to ‘connected individualism,’ where personal responsibility extends beyond narrowly defined self-interest. Connecting the message from Confucius with the voices of Lu Xun and Shi-xu, and giving this message to the world would be an invaluable gift to humankind (Lindner, 2007: 16.)

To sum up, Asia illuminates different aspects of the present worldwide transition away from ranking human worthiness into supposedly lesser and higher beings, toward the ideal and reality of equality in dignity for all. We frequently meet the argument of ‘more’ with which I began this chapter, namely that peace is more than conflict resolution. As Brown asserts, human rights are more than abstract airy judgments or monologist preaching.

Let us now insert a section on the current state-of-the-art of humiliation research.

3. Current state-of-the-art of humiliation research

Until very recently, few researchers studied humiliation explicitly. Mostly, the phenomenon of humiliation figures implicitly, for example in literature on violence and war. If humiliation is treated explicitly, it is often used interchangeably with shame and conceptualised as a variant of shame (see, among others, Tomkins 1962, and Nathanson 1992).

One way to explain this situation is to consider the larger historical context explained earlier in this paper, from which also academia is not exempt. In former times, it was regarded as legitimate that superiors humiliate inferiors so as to elicit enough shame to keep them inferior (see also the work by Norbert Elias mentioned earlier). Underlings were taught to be so afraid of shame and being shamed that they would ‘voluntarily’ refrain from surpassing their lowly position in society. Australian researcher of emotions, Tony Webb, believes that guilt cultures, for instance, American guilt culture, still function in this way.13 Also superiors avoided shame.

13 Tony Webb, in a personal communication, October 12, 2009, wrote: I call the view of shame so dominant in guilt cultures (like the USA) the pathology of shame. This is, in my view, not shame. In fact it is, affectively, ‘not-shame’: the residue of other feelings left when we fail to acknowledge and deal with shame authentically. Authentic/salutogenic shame is not a place where one gets stuck – one gets stuck when one of the other masking emotions: fear anger, distress disgust, kicks in and takes over from/distorts the signal of shame that would motivate me to change (and works through the special quality of shame-empathy to bridge the gap to others). Shame-anger, shame-fear, shame-distress, shame-disgust are ‘not-
Not to respond with duel-like responses when honour was humiliated was too shameful to bear. Death was preferable. Fear of shame thus ‘secured’ both superiority and inferiority in ranked societies. Unsurprisingly, also theoretical conceptualisations mirrored these officially prescribed framings.

The human rights ideal of equality in dignity removes all legitimacy from such applications of shame and humiliation and thus also affects how these phenomena are, and can be conceptualised. I explain this in more detail in a paper entitled ‘How the Human Rights ideal of Equal Dignity Separates Humiliation from Shame’ (Lindner 2007c). Human rights ideals open space for shame to be seen as salutogenic, as Tony Webb formulates it. Shame must no longer be avoided as pathogenic, on the contrary, shame can be cherished as a valuable signal, a signal that a relationship is in need of healing (Webb 2005; see also the section ‘How Human Rights Can Free Shame,’ in Lindner 2009a: 78–83, where I report on Tony Webb’s workshops).

Also humiliation is affected by the rise of human right ideals. Humiliation no longer needs to be conceptualised as part of the shame continuum (at least in part); on the contrary, feelings of humiliation may occur without feelings of shame. A young man – call him Ahmed – told me that he felt pure triumph, without any sense of shame, when he was beaten and humiliated, almost killed, by the military. This sensation, he reported, had such a triumphant quality because it proved to him that he was able to heroically resist oppression. As long as he meekly bowed to the humiliation of oppression, he felt unbearable oppression. As long as he meekly bowed to the humiliation of oppression, he felt unbearable shame and guilt, he explained. Feeling shame-free triumphant humiliation liberated him, made him resilient and gave him new pride.

Transitions typically are slow processes, and indignation at those who lag behind is not only inappropriate, more even, indignation can hamper the transition and slow it down. Those accused of lagging behind may feel humiliated when criticised, become defensive, and introduce divisive enmity and hostility that throws the transitional process back instead of helping it along. Furthermore, indignation belongs into the traditional world of combat and domination instead of dialogue and thus inherently violates the spirit of the very message of equality in dignity that it seeks to advocate (Lindner 2006e). In transitional times, when human rights ideals are still too abstract to permeate all concepts, even academic concepts, it is sufficient to describe this process and point out that it is the nature of transitions to be patchy. Tony Webb has already understood that human rights ideals open space to restore the salutogenic power of shame. Others may not yet have understood that they are part of a historical transition and that there is more distance to cover in conceptualising shame and humiliation than they may imagine and have done so far.

shame’ affects (all effectively mask the shame with the other emotion). To regard shame as ‘painful,’ ‘distressing,’ something to ‘fear’ or avoid, is to confuse shame with those ‘not-shame’ masks that so interfere with the salutogenic functioning of shame. This shame-sorrow disastrously interferes with the healing process. A prime example of this being where we say ‘sorry’ rather than ‘I feel ashamed.’ I have examined what happened in response to the national ‘apology’ to Aboriginal people in the Australian parliament last year, which illustrates how disastrous (and violent) it can be.

Ahmed, personal communication, 2004. I heard Ahmed’s account many times also from other people, in many variations. They all tell me that living in perpetual despair forces one into experiences one would have thought to be impossible before.

Accounts like this led me to doubt that humiliation and shame are always connected: feelings of humiliation can occur without shame. Torturers inflict humiliation to create deep shame, however, as I have learned from torture victims, they can succeed in insulating themselves from such onslaughts or they may even feel humiliation as a triumph.
Let me now present you with a brief overview over research that is related to humiliation. 

*Humiliated fury* is a term that was coined by psychoanalytic psychologist Helen Block Lewis (1913-1987; see Lewis 1971). Scholars of the sociology of emotions Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger extended their work on violence and the Holocaust and studied the part played by humiliated fury in escalating conflicts between individuals and nations (Scheff 1997). Psychiatrist Vamik D. Volkan explains the link between humiliation and violence as the combination of a *chosen trauma* with a sense of entitlement to revenge (Volkan 2004). In the realm of psychology, sociology and trauma, Ervin Staub’s work continues to be highly significant (Staub 2003; Staub 1999). Political scientist and psychoanalyst Blema S. Steinberg, based on her analysis of political crises, cautions that international leaders, when publicly humiliated, in some cases, may instigate mass destruction and war (Steinberg 1991; Steinberg 1996). At a societal level, philosopher Avishai Margalit calls for institutions that do not humiliate. His book *The Decent Society* (Margalit 1996) stimulated a special issue on humiliation by the journal *Social Research* in 1997.

The notion of honour and humiliation that operates in traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds, has been addressed by social psychologists Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen (Nisbett & Cohen 1996). The history of American *Southern Honour* and humiliation has been studied by historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown (Wyatt-Brown 1982). Scholar of law William Ian Miller has explored honour and its link to humiliation as understood in historical and literary classics like *The Iliad* or Icelandic sagas (Miller 1993).

The philosophy on the *politics of recognition* supposes that it may lead to violence when people suffer humiliation as a result of non-recognition. In ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (Taylor 1994), the argument is put forward that identity politics are motivated by a deep human need for recognition, with misrecognition having very injurious effects. Political scientist, sociologist, and social anthropologist Liah Greenfeld uses the example of Ethiopia and Eritrea and suggests that resentment plays a central role in nation building (Greenfeld 1992; Greenfeld 1996; see also Hechter 1992).

More complex cases of humiliation are those that could be labelled as self-humiliation, such as *identification with the oppressor*, or Ranajit Guha’s understanding of the term *subaltern* (Guha and Spivak (eds.) 1988).

*Face* is the positive social value a person wishes to attain for herself in a social interaction. Humiliation can be described as a loss of face; the picture one wishes to present is suddenly discredited (Goffman 1953, and Goffman 1967). *Facework* (Ting-Toomey 1994; Masumoto, Oetzel, Takai, Ting-Toomey, & Yokochi 2000), and *face-saving* is often associated with Asian culture (Pharr 1990). Chinese research indicates that shame and guilt shade into each other, and both emotions ‘direct people into self-examination in social situations in order to recognise their own wrong doings, as well as to motivate people to improve themselves’ (Li & Fischer 2004: 411).

The link between humiliation and aggression has not received much attention among researchers so far. Feelings of humiliation serve as a justification for dating aggression (Foo & Margolin 1995) and *rejection-sensitive* men may get ‘hooked’ on situations of debasement where they can feel humiliated (Mischel & De Smet 2000).

Humiliation and rage can be classified as moral emotions, since they motivate moral behaviour such as violence or aggression (but also prevention of violence and aggression). Some people may become attached – almost addicted – to this emotion, as this secures the ‘benefits’ of
the victim status and an entitlement for retaliation (Margalit 2002; chapter 7 ‘The Humiliation Addiction’ in Lindner 2006).

There is also a link between help and humiliation. Help can be both, an expression of caring, but also a demonstration of superiority (Nadler 2002; Rosen 1983). Applied to international development, trade may advance peace more than aid, among others because it does not entail humiliation (Oneal & Russett 1999; Morrow 1999; Hegre 2000; see also Anderson 1999).

Important new research on mirror neurons illuminates the phenomenon of humiliation. ‘Social emotions like guilt, shame, pride, embarrassment, disgust and lust are based on a uniquely human mirror neuron system found in a part of the brain called the insula’ (Blakeslee 2006: 3). Humiliation appears to be mapped in the brain by the same mechanisms that encode real physical pain – that is the insight researchers draw from recent research on human mirror neurons: ‘Social connection is a need as basic as air, water, or food and that like these more basic needs, the absence of social connections causes pain. Indeed, we propose that the pain of social separation or rejection may not be very different from some kinds of physical pain’ (Eisenberger & Lieberman 2005: 110).

This overview does not exhaust the contributions to the topic of humiliation and related issues. But to my awareness, only Miller, Hartling and the two above-mentioned journals explicitly put the word and concept of humiliation at the center of their studies.

3.1. Definitions of humiliation

Goldman & Coleman 2005 brought humiliation research ‘into the lab.’ They define humiliation as follows:

Humiliation is an emotion, triggered by public events, which evokes a sense of inferiority resulting from the realization that one is being, or has been, treated in a way that departs from the normal expectations for fair and equal human treatment. The experience of humiliation has the potential to serve as a formative, guiding force in a person’s life and can significantly impact one’s individual and/or collective identity. Finally, the experience of humiliation can motivate behavioural responses that may serve to extend or re-define previously existing moral boundaries, leading individuals to perceive otherwise socially impermissible behavior to be permissible (Goldman & Coleman, 2005: 11).

As I have laid out above, to my view, there are two fundamentally contradictory definitions of humiliation. One definition is embedded into a larger normative and cultural frame of ranked honour, while the other has meaning only within a human-rights based context.

I set out to study the link between humiliation and violent conflict, such as war and genocide, in a doctoral research project entitled The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties, from 1997 to 2001 (Lindner 2000c). I carried out 216 qualitative interviews in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi addressing their history of genocidal killings. From 1998 to 1999, the interviews were carried out in Somaliland, Rwanda, Burundi, Nairobi, Kenya; and Egypt, as well as in Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Belgium. Some of the interviews were filmed (10 hours of film and images of Somaliland and Rwanda), others were taped (over 100 hours of audiotape), and in situations where this seemed inappropriate, I made notes. The interviews and conversations were
conducted in different languages; most of them in English (Somalia) and French (Great Lakes), many in German or Norwegian.

Since the conclusion of the doctoral dissertation on humiliation in 2001, I have expanded my studies, among others in Europe, South East Asia, and the United States. Together with my co-researchers, particularly with Linda M. Hartling, I am currently building a theory of humiliation that is transdisciplinary and entails elements from anthropology, history, social philosophy, social psychology, sociology, and political science. I am the Founding President of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (HumanDHS, www.humiliationstudies.org), with Linda M. Hartling as its Director since November 2008. We develop this network of academics and practitioners globally since 2001.

In everyday language, the word humiliation is used threefold, at a minimum. Firstly, the word humiliation signifies an act, secondly a feeling, and thirdly, a process: ‘I humiliate you, you feel humiliated, and the entire process is one of humiliation.’ (In this paper it is expected that the reader understands from the context which alternative is the one applied at a given point, since otherwise language would become too convoluted.)

In my work, I deconstruct the concept of humiliation into seven layers (Lindner 2001), including a) a core that expresses the universal idea of putting down, b) a middle layer that contains two opposed orientations towards being put down, treating it as legitimate and routine, or as illegitimate and traumatising, and c) a periphery with several layers, including one pertaining to cultural differences between groups and four layers that relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experience of humiliation.

The definition of humiliation that I have developed and use in my work is as follows: Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against one’s will (in some cases also with one’s consent as in cases of religious self-humiliation or in sadomasochism) and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what one feels one should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down, or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, and made helpless. People react in different ways when they feel that they are unduly humiliated. Some people feeling humiliated may experience rage; this may be turned inwards, as in the case of depression and apathy. However, rage may also turn outwards and express itself in violence, even in mass violence when leaders are available to forge narratives of group humiliation. Some people hide their anger and carefully plan revenge. A person who plans for ‘cold’ revenge may

16 See www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/evelin02.php, and, for the most recent publications, Lindner 2008c; LindnerGanesan & Brown 2008; Lindner 2008a; Lindner 2008d; Lindner 2008b; Lindner 2008e; Lindner 2007e; Lindner 2007d; Lindner 2007a; Lindner 2007b; Lindner 2007c; Lindner 2006c; Lindner 2006b; Lindner 2006a; Lindner 2006f; Lindner 2006d; Lindner 2006e.

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become a leader of a particularly dangerous movement (see an evocative article on extreme mass homicide by Dutton, Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005).

3.2. The role of the ability to feel humiliated for conscientisation

Feelings of humiliation can play the role of the nuclear bomb of the emotions, a term coined by Lindner (Lindner 2006f). Extremist Hutus in Rwanda achieved a genocide, within a few weeks, simply by stoking feelings of humiliation and fear of future humiliation in the Hutu population. Radio Mille Collines was used for incitement, with the aim to turn the hearts and minds of their listeners into the most effective weapons.\(^{17}\) No bombs thrown from the air could have achieved the degree of deadliness that was brought about by Hutu neighbours who knew exactly where their Tutsi neighbours lived and who had their machetes handy for homicide. Thus the ultimate ‘surgical strikes’ were perpetrated, and at an unparalleled low cost, by instrumentalising various scripts connected with the experience of humiliation.

To add real nuclear weaponry to this scenario would be disastrous. However, this is precisely one of the potential scenarios at present. The nuclear threat has not been mitigated since the Cold War ended, only displaced and fragmented. Particular nuclear terrorism poses a grave threat to global security (Levi 2008). In June 2004, Mohamed ElBaradei, the usually guarded Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), described the threat of nuclear terrorism as ‘real and imminent,’ and talked of a ‘race against time’ to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radioactive materials (El Baradei 2004). ElBaradei’s warnings are highly relevant not least for Southeast Asia – political scientist Tanya Ogilvie-White outlines some of the most vulnerable sources of nuclear and radioactive materials in use and storage at facilities throughout the Southeast Asia region, ranging from high-risk highly enriched uranium at existing nuclear research reactors to lower-risk radioisotopes, which are widely in use and yet insufficiently monitored by a number of Southeast Asian commercial enterprises (Ogilvie-White 2006). Even more unacceptable levels of insecurity loom from the present trend to cyber warfare. Cyber war has moved from fiction to fact, says a report compiled by security firm McAfee, which bases its conclusion on analysis of recent net-based attacks (newsroom.mcafee.com/article_print.cfm?article_id=3594).

However, the ability to feel humiliated, on behalf of oneself and others, in the face of violations of dignity, can also serve as the very engine that connects new awareness with conscientisation, which then can drive systemic change (see Table 2: The role of feelings of humiliation for conscientisation). Conscientisation has been explored as a mediator between antecedent conditions and pro-democracy movements by social-organizational and peace psychologist at Ateneo de Manila University, Cristina Montiel. Montiel shows how active non-violent movements become increasingly powerful with conscientisation informing networks both locally and globally (Montiel 2006). I have built on her conceptualisation (Lindner 2009b).

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\(^{17}\) Radio Mille Collines was headed by Felicien Kabuga, a wealthy businessman. Officials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have long maintained that Kabuga is hiding in Kenya and that the Nairobi government is protecting him. ‘US ambassador for war crimes, Stephen Rapp, has called on the Kenyan authorities to arrest a key genocide suspect…. Mr Rapp said he had received fresh reports that Mr Kabuga was in Kenya. ‘The latest response of government authorities is, ‘Oh he’s left.’ The ICTR says if he’s left show us the evidence. And they say, ‘Well we’re still looking for that evidence,’” Mr Rapp said. “If you are still looking for the evidence you cannot honestly say that he has left,” he said.’ BBC NEWS, 16th November, 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/africa/8363342.stm.
## The Role of Feelings of Humiliation for Conscientisation

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depression and apathy</td>
<td>Depression and apathy, in reaction to being humiliated, is associated with a narrow, self-referencing horizon, with ‘tunnel vision.’ If anger is felt, it is turned inwards. There is little or no resilience on the side of the victim, however, the immediate social environment of the victim, as well as society at large stay undisturbed and have the impression that everything is ‘calm and quiet.’</td>
<td>Feelings of humiliation play an anti-social role, particularly for the victim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot retaliation</td>
<td>Hot retaliation, in reaction to being humiliated, is also associated with the narrow scope of tunnel vision, however, with anger projected outward. This may translate into more subjective resilience for the victim, through a short-term release of tension, but the immediate social environment of the victim and society at large are negatively affected. This could be called ‘the resilience of revenge.’</td>
<td>Feelings of humiliation play an anti-social role, particularly for the victim and society at large. In this case, feelings of humiliation play the role of the <em>nuclear bomb of the emotions</em>, a term coined by Lindner (Lindner 2006f).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Cold’ retaliation (Hitler/terrorism)</td>
<td>‘Cold’ retaliation (Hitler/terrorism), in reaction to being humiliated, is associated with a wider horizon; larger spans of history and larger groups are included into the planning of responses that resemble hot retaliation, but are more effective and larger in scale. This may generate a high degree of subjective resilience for the victim, who may, as Hitler did, even feel elated, legitimised by providence (‘Vorsehung’), however, large-scale destruction may be the result. This could also be called ‘the resilience of revenge.’</td>
<td>Feelings of humiliation play a disastrously anti-social role, particularly for society at large. Also in this case, feelings of humiliation play the role of the <em>nuclear bomb of the emotions</em>, only at a much larger and more destructive scale, since these feelings have now high jacked institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive psychological, social, and cultural change (Mandela)</td>
<td>Larger spans of history and larger groups are included into the design and planning of large-scale constructive change of psychological, social and cultural scripts, with the aim to dignify relationships. This path presupposes and generates a high degree of subjective resilience for the victim. As a result, the victim’s immediate social environment and society</td>
<td>The ability to feel humiliated, on behalf of oneself and others, plays the prosocial role of a fire sensor and fire alarm (humiliation sensor and alarm). The presence of a fire alarm does not mean that fire (humiliation) is pro-social, on the very contrary. However, the ability to sense fire (humiliation) and call the fire brigades is profoundly prosocial.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The ability to feel humiliated depends on many factors. First, a minimum of physical and psychological nurturing during childhood is necessary to enable a human being to feel phenomena such as dignity and humiliation – a malnourished and abused child may be condemned to a state beyond any consciousness of dignity and humiliation. Early childhood neglect and humiliation may lead people to perpetrate acts of humiliation inadvertently, through affective blindness (Perry 1997, p. 128). Next, cultural factors play a role, as has been explained above – the definition of humiliation varied profoundly during the past millennia – with the definition of humiliation as a violation of equality in dignity being inscribed in the normative universe of human rights ideals.

Human rights provide a normative frame that is suitable for the creation of a sustainable socio- and biosphere for all humankind, however, only when feelings of humiliation are channelled constructively. The advance of human rights is supportive of the ability to feel humiliated, because it provides a framework for the collective and individual transformation of psychological, social, cultural, and institutional environments. This psychological, social, and cultural pre-condition is termed resilience of dignity and love.

The ability to feel humiliated is the very driving force of the human rights movement. Human rights ideals entail the promise to constructively reshape the psychological, social, cultural, and institutional environment of the human family. ‘Resilience of dignity and love’ is the psychological, social and cultural pre-condition that enables new ‘hearty’ institution building. As soon as ‘hearty’ institutions are in place, in a self-enforcing manner, they nurture ‘resilience of dignity and love’ in the psychological, social and cultural realms. While the ability to feel humiliated resembles the fire sensor and fire alarm, the building of decent institutions resembles the construction of safer buildings. The path proceeds from the ability to feel humiliated through conscientisation to global institution building, This process can be aided by dialogically harvesting from worldwide cultural wisdom (see, for example, Brown 2002, and Lindner 2007a).

Table 2: The role of feelings of humiliation for conscientisation

| Constructive large-scale systemic change at the institutional level (Mandela, Margalit’s Decent Society) | Global horizon, larger spans of history and larger groups are included into the planning of large-scale constructive systemic change, with a particular focus on the creation of non-humiliating institutions (a Decent Society, Margalit 1996). This path presupposes and generates a high degree of subjective resilience for the victim. As a result, the victim’s immediate social environment and society at large, including global society, become more resilient. This ‘resilience of dignity and love’ is the very pre-condition and force behind the vision for constructive local and global institution building. ‘Resilience of dignity and love’ not only stimulates the creation of new visions for the future of humankind, it furthermore provides the strength and motivation to implement these visions. | The ability to feel humiliated is the very driving force of the human rights movement. Human rights ideals entail the promise to constructively reshape the psychological, social, cultural, and institutional environment of the human family. ‘Resilience of dignity and love’ is the psychological, social and cultural pre-condition that enables new ‘hearty’ institution building. As soon as ‘hearty’ institutions are in place, in a self-enforcing manner, they nurture ‘resilience of dignity and love’ in the psychological, social and cultural realms. While the ability to feel humiliated resembles the fire sensor and fire alarm, the building of decent institutions resembles the construction of safer buildings. The path proceeds from the ability to feel humiliated through conscientisation to global institution building, This process can be aided by dialogically harvesting from worldwide cultural wisdom (see, for example, Brown 2002, and Lindner 2007a). |
humiliated on behalf of oneself and others, and increases feelings of humiliation around the world wherever conditions do not safeguard equality in dignity. It is the responsibility of human rights advocates to explain that there is a Hitler-path out of humiliation, however, that it is only the Mandela-path that will render a better world.

4. Humanising globalisation through egalisation, and pro-active global cohesion building

How do we humanise globalisation? How do we achieve what I call egalisation? And how do we pro-actively build harmonious global cohesion?

Lee D. Ross at Stanford and his colleagues have carried out illuminating work on the role of framing (Ross & Nisbett 1991; Liberman, Samuels, & Ross 2004). When students are told that a task they are asked to carry out is difficult, they may not solve it; however, when they are told that the same task usually is being solved quite easily, they will solve it. When students are asked to play a game where they have the choice to cooperate or to cheat on one another (Prisoner’s Dilemma game) and they are told that this is a community game, they will cooperate; however, they will cheat on each other when told that the same game is a Wallstreet game (see also Milgram and Zimbardo’s research introduced in section 2.2).

In other words, by building constructive large-scale institutional, societal, and social frames, existing grievances can be guided into constructive channels. For the case of Indonesia, this claim has been supported (van Klinken 2007). Collective violence in Indonesia in the years 1996-2002 claimed an estimated 19,000 lives. Gerry van Klinken is a researcher at the KITLV/Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (www.kitlv.nl), involved with several collaborative research programs on post-New Order Indonesia. His research shows that grievances about ‘timeless hurts’ were secondary to political resource mobilisation and that better rules have the potential to build a substantive democracy in Indonesia even at the risk of messy communitarian expressions of popular sovereignty.

If we extend van Klinken’s results from the national to the international level, we could conclude that creating better global rules would be useful also to forge a harmonious global society. Political mobilisation for better global rules would improve the chances for peaceable local cultures to flourish and for attempts to pro-actively create cohesion, locally and globally, to succeed. At the current point in time, insufficient global rules call for systemic change at the global level so that local contexts can be framed as community game.

Asia is in the privileged position to be able to look back on rich peaceable traditions. One example is Kashmiriyat (Kashmiri-ness), or the ethno-national and social consciousness and cultural values of the Kashmiri people, characterised by religious and cultural harmony (Khan 2009). The example of Kashmir demonstrates how important large-scale contexts are and how even the most peaceable culture cannot stand up in an overall context that fosters conflict, in this instance the conflict between India and Pakistan. ‘The conflict “of” Kashmir (originally a dispute between India and Pakistan) has been replaced by the conflict “in” Kashmir (a conflict within the territorial space of India)’ (Khan 2009: Abstract).
Clearly, it is not sufficient to hope that the so-called contact hypothesis, or the hope that mere contact will foster friendship,\(^{18}\) will lead to a global harmonious society. Merely being neighbours does not guarantee harmony and peace, even though the aggregate level shows an overall positive trend (see a meta-analysis of the contact hypothesis by Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Examples abound. Malays and Chinese in Malaysia, though neighbours, are not necessarily friends (Noor & Khaiyom 2009), as are Serbs and Croats in the Balkans, or Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, or were German Jews and their German neighbours in Nazi-Germany.

Only more appropriate global institutions can provide more benign overall framings and be strong enough to initiate a global harmonious society. Only then can the ‘illusory homogeneity’ (Brown 2002: 129) be deconstructed and dismantled that currently characterises many discussions about cultures and states. Brown points out that thinking about rights in international politics entails the opportunity to work across borders – but that this ‘is obscured by the habit of thinking within the terms of the state, with its illusory homogeneity’ (Brown 2002: p. 129).

Brown writes, ‘For in order to give voice to suffering and to work against the infliction of suffering, people need to be able to take part to some reasonable degree in shaping and reflecting upon the contours of their common and individual lives — to take part in dialogue, not only to speak but to be listened to’ (Brown 2002: 129).

4.1.1. **Pro-active creation and maintenance of global social cohesion**

Avishai Margalit argues that is not sufficient to build just societies, but that we need to create decent societies, with institutions that do not humiliate their citizens but protect their dignity (Margalit 1996). Margalit’s call for decency dovetails with philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas’s call to interpret human rights not just as negative rights, but as positive rights. There is a difference between the Kantian interpretation of human rights as abstract principle and the Lévinasian interpretation that emphasises human rights as care and respect for the other (Badiou 2001; see also chapter 4 or Lindner 2006f). This resonates also with Brown’s differentiation of human rights as abstract judgements and monologist preaching on one side, and empathic dialogue on the other side.

How do we, as humankind, create a global system of decent institutions that fosters mutual care, not just in form of emergency charity, but in the long term, and that secures the pro-active nurturing of harmonious global social cohesion?

This is the lead question for my book *Gender, Humiliation, and Global Security*, Lindner 2010. One area where this question has been studied is marriage. John Gottman and colleagues have done extensive research on the question of why some marriages last and others not.\(^{19}\) For several decades, John Gottman watched couples interact at the Family Research Laboratory in Seattle. Using video cameras, one-way mirrors, and body sensors, Gottman and his associates collected a wealth of data. Interestingly, already very early on in marriage, they can predict divorce that will occur many years later (Gottman & Levenson 2000).

Their results indicate that not just negative factors play a role, but also a lack of positive factors:

\(^{18}\) The contact hypothesis represents the “belief that interaction between individuals belonging to different groups will reduce ethnic prejudice and inter-group tension” (Ryan 1995, p. 131). See on cultural diffusion also Triandis 1997, for Cultural and Social Behavior.

\(^{19}\) I thank Peter T. Coleman for reminding me of Gottman’s work.
Another surprise: we followed couples for as long as 20 years, and we found that there was another kind of couple that didn’t really show up on the radar; they looked fine, they weren’t mean, they didn’t escalate the conflict – but about 16 to 22 years after the wedding they started divorcing. They were often the pillars of their community. They seemed very calm and in control of their lives, and then suddenly they break up. Everyone is shocked and horrified. But we could look back at our early tapes and see the warning signs we had never seen before. Those people were people who just didn’t have very much positive connection. There wasn’t very much affection – and also especially humour – between them (Gottman 2004).

Gottman proposes a new form of couple therapy (Gottman & Silver 1999) based on his core insight, namely that ‘successful conflict resolution isn’t what makes marriages succeed’ (Gottman 1999: 11). He works primarily on increasing positive couple interactions. ‘The foundation of my approach is to strengthen the friendship that is at the heart of any marriage’ (Gottman 1999: 46). Gottman suggests seven principles, first, the three main principles of (1) know each other, (2) focus on each other’s positive qualities, (3) interact frequently, and second, four traditional conflict resolution principles, such as (4) let your partner influence you, (5) solve your solvable problems (communicate respectfully, etc.), (6) overcome gridlock, and (7) create shared meaning.

Gottman emphasises ‘meta-emotions’ as determinants of emotional behaviour in families. Meta-emotions delineate a family’s philosophy about emotions and why they have this philosophy, in sum, how people feel about feelings, what their history is with specific emotions like pride, respect or disrespect, love, fear, anger, sadness (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven 1997). Also psychotherapist Milton Spett cautions that recipes for conflict resolution, even rules for behaviour in general, are insufficient. He believes that it is individual psychopathology that is the most important cause of both couple distress and the failure to practice Gottman’s seven principles (Spett 2004a).

According to Spett, the most common individual problems that cause couple distress are:

1. Constantly criticizing your partner; the tendency to feel criticized when you are not being criticized, and emotional overreaction when you are being criticized.
2. The inability to communicate positive emotion; the tendency to feel unloved.
3. Being domineering and unable to see others’ viewpoints; unassertiveness, overconcern with pleasing your partner, and the resulting tendency to feel obligated and controlled (Spett 2004a).

Spett believes that overcoming these individual psychological problems is the most effective method for helping couples, at least in most cases. The two critical components of all psychotherapies, according to Spett, are ‘experience the emotion, change the cognition’ (Spett 2004b).

In the concluding remarks of this paper, I combine Gottman’s and Spett’s recommendations with the rest of the reflections so far discussed in this paper.
4.1.2. **Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network**

The steps in the above presented vision for future action will not come about unless they are intentionally envisaged and embarked upon by the human family. At the current point in time, the political will around the world lacks the necessary strength. However, support is slowly forthcoming. For instance, the focus of contemporary peace psychology has turned toward systemic change. Systemic change is most needed at the global level, because as soon as the highest levels are framed differently, this will have large-scale reverberations also locally. Many protracted local conflicts are not being solved now, only because institutional structures and the political will at higher levels fail them. Yet, despite of the gains to be expected from global systemic change, the macro level is currently being severely neglected – few people reflect on global institution building (Baratta 2004; see also Weiss 2009, or O’Byrne 2003).

Through our work in the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network, we attempt to support all elements of the above presented vision for future action. At the highest global level, we propose, for example, the very grand and ambitious idea of a Peace Star:

9/11/2001 has become a code for a water-shed. It was a big event that moved the world not least due to its unexpected audacity and creativity. And it was a terrible event. Let us now ask: Is it possible to create events that have as much impact as this tragedy, only that they inspire hope, instead of making us sad? … Peace is boring, nothing happens. Let us make something happen! (read more at http://humiliationstudies.org/intervention/events.php#peacestar).

However, other points in the plan for future action need as much attention, from macro to meso to micro levels.

I suggest four principal moves, steps, or major initiatives: First, I put forward that it would be beneficial to promote respect for the individual (rather than ‘respect for the group’ or ‘respect for a culture’; Lindner 2000b; Lindner 2007a); second, I propose that it is worth making a case for contamination and fluidity (rather than purity and rigidity; Lindner 2009a: 136-137); third, I suggest that common interest needs to be given priority over difference, and that human rights are the best way to define this common interest; and finally, fourth, I propose that it would be useful and beneficial to ‘harvest’ (using human rights as triage tool) cultural practices from all cultures, sub-cultures, as well as counter-cultures, so as to support the creation of a globally inclusive culture of Unity in Diversity for a decent sustainable future for our world (Lindner 2007a). Human rights provide a suitable triage filter, because we would not wish to harvest and reintroduce, for example, Chinese foot binding, so as to satisfy our desire to respect Chinese culture. Cultural practices can humiliate, and we cannot blindly harvest whatever ‘a culture’ or ‘a tradition’ offers us. See Table 3 further down.
### Four Important Elements for Future Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do</th>
<th>Beware</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Respect the individual</td>
<td>Beware of blindly respecting ‘the group’ or ‘a culture’</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Opt for contamination and fluidity</td>
<td>Beware of purity and rigidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Give priority to common interest</td>
<td>Beware of the potential entailed in difference to become divisive</td>
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<td>over difference so that diversity can</td>
<td></td>
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<td>be celebrated</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Harvest cultural practices from all</td>
<td>Use human rights as triage tool to refrain from harvesting traditional</td>
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<tr>
<td>cultures, sub-cultures, as well as</td>
<td>practices that violate human rights (such as foot binding, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counter-cultures</td>
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Table 3: Four important elements for future action

With regard to the fourth element proposed above, on 10-13th August 2005, ‘harvesting’ event took place in Brisbane. At the Multi-Faith Centre at Griffith University in Queensland in Brisbane, Virginia F. Cawagas and Swee-Hin Toh organised an international symposium entitled ‘Cultivating Wisdom, Harvesting Peace Education for a Culture of Peace through Values, Virtues, and Spirituality of Diverse Cultures, Faiths, and Civilizations’ (Toh and Cawagas (eds.) 2007). Among the wise cultural practices and philosophies of the world that merit harvesting is *ubuntu*, a traditional African philosophy. *Ubuntu* is a way of life and state of being, a code of principles for living together, and a strategy for conflict resolution. It is a way of living together in community in an atmosphere of shared humility. Desmond Tutu’s (1999) work of the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* drew on *ubuntu* (Tutu 1999; Battle 1997) and Nelson Mandela’s approach resonated with the spirit of *ubuntu*.

With respect to Asia, the book *Peace Psychology in Asia* (Montiel and Noor (eds.) 2009) offers rich harvest. ‘Harvesting Civil Islam,’ for instance, could be the heading of the chapter entitled ‘Interreligious Harmony and Peacebuilding in Indonesian Islamic Education’ (Pohl 2009). We read in this chapter, ‘From the private and the state-run Islamic institutions of higher learning and the madrasah to the mostly independently organized pesantren, Islamic educational institutions have become vital agents in the network of ‘civil Islam’ that promotes social justice and peace-building in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Indonesia’ (Pohl 2009: Abstract). ‘Harvesting Peaceful Islam’ could characterise another chapter in the same book, namely the chapter entitled ‘Contested Discourses on Violence, Social Justice, and Peacebuilding Among Indonesian Muslims’ (Khisbiyah 2009). Also the cultural resources of the Korean Baku Bae Movement, as discussed in the chapter on ‘Peace Psychology of Grassroots Reconciliation: Lessons Learned from the “Baku Bae” Peace Movement’ (Muluk & Malik 2009) lends itself to being harvested.

Bougainville offers another good example for how indigenous customary methods of conflict transformation – not simply copying the western model of the state but drawing on customary ways that are rooted in local communities – have contributed decisively to the success of peace-building (Böge 2006). Post conflict peace-building in Bougainville has been a success so far, and prospects for state-building look promising. ACPACS researcher Volker Böge argues as follows:
Local customary patterns and logics of action mix and overlap with introduced modern state patterns, hybrid political systems emerge. That hybridity is perceived as a negative factor from the point of view of the mainstream Western policy and academic discourse on ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states. However, any attempts at peace- and state-building that ignore or fight hybridity experience difficulty in generating effective and legitimate outcomes. Any endeavours that perceive building the capacity of state institutions as a merely technical issue and confine themselves to that institution-building are bound to fail. In particular, rebuilding the state in the same form which was one of the causes of violent conflict in the first place does not make sense. Rather it is vital to recognize hybridity as the starting point for any endeavours that aim at sustainable peace- and state-building (Böge, 2006: 36).

4.1.3. Global inter-human communication

M. Anne Brown puts forward dialogue as an ‘evocative trajectory for reflection’ (Brown 2002: 122). She explains that in a conversation ‘the significance lies also in part in the nature of the interaction over time and the character of the relationship,’ while in a monologist message the ‘significance of the communication could be understood to be essentially contained in the words’ (Brown 2002: 122).

Brown points out that human rights connotes more than the relationship between individual and state but play part in how we construct community. She writes: ‘Response to systemic injury may thus demand less the assertion of a singular truth than long-term engagement with the social practices in which much abuse is embedded or sustained’ (Brown 2002: 122).

Brown recommends to step aside from the polarity of universal versus relative values by understanding this polarity as a product of the history of the state system, whereby the state’s sovereignty may be seen by some as ‘threatened’ by alleged universal values. In a nondualistic spirit, Brown explains that ‘whether understood pragmatically or ontologically or both, universality versus relativism is not a dispute that can be finally resolved across the board in favour of one term of the polarity or the other’ (Brown 2002: 123). She points out that dialogue offers an alternative to this overworked polarity, and warns against conceptualising entirely discrete, separate and self-contained subjectivities, or cultures. Dialogue draws attention to the contextual and interactive dimension of our understanding, it emphasises listening and attentiveness to circumstances and to others, it ‘is not monologue or the enunciation of singular truths’ (Brown 2002: 124).

Earlier, I mentioned that human rights advocates need to be aware that human rights entail two kinds of dismantling, first, the dismantling of tyranny, and, second, the dismantling of tyrannical structures, methods and approaches, be it societal, social, cultural, or psychological. Monologist preaching of human rights would neglect the second part of this paradigm shift. Dialogue, travelling the Möbius strip on both sides, keeping them apart while connecting them, this is the only communication form that is consistent with the spirit of human rights. Partiality in this context is not a failure, posits Brown, ‘but a natural condition of being part of interactions and exchanges. Partiality is a condition of potentially sharing, extending or changing understanding – one’s own, someone else’s or both. It is a condition of learning’ (Brown 2002: 124). And, Brown stipulates, dialogue is one response to the ‘vulnerability’ of knowing.

Particularly if we are thinking of slow and difficult ‘conversations’ over generations or centuries, listening to others and to our own self-reflection may lead to deconstructing humanity, with the result of equipping us ‘with a more discriminating awareness of our sense of humanity...
and of its adequacy to our commitment to rights, in this case, or to community which does not systematically generate suffering’ (Brown 2002:125). Brown cautions that history provides good reasons not to trust the processes of ‘coming to understandings,’ but that dialogues are a central element of the tools that we have for living together (Brown 2002: 127).

The dialogue that Brown describes can be aided by input from many sides. For example, feminist Jean Baker Miller advocated ‘waging good conflict’ (Miller 1976), which means practicing radical respect for differences and being open to a variety of perspectives and engaging others without contempt.

The Yoshikawa’s double-swing model presented in section 1. relates to what Peter A. Levine calls pendulation (Levine 1997). Successful pendulation can produce solidarity and social integration; without it, we have alienation and lack of social integration. Thomas J. Scheff commends the idea of pendulation, through which ‘we swing back and forth between our own point of view and that of the other… It is this back and forth movement between subjective and intersubjective consciousness that allows us the potential for understanding each other’ (Levine 1997, quoted in Scheff 2003, p. 10, an earlier and longer draft of Scheff 2006).

Good attunement is achieved when pendulation is successful, when intersubjectivity is lived to its full potential. When pendulation succeeds, the result is a relationship of interdependence. Healthy Identity in Unity and pendulation are interdependent – neither independent and isolated, nor engulfed. Both parties in conflictual relationships must avoid going too far, not ‘walk over’ the other, and not allow the other to ‘walk over’ them.

In my paper ‘From Intercultural Communication to Global Interhuman Communication,’ I draw attention to the fact that intercultural communication has the potential to fertilise transformative learning due to its power to unsettle us. I suggest that we may go beyond being unsettled ourselves and let the very field of intercultural communication be unsettled. I propose to inscribe intercultural communication into global interhuman communication and suggest founding a new field, the field of ‘Global Interhuman Communication’ (Lindner 2007a). This would be yet another contribution to strengthening the creation of the move toward the global social cohesion described earlier.

Global interhuman communication is needed to foster a harmonious global society. For this endeavour, traditional ranked honour concepts are as unhelpful as the extreme and ruthless individualism that has recently emerged in some segments of Western culture. What is helpful is a nondualist approach that offers equality in dignity to all world citizens.

5. Concluding remarks

At the current point in history, humankind faces a unique window of opportunity. Never before have humans understood how small and vulnerable their habitat is. Never before have humans seen their habitat from the astronaut’s perspective. History does not repeat itself.

In the face of global crises, a harmonious global society must be created in a pro-active nondualistic way. The strengths of all citizens of the world and of all cultures must be combined to achieve this task. Asia in particularly important in this historical moment.

If we assume that the first 95 percent of human history were characterised by nondualism, and the past 10,000 years saw the rise of dualism in the wake of the security dilemma, then, today, space opens again for nondualism. And Asia is perhaps the most significant historical source for nondualist thought. Therefore Asia’s contributions to world peace are so important. The past 10,000 years produced a Pandora’s Box of malign biases – as there are ‘good in-group’ against

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‘evil out-group’ – that were culturally enforced into human minds and hearts all around the world throughout the past ten millennia. At present, we, as humankind, must exit from the mutilating frame and its malign reverberations of the past 10,000 years as fast as we can lest we will lose our habitat.

What humankind needs, at a grand level, in self-enforcing loops, is global systemic change, in the spirit of nondualistic Unity in Diversity, change that offers new global ‘community’ framings and sustains them through continuous pro-active maintenance of harmonious global social cohesion (Gottman’s seven principles, Buber’s I-Thou). New institutional frames at the global level, when in place, can open space for new cognitive evaluations of emotions (Spett’s emphasis), which can help re-conceptualise meta-emotions (Gottman) so that emotions, when they are experienced, can now lead to new outcomes. Thus, the traditional ‘automatic’ connection between hatred and mayhem could be severed, and a new sequence take hold, a sequence that proceeds from suffering, via feelings of humiliation and conscientisation, to Mandela-like constructive social reform towards this very global systemic change.

As mentioned earlier, at the current point in time, we already see some post-individual consciousness emerge, or unity consciousness, and we feel a ‘Kantian culture’ of collective security or ‘friendship’ coming closer. However, this is not enough. Huge changes need to be implemented. Every detail of human activity has to be designed from the point of view of the unifying common good of all humankind, with the nurturing of diversity as integral part. All contemporary – isms need scrutiny. Today, nationalism, or capitalism, are only benign as long as they put this common interest first. Whoever tries to fire up nationalism or capitalism by keeping the Security Dilemma alive or by intensifying it (for example, in order to be elected, to stay in power, or to accumulate more riches), represents a danger. All philosophies and biases that underpin the primacy of self-interest – from might-is-right approaches to just-world thinking – represent a risk that might push humankind over the edge. Self-interest is identical with common interest in an interdependent world. Anybody who detaches self-interest from common interest may damage common interest.

Abuse crosses borders – as dependency theorists and refugee flows show. But also bonds of solidarity cross borders, and rights are not only institutional or political but also aspirational. Brown explains that rights are ‘an available language for asking and, in part, for answering how can we live well together, how can we build and sustain non-injurious relationships at all levels.’

We need to keep asking this question because we answer it differently at different times, and sometimes in better ways than others. And we need to ask not only ourselves, but others’ (Brown 2002: 127). Brown stipulates that questions and answers about how to live together must not rest within the scope of the state nor ‘need questions of human rights seek universal laws upon which to base claims to certainty or an achieved or definitive political form but rather acceptance of the uncertain processes of constructing our collective lives and the ongoing need, not for a metalanguage, but to work with each other’ (Brown 2002: 128). To Brown, rights promotion can unfold as a participatory process and an act of many-sided communication, including their Western and non-Western histories and Western and non-Western potentials.

When I studied medicine in the 1980s, debates were waging between proponents of two approaches, a preventive strengthening approach to health, as opposed to surgical or pharmaceutical strikes to rescue damaged health. We learned, however, that patients benefit most when both strategies are used, supporting one another.

Transposed onto the global arena, building a sustainable world based on Brown’s concept of a global dialogue on human rights would be equivalent to the preventive strengthening approach.
Forcefully standing up against abuse, dissuading, isolating, and marginalising extremists, would correspond more to *strikes*.

Some world regions and segments of world society lean more to one strategy, others to the other approach. Yet, instead of being pitted against each other, they need to be combined. During the 2003 Iraq war, for example, European hesitation confirmed American suspicions that Europeans are not capable of being decisive and courageous and that Americans are the world’s most visionary and strong-minded leaders. Americans are good surgeons so to speak, and Europeans are weaklings who cannot stand the sight of blood. From the European point of view, American strategies risk being counterproductive – the wrong strikes at the wrong time – exacerbating the disease instead of healing it (Lindner 2006f: 95). In the spirit of in Brown’s participatory process, everybody’s strengths need to be drawn upon and brought together.

Nondualism and harmony are two ingredients which can serve the pro-active creation of global cohesion, if carefully combined, for example, with Anglo-Saxon emphasis on action, European strengths in planning, and all other nondualist, dignifying philosophies from around the world, be it ubuntu (Africa), or Buber’s ‘dialogical unity’ in I and Thou.

I believe that we can harness globalisation with egalisation (see section 2.3). We have a chance to build a *decent global village*, in spirit of the call for a *decent society* by Avishai Margalit.

The way is to stop waiving our hands in the air in despair or turn our thumbs in scepticism. In times of emergency, any hands-off approach guarantees demise. The only viable approach is hands on, even if we fail – in times of emergency there is no try. The reward will be much more benign than the past 10,000 years – a world where everybody, men and women from all corners of our globe, can together engage in nurturing harmonious relationships of caring connections embedded into mutual respect for equality in dignity.

Kevin P. Clements, formerly the head of ACPACS, holds the Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies, and is the Director of the new National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand since January 2009.

He has chosen ‘Enlarging Boundaries of Compassion’ as the title of his Inaugural Professorial Lecture on 23rd September 2009. In this lecture, he explained:

> Compassion is a word that means empathetic and altruistic concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others. When one starts unpacking its deeper meanings though it becomes an extremely generative concept that can only be fully grasped from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. I want to argue that enlarging boundaries of compassion is a pre-requisite for developing a more just and peaceful world and that it is a research and practice objective that is perfectly appropriate for a new Centre of Peace and Conflict Studies.

**Author’s biographical background:**

Evelin G. Lindner is a transdisciplinary social scientist, covering the entire range from neuroscience to political science and philosophy. She holds two Ph.Ds., one in medicine and the other in psychology. She is the Founding President of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies, a global network of academics and practitioners (HumanDHS, www.humiliationstudies.org). Lindner lives and teaches globally, affiliated, among others, with Columbia University in New York, the University of Oslo, Norway, and the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme in Paris. Lindner is the author of *Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict*, which was

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