Global Turning Points:  
The Journey of Dignity and Humiliation  
from the Neolithic Revolution to 1757 and 1948  
—  
Is There a Future of Dignity for Humankind?  

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With great gratitude to peace linguist Francisco Gomes de Matos and linguist David Crystal  

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SUMMARY

In the English language, the concept of humiliation traversed a fascinating journey throughout the past centuries. It is a captivating story of ‘historical linguistics’, or philology. Greek philologos means ‘fond of (phil) ‘words and speech’ (logos). Philology means being fond of studying literature and the historical growth and adaptation of languages.

The year 1757 is of particular significance for the journey of humiliation. This year represents an important historical linguistic marker, a marker that signals a momentous change in the Zeitgeist, first in the European cultural realm, then globally, thus reconnecting to a Zeitgeist that might have existed prior to the Neolithic revolution but was side-lined for many millennia. This marker points at a specific form of how we imagine a person; it points at the ideal of equality in dignity for each person on the planet as an individual, in mutual care and responsibility, and in harmony with the larger ecological context we are part of.

The year 1757 stands for the early stages of a ‘U-turn’ that first led away from collectivist honour toward the honour of a single individual, and from there it culminated in the ideal of equal dignity for all, as individuals, in solidarity – with the term decorum forming the bridge from honour to dignity. Ultimately, this development led up to the foundational sentences in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10th December 1948: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’.

In former times such utterances were unconceivable (and they still are unconceivable in certain world regions today). A very different version of these sentences would have been regarded as divinely ordained or nature-given throughout the past millennia: ‘All human beings are born unequal in worthiness and rights. Some are endowed with more reason and conscience and should act towards inferiors in a spirit of superiority’. Or: ‘All human beings are born unequal in worthiness and rights – all people are born into their rank and they are meant to stay there, only some might move up or down due to their own doing or undoing – and, as an unavoidable consequence, there will always be some who are more free than others, there will always be elites who preside over subordinate collectives’.

This essay embeds the journey of humiliation and dignity into the larger contexts of globalisation and tries to shed light on why the phenomenon of humiliation becomes more salient nowadays. The essay traces the ways in which human rights ideals are creating an expectation gap – a dignity gap – that may lead to violent cycles of humiliation.

The essay weaves together a large number of diverse voices and ends with an overview over human history – where we come from, where we stand now, and where we go. It ends with a call for action to humanise globalisation with egalisation and suggests dignism as vision for the future.

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I thank peace linguist Francisco Gomes de Matos for so very generously sharing his wisdom with me. It is a privilege to have Francisco Gomes de Matos as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (HumanDHS) fellowship and as founding member of the World Dignity University initiative. Have a look at Gomes de Matos, 2013, Dignity – A multidimensional view, published in Dignity Press. See, furthermore, his page on the HumanDHS website, ‘World language for equal dignity: Poetry – the humanising, dignifying way’.

Francisco Gomes de Matos was so kind as to ask linguist David Crystal for help. Very

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generously, David Crystal pointed the relevant entries in the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)* out to me. I am indebted to his support.

Howard Richards is a philosopher of social science and scholar of peace and global studies. I thank him profoundly for including me into his life-long journey of reflecting on social change. It is a privilege to have him as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship and core pillar of our World Dignity University initiative. Howard Richards has taught all around the world, he lives in Chile, and often works in South Africa. I had the privilege of joining him in both places: I was kindly invited into the Howard Richard’s intellectual universe in 2012 in Chile, and in 2013 in South Africa. He generously declared his home in Chile to be one of the Dignity Dialogue Homes of the HumanDHS fellowship.

May I now extend my deepest gratitude to the core leadership team of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies (HumanDHS) fellowship, Linda Hartling and her husband Rick, together with Michael Britton, and Uli Spalthoff. Without their loving support, my life path and work would be impossible to even imagine. This fellowship, of which I am the founding president, with Linda as its director, has around 1,000 invited members, more than 7,000 people on its address list. Please meet the members of our global advisory board, global core team, global research team, and global education team on www.humiliationstudies.org. You will see how this essay is constituted of many gifts, gifts of insights given to me by this vast global network of friends. Because of that, this is not an essay about a topic, it is a journey co-created with people, and I wish to express my deepest gratitude to the hundreds of people who continuously extend their loving support. Many endnotes represent little love letters, and these letters are meant for all, not just for those mentioned by name. Expressions of appreciation are central to this essay, to my life path, and to my work in general, as I aim to dignify our relationships in this world.

**INTRODUCTION**

In the English language, 'the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757'. This was a sentence that startled me when I first read it in 1997 in William Ian Miller’s book on humiliation and honour. Miller is a legal scholar who shows how ancient codes of honour still function in contemporary life. In his book, he mainly writes about the *Sagas of Icelanders*, but also includes the Middle English poem *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, and touches upon the works of Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky.

Miller wonders why we need words such as *embarrass, shame, or mortify*. Would not words such as *awkward or uncomfortable* be able to fill in for them? No, he concludes, we would feel a loss if we did not have these words, as they are ‘getting at important features of our emotional life’.

It is surprising, therefore, that all three words were rather late additions to English, and it is perhaps even more surprising that the metaphoric underpinnings of *humiliate* initially connected it more to *making humble* than to what we now associate with humiliation. Prior to the mid-eighteenth century the usual sense of humiliation was related to the physical act of bowing and prostrating oneself. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the original meaning of *to humiliate* was to ‘bring low’, while the current sense only dates from the mid-eighteenth century.

The etymology of the various forms of humiliation ultimately goes back to Latin *humilis* or *humble*. *Humus* means ‘earth’ in Latin, suggesting that a spatial metaphor is at work, namely, enforcing humility by being brought down to earth or humus, a downward push to the
ground. Whatever language we look at, we always find a downward spatial orientation: debasement, denigration, and degradation are all words that contain the prefix *de-*—which signifies *down from* in Latin, from great heights down to the ground. All these words — to put down, degrade, denigrate, debase, demean, derogate, lower, lessen, or belittle — are built on the same spatial, orientational metaphor, namely, that something or somebody is being pushed down and forcefully held there. I am not aware of any language that does not use these spatial metaphors, they are global. Words such as *ned-verdigelse* in Norwegian, *Er-niedrig-ung* in German, or *a-baisse-ment* in French attest to this. The syllables *de, ned, niedrig*, and *bas* all mean down from, low, or below.

I wish to shed a bit more light on the notion of philology. Gomes de Matos explains that philology appeared in written English from 1350, whereas the concept-term *linguistics* appeared only from 1850. In his introductory courses on linguistics, Gomes de Matos tells his students that philology (1350-), anthropology (1585-), and psychology (1675-) preceded linguistics and each helped pave the way for a *science of language*. In sum, philology came first, and together with anthropology and psychology, it prepared the path for the scientific study of language. Once the study of linguistics had emerged, clearly, also this field continued to change over time.

Philology means the study of language, or, more precisely, the study of how languages or words develop (from Greek *philologos, phil- + logos*, love + word or speech, or ‘fond of learning and literature’). *Merriam-Webster* gives as a full definition of philology, first, ‘linguistics, especially historical and comparative linguistics’, and, second, ‘the study of human speech especially as the vehicle of literature and as a field of study that sheds light on cultural history’.

The field of semiotics is the overarching field, insofar as it studies signs and symbols in general, both linguistic and non-linguistic sign systems. One of the most basic insights of semiotics is that meanings do not reside in words. Rather, words are associated with meanings largely through cultural codes or socially constructed rules of correspondence between signifiers and meanings. I remember my years of reading the ideas of French thinkers — Jacques Derrida’s notion of *differénce*, for example, or the idea of our embeddedness in an ever shifting web of language. Culturally encoded meanings can be widely shared — or widely contested — among diverse people, and they can be relatively fixed or relatively fluid across time. Philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952), whose bronze bust I greet every year when I am at his Teachers College at Columbia University in New York City, laughed at ‘the dogma of the immaculate conception of philosophical systems’.

I have come to explore dignity through research on humiliation. In 1996, I began to prepare my doctoral research on humiliation in Somalia and Rwanda, on the background of Nazi Germany. Having grown up in Germany, I could not help seeing humiliation there against the background of Nazi humiliation. Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies — both as a field and an organisation — emerged from this work, starting as an idea in 2001. Psychologist Linda Hartling is the only other scholar I am aware of who did her doctoral research on humiliation, and she did it earlier than me. She is now the director of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies, while I am its founding president.

This essay has grown out of the astonishment I felt in 1997 when I read in William Ian Miller’s book that ‘the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757’. In 2015, I began exploring this transition deeper, and these explorations are presented in the first part of the essay. Toward its end, the essay places the linguistic journey of humility, humiliation, and dignity into a larger historical context. This historical context is presented in a more expanded and comprehensive form in my 2017 book titled *Honor, humiliation, and terror*.

With my work, I wish to reach all audiences. However, since human dignity and human

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rights might interest law students in particular, I would like to introduce legal philosopher Duncan Kennedy now. 16 *Resisters* is the name Kennedy gives to students who feel uneasy about the status quo but do not really know why and what to do about it. This essay is being written for those resisters, not just those in law school but everywhere in society. Kennedy met them during his long years of teaching in the American ‘Ivy League’ academic context. Among them were those students who came to law school to do international human rights work. Often they had travelled outside of the United States before coming to law school and had not followed what most law students do, namely work as paralegals in big city law firms. Those who had travelled had become aware of the world outside of the U.S., a world of extreme poverty and brutal oppression, be it ‘by states and by cultures, of the poor, of children, of women, of dissenters, of minorities’. 17 They were also aware that people in the United States either ignore this or think that it is the fault of the people who suffer it, and ‘that we rich Americans are absolutely and unequivocally not implicated ourselves’. 18 They were also aware that about everyone in the rest of the world thinks that Americans indeed ‘are implicated, or even ultimately responsible’. 19 To some of these students, international human rights meant being committed to helping victims simply because they are ‘the other’. Others, such as children of the African American, Latino/a, Asian American, or Arab American middle class, had relatives, near or far, who actually were victims or risked becoming victims. Some of those children became resisters, while others simply tried to work harder than everybody else to avoid appearing to be an ‘angry black’. Or they were too busy with simply surviving the feeling of alienation caused by their ‘brown skin’, especially after 9/11. They were American-born and wished nothing more than to distance themselves from their parents who thought ‘an arranged marriage would be the perfect way to celebrate a graduate degree’. 20 Kennedy saw similar problems of alienation from the mainstream in children of parents of ‘the sixties’, who were ‘radicals, hippies, veterans, civil rights workers, musicians, poverty workers, social workers on reservations, or Peace Corps volunteers’. 21 Then there were those students who were aware of the predicaments of sexual harassment or sex work, because they had worked in a shelter, for instance. And then there were those who themselves secretly belonged to a L.G.B.T. minority. They did not expect for a moment that the majority would be stopped from mistreating them by the norms of non-discrimination they claimed to believe in. Another route to resistance was having studied postmodern critical stance Cultural Studies – being familiar with catchwords such as privileging, hegemony, the subaltern, or silencing, and with names such as Foucault or Derrida – and then meeting a law class where those terms were totally unknown. If such a student was sincere, she would ‘have to deconstruct law starting from scratch all by herself’. 22

What bound all resisters together was that there was something that set them apart from the rest, at least in their own minds, and therefore aligned them with those who were victimised. What set them apart was something in the past that was ‘marking or scarring or revelatory, involving mental illness, disability, crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, AIDS, suicide, domestic abuse or other violence at close range, displacement, abandonment, frequent changes of school, poverty in the midst of plenty, or relative wealth amid crushing poverty’. 23

Mainstream law students, in contrast, far from becoming resisters, focussed on their careers, on getting a job and making money, getting married, in other words, ‘getting through law school as trade school, with no intellectual, political, cultural agenda of any kind for their legal education, on the way to life in the mainstream afterward. 24 Kennedy’s verdict: ‘The dominant student culture is Middle American on both coasts as well as in the middle. It is closer to jock or fraternity culture than to nerd or cool-people culture’. 25 Kennedy also reports on the rising force of conservative students, both social conservatives and libertarian conservatives, who are allied in the Federalist Society of law school. Kennedy witnessed how particularly the ‘right-wing econ jocks’ intimidate everybody, students and teachers alike,
including the liberals among the mainstream. Then he observed the ‘gunners’, students who talk all the time, who ‘brutally try to upstage or cut out their fellow students … violating a norm held by everyone in the class: the norm of not grabbing’. Kennedy did not meet many faculty members who were of support to resisters, faculty mostly tried to help their students adjust to reality ‘out there’ rather than ask questions, a reality that faculty members themselves were happy to be shielded from. Kennedy sees only the occasional leftover sixties person in the faculty, ‘who vaguely suggests’ that the whole student generation is ‘not up to whatever it is that they were, but no longer are, up to’.27

Duncan Kennedy advises potential resisters to keep in mind that there are progressive lawyers around who do interesting and ethical and politically valuable work, and that going to law school can be a path to building ‘a long-term life project that works against loss and injury and oppression’.28 Kennedy recommends joining hands and protesting inside law school, against law school.29 Kennedy emphasises something I find crucially important for all groups who smart from trauma and build their identity around it, namely, to avoid the sense of that they are ‘uniquely victimised, uniquely isolated, unintelligible to all the others’. Kennedy advocates a kind of ‘postmodernism-inspired rebellion against identity politics, not in the name of assimilation to the mainstream but in the name of a large countercultural project – cosmopolitan and original rather than inward-turning or backward-looking’.30 Kennedy is certain that ‘the time of analysis and protest will come around again’.31 This essay is written in this spirit.

Many questions have guided my research on humiliation and dignity since 1996. Here is an overview; not all of the questions are relevant for this essay32:

- How do you define humiliation?
- Have you yourself ever felt humiliated, and if yes, how?
- How is humiliation felt and acted upon in different cultural contexts?
- How is humiliation felt and acted upon in different historical periods?
- How do meta-emotions influence experiences of humiliation?
- Do feelings of humiliation always lead to violence? Or only under certain circumstances? If yes, under which circumstances?
- Do feelings of humiliation always entail feelings of shame? Is there a difference between humiliation and shame?
- What is the difference between humiliation and humility?
- What about the role of anger?
- Is there a difference between the humiliation of honour and the humiliation of dignity?
- Is there a difference between humiliation at a group level and humiliation at the individual level?
- Which humiliation is more salient, that of one’s reference group, or one’s own personal humiliation?
- Does it make a difference if the humiliation is witnessed by others, and, if so, by whom?
- Is there a difference between humiliations experienced during childhood as compared to adult life?
- Is there a gender perspective to how humiliation is felt, perceived, experienced, judged, and acted on?
- How does a terrorist/violent freedom fighter feel about the killing and maiming of people who have nothing to do, at least not directly and immediately, with his/her humiliation and pain?
- Does humiliation play a role in terrorism/violent freedom fighting?
- Is there an element of vengeance in actions that inflict terror?
• Can terror create a better world, either here or in the hereafter?
• Does violence beget violence?
• Are there more effective ways than violence for achieving political goals, even against ruthless opponents?
• What is needed to defuse terrorism that emerged from humiliation?

On 11th June 2016, Linda Hartling devised the following tasks for our online doctoral course titled ‘Dignity studies: An introduction to the dynamics of dignity and its violation’, a course we offer at the Western Institute for Social Research (WISR) in Berkeley, California, in cooperation with our World Dignity University initiative:

• Analysis of the relationship between human rights and human dignity
• Analysis of the relationship between human dignity and humiliation
• Analysis of the relationship between globalisation and humiliation/human dignity
• Differences and similarities of the concepts of shame, humiliation, and dignity
• Differences and similarities of the concepts of humility, humiliation, and dignity
• Differences and similarities of the concepts of equality, egalitarianism, equity, and equal dignity
• An analysis of the interaction between human dignity and human resilience.

PART I: HUMILIATION AND HUMILITY – TIMELINE FROM 1315 TO 1948

In the English language, the concept of humiliation traversed a fascinating journey throughout the past centuries. It is a captivating story of ‘historical linguistics’, or philology. Greek philologos means ‘fond of’ (phil) ‘words and speech’ (logos). Philology means being fond of studying literature and the historical growth and adaptation of languages.

I am grateful that peace linguist Francisco Gomes de Matos delved into his Random House Webster’s College dictionary (1995 edition) and found that the verb to humble appears as early as 1200, to degrade dates from 1275, and to humiliate occurs around 1525–35. The noun humiliation emerges around 1350–1400.

It is the English language that is the focus of the linguistic overview presented here. The English timeline is relevant not just for the sake of the English language, but also as a window into historical processes in general. Moreover, since the English language has been the global lingua franca for a considerable time period so far, this adds additional significance to its linguistic journey. Every reader with an interest in the philology of other linguistic realms is warmly invited to contribute with that realm’s timeline.

I am not a natural English speaker myself. I grew up in Central Europe, in what was West Germany at the time, and German was the language I grew up with. I had the privilege of a classical education of eight years of Latin at high school, with a main focus on the natural sciences, aside from lessons in English, French, and Russian. A teacher who hailed from East Prussia offered Russian lessons in the zeroth hour early in the morning before school began, as an optional subject. I came to Norway in 1977, and, by now, I am fluent, both written and oral, in English, French, and Norwegian. Mastering these languages implies that there is a good understanding of Dutch, Swedish, and Danish. During my seven years in Egypt, I learned to read and write the Arabic script, and to speak Egyptian-Arabic. My time on the Azores allowed me to learn basic Portuguese (along with French and Latin, it opens up Italian and Spanish, which later became useful in South America). During my work in Jerusalem, I
learned modern Hebrew, and in Indonesia it was Bahasa Indonesia. I began learning Chinese at the age of nineteen, in 1973, long before my first travels throughout the whole of China in 1983. In 2004, I returned to Asia again, this time to Japan, and began learning Japanese.

Today, the concept of a delimited language no longer exists for me. I think more in language families, as I am always aware of many variations of a particular word within its language family. When I think, it is always in a mixture of several languages rather than one single language. There is no mother tongue anymore for me, and I cannot speak any language perfectly. Every sentence I want to write or say has to be translated from my multilingual thoughts into the language I want to use at the given moment.

**1315: The journey of humility and humiliation begins**

Francisco Gomes de Matos was so kind as to ask linguist David Crystal for help. Very generously, David Crystal pointed the relevant entries in the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)* out to me.³⁵ I will follow his guidance now.

**1315: The noun humility appears**

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the noun *humility* appears circa 1315, in the sense of ‘the quality of being humble or having a lowly opinion of oneself’, or ‘meekness, lowliness, humbleness’, being ‘the opposite of pride or haughtiness’.

If we follow the lead offered by the *OED*, we encounter William of Shoreham, or Willelmi de Schorham, a clergyman, poet, and vicar of Chart-Sutton in Kent, during the reign of King Edward II of England (1284–1327). In a collection of seven poems, he explains the Christian doctrine of the fourteenth century, and he does so in medieval Kentish (a southern dialect of Old English spoken in the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Kent).³⁶

A poem by Shoreham from 1315 is titled *The five joys of the Virgin Mary*. There we read: ‘Cause of alle pyse dignyte, Thorȝ clennesse and humylyte’³⁷ This phrase is part of the following lines, as suggested by Matthias Konrath, one of the early European scholars interested in English vernacular pastoralia: ‘Mary is worth higher praise than all tongues on earth can bestow upon her. She is Queen of Heaven, Lady over all earth, and powerful in hell, because, by the grace of God, she bore the King of Heaven…’³⁸

Similar ways of seeing humility appear also nowadays. Jorge Mario Bergoglio is Pope Francis since 13th March 2013, and he spoke about humility and humiliation in his daily homily in the Vatican in January 2018 in ways that seem reminiscent:

Sometimes we think that humility is to move calmly, perhaps head-down looking at the floor… but even pigs walk with their heads down: this is not humility. This is that fake, ready-to-wear humility, which neither saves nor guards the heart. It’s good for us to be aware that: there is no true humility without humiliation, and if you are not able to tolerate, to carry humiliation on your shoulders, you are not truly humble: you pretend you are, but you are not.

There is always the temptation to counter slander and oppose anything that humiliates us or makes us feel ashamed – like Shimei. But David says ‘No’; the Lord says ‘No’, that is not the right path. The path is the one taken by Jesus and prophesied by David: bearing humiliation. ‘Perhaps the Lord will look upon my affliction and make it up to me with benefits for the curses he is uttering this day’: turning humiliation into hope.

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Let us ask the Lord for the grace of humility, with humiliations. There was a nun who used to say: ‘yes, I am humble, but never humiliated!’ No, no! There is no humility without humiliation. We are asking for this grace. And if someone is brave – just as St. Ignatius teaches us – he can even ask the Lord to send humiliations so he can be more like the Lord.\textsuperscript{39}

1386: The noun humiliation emerges

The \textit{Oxford English Dictionary} indicates that the noun \textit{humiliation} appears circa 1386 in Geoffrey Chaucer’s \textit{Parson’s Tale}.\textsuperscript{40} There it means ‘humbling, abasement’, ‘the action of humiliating’, the ‘condition of being humiliated’, or a ‘humbled or humble condition’, a condition of ‘humility’.

Geoffrey Chaucer was a poet and administrator, born in the early 1340s, known as the Father of English Literature, and widely considered the greatest English poet of the Middle Ages. Chaucer gave legitimacy to the vernacular Middle English at a time when French and Latin were the dominant literary languages in England. Between 1387 and 1400, he is reported to have written \textit{The Canterbury Tales}, a collection of stories of a group of thirty people who travelled as pilgrims to Canterbury in England. The pilgrims came from all walks of society and told stories to each other while they travelled.

\textit{Parson’s Tale} from 1390 is the longest of all the surviving contributions; it is a long treatise on penance. In paragraph 406, we read: ‘The ferthe [manere of humylitee] is whan he nys nat sory of his humiliacion’,\textsuperscript{41} or ‘the thridde is / whan he ne rekketh nat though men holde hym noght worth, the ferthe is / whan he nys nat sory of his humyliacioū’.\textsuperscript{42}

Here is the full paragraph in a more modern translation:

\begin{quote}
Now be there three manners [kinds] of humility; as humility in heart, and another in the mouth, and the third in works. The humility in the heart is in four manners: the one is, when a man holdeth himself as nought worth before God of heaven; the second is, when he despiseth no other man; the third is, when he recketh not though men hold him nought worth; the fourth is, when he is not sorry of his humiliation. Also the humility of mouth is in four things: in temperate speech; in humility of speech; and when he confesseth with his own mouth that he is such as he thinketh that he is in his heart; another is, when he praiseth the bounte [goodness] of another man and nothing thereof diminisheth. Humility eke in works is in four manners: the first is, when he putteth other men before him; the second is, to choose the lowest place of all; the third is, gladly to asent to good counsel; the fourth is, to stand gladly by the award [judgment] of his sovereign, or of him that is higher in degree: certain this is a great work of humility.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

1525 to 1535: The verb to humiliate is being used

\textit{Random House Webster’s College dictionary} (1995 edition) informs that the verb \textit{to humiliate} occurs around 1525–1535.\textsuperscript{44} According to the \textit{Oxford English Dictionary}, it first emerged in 1533–1534, in the sense of to humble oneself, ‘to make low or humble in position, condition, or feeling; to humble’ and in its reflexive form ‘to humble or abase oneself, to stoop; sometimes, to prostrate oneself, to bow’.

This sense has been documented by antiquarian and writer Thomas Wright (1810–1877), who collected historical letters, among them letters relating to the suppression of monasteries.
He included into his collection a letter titled ‘Petition of the monks of Canterbury to the King’, a petition ‘for the pardon of those who had been concerned in the affair of the Maid of Kent’.45

The Maid of Kent, or Elizabeth Barton, was a woman famous for her prophecies, yet, she was executed when her prophecies turned against King Henry VIII of England (1491–1547). Barton strongly opposed the English Reformation and the King’s severing the church in England from Rome. Together with five of her chief supporters, four of whom were priests, Elizabeth Barton was hanged for treason.46

This is what the monks of Christ’s Church in Canterbury wrote to the king, fearing to be compromised by the affair of Elizabeth Barton:

But now, considering your gracis most benigne nature, moche more inclyned to mercy and pitie than to the rigour of justice, we be anymated and set in comforte to humyliate our selfes as prostrate afore your highnes, and to beseche the same to remitte an d forget the necligences and offences committed ayenst your grace by certen persons of our congregacion and monestrie, which causith us all most woofullie to lamente and sorow.47

It is an interesting detail that Wright hailed from a Quaker family and disliked the Roman Catholic church. To him, the dissolution of the monasteries was ‘the greatest blessing conferred by Providence upon the country since the first introduction of Christianity’.48

1602: The humiliation of honour is like a ‘mask’

William Fulbecke was born about 1559 or 1560 and died in or after 1602. He was a lawyer, legal scholar, and historian who did pioneering work in international law. In 1602, he laid out what a religious man may or may not do in the rite of homage or hommage, a rite whereby a noble man became the ‘man’, ‘homme’, or vassal of another man in the feudal system. The lord would give his vassal protection and a fief (land providing a means of subsistence), and in return, the vassal would promise annual military service to his lord. What Fulbecke teaches is that a religious man belongs to God, and, therefore, he has to avoid formulating his allegiance to his lord in ways that compromise his relationship with God. In short, a religious man should not say *Ego deuenio homo vester* (‘I am going to be your man’49) and thus ‘humiliate himselfe to execute the rite of homage’. This is the counsel Fulbecke gave to a religious man in 1602:

By our law he may do homage: but may not say to his Lord *Ego deuenio homo vester*, because he hath professed himselfe to be onely God his man, but he may say: I do vnto you homage, and to you shalbe faithfull and loyall.50

When reading these lines, it becomes clear that it is not a personal emotion of humiliation that is at stake here; it is the description of a place in a collectivist ranking order, with God at the top, whose primacy ought to be respected.

William Ian Miller explains the context of the time:

One could hazard the claim that as late as the seventeenth century the self did not feel emotions at all; instead the emotions were borne almost as a quasi-juridical status or as allegorical personae that the subject put on mask-like. When one was sad, one became the character Sadness in a moral and social drama, with its behaviour thus constrained by the role.51

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William Ian Miller intuits that it was the influence of Romanticism, industrialisation, and capitalism that changed the articulation and conceptualisation of the individual and the self. Miller observes that the Oxford English Dictionary does not treat humiliation as an emotion, it only links it to emotions, namely to emotions of self-attention such as mortification or the lowering of self-respect as in displays of humility or humble condition in religious devotion. For humiliation proper, the OED seems to prefer the state to the feeling in its illustrations of the use of humiliate and its various forms, refraining from defining humiliation or related words as an emotion. Only in a few incidences, emotion begins to shine through: ‘Yet under its entry for mortification, 6, and mortify, 8, the gloss is “the feeling of humiliation”, “to feel humiliated”, where humiliation is impliedly understood as an emotion’. Miller reflects on the transition from a state to a feeling:

But when one could at last feel sad, sadness became a feeling, a perturbation of the nerves coupled with the effects of the thoughts one might have about that perturbation. The new self could thus be something more than its feelings; it could be more detached from them, more ironical, perhaps more restrained, and definitely more self-conscious. And this last characteristic – self-consciousness – might also tend to make this new self more likely to feel such emotions as humiliation and embarrassment than heretofore. This claim may seem a bit mystifying, but it is not without some reason. It is reasonably consistent with some of the drift of Norbert Elias’s work.

William Ian Miller wonders why ‘I feel sad’ is almost synonymous with ‘I am sad’, while this is not the case in ‘I feel guilty’ and ‘I am guilty’. Miller looks at the following two collocations: ‘I feel + emotion term’ (for example, guilty, embarrassed, ashamed, humiliated, sad), and the similar one ‘I am + emotion term’. What interests Miller most, however, is why the construction with ‘feel + emotion term’ is relatively recent in regular usage, in fact becoming common only in the nineteenth century. And why, after that, both be and feel constructions where available for most emotions, while before, the feel construction could be encountered only rarely. This is what Miller found, in more detail:

The OED, as well as some 220 titles from English and American fiction, belles-lettres, and philosophical texts, is available as part of a computer data base. Nearly 120 of these texts predate 1800, although they are mostly short, including plays and verse by Shakespeare and Marlowe; there are also works by Milton, Sterne, Fielding, Dryden, Defoe, Swift, and others. This is hardly a perfect sample, but it cannot be without some significance that the collection gives no uses of feel (felt) ashamed, feel (felt) shame, feel (felt) guilty, sad, aggrieved, etc. prior to the mid-nineteenth century. Yet feel plus an emotion word was not an impossible collocation before then: the OED lists Tyrwhyt in 1634 (s.v. feel, v. ga):’I have not at all felt the emotion I shewed’; the data base also yields ‘feel an emotion’ from Shamela, while Pope writes of woes being felt (Eloisa 366). But the preferred mode, and almost exclusively so, of expressing the thought of having an motion was with the to be constructions. Even in the nineteenth century it is greatly preferred, and not until the twentieth century did ‘feeling’ emotions come into its own.

William Ian Miller asks: What are the causes for these different ways of expressing the relation of the self to emotions? He thinks they might be found in the changes in styles of religious devotion. He notes that also the notion of mortification – with its long association with religious self-abasement and the denial of the pleasures of the flesh – has changed roughly concurrently with the semantic changes for humiliation. Also mortification came to

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indicate the unpleasant feeling of humiliation and chagrin.

What Miller sees occurring is a secularisation or re-contextualisation of devotional diction in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as part of major shifts in the styles of devotion. What can be observed, furthermore, he explains, is the emergence of a closer look at the inner life, an extraordinary attention to manners and the emotions supporting them in elite social circles, together with the philosophical or medical treatments of the passions, as shown, for instance, in the novels of Richardson and Sterne.

When we look into the evidence for Miller’s hypotheses, we find for instance *Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded*, a novel by Samuel Richardson, first published in 1740. The beautiful 15-year-old maidservant Pamela Andrews faces her country landowner master, Mr. B, who tries to seduce and rape her. She successfully resists and her virtue is eventually rewarded when he proposes an equitable marriage to her. The readers of the novel became divided into ‘Pamelists’ and ‘Anti-Pamelists’. Anti-Pamelists were loyal to the Zeitgeist of the past and suspected her of cunning utilitarianism, tricking her master into marrying her. In the eighteenth century many thought that it was a servant’s duty to please her master and that virginity was not a value for a poor girl to defend. Pamelists, in contrast, reacted in the spirit of a new Zeitgeist: they acknowledged and valued a poor girl trying to keep herself honest and chaste.

What William Ian Miller does is trace how the articulation and conceptualisation of the individual and the self have changed throughout history in resonance with larger historical trends. Miller dissects the historical path from rigidly defined ‘mask-like’ collectivist unequally ranked honour to the much more open and more fluid equality in dignity for each single individual and her feelings. He describes how the ‘mask’ got thinner as its rigid state dissolved into fluid feelings.

What is honour?

Allow me to take a brief look at related practices in different cultures both in the past and at present. Honour is linked to a vertical ranking of higher beings presiding over lesser beings; lesser beings are expected to go as far as die for the honour of their superiors, and they are taught – and often successfully internalise – that this is a privilege and duty. Honour is for men, not for women: From the point of view of ‘honourable men’, peace-loving individuals are unpatriotic traitors; they are at best misguided and ignorant – permitting themselves to fall for ‘female weakness’ – at worst they are peddling ill-intentioned and malicious ‘love for the enemy’.

Throughout history, many subordinates learned the lesson so well that they even ended their own lives when they brought shame upon themselves and their own. Even today, wherever female chastity is regarded as proof of the honour of her male guardians, a raped girl may ‘voluntarily’ commit suicide – rather than wait for her family to resort to honour killing – even though she is the victim of aggression and not the perpetrator. In Iraq – but also in many other world regions – ‘a woman who suffered rape is considered to be dead to society, as she is held responsible for having enticed males to abduct, rape or molest her’.

I have lived in Japan for three years (combined). Many samurai took their own lives – and this was even ritualised – when they failed to defend their masters, or fell into dishonour, even if only by accident. The work done by psychologist David Matsumoto and linguist Sachiko Ide supports my intuition that even today’s politeness in Japan is not so much a question of individual volition and choice but rather a sign of fear, fear that once was enshrined in the traditional social structures and that still lingers on. Under the Tokugawa shogunate, the last feudal Japanese military government which existed between 1603 and 1867, the majority of...
the Japanese population lived in fear of their superiors, including fear for their lives. It was the right of a samurai to kill commoners for whatever affront; it was called *kiri-sute gomen*, or ‘authorisation to cut and leave’ the body of the victim. Japanese language encodes this fear at the very core of its expressions of politeness. The Japanese language employs different personal pronouns for each person according to gender, age, rank, degree of acquaintance, and other cultural factors. Politeness is thus not based on individual trait or preference, but on what in Japan is called *wakimae*, or ‘finding one’s place’ within prescribed social norms, or what Miller would call ‘mask’.

In Chinese social relations and everyday speech, face refers to the social perceptions of a person’s prestige and authority (*mianzi*, Chinese 面子), and to the confidence and trust within a social network in a person’s moral character (*lian*, Traditional Chinese: 臉, Simplified Chinese 臉). So-called ‘polite lies’ are therefore acceptable, even expected. Honour in Iraq can be described with three words: *sharaf, ihtiram*, and *ird*. Victoria Fontan, scholar of conflict resolution and peace studies, reported from her fieldwork in Iraq that *sharaf* is honour bestowed on a man whose service or lineage are found deserving by his peers; *ihtiram* is the honour he can gain by imposing himself on others by force; and *ird* is the honour measured according to his success in protecting his women from intruders. *Sharaf* is something that is being given to a man – he can only invite it through benevolent actions – while *ihtiram* and *ird* depend on him and his ability to impose his will on his environment. Together, these three elements describe the standing a man can claim to have in his social context. Women are his substrate.

Also in other cultural realms, honour can be regarded as either derived from a lineage or gained through personal achievement. It often is talked about as ‘saving face’. In the Filipino language, for instance, humiliation means *pagkapahiya* or ‘being shamed’ or ‘being hurt’ and connotes ‘losing one’s face’. For the Muslims living in the Philippines, since their religious, cultural, ethnic, and historical conditions are different, the concept of humiliation could also include ‘humiliation as an affront to their religion and culture’.

In Europe and the United States, ‘pistols at ten paces’ and other forms of duelling were once common. Two men whose portraits adorn contemporary American dollar bills were involved in duels. The most famous political duels were fought in Missouri between Charles Lucas and Thomas Hart Benton, who killed Lucas in 1817. For Lucas, honour was part of his descendancy from Norman nobility, while Benton rather sought honour through his own actions. The practice faded in the north of the United States in the early nineteenth century, while staying strong in the south and west. In some so-called developing nations duelling persists in rural areas until now. Yet, more importantly, its spirit still informs the deep structure of modern-day cultural scripts in all world regions.

Sociologist Erving Goffman (1922–1982) introduced the concept of *face* into social theory as a sociological universal. Face, according to him, is a mask that people strive to maintain in social situations. Research in social psychology has since confirmed that the social humiliation of losing face can lead to retaliation even at the cost self-damage. Also philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas speaks of the face, yet, for him it is no longer a mask. While Goffman speaks from within the *Zeitgeist* of honour as a mask on one’s own face, Lévinas marks the transition to a new *Zeitgeist* of dignity when he highlights the face of the Other.

It is the collectivist character of honour that causes it to be worn like a mask-like armour. People may defend their group’s honour against humiliators merely out of duty, without feeling any particular personal emotion. People may find themselves caught in games of honour beyond their control – *affaires d’honneur* important to their group – without themselves identifying with these affairs as individuals. I myself met many variations of honour and face during my seven years in Cairo, Egypt (1984–1991), where I worked as a psychological counsellor and clinical psychologist, first at the American University in Cairo,

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and then in my own private practice in Cairo from 1987–1991. I remember that I once counselled an Egyptian lawyer who had studied in Europe and had almost forgotten his roots in the Egyptian countryside where blood feuds were common. One day, to his great surprise and shock, he was visited by villagers who told him that he was next in line to be killed. He knew neither why nor by whom. He had done nothing to elicit other people’s hatred. His place in the genealogy of his extended family was sufficient to give him a place in the honour game.

Albania could serve as another example of honour’s nature as armour that is put onto an individual by the collective. Blood feuds were officially banned during the 40-year rule of Albania’s communist-era Enver Hoxha, but in the chaos that accompanied the fall of communism in the early 1990s, the practice resurfaced. Under the ancient Albanian code called *kanun*, the victim’s family now invokes its right to take revenge on any male adult in the extended family who caused the loss of one of their members. As a result, hundreds of males – even children – across Albania are now living virtually imprisoned in their homes for fear of being killed, even though they themselves would wish for nothing more than being liberated from this collective yoke.

Tribal honour in Pakistan manifests a similar mind-set, and also warriors who wish to re-instate a lost caliphate are fired up by the bloody and heroic script of honour. Then there is the southern honour in the United States that historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown describes in his book with the same title.

That the world should recognise a state’s high distinction; a dread of humiliation if that claim is not provided sufficient respect; a yearning for renown; and, finally, a compulsion for revenge when, in issues of both personal leadership calculations and in collective or national terms, repute for one or another virtue and self-justified power is repudiated.

Historian David Hackett Fischer shows that the American South ‘strongly supported every American war no matter what it was about or who it was against’. Historian Donald Kagan suggests that at the national level, honour reigns in today’s world no less than it did earlier, only that ‘national honour’ may now be partly concealed by human rights rhetoric and no longer invoked as openly as in the past.

In sum, what was vibrant in 1602, the mask-like character of honour, and, in extension, that of humiliation, is still vibrant today. However, today, it lives alongside with, or sometimes in opposition to, all those new ideas that slowly dissolve the mask. Even during my life-time, this trend has proven to be well and alive: I grew up somewhere in the countryside in western Europe and do not remember having heard of transgender people, except, perhaps at school in biology lessons. When I began my life as a student in 1974, coming to the big city of Hamburg in Germany, travesty comedy was the closest I came to knowing about the fluidity of biological gender. Only because I studied psychology and later medicine, did I learn already then how undetermined biological gender can be, not to speak of the fluidity of the psychological and cultural construction of gender. Many others begin to see this reality only now.

1757: A new meaning of to humiliate emerges – the violation of a dignitary’s decorum

In 1757, a new sense of *to humiliate* emerged, namely, ‘to lower or depress the dignity or self-respect of; to subject to humiliation; to mortify’. When we look at the historical path that went from ‘mask-like’ collectivist and ranked honour to the equal dignity of each single
individual, then the notion of *decorum* forms a bridge between honour and dignity. *Decorum* is bestowed on individuals, yet, it is still inscribed in the order of collectivist ranked honour, as the word *dignitary* indicates. From there, the historical path of the *Zeitgeist* culminates in the ideal of equal dignity for all individuals.

Stentor Tell-Truth, Esq. could be described as a blogger of his time, proud and patriotic, at the same time a somewhat indignant blogger against the British Empire who may have had a need to compensate for a personal sense of insignificance by venting anger. This is what he wrote to *The Herald* in his letter X on Thursday, 10th November 1757: ‘It may here be worth while to enquire what foreign ministers there are at the court of Portugal to have demanded so humiliating a sacrifice of *decorum*’.77 He continues to enlist those foreign ministers: ‘The whole of them are, the Pope’s Nuncio, a Spanish ambassador, an Hungarian, Neapolitan and Dutch minister, a Prussian resident, and a French chargé des affaires. With the first and last ours has at present nothing to do; and surely among the rest a British envoy extraordinary should figure high enough to require and receive the rights and preheminencies of his character’.78

What Tell-Truth addresses in this letter is Great Britain’s relationship with honour, illustrated by its relations with Portugal. He laments to the reader about the French ambassador to Portugal, Chavigny, who, when he first came to Lisbon, received a treatment much superior to the British envoy. Tell-Truth explains in minute detail how the British envoy then took revenge and tricked the Portuguese Minister of State and the French ambassador into giving him a more honourable treatment. The details are almost incredible, seen from a modern perspective – perhaps still to be found, at least in part, in the protocols of foreign ministries or royal families – as rank and ‘character’ were determined in such minute details as to whether a person had the right to be greeted already at the door of his carriage or inside the house, in the anti-chambers.79 Tell-Truth admonishes his own government, asking it to be more careful in considering the etiquette and ceremony of diplomatic interactions, since it would serve the entire country’s reputation ill, if their representatives were treated with less honour than their country should expect. He bemoans that times had become ‘tame’, ‘for the intoxicating revelries of effeminating pleasures, money, and not honour, is become our object’.80 He wishes to resurrect old, more honourable and manly times: ‘It concerns all nations to regulate their proceedings by the same rigid rules of right, dignity and decorum’.81

What is new in Tell-Truth’s quote with regard to humiliation, is that humiliation no longer is a virtuous ‘condition of humility’ but the violation of the worthiness of a person, or, as in this case, of a nation whose representative this person is. It does not yet mean ‘equality in worthiness for all’ as in later human rights ideals; worthiness is still ranked, with dignitary elites at the top who are attributed more worth than their underlings, and who see it as their duty to protect their privileged superior position.

Stentor Tell-Truth thus uses dignity in the sense of reputation and how it highlights the rank of a person. *Decorum*, in his writing, is more part and parcel of rank and honour than of the modern realm of equality in dignity. The term *dignitary* still reminds us nowadays of the original hierarchical sense of dignity, since a dignitary is a more important person than others, standing above the rest. *Decorum* therefore means dignity in a hierarchical context, rather than as in ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10th December 1948.

Zaynab El Bernoussi is a dignity scholar from Morocco and supporter of what has been called the Arab world’s dignity revolutions from 2010 to 2012. She comments in 2014:

In ancient times, Roman philosopher Cicero suggested the need for universal dignity in society. The history of humanity that ensued cumulated cases of betrayals of dignity in acts

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such as slavery and colonialism. Indeed, it seems that in the human experience it is hard to truly establish egalitarian systems. Dignitas, where dignity comes from, is by definition a ‘non-egalitarian’ signifier: it refers to an obtained rank. A discussion of rank and equality necessarily involves a debate around the concept of power: why are there systems of hierarchy given the risks of abuses of power? These transgressions often leave their victims devoid of their dignity.  

The phrase dignity has its root in the Latin words decus and decorum (Sanskrit dac-as, ‘fame’). For Cicero, dignity was a quality of masculine beauty. For him, it was precisely this kind of dignity that elevates the status of the human race above that of animals. Cicero wrote in 44 BCE: ‘And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity of our [human] nature, we shall realise how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety’.

The concept of dignity was discussed in classical and Christian antiquity and in the Latin Middle Ages in Europe, yet, it was forged into an internally consistent set of ideas only later, with the advent of the Renaissance. The Renaissance began by 1415 in Florence in Italy in the wake of its liberating and energising experience of being a republic. The increase in secularism, manifested in the expanding economic, political, and social activities of late medieval Europe, helped highlight the human being’s this-worldly dignity and achievements.

Giannozzo Manetti (1396–1459) was born in Florence as a son of a rich merchant and he gave philosophical and theological form to the importance of this-worldly dignity, followed by Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), another Florentine humanist and nobleman, and philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494).

The historical context of 1757

Since the year 1757 is so important, as it brought a new meaning of to humiliate to the fore, the entire historical period surrounding it is of interest today. Therefore, I would like to look deeper into it. Interestingly, while Stentor Tell-Truth is immersed in the minute details of decorum and the microscopic specifics of his country’s representatives’ honour, he seems to be oblivious of the wars and disasters that unfolded around him at the time. He wrote his letter while the Seven Years’ War was fought, between 1754 and 1763, the most significant European war since the Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century. Retrospectively, the Seven Years’ War is now being regarded as one of the first true world wars, 160 years earlier than what is commonly known as World War I. It involved most of the great powers of the time and split Europe into two coalitions, one led by Great Britain and the other by France. It affected Europe, North America, Central America, West Africa, India, and the Philippines. In 1763, victory in the Seven Years’ War led to the dominance of the British Empire, which was to become the leading global power for over a century and the largest empire in history.

The war became known under various names, and this included the Third Silesian War between Prussia and Austria 1756–1763. Since my family hails from Silesia, I have a special interest in this part of history: If Prussia’s King Frederick the Great had not been traumatised during his childhood and adolescence by incessant and brutal humiliations at the hand of his father who wanted to make ‘a man’ of him, he might not have felt the need to prove his battle valour later when he as king, by inflicting humiliation on Austria’s young Empress Maria Theresa through grabbing Silesia from her. In extension, my father may have been spared utter humiliation during and after World War II.

Not only was it a time of war, Tell-Truth’s letter was also written shortly after the monumental 1755 Lisbon Earthquake. Portugal was part of the alliance led by Great Britain,
and immediate support was promised by Britain’s Protestant King George II to King Jose, a sum equivalent to what would be 148 million Pounds in 2012. An interesting detail is that the Protestant Dutch government did the opposite, it had a very different view on dignity and aid and refrained from offering relief aid to Portuguese victims. Calvinist religious thinking prevented the donation of help, as historians report: ‘In this strongly Calvinist community there seems to have been little doubt but that the earthquake was an awesome example of the wrath of the Living God, and that Lisbon’s addiction to “Romish idolatry” had brought the visitation upon her’. In other words, from the Calvinist point of view, help would not dignify, on the contrary, it would be sinful to undermine God’s efforts in punishing idolatrous heretics. Clearly, such arguments are not exclusive to Calvinism. Defenders of the Indian caste system, for instance, might use terms such as *karma* for similar lines of argument.

The Calvinist attitude would later affect American culture deeply and from there go global. Russell Conwell was an American Baptist minister and ‘Temple University’ founder, and also he was opposed to helping the poor. He began giving his famous speech *Acres of diamonds* in 1913, where he states that helping the poor is wrong, since to ‘sympathise with a man whom God has punished for his sins, thus to help him when God would still continue a just punishment, is to do wrong…” Conwell thus fused Christianity and capitalism into the message of economism by using pseudo-religious explanations to deify economic activity and give it priority over everything else. This fusion is as salient today in the United States of America: ‘To make money honestly is to preach the Gospel’, and to get rich ‘is our Christian and godly duty’. Economism as a new belief system has since conquered the world, as I observe on my path all around the world. It brings the dark and cruel sides of individualism to the fore, as it justifies the foregoing of mutual care and connection. It is interesting that the British government at the time of the Lisbon Earthquake still manifested what I call connected individualism. Connected individualism avoids going too far in liberating the individual from oppressive collectivism, it stops short of creating cruelly disconnected individualism.

Historical sociologist and political economist Karl Polanyi has explained how the feudal *Gemeinschaften* of the Middle Ages disintegrated and capitalism dissolved personal bonds through arms-length transactions. As market relationships became dis-embedded from social relationships, a double movement was designed. This is the term Polanyi uses to describe the project of first dis-embedding the economy from society to give market pricing priority – including ‘false commodities’ such as land, labour, and money – only to then try to remedy the damage by re-embedding the economy into society through social interventions such as labour laws. By the year 2018, many examples can be listed that show how doomed this project was and still is. For instance, a minister for loneliness had to be appointed recently in Britain: ‘The majority of people over 75 live alone and about 200,000 older people in the UK have not had a conversation with a friend or relative in more than a month... Most doctors in Britain see between one and five patients a day who have come mainly because they are lonely, according to the Campaign to End Loneliness’.

In this context, allow me to share a personal experience. I am in New York in November and December each year, and I usually enjoy the affordable seats under the roof of the Metropolitan Opera. Incidentally, the first two operas I saw in 2015 spoke directly to the themes of this essay. The first one was the opera *Tannhäuser* by Richard Wagner that I saw on 31st October 2015. It brought to me also a very personal incident of humiliation with two fellow viewers in the second break of the opera, an incident that felt intimately linked to Conwell’s message of economism. You can read more about this personal experience in my essay on *Tannhäuser*. In a nutshell, my neighbours busied themselves to explain to each other that they usually were able to afford more expensive seats further down in the opera hall and that only today was an exception. They heatedly ridiculed me when I confessed that I loved the ‘cheap seats’ under the roof of the opera, and when I shared my personal mission,
namely, to re-invigorate direct solidarity between people rather than the arm-length distance that arises when money mediates relationships. In short, while I had separated my personal dignity from money, they had intimately fused it. I will come back to this split later, as it plays out globally by now.

On 7th November 2015, I saw the opera Turandot, by Giacomo Puccini, based on an earlier text by Carlo Gozzi. Also this opera brings the year 1757 to mind as it throws into stark contrast the transition from mask-like honour to less mask-like dignity. The Venetian playwright Count Carlo Gozzi (1720–1806) was dedicated to preserving Tuscan literature from foreign (particularly French) influence. His ‘enemy’ was Carlo Osvaldo Goldoni (1707–1793), who admired French playwright Molière. In 1757, their dispute became so bitter that Goldoni left Venice in 1761 and moved to Paris.

Carlo Gozzi stood for the tradition of the sixteenth-century Italian dramatic form of commedia dell’arte all’improvviso, or ‘comedy of the craft of improvisation’, which was vernacular and brought theatrical performances closer to the people than the contemporary commedia erudita, or ‘learned comedy’. Commedia erudita followed scripts written in Latin or Italian that were based on the scholarly works of earlier Italian and ancient Roman authors, and, as this was not easily comprehensible for the general public, these plays were mainly performed for the nobility. Commedia dell’arte, in contrast, was performed by professional actors (comici) who perfected a specific role or mask that represented fixed social types, stock characters, such as foolish old men, devious servants, or military officers full of false bravado. Goldoni was more radical than either form by fusing their missions. He was inspired by the humanist movement and the study of philosophy. His plays promote rationality, civility, and humanism, they critique arrogance, intolerance, and the abuse of power. To him, commedia dell’arte was ‘somewhat stale, too often dominated by crude humour and vulgarity... too limited a means to give theatrical consideration to the world in which he and his audience lived’.

What we observe here is a transition from culture as a reserve for elites to culture being democratised, just like the notion of humiliation was ‘brought to the people’. First – and this was Gozzi’s mission – this was done by using ‘bread and circus’ attractions, including fairy dramas (Turandot was one of them). Goldoni, on his part, was disgusted by such superficiality. He democratised elite culture in an even more radical way, namely, by offering to a wider audience deep insights into the human psyche and even turning it against elite arrogance. Here we meet a split similar to the one that Calvinism introduced when it delegitimised deep compassion: bread and circuses build on a superficial view on humanity and dignity by defining humans primarily as money-making beings, in contrast to views that fuse dignity and care.

In 1765, Goldoni became a tutor at the court of Versailles and a small state pension was paid to him by the Royal Civil List. This ended, however, by 1792, as the French revolution had broken out. Interestingly, the National Convention, the assembly that governed France during the most critical period of the French Revolution, voted to restore his pension. Sadly, this happened only the day after his death. Still, this decision underscores Goldoni’s achievement in truly democratising elite culture: he was someone who first was recognised and remunerated by the royal court and then by the people.

Goldoni’s work was thus part of the journey of worthiness, as it started from mask-like collectivist ranked honour, to the ranked decorum of individuals, and, finally, to the undoing of the ranking of worthiness by liberating the individual from behind her mask and awarding equal dignity to all.
The wider historical context – the security dilemma

Incidentally, the story of Turandot reminded me also of the message of the book I wrote in 2010 on the link between gender, humiliation, and global security. There I focussed on the deep connection between gender roles and the security dilemma. During the past millennia of human history, the world was not yet as interconnected as today. In the compartmentalised world of the past, the security dilemma reigned and was strong: ‘I have to amass weapons, because I am scared. When I am scared, weapon amass, you get scared. You amass weapons, I get more scared’. In the context of a strong security dilemma, out-group relations follow the motto of “If you want peace, prepare for war,”98 or that of Carl von Clausewitz, “The best defense is a good offense. The war to end war, sometimes also the war to end all wars, was a term used in the First World War of 1914–1918 to mobilise war enthusiasm.” Even though it failed miserably then, the slogan war for peace was again employed by Svetozar Marović, political leader in Montenegro, to justify the Montenegrin assault on Dubrovnik in 1991.100

The security dilemma is a frame that enforces non-cooperation between hostile out-groups and cooperation within in-groups. Trust and altruism are imposed within in-groups. Inferiors have to trust their superiors, not least since a tightly knit and disciplined military is better prepared to overcome the enemy. This is the line of reasoning in my 2017 book on honour, humiliation, and terror in a nutshell: ‘Violence, hatred, and terror are deeply intertwined with honour, heroism, glory, and love’.101 Psychologist Kenneth Gergen describes this dilemma when he writes about ‘struggles of conscience’ and that they are not struggles between good and evil but between competing goods: ‘By far the most obvious and most deadly outcome of the urge to eliminate evil is the hardened shell separating relational clusters – families, communities, religions, nations, ethnic traditions, and so on’.102 In other words, when the security dilemma is strong, even the most peace-loving people cannot escape from this hardened shell, from the ethics and morals that have become customary within their shell. The term ethics comes from the Greek word ethos, or the customs of the people, and, equally, the term morality has its root in the Latin mos, or mores. In both cases morality takes accepted conventions as the basis for the good. The term religion comes from the Latin religare, meaning to re-tie or re-connect. Under conditions of a strong security dilemma, the hard shell binds religion with ties of allegedly absolute truth so that it can keep in-group members within their isolated shell, while people outside the shell are seen as either faceless and irrelevant or threatening barbaric infidels. Literature often undergirds and fires up under this dynamic. British ‘invasion literature’, for instance, fed fear of invasions of the British Isles from outside: The Battle of Dorking (1871), The seizure of the channel tunnel (1882), The capture of London (1887), or The invasion of 1910 (1906). The so-called Brexit – the exit of Great Britain from the European Union – that was voted for in 2016, might not have happened without this literature and the sense of threat that it cultivated in the citizens of these Isles.

In the context of a strong security dilemma, the hard-shell thinking is the interpretive frame, or ‘conceptual scaffolding’ that everybody relies on to construct their understanding of the world.103 Interpretive frames are part of every discourse, with their systems of categorisation, metaphors, narratives, frames, and other interpretive devices that influence cognition, perception, and action within communities that share the same discourse.104

The opera Turandot illustrates the strength of the dilemma and its salience for gender relations. In the context of a strong security dilemma, strong-arm systems emerged that define peace in terms of stability and control. As the past millennia were characterised by a strong security dilemma almost everywhere in the world, resisting war and its cruelty could only be manifested in the form of ‘crazy’ behavior, as in the opera Turandot. Turandot is a princess who uses the few tools available at her time to resist and deny her participation: First, she

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expresses her resistance by placing the hurdles for any suitor too high for any mortal to be able to gain her hand, and even when one suitor ultimately does succeed, she implores her father to refrain from giving her away like a slave.

Over time, this situation has changed. Later, during the Napoleonic Wars, modern peace education emerged in Europe driven by progressive intellectuals. Today, the Nobel Peace Prize is intended for people who work for ending war, and women are no longer to be treated like chattels. Bertha von Suttner, the first female recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, was initially regarded by many to be precisely as ‘crazy’ as Turandot. Von Suttner wrote the book Die Waffen nieder, or Lay down your arms! which brought her the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905.

What we can conclude is that the OED entry of 1757 is a marker for a historical change in social structure that reflects and promotes a shift in the way the word humiliation is used and how corresponding feelings are felt. Howard Richards is a philosopher of social science and scholar of peace and global studies, and he explains:

The year itself is not significant. The shift was in all likelihood no stronger than in 1756 or 1758. The OED entry does mark a significant shift, but the sudden appearance of a new meaning in the OED is not itself the shift, but only evidence of the shift. The significance of 1757 is that it was the year when a text was written that found its way in the OED that signifies a broad historical shift. The broad historical shift did not happen in 1757, and it did not happen only in England – but something signifying it did.

I resonate with Gergen when he states that ‘struggles of conscience’ are not struggles between good and evil but between competing goods. In extension, this means that ‘holding single individuals responsible for untoward actions not only represents a failure to confront the relational conditions from which the act has emerged, but results in alienation and retaliation’ and that ‘there are no acts of evil in themselves, for the meaning of all action is derived from relationship’. Even those problems that appear as pathologies of individuals, ‘usually have roots in cultural rules that constitute social positions that establish material relationships; for example, the positions of “owner”, of “employee”, and of “unemployed”’, writes Howard Richards.

Like Gergen, I call on us, humankind, to co-create a higher order morality. I see an unparalleled historical opportunity to ground this higher order morality in a new meaning, namely, that of one single undivided global human family, where individual responsibility is replaced by relational responsibility, replaced by ‘a collective responsibility for sustaining the potentials of coordinated action’. I also resonate with Gergen when he says that relational responsibility enables us to avoid the narcissism of calls for ‘care of the self’ or ‘care of the other’. When care for the relationship becomes primary, we can step outside the individualist view of the self/other split that the Western predilection for the agency and entitlements of individuals has brought to us. The Western preference for negative rights understood as freedom from undue interference or repression by political authority stands in contrast to other conceptions of rights that have traditionally been far more prevalent in other parts of the world, ‘which privilege notions of social and economic justice (hence the dual emphasis on rights and responsibilities) or collective entitlements (hence the emphasis on the rights of peoples, ethnic, religious and indigenous communities, and other minorities)’, writes expert on global governance Joseph Camilleri.

To end this section, I would like to share in what way I work to bring individualism and collectivism together. I call for the field of inter-cultural communication to expand toward global inter-human communication and to ‘harvest’ those elements from all world cultures that foster relationships of loving mutuality and respect for equality in dignity – be it
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harvesting from the African philosophy of *ubuntu* or from indigenous knowledge about consensus building. ‘Democracy’, as it stands now, incentivises short-term confrontation to the point that it undermines long-term sustainable consensus building. There are many alternative cultural practices and concepts around that merit further exploration if we want to improve democratic practices – from *ho’oponopono*, to musyawarah, silahturahmi, *asal ngumpul*, *palaver*, *shir*, *jirga*, *minga*, *dugnad*, to *sociocracy*.¹¹²

What I call *big love* in my book on gender, humiliation, and global security, is meant to be more than just a personal experience, as love is for Turandot when she finally falls in love at the end of the opera.¹¹³ *Big love* is the manifestation of *Homo amans* (*‘the loving being’*). *Amans* is the present participle of Latin *amare* ‘to love’. More even, it manifests *Homo amans relationis*, or ‘the loving relational being’, a model of human nature that I suggest needs to become a global culture if we, as humankind, wish to overcome the trappings of the security dilemma and create a future worth living in for all of us now and in the future.¹¹⁴

**1776: Bankruptcy – a humiliating calamity**

Moral philosopher and pioneer of political economy Adam Smith (1723–1790) uses the notion of humiliation in his classic 1776 work on the *wealth of nations*. Smith describes bankruptcy as ‘perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity which can befal and innocent man’.¹¹⁵

This is William Ian Miller’s analysis of the context of Smith’s use of words:

Smith takes us into the world of finances and hence to the intimate association of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century embarrassment with money matters, either too much or (usually) too little. What linked an embarrassment of riches to being pecuniarily embarrassed was a shared notion that embarrassment’s root sense meant something encumbered or impeded. Unlike *humiliation*, which was floating around in English in devotional sense from the fourteenth century on, *embarrass* in its various forms in any sense made its presence felt only in the seventeenth century.¹¹⁶

As to the historical context, the commons in England were being enclosed starting during the sixteenth century. This meant that those who succeeded in getting common land under their control could intensify production,¹¹⁷ while those driven off their land had nowhere to go. Those put off their land faced first idleness, and then the outlawing of idleness, which pushed them into early capitalist manufacturing: ‘bloody legislation’ forced people from serfdom into wage-labour, so goes the interpretation.¹¹⁸ Sociologist Eric Mielants speaks of ‘terroristic’ laws.¹¹⁹ It has been argued that it might have been precisely this ‘bloody legislation’ against those who had been put off their land by the enclosure of the commons that gave legitimacy to Protestant work ethics.¹²⁰

Historical sociologist Karl Polanyi has explained how state intervention made markets internal to society, including its *Homo economicus* way of feeling and acting.¹²¹ Also anthropologist David Graeber notes that the criminalisation of debt, together with the enclosure movements, contributed to the destruction of English communities:

The criminalisation of debt, then, was the criminalisation of the very basis of human society. It cannot be overemphasised that in a small community, everyone normally was both lender and borrower. One can only imagine the tensions and temptations that must have existed in a communities – and communities, much though they are based on love, in fact, because they are based on love, will always also be full of hatred, rivalry and passion.
– when it became clear that with sufficiently clever scheming, manipulation, and perhaps a bit of strategic bribery, they could arrange to have almost anyone they hated imprisoned or even hanged.122

**1782: A humiliated state of mind is humiliatingly treated**

In 1782, Elizabeth Blower (c. 1757/63—post-1816) used the adjective *humiliated* in one of her novels, the one titled *George Bateman*. She reports on a person who ‘was at that period in a humiliated state of mind’.123 Blower was an English poet, novelist, and actress, who initially commented on political and electoral matters, with her later two novels focussing more on sentiment. The novel *George Bateman* includes a dialogue in dialect and gives a colourful description of electioneering.

The adverb *humiliatingly* appears in *A memoir of the right honourable Hugh Elliot*, compiled by Countess Emma Eleanor Elizabeth Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound Minto: ‘I was very humiliatingly treated’, is what Hugh Elliot writes in 1782 in one of his letters.124

The Countess was the granddaughter of Hugh Elliott. Hugh Elliot was born in 1752, as the younger brother of Gilbert Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, 1st Earl of Minto. The two brothers were being educated together, first by a private tutor, and later, between 1764 and 1766, in Paris, where Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume was their mentor. Hugh Elliot was somewhat of a ‘tough guy’: at the age of eighteen, he fought against the Turks in the Balkans, as an officer in the Russian army, and the tale is told that he was forced to swim in the Danube holding on to the tail of a horse ridden by a Cossack. Later, the two brothers’ political stances parted, with Hugh remaining more conservative than his brother Gilbert: Hugh continued being staunchly invested into keeping the British Empire mighty.

When I read about Hugh and his self-description as a victim of humiliation, I must admit, that I am not convinced. I ask myself whether not what I call *addiction to humiliation* is at work.125 Philosopher Avishai Margalit describes how a victim may hold on to memories of humiliation to be able to hang on to anger.126 What can be maintained in this way is a *post-victim ethical exemption syndrome*.127 Some people may even invent stories of humiliation to manoeuvre others into the role of loathsome perpetrators – be it out of unprocessed pain or as deliberate Machiavellian strategy. In other words, people may call themselves victims of humiliation, yet, not just the accused perpetrators, even third observing parties may deem the alleged sense of humiliation as unwarranted, as unduly exaggerated, as a sign of ‘skin being too thin’, or, in the case of deliberate humiliation entrepreneurship, as a case of ‘skin being too thin due to being too thick’.

The fact that I feel uneasy about Hugh’s sense of victimhood shows that his case is highly relevant also for today. ‘Skin being too thin’ is the accusation that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt levels at contemporary cultural influences in America, when he says that they systematically fail to enable young people to stand tall in the face of adversity and process pain. In 2014, he was criticised by a gay student for showing a video that the student found hurtful.128 In 2018, Haidt co-authored the book *The coddling of the American mind*, where he argues that ‘the generation now coming of age has been taught three Great Untruths: their feelings are always right; they should avoid pain and discomfort; and they should look for faults in others and not themselves’.129 Haidt is not the only one making such allegations, others have offered similar arguments: ‘Generation snowflake: How we train our kids to be censorious cry-babies’ is the title of a 2016 article.130 As may be expected, these allegations are being hotly debated, both enthusiastically acclaimed and angrily rejected, thus triggering a host of cycles of humiliation at meta-levels.131

We also have the case of ‘skin being too thin due to being too thick’. Hugh might have
suffered from too much self-esteem, albeit brittle. Psychologist Roy Baumeister posits that contrary to the popular assumption that low self-esteem is a major source of criminality, perpetrators of violent crime combine a high but brittle self-esteem with poor self-regulation, particularly when challenged. Hugh might have suffered from precisely this predicament: He went to duel when his wife had a lover, even though this was no longer comme-il-faut and severely damaged his career prospects. While his skin is thin with respect to his own honour, his skin is thick with respect to the violence he metes out to uphold it - from duels to duel-like wars, to routine humiliation, cruelty has been an accepted tool. Underlings, on their part, cannot afford thin skin in the face of superiors; they have to thicken their skin in meek humility or perish. The kiss-up-kick-down principle is called Radfahrerprinzip German for the ‘principle of bicycling’ of ‘nach oben buckeln, nach unten treten’. It offers a short description for the thick skin that is needed to kick down without scruples, while quietly enduring it when kicked by a superior, while thin skin is needed to keep alert as to when it is necessary to kick down to maintain one’s rank in the pecking order.

Not just honourable ranking systems, also cultures of hyper-individualism have the potential to produce similar outcomes. Psychologist Jean Twenge has written about the ‘generation me’ and ‘why today’s young Americans are more confident, assertive, entitled – and more miserable than ever before’. Hyper-individualism ‘democratises’ thin skin in that it ‘empowers’ people to believe that rising up from inferiority entitles everyone to become like former masters. In that way, even ‘snowflakes’ can suffer from ‘thin skin due to skin being too thick’. Hyper-individualism fills the world with Hugh’s so to speak.

Hugh’s brother Gilbert was already much more future-oriented than his brother. He might have understood my call for a third way, one where masters and underlings meet in the middle, all equal in dignity rather than feeling entitled to become masters. The self-esteem movement in the United States failed due to the lack of humility. For a society to truly manifest human rights ideals, extrinsic whip-and-carrot pressure needs to be transcended and enough people must have the intrinsic motivation to embrace dignified humility, with masters stepping down from haughty arrogance and underlings rising up from meek humility.

Let me share a bit more about Hugh’s life path. He was the British ambassador to Frederick the Great in Prussia, yet, he was never liked by the Prussian King. Therefore, he waited to be given another post. It was in this period of need and transition in his life, that he felt that his own superiors treated him humiliatingly. He was ultimately sent to Copenhagen, where he served from 1782 to 1791, where he developed a reputation for his efforts in stopping war between Sweden and Denmark and helping Gustav III reintroduce absolutism in Sweden.

While in Berlin, he had married his first wife, young Charlotte von Kraut, whom he tried to form and educate, yet, tragedy was the result. She fell in love with another man, in other words, she committed adultery. Even though the Prussian court attempted to prevent it, he challenged her lover to a duel. Probably due to this scandal, he never received the customary knighthood.

During all this time, his brother Gilbert was in London, where he had entered parliament in 1776 as an independent Whig Member of Parliament, contesting the Tories. Gilbert was much more in resonance with future human rights ideals than his brother. Gilbert was close to Charles James Fox, a famous champion of liberty, who regarded King George III as an aspiring tyrant and who supported the American Patriots. Even though Fox served as Britain’s first Foreign Secretary (1782, 1783, 1806), his career was ‘one of almost unrelieved failure’: ‘He conducted against King George III a long and brilliant vendetta; for this reason he was almost always in political opposition and, in fact, held high office for less than a year altogether’.

The context of Hugh’s humiliation were thus turbulent times, times that ultimately resulted...
in the Peace of Paris of 1783 that marked the end of the First British Empire. It was the time when Britain’s military became increasingly overstretched. When two more West Indian islands were lost in January 1782, the Parliament began suggesting that Great Britain had no more confidence in its government. The King wanted to instate Lord Shelburne as Prime Minister, whose initial position was to never acknowledge the independence of America. However, Shelburne refused the post. This led to a new government constellation, nominally led by Lord Rockingham, whom the King hated, with Shelburne and Charles James Fox as Secretaries of State, who, on their parts, hated each other.

Whoever was Foreign Secretary in that cabal was the person in charge of deciding over the fate of diplomat Hugh Elliott, and since the political scene was in such continuous shift and turmoil, and, on top of this, Hugh and his brother Gilbert were affiliated with opposing political camps, it is not surprising that humiliation was felt by Hugh whenever he sensed that his career was not promoted as surely as he felt entitled to expect. This was aggravated by the fact that Hugh was given to the traditional values of honour more than others and always ready for a fight – his duel and his sympathy for preserving national grandeur so indicate. Even though the brothers starkly diverged in their political preferences, Gilbert’s letters attest that he always did his best to support his brother Hugh and calm his brother’s fears.

Hugh wrote, ‘I was very humiliatingly treated by the demigod of the blackguards’. The full quote by Countess Minto goes as follows: ‘Early in September Lord Grantham notified to Mr. Elliot his appointment to the Mission at Copenhagen, and on the 29th Hugh wrote to his sister Isabella that he had accepted “an offer which, considering the circumstances of the times and my brother’s political line, I think exceedingly handsome on the part of those who made it. I was very humiliatingly treated by the demigod of the blackguards…”’

Blackguard (pronounced blaggard) was a term of the time for a scoundrel. Thomas Robinson, 2nd Baron Grantham PC (1738–1786) was the Foreign Secretary between 1782 and 1783 under the Earl of Shelburne, preceded and succeeded by Charles James Fox. In other words, in Hugh’s eyes, his brother’s good friend Fox was a ‘demigod of the scoundrels’, and this was the scoundrel that had treated him so humiliatingly.

We might conclude that Hugh’s sense of humiliation was connected to the violation of his honourable decorum more than to a violation of dignity in the sense of equality in dignity for all. If we could ask Hugh, he might give us a resounding ‘Yes’ to the argument that ‘war is good because it makes you hard’, and he would perhaps endorse the black pedagogy described by psychologist Alice Miller. What he tried to apply to his young bride might have been the strict father model that cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson describe, a pedagogical framework that produces obedient inferiors, in contrast to the nurturant parent model that nurtures responsible and aware citizens.

It is interesting to note how times have changed, when we consider that none of the contemporary scholars alluded to above – Jonathan Haidt, for instance, as much as his critics – would agree with Hugh today. Haidt and his critics are all united in wishing to avoid the thin skin of honourable narcissist ‘snowflake’ reactions, and none would endorse the ‘resilience’ of thick skin. All wish to nurture dignified resilience that is not too sensitive, yet, sensitive enough when acts of humiliation are committed that deserve to be transformed into systemic change. All will agree that a Nelson Mandela, who acted out of a deep sense of humiliation, was not a whining snowflake narcissist, and that it would have been a great loss for humankind if he had been ‘resilient’ and quietly succumbed to apartheid.

To conclude this section, as I see it, the adage ‘it takes a village to raise a child’ puts responsibility on society as a whole, and today this applies to the global village. The global community in its entirety is called to think about ways of living together in the future that are more nurturing and offer more dignifying learning opportunities to the next generation. Ideas abound today that both Hugh and Gilbert could not have dreamt of in their time. Hugh would
most probably laugh at psychologist Anthony Marsella calling for the development of a new psychology – a global-community psychology, a ‘meta-discipline’ or ‘superordinate discipline’ characterised as ‘a set of premises, methods, and practices for psychology based on multicultural, multidisciplinary, multisectoral, and multinational foundations global in interest, scope, relevance, and applicability’. 

Hugh would laugh at Marsella claiming that ‘all psychologies are indigenous psychologies’. He would laugh at my suggestion to ‘harvest’ the most dignifying practices and skills from all the cultural realms of this planet, and to supplement inter-cultural communication with global inter-human communication.

Gilbert, in contrast, might be interested in concepts such as intergenerational learning spaces, schools without classroom, or forest kindergartens. He would perhaps not ridicule me if I told him that indigenous peoples might have the best ideas and that I admire the ‘Lazy School’ and ‘Lazy University’ of Karen elder Joni Odochaw in Northern Thailand. Gilbert would applaud Marsella’s suggestion that we have ‘to move beyond such all-too human dynamics, even beyond our identification and pre-occupation with humanity altogether (such as humanism, humanitarian, or humanistic) and to “move to an identity with life – lifeism”.

1865: Humiliation separates from humility

William Ian Miller points out that it is under the entry humiliating that we get our earliest recorded instances of uses that strongly imply an emotion. And as to the difference between humiliation and humility, or being humbled, it is an entry under humiliate from 1865 that differentiates them clearly. This is what the Scottish author George MacDonald (1824–1905) wrote in his novel Annals of a Quiet Neighbourhood, first published in 1865 as a serial in the Sunday Magazine in England:

Now I think humiliation is a very different condition of mind from humility. Humiliation no man can desire: it is shame and torture. Humility is the true, right condition of humanity—peaceful, divine. And yet a man may gladly welcome humiliation when it comes, if he finds that with fierce shock and rude revulsion it has turned him right round, with his face away from pride, whither he was travelling, and towards humility, however far away upon the horizon’s verge she may sit waiting for him. To me, however, there came a gentle and not therefore less effective dissolution of the bonds both of pride and humiliation; and before Weir and I met, I was nearly as anxious to heal his wounded spirit, as I was to work justice for his son.

Annals of a quiet neighbourhood is a novel ‘of faith and hope, repentance and redemption’, set in a rural location in Victorian England. The author George MacDonald was also a poet and a Christian minister. He pioneered fantasy literature and influenced fellow writer Lewis Carroll. The story of this novel turns around a young vicar, Harry Walton, who begins work in his first parish, and around a young woman in stately Oldcastle Hall, the centre of some of the neighbourhood’s longest hidden secrets.

If we consider humiliation to be an emotion, or a set of emotions, and therefore to be a trope that can be anchored in the field psychology, then it is interesting to consider how this field evolved. Psychology has been described as ‘a mistake waiting to happen’: ‘When physical science has promoted its methodology (of atomism, mechanism, and quantification) to an exclusive ontology, psychology (so conceived) was a pretty obvious mistake just waiting to happen – an essentially derivative science modelled on physics, yet having as its subject the very realm that physics rendered utterly obscure’, writes psychologist Alan Costall.

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Philosopher David Hartley (1705–1757) was the first person known to have used the word *psychology* in English, in a work published in 1748, in which he developed an associationist theory of the mind. Already before, early empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume, even though they did not use the term psychology, responded to Isaac Newton’s mechanical physics for the ‘outer’ extended world, with what Hume thought of as a corresponding physics of the mind. For Locke primary qualities comprised everything that is independent of observers (such as extension, number, and solidity), in other words, the ‘objective reality’ that natural scientists such as Galileo and Newton demonstrated to be nothing but matter in motion. Locke’s secondary qualities, in contrast, were confined to the subjective mind. They were subjective effects in observers in the form of experienced colours, tastes, and smells.

In other words, psychology as a discipline attempted to appear as a purely quantitative endeavour. Yet, as psychologists such as Svend Brinkmann point out, despite of this, psychology, has always been qualitative, even though qualitative psychologists have been marginalised for decades. Not only this, but the qualitative methods in psychology ‘meet the demands of the methodology of the natural sciences more truly than do the methods of mainstream quantitative methodology.’ Indeed, when Wilhelm Wundt established the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, he studied the mind in its historical and cultural manifestations, and ‘James’s study of religious experience, Freud’s investigations of dreams and his clinical method more broadly, Gestalt psychologists’ research on perception, Piaget’s interviews with children, Bartlett’s studies of remembering, and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body (and the list could go on) represent foundational qualitative studies in psychology’. Brinkmann suggests that qualitative psychology was able to come to the fore and be more acknowledged only with the arrival of ‘liquid modernity’ after 1970, ‘with the emergence of a new dynamic, multiperspectival, and emergent social complexity that cannot easily be captured with the use of quantitative methods’.

Let me join all of those who suggest that the main philosophical ideas behind recent post-quantitative thinking in psychology go along three lines, all of which help us to understand the social construction of the emotion/s of humiliation as a historical process: First, matter (or nature) is understood as agentic and always changing, and the constructed opposition between a sphere of passive, inert matter on the one hand and a sphere of meaningful human experiences, discourses, and actions on the other is deconstructed.

Second, theorising is seen as generative, with new words and concepts aiming to erode the established binaries that formed the foundation of the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research: Why are empirical data seen as material to be coded, categorised, and analysed, using theoretical concepts supposedly on a higher level? Why should what informants say be coded and not what scholars such as Gilles Deleuze or Jacques Derrida say? Third, the philosophy of representation in general is being critiqued and rejected: Recent qualitative inquiry breaks with ‘the humanist, modernist, imperialist, representationalist, objectivist, rationalist, epistemological, ontological, and methodological assumptions of Western Enlightenment thought and practice’. Psychologists Jeroen Jansz and Peter van Drunen summarise:

The positivist view of psychology was based on three basic assumptions: (a) Practical psychology is believed to rest on scientific knowledge developed within academic psychology, (b) this knowledge is further thought to be progressive and value-free, and (c) the application of this psychological knowledge is generally perceived as being beneficial for society and humankind. The opposite view, ‘the revisionist view’, holds three different basic assumptions: (a) Practical psychology originates from societal forces rather than from academic psychology, (b) psychological knowledge does not necessarily imply progress and is never value-free, and (c) psychology often represses or conceals society’s real conflicts.
To say it short, the positivist view is not an accurate reflection of the history of psychology; it is rather an article of faith. ‘Psychology’\textquotesingle s utility and role in society has been oppressive just as often as it has fostered social progress\textsuperscript{155}. The entire complex of phenomena that surround humiliation, honour, and dignity, and how we speak about them, is a showcase example for the role of societal forces, how they are not value-free, and how society\textquotesingle s real conflicts can be exposed or concealed.

Psychologist Jaan Valsiner traces how psychology emerged in the post-Napoleonic era in Germany as a discipline tasked to keep order in communities and in the minds of people, and how the notion of science emerged later.\textsuperscript{156} Somewhere on this path, psychology, however, lost its subject, namely, the person. The person was the core of developmental psychology only from the 1920s to the 1930s, then rats, pigeons, monkeys, and crowds of human beings became substitutes for persons, \textit{\textasciitilde} as if they represent the intricacies of the human psyche\textsuperscript{157}. It was only in the 1970s that this began to change again, among others, with the establishment of the \textit{Journal of Person-Oriented Research (JPOR)} with the Person-Oriented Approach (POA) that \textit{\textasciitilde} breaks out of the confines of the practice of substituting the person by a rat, a pigeon, a well-educated bonobo, a crowd (called \textit{\textasciitilde} a sample\textasciitilde), or a computer.\textsuperscript{158} In twenty-first century psychology the self – with a myriad of possible personality traits – has now taken the place of the soul as scientifically acceptable causal agent: ‘psychology has lost its soul in the fight against the soul – resulting in legitimisation of mechanistic terms as explanatory agents’.\textsuperscript{159}

From the viewpoint of semiotics, the study of signs and symbols as elements of communicative behaviour, there is a meta-sign of scientific, or a common sense legitimacy of science, and this is subject to historically changing social constraints, meaning that any search for attributions is a form of sign construction aiming to pass this controlling meta-sign.\textsuperscript{160} Further down, I will report on my experiences with my research on humiliation, and how the very word initially almost did not pass the ‘controlling meta-sign of science’: Publishers did not want to have the word \\underline{humiliation} in the titles of my books, as it seemed too ‘unscientific’ a word. When my first book finally came out in 2006, with the title \textit{Making enemies: Humiliation and international conflict}, it was honoured as one of the best academic books of the year, thus exposing how the ‘common sense legitimacy of science’ is changing these days.\textsuperscript{161}

In my personal life, I have drawn radical consequences from such insights. Also the way this essay is written is a consequence, namely, as a painting more than as a scholarly presentation of a theory, as a painting that paints itself with the painter\textquotesingle s humble and loving involvement.\textsuperscript{162} It is a kaleidoscope or panorama painting,\textsuperscript{163} an associative report of my personal life journey in its loving embeddedness into a global network of the relationships with people that have impacted my life.

Already sociologist George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) emphasised the self as a relational construction.\textsuperscript{164} But what became dominant, particularly in North America, was the stark opposite, namely, one-hero individualism, until pioneers such as Jean Baker Miller turned away from it again.\textsuperscript{165} Miller was an early leader re-emphasising the role of relationships and community, building on Lev Vygotsky and cultural-historical activity theory.\textsuperscript{166} Also I tend to regard ‘the relation’ itself as having causal effects.\textsuperscript{167} In my work I try to express the person-oriented approach that Valsiner speaks up for, the Gestalt nature of personal encounters with the external world, the person as a Gestalt-maker: ‘The basic human psychological development is centred in the personal innovation of one’s unique life course. Generalisation becomes re-inserted into the never-ending particularities that are created as the person moves towards his or her future, from birth to death.’\textsuperscript{168} According to psychologist Kenneth Gergen, the ‘hierarchy of knowing’ with the scientist as ‘the knower’ and the objects of research being

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‘the known’ can also be reversed. While the claim to objectivity in method ‘permits the researcher to dismiss the knowledge claims of the “objects of research” as biased and ignorant’, from the standpoint of relational being, ‘I speak with others, and therefore I can know’.169

The Gestalt-maker approach aligns with dignity seen as a relational concept, ‘inherent to every human being it requires affirmative action and therefore recognition from others. In this sense it is at the time a radical individualised and a socialised moral concept’.170 This essay is thus true to dignity by being very personal and at the same time very relational, letting the many voices that have spoken to me throughout my life-time be heard. I regard my global life design as methodology, where ‘speaking with others’ not only dignifies research but provides it also with validity.171 And I speak with all others, not just with ‘dignitaries’. Attentive readers will notice, for instance, that I avoid identifying scholars I quote by highlighting it when they are based at so-called ‘prestigious’ institutions, be it Harvard or any other American ivy league school, or the United Nations, or any similar ‘dignitary’ institution. I also highlight the nationality of a person only when it is relevant for the context to avoid hinting that educated Western voices may be worth more than other voices. ‘Borrowing’ status for my arguments from citing researchers because they are ‘Harvard’ scholars, or Western scholars, or because they work for the United Nations, would be humiliating for me. To me, it would not just violate my personal sense of dignity, it would also betray poor judgement: It would be like being proud of the advice of the captain of the Titanic. Many institutions that once elicited enthusiasm have since betrayed it – despite many of its individual members trying to hold up original ideals – similar to what happened with the enthusiasm of those who once believed that the system of the Soviet Union would manifest the dignified communism it promised. ‘Socialism at its best for the Capitalists and Capitalism at its worst for us, the People’, is a sigh coming from an economy professor in 2018.172

I began living globally when I was twenty years old, and decades of global experience have made me increasingly critical of mainstream Western armchair research. I am 64 years old now, and especially since I was 45, I have intentionally refined this life design to walk the talk of dignity and validity. I have designed a life where I do not just speak with others, but live with others, be with others, so that I can try out ever new ways of speaking, so as to allow new understandings and new forms of action to emerge. I have learned that there is no guarantee for ‘truth’,173 there is only the experience of ‘I understand’.174 With this caveat in mind, I allow myself to be drawn into ‘truth events’ all around the world, humbly acknowledging that I will always be too late if I want to know what to believe. In this way, I live a life of interbeing.175 I attempt to search for and nurture what physicists call ‘coherence domains’, which means that I search for areas where hearts and minds can align, not just locally, but at a global level.176 By engaging in ‘living translation’,177 I follow my teacher philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal, who advised me, back in 1996, that the phenomenon of humiliation can only be illuminated by rich descriptive studies.178

The planet and its living creatures are therefore my university. As its student, I am a voyager, someone who uses the challenges of cultural diversity and intercultural conflicts for forging new relationships and new ideas; I am not a vindicator who vindicates pre-existing ethnocentrism and stereotypes.179 I do not speak of people as ‘samples’, I abstain from research about ‘objects’, I only have co-researchers who co-create conjoint narration. I find it utterly humiliating when people are turned into objects of ‘scientific’ characterisations of which they are unaware. I prefer participatory action research approaches that aim at including all involved and entrusting them with the search for knowledge. I admire, for instance, sociologist Maggie O’Neill, who bases her work on the theoretical concept of ethnomimesis, an inter-connection of sensitive ethnographic work and visual re-presentations. Ethno-mimesis is both a methodological tool and a process for exploring lived experience, for
instance, that of displacement, exile, belonging, and humiliation.180

Last but not least, also autoethnography is part of my inquiry, meaning that I, as researcher, serve as the subject of research where I am also my own case study.181 This is how I survive the sense of humiliation that haunts me when I see how dignity is being trampled on in today’s dominator world, and I do this in dignified and loving humility, rather than self-righteous haughty arrogance.

1948: Human rights ideals separate humiliation from humility and shame182

Many have read Thomas Friedman in The New York Times, where he stated in 2003: ‘If I’ve learned one thing covering world affairs, it’s this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation’.183

Are humility, shame, and humiliation part of the same continuum?

Scholars have long treated the terms humiliation and shame as interchangeable, or as part of the same continuum, with humiliation being a more severe form of shame and humility, or as intertwined. Among them was psychologist Silvan Solomon Tomkins (1911–1991),184 whose work was carried further by Donald Nathanson.185 Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of a total of nine, namely, shame, disgust, and ‘dissmell’ (Tomkins’s term).186

My approach is different, at least partly: As I observe it, with the advent of the notion of equality in dignity, humility, shame, and humiliation enter into a new relationship with each other. Whenever and wherever human rights ideals become salient, those three notions seize to be interchangeable terms, no longer are they always on the same continuum, nor are they necessarily intertwined. Furthermore, the new normative context provides humiliation with a degree of explosiveness that it did not have before, and globalisation intensifies this effect. I note that I have been ahead of my time in discerning this new constellation, possibly through my family background of war and displacement, and through my global life.187

As this essay has shown so far, phenomena such as shame, humility, and humiliation are far from a-historic emotional processes that can be defined once and for all. They are historical-cultural-social-emotional constructs that change over time and according to context. Humiliation began to separate out from the humility-shame-humiliation continuum around three hundred years ago. As a result, there are two mutually excluding concepts of humiliation in use today, all around the world, one that is ‘old’, and one that is ‘new’ (or, rather, it returns to a concept that predates the ‘old’ one; more on that later).

I have a sense that those who do not distinguish between shame and humiliation, those who treat humiliation and shame as part of overlapping or identical innate categories, are unwittingly thinking within the ‘older’ (honour) perspective. Sometimes this takes the form of positing a humility-shame-humiliation continuum. Sometimes it appears in the work of psychologists who suggest that humiliation is a beneficial tool that can be used positively, not just negatively, for instance, as a form of social control.188 In many contexts around the world, views that wrap humility, shame, and humiliation into one and the same package are still widely held.189

One of the conceptualisations of humiliation that I have developed and use in my work is the following: Humiliation is an act, an emotional state, and a social mechanism, that is relevant for anthropology, sociology, philosophy, social and clinical psychology, and political science. This multidisciplinarity may be one reason for why the notion of humiliation has

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almost not been studied on its own account so far. Another reason I see is that globalisation and human rights ideals increase the significance of humiliation (more on this later), and I happen to have stumbled over this fact earlier than others due to the ‘global life’ I have led.

The notion of humiliation has, furthermore, the potential to elicit scepticism in certain segments of academia, as it appears to be lacking academic neutrality, detachment, and objectivity. The notion seems to be too ‘soft’, this has been at least my experience since I began with my research on humiliation in 1996. Despite the rising acceptance of qualitative approaches in the past years, it seems still to be an intellectual virtue to define ‘hard’ categories with a definite technical meaning and psychometric reliability and validity, and then to impose them on diverse cultures around the world and on changing historical realities.

Time and again, I am astonished how humiliation can be regarded as too ‘soft’ a concept and field of study, while, obviously, humiliation has the potential to create the ‘hardest’ of facts at all levels, macro, meso and micro levels – from war to domestic violence to self-destruction. Many scholars in the peace and conflict research field seem to prefer vocabularies such as ‘cultural relative deprivation’, a parlance that precisely overlooks the core of the problem, namely, the very explosiveness of the emotional impact of this deprivation and its potentially dire real life consequences. To me, this amounts to sacrificing scientific validity for the illusion of scientific rationality.

The impact of humiliation has been demonstrated, not least very recently by American President Donald Trump. The ‘hard facts’ that Donald Trump has introduced into the reigning Zeitgeist show the power of humiliation: his ‘politics of emotions’, his humiliation entrepreneurship, challenge the ‘distribution of the sensible’ and move the boundaries between what is thinkable and unthinkable, the boundaries between what is accepted as rational or irrational. Finally, Donald Trump has the power to literally ‘blow up’ the world, undoubtedly a very hard fact.

As Linda Hartling has observed: ‘It is often felt to be humiliating to talk about humiliation. People do not like to talk about their feelings of humiliation because there is a sense of powerlessness involved with not being able to prevent these types of experiences’. Worse even, arguments that attribute causal powers to humiliation may even be met with hostility. There are people who angrily reject any suggestion that violence may be explainable by feelings of humiliation; some have accused me of wanting to use this argument to excuse perpetrators and turn them into victims while blaming the victims as if they were perpetrators. When I worked on my book on terrorism and terror, for instance, I was being warned and told that wishing to understand terrorism is to serve terrorists as their lackey and do their bidding, that wanting to understand the un-understandable condones evil. Or, in Rwanda in 2015, my doctoral dissertation on humiliation from the year 2000 was misunderstood as a justification of genocide, until I explained that understanding is not the same as condoning.

The phenomenon of humiliation is very complex. Broadly speaking, humiliation can be studied as (1) an internal experience, as a feeling, an emotion, (2) as an external event, an act, in cases of degrading interpersonal interactions, bullying, abuse, violent conflict and extremism, terrorism and genocide, or (3) as a systemic condition – apartheid is a good example – such as intractable inequality, discrimination, or economic injustice.

Humiliation is thus a word that is used in describing the act of humiliation perpetrated by a perpetrator; it is also used as a word for the feeling of humiliation felt by a victim. However, the perpetrator may just want to help; but still the receiver of this help may feel humiliated. Thus help may humiliate, in a situation where the receiver of help interprets a situation as humiliation, not the actor. Or, neither actor nor victim may define a situation as humiliating, but a third party. The social worker, as a third party, wants to rescue the battered wife, for example, but the wife may answer that beating her is her husband’s way of loving her – a case

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that evokes the terminology of ‘false consciousness’. A further complication is that although one may expect that humiliation is something people would want to avoid, some people seek it; practices such as sadomasochism, for instance, may be seen as an attempt to heal from having been exposed to acts of humiliation earlier in life.\textsuperscript{197} Or, in certain religious rites, people whip and humiliate/humble themselves to praise god, informed by the ‘old’ notion of humiliation, as suggested in the homily of Pope Francis that was mentioned above.

Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity.\textsuperscript{198} To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will, or in some cases also with your consent, often in deeply hurtful ways, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless.

Humiliation is the lowering of a person beyond justifiable shaming. It includes the transgression of the shaming limit. A person who is shamed may deserve it, she may, for example, have given a promise and not kept it. However, a person who is humiliated is lowered beyond that point.

Humiliator and humiliatee have three main options. First, they may agree that this lowering, though painful, is necessary and beneficial. As mentioned before, followers of religious beliefs may even humiliate themselves. Second, both sides may agree that this lowering is cruel and oppressive, for example, when the army of a conqueror pillages a defeated city and all concur that such behaviour is within the rights of conquerors. Third, they may disagree. The feudal lord, for instance, may believe that the humiliation he inflicts on his underlings is beneficial, yet, his underlings may bitterly object. Or, the modern employer may happily apply humiliation to increase profit, while the employee may wish to be treated with respect.\textsuperscript{199}

The role of the victim is not necessarily unambiguous either. A victim may feel humiliated in the absence of any humiliating act, as a result of misunderstandings, for example, or as a result of personal and cultural differences concerning norms of what respectful treatment ought to entail. The case of unwelcome help has been mentioned above. Or, as has been alluded to in the case of Hugh Elliott, a victim may even hold on to memories of humiliation to be able to maintain a post-victim ethical exemption syndrome.\textsuperscript{201} Or the ‘victim’ may invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of a loathsome perpetrator. In my work, I sometimes speak of an addiction to humiliation.\textsuperscript{202}

In cases where the victim is being humiliated against her will in a context informed by human rights ideals of equality in dignity for all, where attempts to humiliate people are understood as a violation rather than as a beneficial lesson, humiliation-attrition can have the effect of wearing down people to the point of apathy and depression,\textsuperscript{203} and inertia.\textsuperscript{204} Research shows, for instance, that the combination of loss and humiliation is the strongest predictor of major depression.\textsuperscript{205} Research also shows that humiliation is the most intense human emotion – it leads to the mobilisation of more processing power and a greater consumption of mental resources than other emotions: ‘humiliation is a particularly intense and cognitively demanding negative emotional experience that has far-reaching consequences for individuals and groups alike’.\textsuperscript{206} Protracted cycles of humiliation can lead to the very paralysis and apathy that also learned helplessness engenders.\textsuperscript{207} A seemingly ‘peaceful’ society can be the result, peaceful because the price for keeping structural violence covert\textsuperscript{208} is paid for by its members’ pain.\textsuperscript{209}

While feelings of humiliation can result in apathy and depression, they can also lead to ‘going black’, to humiliated fury, as psychologist Helen Lewis called it,\textsuperscript{210} representing what I

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call the *nuclear bomb of the emotions*. This fury might find its way into domestic violence, or it can express itself in large-scale atrocities, such as genocide or terrorism, when extremist humiliation entrepreneurs instigate cycles of humiliation. This is the ‘Hitler path’ out of humiliation. Yet, there is also the Freire-Gandhi-Mandela path. Feelings of humiliation can awaken what Paulo Freire called *conscientisation* and motivate people to work for constructive social change. This is the path of moderation, the path of those whose aim is to change humiliating systems without using humiliation as a tool. This is also my path.

Linda Hartling suggests that dignity, specifically equal dignity, is an inoculation and an antidote to feelings of humiliation: ‘When we create relationships characterised by mutual dignity, we are simultaneously reducing the risk of humiliation impacting relationships. Parents need to inoculate their children to the risk of humiliation. They need to create mutually empathic “growth-fostering relationships” with their children that will strengthen their resilience in the face of humiliating experiences’.

The complexity of the phenomenon of humiliation has been demonstrated also by other scholars and their different views on it. For instance, philosopher Avishai Margalit defines humiliation as the ‘rejection of persons of the Family of Man’, as injury to self-respect, or, more specifically, as failure of respect, combined with loss of control. Philosopher Anthony Quinton, however, disputes Margalit’s position, arguing that self-respect ‘has nothing much to do with humiliation’.

Our annual Workshops on Transforming Humiliation and Violent Conflict at Columbia University in New York City, have been a rich source of reflections on humiliation. Psychologist Clark McCauley, for instance, editor of the journal *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide*, spoke of humiliation as a toxic mix of anger and shame that is difficult to acknowledge. In our 2006 workshop, he shared the following thoughts with us, referring also to my 2006 book on humiliation:

When I started thinking about humiliation, it occurred to me to ask: 1) is this an emotion? 2) is it a new emotion, or a blend of emotions that we already know about?

My first thought is that it’s a forced lowering, seen as illegitimate. In Aristotle’s theory on anger, disrespect produces anger and a tendency toward vengeance. But in humiliation, anger has to be suppressed because of imbalance. The victim is not able to respond with anger or vengeance.

Reading Evelin’s book, there’s a heavy burden of shame in these stories. A woman connived her boyfriend’s bad treatment, felt ashamed of the role she played in her own abasement. Maybe humiliation is more than a sub-case of anger, more than suppressed anger: maybe it’s a blend of suppressed anger and shame. The whole focus of anger is to triumph over another. The good thing about anger as an emotion is that it’s a net transfer of power from perpetrator to victim in the long haul. In Evelin’s book, a reference to Aristotle, it is a slavish and ignoble person who doesn’t respond with anger. Yes, humiliation is suppressed anger but there’s shame, too; a ‘real’ man is going to strike back despite the cost. So humiliation might fit into the existing psychology of emotions. The levels are an empirical issue individual and intergroup levels. This person humiliated me as an individual; this group humiliated my group. It’s not the same thing. We can’t project the individual on the intergroup level.

Then there’s another ugly problem: emotions are transitory; they go by in a hurry. You would never try to measure the eliciting of emotion more than three to four minutes after it’s happened. Humiliation and anger aren’t chronic conditions; we have to worry about the time signature. The psychology of emotions has to work toward longer-term understanding. Or those working on intergroup emotions will have to cut loose of the
psychology of emotions.\textsuperscript{215}

As far as I am aware, psychologist Linda Hartling, director of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, is the first to write a doctoral dissertation in which she separates humiliation out of the shame continuum and treats humiliation on its own account, and she did so in 1995, five years before I wrote my dissertation on humiliation.\textsuperscript{216} Linda Hartling developed the \textit{humiliation inventory}, a scale to assess the internal experience of derision and degradation. It uses a scale of 1 to 5 to gauge the extent to which respondents feel harmed by humiliating incidents throughout life and how much they fear ‘being teased, bullied, scorned, excluded, laughed at, or, harassed’.\textsuperscript{217}

Linda Hartling found that psychoanalyst Karen Horney (1885–1952) was perhaps the first personality theorist who spoke directly about the experience of humiliation. Hartling wondered: ‘Perhaps this was due to the many degrading experiences she endured while becoming a physician in a system and society that disapproved of women pursuing medical careers. Several biographies describe the various humiliations she encountered as a result of gender discrimination’.\textsuperscript{218}

Linda Hartling has listed some of the ways in which humiliation can be assessed:

1. from the perspective of the victim,
2. from the perspective of the witness,
3. from the perspective of the humiliator,\textsuperscript{219}
4. from any combination of these relationships,
5. as an individual/\textit{internal} experience,
6. as a relational/\textit{external} experience,
7. as a traumatic relational violation,
8. as a narrative or reflection in response to an acute or a chronic experience of humiliation,
9. as a culturally dependent behaviour or social practice (e.g., discrimination, micro-aggressions) in obvious or subtle forms,
10. as an individual incident or a systemic dynamic,
11. as an atmosphere or environment characterised by contempt, devaluation, denigration,
12. as a tool of social control, a tool of domination, a power-over tool,
13. from the perspective of a specific practice (e.g., using a single letter grade to describe the quality of a child’s academic performance on a topic or using a number to signify a child’s lifelong intellectual capacity), or
14. as a ‘resilience-triggering’ experience\textsuperscript{220}

In the year 2000, I wrote my doctoral thesis,\textsuperscript{221} and have since published many papers jointly with Linda Hartling, and also some together with core members of our dignity group, for example, with Michael Britton and Ulrich Spalthoff,\textsuperscript{222} and with Howard Richards.\textsuperscript{223} We all believe that in the new historical context in which we live, while humility and shame still hold pro-social connotations, the act of humiliation has changed into an entirely anti-social violation that cannot be used pro-socially under any circumstances. Furthermore, we see that it is possible, now, for humiliation to be experienced completely without shame, indicating that the humility-shame-humiliation continuum no longer holds.

When Linda Hartling and I began with our doctoral research, and when we searched for the term humiliation on the web, what came up first and foremost, was pornographical material. At that time, I knew only of one serious academic book with the term humiliation in the title, namely, the book by William Ian Miller that is the starting point of this essay.\textsuperscript{224} A pioneer of community psychology, Donald Klein, had edited special issues on the topic of humiliation for the \textit{Journal of primary prevention}, in 1991,\textsuperscript{225} 1992,\textsuperscript{226} and in 1999 with Linda Hartling
and Tracy Luchetta as contributors. And, as noted before, philosopher Avishai Margalit calls for a decent society, in which institutions no longer humiliate citizens.

A more comprehensive list of relevant references can be found on the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies website. Papers, texts, and comments on humiliation and dignity prepared for Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies and its conferences are listed on the same website. There is, among others, the special issue on ‘Humiliation and History in Global Perspectives’, published by Social Alternatives, edited by Ralph Summy in Australia, with guest editor Bertram Wyatt-Brown, and another special issue, ‘Humiliation in the Academic Setting’, a part of the series Experiments in Education, coordinated by D. Raja Ganesan in India. A number publications on humiliation that came out between the years 1990 and 2000 came to my awareness later (see endnotes), and further, a selection from 2000 to 2010, and, finally, after 2010.

Even though humiliation as a concept has not received much attention on its own so far, the phenomenon plays a role in many related fields of inquiry. The relationship between guilt, shame and aggression, for instance, has been addressed in many publications, as has the relationship between anger and aggression. Hazing and bullying have humiliation at their core. Cultural differences have been highlighted widely in the literature. Evidently, the phenomenon of humiliation figures implicitly, among other places, in literature on violence and war. The notion of oppression is related to humiliation, as is the notion of domination. Philosopher of criminal justice John Kleinig calls for non-degradation, philosopher and political theorist Philip Pettit for non-domination, and physicist and educational reformer Robert Fuller for rejecting what he calls rankism.

While humiliation is now anti-social, humility remains pro-social

Now to the main topic of this section, namely: how human rights ideals have separated humiliation from humility and shame. The year 1757 could be seen as a linguistic marker of a transition from one era in human history to another era. Roughly the past five per cent of human history, the past ten millennia, have been characterised by what social scientist Riane Eisler calls the dominator model of society. In the dominator context, an ‘alpha male’ dominates and leads the pack. Eisler is a social scientist and activist, who has developed a cultural transformation theory, through which she describes how during the past millennia otherwise widely divergent societies all over the globe followed the dominator model of society, rather than a partnership model. The dominator model brings to the fore what cross-cultural psychologists call honour and face cultures, including its wide range of practices of routine humiliation of underlings. Among them is the strict father pedagogical framework that cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson describe, that contrasts the nurturant parent model, which matches Eisler’s partnership model of society.

As long as the view was ubiquitous that it is legitimate for inferiors to humiliate themselves or to be humiliated, prior to 1757 so to speak, humiliation was simply an intense form of shame on a continuum starting with mild embarrassment. Underlings humiliated themselves, or they were humiliated, so as to instil pro-social shame in them and prevent them from engaging in undue arrogance. There was ubiquitous agreement that it was pro-social for underlings to be stopped from developing a ‘shameless’ sense of entitlement for a rank that was higher than they were deemed to deserve. Nobody was allowed to aspire to an undeserving rank, all were to stay in their due place. Superiors would humiliate their inferiors to ensure their humility, while they would humiliate themselves to be humble in the face of God.

Still today, shame is seen as pro-social in certain contexts. Human rights activists will
shame companies that do not fulfil their promises and regard this shaming as pro-social. A society of shameless people, indeed, is not desirable. But not all shaming practices remain acceptable, many are now in the process of losing their status as pro-social. Torture is one example. Torturers use shame and pain to humiliate and break the victim’s self-respect and will to resist, and while this was seen as thoroughly pro-social in the past, from today’s human-rights perspective it is anti-social (aside from also being impractical, since it does not generate valid insights). Although there are still many who think that torture is necessary and useful, an increasing number of people do reject it. James Elmer Mitchell was one of two psychologists involved in designing interrogation methods for the American secret service, as the 2014 U.S. Senate report on the C.I.A. torture program has exposed. Mitchell and his colleagues built on psychologist Martin Seligman’s research on learned helplessness, in addition to having learned from Chinese interrogation methods that were used on American soldiers during the Korean war. Decades later, Mitchell recommended the same methods to be used on suspected terrorists, among others, in Afghanistan: ‘humiliation, painful stress positions, confinement, sleep deprivation – and waterboarding’. The aim was to give the captive a ‘sense of hopelessness’. In 2014, still the majority of Americans thought that torture was justified, particularly given the 9/11 attacks. Yet, a minority believes that, on the contrary, those involved in such interrogation strategies – James Mitchell and his colleagues superiors – ought to feel ashamed and humiliated by their own actions. In 2018, several Catholic groups have opposed American President Trump’s nomination of Gina Haspel for director of the Central Intelligence Agency, saying that her ‘role in overseeing torture disqualifies her’, according to ‘basic moral standards for human dignity’. Those who oppose her confirmation say that ‘Haspel’s confirmation could send a message of U.S. support for previously banned interrogation techniques’, not least since ‘President Donald Trump had expressed interest in lifting current restrictions on torture.’

As this short overview shows, the concept and phenomena of shame and humiliation are continuously changing. The rise of human right ideals has profoundly affected them, to the extent that humiliation can no longer be conceptualised as a mere part of the shame continuum. Feelings of humiliation can occur entirely without feelings of shame. In the past, it was the privilege and duty of elites to forego the shame of humiliation through duels or duel-like responses. A beaten wife, however, could not challenge her husband to duel, she had to humbly learn to feel duly ashamed for failing to respect his superiority. In a human-rights based context, in contrast, she can liberate herself from this shame, accuse her husband of unduly humiliating her, and exit from this humiliating situation entirely unashamedly. Human rights ideals ‘democratis’ the privileges of former elites.

There are many examples that illustrate feelings of humiliation occurring without shame. While torturers inflict humiliation to create debilitating shame, still, as I have learned from torture victims, some succeed in insulating their inner selves from such onslaughts and refuse to feel shame, or, they may even feel humiliation as a victory. A young man – call him Ahmed – told me that he felt pure triumph, without any sense of shame, when he was beaten and humiliated, almost killed, by the military. This sensation, he reported, had a triumphant quality because it proved to him that he was able to heroically resist oppression. As long as he meekly bowed to the humiliation of oppression and tried to hide from it out of fear of more humiliation, he felt unbearable shame and guilt. He explained to me that feeling shame-free triumphant humiliation liberated him, made him resilient and gave him new pride.

Nelson Mandela refused to feel ashamed when he was being humiliated. While young Ahmed chose the path of destructive violence to liberate himself from shame, Nelson Mandela chose the path of constructive social change. In my work, clearly, I follow Mandela. In a way, Ahmed ‘went black’ when he threw himself at highly armed soldiers, knowing that he would be thrown to the ground, he simply could not endure his own shame anymore,
he was ready to participate in terrorist attacks and die in them. In my conversations with representatives of the Security Services in Norway, Josefine Aase highlighted how the lack of choices may contribute to such ‘going black’; I summarise what she said:

Those born in Europe, or who came here as a child, do not belong to the economically deprived. Sociological models are therefore not well suited. They have many choices other than terrorism…

Islamists are concerned with pure doctrine. In Palestine the situation is different to Europe. In Gaza there are fewer choices. The humiliation experienced is very much greater. They can ‘go black’, and then usual rational assessment values dissolve: lost honour must be avenged at whatever cost.

Taliban, or those who live in Pakistan or the Middle East, experience different dynamics, much more acute frustration. Palestinians were apparently the first Muslims in modern times, in the 1990s, who used suicide bombers (Assassins were using similar methods 1,000 years ago), and then time passed and the Taliban entered the stage much later, in 2006. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka were the first in modern times who used this as modus operandi.260

Psychologist Helen Block Lewis coined the phrase humiliated fury, a term that reminds of ‘going black’.261 Psychologist Thomas Scheff has studied ‘bypassed shame’, or shame that is not acknowledged, as the source of humiliated fury and as motor of violence.262 If not acknowledged and worked through constructively, Scheff explains, if bypassed, feelings of shame can maintain destructive conflict.

In my 2010 book on gender, humiliation, and global security, I dissected that, in contexts of honour, shame is a duty for females, proof of her morality, while for males, particularly those in ruling positions, shame is shameful. Shame can be shameful also for those who have learned to identify with proud identities, be they ethnic, national, or gender identities. In the genocide against the former ruling Tutsi elite in Rwanda, for instance, through humiliating and killing Tutsi, also shame was being ‘cleansed’. Hutu felt ashamed that they once had been submissive to their Tutsi superiors, that they had looked up to them in the past as benevolent patrons and failed to despise them as malevolent oppressors.263 Similarly, a wife who learns to liberate herself from her beating husband might feel ashamed that she ever accepted such a treatment. If she were to kill him to cleanse her shame, she would follow the Hutu example.

Rising up from the bottom is a complex and difficult psychological process that can create shame, and this shame can become pathogenic when one is ashamed of it. In a context defined by human rights ideals space opens for a culture of shame to move from pathogenic to salutogenic, for shame to become something one does not have to be ashamed of.264

Humiliators want their victims to feel ashamed. Resilience in the face of humiliation therefore means resisting feeling shame, insisting on one’s sense of worth in the face of humiliation. This is different from suppressing shame or bypassing shame. Linda Hartling has shared the following reflections:

Perhaps, as Scheff seems to imply, ‘some’ working-class clients have more difficulty acknowledging ‘shame’ because their shame is actually humiliation (unjust degrading mistreatment)? Perhaps members of the working classes have difficulty acknowledging shame because they have been beaten down by the daily humiliation and demoralisation of living in a society that exploits the working class and the poor? Perhaps it is the upper social classes who are more likely in need of ‘acknowledging their shame’?265

As I said before, I am impressed by what Nelson Mandela did. He approached Frederik
Willem de Klerk and his followers and explained to them that ‘the old order was dying’.\textsuperscript{266} Mandela called for mutually shared humility without humiliation. He himself did not feel ashamed and therefore did not have to acknowledge suppressed or bypassed shame, even though he had been systematically put down and humiliated. Mandela had liberated himself from the master’s intentions to instil shame in him. He carried his head high. He refused to translate humiliation into shame. He rejected humiliation, like a master. However, he refrained from walking the traditional master path of honour in response. He did not call upon his black brothers and sisters to follow the Rwandan example and kill all former oppressors. He refrained from humilitating the white elite of South Africa into submission but humbled them into equality in dignity. He stood up to the humiliation inflicted on him and his brothers and sisters by translating it into a mission for profound constructive social change within the context of human rights ideals of equal dignity for all.

Morton Deutsch thought about how Mandela ‘kept his self undistorted by preserving his dignity and refusing to submit, psychologically, to the definition of self that the oppressors tread to force upon him’.\textsuperscript{267} Mandela described the following incident after landing on Robben Island:

We were met by a group of burly white wardens shouting: ‘Dis die Eiland! Hier gaan jiel vrek! (This is the island! Here you will die!)’ … As we walked toward the prison, the guards shouted ‘Two-two! Two-two!’ – meaning we should walk in pairs ….. I linked up with Tefu. The guards started screaming, ‘Haas! … Haas!’ The word haas means ‘move’ in Afrikaans, but it is commonly reserved for cattle.

‘The wardens were demanding that we jog, and I turned to Tefu and under my breath said that we must set an example; if we give in now we would be at their mercy ….. I mentioned to Tefu that we should walk in front, and we took the lead. Once in front, we actually decreased the pace, walking slowly and deliberately. The guards were incredulous (and said)’ … we will tolerate no insubordination here. Haas! Haas!’ But we continued at our stately pace. (The head guard) ordered us to halt and stood in front of us: ‘Look, man, we will kill you, we are not fooling around … This the last warning. Haas! Haas!’ ‘To this, I said: ‘You have your duty and we have ours’. I was determined that we would not give in, and we did not, for we were already at the cells.\textsuperscript{268}

Morton Deutsch concluded: ‘By his persistent public refusal to be humiliated or to feel humiliated, Mandela rejected the distorted, self-debilitating relationship that the oppressor sought to impose upon him. Doing so enhanced his leadership among his fellow political prisoners and the respect he was accorded by the less sadistic guards and wardens of the prison’.\textsuperscript{269} Indeed, when Mandela left prison, some of his guards had become his friends.

**Cultures of shame, guilt, honour, face, humility, and dignity**

In cultural anthropology, shame and guilt have often been contrasted as methods of social control. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict, for instance, has described American (Christian) culture as a guilt culture, in which the individual’s internal conscience counts most, and Japanese culture as a shame culture, where the emphasis lies on how outsiders perceive one’s moral conduct.\textsuperscript{270} After living in Japan for three years, I have developed an understanding of all those who feel humiliated by Benedict’s view of Japan as a ‘shame’ culture for ranking American guilt culture higher than Japanese shame culture. Japanese psychoanalyst Takeo Doi was not the only one I got to know who found it to be humilitating to Japanese culture to
be ranked as inferior to American culture.\textsuperscript{271} In Japan, I learned a lot about the advantages of *amae*, or ‘sweetness in interdependence’, and that Benedict’s ranking might merit a re-calibration.\textsuperscript{272}

While Ruth Benedict presumably did not intend to instrumentalise research to help entertain Western arrogance, others might be less cautious, less interested in making sure that academia serves all of humanity rather than particular agendas. Lately, ‘Arab culture’ has been subsumed into the honour-shame category, and allegedly, even torture methods have been shaped with the help of this categorisation.\textsuperscript{273} For Africa, a power-fear category has been added, and has been used by Christian missionaries.\textsuperscript{274}

I have been criticised as Western imperialist for advocating dignity, given that in cross-cultural psychology Western *dignity culture* has been contrasted with non-Western *face and honour cultures*.\textsuperscript{275} Also sociologists use these categorisations, and sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning, for instance, argue that the United States made the transition from an honour culture to a dignity culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{276}

Whenever I meet the accusation of imperialism, I try to explain my view, namely, that everything depends on how dignity is defined and conceptualised. If dignity is conceptualised as *interconnected individuality* – connected in equality in worthiness and connected in loving solidarity – then dignity includes the best from face and honour mind-sets, as also considerations for face will be heeded because saving face means avoiding to humiliate others, which, furthermore, entails a rejection of violent vindications of honour. If dignity is being defined as competition for domination between *disconnected autonomous individuals*, it could indeed perhaps be called Western imperialism if I were to proselytise this view. If I did, I would partake in an irony, because in hyper-individualistic Western contexts, where freedom means that might is right, dignity and face flow together with traditional honour values of ‘dignitaries’, in other words, when dignitaries of equal standing try to preserve their honour in duel-like confrontations, dignity becomes almost indistinguishable from traditional honour settings – leaders of giants such as Google, Facebook, or Apple showcase this.

In my view, it is equal worthiness versus unequal worthiness for all that is the significant differentiating element. Dignity, face, and honour, all three can be inscribed in equal or unequal worthiness. Unequal worthiness manifests itself in a culture of honour in which everybody accepts as nature’s order or as divinely ordained that superior ‘dignitaries’ preside over inferiors, with equality existing only within each rank. My doctoral research among proud Somali warriors has brought this mind-set to me forcefully – including once with the gun to my head\textsuperscript{277} – and also my seven years of working as a psychologist in Egypt have taught me much about it, for instance, how the nomadic culture of the Arab Peninsula impacted Upper Egypt more than Lower Egypt. A high level of ‘readiness for duel’ among proud aristocrats – ‘shoot first, talk later’ – characterises the entire culture, while meek subservience does not last long. As to cultures of face, my years in Japan and China have suggested to me that such cultures may be the result of similar honour set-ups, only with a longer time-frame and in larger groups, as this enables power elites to establish subservient humility among their subordinates not just ad hoc and in the short term but as an ingrained long-term culture. When we then look at present-day’s Western culture which prides itself of being free from oppressive hierarchy, and where dignity is defined as disconnected autonomy, the result is merely yet another increase in inequality in worthiness on the ground. Power elites employ dignity rhetoric to create a global machinery that is so large that it traps all those now disconnected individuals as ‘rats in a rat race’. A culture of dignity represents a liberation only if dignity is defined as equality in dignity for interconnected individuals, only then it can be a force for liberation from ‘honourable dignitaries’ trapping underlings, either in cultures of face or in the indignities of rat races. At present, I hardly see any true dignity culture anywhere in the world, despite much dignity rhetoric; measurements of rising inequality

\textbf{Evelin Lindner}
underpin my intuition.  

Social psychologist Peter B. Smith and his colleagues have researched dignity, face, and honour cultures. They have conducted surveys where the sentence ‘how much a person respects himself is far more important than how much others respect him’ was taken to connote a dignity orientation, the sentence ‘people should minimise conflict in social relationships at all costs’ was seen to point at a face orientation, and ‘you must punish people who insult you’ to characterise at honour culture. Respondents in UK and Finland served as informants from dignity cultures, and they perceived dignity values as incompatible with face and honour values. Respondents from China and Malaysia were asked as representatives of harmony and face cultures, and they welcomed dignity values of equality as basis for interpersonal harmony, while rejecting honour values with their emphasis on assertion and defense against threat. Respondents from Lebanon, Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico, in contrast, rejected reliance on face and dignity values as being ineffective to uphold honour.

For many decades, psychologist Dov Cohen and his colleagues have done research on honour, studying, among others, the psychology of violence in the culture of honour in the southern parts of the United States. In 2013, in an article on ‘the self in face and dignity culture’, they compared Hong Kong and the United States and found that ‘people from a face culture absorb the judgments of other people into their private self-definitions’, while ‘people from a dignity culture try to preserve the sovereign self by not letting others define them’. Sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning describe how aggrieved parties in honour cultures like the American Old West or the street gangs of West Side Story, might engage in a duel or physical fight in response to conflict, while in dignity cultures, such as the ones that prevailed in Western countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, insults no longer had the same impact on one’s reputation of bravery. In a dignity culture, people are expected to tolerate accidental personal injuries, or at least to use non-violent responses rather than taking the law in their one’s own hands, which might mean covert avoidance, or quietly cutting off relations with the offender, or seeking harmony without passing judgment, only in the most serious cases calling the police.

Social anthropologist Michael Minkov uses the term monumentalism on cultures where the human self manifests itself as invariant, proud, and stable like a monolithic monument, and he applies the term flexumility (flexibility + humility) to cultures where the focus is on adaptability and imitation. Smith suggests that Minkov’s monumentalism versus flexumility dimension may help differentiate honour cultures from face cultures insofar as honour cultures distinguish sharply between what is approved and what is disapproved, while face cultures are more flexible. Some Arab nations could be seen as monumentalist to the extent that their citizens see it as treason to change time-honoured values and beliefs, as it may happen, for instance, through Western education. The advantage of monumentalist cultural configurations appears to be a low suicide rate, as pride and self-stability seem to be protective. East Asian nations, on the other side, manifest flexibility and humility when they adopt Western names, rituals, customs, and other practices, which results in high school success in mathematics and modern science, and in high economic growth, paid for, however, with high suicide rates.

Earlier, I referred to the research done by psychologist David Matsumoto and his colleagues distinguishing the vindicator from the voyager, a contrast that seems to align with the monumentalism versus flexumility dimension. A vindicator defends pre-existing ethnocentrism and stereotypes, while a voyager uses cultural diversity and intercultural conflicts for forging new relationships and new ideas.

Sociologist David Riesman and his colleagues identified three main cultural types, tradition-directed, inner-directed, and other-directed. A tradition-directed culture follows the direction given by preceding generations, whereas inner-directed people discover their
own potential within themselves. Other-directedness came in after the Industrial Revolution, when the growing ability to consume goods and afford material abundance led the new middle class to defining themselves in comparison to the way others lived. It is the latter culture that increasingly dominates world culture by now.

Over many decades, social scientists Paul Ray and Sherry Ruth Anderson carried out surveys in the contemporary cultures of the United States and Europe, and they identified three main cultural trends. First, the moderns, the cultural movement that started about 500 years ago and that endorses the ‘realist’ world view of either big business, big government, or big media, or past socialist, communist, or fascist movements. Then, the first countermovement against the moderns were the traditionalists, the religious right and rural populations. The most recent countermovement are the cultural creatives, who value strong ecological sustainability for the planet, support women’s issues, personal growth, authenticity, and are wary of big business. The cultural creatives movement is now flowing together from two branches that both started out around 1960 but initially antagonised each other, namely, the consciousness movement, an inward-oriented movement focusing on the inner state of the psyche, and the social movement, an outward-oriented movement focusing on action for peace in the streets. When Ray and Anderson published their work in 2000, in the United States, traditionalists comprised about 24 to 26 per cent of the adult population (approximately 48 million people), moderns about 47 to 49 per cent (approximately 95 million), and cultural creatives are about 26 to 28 per cent (approximately 50 million). In the European Union, the cultural creatives were about 30 to 35 per cent of the adult population.286

A whole body of research addresses authoritarianism, studied first by philosopher Theodor Adorno and his colleagues, and then by their successors.287 They initially thought authoritarianism was an aspect of personality. Yet, new insights emphasise the role of the context: authoritarianism emerges under circumstances of social threat.288 My observation on my global path is that, indeed, the human ‘default’ orientation is to be less authoritarian, while a context of threat brings stronger authoritarianism to the fore, whereby the most significant and systemic large-scale threat flows from a strong security dilemma. The security dilemma has legitimised authoritarianism throughout the past millennia and elevated it to a cultural norm, and people with less authoritarian inclinations find safe spaces to express themselves only now, in a context where the attenuation of security dilemma becomes a possibility.

Global change is the name of a role-play that researchers use in psychological research on authoritarianism.289 When people with a strong sense of authoritarianism were asked to play the game, the outcome was dramatic: the simulated future of the world became highly militarised and eventually entered the stage of nuclear war until the entire population of the Earth was declared dead. In contrast, when people of less authoritarianism played the same game, the result was world peace and global cooperation.290 Social psychology experiments confirm that people bound in authoritarian collectivism tend to blame victims rather than aid them, while those who regard all people as equally worthy, tend to come to help.291

All results resonate with a differentiation that is called conservative versus liberal in the Anglo-Saxon world. Moral foundations theory posits that there are (at least) six innate moral foundations, upon which cultures develop their various moralities – care/harm, fairness (equality)/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation – and that so called liberals or ‘leftists’ endorse primarily the care and equality foundations, whereas conservatives or ‘rightists’ endorse all six foundations more equally, and that this difference can be found across cultures, nationalities, race, and ethnicity. When we speak about our morals, says social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, one of the thinkers in positive psychology, and, in particular, of the psychology behind morality, we are not ‘scientists discovering the truth’, we are more like lawyers arguing for positions that we had arrived at long before and by other means.292 Haidt suggests that we have in-born ‘moral
receptors’ and that what we perceive as our defining moral values is unconsciously reflexive, whereby relationships matter more for our moral matrix than the message. Therefore, he recommends travel, as it can open horizons, while conflict hardens the matrix, makes it ‘water-tight’ and impossible to think beyond. Conservatives are better than liberals in keeping a group together and accomplishing shared goals, while liberals are more effective in achieving justice within the group. While liberals are universalists and try to balance compassion and fairness, conservatives are more parochial. Conservatives can easily describe liberal views and are horrified when they see, for instance, liberals’ lack of respect for order and for hierarchy, while liberals, in contrast, cannot as easily put themselves into the shoes of conservatives.

If we bring all these differentiations together, we can say that conservatives are embedded in what Riane Eisler calls the dominator model of society, they are more authoritarian and prefer the strict father pedagogical framework that George Lakoff and Mark Johnson describe, while liberals have a sense of Eisler’s partnership model of society, are less authoritarian and adopt the nurturant parent model.293 Again, I see my observation being strengthened, namely, that the human ‘default’ orientation is ‘liberal’, while a context of threat brings the parochial conservatism of the dominator model to the fore. Since a strong security dilemma was definitory for most populations on the globe throughout the past millennia, it was to be expected that it pushed the moral matrix toward conservatism, and that the attenuation of the security dilemma through the ingathering of the human tribes now opens space for the human default of liberalism to flourish again. Particularly when men and women share child care, it can be expected that men are being freed from having to incessantly ‘prove their masculinity’, freed from the double bind of having to be what they are not.294 Conservatives can then be invited to embrace all of humankind as their in-group, and liberals can be encouraged to better understand the idea of unity in diversity and subsidiarity, which means that loyalty, authority, and a sense of sanctity can be invited to jointly protect diversity.

Author Yossi Klein Halevi makes the agony of the security dilemma palpable when he describes the two biblical commands that Jewish history offers to present generation Jews: On one side, Jews are reminded that they were strangers in the land of Egypt, and the lesson is: ‘Don’t be brutal’. On the other side, Jews are warned that while the they were wandering in the desert, the tribe of Amalek attacked them without any reason, and the lesson is: ‘Don’t be naïve’. The ‘Pesach Jews’ hear the first lesson, while ‘Purim Jews’ hear the second.295 We could extrapolate Halevi’s story and say that in today’s globally interconnected world we are all strangers and nobody should be naïve. It would be naïve to overlook that the situation is radically new, and it would be naïve to approach a new situation with solutions from the past. The only path forward now is to pro-actively build global trust and governing institutions that protect everybody from surprise attacks.

Anthony Marsella is a cross-cultural psychopathologist, psychotherapist, clinical cultural psychologist, and multicultural psychologist, and he has spent a life-time collecting cultural typologies.296 As he reports, the making of cultural typologies has a long history in the social sciences, done by cultural anthropologist, psychologist, psychiatrists, and sociologists on the basis of cultural, psychological, psychiatric, and sociological dimensions. Here is Marsella’s list (cited in no order) of attempts to place culture into dichotomous mental maps:

- Normal versus Abnormal Cultures (Ruth Benedict)
- Integrated versus Disintegrated Cultures (Alexander Leighton297)
- Tough versus Easy Cultures (Arsenian and Arsenian)
- Continuous versus Discontinuous Cultures (Ruth Benedict/Margaret Mead)
- Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft (Ferdinand Tönnies298)
- Apollonian versus Dionysian (Ruth Benedict)
• Oppressive versus Suppressive (Francis L. K. Hsu299)
• Traditional versus Modern (Many)
• Western versus Non-Western (Many)
• Shame versus Guilt (Cultural Anthropology)
• Collectivistic versus Individualistic
• Indigenous versus Non-Indigenous
• Urban versus Rural (Sociology)
• First World versus Third World
• Post Modern Versus Non-Post Modern (Critical Psychologists)

On my global path, wherever I go, I observe two basic ways of moving through the world that are all related to the classifications listed above. Simplified said, I meet what I call ‘Pharisees’ and ‘Sufis’. What I mean by Pharisees aligns somewhat with the tradition-directed and other-directed ways of being, or the ways of the monumentalist vindicator and strict conservative authoritarian. What I call the Sufi way of being, in contrast, reminds of the inner-directed way, or the way of the flexible and humble voyager and liberal nurturing parent.300 In saying this, I use Max Weber’s ideal type approach, which allows for analysis and action to proceed at different levels of abstraction, as there are, clearly, huge grey areas in between.301 By choosing the terminology of ‘Pharisee’ and ‘Sufi’, I do not wish to point at any particular religion. I choose these phrases only because of my personal biography; I understood the Pharisee orientation first, as I grew up in a Christian context in Europe; later, when I lived in Egypt, the Sufi orientation surprised me. Slowly, throughout my global life, I saw that these two orientations can be found everywhere, including among staunch atheists. I myself belong to the second group, to those who are rooted organically in a larger context of meaning, similar to those indigenous people who are in deep dialogue with nature and each other.302

The first group, what I call the Pharisees, are those who cling to the letter, to dogmatic fixedness, be it religious or secular dogma of ranked or unranked worthiness. They profess to practice Glauben (faith), yet, to me their practice is closer to Aberglauben (superstition). I meet Pharisees and Sufis everywhere, be it in what cross-cultural researchers call dignity, face, or honour cultures, even though, admittedly, the Pharisee orientation is aligned with systems of ranked honour and face more than with systems of unranked dignity. Wherever it manifests itself, in all cultural realms, the Pharisee orientation is prone to sow frustration, invite fanatical behaviour, and foreclose psychological and spiritual fulfilment. One reason for this outcome may be that it is inherently impossible to follow all rules and requirements of the letter perfectly; perfection typically calls for more perfection. Pharisees who are committed to competition for domination, will not stop before all-out destruction as they are not flexible and humble enough to understand that domination lacks an inherent endpoint and that they will destroy their own survival substrate if they stay on course no matter what. The will behave like locusts who destroy their food supply in one place and would die out if there were no other places to move on to.303 Nazi Germany offers a telling example. On 18th February 1943, propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels held the so-called Sportpalastrede in the Berlin Sports Palace, a speech in which he called for the intensification of ‘total war’. With exalted pathos, he roared: ‘The English claim that the German people are resisting the government’s total war efforts. It does not want the total war, say the English, but surrender. I ask you: Do you want total war? Do you want it, if necessary, more total and more radical than we can imagine today?’304 The resounding answer from the more than ten thousand people present in the palace was: ‘Yes!!!’ It was a yes to a project of collective suicide.

What I call Sufi orientation, in contrast, resonates with dignity orientations. All cultural contexts that highlight equality in dignity have the potential to nurture Sufis and this will be
beneficial to all. Cross-cultural research has found that mean life satisfaction is higher in dignity cultures and that there is a pan-cultural correlation between higher satisfaction with life and the perception that one’s nation favours dignity values. I take these results to underpin my conclusion that ranked honour values are pushed to the fore by contexts where the security dilemma is strong, while equality in dignity values are the life-enhancing ‘default’ in absence of a strong security dilemma.

What we observe in the present historical time window, is honour backlashing, both overtly and covertly. It began covertly, with dominators exploiting Sufis’ tolerant humility, flexible openness, and belief in dialogue, to invade and hijack dignity values. As a result, the emancipative thrust of the slogan of the French revolution, liberté, égalité, fraternité, has widely turned into its opposite. In its most extreme form, liberty has come to mean freedom for might to become right, equality translates into the sense of entitlement for all to be equally narcissistic, and fraternity means the cooperation within monopolistic corporations in their competition for domination. When solidarity (fraternité) is sold out for misguided definitions of liberté, when solidarity is seen as nemesis for individual freedom, égalité is likely to be lost as well. The double standards and misery that this covert invasion brought about, now trigger the overt honour backslash of so-called right-wing movements.

As mentioned before, in my work, I use the Weberian ideal-type approach, which allows for different levels of abstraction, and I do find many simplifying categorisations very useful and interesting. Clearly, simplifying categorisations should always be complemented by highlighting complexity and diversity at other levels. Basically, I am not so much interested in ‘understanding other cultures’ – and certainly do not harbour any imperial missionary desire. I am more interested in ‘being with my fellow human beings’ and in understanding how ‘we, as humankind’, may unite sufficiently, so that our diversity does not turn into hostile division, which, given our global interconnectedness, may spell the extinction of our species. I am also inspired by the diversity I encounter around the globe, both cultural and biological diversity, and I feel deeply enriched by the potential for love that I observe in all humans, which, in my view, can serve as a starting point from where unity can emerge.

1948: Awe in the face of inherent dignity

It is understandable that many are taken aback by the fact that dignity cannot be defined, that it resides, not so much in academia, but in the bodies and souls of people. Many people have become very angry with me when I say that dignity cannot be defined in the same way physical laws can be pinned down. For me, the best way to describe dignity is to say that it is embodied: Humiliation is when a person keeps her head down in aching meekness or even agony; arrogance is when a person sticks her ‘nose’ up too high; and dignity is somewhere in the middle, when we hold our head straight in dignified humility.

This explanation, however, only describes the ideal of equality in dignity. As the notion of a dignitary indicates, prior to the arrival of human rights ideals, dignity was ascribed precisely to the right of ‘higher beings’ to carry their nose high. Still today, this practice can be found in many world regions. A dignitary may perceive it as a humiliation when asked to lower his head and meet everybody else on an equal par. Likewise, those who have accepted that it is nature’s order or god’s will for them to be at the bottom of society as ‘lesser beings’ may connect their very dignity with keeping their heads down. The beaten wife might not have the courage to raise her head, while her husband may refuse lowering his head to see his wife into her eyes as an equal. The work of human rights defenders is to invite the ‘lesser beings’ to lift their heads up from meek humility, and the ‘higher beings’ to lower their heads down from arrogance, so that all can look straight into each other’s eyes as fellow human beings of equal
worthiness.

In this way, the postures and movements of the body can illuminate the human rights revolution. It is the transition from a normative universe anchored in unequal honour to a normative universe built around the notion of equal dignity, from a normative universe of superiors looking down on inferiors to a setting where all look each other into their eyes as equals. I have found that unity in diversity is the motto that makes equal dignity work.\textsuperscript{309}

Legal philosopher and international law scholar Oscar Schachter observes:

We do not find an explicit definition of the expression – dignity of the human person – in international instruments or (as far as I know) in national law. Its intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large measure by cultural factors. When it has been invoked in concrete situations, it has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be recognised even if the abstract term cannot be defined.\textsuperscript{310}

Indeed, we are all explorers in the larger world of human suffering and well-being, says the founder of the health and human rights movement, epidemiologist Jonathan Mann, and we know instinctively when our dignity is impugned, even though our concepts of dignity are fuzzy:

And our current maps of this universe, like world maps from sixteenth century Europe, have some very well-defined, familiar coastlines and territories and also contain large blank spaces, which beckon the explorer... The definition of dignity itself is complex and thus far elusive and unsatisfying. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights starts by placing dignity first, ‘all people are born equal in dignity and rights’, we do not yet have a vocabulary, or taxonomy, let alone an epidemiology of dignity violations. Yet it seems we all know when our dignity is violated or impugned.\textsuperscript{311}

Perhaps dignity is a useless concept?

Ruth Macklin is a philosopher and professor of bioethics. In her opinion, dignity is a useless concept. She writes that dignity ‘seems to have no meaning beyond what is implied by the principle of medical ethics, namely, respect for persons: the need to obtain voluntary, informed consent; the requirement to protect confidentiality’.\textsuperscript{312} Psychologist Steven Pinker concurs; he suggests that autonomy is a more practical and specific term than dignity.\textsuperscript{313} Similar views are held all around the world, also in countries such Norway, known for their cultural heritage of likeverd, or equality in dignity. In 2014, the Norwegian Constitution was about to receive a new human rights chapter,\textsuperscript{314} and the committee recommended that also economic, social, and cultural rights be included. Conservative committee member Carl I. Hagen disagreed. He and his party colleagues said they welcomed the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because it aims at preventing authoritarian and dictatorial regimes from controlling and keeping their citizens down. They rejected, however, the secondary or 2nd generation rights of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by saying that it risks establishing a basis for a very expensive welfare state that imposes high taxes and fees that stifle sensible economic development. Furthermore, their argument went, if a constitution is filled with idealistic goals and proclamations that most consider to be unrealistic dreams without legal effects, it may weaken the core rights both in repute and real legal effect.\textsuperscript{315}
'False dignity’ and a ‘culture of victimhood’

Even those who regard the notion of dignity as useful, will agree that it has been diluted, displaced, perverted, instrumentalised, and abused. It can become a cover for ‘making more money’ in the spirit of Russell Conwell, following recipes such as ‘when you make your employees believe you love them, and they feel dignified, they will work better for you, and you will get rich’. 316

The falsification of the dignity of ‘Others’ has been lamented, namely, the abuse of dignity as a shield for imperialist policies that engage in domination for cheap natural resources. It is Achankeng Fonkem who makes this argument, a scholar hailing from British Southern Cameroon. 317

Others apply the notion of false dignity to situations where the ‘dignity of role’ is ‘carried too far’ so that it acts ‘as a cloak or mask behind which to hide, and which impedes human connectedness’. 318 Christina Mason writes this in a chapter of a book that resulted from a colloquium on dignity. She is a provider of palliative care in London and observes that in the colloquium, while dignity was spoken about ‘from all our different perspectives’, still, ‘not one of us was able to capture the experience, known throughout time and throughout the world; the experience of suffering that comes to people when they are not accorded the dignity that is, I believe, their right’. 319 She uses an example from paediatric medicine to illustrate her point of false dignity: ‘The isolation of the enzyme deficiency responsible for Tay Sach’s disease is a biological finding; it says nothing, since it intends to say nothing about the suffering attendant on that disease’. 320

Others warn that the notion of dignity has been used too one-sidedly, particularly in recent years in Western societies. Indeed, if we say that dignity means unity in diversity, then there is a balance between too much and too little that is difficult to hold. If dignity is associated too one-sidedly with the celebration of diversity, this can cause diversity to become divisive. The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States threw this division into stark contrast very recently. Political scientist Mark Lilla warns:

The fixation on diversity in our schools and in the press has produced a generation of liberals and progressives narcissistically unaware of conditions outside their self-defined groups and indifferent to the task of reaching out to Americans in every walk of life… At a very young age our children are being encouraged to talk about their individual identities, even before they have them. By the time they reach college many assume that diversity discourse exhausts political discourse, and have shockingly little to say about such perennial questions as class, war, the economy and the common good. 321

The desire to dignify certain groups, as it appears, seems to have made other groups, for instance, voters in Middle America, feel so humiliated that they now tolerate Trump’s ‘juvenile viciousness’ because for them, ‘the narcissism of prevailing closed-minded progressive ideology was no longer to be tolerated. In the end, the alternative was worse than Trump’. 322 The rhetoric of diversity, with its focus on African-American, Latino, L.G.B.T. and women voters, has elicited feelings of exclusion and humiliation in those left out. ‘If you are going to mention groups in America, you had better mention all of them. If you don’t, those left out will notice and feel excluded’. 323 Those excluded now rage against ‘political correctness’. 324

Sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning warn that the overuse of the notion of dignity made victimhood transmute into entitlement: the culture of dignity became a culture of victimhood. 325 After the United States made the transition from an honour culture to a dignity culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as Campbell and Manning
conceptualise it, now a new culture of victimhood rises. When progressives lament the rise of fake news and ‘alternative facts’, finger-pointing would be inappropriate, warns also social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. Progressives should rather acknowledge their role in introducing the elevation of emotion over reason in the first place, permitting feelings to guide reality. Haidt has been quoted earlier, in the context of Hugh Elliott’s story, as lamenting that people now learn that ‘feelings are always right’. 326 The self-esteem movement that psychologist Jean Twenge describes in her work, has led to a ‘dukes up’ narcissism of entitlement. 327 Haidt argues that the cult of victimhood in law and process ‘causes a downward spiral of competitive victimhood’ and the generation of a ‘vortex of grievance’. 328 No wonder that men accused of sexism now feel entitled to take the position of victims of reverse sexism. No wonder that the ‘forgotten people’ who have voted for Donald Trump as President of the United States, feel they are the victims of the devil (aka socialism, Obama, Hillary, and so forth).

The bitter obsession, with which this victimhood is being celebrated by supporters of Donald Trump – I am on some of their email lists and have over the years acquired a deep understanding of the burning intensity of their bitterness and wrath – reminds of philosopher Avishai Margalit and his work on memory. Margalit explains how a victim may hold on to memories of humiliation to be able to hold on to anger. 329 Trump cultivates his appearance as a martyr, 330 thus stirring up what interfaith scholar James Edward Jones calls the post-victim ethical exemption syndrome. 331 As mentioned earlier, a ‘victim’ may even invent stories of humiliation so as to manoeuvre other parties into the role of a loathsome perpetrator; I speak of humiliation entrepreneurship and addiction to humiliation. 332

Again, the balance of unity in diversity requires great care to hold and what is ‘too much’ for one is ‘not enough’ for another. Campbell and Manning received criticism for speaking of a culture of victimhood. Here is one critical voice: “Victimhood” is not a culture. What Campbell and Manning are really describing is a tool that marginalised and oppressed peoples use to challenge the “status quo”. “Victimhood” is an aspect of “Revolution”. 333 Another critical voice says: ‘The new “culture” is not rooted in the wish to have victimhood – where the “honour culture” is rooted in a wish for “honour” and “dignity culture” is rooted in a wish for “dignity” – rather, the new “culture” is rooted in a wish for greater empathy for one another. Thus, I think it is best to refer to it as the “empathy culture”. 334

In other words, what is a culture of victimhood for one, is a culture of empathic revolution for another. Those lamenting a culture of victimhood feel that diversity is overemphasised and unity endangered, while those who praise a culture of empathic revolution appeal to society to include more diversity into the overall scope of unity in diversity.

My position is that we lose valuable time if we pit unity against diversity, or diversity against unity, just because unity can degrade into uniformity and diversity into division. Both are important and need to be balanced. It is an inherent characteristic of unity in diversity that unity can slide into oppressive uniformity, and diversity can degrade into hostile division. Yet, this in-built risk does not warrant the rejection of unity nor of diversity, but calls for the harnessing of diversity within unity.

Jonathan Haidt describes how in the beginning of his career, everything was about diversity for him, until he understood how divisive this can be and that it must be managed by pointing out what we have in common. 335 As a consequence, he became more of a conservative, and began to speak up against diversity. Similar polarisations can be observed in other parts of the world, including in Europe, bitterly divided over whether the European nation states should merge into a European state, or the opposite, the European Union should be dismantled back into nation states. 336

Unity in diversity is made to work through subsidiarity, which means ‘and’ rather than ‘either or’. It is not about the rejection of local identities, rather, it is about preventing them

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from becoming divisive; it is not about the rejection of global governance, it is about preventing it from becoming oppressive. The question is not ‘nation state yes or no’, but ‘what kind of nation state, and in what kind of larger context’. The solution is that all humans of planet Earth come together as members of one in-group and take the best from conservatism and liberalism, rather than pitting them against each other.

Political scientist Mark Lilla suggests a ‘post-identity liberalism’, that ‘should draw from the past successes of pre-identity liberalism. Such a liberalism would concentrate on widening its base by appealing to Americans as Americans and emphasising the issues that affect a vast majority of them’. I would add: …appealing to human beings as fellow human beings on a tiny planet.

Classifications of dignity

Bioethics philosopher Richard Ashcroft offers a fourfold classification of the various prevalent viewpoints on human dignity. The first position – represented, for instance, by Ruth Macklin – deplores dignity talk as straight forward incoherent and misleading talk. Then, there is dignity strictly reducible to autonomy. Third, thinkers such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum focus on capabilities, functionings, and social interactions. Fourth, dignity is seen as a metaphysical property possessed by all and only human beings, a position mainly found in European bioethics and in theological writings.

Others offer three interpretations of human dignity across time, ranging from dignity as general category, to dignity being inherent and universal, to dignity being earned and contingent. As to dignity as a general category, philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) posited in 1785 that ‘everything has either a price or a dignity’, and that ‘whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity’. Following Kant means viewing dignity as a category of non-market goods, be it aesthetics, nature, compassion, forgiveness, or institutions such as marriage or the Supreme Court. Poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) built on Kant’s view on dignity and linked it to grace, thus also he connected morality with aesthetics, through which duty and nature can come into harmony.

The second interpretation sees human dignity as inherent and essential attribute of human beings or human persons, while the third interpretation sees it as an attribute that is contingent on being earned through actions.

Discourse analyst Michael Karlberg sees three contrasting interpretive frames for human dignity: the social command frame, the social contest frame, and the social body frame. The social command frame is a legacy of patriarchal and authoritarian modes of thought and fits into Riane Eisler’s dominator model of society, or what I call the normative universe of unequal honour. The second, the social contest frame, emerged in part, so Karlberg explains, in response to the injustice and oppression that flows from the social command frame. It draws on the misunderstood social Darwinist metaphor of the ‘survival of the fittest’, misunderstood as ‘might makes right’. It uses metaphors of war, sports, fighting, and market competition. The underlying normative assumption is that society just needs to harness everyone’s self-interested and competitive energy into contests, which will then produce winners and losers, and, in the long run, the (surviving) populations will ‘allegedly be better off’. Collective well-being is no longer seen as achievable through oppressive power hierarchies, but by structuring all social institution as a contest of power.

The third, the social body frame, has roots in diverse cultures that have been ‘re-emerging in a modern form over the past century, in response to the ever-increasing social and ecological interdependence humanity is now experiencing on a global scale’. At the core of
this frame is an understanding of society as an integrated organic body, where the well-being of every individual or group depends upon the well-being of the entire body and is achieved by maximising the possibilities for every individual to realise their latent potential to contribute to the common good, within empowering social relationships and institutional structures that foster and canalise human capacities in this way.

Howard Richards is a philosopher of social science and scholar of peace and global studies, and he has taught all around the world, living mainly in Chile. He offers an illustration from Chile: ‘Here in Chile and in the rest of Latin America the social doctrine of the Catholic church uses family talk: the source of dignity is being hijos e hijas de Dios, con la misma padre y madre, or sons and daughters of God, with the same father and mother. The alternative to being hijos is just being things, a particular type of molecular structure that happened to succeed’ Richards thus ties dignity to the notion of the family, and he therefore gives dignity the content of social rights such as food, shelter, medical care, or pensions.

Human beings are capable of competition and cooperation, egoism and altruism, and it is our cultural environment, our education and training, our opportunities for moral development, and the institutional structures we act within that guide the direction, so Karlberg. Viewed from a social body frame perspective, it is therefore imperative for humankind, at the present juncture in history at which global crises loom, to learn to cultivate every individual’s latent capacity for cooperation and altruism, and to do so widely, effectively, systematically and systemically, by fostering the individual’s consciousness of the oneness of humanity and by building corresponding systemic structures. ‘Such a consciousness entails a radical reconception of the relationship between the individual and society, the implications of which are conveyed in a compelling manner by the social body metaphor’, these are Karlberg’s words.

The aftermath of World War II as a window of opportunity for dignity

Kathryn Sikkink is an expert of international norms and institutions and she recently provided a concise overview over the chronology that lead up to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The Second World War opened a unique historical window of opportunity for pro-human rights actors and they were able to use it. It started with human rights being part of the Allied war aims – in 1941 Franklin D. Roosevelt held his famous Four Freedoms Speech, in which he encouraged US civil society organisations to believe that the war was being fought for freedom and rights. Yet, in 1944, when it came to preparing for the legal protection of individual rights, Allied enthusiasm had waned. They feared that they themselves and their very own practices would become the target of such international law. This was a time when the United Kingdom was still an empire that held vast colonies in subjugation, the United States was racially disunited under Jim Crow, and Stalin held USSR’s citizens in a brutal iron grip. Thus, when the Big Four (the UK, the US, the USSR, and China) met in Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 to draft a charter for the United Nations, they excluded all but one mention of human rights from the draft charter for the United Nations. China, the weakest of the four, was the only one trying to include a statement against racial discrimination in the draft UN Charter, but the other three rejected it.

This would have been the end of human rights declarations at this critical historical moment, had it not been for enough pro-human-rights advocates mustering the courage to step up to the challenge. Latin American countries were much more democratic at the time than later and they had organised the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City in February 1945. This was a few weeks prior to the San Francisco Conference,
and they succeeded in impacting it. Furthermore, US civil society organisations were disappointed by the neglect of human rights in the Dumbarton Oaks draft, and forty civil society groups were allowed to serve as consultants to the US delegation in San Francisco, they were women’s organisations, religious organisations, labour groups, and academics.

It is interesting to ponder whether such a feat might be possible the same way today. I hear from civil society groups all around the world that their activities are being curtailed. In the Global North this is done more covertly, for instance, under the cover of calls for more ‘efficiency’ in society, while in the Global South many fear for their lives. The Second World War seems to have opened a unique historical window of opportunity for pro-human rights actors and they were also able to use it. In contrast, windows seem to close now, rather than to open.

Legal philosopher Duncan Kennedy observes that ‘the left’ relies on rights as the principal basis for universalising its positions approximately since the 1970s, while for the conservative ideological intelligentsia, efficiency has become the alternative to rights. ‘An efficiency claim has many of the same mediating properties as a rights claim: it is a value judgment that is universal (who can be opposed to making everyone better off according to their own understanding of better-offness?) and factoid (efficiency arguments are nothing if not technical and they are supposedly empirically based)’.

In 1945, although an exact definition of human rights remained wanting, forty civil society groups, together with a number of small states were able to convince the U.S. to join them in making human rights a major focus of the United Nations. As a result, the United Nations Charter that was drafted in the San Francisco Conference of 1945, was the beginning of the international protection of human rights through law.

One lesson to be learned from this historical moment is that norms need not come from powerful states, as the emergence of human rights norms in Latin America and other countries in the Global South shows. Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the new UN Human Rights Commission, and René Cassin, a French jurist, was a member of the Commission. Deeply involved in writing the UDHR was also Charles Malik from Lebanon, Peng-chun Chang from China, and Hernán Santa Cruz from Chile, who worked to include economic, social, and cultural rights. People like Bertha Lutz, a Brazilian biologist, feminist, and lawyer, and Hansa Mehta, an Indian delegate and independence activist, insisted on the explicit recognition of equal rights of women and men in the UN Charter and the UDHR.

Norway and its cultural heritage of solidarity in equality in dignity

Norway is a place in the world worth paying particular attention to with respect to dignity, and also Norwegian thinkers and scholars deserve having their voice heard loudly. The reason is that Norway was able to emerge, throughout the past centuries, from a culture of proud, independent, and violent Viking warriors and adventurers, and transcend into a culture of likeverd (equality in dignity), dugnad (communal cooperation, local solidarity) and global responsibility (global solidarity, see the Nansen passport). In Norway, equal dignity, solidarity, and global responsibility manifest liberté, égalité, and fraternité as a lived heritage.

Celebrated writer and poet Henrik Wergeland (1808–1845) has already in 1843 pointed out that Norway’s disadvantages are now its advantages. Norway’s marginal location on the planet has protected it. Nobody has ever ‘bothered’ to thoroughly conquer Norway and force it into the kind of submission that underlings elsewhere had to endure in hierarchical empires. In other words, Norwegians never had their heads forced down by superiors as much as citizens in most other societies; Norwegians look back on a tradition of treating each other as more or less equals. It is not by accident that Norway abolished the institution of
aristocracy by law in 1821.

This particular cultural heritage of Norway is also the reason for why it is one of the main platforms and starting points for the global work of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, and why we have launched the idea of the World Dignity University initiative in 2011 from the University of Oslo.\textsuperscript{358}

\textbf{Is dignity inherent?}

Norwegian philosopher Tore Frost has a particular interest in the notion of the \textit{inherence} of dignity stipulated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and how it came into being. It is a novel notion that seems to have arisen suddenly, almost from nowhere, becoming prominent through the very human rights declaration of 1948.\textsuperscript{359} Frost intuits that Eleanor Roosevelt in her role as an influential \textquote{norm entrepreneur}\textsuperscript{360} was the author of the phrase \textit{inherent}.\textsuperscript{361} She wrote in 1948: \textquote{If the Declaration is accepted by the Assembly, it will mean that all the nations accepting it hope that the day will come when these rights are considered inherent rights belonging to every human being}.\textsuperscript{362}

Georg Lohmann, a philosopher hailing from Germany, a country with despicable and abysmal war experiences, resonates with Frost\textquotesingle s reflections.\textsuperscript{363} In Lohmann\textquotesingle s view, there is no need to draw on any natural law to understand the historically \textit{new} concept of \textit{human dignity}, no need to see it as \textit{inherent} by virtue of human nature. Rather, what happened, he suggests, was that the international community was so horrified by the barbarism of the world wars and the colonial powers, that it simply \textit{declared}, as a political act, and enshrined in international law, that human rights derive from inherent human dignity.

Until the Second World War, the historical discourses on human dignity and human rights were separate, observes Lohmann. In the eighteenth century, the justifications and political declarations of human rights still lacked reference to a concept of dignity. Furthermore, historical concepts of \textit{dignitas} and dignity were connected with obligations rather than with the possession of rights. It was only in the founding acts of the United Nations in 1945, and in their human rights policies following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, that increasingly complex relationships were forged between the newly determined human dignity and the possession of human rights. These connections were not arbitrary, though, and they were not merely the result of political-pragmatic compromises. Rather, they seek to satisfy the general normative demands of human rights, namely, that they must be \textit{morally} justified, they must be \textit{legally} legitimate, and they must be \textit{politically} supported by a majority consensus among the states and citizens involved.\textsuperscript{364} The use of the word \textit{inherent} therefore obscures that what happened in reality was a performative act by which a politically announced contract law was created that authorises the appreciation of every person and guarantees human rights without further conditions, says Lohmann.

Philosopher Howard Richards points out, though, that the connection between dignity and rights is already quite clear in philosopher Immanuel Kant\textquotesingle s \textit{Rechtslehre} and \textit{Tugendlehre}.\textsuperscript{365} and that when philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) developed their ethics, they followed the pattern of those treatises, as did a host of lesser known figures: \textquote{The conceptual connection is the concept of \textit{Freiheit}, of freedom, liberty, liberté}.\textsuperscript{366} Richards comments further:

It is true that it was a performative act, but it was a performative act that drew on intellectual traditions, advised by three philosophers familiar with those traditions, and it was a performative act in a context where Keynesian economics taught the feasibility of realising social rights, and in which the political power of the working class had been
enhanced by the war. The soldiers who were sent to fight in World War II were promised by American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and others that they were not fighting to return to the depression of the thirties but for the four freedoms. After the war, nearly every country wrote into law – and in cases like Italy into the Constitution – that the government would act to provide full employment. These and other measures were implemented to keep promises that had earlier been made to the troops.\(^{367}\)

According to Lohmann, human rights can be understood as a self-binding act between peers in accordance with a horizontal justification model, meaning that no higher power justifies this position and is needed to justify it.\(^{368}\) When human dignity is being violated today, there are therefore three kinds of dignity that are being violated: first, general moral dignity, second, social worthiness conceptions, including traditional ideas of honour, and, third, human dignity as a novel legal concept of the human rights regimes established since 1945.\(^{369}\)

Georg Lohmann agrees with Tore Frost that images and metaphors – rather than theories – are more suitable to describe dignity since imageries make meaning palpable in an interpretative way, rather than in a logical way.\(^{370}\) Like Howard Richards, also Frost sees the Kantian justification for inherent dignity in the premise of human freedom, with equal rights following from this. Frost suggests that the phrase in Article 1, if it were complete, would go as follows: ‘All human beings are born free in (their inherent) dignity and (therefore) they are equal in (their) human rights’.\(^{371}\) Article 1 of the post-war German constitution of 1949 states that ‘Human dignity is inviolable’. Many other modern human rights documents written since echo this usage.

Howard Richards chimes in:

This is true. However, for Kant himself property rights, and therefore unequal rights, also follow from freedom, as Hegel commented at great length. Kant introduces each section of the Rechtslehre,\(^{372}\) where he deduces legal principles from freedom, with the citation of a Roman legal maxim. In this way, Kant gave philosophical support to the reception of Roman law and its adaptation to be the framework of modern commercial society, as also Max Weber in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,\(^{373}\) and many others note. There is a reason why Kant’s Freiheit perfectly matches Roman Law. It is that Kant treats freedom as an exception to Newtonian laws. Everything in nature is Newtonian. Freedom is absolute because it is independent from the laws that govern all things perceived by the senses. Similarly in Roman law, emancipation (becoming free) meant gaining the exceptional status formerly held only by the pater familias, who was a petty military chief with absolute power within his petty kingdom as far as the law was concerned. The pater familias was defined by law as he who has absolute command in the famiglia, the family household (including slaves, animals, equipment and the land itself in his famiglia).\(^{374}\)

The introduction of the idea of an inherent dignity is revolutionary, Frost points out, because it places dignity inside the human being and liberates it from outside guarantors such as divinity or rationality. Richards concurs: ‘Frost is right to see this as different from Kant and Kantism, since for Kant dignity depends on rationality’.\(^{375}\) Equal dignity is now a quality, not a quantifiable ‘value’, and not something that can be ranked.\(^{376}\) Also Frost warns against attempts to formulate definitive justifications of the inherence of dignity in human nature: on the contrary, he maintains, the demand to recognise inherent dignity is a demand that needs to be without content.\(^{377}\)

I would like to add a question: Perhaps dignity shares with Immanuel Kant’s elusive Ding an sich (thing in itself) that it remains unknowable, whether experienced or not?\(^{378}\)
Allow me to also invite philosopher Glen Martin into this discussion. For him, justice, freedom, truth, beauty, and goodness, are all ideals inherent in our ‘utopian conscience-and-knowledge’:

The perpetually transcending quality of our human existence places us above the circumstances of our lives and the contemporary world and allows us to judge these circumstances precisely as departure from what should be. In producing human beings, the cosmos has created a creature capable of perpetual transcendence, that is, capable of continuously transforming existence under the ever-transcendent ideals of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Our dignity lies both in these inherent capacities and in the ever-greater actualisation of the true, the good, and the beautiful that results from the temporalised human journey.379

Howard Richards adds that ‘is not an accident that historically the first generation human rights were installed by a triumphant third estate,380 while the social rights were installed in the heyday of social democracy, during les trente glorieuses, or glorious thirty, the thirty years from 1945 to 1975, following the end of the Second World War’.381

Glen Martin goes back in history and explains how Plato saw human dignity as arising from our common capacity to actively care for ‘wisdom, truth, and the improvement of the soul’, and from being capable of moving up the ‘ladder of love’ linking earth and heaven.382 Martin describes how for many of the ancient Greek and Roman thinkers, the human capacity for reasoning revealed human beings as microcosms of the macrocosm, of ‘the logos in us’ being ‘capable of reflecting the logos that informed the cosmos’. While the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition saw law as a vehicle for fostering virtue and happiness, the Stoics saw it also ‘as a vehicle for fostering human equality and dignity’. For the Roman Marcus Tullius Cicero, all human beings were equal, potentially free, and rational.383

Martin shares a quote from fourteenth century mystic Meister Eckhart: ‘You should love God…. You should love him as he is a non-God, a nonspirit, a nonperson, a nonimage, but as he is a pure unmixed, bright “One”, separated from all duality; and in that One we should eternally sink down, out of “something” into “nothing”’.384 Also Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in his Oration on the dignity of man, written at the time of the Renaissance in the fifteenth century, highlights the human capacity for self-transcendence into the deeper dimensions of existence: dignity lies in the freedom of humans to rise up to the eternal and divine, or descend into brutishness.385 Martin then proceeds to seventeenth century Blaise Pascal’s Pensées, to dignity seen as intrinsic to human self-awareness and actualisable through self-surpassing. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the eighteenth century, human dignity flows from the synergy of moral relationships as the basis of civil society and is confirmed through a social contract. Karl Marx, in the nineteenth century, identified the dignity of human beings in their capacity to proceed from illusory communities to real communities of freedom, justice, and mutual recognition. In the twentieth century, philosopher Jürgen Habermas acknowledges that human beings are language-constituted beings, whose dignity manifests through communicative discourse as equals in a moral community. For the twenty-first century, Martin gives voice to Swami Agnivesh, who calls for ‘love to supersede power as the shaping paradigm for the human species’.386 Martin himself works for a ‘holistic planetary transformation through a global social contract’.387

For Michael Karlberg the social body frame of dignity highlights the intrinsic value or worth of every human being as a member of the social body of an interdependent community. This intrinsic value is realised through individuals developing the capacities upon which the well-being of the entire body depends, as there is the capacity for ‘honesty and trustworthiness, for cooperation and reciprocity, for empathy and compassion, for fairness and
justice, for altruism and selflessness, for discipline and moderation, for learning and the investigation of reality, for creativity and productivity.\textsuperscript{388} In this way, the individual’s latent potential is fully realised, together with the well-being of the entire social body.

For Tore Frost, love is the very foundation for human dignity: ‘Our emotional life, in the tension between passion and suffering, confronts us with love as the basic premise of human life in all its complexity. Love is what life is about’.\textsuperscript{389} In my work, I also speak of literacy of love.\textsuperscript{390}

And Frost goes even further. In his endeavour to avoid overly abstract and lifeless humanisms, he asks: Is the term respect, as in ‘respect for inherent dignity’, sufficient? After all, respect is something humans should demonstrate to all life, not just to human life? What about ‘awe of (human) life’? He suggests that the word awe could serve as a reminder that humans are living creatures, both to be honoured and to be feared. It would be awe and reverence for the human being with all its bright sides and its dark sides – after all, it is a shaken love life that characterises human faring.\textsuperscript{391} When Frost uses the word shaken (rysted in Norwegian), he draws on philosopher Jan Patočka (1907–1977), who was one of the original signatories and main spokespersons for the Charter 77 human rights movement in Czechoslovakia in 1977. Fellow dissident Václav Havel (1936–2011) explains what it means: ‘When Jan Patočka wrote about Charter 77, he used the term “solidarity of the shaken”. He was thinking of those who dared resist impersonal power and to confront it with the only thing at their disposal, their own humanity’.\textsuperscript{392}

Also for protestant theologian Paul Tillich – his ideas were further developed by Martin Luther King Jr. in his doctoral dissertation – love is the fundamental ethical commandment. For Tillich, love has ‘being’, while justice has no separate being apart from being a way to put love into practice.\textsuperscript{393}

Love is also what philosopher Howard Richards speaks of when he explains that ‘natural’ human rights were not created by nature or by a social contract, they were created by history.\textsuperscript{394} Human rights are historically constructed social realities, with two long key historical periods of gestation culminating in the declarations of rights: first, the time of the French Revolution, and, second, the time of the Second World War. The first engendered the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (1789), while the second brought the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):

Human rights, then, are a gift of history that help us to put into practice the fundamental ethic of love, also known as solidarity. Rights give love the force of law. For those who are not religious, Mahatma Gandhi offered a secular argument for a love ethic: if love were not the law of our species, our species would never have survived and we would not be here today.\textsuperscript{395}

In my work, I conceptualise human rights as the ethics of the global village, just like the ethics of any village, with one significant difference: As long as the world was divided into ‘many villages’, the ethics of a village had to serve the dominator model of society, as each village lived in fear of the other ‘villages’ and had to develop out-group ethics in addition to in-group ethics. When there is only one village left, the one single global village, first, out-group ethics become redundant, and, second, the new in-group ethics can afford to manifest the partnership model of society. In the global village each villager can be equal in dignity and collaborate with the others in mutual solidarity, care, and responsibility.\textsuperscript{396} Those who say that human nature stands in the way of such a path, need to remember the experiments on equity that social psychologists Lee Ross and John Jost carried out to see whether people like to share equally or not.\textsuperscript{397} They found that the myth that ‘humans are greedy by nature’ is inaccurate. They saw a strong tendency to share equally within in-groups, yet, not with out-
groups. By declaring that human dignity is inherent to every human being, the international community in effect widened the scope of in-group ethics to include all humanity, and it made out-group ethics illegitimate. In this way, it became equality in dignity, rather than the haughty decorum of the dignitary, that became the moral source of human rights. The term ‘dignity’ comes before the phrase ‘rights’ in the sentence: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’, indicating that the equality in rights is a specification of equality in dignity, as also philosopher Jürgen Habermas observes.\textsuperscript{398}

In this context, it is the Lévinasian-Buberian interpretation that fits best the spirit of these new inside ethics, more than the Kantian interpretation of dignity: Kant emphasises the individual’s rationality, while Lévinas highlights the face of the Other as Thou, to use Martin Buber’s formulation, rather than the Other as an It. The Lévinasian view of human rights is closer than the Kantian view to norms that preserve the cohesion of the social fabric within a community, including the global community. The Kantian version could be simplified as follows: ‘Equal dignity means that, although you are poor, you can have full dignity. In order to have dignity you need a societal framework that gives you political rights, such as the right of free speech. You can be poor and at the same time dignified, and if you work hard, you may even be able to rise from poverty’. The Lévinasian-Buberian version, again simplified, could go as follows: ‘You are poor and others are rich and this is because all live under circumstances that violate everybody’s human dignity. It is the responsibility of the entire community to create environments that help ensure the dignity of all, since a dignified quality of life depends on a sense of personal mastery and responsibility for the common good in a web of supportive relationships of care and solidarity’. Others agree: ‘…dignity is a relational term and concept; inherent to every human being it requires affirmative action and therefore recognition from others. In this sense it is at the same time a radical individualised and a socialised moral concept’.\textsuperscript{399} I recommend interconnected individuality as path to transcend both oppressive collectivism and ruthless individualism, and this essay is true to the dignity of interconnected individuality by being very personal and at the same time very relational, letting the many diverse voices that have spoken to me throughout my life-time be heard.

We could say that Kant was ahead of his time in surpassing the notion of dignity as something that gives dignitaries higher status, and Lévinas, in turn, was ahead of his time when he surpassed Kant. Those who engage in the discussion of so-called negative and positive (‘welfare’) rights will recognise that there is a Lévinasian connection to practical on-the-ground equality hidden in the ideal of equal dignity. The notion of equal dignity is a Lévinasian ‘Trojan horse’ that ‘sneaks’ into the Kantian view. The ‘Trojan’ connection is implicated in the human rights stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect human dignity.

Also Donald Klein, a pioneer in the field of community psychology, speaks about the human ability to feel ‘awe and wonderment’ in the face of this world and its living creatures.\textsuperscript{400} In my book on the satyāgraha approach of a Mahatma Gandhi, a book that speaks of big love as antidote against ‘big hate’, I explain that my personal ‘religion’ is ‘love, humility, and awe for a universe too large for us to fathom’.\textsuperscript{401} This is my personal path in pursuit of what Victor Frankl called ‘the search for meaning’.\textsuperscript{402} My personal worship is through my relationships, ‘where unique beauty fills the senses each day for those with eyes to see it’.\textsuperscript{403} ‘Love is the only rational act’, is a saying attributed to author Mitch Albom, and I resonate deeply.\textsuperscript{404}

Therefore, I regard the work that I do as sacred work. In resonance with the views of historian Morris Berman, I am a global wanderer like our Palaeolithic forebears, open to experience and surprise, perceiving the divine as a process from which we cannot separate, the sacred as immanent in all human affairs.\textsuperscript{405} With Berman, I am aware of the disastrous results for the planet and for human relationships when a ‘scientific’ perspective insinuates

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that nature is independent from humans and that ‘we’ can study and use nature for ‘our’ own purposes. I try to save us from our ‘nature-deficit disorder’ by nurturing mutualism. This is sacred work, since relational processes carry a sacred dimension as we hear from psychologist Kenneth Gergen: ‘that which contributes to the growth and extension of relational process acquires aspects of the divine’.

My home is planet Earth, on which I am sedentary, and my global wandering is sacred not least because it aims to bring back what the Palaeolithic period seems to have offered its inhabitants, namely, space for meaning that is grounded in unbounded ‘we’ relationships. When meaning is sought in ‘we versus them’ relationships, in ‘we who are right’ in opposition to ‘them who are foreign or wrong’, then immeasurable misery is bound to result. Only when humankind perceives itself as one single unbounded family, can the kind of ‘we’ emerge that can do without a ‘non-we’. Only one single unbounded global in-group can manifest unity in diversity in the form of ‘we together with we’, and leave behind all forms of hostile ‘we in contrast to non-we’ configurations. If Gergen is right, if ‘no/thing truly or fundamentally exists for us outside our immersion in relational processes’, and all individual action emerges from a matrix of relationships, then, to my view, it is our duty to nurture relational processes that create dialogical bridges rather than build alienating fences.

To manifest humble relational dignity also in this essay, I give Kenneth Gergen the last word in this section, because he formulates it more beautifully than I could:

Relations between groups – religious, political, tribal, ethnic – have brought untold misery in the history of civilisation, and the future hangs in the balance. The route from separation to alienation, and then mutual destruction, is a route to the demise of meaning altogether. Dialogic practices that restore the flow of productive meaning are vitally needed. Similarly honoured are practices that bring humans and their environment together into a mutually sustainable world. All such actions are realisations of second-order morality – a revitalising of the relationship among relationships. All harbour sacred potential...

PART II: EQUAL DIGNITY FOR ALL

Kim Stafford on his father William and the dignifying power of poetry

In February of 2014, the William Stafford Symposium had to be cancelled because of snow. In spite of difficult driving conditions, I put on my chains and crept about the city to gather the symposium participants who had come the farthest, and we convened in a house in SW Portland, where we sat by the fire and shared stories and ideas about William Stafford as writer and witness. We were Wendy Erd from Hanoi, Abayo Animashaun from Wisconsin, Keiko Shimada from Sapporo, Japan, Fred Marchant from Boston, and Li-Young Lee from Chicago. The snow flew by outside, the fire crackled, and we went once around the room. Among the stories that were shared, here is one:

Li-Young Lee: My wife said to me, ‘Li-Young, you need to be active, get out and do something. All you do is sit and read and write. Go’. So I went to study martial arts. I have a friend who teaches, and I told him I wanted to learn. But my teacher said to me: ‘You do not need to study with me. You are already a poet’. ‘But I wish to learn the physical arts you might teach me’. ‘You do not understand. It’s like this: 1. At the first level for the martial artist, an opponent comes to you with ill will, and with the decision to attack you. You must defeat this person with physical skill.
But once you do this, there is no security. He may come back with his friends any
time, and overwhelm you.

2. At the next level, an opponent comes to you with ill will, but there is something
about you that makes him hesitate to attack you. He may then retreat, and so you
have overcome him without needing physical force. But still there is no security, for
he may come back with his friends and overwhelm you.

3. At the next level, an opponent comes to you with ill will, but there is something
about you that leads him to engage you with words instead of blows, and in time you
may be able to have a dialog, and come to understand one another, and ill will is
dissipated. Then there is some safety.

4. At the fourth level, there is something about you that makes you invisible. If an
opponent approaches, he can’t even see you. You are so calm, so self-possessed, you
are not to be seen. No harm is done.

5. But at the fifth level, through long practice, you live in keeping with the Dao, and
you move through the world strewing beauty before you. Is this coming from within
you? Or is this beauty the Dao moving through you, strewing good wherever you go?
You can’t tell. But know this, Li-Young: the only way to cultivate this ability is
through the practice of poetry, or painting’. And, Li-Young says to us, ‘I consider William Stafford the quintessential Level 5.

He travelled through the world in this way, offering his poems, disarming others, in
the way of the Dao’.

**Dignity is being yearned for all around the world**

If we look back, we observe that rights have only gradually been tied to equality. Many
consider the Magna Carta of the year 1215 as a precursor to human rights. The Magna
Carta was a peace treaty between an unpopular King of England and rebel barons. The rights
it recognised were mainly feudal privileges. Later, the French and American revolutionary
regimes, while using the word equality, left many status differentials untouched, such as fixed
property rights, slavery in the case of the U.S., and all together patriarchal structures.
American revolutionaries learned their law from English jurist William Blackstone, who
devoted one of the four volumes of his summary of law to categories of inequality, for
example that between master and servant. It was only in 1948 and 1966 that today’s
concept of equal rights was put into practice with tangible benefits. It started with the 1948
Human Rights Declaration, where political rights were emphasised and social rights
guaranteed. Then came the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
signed in 1966, and in force from 1976.

Now, I sense, the time has come, despite all challenges, to take dignity more seriously, or,
more precisely, equality in dignity. It is not by accident that the word *dignity* comes first,
before *rights*, in the foundational sentence: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights’. As has been reported earlier, philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas argue
that human dignity represents the moral source of human rights, which are merely
specifications of human dignity.

Despite its complexity, the notion of dignity has already risen to considerable fame.
Dignity has by now moved into the centre of many constitutional texts. Since the end of the
Second World War, human dignity has become the foundational principle of both
international human rights law and domestic constitutional rights provisions. The European
Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is only one of many examples. In Article 1 it
declares: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected’. The UNESCO

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Evelin Lindner says in Article I of its Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Co-operation: ‘Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved’.

Philosophers are increasingly interested in dignity: ‘Why are philosophers invoking the notion of human dignity to revitalise theories of political ethics?’ asks professor of law and history Samuel Moyn. Indeed, recent attention to the topic of dignity has been considerable, not just in the field of philosophy. Since 2010, dignity has been the theme in a number of fields.

In the course of my four decades of global life, I have observed that dignity and respect are being yearned for and called for by an increasing number of people, all around the world. Not least the recent so-called Arab Spring was often described as ‘dignity revolution’.

Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development of the University of Maryland, wrote to me in a personal communication on 16th May 2013:

Considerable evidence through public opinion research over a period of two decades confirms what ordinary citizens across the Arab world chanted during their revolts: One of the central driving forces behind the Arab uprising is the pursuit of dignity and overcoming a pervasive sense of humiliation not only in the relationship between rulers and ruled but also between Arabs and the rest of the world.

Nayef Al-Rodhan, a philosopher, neuroscientist, and expert of the geopolitics of globalisation and transnational security with a background from Saudi Arabia, observes that ‘what drives history is not primarily the search for freedom, but rather the profound human quest for dignity’. He writes further:

Dignity, more than the absence of humiliation, is a holistic set of criteria indispensable for good governance: reason, security, human rights, accountability, transparency, justice, opportunity, innovation, and inclusiveness. Indeed, the call for dignity has been the theme of the Arab Spring. The revolutions were prompted by leaders’ failure to respect and ensure the dignity of their citizens. The protesters were driven by underlying discontent and frustration with arbitrary and disrespectful security forces, lack of economic opportunities, malfunctioning public services, and the arrogance as well as corruption of an affluent ruling class. The numerous failings in governance of incumbent regimes thus culminated in collective dignity deficits that made a critical turning point for the region inevitable. The question was not if, but when. Therefore, both the Arab Spring and its aftermath need to be dissociated from the overly-repeated dictum of liberal democracy, as it was not rooted in freedom but rather in a search for dignity.

I meet the notion of dignity in all spheres of life and on all continents. Allow me to mention here but one of myriad examples, one from the sphere of architecture. We had our 2017 Dignity Conference in Indore, India, and Balkrishna Vithaldas Doshi, born in 1927, is an Indian architect, who is being praised for the Aranya Low Cost Housing development in Indore. In 2018, he became the first Indian architect to receive the ‘Nobel prize of architecture’, namely, the Pritzker Architecture Prize. He is noted for his contributions to the evolution of architectural discourse in India and this is his message to architects and urban planners involved in low-income housing projects and in architectural education: Please move away from your focus on being individual designers, please become ‘far more collaborative, compassionate and invested in the dignity’ of those you house.
Human rights can violate human dignity

If Jürgen Habermas is right in saying that human dignity represents the moral source of human rights, then this implies that human rights have the potential to violate human dignity if human rights are designed without regard to human dignity. Clearly, however, given the complexity of the concept of dignity, taking dignity into account for the formulation of rights is a highly demanding task.

Christopher McCrudden is a global law professor at the University of Michigan Law School, and a professor of human rights and equality law at Queen’s University in Belfast. He acknowledges that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularising the use of ‘dignity’ or ‘human dignity’, however, ‘there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions’, because dignity, ‘beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that’. He continues:

The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation, increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of ‘human dignity’ plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

If human dignity represents the moral source of human rights, then dignity itself should be a right. Indeed, both the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man and the UDHR of 1948 entailed the view that human rights include and guarantee the right of all humans to dignity. In South African jurisprudence, the right to dignity has been directly applied in a number of cases relating to criminal punishment, the law of defamation, and the right to marriage and family life.

Political theorist Michael Rosen, however, wonders whether the officialisation and institutionalisation of dignity as an international and universal human right has not undermined the essential sense of dignity as the right to be treated with proper respect, with dignity. Rights have the advantage of being more easily definable than dignity, as rights are more pragmatically applicable than the notion of dignity. As Christopher McCrudden has pointed out, the concept of human dignity increases rather than decreases judicial discretion. It is therefore easier to simply leave the concept of human dignity out, and, indeed, it has initially been absent from the European Convention on Human rights.

However, a focus on rights offers only a short-term advantage, lasting merely until problems occur with one right claim sliding into contradiction to another: ‘By now almost any imaginable rights claim by one group of individuals will almost inevitably contravene or contradict the established or potential rights claims of others. The student’s right to live free in a peaceful, gun-free environment contravenes the gun-owner’s right to bear arms. The tenant’s right to affordable, rent-controlled housing contravenes the landlord’s right to extract rent at the market rate. The mother’s right to choose contravenes the foetus’s right to life, and so forth’. Some even argue that ‘there is no such thing as a right to dignity’:

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Many people feel that autonomy is so fundamental to the human condition that it is, essentially, a facet of our human dignity. Many people also feel that the idea of human dignity is so fundamental that we should have a right to dignity. While superficially appealing, both of these viewpoints are essentially inconsistent with the concept of inherent human dignity as an underlying foundation and basis of international human rights law.433

Sociologist Miki Kashtan sees only one way out, namely, to let go of any overemphasis on rights. She writes: ‘I find the notion of human rights deeply problematic. I prefer human needs. Human needs are biologically given, also socially and culturally emergent. Human rights are conceptual. Needs are indisputable, even if someone will dispute, because their authority is lived experience. Human rights are disputable because their authority is conceptual. They separate’.434 Kashtan sees the language of rights as still rooted ‘within the paradigm of separation and scarcity: my rights give me a claim, and you and I can debate and ultimately go to war about whose rights are more fair. Rights don’t open our hearts and don’t restore the flow of generosity’.435 If we want to exit from ‘the perpetual fight about who deserves what’, Kashtan writes, we need to ‘transcend the language of civil or human rights and re-embrace the awareness of needs’.436

Dignity – an enthymeme

If dignity is such a difficult concept, should we perhaps use other words? Ruth Mackins and Steven Pinker have been quoted earlier, and their preference for the concept of autonomy. Others have suggested that it would be better to speak of pride or respect.437

When I think of respect, the following question comes to mind: Respect for what? Respect can also be connected with ranked honour: A man who beats his wife, for instance, may do so to force her to respect his supremacy. Apartheid was a system where respect was required for systemic humiliation. In other words, the unqualified term of ‘respect’ is not a solution.

Would the problem be solved by making the phrase longer by saying: we need ‘respect for dignity’? Also this phrase would be incomplete. The reason is that also the notion of dignity emerged in a time where ranked honour was the reigning cultural paradigm – the notions of decorum and dignitary betray this.438 Still today, the concept of a dignitary points at a person who is higher in rank than others. A formulation that expresses the entirety of human rights ideals, might be this: ‘respect for equal dignity for all’. Or, ‘respect for the equality of dignity for all individuals’.

What we learn is that the word dignity alone is not enough. Dignity is an enthymeme (Greek: ἐνθύμημα, enthumēma), meaning that a speaker spells out only certain aspects of an argument and leaves other parts out because she assumes that the audience holds those parts in their minds (en thymo). In a narrow sense, an enthymeme is an informally stated three-part deductive argument, with an unstated assumption that must be true for the premises to lead to the conclusion. In a broader usage, the term describes all incomplete arguments.

Philosopher Hubert Schleichert wrote a book on ‘how to discuss with fundamentalists without losing your mind – instructions for subversive thinking’.439 In this book he explains the enthymeme phenomenon with the following example:

Meier says: I think X should be prime minister again; times are difficult, and X has ruled for ten years. But Müller replies: I think X should not be prime minister again; times are difficult, and X has ruled for ten years. These two enthymematic arguments look alike, but
lead to opposite theses. The reason is clear: the two arguments use two different, unspoken arguments. For the analysis, it is necessary to make the unspoken arguments explicit; often it is here that the real bone of contention lies. Meier goes by the sentence: When times are difficult, a veteran leader should not be replaced. Müller, on the other hand, takes the exact opposite position.\textsuperscript{440}

In other words, people who call for respect or dignity, do not necessarily talk about the same thing. The use of terror tactics can illustrate this: Those who engage in such tactics often justify them by saying that there is no other way to gain respect and dignity. Their victims will have the opposite view and feel that it is precisely everybody’s dignity that is being violated.

Freedom is yet another example. People who call for freedom may call for freedom for all, or they may call for freedom for might to become right. In the first case, the end-result will be equality in dignity, stark inequality in the second.\textsuperscript{441} Theorist Isaiah Berlin said it short: ‘Freedom for the wolves has often meant death to the sheep’.\textsuperscript{442} In 1944, economist Friedrich von Hayek wrote a book titled \textit{The road to serfdom} that still informs the contemporary \textit{Zeitgeist}, particularly in the United States. Hayek argued that all freedom is lost if the state assumes ever more power under the pretext of wanting to contribute to the common good and to the welfare of citizens.\textsuperscript{443} Hayek warned that social democracy would only be the beginning, and a Stalin or Hitler would be the end. Hayek’s predictions of 1944 have, however, not come true. European social democracies did create benefactor states and loss of freedom was not among their defects.\textsuperscript{444} On the contrary, ‘the imposition by force of the economic theories of the Austrian and Chicago schools has led more than once to the loss of liberties’ and ‘research shows that the most solidary people are also the people most respectful people of diversity, of the rights of others, and in the end of freedom’.\textsuperscript{445} Liberalism has failed, this is the verdict of political scientist Patrick Deneen in 2018: The definition of liberty as the most extensive possible expansion of the human sphere of autonomous activity has failed.\textsuperscript{446}

Let me suggest that it is not respect, nor pride, nor simply dignity alone that describes the core of the new moral universe built on human rights ideals, it is \textit{respect for equal dignity for all, as responsible individuals connected in loving solidarity}. And this equal dignity is an embodied sense, a sense of being able to stand straight upright and carry one’s head high, rather than bowing down in submissively meek humility or sticking one’s nose up in haughty arrogance.\textsuperscript{447} Philosopher Franz Josef Wetz describes dignity and self-respect as an ‘orthopaedic challenge’: it is the art to walk upright.\textsuperscript{448} It is a posture of dignified humility, looking into the eyes of others as equals with calm confidence, in contrast to either arrogant upmanship or meek downmanship.

Human dignity is thus not merely a philosophical abstraction or a legal construct; ‘it is a phenomenological reality that has its basis in human consciousness’,\textsuperscript{449} and, we might add, it has its basis in the body, in short, in the body mind.\textsuperscript{450} Phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) emphasised the body as the primary site of knowing the world, influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.\textsuperscript{451} Cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson have written a book about ‘the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought’.\textsuperscript{452} Human dignity, rather than a justification for norms, is a \textit{Haltung} (posture, demeanour, attitude), a good that, if it is to last, must be attained, preserved and, if needed, regained.\textsuperscript{453} Dignity is a sense of worthiness, ‘which we have a duty to develop and respect in ourselves and a duty to protect in others’, while acknowledging that there are diverse interpretations of dignity.\textsuperscript{454} Human rights can thus not be justified by simply mentioning the word dignity.\textsuperscript{455} ‘For meaningful dialogue on the subject, it is therefore necessary to listen carefully and ascertain whether or not conversation partners use the same or at least a similar

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concept of dignity. If not, fundamental disagreements can remain hidden to the detriment of constructive consensus’.\textsuperscript{456} The reader may enjoy the little video on dignity, where Ragnhild Nilsen interviews me about the World Dignity University initiative.\textsuperscript{457}

\textit{From honour to dignity}

Throughout the forty years of my global living, I have observed human worthiness be measured in two profoundly different ways, which, if applied rigorously, are mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{458} If we think of a ranking order that ranges from high to low – the \textit{great chain of being} with divinity at the top and dirt at the bottom\textsuperscript{459} – then people can either be ranked into higher and lesser beings somewhere on this ladder, or the practice of ranking humans can be rejected altogether.\textsuperscript{460} I have chosen to give the label \textit{honour} to the first practice and \textit{dignity} to the second, the first corresponding to Riane Eisler’s \textit{dominator} model of society and the second to Eisler’s \textit{partnership} model of society. Dignity is a necessary recognition, and honour a non-egalitarian value within systems of preference, this is how philosopher Charles Taylor speaks of these two moral universes, following Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his differentiation of dignity and honour.\textsuperscript{461}

Honour and dignity are both collective phenomena that shape everything from the micro to the macro level, from emotions to institutions. They are learned responses to group pressure, a pressure that affects the meta-emotions of a society, or how people manifest feelings,\textsuperscript{462} including norms and institutions. Honour and dignity are not codes of law, but \textit{normative paradigms}, sets of informal values that contain intellectual and affective elements that keep those who subscribe to these paradigms engaged in them.\textsuperscript{463} Honour and dignity can be described as \textit{interpretive frames} in discourse.\textsuperscript{464}

While honour ranks human worthiness from high to low, dignity rejects the ranking of human worthiness and instead invites everybody to meet in the middle, in shared humility, so that nobody is looks up or down at others anymore. When I speak of honour, this is short for ‘ranked worthiness for people who are rigidly wedged into their particular local collective, their particular in-group that perceives itself as surrounded by out-groups’. When I speak of dignity, I mean ‘unranked worthiness for people who have considerable leeway in the human family that inhabits planet Earth, the one single in-group that is left when there are no out-groups anymore’, or also ‘respect for equal dignity for all, as individuals in solidarity’. For the second scenario I have also coined the word \textit{globegalisation} to describe how \textit{egalisation} (short for equal dignity, or the undoing of humiliation) can to humanise globalisation (see more further down).

As I said earlier, if applied rigorously, honour and dignity mind-sets are mutually exclusive, and I often use the example of honour killing to illustrate how those two moral universes can slide into highly irreconcilable positions.\textsuperscript{465} Honour killing is a term often used for the killing of a girl by her family with the aim to remedy humiliated family honour. In a context of dignity, in contrast, killing her would compound humiliation rather than remedy it; the girl deserves trauma treatment rather than death. A human rights defender facing cases of honour killing is caught between her desire ‘to respect other cultures’ and her wish ‘to respect the dignity of the girl’. A human rights defender cannot concurrently say: ‘I respect the dignity of the girl, therefore she must live’ and, ‘I respect all cultures, including honour cultures, and therefore, if this is what honour culture prescribes, I respect that the girl must die’. ‘The girl must die’, and ‘the girl must live’ are two mutually exclusive stances. It is a problem of ‘intersectionality’, when ‘rights that supposedly flow from a particular group identity may be oppression for subgroups that have a crosscutting allegiance’, explains legal philosopher Duncan Kennedy.\textsuperscript{466}

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Both approaches – that of honour as much as that of dignity – are promoted by social collectives. The difference is that honour fixes all individuals in ‘their place’ in a local collective, attributing more worth to some and less worth to others, while in a dignity context the individual is no longer supposed to be ranked with respect to what she is worth, and no longer fixed in a particular local collective. The ideal of the dignity universe is to liberate the individual from ‘her place’ in her particular in-group as it faces out-groups, and to open up fluid spaces for her in the much larger in-group of all of humankind where there is no out-group anymore. The ideal is unity amidst diversity; the global human family being united in caringly offering space for diversity to flourish to all; some call it glocalisation. Clearly, this ideal is being betrayed, as it happens frequently nowadays, when liberation simply means that one loses one’s place in a caring in-group, and is turned into a machine-like piece in an anonymous and exploitative cogwheel where diversity plays out as division between isolated individuals.

Another way to describe the transition from honour to dignity is to use traffic as a metaphor. A society has to decide on whether to go for left-hand or right-hand driving. A society that allows ‘freedom’ and ‘respect’ to mean that everybody can drive as they like – left or right – will head toward ubiquitous chaos and myriad accidents. The decision of either left-hand or right-hand driving is one on which society has to be united. At the same time, diversity can reign with respect to the kind of vehicles and driving styles everybody may choose. The transition from unequal honour to equal dignity resembles this situation to a certain extent. If we say that left-hand driving stands for honour, then, to make the metaphor work, we have to add that honour entails more mere left-hand driving, it entails also that large vehicles can rig the traffic lights in their favour – in short, honour means that larger vehicles get the right of way. If dignity stands for right-hand driving, then this requires a superordinate authority to protect and enforce that all vehicles are equal in front of a red light, large and small vehicles alike. If large vehicle owners manage to hijack those superordinate authorities, then this means a return to left-hand driving in practice. If this happens, or the transition to right-hand driving is done too slowly and uncoordinatedly, the resulting misery will cause some people to mistake right-hand driving as the culprit, and they may want to go back to left-hand driving. ‘Make America great again’ is a slogan that speaks to that.

By giving the words honour and dignity such a central place in my work, I exercise my linguistic right to label cultural codes as I see them work in the world. By doing so, I draw on the most basic insight of semiotics, namely, that meanings do not reside in words. Philosopher Jacques Derrida spoke of différence. Words are associated with meanings through socially constructed rules of correspondence between signifiers and meanings: ‘Culturally encoded meanings can be widely shared or widely contested among diverse people, and they can be relatively fixed or relatively fluid across time’. At the same time, I continue to use the verb to honour in less conceptually circumscribed ways, for instance, when I want to honour people I respect.

Where does honour come from?

Humans need recognition. The evolutionary universal struggle for recognition has already been described by philosophers Kant and Hegel. Philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) made the concept of recognition (Anerkennung) fundamental to his philosophy, and taught that a good life is dependent on being held in regard by others. Human self-consciousness, he argued, depends on being recognised by others as a person who possesses worth. Hegel’s discussion of the struggle for recognition has inspired an extensive literature in contemporary political theory. See, among many others, philosopher Axel Honneth, or

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sociologist Zygmunt Bauman.470 Also political scientists are aware of the need for recognition, as Neera Chandhoke from the University of Delhi in India explains: ‘If, for Kant, the idea of Achtsung or respect contains the nucleus of his Categorical Imperative, for the Scottish moralists, recognition or disapproval motivates individuals towards the attainment of desirable virtues’.  

Philosopher Max Scheler set out related issues in his classic book Ressentiment.472 Scheler stated that a person at her core is a loving being, ens amans, who may feel ressentiment (comparable to resentment) when not recognised.473 Political scientist, sociologist, and social anthropologist Liah Greenfeld has used the examples of Ethiopia and Eritrea to suggest that ressentiment plays a central role in nation building.474 Political scientist Alexander Wendt adds the United States to the list of examples: Its struggle for recognition and ‘need for positive self-regard’475 may actually ‘explain much of the Realpolitik behaviour, including war, which Neorealists have attributed to the struggle for security’.476

The philosophy on the politics of recognition, by building on Scheler, supposes that it may lead to violence when people suffer the humiliation of non-recognition. Philosopher Charles Taylor describes identity politics as being motivated by a deep human need for recognition, with misrecognition having various forms of injurious effects.477 It is particularly injurious when victims learn their own self-deprecation. Taylor sees in the modern notions of equality and dignity the Romantic idea of authenticity and the authentic self, linked with Enlightenment ideas such as those of Kant.478 As reported before, Taylor follows Rousseau in differentiating dignity from honour, with the idea of dignity rising as hierarchical societal structures decline. Taylor credits Rousseau with being the originator of the notion of equal recognition as the path to amour-propre (‘self-love’). Then authenticity can be inwardly generated, in contrast to identity primarily being constructed through social roles.

Taylor puts his finger on two problems with recognition and universal dignity that need particular attention. First, Taylor warns that the politics of universal dignity per definition leads to a politics of difference, because marginalised groups seeking to attain universal rights can do so only by emphasising their difference. The presently unfolding polarisation in many societies around the world confirms Taylor’s warning. A counterforce is needed that emphasises unity, as diversity needs to be held together, rather than unity being fractured by diversity. Indeed, unity in diversity is undermined if diversity turns into division.

Then there is a problem with the need for recognition. Taylor alerts to this when he says that it is particularly injurious when victims learn their own self-deprecation. The problem lies in beliefs: in order to belong and be recognised, we might accept toxic beliefs. Beliefs help us test reality. However, beliefs also speak to our need for recognition and help us live with ourselves and with others.479 In a context where beliefs are not in synchrony with reality, we may be tempted to embrace false beliefs to attain recognition.

For instance, toward the end of the Second World War, every German citizen could have understood that there was no Endsieg (final victory) in sight. Yet, as the majority of Germans fervently believed in victory, doubters risked execution. The final outcome was ubiquitous destruction that affected the entire world. Similarly, if the majority of the people around us believes in final victory for human domination over nature and denies, for instance, human-made climate degradation, we may be tempted to go along, simply to continue belonging to this group, and the demise of humankind as a whole might be the price.

Concepts such as mécéonnaissance (misrecognition) and naturalisation were used by thinkers such as Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault (among others). They describe how power structures use the concealed nature of habitus to covertly and stealthily manipulate people into embracing beliefs that may not benefit them.480

Psychologist John Jost and his colleagues have developed system justification theory, which includes social identity and social dominance theories, as well as notions such as self-
interest, inter-group conflict, ethnocentrism, homophily, in-group bias, out-group antipathy, dominance, and resistance.\textsuperscript{481} They find that there is a general ideological motive to justify the existing social order, and that this motive is partially responsible for the astonishing fact that subordinates fail to rise up. Instead, they may even internalise their own inferiority, if only at an implicit nonconscious level of awareness, and this, paradoxically, is sometimes strongest among those who are most harmed by the status quo.\textsuperscript{482}

Our need for recognition and our readiness to even sell our own survival for it, all this has a deeply structural impact on the development of children. Sociologist Donald Carveth speaks of ‘unconscionable societies’ and how their beliefs can be internalised into an ‘unconscionable superego’.\textsuperscript{483} Carveth contrasts two forms of conscience, one born of identification with aggressors – ideologies of domination – the other born of identification with nurturing.\textsuperscript{484}

Peace researcher Johan Galtung forged the notion of penetration, or ‘implanting the top-dog inside the under-dog’.\textsuperscript{485} illustrating the fact that acceptance of subjugation may become a culture of its own, a collective way of managing the cognitive dissonance between commands coming from above and feelings coming from one’s heart. Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality – the manipulation of populations – has its place here, too.\textsuperscript{486}

Historian Ranajit Guha and literary theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak use the term subaltern.\textsuperscript{487} Subaltern studies conceptualise history from ‘below’.\textsuperscript{488} Also the colonisation of the lifeworld, a phrase coined by sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas,\textsuperscript{489} describes the ‘seduction to accept domination’. More recently, African-American sociologist Patricia Hill Collins spoke of controlling images that are being imposed by a dominant culture, images that are voluntarily or involuntarily accepted by disempowered subordinate groups.\textsuperscript{490} This resonates with the concept of the Stockholm syndrome,\textsuperscript{491} and how an emotional bond can emerge between hostages and their captors ‘when the hostages are held for long periods of time under emotionally straining circumstances’.\textsuperscript{492}

In other words, we are able to act against our own self-interest and even learn our own self-deprecation – a potent instrument for our own oppression. I call this self-humiliation.\textsuperscript{493}

Also honour itself is part of this dynamic. If we look at honour and ask where it comes from, then, in my view, it was the security dilemma that engendered the honour code. It is the very fear entailed in the security dilemma that made it possible. Throughout the past millennia, ‘enemies’ could arrive almost out of the blue and destroy everything dear: the so-called Sea Peoples suddenly destroyed flourishing cultures in the East Mediterranean prior to and during the Late Bronze Age collapse (1200–900 BCE\textsuperscript{494}), Mongols overran Europe, Vikings brought terror, Spanish Conquistador Hernán Cortés caused the fall of the Aztec Empire; the list of examples is endless. In other words, fear was utterly justified and strongmen who promised protection were welcome. Continuous war preparations were needed. The dominator model of society arose, bringing what is called patriarchy into the driving seat. The maxim If you want peace, prepare for war was unavoidable.\textsuperscript{495} The security dilemma gave competition for domination feasibility, as successful domination meant victory. Lords, kings, and emperors kept their followers in line with ruthless domination to be victorious in their competition for domination over whoever threatened from outside or whoever they felt would come to threaten them.

In this context, worthiness became ranked. It became seen as unavoidable, either divinely ordained or nature’s order, that human worth is not equal and that ‘higher’ beings preside over ‘lesser’ beings, and that lesser beings need to subject themselves to their masters’ beliefs and decisions.

In my view, the concept of ranked honour was the single largest ‘master manipulation’ of governmentality ever perpetrated, as it gives master elites the power to define everything – from what is to what ought to be.\textsuperscript{496} It was the very fear entailed in the security dilemma that

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gave power elites the necessary leverage to convince subordinates of the concept of honour, so that superiors could ask what they wanted from their inferiors, including their lives. If those superiors were wise patrons who had the common good at heart, they kept their deal, that is, they gave their people protection in exchange for their obedience. If superiors instrumentalised their inferiors’ fear for ulterior motives, all was in danger.

The honour code was enforced on human nature against basic human inclinations.\(^{497}\) Sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson has studied *eusociality* (Greek *eu* ‘good/real’ and ‘social’), the highest level of organisation of animal sociality, which includes, for instance, cooperative care for the young.\(^{498}\) Wilson makes the argument that among humans there is no ‘naturally’ isolated selfish individual who violently defends her self-interest and depends on religious or moral pressure to behave pro-socially, or on abstract ideas imposed on them.\(^{499}\) Human pro-social behaviour such as solidarity, altruism, care, and compassion, all have evolved throughout evolution. Pro-social virtues emerged during human natural and cultural evolution, and are therefore part of human nature. There is no ‘primitive’ human nature that needs to be ‘civilised’. There is no need to arrogantly look down on our stone age forebears as barbaric and uncivilised.

In other words, the human need to belong and be recognised, while it holds a group together in solidarity, is also a weakness, namely, when we too uncritically believe what the majority around us believes. And when the security dilemma came down on us and brought fear, we also started to believe what our masters believed. And we continued to do so, even when those masters had employed sophisticated strategies to manipulate us into holding beliefs incompatible with our interests. For instance, for young men to learn to kill and die to fend off enemies required heroic self-mutilation, the mutilation of their very humanity – many war veterans commit suicide, as it is not ‘in the blood’ of a soldier to be able to kill than civilians are.\(^{500}\) This sacrifice has been wasted, throughout all of history, when superiors used their soldiers merely as cannon fodder.

Not only inferiors were misled by superiors under the banner of honour. Everybody was misled by the security dilemma – also the masters themselves. It is a dangerous belief to think that domination always works. Admittedly, when we look at human history throughout the past millennia, it is true that the most ruthless dominators often were also the most spectacular victors. It is understandable that the belief arose that competition for domination is the only way there is – philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ famous anarchy of the ‘state of nature’\(^{501}\) – and that it is not possible to create a world of dialogue. People even came to believe that domination not only works, but that humans have the right to dominate both nature and each other. This belief represents pure hubris, however, and hubris is known to come before the fall.

The fall took many millennia to manifest, and it seems that the moment has come now. Several tipping points have already been surpassed, irreversibly altering the state of the Earth system.\(^{502}\) This fall took many millennia to have an impact, but now, as the world grows ever more interconnected and overstretched, it becomes apparent that the belief in the feasibility of domination is nothing but foolish hubris. And the fall does not exempt the masters, all fall together: on Titanic, also the luxurious first floor eventually sank. Competition for domination is a strategy that does not serve anybody’s interest in the long term, and particularly not in an interconnected world.

Even the belief in belief might represent hubris. Who are we humans to ascribe ultimate truth to the letters of our ideological and religious dogmas? Many would reply that everybody should have the freedom to choose whether to have a dogmatic belief or not. I ask: Is not the act of believing itself, the very belief in the legitimacy of dogma, an expression of the dominator mind-set? Is it not that we elevate a psychological need to law? We have the need to belong, be recognised and safe, and then we give ourselves the right to cling to dogma that

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speaks to these needs. Worse even, a person who believes to be in the possession of the only truth may feel compelled to force everybody else into adherence, and thus will set in motion ever new rounds of competition for domination. And since domination has no inherent endpoint, this person will never have a quiet moment again: She will never be able to relent in her missionary zeal, she will never know about the joys of non-dogmatic intuition, never experience the liberation of not having to believe, never taste the delight of being humbly embedded in a larger universe of meaning where the very act of relenting can be the guiding principle.

Of course, also believing in non-belief is a belief. Is there a kind of loss of belief that opens space for a more beneficial way of handling belief? In my work, I have given the name ‘Pharisees’ to people who cling to the letter, in contrast to a ‘Sufi’ who is organically and fluidly embedded in a larger universe of meaning.

Legal philosopher Duncan Kennedy indeed recommends ‘loss of faith’, both faith in gods and faith in rights. He suggests that losing faith is better than investing in bad faith, it is better than being ‘in favour of religious faith for the masses, no matter how delusive, on the ground of its beneficial consequences’. He suggests that we should not ‘prefer error to enlightenment when enlightenment is at the cost of beliefs that seemed useful when we still believed in them’. Loss of faith does not necessarily mean demoralisation, nihilism, or a new Hitler or Stalin. If some say that Hitler and Stalin were able to do what they did ‘because they were nihilist, meaning that they denied the validity of fundamental human rights’, then this argument can also be turned around, says Kennedy: They were able to do what they did ‘because they were totalitarian, meaning that they proclaimed the absolute truth of their theories’.

Kennedy shares with his readers how he lost faith. When he was working for a law firm as a student, he helped defend a client against hostile takeover by saying it would violate the antitrust laws, and he did so with fervent conviction. Yet, then suddenly the client changed his mind and decided to go along with the takeover. Kennedy’s lead lawyer said to him: ‘You know the argument so well, it should be easy to turn it around’. Young Kennedy was so visibly shocked that his boss patted his arm saying, ‘On second thought, we’ll get someone else to do it’. What Kennedy learned at that moment, painfully, was that believing in the validity of law was like believing in fairy tales, something for an innocent youth rather than an informed adult. Such painful moments have occurred many times throughout history and Kennedy wonders, ‘how abolitionist litigators dealt with their own dramatic shift, from nationalists to states’ rights advocates, after the Fugitive Slave Law put the federal government on the side of the South against resisting Northern state governments’. Kennedy has since studied how the loss of faith in legal reasoning, which struck him as a young man, has indeed gone on continuously not just in his life, but in the entire legal field, at least since Jeremy Bentham’s critique of Blackstone.

In my case, I began to lose faith when I was nine years old and saw the high price that we, as humankind, pay for the solace that fundamentalist religious dogma offers to its adherents. The price being that such dogma rips the world apart into believers and infidels. I have later met many people hailing from religious backgrounds who have tried to escape from this predicament by either moving to another religion, or to atheism, or to ‘scientific’ ‘communism’, ‘socialism’, or ‘capitalism’, or to rights in the legal field, and how this has often kept them in the grip of fundamentalist belief. I have always thought that we, as humans, need to grow up, let go of clinging to the fairy tale of absolute truths, and rather embrace experience and responsibility, that we need to dare seeing the emperor naked, dare to understand that we all are naked, and then muster the courage to live with our nakedness in mutual care and solidarity. This, for me, is the difference between ‘Pharisees’ and ‘Sufis’. In this way, loss of faith is a blessing, not a curse.
I was therefore delighted to find Duncan Kennedy’s insightful reflections on how beneficial it can be to always remain in ‘critique’ as a path to living in flux, rather than using critique to return to a new kind of clinging to the potentially deadly ‘reification or fetishism of theory, in a mode parallel to the fetishism of God, the market class, law, and rights’.\(^{511}\) I was as delighted when I listened to philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal explaining the reflective equilibrium, as it was employed in philosopher John Rawls’s Theory of Justice,\(^{512}\) and defended, for instance, by his colleague Nelson Goodman. The reflective equilibrium is an epistemological orientation that indicates going round in loops, in never-ending circles, to arrive at ever denser understanding, something that philosopher Aristotle would still have rejected as circular fallacy. Philosopher Dagfinn K. Føllesdal explained this point so well at a presentation at the Norwegian Academy of Science in 1996 that he left his audience, including me, deeply impressed.\(^{513}\)

Kennedy describes in minute detail how loss of faith has occurred in recent history – mainly in the Anglo-Saxon sphere, since this is where he is based – and how our task is to embrace this loss responsibly rather than bemoan it. He begins by explaining how legal discourse is based on the distinction between value judgments, which are subjective philosophical preferences, and factual judgments, or objective empirical scientific judgments, and that ‘rights are mediators between the domain of pure value judgments and the domain of factual judgments’.\(^{514}\) The distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ rights means that a person has rights even if the legal order does not recognise them or even makes it illegal to exercise them: ‘slavery denies the right to personal freedom, which exists in spite of and above the law of slave states’.\(^{515}\) In classic Liberal political theory, Kennedy explains, the world was simple: there were ‘natural rights’ enacted into law by We the People, and there was the judiciary as ‘translator’, giving those rights two existences: first, rights were still ‘natural, existing independently of any legal regime’, and at the same time, ‘they were also legal’.\(^{516}\) The language of natural rights is now ‘out of fashion’, but still, Liberal theory aims to protect outside rights against the ‘invasion by private and public violence’.\(^{517}\) And here is the problem: inside and outside rights can slide into opposition. By now, this predicament has resulted in that ‘the positivists celebrate judicial method and denigrate rights theory, while the interpretivists do the opposite’, so explains Kennedy.\(^{518}\)

In my words, cycles of humiliation are being set in motion on the back of rights claims when ‘ideological intelligentsias of all stripes’ use rights as key element in their universalisation projects. This leads to an unwitting destruction of faith in rights, despite all involved parties desiring the exact opposite, and since it happens unintentionally and stealthily, everybody is left alone to cope. Loss of faith is indeed pre-programmed when all, liberal and conservative intelligentsias, believe in the ‘mana of the judge’ and instrumentalise it for their particular group interests, Kennedy warns. For instance, a gay person’s interest in the legalisation of homosexual intercourse can be formulated as the right to sexual autonomy, and once this operation has succeeded, deniers of the validity of these particular rules become wrong, not just ‘selfish and powerful’.\(^{519}\) Yet, nothing keeps conservatives from succeeding with the same strategy: ‘Both claim a whole history of triumph over the other side under the banner of rights. Each recognises that the other holds some territory, but interprets this as manipulation of legal reasoning, or wrong legal reasoning, to conclusions that violate outside rights’.\(^{520}\) At the very end, the loss of faith in reasoning about legal rights brings about even the loss of faith in the ‘outside’ normative rights – to say it simplified, when God is dead and rights are dead, cynicism may gain a foothold in the crevice, while what is neglected is the development of better alternatives.

An interesting detail that Kennedy draws attention to is that ‘the left’ only relies on the rights strategy since the 1970s. Prior to that time, ‘there had always been a live controversy between Marxists hostile to the whole rights formulation, social democratic progressive
planners with a universalisation project based on savings from eliminating wasteful and
chaotic markets, and civil libertarians. For the left, the move to rights rhetoric signifies the
abandonment of any claim to represent a working-class majority against a minoritarian
‘bourgeoisie’. In the United States, ‘by the end of the 1970s, with the rise of identity politics,
left discourse merged with liberal discourse, and the two ideas of the rights of the oppressed
and the constitutional validity of their legal claims superseded all earlier versions of
rightness’. The background for this development, according to Kennedy, were three
failures: By the 1970s and 1980s, times had turned against ‘popular movements’ that would
aggressively raise rights claims, no longer were federal courts ‘willing to invalidate legislation
and regulations in the interests of oppressed groups’, and gone was ‘the sense of the
undeniable moral/philosophical correctness and ineluctable coherence of left constitutional
theory’. However, Kennedy sees also advantages. The remaining left intelligentsia was not
only ‘freed of the white male working class’, but also ‘rid of the radicals who had made their
lives miserable throughout the 1960s’ when they exposed everybody to the horrible dialectic of
‘taking up the gun’ or ‘selling out’.

While the left has now rights as their ‘weapon’, the conservative ideological intelligentsia
has two ‘weapons’ in their arsenals: they always had – and still have – efficiency as an
alternative to rights: efficiency claims, just like rights claims, are universal – nobody can
oppose their aim to make everyone better off – and they are factoid, supposedly scientifically
and empirically based. In other words, for the left loss of faith is more significant.

Loss of faith is neither a theory nor the outcome of a theory, this is Kennedy’s word of
wisdom. Those who lost faith in divinity did so not because someone proved to them that
god does not exist. Those who lost faith might still experience divine intimations: ‘But
somehow the combination – the processes of critique and reconstruction of rational
demonstrations, along with the process of doubt and reaffirmation – had “ended badly”’. The
end result is neither a position of certainty nor one of uncertainty, it is simply a position
‘post-god’, or, in the case of rights, ‘post-rights’. However, consoles Kennedy, this position is
not necessarily a bad one: ‘the critique and loss of faith in legal rights reasoning does not
necessarily imply a loss of faith in normativity in general, or in the use of rights and rights
reasoning to decide what we leftists think the law should be’. Indeed, listening to
Kennedy’s reasoning can give courage to recent efforts to propose laws to protect the planet,
or ecocide law.

Not without reason comes the label ‘Pharisee’ to my mind when I meet people who cling
to the letter and the label ‘Sufi’ when I get to know people who are organically and humbly
embedded in a larger universe of meaning. Christoph von der Marlsburg is a renowned
physicist and neuroscientist, and the defining feature of consciousness, in his view, is
coherence. More coherent means more alertness, more focus, and the greater the degree of
this coherence across regions of the brain, the ‘higher’ the state of consciousness. Brian
Lancaster is a psychologist and researcher of consciousness and he observes an interesting
parallel ‘between what science can reveal about the brain code and more mystical notions of
resonance and binding operating at a level beyond the brain’. The knot is a powerful
symbol of binding that plays a role in spiritual and mystical traditions, for example, in Jewish
mysticism; indeed, historian Moshe Idel concludes that ‘the process of loosening and tying is
identified with enlightenment’. Lancaster sees a similarity between the ‘neural binding in
identifying and categorising images’ and the knots that bind us ‘to objects of this world’,
knots that have to be untied, suggests Lancaster, so that ‘the re-tying entails establishing
connection to the highest level, that of the divine’.

It might be interesting to reflect on why it is so difficult for people to embrace the
blessings of ‘loss of faith’, why the Pharisee way of life is so persistent, why people cling to
the letter, and why there are so few Sufis who engage in the permanent untying of knots that
bind us to the objects of this world and re-tying the knots that connect us to larger universes of meaning.

Wiederholungszwang is a term that was coined by Sigmund Freud – in English repetition compulsion – describing the repetition of destructive behaviour which was distressing in earlier life; Freud was so impressed by the self-destructiveness of this dynamic that he even suggested a death drive.533 Freud’s thoughts were rejected by many of his successors, others amalgamated them with new thoughts. I use the term humiliation addiction when I see people repeating scenarios of humiliation that they were unable to process in early childhood.534 The strict father model of parenting that cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson identified,535 or the black pedagogy that Alice Miller described,536 produce childhood trauma per design, thus helping to maintain honour culture by way of repetition compulsion. In other words, the security dilemma has engendered a kind of collective obsession with inflicting trauma as a cultural trait.

Not only can black pedagogy turn the repetition of traumatic experiences into a cultural trait, the compulsion to pour everything into calculable contracts may be another outcome. As a clinical and social psychologist, I know that people who were subjected to the strict father model of parenting have not only undergone a learning process to think in a calculus of punishment and rewards, they have also developed a psychological need for it. People who were not nurtured as children, who did not experience being welcome in the human family just for the sake of being born, may later want to earn this welcome through quantifiable achievements. All this resonates with the Pharisee way of being, and whole societies can be built on such calculations. Even the gods are then regarded as authoritarian contract enforcers who reward obedience and punish noncompliance. Examples abound. As reported earlier, Calvinists saw the devastating 1755 Lisbon Earthquake as proof of the Calvinist god’s wrath, and that Lisbon’s addiction to ‘Romish idolatry’ had brought ‘the visitation upon her’. Likewise, Baptist minister Russell Herman Conwell preached that helping the poor would be wrong, since to ‘sympathise with a man whom God has punished for his sins, thus to help him when God would still continue a just punishment, is to do wrong…’538 As for a more recent example, Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin was murdered in 1995 to allegedly fulfil God’s will.539 Suicide terrorists around the world feel they are God’s tools and that they will be duly rewarded. After Prime Minister Ariel Sharon unilaterally removed Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and fell into coma, he received a similar verdict from right-wing Israelis: ‘God gave him what he deserved’.540 Hurricane Katrina’s destruction on the southern coast of the United States in 2005 was regarded by religious fundamentalists from all three major faiths – Christian, Jewish, and Muslims – as ‘part of God’s punishment on America’.541

What the calculus sacrifices is compassion and care: ‘Love is intertwined with gifting, and thus withers away in transactional contexts’.542 The nurturant ways of parenting that Lakoff and Johnson advocate found space to be experimented with in less fundamentalist Western contexts mainly around the 1960s and 1970s, and it seems that this window has slowly been closing since then. As American religious fundamentalism now increasingly informs corporate fundamentalism with a ‘missionary-like zeal’, families are being fractured by ‘commercialising childhood’.543 Present-day trends in child rearing – making the child fit for a brutal world ‘out there’ – thus return children to less nurturing environments to grow up in, and with it the compulsion to repeat trauma, to construct dogma, and to cling to the letter.

At the present point in history, we observe absurd inequalities being on the increase globally and locally. A small leisure class moves from one St. Moritz to the next in their private jets,544 and many of them hold the belief that the poor are simply lazy and therefore to blame for their own poverty. In this way, they give tribute to Russell Conwell still today, the fuser of Christianity and capitalism, and to his message that ‘to make money honestly is to preach the Gospel’, and to get rich ‘is our Christian and godly duty’.545

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Not just in the Anglo-Saxon world, also in countries like Germany has the belief in the poor’s’ laziness seeped into mainstream culture by now: it has gained so much traction that critics feel pressed to begin every argument by ascertaining that they neither are lazy nor envious.\textsuperscript{546} The blaming of the victims of systemic inequality as lazy, and the shaming of critic as envious has reached even Scandinavia, a former heaven of equality.\textsuperscript{547} Since also I am one of those critics, I am now compelled to begin any statement by confirming that I am not lazy – I work twelve house per day, seven days a week – and that I am not given to envy either, on the contrary, I always celebrate others for their achievements. I feel compelled to explain that I am extremely highly educated, with two doctorates, and could very well have succeeded in ‘making money’ and buying impressive status symbols. I do not disparage tokens of wealth because I cannot afford them, I am not given to ‘sour grapes’ envy.\textsuperscript{548} I have occasionally been invited into contexts of monetary wealth – from champagne to penthouses to horse races – and I must admit that I felt utterly bored and disgusted. I felt bored because the St. Moritz life-style provides an artificial kind of life that separates its practitioners from authentic relationships, while self-righteousness hinders them from understanding that getting out into the rest of the world would provide them with much worthier riches. As in the famous fable of the naked emperor, I see them walk around naked, believing they are luxuriously dressed. In addition to feeling bored, I feel disgusted, because this life-style abuses the world as a leisure park, it gambles away the human and natural resources of the world, a world that deserves being taken more seriously. Here the Titanic is sinking and some dance to the tune of the orchestra, haughtily believing, until the very last moment, that they can keep dancing while everybody else goes down. Whenever and wherever I encounter people of this mind-set, I attempt to invite them to use their resources and assume their responsibility to go the bridge of our Titanic and help us all change the course.

This is the message I would like everybody to hear: At the present historical point in time, the weakening of the security dilemma, due to the ingathering of the human tribes, opens space for equal dignity for all: ‘For the first time since the origin of our species, humanity is in touch with itself’.\textsuperscript{549} While a strong security dilemma provided a toxic context of fear for people’s wish to belong by default, the weakening of the security dilemma now offers a much more benign context. The new reality of global interconnectedness and its potential to attenuate the security dilemma provides humankind with the opportunity to further attenuate it intentionally, thus ending the need for competition for domination and continuous war preparations.\textsuperscript{550} The script of honour and heroism that characterised the past millennia created a world of victors and vanquished, of dominators triumphing over what they dominated, be it other people or nature. Global interconnectedness is a radical game changer. In the new context, the old script no longer leads to victory. What formerly could be called victory, now means the suicidal shredding of our entire sociosphere and ecosphere.\textsuperscript{551}

In this situation, it is absurd to continue with competition for domination of any kind, including preparations for war. However, since preparing for war was the only way to protect security while the security dilemma was strong, people will continue with preparations for war as long as they are surrounded by people who overlook that the reality around us has dramatically changed. People continue with competition for domination as long as people around them cannot let go of the belief in the heroism of honour. What is needed now, and what I advocate, is the heroism of dignity.

In an overstretched world a certain problem becomes more apparent than before, namely, that domination has no inherent endpoint except for the total destruction of its substrate. Locusts survive only as long as they can move on, can fly to the next pasture; could they ravage all surfaces of the planet at the same time, they would cause their own extinction. This is the very trajectory humankind is currently following. What is lacking, are built-in mechanisms that would hinder domination from being driven to the point of self-destruction.

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Historian Gareth Porter speaks of the ‘perils of dominance’. Native American scholar Jack Forbes has denounced the Western compulsion to consume the Earth as ‘cannibalism’: ‘Brutality knows no boundaries. Greed knows no limits. Perversion knows no borders’. Philosopher Eric Hoffer adds: ‘You can never get enough of what you don’t really need’.

Accumulation is a linchpin of earlier forms of market exchange that produced a system driven by capital accumulation, says Howard Richards, philosopher of social science and scholar of peace and global studies, pointing at Karl Marx’s account of how one form of exchange leads to another. The resulting dilemma of our days is that it is now a physical necessity to keep the accumulation of capital going, explains Richards: ‘Life depends on production. Production depends on profit. Therefore, life depends on profit. Ergo, life depends on the accumulation of capital. The dependence of life on accumulation implies that every feature of society – education, religion, art, sports, media, family, taxes, wages, police, courts, music, architecture, agriculture and so on and on – must be compatible with accumulation’. In this way, we could say that the security dilemma has been compounded by a growth dilemma.

It is a mistake to think that the way out, the way to ‘goodness’ can be found in overcoming ‘beastly evil’ with ‘good rationality’, this is the warning Donald Carveth gives us. He finds the roots of morality not in reason, but in feeling, in sympathetic identification or ‘pity’. Following Carveth, it may be time for humankind to start feeling pity, pity both with ourselves and with our planet that has fallen victim to such a super-predator species as Homo sapiens that destroys itself and its habitat for the simple need to feel recognised by peers, peers who spell disaster if they remain blind to the fact that the security and growth dilemmas must be transcended now and can be transcended.

Anthropologist Arturo Escobar concurs: ‘Patriarchal modern societies fail to understand that it is emotioning that constitutes human history, not reason or the economy, because it is our desires that determine the kinds of world we create’. A culture of competition for domination – or patriarchy – is characterised ‘by actions and emotions that value competition, hierarchies, power, growth, appropriation, procreation, the domination of others, violence, and war, combined with the rational justification of it all in the name of truth’, explains Escobar. ‘In this culture, which engulfs most modern humans, we live in mistrust and seek certitude through control, including the control of the natural world’, Escobar laments. The antidote is love. Not love as a moral value, not blind love, but visionary love, love as a basic fact of biological and cultural existence, as ‘it liberates intelligence and expands coexistence in cooperation as it expands the domain in which our nervous system operates’. Escobar calls for historical matrismatic cultures to be returned, which is ‘characterised by conversations highlighting inclusion, participation, collaboration, understanding, respect, sacredness, and the always recurrent cyclic renovation of life’.

I am pleased to see that Escobar resonates with my views that ‘with the rise of pastoral societies, the transition from one culture to the other started and has not ceased ever since’. Yet, so Escobar consoles, ‘matrismatic practices persist in contemporary cultures, despite prevailing patriarchal ways. They survive, however partially and contradictorily, in mother or parent-child relations, in love relations, and in democracy’.

In my book on gender, humiliation, and global security, I speak of big love, the tough love of Gandhi’s satyāgraha (nonviolent action), a term that is assembled from agraha (firmness/force) and satya (truth-love). Double standards and the transition from honour humiliation to dignity humiliation

One way to approach a deeper understanding of equality in dignity is through exploring its

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violations. As mentioned earlier, philosopher Avishai Margalit has done work in this area with his notion of non-humiliation;\textsuperscript{562} as has philosopher of criminal justice John Kleinig with his similar notion of non-degradation;\textsuperscript{563} as has philosopher and political theorist Philip Pettit with non-domination;\textsuperscript{564} and physicist and educational reformer Robert Fuller with his rejection of what he calls rankism.\textsuperscript{565}

Other examples abound. The relationship between the Arab world and the so-called West has already been alluded to earlier. Political scientist Dominique Moïsi observes that a culture of humiliation ‘helps unite the Muslim world around its most radical forces and has led to a culture of hatred’.\textsuperscript{566} Moïsi describes a worldwide clash of emotions between a culture of humiliation in the Middle East, and a culture of hope in central Asia. In the West, he observes a culture of fear, fear of loss of identity and control, fear of economic instability, fear of immigration driven by violence and poverty, and of terrorism.

I was led to explore dignity through my research on humiliation as well. My conclusion after I had carried out my doctoral research in Somalia and Rwanda, in the light of the background of Nazi Germany, was: clashes of civilisations are not the problem,\textsuperscript{567} clashes of humiliation are.\textsuperscript{568} The reason is that feelings of humiliation potentially have the force of a ‘nuclear bomb of the emotions’.\textsuperscript{569} This is an adaptation of my summary from 2006:

Based on many years of research on humiliation, I would suggest that feelings of humiliation come about when deprivation is perceived as an illegitimate imposition of lowering or degradation, a degradation that cannot be explained in constructive terms. All human beings basically yearn for recognition and respect. When they perceive that due recognition and respect are withdrawn or denied they may feel humiliated. For that to happen, it does not matter whether this withdrawal of recognition is real or misread. Both the violation of ranked honour and of equal dignity can elicit feelings of humiliation, yet, diametrically opposed meta-scripts will be activated in response for how humiliation should be felt and acted on. The strongest force for creating rifts and destroying relationships is dignity humiliation, or, more precisely, the violation of the promise entailed in the human rights ideals that all people are part of one family with all members having the right to enjoy equal dignity.\textsuperscript{570}

The human rights proclamation of 1948 states that all human beings – not just all Americans or all French citizens or any other national citizens – deserve to be respected as being equal in dignity with all other members in the one single global family that inhabits planet Earth. This proclamation represents a revolutionary promise. Human rights ideals aim to liberate all people from humiliating oppression and they promise a better and happier world.

Ironically, wherever I go on our planet, I see feelings of humiliation on the increase now, rather than decreasing, as was hoped for. The proclamation of human rights ideals raises high hopes, yet, the problem is that, too often, these hopes are being disappointed in the next moment. Time and again, throughout the past decades, human rights ‘antipreneurs’ have undermined the mission of human rights ‘entrepreneurs’, and this has happened both overtly and covertly. Many say that it is a sign of progress when dominators feel the need to hide behind human rights rhetoric. Yet, double standards damage the human rights message perhaps more. Empty human rights rhetoric and double standards are insidious.\textsuperscript{571}

Empty human-rights rhetoric creates a deeply humiliating expectation gap between talk and practice. Scholar Stephan Feuchtwang formulated succinctly how double standards cause double damage: ‘To recognise humanity hypocritically and betray the promise, humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed.’\textsuperscript{572}

I am always surprised to observe the strength of the promise. However much it is betrayed,
this promise seems to be a genie that, once unleashed, cannot be put back into the bottle anymore. It has force now. On my global path, I observe how the sentence that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ has become a foundational value, far beyond mere legal concepts. The message seems to speak to a deep human desire, the desire to rise from being pushed down, as a deeply embodied experience, beyond language, beyond legal instruments. It is the desire to be respected as an equal fellow human being among fellow human beings.

Wherever and whenever people swallow it quietly when they are betrayed, there is no apparent problem. Yet, human rights ideals themselves stand in the way of such a passive outcome. The violation of dignity smarts more than the violation of honour, and therefore carries the potential to lead to more active responses, responses that might very well become violent – Gandhi-like figures are rare who can inspire people to transcend violence into peaceful social activism.

Why does the violation of dignity smart more than the violation of honour? In a ranked system of honour, a person’s own personal assessment and that of her peers determines whether her rank is being degraded unduly or not. In contrast, human rights ideals offer an unconditional right of equality in dignity to everybody, just for being born. This means that breaking the promise of equal dignity humiliates more intensely than when honour is infringed. Being ranked lower than expected in a ranked honour system does not immediately exclude from the human family, while being ranked lower than expected in an equal dignity context excludes from the human family entirely.

What I call dignity humiliation is thus much more intense than honour humiliation. When equality in dignity is promised but withheld, a dignity gap opens – or an indignity trap – which is more hurtful than an honour gap: if I am promised to be part of one united family of equals, and then debased, this means being excluded from that family entirely: I am no longer part of humanity. In contrast, having one’s honour humiliated, while upsetting, keeps one at least within the ranking orders of honour, only somewhat lower.

As the philological journey retraced in this paper has shown, the word humiliation was not used in the era of honour in the same way it is being used today. Loss of honour, or dishonour, was resisted only by masters who held superior positions in the social structure. Inflicting humiliation on inferiors was seen as a pro-social duty for superiors, while humility was regarded as a virtue for underlings in the face of superiors.

Honour humiliation can be categorised in four variants, as you see in Table 1 further down. A master uses conquest humiliation to subjugate formerly equal neighbours into a position of inferiority. When the hierarchy is in place, reinforcement humiliation keeps it in place, ranging from seating orders and bowing rules to brutal measures such as customary beatings or killings. Relegation humiliation is used to push an already low-ranking underling even further down, while exclusion humiliation means excluding victims altogether, exiling, or even killing them.

In an intermediary phase, modifying the structures of honour society but not yet arriving at an equal dignity society, it was the notion of decorum that opened up new space for the individual person and her worthiness to become less mask-like, less like an armour.

In a final phase, human rights ideals turn all four types of honour humiliation into the last one (exclusion humiliation) because all human rights violations exclude victims from humanity. This violation produces intense pain and suffering, because losing one’s dignity means being excluded from the human family altogether. This type of humiliation can be called human rights humiliation or dignity humiliation, or, even more precisely, equal dignity humiliation (to distinguish dignity from decorum). It is a deeply destructive and devastating experience that assaults people at their cores. It is in this context that practices of humiliation once considered ‘normal’, such as beating and ‘breaking the will’, acquire medical labels such
as *victimhood* and *trauma*.  

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<th>Honora Humiliation</th>
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<td>(1) Conquest humiliation: A strong power reduces the relative autonomy of rivals who were previously regarded as equals, and forces them into a position of long-term subordination. A new hierarchy is created, or a new upper tier is forced upon an existing hierarchical order.</td>
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<td>(2) Relegation humiliation: An individual or group is forcefully pushed downward within an existing status hierarchy.</td>
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<td>(3) Reinforcement humiliation: Routine abuse of those less powerful in order to maintain their self-perception that they are, indeed, inferior.</td>
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<td>(4) Exclusion humiliation: An individual or a group is forcefully ejected from society, for instance through banishment, exile, or physical extermination.</td>
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Table 1: Four variants of humiliation, thanking sociologist Dennis Smith, 2001, p. 543

Apartheid may illustrate the transition from honour humiliation to dignity humiliation and how patchy and incoherent it can be. Apartheid means segregation, and when it was devised, after the trauma of the Boer Wars, it was regarded as a solution and did not carry the taste of a violation, as painful as it was for those at the bottom. The global rise of the promise of equality in dignity gave this pain legitimacy so that it had the strength to inform *conscientisation*. This could have led to horrific genocidal killings, had not people like Nelson Mandela channelled its force into constructive societal change.

Human rights scholar Kathryn Sikkink notes: ‘Alongside decolonisation, African and Asian nations led what was perhaps the most important early and sustained international human rights struggle: the anti-apartheid campaign. As early as the 1940s, the African National Conference (ANC) explicitly embraced human rights as a fundamental goal of its struggle for racial justice’. Indeed, I am among those who admire Nelson Mandela’s path, yet, it stands in stark contrast to the brutal concentration camps that his fellow freedom fighters have implemented – as it seems, this was still done in the tradition of honour – as we can read in Paul Trewhela’s book from 2009, *Inside Quatro: Uncovering the exile history of the ANC and SWAPO*. The dark sides of the liberation struggle in South Africa remained hidden for very long and it took many years for this book to come out; as it seems, early phases of conscientisation did not yet inspire the humiliated to abstain from inflicting humiliation on others.

There are many forms of dignity humiliation, it can be perpetrated brutal and open or covert and hidden, and it can be inflicted by individuals or by entire societies. Impunity, for instance, can be considered to be an on-going form of systemic torture, perpetrated by society.
This is what psychologists and doctors say, for instance, in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru. In 2012, I had the privilege of learning about their work, when meeting with those who work with torture survivors and families of disappeared persons.\(^{581}\)

All around the world I meet human rights defenders and I observe that their mood has become darker during the past decades, after a brief return of optimism at the end of the Cold War.\(^{582}\) Many feel that the race for power and resources within and among states undermines the legitimacy of human rights, as does the suspicion that states use human-rights rhetoric only when it fits their interests.\(^{583}\)

Particularly those in the Global South feel betrayed. I have learned to understand deeply young voices such as that of Noha Tarek, when she laments that ‘wars, poverty, and deterioration of the human living condition turn the human’s psyche into a violent domineering unstable mind’.\(^{584}\) She is particularly wary when people in the North avoid looking into the face of their own betrayals and instead blame foreign religious scriptures for fundamentalism. The depth of Noha Tarek’s sense of scepticism and even humiliation becomes palpable when she calls out emphatically:

And guess who’s causing this war and poverty in the South? It’s the governments, militaries, and corporations of the North! But sadly, human rights organisations tend to focus the blame on the ‘weaker’ party, those fundamentalists of the un-modernised societies of the South, but they never direct any blaming finger to those parties who ‘created’ those fundamentalists, who committed genocides and brought about the death and destruction and deterioration that created those fundamentalists. Perhaps it is because those parties are too strong and powerful and internationally-domineering to be blamed!\(^{585}\)

Kathryn Sikkink, in her work, defends human rights and their advocates. In her 2011 book titled *The justice cascade*, she highlights the power of human rights prosecutions as a political tool: ‘Since World War II, and in particular since the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998, a dramatic new trend in world politics toward holding individual state officials, including heads of state, criminally accountable for human rights violations has emerged’.\(^{586}\) Sikkink highlights that this is ‘not to say that perfect justice has been done or will be done, or that most perpetrators of human rights violations, particularly among the state’s most powerful actors, will be held criminally accountable’. Rather, this justice cascade ‘entails a shift in what is considered the legitimate norm of individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and an increase in criminal prosecutions reflecting that norm’.

What needs to be acknowledged more in the West, as I see it, is that Noha Tarek and her friends might not be as lenient: they might feel profoundly hurt by such ‘imperfect justice’, and even humiliated by it being taken so lightly. My global living has taught me the extent to which people living in Western countries are shielded from experiencing the impact of their own governments’ treatment of non-citizens (or those defined as such). As a result, they are oblivious of the immensely humiliating effects of their own governments’ ‘too casual display of power’ in the rest of the world. Noha Tarek gives voice to the devastating results of the Global North’s blindness to their own double standards. Citizens in the West, shocked and bewildered, ask: ‘Why do they hate us so much?’

As international relations scholar Joseph Camilleri points out, the current international legal order, ‘is a function of the West’s technological, economic, and military supremacy’, and ‘until recently, this legal order was international only in name’.\(^{587}\) The West has used its supremacy throughout the past decades in ways that often were detrimental to the human-rights message in the rest of the world – the image of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq is a poignant illustration. Another illustration, from 1994, I find to be still valid. It was the UN’s Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, and on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in

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Mogadishu in 1994, Sam Engelstad, who wrote to me (I quote with his permission):

During my time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent... Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us.

Here is a more recent example of too casual a display of power. In 2018, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, John J. Sullivan, released the State Department’s annual human rights report covering nearly 200 countries and territories around the world. The report is required by U.S. law and is used as a factual resource for Congress and Executive and Judicial branches in their decision-making processes. In his remarks during the launch of this year’s report, Sullivan stated that: ‘Our foreign policy reflects who we are and promotes freedom as a matter of principle and interest. We seek to lead other nations by example in promoting just and effective governance based on the rule of law and respect for human rights. The United States will continue to support those around the world struggling for human dignity and liberty’. This is what journalist Gerard Horton comments: ‘It is difficult to argue with these sentiments. But they do ring jarringly hollow… the damage to America’s credibility won’t be limited to Israel/Palestine: Russia and China will also have reason to celebrate’.

As a result of the fact that the international legal order has been international only in name until recently, many of my friends in the Global South are surprised when they learn that ‘the shift from national to international protection of human rights was often championed by activists, diplomats, and jurists from the Global South’. Kathryn Sikkink reminds us that in 1948, people such as Charles Malik from Lebanon were involved in writing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or Peng-chun Chang from China, Hernán Santa Cruz from Chile, Bertha Lutz, a Brazilian biologist, feminist, and lawyer, and Hansa Mehta, an Indian delegate and independence activist. Clearly, these ‘Global South’ contributors may have been educated in Westernised institutions, and geographical origins do not automatically make individuals legitimate representatives of the concerns of the Global South. Still, as mentioned above, forty years of global living have shown me that the message of equality in dignity for all members of the human family is a profoundly welcome message all around the world; it is not a message that is ‘owned’ by the West.

It seems that the end of the Second World War opened a unique historical window of opportunity for human rights promoters, who, in addition, had the strength and courage to actually make use of this opportunity. In contrast, by now, windows seem to close rather than open. Forty civil society groups were allowed to serve as consultants to the US delegation at the San Francisco conference of 1945 where the UN Charter was drafted (women’s organisations, religious organisations, labour groups, and academics). Doubts may be warranted as to whether this would be possible in the same way today. On my global path I witness at close hold how civil society groups and their activities are being curtailed. This happens more covertly in the Global North – there it may simply come under the cover of calls for more ‘efficiency’ – while in the Global South many fear for their lives.

One of the many covert ways of undermining dignity is to make the focus on rights too narrow. As has been argued earlier, since equality in dignity is what informs human rights ideals, human dignity has to guide human rights. Neglecting human rights violates human

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dignity, and vice versa. Nurturing dignity must therefore not be left to the legal field and its professionals alone. Every single citizen who subscribes to human rights ideals, and society as a whole, is called to nurture dignity. This entails to remain alert and aware that human rights have the potential to violate human dignity if human rights are designed without regard to human dignity.

Critical legal studies provide many insights into traps that need to be avoided. *Law and development* is an interdisciplinary study of law and economic and social development. In the 1960s, the law and development movement saw leading legal scholars from American law schools write many articles discussing law reform in developing countries, sponsored by American organisations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Ford Foundation. It took only one decade, and failure was declared by key scholars who had been involved and by former Ford Foundation officials. Despite of this, the movement was revived in the 1980s, this time supported by the World Bank, USAID, and other public agencies and private foundations, now with law reform projects being based on neoliberal ideals such as privatisation and trade liberalisation. Soon, also these efforts were being criticised as ineffective or counterproductive. Yong-Shik Lee, director of the Law and Development Institute founded in 2009, identifies as reason for the failure of both movements that they lacked sufficient understanding of how the Laws of Foreign Investments impact economic and social development.

Paulo Barrozo is an expert on the nature and evolution of law. He asks: ‘But can we silence the longing for deeper and more universal emancipation in justice, equality, freedom, dignity, and reason? Should we? I do not think we can or should’. He continues, ‘Given the limits it inevitably encounters, the Great Alliance model of moral imagination may not last forever. And the masses, from Rio and New York to Cairo, Tehran, and Kiev, seem to be returning to the world stage, again challenging legal philosophy to imagine their place in contemporary law, but this time not out of fear, but out of hope’. He explains that ‘law is, and will always be, the creation and the institutional expression of moral imagination’:

The dispute is over the type of moral imagination that will influence law and legal thought. Will law and legal thought become the terrain of open and reflective moral imagination or will they continue to function as a limited space for creative problem solving?... We are challenged to imagine a new covenant between history, reason, and will, one that is able to further expand authentic and recognised freedom in evolving social orders without failing to provide for the functions of social integration and cultural reproduction. Second, we are challenged to imagine a new covenant able to serve the expansion and deepening of the human capacities to learn, reason, create, judge, invent, connect, and act.

What does Barrozo mean by the ‘Great Alliance model of moral imagination’, and how was it detrimental? Barrozo describes jurists as a class that is ‘peculiarly sensitive to social change’ and what they do best when facing challenges, is creating legal doctrines. Barrozo goes back to the revolutionary events of 1848 in Europe and the Civil War in the United States, and how ‘entrenched-interest holders’ tried to ‘tame the wild surges of mass politics once and for all’ through ‘the creation of a form of consciousness capable of limiting reform while speaking in the language of the revolutionary reformers’. Barrozo recalls that in the eighteenth century, some thought that ‘law could be conquered through reason’, while others put their hopes on history. Nineteenth-century jurists had the answer: ‘Only the combined insights of historicism and rationalism could forge the kind of legal consciousness capable of reining in and corralling modern popular “will”’. Barrozo explains:

The mission assigned to (or the function assumed by or the elective affinities of) legal

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thought in this context was to subdue popular will through a jurisprudence serving a preservationist ethos, while paying due homage to reason and incremental reform. Here lies the birth of the Great Alliance between historicism, rationalism, and will.\textsuperscript{598}

The result of this nineteenth century Great Alliance amalgamation of ‘utopian rationalism’, ‘consequentialist historicism’, and ‘popular will’ was that philosophical hope and political enthusiasm were stifled, and ‘a period of mysticism, empiricism, naturalism, positivism, irrationalism, and pragmatism ensued’.\textsuperscript{599} Still today, the consequences are felt, says Barrozo: ‘the legal and institutional framework of contemporary Western democracies is left overlegitimised and substantially shielded from deep-cutting rational challenge and reimagination’.\textsuperscript{600} If we want to manifest ‘the role of law as a broker between the past and the future of social orders and the social functions of legal doctrine’, so Barrozo, we should have the courage, today, ‘to rekindle and transform the utopian rationalism’.\textsuperscript{601}

Barrozo follows legal philosopher Duncan Kennedy in describing three waves of legal consciousness in jurisprudence, mainly in the Anglo-Saxon sphere, and from there trickling out into the world. Each wave cast ‘its own cognitive-normative-practical plan onto the world’: first, classical legal thought (between 1850 and 1914), second, the social legal consciousness (between 1900 and 1968), and, third, modern legal consciousness, or what Barrozo calls \textit{idealising reflective equilibrium or reflective equilibrium idealism} (post-World War II).\textsuperscript{602} The first wave was ‘centred on the aspirations of science and on the ideas of rights-holding legal subjects and insulated spheres of autonomy of the will within which private and public actors could operate in socially unconditioned ways’\textsuperscript{603} In the second wave, sociological sensibility was inserted into legal thought, recognising ‘the interdependence of social spheres and actors, to which it reacted with a mosaic of compromises and policies protective of privileged private interests’.\textsuperscript{604} The result, however, was highly problematic: a host of distributive and regulatory conflicts arose, and some higher level of rationalising abstraction was needed to solve them. ‘Idealising reflective equilibrium scaled these heights on the back of American post-war constitutional law. The ever-elusive but continually reassured equilibrium to be achieved was that between socioeconomic expediencies and the idea of individual rights’.\textsuperscript{605} For Barrozo, the critique of contemporary legal thought (or what Barrozo prefers to call idealising reflective-equilibrium) is imprisoned within the Great Alliance.\textsuperscript{606}

What does Barrozo mean when he calls on us to leave behind the shackles of the Great Alliance, when he calls for the courage ‘to rekindle and transform the utopian rationalism’?\textsuperscript{607} In legal doctrine and thought, three kinds of reason – instrumental, cognitive, and idealist reason – appeal to the faculty of reason to ‘chart broad directions of development for the law’.\textsuperscript{608} \textit{Instrumental} reason is the ‘concern with consequences, expediency, cost-benefit analysis’, \textit{cognitive} reason means ‘science and expertise’, while \textit{idealist} reason refers to ‘revelation of the true meaning and the legitimate forms of social manifestation of values such as freedom, equality, justice, and dignity’.\textsuperscript{609} Many challenges lie ahead. One of them is the notion of freedom: ‘Freedom as dignity demands recognition by others and responsiveness on the part of institutions of governance’.\textsuperscript{610} It is therefore insufficient today to merely grant freedom of conscience and expression, because only when freedom is qualified by authenticity, is it also autonomy: ‘Freedom as autonomy demands that the content of conscience be, in matters of the greatest import, experienced as authored, or at least willingly and reflectively accepted, by the self. Only then does the self mean what it says, creates, feels, and does’.\textsuperscript{611}

Barrozo calls on us to recognise to which extent we still are captive of ‘the nineteenth-century elites’ anxieties’ and their ‘theoretical and argumentative manoeuvres’,\textsuperscript{612} and he asks us to dare embrace more courageous analysis and action.

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To conclude this section, I find the human desire for recognition promising. It unites us and thereby provides us with a platform for contact and cooperation. Ethnic, religious, or cultural differences, or conflicts of interests, after all, carry the potential to engender creative cooperation and problem solving, and diversity can be a source of mutual enrichment. For almost forty years, I have ‘tested’, through my personal global life, the hypothesis of whether it is possible to approach all human beings on this planet as family, or not, and I can attest to the strength of the human eagerness to connect as equal fellow human beings. These are thick attractors, to use the language of Peter Coleman’s dynamical systems theory.⁶¹³

Yet, and this is my warning, connection can only succeed within relationships characterised by respect for equality in dignity for all, by actually walking the talk of equal dignity in solidarity, and refraining from double standards. When true respect and recognition fail, those who feel put down and victimised are prone to highlight whatever differences there are – religious, ethnic, racial – to ‘justify’ rifts, rifts that could easily be bridged were it not for the barriers of humiliation. In that way, clashes of humiliation are dangerous, while clashes of civilisations can be enriching. Clashes of humiliation can reverse the global interconnectedness that carries the potential to attenuate the security dilemma, re-divide the world, and re-strengthen the security dilemma.

It is therefore the aim of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship to contribute to convening a global dignity community.

**Beware of the dignity mission creep**

**Aly Juju and the 54 Thieves**

In the Africa Unlimited scheme of things
A dark, deeply entrenched Orwellian cabal
Holds sway.
Sovereignty is majestic void
Predation is power
Tyranny is liberty
Bondage is freedom
Poverty is progress
Violence is peace
Reign of terror is rule of law
Humiliation is dignity.

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written in Nairobi in January 2018, as a ‘manifestation of a raw and rumbling African cry for dignity and freedom’, in the aftermath of the 2018 Heads of State of the African Union meeting in Addis Ababa for their 30th summit on the theme of fighting and ending corruption and promoting sustainable transformation. *Aly Juju and the 54 Thieves* is an African fairy tale modelled on *Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves* that featured in the magical one thousand and one nights Arabian fable: in Africa, there are 54 countries and there always comes one guy who pretends that he is the good guy who will deal with the evil 54 thieves – unfortunately this fantastic illusion exits only in the realm of imagination...⁶¹⁴

Social theorist Margaret Archer holds that dignity is of utmost importance.⁶¹⁵ However, she also asks: Which kind of dignity? This is the same question I asked myself when I came to prefer the Lévinasian definition of dignity over the Kantian definition.
Sociologist Mark Regnerus looked at the different ‘kinds of dignity’ that are around today and he observed a ‘mission creep’ of dignity, a creep from what he calls Dignity 1.0 to Dignity 2.0.615 Dignity 1.0 held sway from times far back before Immanuel Kant (1724–1824) and Catholic Pope Leo XIII in 1891, up to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thereafter, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the notion of dignity was used less, only to re-emerge in the 1990s, however, this time as Dignity 2.0.617 Dignity 2.0 aligns with its predecessor insofar as it has to do with inherent worth, the reality of the good, and rights seen to be flowing from dignity. However, while Dignity 1.0, as Regnerus sees it, pointed at the ability to ‘flourish as the person one is and should become’ and to help other persons to do the same, Dignity 2.0 appears to disregard flourishing in favour of freedom, autonomy, and independence.618 Also another sociologist, Christian Smith, warns that ‘flourishing personhood’ can only become manifest if society takes real action to nurture it by social practices, institutions, and structures; otherwise, it will be damaged.619

If we look at the backgrounds of these three sociologists, Archer, Regnerus, and Smith, we notice that the three have a Catholic background. Margaret Archer emphasises the four pillars of Catholic social teaching: human dignity, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the common good, and calls for transforming late modernity into a ‘civilisation of love’.620 Tina Beattie is a professor of Catholic Studies and she explains the Catholic approach to defining intrinsic and extrinsic dignity, whereby intrinsic dignity pertains to the nature of our being, while extrinsic dignity refers to how we live. Intrinsic dignity comes with ‘being made in the image of God with a capacity for rationality and freedom that is accorded to no other species’, therefore, not even a murderer loses his personal dignity.621 Extrinsic dignity can be undermined or violated, for instance, ‘by the selfishness, consumerism and freneticism of modern life, by the exploitation, abuse and marginalisation of those who are poor, and by neglect and violence towards those who are vulnerable, particularly the unborn and the elderly’, and ‘to trample on the dignity of another is to trample on one’s own dignity’.623

If we look at Richard Ashcroft’s systematisation presented earlier, we might place Archer, Regnerus, Smith, and Beattie into the fourth category of views on dignity, while thinkers like Ruth Mackins and Steven Pinker appear to rather fall into the first.

The message of Catholic authors who speak up for human dignity is also expressed in liberation theology.624 By drawing on Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, in liberation theology, the notion of the common good, or bonum commune in Latin, has been expanded to bonum commune humanitatis, meaning the common good not just of one nation but of all of humanity, of the Weltgemeinwohl in German.625 Catholic development organisations such as Misereor now emphasise the global common good or Weltgemeinwohl as global social and ecological responsibility.626 Clearly, as I would add, as humanity’s common good is intricately linked also with nature, international law needs to become more inclusive and expand into bonum commune humanitatis et naturae, meaning the common good of humanity as part of nature.

The magisterium of the Catholic church has adopted human dignity at the end of the nineteenth century with Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum, and it was developed further in 1931, with Pius XI, and with John XXIII in the 1960s. All this has happened in response to two perceived threats: first the threat feared from a communist push toward radical redistribution, class war, and totalitarianism, and, second, the threat from ‘radical individualism, in particular an individualism that was seen as supporting unbridled capitalism’.627

In 2016, Pope Francis called on his followers to ‘renew their commitment to defending the most vulnerable in society, to promoting human dignity, and to preserving Christian principles in the public square’.628 The Dignitatis Humanae Institute (DHI), also known as the Institute for Human Dignity or L’Istituto Dignitatis Humanae, is a Catholic-inspired NGO.
based in Rome. The DHI has been engaged in launching parliamentary working groups on human dignity in various legislatures around the world, all based on the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Dignity. The Universal Declaration of Human Dignity was launched on 8th December 2008 by the International Committee on Human Dignity, and it aims to codify what is meant by human dignity, namely, ‘that man is made in the image and likeness of God; that this image and likeness proceeds in every single human being without exception from conception until natural death; and that the most effective means of safeguarding this recognition is through the active participation of the Christian faith in the public square’.

As mentioned earlier, discourse analyst Michael Karlberg speaks of the social command frame of dignity, in contrast to the social contest frame and the social body frame. In the terminology of Mark Regnerus, the social body frame corresponds to Dignity 1.0 (inherent worth), and the social contest frame to Dignity 2.0 (emphasising autonomy). Karlberg recommends looking also at other religious traditions besides Catholicism and other orientations within Christianity, for instance, the worldwide Baha’i community, ‘which has over a century of experience applying non-adversarial models... in an integrated and mutually reinforcing manner’.

As to the notion of autonomy, the social body frame of dignity does not neglect it; it only embeds it differently than Dignity 2.0. Karlberg explains:

The social body frame thereby entails respect for individual agency and autonomy (within the bounds of moderation). This is because the development of an individual’s latent potential, and the direction of that potential toward the common good, cannot be imposed on an individual against their will. Rather, it can only emerge as an expression of a will that is informed by a consciousness of the essential unity and interdependence of humanity. Therein lies the key to human dignity within the social body frame: it is achieved through the voluntary subordination of self-centred instincts and appetites to the well-being of the entire social body.

Karlberg emphasises the responsibility of all social institutions – families, schools, media, corporations, the state – to foster and protect the development of the human potential, and to channel it toward the common good. And this implies more than merely guaranteeing individual liberty: ‘It implies fostering the consciousness of the oneness of humanity and providing a framework for acting upon this consciousness in our private and public lives’.

Philosopher Thaddeus Metz, a professor at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, connects cooperation and dignity in ways reminiscent of Regnerus’ Dignity 1.0. He offers an alternative to the Dignity 2.0 conception of the West, where dignity is seen to inhere in certain (typically Kantian) forms of rationality essentially related to autonomy. Metz invokes an Afro-communitarian conception of human dignity that is closer to Lévinas’ views and that develops the idea that human beings have dignity in virtue of their communal nature, in virtue of their capacity for what he calls ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity’. The foundation of communal practice is consensus, rather than the will of a majority or a monarch. Even when retributive punishment is meted out after a violation, it still contains elements of reconciliation among the offender, his family, the immediate victim, and the broader community. ‘The dignity of human beings emanates from the network of relationships, from being in community; in an African view, it cannot be reduced to a unique, competitive and free personal ego’, says also the South African theologian and academic leader H. Russel Botman.

Metz explains that sub-Saharan thought brings together two different sorts of relationship, that of identity and that of solidarity. Identity is the sharing of a way of life, identifying with each other, and conceiving of ourselves as ‘we’, while solidarity is the caring for others’
quality of life, or what English speakers would call love or friendship: ‘One could identify with others but not exhibit solidarity with them – probably workers in relation to management in a capitalist firm. One could also exhibit solidarity with others but not identify with them, e.g. by making anonymous donations to a charity’. Metz lays out:

To exhibit solidarity with one another is for people to care about each other’s quality of life, in two senses. First, it means that they engage in mutual aid, acting in ways that are expected to benefit each other (ideally, repeatedly over time). Second, caring is a matter of people’s attitudes such as emotions and motives being positively oriented toward others, say, by sympathising with them and helping them for their sake. For people to fail to exhibit solidarity could be for them to be indifferent to each other’s flourishing or to exhibit ill will in the form of hostility and cruelty.

Metz lines up a number of sub-Saharan thinkers and their sense of community: ‘Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all’. ‘Harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations within the group’. ‘The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an overall way of life, inspired by the notion of the common good’. ‘(T)he purpose of our life is community-service and community-belongingness’.

Metz argues that when our dignity is grounded in our capacity for communal or friendly relationships, then to degrade this capacity means violating human rights. The innocent have the right not to be killed, enslaved, or tortured because such actions disrespect the capacity for community of all involved, victims and perpetrators. If the project of the West is to destroy communal practice and the dignity connected with it, then, he warns, we may predict that it does so at its peril.

All these scholars form the same bridges that also I attempt to build in my work, namely, bridges between modernity and the two counter-movements against modernity that often are hostile to each other, what Paul Ray and Sherry Ruth Anderson called the traditionals, those who wish to turn back into an imagined past, and the cultural creatives, those who turn their eyes toward a new future.

All of those groups and trends described by Ray and Anderson – moderns, traditionals, and inward and outward oriented cultural creatives – have the potential to use or abuse the terminology of dignity. Oppression was perpetrated, for example, in the Colonia-Dignidad community in Chile, where dignity was trampled on under the very banner of dignity.

All groups can also manifest a constructive kind of dignity, the kind that nourishes unity in diversity. I myself share the deep sense of uneasiness that cultural creatives express when they look at the current state of affairs in the world, and I invite all groups into combining the best they have to offer: In a first step, we can all turn inward, so as to liberate ourselves from dogmas of the past that are no longer suitable in a new interconnected world. Then we can co-create visions for a dignified future for our children. Finally, we can go out together and become activists in the ‘global street’.

Global civil society needs to go ‘into the streets’, as I see it, because the mission creep of the concept of dignity is part of a much larger mission creep that currently affects all spheres of life. The promise of equal dignity was first undermined by double standards. By now, however, many of those standards are no longer even double in the sense of being promised but not delivered: they risk being downgraded into accepting the status quo, going back to the Zeitgeist prior to the promise of equal human dignity for all. To say it short: money is pushing dignity to the wayside.

If we look at contemporary trends in the light of a long time frame, then we see that
indigenous foragers still had ‘a life’ and did not ‘go to work’. Theirs was the most comprehensive anchoring of a person’s being-on-this-planet. Anthropologist Alan Page Fiske calls this model of living communal sharing. Today, every aspect of life is moving into the least comprehensive anchoring, namely, the one that degrades quality into the quantity of a calculus, or what Fiske calls market pricing.

Anthropologist Alan Page Fiske found that people, most of the time and in all cultures, use just four elementary and universal forms or models for organising most aspects of sociality: Interaction can be structured, (1) according to what people have in common, or communal sharing (2) according to ordered differences, or authority ranking, (3) additive imbalances, or equality matching, and, finally, (4) according to ratios, or market pricing. These four social models follow the well-known four scales of measurement of nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio, of which the first is the most comprehensive and qualitative and the last one the least comprehensive and most quantitative. When people emphasise what they have in common, it is Fiske’s model of communal sharing they give priority to. Family life is often informed by communal sharing, embracing the motto of ‘one for all and all for one’, or ‘every family member gives what she can and gets what she needs’. Trust, love, care, and intimacy can prosper in this context. This is the arena for the dignity of a Homo amans, the loving being. This overlaps with the term Gemeinschaft (community) that sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies coined, in contrast to Gesellschaft (society). The African philosophy of ubuntu has its place here. ‘Communal Sharing relationships are formed among people who are considered and who consider themselves equal (in one or more aspects). The participants in this relationship feel togetherness; they are bounded; they have something in common (interest, origin, blood, etc.), and refer to themselves as “we”’. When people set out to create ordered differences, it is the model that Fiske calls authority ranking they use. Authority ranking involves asymmetry among people who are ordered along vertical hierarchical social dimensions – it can be a good parent who manifests the Homo amans model, or it can be a brutal dictator who follows a Homo dominans path. Equality matching is the third model, a model for arranging interactions in terms of additive imbalances, implying a balance of taking turns, for instance, in car pools or babysitting cooperatives. The fourth, the market pricing model, views relationships as defined by proportions or rates, and this is the arena of Homo economicus.

At the present point in history, every aspect of life at all corners of the planet is moving toward what Fiske calls market pricing. On the surface, in official rhetoric, this is supposed to serve everybody’s interest and to benefit all, yet, statistics of rising inequality show that this is a mission shift that benefits but a few, and at the price of wearing down the social and ecological fabric of the world. Indigenous psychologist Louise Sundararajan reminds us that ‘neoliberal governmentality’ operates not through the domination and oppression of citizens, but ‘by making their subjectivity a target of influence’.

Bringing millions into a monetised world and hailing this as ‘lifting them out of poverty’, might turn out to be a very short-term success. Inviting ever more people to participate in a glitzy albeit unsustainable party – as much as people might cherish this invitation – is no true long-term success. Successes of economism can only be perceived as successes within a narrow Homo economicus model, and only as long as externalities are disregarded. As soon as we use a Homo amans model, it is no longer a success.

In other words, while the most comprehensive model, namely, communal sharing, needs to receive more attention by society if it wants to be sustainable, contemporary society allows market pricing, the poorest model, to reign, thus hollowing out life at all levels. The market pricing model is advocated as a path to freedom, yet, the opposite happens. A culture of ranked honour more than of equal dignity is the result when ever more consumption is regarded as an easily quantifiable path to higher rank, while the quality of life through wisdom, knowledge, and the loving nurturing of relationships is falling by the wayside.

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Equal dignity can only emerge in the context of communal sharing, combined with authority ranking that emphasises the nurturing care of good parenting rather than oppressive domination, and only as long as it protects quality from being overly quantified.

The ‘party’ that economism throws at the present point at time wherever there are social and ecological resources still available to be exploited, echoes earlier mission creeps in past history. Many revolutions began with a sense of enthusiasm and promise, only to end in systemic oppression brought about by what I call the art of humiliation. Peace researcher Johan Galtung would call it cultural violence. Napoléon Bonaparte, for instance, turned the French Revolution’s ideal of egalitarianism into its opposite. Vladimir Illyich Lenin ended a promising February Revolution and turned it into an authoritarian October Revolution, only to be succeeded by Joseph Stalin, an even more ruthless despot. Even the West was afflicted by this revolution, as influential author Ayn Rand learned the wrong lessons from this revolution, lessons she imported to America, which, eventually, brought even the Western economic system almost to its knees. Iran’s revolution in 1979 against a brutal and authoritarian rulership was originally set off by students, by secular Iranians, who thought that Khomeini was only a figurehead and expected that the secular groups would take over power after the revolution. Egypt’s hopeful 2011 dignity revolution has by now brought military rule.

Also the notion of ‘work’ traverses a mission creep that calls for attention to the uses of concepts of dignity if we wish to transition to a dignity economy. In former times, slaves were beaten into work. Then, slavery was abolished. However, this did not mean that workers no longer had to live in fear; now they feared ‘no job, no food’. Over time, in Western countries, labour movements fought for improved conditions. Workers could go to a well-deserved retirement in old age. Yet, fear of humiliation remained: whenever a job is the path to ‘earn’ the respect of society, then losing the job means losing respect. In many contexts it is still today seen as a virtue to self-mutilate oneself and one’s talents to fit into ‘wage slavery’, so as to ‘earn’ one’s livelihood and one’s respect. Very recently, however, even this path to respect has become ever more stony, at least for the majority, as precarious work is on the increase. ‘If meaning has since chattel slavery and factory servitude disappeared from many people’s work, then it is only as a result of vocations transforming into jobs – the declension of life’s purpose into drudgery, the replacement of realising one’s potential into the slave-like consignation to what Gorgio Agamben calls “bare life”’. A problem arises when the Zeitgeist regards employers and investors as unequivocally ‘good’ people, who ‘create’ and ‘offer’ jobs. Philosopher Howard Richards explains: ‘The proposition that more investor-friendly reforms will serve the common good is treated as a given needing no proof; as if it were a joke that had already been told; as if those who did not understand the joke and did not know when to laugh, or did not know whether to laugh or cry, were not so much mistaken as left out of the conversation, deprived of voice’. Richards adds: ‘The historical conditions of the possibility of unemployment did not exist until Africa was conquered by Europeans’.

Inequality has now increased to absurd levels, locally and globally, yet, the so-called leisure class, many of those who live in luxury rather than ‘working hard’, do not question their own impact and prefer to accuse critics of suffering from envy. The self-mutilation into wage slavery, while still seen as a virtue by many, is by now increasingly being supplanted by the idolisation of entrepreneurship. This idolisation is partly justified, as it is true that a ‘slavish’ mind cannot contribute with creativity to a society that is in ever greater need of it. However, what is overlooked is that in a system that is rigged, also the most dedicated entrepreneurship risks ending in new forms of self-exploitation and self-humiliation.

At the same time, I still meet adherents to the traditional order of honour in many parts of the world, there are still those who regard the application of humiliation as pro-social:

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‘Employees need to be humiliated, otherwise they do not work! Humiliation is an important tool in the workplace! It teaches people the right work ethics! Don’t take this tool away from us!’ this is an argument I have frequently heard voiced in the corporate sector. I was reprimanded in this way by a celebrated Indian economy professor in the United States in 2002, and by a renowned Chinese organisational consultant in 2006.663

Academia carries a particular responsibility to protect society from destructive mission creeps. I am among those who fear that academia is largely failing this responsibility.664 Former economy professor and founder of the Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative, Kamran Mofid, wrote on 21st March 2018, in response to news about university vice-chancellors being paid far more than public sector peers:

The neoliberal charlatans made the students customers, universities the service providers and the vice-chancellors the Deans and Heads of Departments of a better understanding of greed and ‘thieving’. And all along silly me was thinking that teaching was a vocation for the common good.665

Higher education presently maximises its training functions and certification processes, but fails to comply with its most important raison d’être: ‘the liberation of the human mind to think about the needs of society and engage the capacities of the individual to address those needs’.666 This failing is related to the culture that the security dilemma engendered. The background is a tradition that gives significance to everything that is ‘hard’, worthy of ‘male’ rationality, while what is ‘soft’ smacks of ‘female’ irrationality. In my books on emotion and conflict (2009), and gender, humiliation, and global security (2010), I discuss the reasons why emotion has long been overlooked in academic inquiry.667 Tellingly, it is ‘hard’ technology, such as functional MRI (fMRI), a neuroimaging technique, that now leads to emotions becoming more visible, as brain areas which are involved in emotion now can be studied the ‘hard’ way.

This striving for ‘hardness’, and its ‘pseudo-hard’ out-growth, namely, quantification just for the sake of quantification, betrays that a rather ‘soft’ psychological problem lies behind it, namely, a problem with ‘physics envy’. I observe it in academic institutions all around the world, and see it intensifying throughout the past decades. I see it undermining academia’s relevance for real life and weakening the very scientificity of science. Terrorism research is one of the victims of such trends. Funding continues to be biased in favour of philosophically indefensible quantitative methodologies, even though the hope of those agencies has largely failed, namely, the hope that the social sciences can provide them with ‘hard’ explanatory models fashioned on a positivistic interpretation of the natural sciences.668

Scientist and novelist C. P. Snow may have been right to say that it was a mistake to split the intellectual life of Western society into the sciences and the humanities.669 This split may have served what Michel Foucault called governmentality, namely, the manipulation of populations.670 Philosopher Jürgen Habermas defines ‘scientism’ as ‘science’s belief in itself: the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science’.671 Social psychologist Michael Billig wrote a book titled, Learn to write badly: How to succeed in the social sciences, where he laments the present trend toward mediocre technocratic thinking and writing in academia, driven by an increased push toward competition that forces scholars to build self-importance, even if only achieved through overly technical terminology.672

As I see it, many academics are being complicit in keeping societies in what I call a state of self-humiliation, or in a collective Stockholm syndrome.673 This syndrome was first conceptualised when a group of hostages was held by robbers in a Stockholm bank for five days.674 It describes the identification with the oppressor as ‘an emotional bond between

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hostages and their captors, frequently observed when the hostages are held for long periods of time under emotionally straining circumstances.  

The present ‘captor’ of society, including of academia, appears to be a nexus of corporate and national interests that introduces yet another wave of idolising ‘hardness’, this time cloaked in the language of modernisation and efficiency. What is sold out, literally, is academic freedom and integrity. What is sacrificed is an invaluable academic tradition of cooperation for the sake of gaining relevant insights together, rather than merely competing for funding and the best way to monetisation.

This trend of hollowing out quality for the sake of quantity in the academic world is made possible, among others, by the fact that scientists, as most others, depend on their ‘job’ for financial stability, but more, it may perhaps also betray a certain lack of courage. I often hear entrepreneurs look down on academics, saying: ‘Academics are cowards and clever rationalisers: they present cowardice as a virtue necessary for “objective detachment”’. I must admit that I sometimes feel compelled to agree with these harsh judgments, even though I am an academic myself. While humility is a virtue that is indispensable for true integrity – scientific and otherwise – humility turns into a violation if it is used as a hide-out for cowardice in the face of abusive power.

What many academics tend to overlook is the immense influence they do have, even if they do not aim for it and simply wish to secure a career. This influence is being instrumentalised precisely because of its potency. Where would fascism have been without its philosophers? ‘Murderous professors’ stood behind the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Cambodia’s Pol Pot studied with Nicos Poulantzas (1936–1979), a Greco-French political sociologist in Paris. Pol Pot turned Poulantzas’ academic reflections into rigid ideology, implementing it in his homeland, and Poulantzas, seeing what he had set in motion, committed suicide. States, international financial institutions, and NGOs now increasingly engage in arrogant ‘new managerialism’ and ‘all of these share a lack of humility, a keynote of the development power/knowledge complex’. The documentary Inside job exposed the degree to which academic influence had contributed to preparing the ground for what later broke into the devastating economic crisis of 2007/2008.

On my part, I would like to do my utmost to use the potential that academia has to influence society, yet, I want to use this influence responsibly, for the benefit of the dignity of all. For me, it is part of this endeavour that I do not shy away from terms such as ‘humiliation’. I follow Michael Billig and his warning in his above-mentioned book that technical terminology with its unquestioned faith that reality consists of variables waiting to be reliably measured is often less precise than simpler language. I would add that it is often also less relevant for ‘real life’. I cherish the Humboldtian model of higher education of holistic Bildung, rather than mere Ausbildung, or training.

Joni Odochaw offers advice from Northern Thailand. He is a wisdom teacher in the field of natural resources and environmental management in the Karen village of Ban Nong Thao in Northern Thailand. He was brought to us by Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, founding director of the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development at Chiang Mai University, who hosted our 23rd Annual Dignity Conference in 2014. Together with three colleagues, I had the great privilege of spending three days in Joni Odochaw’s village. We were able to learn from him and his family to better understand the dilemma of education, television, and the digital world, and how they can be destructive for sustainable ways of living, or beneficial. Odochaw and his son and nephew introduced us to their ‘Lazy School’ concept, and eloquently explained how traditional community learning used to work: Everybody in a traditional Karen village once had the skills to be student and teacher for village life – how to care for buffaloes, where to plant which plants to protect the village from fire, and so forth – it was an intergenerational co-learning connection, and all this is interrupted now. As long as

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children are obliged to spend their days in schools, where they learn to sit still on chairs or march to military tunes in the courtyard, they are lost for village life when they leave school at the age of twelve. Instead, they join the flood of poor young people into the cities, hoping for paid jobs and a ‘better life’ – in vain. Joni Odochaw now uses much of his time in communal meetings addressing the rise of drug addiction and domestic violence in society. The first student of the Lazy School, a young man from the United States, Peter Dering, was present during our visit, and he gave this advice to the world: ‘Our vision for the future must be to expand community learning to include modern knowledge through technology, rather than lose community learning!’ 683 The vision is to install computer technology in the village homes and integrate the window to the world that this technology enables into traditional community learning, rather than removing the children from the village: it means bringing learning to the children in their communities, rather than cut them off from their communities by bringing them to learning.

Psychologist Kenneth Gergen speaks of a student’s relationships as multiple circles of participation, comprising mother, father, siblings, friends, and so on, where each of these circles is educational. 684 Each circle can increase a student’s capacities, sensibilities, and skills for relating, each can generate opportunities (or limitations), each can teach their own ways of ‘doing knowledge’.

During my forty years of global living, I have learned to deeply resonate with Gergen’s warnings against debate and argument. Debate closes the focus, risks neglecting the broader context; it polarises and invites mutual negation as it pits one side against another. The moment a person has committed to a given side, participants transmute into combatants, relationships are threatened, and the ‘opposition’ will be targeted with a gamut of devaluation biases. Seldom will one side congratulate the other on making a good point.

To ‘do knowledge’ successfully together, Gergen suggests four foci of attention for educators: first, include all students and do not allow a few to dominate conversations; second, allow student concerns to determine the topics, rather than simply offering ‘canned lectures’ and lock-step power-point presentations; third, credit the students’ capacity to understand, rather than focus on correcting them; and, fourth, encourage ‘teachers to risk their status as ultimate knowers’ by ‘replacing the goal of Truth with that of expanding the range of intelligible realities’. 685 Gergen promises that as soon as teachers dare to ‘thrust themselves into the collective process’, the results will be a ‘more intense engagement, flourishing of ideas and insights, affirming of supportive relationships, and a reduction in alienation and resistance’. 686 Ultimately, this will prepare students for ‘democratic participation, enable them to master multiple points of view, and invite a deeper probing of moral issues’. 687

In my work, I always invite everybody into journeys of mutually enriching co-reflection, rather than offering rigid statements of alleged truths for others to conform or oppose. My entire work is inscribed into a culture of deliberative discourse, in Aristotle’s terminology, rather than a culture of debate. 688 I am only too aware that constructive controversy is often more beneficial than confrontation. When Aristotle spoke of deliberative discourse, he thought of jointly conversing about the advantages and disadvantages of proposed actions, aiming at synthesising novel solutions embedded in creative problem solving. 689 As a young psychology student, I studied psychologist Carl Rogers and his client-centred therapy and student-centred learning, which entailed that a person should not judge or teach another person but facilitates another’s learning. 690 Researcher Mary Belenky calls for connected knowing rather than separate knowing. 691 In connected knowing ‘one attempts to enter another person’s frame of reference to discover the premises for the person’s point of view’. 692 Connected knowing, incidentally, can also be called ‘women’s ways of knowing’. 693 Philosopher Agnes Heller, in her theory of the consciousness of everyday life, describes how masculinity, on an ordinary, everyday level, reproduces itself through the interplay of
individual consciousness and social structures, and how the masculinist models of consciousness objectify world order, obfuscating how fluid and continuously malleable it is in reality. Jürgen Habermas advocates public deliberation. We should grapple with issues. The concept of nudging, at least as long as it also teaches resistance to paternalistic manipulation, can be helpful. Social psychologist Morton Deutsch has suggested persuasion strategies and nonviolent power strategies. Sociologist Seymour M. Miller recommends let-it-flow thinking to prevail over verdict thinking. The Buberian I-Thou orientation, the terminology of capabilities and human flourishing by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, or the teachings of dialogue by Paulo Freire all point into the same direction. David Bohm, Otto Scharmer, Leonard Swidler, or Inga Bostad, are all thinkers who point into the same direction. Social scientist Andrew Dobson diagnoses the lack of listening as the ‘new democratic deficit’. Linda Hartling’s mentor, pioneer Jean Baker Miller, recommends waging good conflict. Listening into voice is what Linda Hartling is an expert of:

The expression ‘listening into voice’ draws our attention to the fact that human communication is a bi-directional experience. It is a phrase that encourages us to attune to the fundamental relational nature of speaking. It reminds us to look beyond the individualist myth that speaking is a one-way experience in which the speaker is solely responsible for communicating effectively. Speaking is interactive. It is a two-way experience in which both (or all) people participating in the relationship can chose to listen and engage in a way that will help others to effectively express and clarify their ideas.

Let me conclude this section with a letter from Michael Karlberg. Karlberg underlines the point that human dignity cannot be achieved merely through legal enforcements. Respect for human dignity arises from an emergent consciousness of the oneness of humanity, a consciousness of the essential unity and interdependence of humanity. The emergence of this consciousness depends on education in the broadest sense of the word: on ‘the ways we are nurtured, socialised, encouraged, trained and empowered, within our families, our schools, our media environment, and the many other social institutions we participate in.’ Karlberg responded to an essay written by Cristina Escrigas on the dire situation of higher education as follows:

I’ve worked in higher education for twenty years now. Universities have made important contributions to human progress yet they are in need of profound transformation at this critical juncture in history. Toward this end, I agree with Cristina that universities must create more space for holistic and integrative knowledge generation, must rethink the core learning outcomes of their graduates in light of the exigencies of this age, and must reorient research priorities in more socially and environmentally responsible ways.

The obstacles to change are, of course, many. In my experience, modern universities tend to be characterised by a culture of individualism and self-promotion, scarce-resource mentalities and interest-group competition, ideological conflicts and divisive politics. The net result is profound inertia and a relative inability to respond to the exigencies of the age. There are, of course, many outstanding individuals pursuing critically important and progressive work within every university. But this rarely translates to vision, focus, and transformative impact at the level of the university as a whole.

One of the reasons for this, as Herman Daly pointed out, is that the ‘higher’ in ‘higher education’ has no normative meaning today. Daly traces the origins of Euro-American
higher education to Christian clerical traditions. The origins actually trace back even further to the height of Islamic civilisation and the emergence of the first universities in Cairo, Baghdad, Cordoba, and other centres of integrated religious, scientific, and philosophical learning that gave rise, in turn, to the European Renaissance and Enlightenment.

The anti-science stance of late medieval Christianity, combined with the subsequent wars of religion that decimated Europe, led, not surprisingly, to the gradual secularisation of higher education in much of the West. At the same time positivist philosophies of science constructed a false dichotomy between facts and values that contributed to the rise of normative relativism in the modern university and to the hegemony of physicalism across the natural and social sciences. This trend was reinforced by other factors such as the cultural relativism that emerged in response to the Euro-centrism of the early social/human sciences, as well as post-modern reactions across the arts and humanities to oppressive structures of modernist knowledge.

There are, of course, many other factors that contributed to the secularisation of higher education and the ascendancy of normative relativism within it. These trends represent important historical advancements in many respects. At the same time, this historical trajectory has left higher education with all but the most skeletal normative foundations. Intellectual freedom and intellectual honesty are the only normative principles most people can agree on. But these principles do not constitute a normative framework adequate to the exigencies of the age. On the contrary, when these minimalist principles operate within an institutional culture of individualism and self-promotion, scarce-resource mentalities and interest-group competition, ideological conflicts and divisive politics, they paralyse higher education in relation to the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Higher education cannot navigate its way through this impasse unless and until it begins to take seriously the need for systematic inquiry into the normative foundations of social reality. If we uncritically assume, as so many academics do today, that social reality has no normative foundations on an ontological level, or that human beings can never gain insights into them on an epistemological level, or that we can never learn to collectively apply foundational normative principles to the betterment of our condition, then there is no reason to take seriously the analysis Cristina offers in her essay. Indeed, there is little reason to care about distant others or unborn generations as long as privileged segments of society, including most academics alive today, can fend for themselves in the uncertain times ahead. Thus, within the normative vacuum of contemporary higher education, Cristina’s essay is easily dismissed as little more than an individual expression of subjective normative preferences that are hopelessly idealistic.

This is one of the reasons the ‘higher’ in ‘higher education’ has lost its meaning and universities struggle to find their role in the great transition. It would be wonderful if Cristina could comment on how we might move beyond the impasse of normative relativism in higher education so that arguments like hers might be taken more seriously by academic institutions.

Respectfully,
Michael Karlberg 13th May 2016.
Beware of systemic humiliation: Sociocide and ecocide
or the shredding of the social fabric and plundering of the planet

Freedom for the wolves has often meant death to the sheep.

– Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997)713

Always and everywhere on the earth, the same drama, on the same narrow stage – a clamorous humanity, intoxicated with its greatness. Always and everywhere it believes itself the universe, living in its prison as if it were immeasurable, only to sink – along with the terrestrial globe itself – into the shadows which soon put an end to its arrogance..

– Political activist Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881).714

Apartheid was humiliation made into a system in South Africa. The terms sociocide715 and ecocide716 likewise encapsulate systemic dangers. These are dangers that all of humanity faces at its present juncture in history, dangers that may foreclose a dignified future for coming generations.

In this situation, humankind does not need the sociopaths and ecopaths of this world to take over, those who have no ‘twinge of conscience’ over the destruction of the social and natural environments.717 Yet, if we ask ourselves whether or not ‘our current organisational practices and intersubjective behaviour in organisations affect the well-being of individuals’,718 then the answer must be: Our organisations are captured in systemic frames of indignity that compel them to violate the dignity of individuals and disregard the well-being of both people and planet.

How does it feel to grow up and live in such a context? For many, it leads to a sense of helplessness or even cynicism. ‘Observing another’s suffering, and being unable to do anything to help, leads to learned helplessness by proxy’, writes ethologist Michael Fox.719 The result may be bystander apathy, the total disconnect of empathy, and, as a possible next step, ‘to observe and derive vicarious pleasure in witnessing another’s plight’.720 ‘This is but one small step away from deliberate torture and calculated cruelty either perpetrated alone, or in participation with others as in the name of entertainment, sport, quasi-religious or cult ritual, and as some see it, experimental vivisection.’ In the midst of all this, most people choose to remain ‘comfortably unaware’, while global depletion is running amok.721

Does this mean that the world does not progress? This question bruises egos and causes indignant counter-attacks. Why counter-attacks? Because this is not a neutral scientific question; even asking it offends those who identify with the currently existing paradigm. The problem lies in beliefs. As mentioned earlier, beliefs have two functions: first, they guide our relationship with our ecosphere, which means understanding the world and testing reality, second, they guide our relationship with our sociosphere, which means living with ourselves and with others.722 Unfortunately, the second function often undermines the first. Particularly dynamics of humiliation can forcefully stand in the way of sound reality testing: ‘What should not be cannot be’, or ‘I know, but I can’t believe it’, is the maxim of people who have attached their personal sense of worth to a certain vision of reality and who then see any dent on their vision as a personal violation of their sense of worth that must be fought.

Old-fashioned traditions of going to duel can then suddenly become astonishingly alive again.723 Even scientists fall for them, even though their identity ought to primarily be connected with sound reality testing. When I listen to scientists speak, including very renowned scientists, on all continents, I am amazed at the amount of spiteful denigration some mete out against those who think differently, far beyond what the scientific discourse warrants.724 Combative duelling between alpha-leaders is the cultural script in many academic...
contexts, rather than mutually enlightening scientific curiosity. If corporate profit interests are amalgamated with academic inquiries on top of this, intimidation is likely to be compounded. This has daunted many scientists. It is the reason for why ‘among many climate scientists, gloom has set in. Things are worse than we think, but they can’t really talk about it’.  

The proverbial fog of war darkens our view on reality. I observe this dynamic unfolding more crudely in individualist Western cultures, where personal independence is emphasised, and more covertly in collectivist cultures where the focus lies more on interdependence and on saving face, where people are taught to listen first and be careful with prematurely and self-righteously judging and throwing their weight around.

Moreover, in an individualistic lone hero culture, the psychological need to shield oneself from any awareness of the vulnerability of human animal nature, including its mortality, is likely to arise, with an ecocidal dominator mind-set as a result. Animal protection and rights advocate Michael Mountain writes:

To alleviate the anxiety we feel over our animal nature, we try to separate ourselves from our fellow animals and to exert control over the natural world. We tell ourselves that we’re superior to them and that they exist for our benefit. We treat them as commodities and resources, use them as biomedical ‘models’ or ‘systems’ in research, and force them to perform for our entertainment.

Does the world progress, or not? Let me repeat my former question: Is throwing a party sustainable? Clearly, throwing a party cannot last forever. ‘Success’ that is achieved by way of overuse of resources can never last. Selling out one’s heirlooms and consuming one’s reserves for the future is no strategy for sustainable achievement. I always remember the times when Adolf Hitler was hailed for the economic upswing he brought to Germany, and how he established his power by manipulating the hope and enthusiasm that this upswing created among the German population. Nobody knew, or wanted to know, that this upswing was hollow, that it had to be paid for by going to war and pillaging the coffers of yet to subjugate neighbours. Today, our upswings are as hollow, they will have to be paid for by coming generations, who will find a pillaged planet.

Can the media form a counterweight? Can at least media in the West do so, wherever they can be independent? It seems not sufficiently. A journalistic elite may be too heavily involved in the elite milieu, even in the West, and therefore unable to act as advocates of the public interest. Still, there are many journalists around who do raise warning voices. Journalist Roberto Savio, for instance, warns that economic growth is not ‘a rising tide lifting all boats’, and that capital is not ‘trickling down to everybody’; instead, social and ecological resources are hollowed out and plundered, with current consumption patterns rapidly depleting the world’s non-renewable resources. Political scientist Ian Bremmer calls it the failure of globalism. Wealth and income extremes hurt everybody, this insight slowly seeps in. Oxfam informs that the annual income of the richest one hundred people is enough to end global poverty four times over. ‘We can no longer pretend that the creation of wealth for a few will inevitably benefit the many – too often the reverse is true’, concludes Jeremy Hobbs, executive director of Oxfam International. The optimistic ‘yes we can’ moment of the Brundtland Commission in 1987 has passed. Physicist Paul Raskin is the author of the widely known 2002 essay titled Great transition. By 2014, he is disillusioned. After the Brundtland Commission, policy and academic circles have adopted sustainability as a concept, Raskin observes, yet, at the same time, ‘a neo-liberal political-economic philosophy consolidated in centres of power, unleashing a highly unsustainable form of market-led globalisation’. Raskin warns that the world became rich in sustainability action plans, of which he wrote a number himself, but poor in meaningful action. Science can by now

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brilliantly illuminate the challenges, and civil action can win this or that battle, but systemic deterioration outpaces piecemeal progress. Paul Raskin confirms also my evaluation of the Rio+20 Summit 2012, which made me chose not to participate and instead join an ‘alternative’ summit with our dignity network members in Marabá, Pará, in the north of Brazil.\textsuperscript{737} Raskin calls for ‘citizens without borders’ to come together in pragmatic hope – neither in naïve optimism nor dystopian despair – because the ‘challenge is extraordinary, but so are the times’.\textsuperscript{738}

Does the world progress? Also Pablo Razeto-Barry asks this question.\textsuperscript{739} He is the son of Luis Razeto, a father of solidarity economics. I had the privilege of being invited into the Razeto family home and their intellectual universe in 2012 in Chile through Howard Richards, philosopher of social science and scholar of peace and global studies.\textsuperscript{740} Razeto and his colleagues conclude that the global ecosystem is approaching a planetary-scale tipping point, as are local ecological systems. When forced across critical thresholds, a system can suddenly and irreversibly shift from one state to another.

Does the world progress at least with respect to human rights? The systematic internationalisation of human rights has indeed seen important progress over the last 50 or 55 years. Yet, like Raskin, also Maria Dahle reports that worrying developments are under way now. Maria Dahle is the director of the Human Rights House Foundation in Oslo, Norway, and she looks back on many decades of experience in the field. This is her report: Around 1980, civil society flourished. Yet, this was also the same time, when neo-liberalism got into its start position. A wave of privatisation followed. Ten years later, civil society faces serious restrictions. It is being choked by government-corporate alliances that use a plethora of interferences, be they legal or practical. Maria wonders: Is civil society seen as having become too confrontational? Does it stand in the way of profit interests?\textsuperscript{741}

In their 2017 World Report, Human Rights Watch warned that demagogues now threaten human rights; Donald J. Trump and European populists can be seen to ‘foster bigotry and discrimination’.\textsuperscript{742} Economist Kamran Mofid, founder of the Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative, summarises the situation after 9th November 2016, when Donald J. Trump was elected president in the United States as follows:

Populists want to replace freedom with control, justice and equality with priority being given to ‘the true people’, peace with polarisation, caring for the earth with short-term benefits for their own nations, honesty with shameless manipulation, integrity with ‘power at all costs’, respect with aggression.\textsuperscript{743}

John Y. Jones is the director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Program in Oslo, Norway. Like Maria Dahle, also he has been part, for the past decades, of the Scandinavian civil society movement, which always had a leading role in the world. Like Maria, he reports on the increased marginalisation, all around the world, of those who defend the ideal of equality in dignity. What seeps in, instead, is inequality – the interest of all is being replaced by the interest of a few. And this happens so slowly and parenthetically that it is difficult to notice for ordinary citizens, Jones warns. The seemingly innocuous establishment of new institutions has been part of this process. Jones reminds that fifty years ago, former UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld was prescient when he warned that the establishment of the Development Assistance Committee by the OECD would have a negative impact on the UN and the African continent.\textsuperscript{744} (The Development Assistance Committee by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international economic organisation of 34 countries founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade.)

This seeping in of inequality does not spare the very heart-land of the originators of this trend. By the 1960s, for instance, Americans worked fewer hours than their counterparts in

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Europe and Japan, while by 2000, the situation was inverse: many low-income workers in the U.S.A. are now forced to work more than one job to get by – also gender equality has stalled.\textsuperscript{745}

Takis Ioannides is a researcher of Greek philosophy, poet, and ‘citizen of Planet Earth’. In desperation, he wrote to me in April 2014: ‘the big economic crisis, but mostly the civilisation crisis terrorises the citizens of my birth-country!’\textsuperscript{746}

A succinct summary of the many crises humankind faces is given by Otto Scharmer, ‘father’ of the concept of ‘presencing’, or learning from the emerging future.\textsuperscript{747} He points at three divides that separate us from our primary sources of life: ecological, social, and spiritual.\textsuperscript{748} As to the ecological divide, humankind currently uses 1.5 planets; the social divide manifests in rising poverty, inequity, fragmentation, and polarisation; and the spiritual divide increases rates of burnout and depression in concert with the widening gap between the GDP and the actual well-being of people.\textsuperscript{749}

Philosopher Howard Richards concludes that there is ‘a generative causal power at work pushing toward the down side, even while other generative causal powers are pushing on the up side’.\textsuperscript{750} This downward trend, since it squeezes the last drop out of people and the planet, has recently brought leaders to power who promise to turn the trend. Yet, as Richards points out, neither a Donald Trump nor a Bernie Sanders have the tools to succeed.\textsuperscript{751}

To say it short: dignity is being violated by systemic humiliation.

**How humanity undermines its own basis of existence: Ecocide**

Does the world progress? Several letters, emails, and other messages reach me every single day that decry the plundering of our planet. I could fill an entire book with each day’s messages. The ‘party’ that we, as humankind, are throwing causes both ecocide and sociocide, mutually exacerbating each other and leading to the degradation of the global socio-ecological systems.\textsuperscript{752} The sixth mass extinction of species is human-induced,\textsuperscript{753} as by the end of this century flora and fauna loss is predicted to be between 20 to 50 per cent of all living species on earth.\textsuperscript{754} Between 1950 and 1990 one third of all fertile soils has been severely degraded or destroyed.\textsuperscript{755} A more than 75 per cent decline in total flying insect biomass over the past 27 years has been measured in a country like Germany, and this while insects play a crucial role in ecosystem functioning, for example, in pollinating.\textsuperscript{756} The rise of certain chronic diseases is being concealed.\textsuperscript{757} New antibiotics are not being developed, not least because administering antibiotics is a rather short-term intervention and therefore not very profitable.\textsuperscript{758} Air pollutants damage children’s brains and lower IQ.\textsuperscript{759}

In May 2014, two teams of scientists reported that the Thwaites Glacier, a keystone holding the massive West Antarctic Ice Sheet together, is starting to collapse. In the long run, enough meltwater will be released to raise sea levels by more than three meters.\textsuperscript{760} In 2016, it became clear that perilous climate shift will happen within decades, not centuries.\textsuperscript{761} By 2050, there will be 140 million people fleeing from climate degradation, according to a 2018 World Bank report.\textsuperscript{762}

*The plundered planet* is the title of the latest report to the Club of Rome, submitted in 2013.\textsuperscript{763} The author is Ugo Bardi, physicist at the University of Florence in Italy. He posits that the present massive exploitation of the last natural resources is unsustainable. Fracking, just to give one example, is a sad symbol of desperation: ‘it is an impotent attempt to keep going at all costs, even though you know exactly: it’s a dead end’.\textsuperscript{764} The *Chatham Report 2012* has analysed the latest global trends of key raw materials. It explores how governments and other stakeholders, both through their defensive and offensive moves, are worsening the situation rather than bettering it, by ‘creating new fault lines on top of the system’\textsuperscript{765}
of existing weaknesses and uncertainties’. The 2017 Doomsday clock is at two and a half minutes to midnight, back to where it was when I was born six decades ago at the height of the nuclear confrontation between Eastern and Western Bloc. The 2016 Doomsday clock was still at three minutes to midnight because the diplomatic successes on Iran and in Paris in 2015 had been offset ‘by negative events in the nuclear and climate arenas’, so that ‘the Doomsday Clock must remain at three minutes to midnight, the closest they’ve been to catastrophe since the early days of above-ground hydrogen bomb testing’.

‘Food is the new oil; Land, the new gold’, is another telling title, pointing at the fact that also earlier civilisations have declined as a result of environmental overstretch – the Sumerians were brought down by rising salt levels in the soil, and the Mayans by soil erosion. In our time, several such overstretches combine – the most severe soil erosion in human history, with 800 million people chronically undernourished due to land degradation, the depletion of aquifers, the plateauing of grain yields in the more agriculturally advanced countries, and rising temperature.

Not only food, also water is the new gold. Access to clean water and adequate sanitation is a human right. Yet, ‘each year 1.7 million people die as a result of poor access to water and sanitation services. Half of the world’s hospital beds are occupied with people suffering from diseases related to dirty water’. Extractive predator capitalism dominates wherever we look.

Stephen Purdey, international relations specialist and research affiliate of the Waterloo Institute for Complexity and Innovation at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, summarises:

Climate change is the biggest but only one entry in what Herman Greene calls a ‘parade of horribles’. There’s no need to list population increase, soil degradation, loss of fresh water, deforestation, ocean acidification, species extermination and so forth. The point is that humanity is rushing headlong into tremendous socio-ecological turbulence which may or may not be survivable. These are not avoidable fictions.

As alluded to above: ‘Among many climate scientists, gloom has set in. Things are worse than we think, but they can’t really talk about it’.

It is hard to understand why we, as humankind, fail to take those news seriously. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber is considered one of Europe’s leading climate science authorities, and he warns that climate change is like an asteroid strike and that it resembles a collective suicide attempt. Asked how this widespread lack of concern is possible, he replies: ‘through cognitive dissonance’:

If I have a huge problem that I do not know how to get a grip on, I’ll suppress it. Or I even intensify my dangerous conduct. Throughout history, the moment systems fell into crisis, they often amplified the fatal mistakes that had put them into the mess in the first place. So, now the world economy has to continue to grow, even if that is exactly what will destroy the world.

And, indeed, Schellnhuber did not have to wait long, immediately, climate change deniers ridiculed him as ‘going off the rails’. A glitzy party is thrown on credit, so to speak, a party for a few at the expense of the many and of future generations. Many are so dazzled by the glitz of the party, or at least by the promise of glitz, that they are successfully co-opted. Understandably, those who benefit from the party praise it as if it were sustainable, they are victims of a positivity bias. Hans Rosling and Steven Pinker stand for such voices and they

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have been characterised as having such a positivity bias, also called *Pollyannaism*, or remembering pleasant items more accurately than unpleasant ones.\(^{779}\) Yet, slowly, ever more people ‘know enough to prefer not to know’.\(^{780}\)

What I personally observe, on all continents, makes me predict that our time once will be called ‘the dark era of the 21st century’, an era where the dominator model overstayed its *raison-d’être*, and social and ecological resources were sold out under the pretence of the partnership model. Without exception, and despite extremely valuable counter-initiatives, I observe how the exploitation of nature is being intensified in ways that are so ruthless that I wonder about the exploiters themselves and what they think of their own children. I am not afraid for myself, I have no children, and I perfectly understand the damaging psychological effects of living in social bubbles, particularly in bubbles of privilege.\(^{781}\) Still, to me, and many others, it is evident that those living in such bubbles sacrifice not just the future of some far removed generations on far removed continents, but also their own children’s future. I do know some of the wealthy of this planet personally, and I am flabbergasted to see that many seem to believe that protected enclaves will wait for them when the rest of the ecosphere goes down. They seem to be unaware that it is not sufficient to build gated fortress-communities or to construct one’s villas on isolated luxury islands such as tiny Maui, where the number of art galleries matches New York.\(^{782}\)

Carol Smaldino has worked as a social work psychotherapist for over twenty-five years in the United States and in Italy, and she feels thoroughly discouraged when she observes how wealthier people increasingly care less, while poorer minorities feel ever more helpless.\(^{783}\) Research is on her side, as it indeed shows that ‘rich people just care less’.\(^{784}\) What is needed instead is a movement of ‘openhearted wealthy people’ who ‘understand that their genuine self-interest is inextricably linked to the rest of humanity and our ability to fix the future’.\(^{785}\)

In other words, while it is understandable that people who live in bubbles develop blind spots for compassionate empathy, and illusions with regard even to their own children’s future, it is hard to understand that we, as humankind, let this happen. It is hard to understand that we are willing to gamble away our last chances for a turn-around for the sake of the illusions and blind spots of a few privileged elites. This, to me, is self-inflicted collective humiliation and terror.

Since the 2008 economic crisis began to impact Germany, books by Karl Marx are being sold again – people remember that he himself ascertained ‘I am not a Marxist’, and that he would be horrified if he knew how his thoughts were abused by oppressive dictators.\(^{786}\) People like economist Kamran Mofid, founder of the Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative, now refer to Marx and his position that ‘from the standpoint of a higher economic formation, the private property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private property of one man in other men’.\(^{787}\)

Arne Naess, the ‘father of deep ecology’, was also a founding pillar of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, of which I am the founding president. Polly Higgins held the Arne Naess Chair at the University of Oslo in Norway for 2013 and 2014. Her topic is *leadership crime* and *ecocide law*: ‘When leaders fail to act or make decisions that lead to mass damage and destruction, that surely can only be called a crime’.\(^{788}\) Lawyers around the world are now advocating the introduction of a *legal duty of care* towards the natural world.\(^{789}\) Climate change litigation is now being actively pursued, with climate lawsuits being brought against fossil fuel companies around the world, alongside non-judicial initiatives, such as, for instance, shareholder activism. ‘Turning up the heat: Corporate legal accountability for climate change’, is the title of a 2018 report.\(^{790}\) Linda Sheehan of the Earth Law Center in Redwood City, California, summarises: ‘We have taken great strides in the last century to recognise the inherent rights and dignity of people. The next step is to expand our recognised community further, to embrace the inherent rights and dignity of the natural

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While the classical security dilemma is attenuating – and waits to be attenuated further through pro-active and intentional building of trust in a globally interconnected world – a new dilemma as entered the scene, namely the growth dilemma. It is driven by a system that requires growth, which, however, mostly benefits the ‘one per cent’, and it does so at the price of ubiquitous sociocide and ecocide. This, in turn, creates a new security dilemma – a fault line that pits the ‘one per cent’ against the rest and turns them into adversaries – and this eventually even re-stokes the classical security dilemma. The motto of the classical security dilemma is If you want peace, prepare for war, the motto of the new dilemma is If you want wealth, invest in exploitation, and this exploitation stokes back the first dilemma, the security dilemma, rather than allowing for Gandhi’s motto There is no path to peace. Peace is the path.

Climate change will lead to wide-spread social disconnection, warns Dan Smith, now director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and former director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and International Alert in London:

A demographic shift of unprecedented scale is under way. As people change habitat and ways of life, they face potential disconnection from norms that previously helped them manage relations within their communities and sustain the group’s well-being. As these changes unfold, there will be some winners and more losers, with more again in between, getting by. Among the winners will be the conflict entrepreneurs, the gang leaders, the under bosses, while the foot soldiers will be recruited from among those young men who see little other (or, at least, no better) way of avoiding being losers. With most people caught in between.

Unless there is dramatic change in how economies run, population growth and fast-paced urbanisation will help drive continually increasing demand for natural resources across the next 20 years. This combines with rising prices to equate to growing competition for access to natural resources. There is an unmistakeable risk here of big power rivalry; there also exists an international institutional framework able safely to contain exactly this kind of rivalry and reduce to negligible the risk of disputes turning violent.

Contemporary examples of so-called foreign fighters show that, indeed, young men, particularly those suffering from a sense of humiliation, are vulnerable to being recruited into becoming foot soldiers by promises of honour. The majority of people will be caught in between and will suffer indignities from all sides, from the ecological and the social damage these economic systems cause. In the worst case, the world may turn into many small-scale off-limits war zones, and thus combine ecocide with sociocide.

These are Dan Smith’s warnings. If we follow the African adage that ‘it takes a village to raise a child’, then the number of disaffected ‘children’ in the global village is bound to rise, and they, in turn, may increasingly be willing to follow humiliation-entrepreneurs who will further ravage this village.

Already now, we live in times where the social fabric of the entire global village is being systemically worn down. The ‘way of the knife’, once a reserve of Japan’s samurai warrior class, is now a strategy of American special operations troops, and it ‘democratises’ when it inspires lone wolf acts. Guns have found their way from the battle field into private homes,
and the use of drones as weapons, if also this is ‘democratised’ further, will make neighbours of nuclear installations, once designed to be peaceful, look into the skies with dread, as such installations can easily transmute into bombs, triggered even by play-drones.  

Psychologist Anthony Marsella sees mass shootings as signs of a ‘trickle-down effect’, not of wealth, but of violence and pathology: We are all socialised by the culture in which we live, he explains, and ‘this socialisation can prepare us for becoming productive and responsible citizens, or demented and sociopathic persons committed to violence and destruction, driven by an ends justifies the means mentality’.  

The new kind of security dilemma, along the new fault line that separates the so-called ‘one per cent’ from the rest, thins out, wears it down, and fragments the social fabric of the global village perhaps more than the classical security dilemma that fed a war culture and pitted states and ethnic groups against each other. Business magnate, investor and philanthropist Warren Buffett admits, ‘It’s class warfare. My class is winning, but they shouldn’t be’. Buffett has the experts on his side, when they warn that the current monetary systems built on bank debt and scarcity are unsustainable, as they cause boom and bust cycles in the economy, produce short-term thinking, require unending economic growth, concentrate wealth in the hands of small elites, and destroy social capital. Political analyst Naomi Klein describes the situation in ways that profoundly resonate with my global observations: ‘…just when we needed to gather, our public sphere was disintegrating; just when we needed to consume less, consumerism took over virtually every aspect of our lives; just when we needed to slow down and notice, we sped up; and just when we needed longer time horizons, we were able to see only the immediate present’.  

Many pin their hopes on civil society – I do, too – however, civil society will lose all impact if it continues being open for co-option: ‘present-day neo-liberal rationality weakens the collective spirit by transforming societies and subjectivities around the notion of enterprise’. I observe non-governmental organisations (NGOs) all around the world now copying for-profit approaches – ‘customer experience management’ is now everywhere. The neo-liberal development paradigm restructures social formations through the instrument of external funding, and the result is that also NGOs turn into ‘missionaries of the new era’ of economism. As mentioned earlier, it is a wrong lesson-learned to believe that a party can last forever – I hope for a world without customers, only with fellow human beings.  

Wrong lessons have also been drawn from apparent initial successes of ‘anti- ‘movements. Political economist Frédéric Bastiat (1801–1850) is often quoted with the following sentences: ‘When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that authorises it and a moral code that glorifies it’. Bastiat was a leader of the French laissez-faire tradition in the first half of the nineteenth century. He thought that laissez faire would serve the comfort, well-being, safety, independence, education, and dignity for all. In other words, he thought that society would be better off with no laws rather than with powerful men forcing bad laws upon society. He overlooked that good laws may be the solution rather than no laws or bad laws. Bastiat was not alone in his ‘anti-power’ stance. Others, among them philosopher Michel Foucault, initially also held an anti-power position, believing that no power is better than bad power.  

Philosopher Howard Richards faults precisely post-modernist critics like Foucault for leaving us with a cruel choice: either no meta-narrative or a toxic meta-narrative. Richards fears that the discrediting of modernity has favoured the rise of fundamentalisms that are fatally hostile to the Enlightenment. Today, Bastiat would perhaps vote for good laws rather than no laws, just as Foucault has moved from anti-power to embrace good power; Richards explains: ‘And then, having carried the logic of revolt against le pouvoir to the extreme point where not only all social norms but logic itself became enemies, because they
are inevitably accomplices of power, in the latter part of the mid-1970s, Foucault reversed engines once again. Power is good, not bad. Power is productive; without power nothing is produced, nothing is a" 807

Jean Baker Miller, pioneer in women’s psychology, and mentor of Linda Hartling, would say: ‘power is the ability to create change, good or ill’. 808

Howard Richards is a philosopher of social science and a scholar of peace and global studies, and he sympathises with critical realism, a philosophical position that connects Enlightenment with postmodernism 809. Enlightenment appreciates that not everything is self-referencing text, while postmodernism helps us by admitting that the Enlightenment was not a discovery of eternal truth but a moment in the history of culture. Richards comes out in favour of moral authority – in favour of Emile Durkheim’s thesis that every human group generates norms because the existence of social norms is a physical necessity; and he comes out in favour of Jean Piaget’s thesis that human children are biologically predisposed to form groups governed by rules. 810 Richards’ central category in his metaphysics is culture-in-ecology, meaning that humans create cultures, which then can be more or less successful an adaptation to physical reality. His verdict: ‘We are still living in the pre-history of humanity. The history of humanity properly so-called will not begin until we are free to create institutions that actually solve our problems’. 811

It would be interesting to see Howard Richards in dialogue with anthropologists Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson about their multilevel selection theory (including its support for structural functionalism), and their view of culture and social structure as a Darwinian (biological or cultural) adaptation at the group level. 812 Or with sociologist Lewis Coser and his distinction of realistic and unrealistic conflict. 813

The result at the present juncture in history is the shattering of the social contract in general, all around the world. It is the shattering of the social contract as it was envisioned from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries to mean that the laws and institutions of government should function to protect the equality, freedom, human rights, and life-possibilities of citizens. Philosopher Glen Martin sees it being replaced with an economic Darwinism, ‘a predatory society in which law and government operate to promote the callous exploitation of the majority by the super-wealthy few, and in which everything is commodified – from human beings to natural resources to the environment – everything is subject to merciless exploitation without regard to human welfare, the common good, or the future of our planet’. 814

The loss of happiness in market democracies is the title of a book that spells out how wealth fails its promise. Drug addiction has increased dramatically in some Western countries, particularly in the United States of America. 815 As prosperity increased in Western countries, family solidarity and community integration were being eroded, and people were becoming increasingly suspicious of their political institutions and each other. ‘Competent communities have been invaded and colonised by professionalised services – often with devastating results’. 816 The author of The loss of happiness, Robert Lane, a political scientist, urges people in the West to increase companionship even at the price of decreasing income. 817

Indeed, ‘the existing economic systems are rigged against connection, leading to relational malnutrition, breaking down the fabric of society’, observes also psychologist Linda Hartling. 818

Also sociologist Hartmut Rosa wonders why so many people in Western societies today are failing to lead a ‘good life’, while enjoying more freedoms than any generation before. The problem, as he sees it, is the acceleration of social life under capitalism, a regime of deadlines that causes a widespread sense of alienation. 819 Another German sociologist, Werner Seppmann, describes the current increase in violence and irrationalism as decivilisation, driven by business-styled social systems that degrade the satisfaction of human

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needs to a secondary consequence, not a deliberate aim, of economic growth.\textsuperscript{820}

Another European writer, Ilija Trojanow, warns that those who produce nothing and consume nothing will become ever more superfluous for the murderous logic of late capitalism.\textsuperscript{821} He warns that also those who still believe themselves to be the winners, are deceiving themselves: also they will become victims. In the long run, nobody will be able to watch the news of the ravages of climate change and the mercilessness of neo-liberal labour market policies from any safe distance.

It is in this context that ‘empowerment’ has gone too far, and a self-esteem movement has produced narcissistic societies.\textsuperscript{822} Linda Hartling observes: ‘The psychology-based efforts to extinguish feelings of shame – rather than examining the pro-social function of shame – that now contribute to social shamelessness in society is similar to the impact of the self-esteem movement’.\textsuperscript{823}

In sum, present-day beliefs that dignity can be gained through economic competition and accumulation of possessions co-opt citizens around the world into weakening the social and ecological fabric, rather than strengthening it. Georg Schramm is a German intellectual comedian who is inspired by Warren Buffet and his analysis of the war of the rich against the poor, where Buffet sees financial products such as derivatives as weapon of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{824} Schramm’s parody starts with describing countries as junkies who are being hooked with cheap money, only for the dealers to raise the prices shortly after. Then comes the billing company and takes everything, from water, gas, and electricity to the pensions, with the global collection company represented by the IMF. The ‘drug dealer’ itself is also addicted, and, as all other junkies, throws huge parties whenever drugs are secured for a few days. Billions of dollars of cheap money have been delivered to the dealers so far, and while many Americans live on ration cards, seven hundred of the richest possess two-thirds of everything. Given that this is a drug problem, Schramm asks satirically how wars on drugs usually are being won. They are won, among others, by dismantling syndicates and drug cartels, he replies. But does that happen? No. Governments are inactive, because also they are customers of the dealers. Instead, the end users are set on cold turkey whenever they rampage and attack one another.\textsuperscript{825} Clearly, Schramm’s parody entails much realism.\textsuperscript{826}

Even remedies meant to alleviate the risks are being instrumentalised for profit, ultimately increasing those risks rather than decreasing them, in that way thinning out social and ecological reserves ever more. MetLife Insurance Portfolio Manager Lawrence J. Oxley has written a book on how extreme climate events represent major investing opportunities for the stock, bond, and futures markets.\textsuperscript{827} At present, large amounts of as-new goods are being destroyed by the largest global online retailer, because it is more profitable to destroy returned goods than to repackage or even donate them.\textsuperscript{828} This is a practice that, in its absurdity, exemplifies the state of the world: within the current systemic rules, it is more profitable to ravage the world than to protect it.

As we see, as long as elites are around who are interested in maintaining their privileged status, or would-be elites scramble to climb up, they will continue viewing risks through the narrow lens of their short-term interests. Risks might not just be denied, neglected, or covered up, they may even be amplified so that they can be better instrumentalised. When we hear the call ‘You need to support this or that political or corporate strategy, because it responds to this or that necessity or risk’, it may take its starting point from a real risk, however, the suggested solution often represents a misleading manipulation. Since sustainable long-term survival is not the aim of such strategies, proposed ‘solutions’ may be suicidal for the collective in the long run. In short, as long as we, as humankind, arrange our affairs on planet Earth in ways that climate degradation improves business opportunities, humanity’s survival is in danger.

History offers many examples where challenges and needs were real, while solutions were perilous. Adolf Hitler was able to capitalise on a problem felt by many Germans, namely,

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humidity national honour combined with harsh economic conditions, yet, his solution led to mass homicide and suicide. The Cold War started from people’s legitimate desire for security and nuclear weapons were the welcome solution. First, massive retaliation was envisioned, later ‘flexible retaliation’ with tactical nuclear weapons,\(^{829}\) and the result is that humankind has so far escaped the loss of most of life on Earth only by sheer luck.\(^{830}\) Under a strong security dilemma military security is sought, it is only in an interconnected world that it can become human security.

Today, ‘the need for jobs’ leads to a similar annihilation of life on Earth, this time not through one big catastrophe like nuclear weapons, but through myriad slowly emerging catastrophes – because livelihoods depend on the sales of services or products, including those that undermine human survival on Earth. And this while the entire economic system could do well without the concept of jobs,\(^{831}\) and while humankind will gain more by eliminating this concept.

Among the social consequences of a system where livelihoods depend on sales is that of rising inequality,\(^{832}\) which then has the potential to unleash waves of migrants fleeing poverty and violence, and stoke religious and ideological terror and extremism. Terror networks, in turn, as mentioned earlier, can link up with organised crime.\(^{833}\) All this is ‘material’ for manipulation and propaganda by the Hitlers of this world.\(^{834}\)

Beyond exploitative business and economic models, even charitable endeavours become increasingly problematic. Non-profit organisations can be hijacked and used as yet another avenue for practicing exploitative profit-maximisation. Charitable organisations can become ‘profiteering non-profits’, spreading the corrosive social disease of distrust locally and globally.

Let’s consider one example. Many of us were initially encouraged by the development of ‘microfinance’ efforts offering small loans to individuals as a pathway for reducing poverty around the world. Within the microfinance frame, some argue that dignity is violated if simple charity were given to poor people, suggesting that it is more dignifying for them to prove that they are able to repay loans with interest. Yet, as it seems, increasingly this ‘do good’ methodology has been sliding down an unethical path. We are reminded of the sub-prime crisis in America, which started with the U.S. government’s laudable intention to dignify poor people through enabling them to own their own homes. Many were given loans they could not repay. The banks repackaged these loans and made sizable profits. When the bubble burst, many people lost their homes. Now they were worse off than before. Not only had they lost their homes, they also had to unlearn the link between dignity and owning a home. This amounted to double humiliation. Legal expert Bernadette Atuahene speaks of ‘dignity taking’ when people not only lose their property but also have their dignity removed; in those cases ‘dignity restoration’ is needed, which is much more challenging than mere material reparation.\(^{835}\)

‘De nye gigantene’ (‘The new giants’) is the title of an article by Bent Sofus Tranøy, professor of political science in Norway, where he summarises how the world’s economy has stumbled from crisis to crisis during the past six or seven years. Growth is far lower than prior to 2008, inequality is on the rise, the financial sector is as rich, powerful, and risky as it was – not least thanks to various state subsidies – and, while some of the debt burden has been moved onto public balance sheets, the burden has not shrunk.\(^{836}\) This sad state of affairs – ‘dignity taking’ at a grand scale – should have led political elites to create new and more future-oriented thinking, yet, it has not.

It has, however, opened some space to alternative thought within the field of economy, thought that was not appreciated before the crisis. One example is economist Thomas Piketty.\(^{837}\) In his book *Capital in the twenty-first century*, Piketty shows that the post-war years were a historical exception with respect to economic equality. Throughout the past
hundreds of years, the dominating trend was that capital grew much faster than the economy in general. This has only been interrupted by capital shocks in the nineteenth century, caused by two world wars, and the ending of colonies. In the course of the last thirty years, however, neo-liberal deregulation, tax cuts, and lower economic growth have moved us back again toward levels of inequality comparable with the eighteenth century. Andy Haldane from the Bank of England writes and speaks so creatively about these topics that *Time Magazine* has honoured him as the world’s most influential person in 2013. Journalist Roberto Savio spells out the sequence and the problems with inequality:

- Inequality, with extreme wealth for a few, the middle class shrinking in rich countries, and permanent unemployment for ever more;
- the rich are not paying taxes as before, because of a large number of fiscal benefits and fiscal paradises;
- politics has become subservient to economic interests;
- social and ecological resources are hollowed out and plundered. Current consumption patterns rapidly deplete the world’s non-renewable resources.

If Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) were still alive, he would be fascinated to see the *double movement* he described in 1944 now being driven to ever new intensities. One side of the movement believes in the blessings of a self-regulating market system – and this has spread from the Anglo-Saxon world to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as to Asia, Africa, and Latin America – while a counter-movement calls for the protection of our eco- and sociospheres against these ‘blessings’.

Sociocide and terror are mutually intertwined. Examples abound. The boy Sherzai is only one example of myriads. He was thirteen years old when poverty made his uncle sell him to Taliban insurgents for 15,000 Pakistani rupees (170 U.S. dollars): ‘Then the Taliban told me to carry out a suicide attack’, he reported, now in a juvenile correctional facility in Kabul. ‘They said I would be a martyr and I would go to paradise’.

Children are more open than adolescents to having their minds shaped, be it to embrace social or anti-social behaviour. In Western countries, babies less than three years old are now targeted by advertisers, driven by studies that show that children can recognise around 100 brand logos by the age of three, and, even more importantly, that some babies ‘request brands as soon as they can speak’. These advertisers act in the spirit of retail analyst Victor Lebow, who wrote in his famous 1955 paper that Americans would have to ‘make consumption their way of life’. If they succeeded in making the buying and using of goods into a kind of ritual, and things were ‘consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced and discarded at an ever-increasing rate’, he thought that this would not just keep the economy going. People would also find ‘spiritual satisfaction and ego gratification in consumption’.

Many readers will deem manipulation into terrorism to be anti-social and manipulation into consumption to be pro-social. Yet, one may argue that both manipulations are anti-social, only to different degrees and at different speeds. The pillars of our present-time economic arrangements may lead to destruction perhaps slower than destruction through terrorism, but no less fatal, namely, through ecocide.

Chirevo Kwenda, an expert on African traditional religion in South Africa, describes the failure of Lebow’s enthusiastically advocated strategy. Kwenda explains how social cohesion in Africa does not flow from state sovereignty, liberal democracy, the advance of modernity, or the global economy. It is paid for by millions of African people forced to accept alienated lives. Kwenda’s observation is relevant not just for Africa – my global experience has shown me that. It is even relevant in the very heartlands of the originators of this experiment, in the West. The fault line no longer runs between the West and the Non-West;
people everywhere pay now the price of psychological alienation and social exclusion, on top of ecological disintegration. Global South conditions are increasingly creeping into the West.

Slowly, we, as humankind, begin to understand this now, and phrases such as *Vivir Bien* have become slogans, the Andean version of *Swaraj* (India), *Ubuntu* (South Africa), *Abya Yala* (Panama), *Mandar Obedeciendo and Comunalidad* (Zapatistas and Zapotecos in Mexico), to mention just a few of the better known. The global Network of Indigenous and Community Conservation Areas brings together more than one hundred communities in 70 countries around the world:

There are hundreds of millions of people who suffered the horrors of exclusion or, even worse, subjugated inclusion as colonialism and capitalism expanded around the globe. Yet, quite miraculously, many have jealously guarded their heritages and traditions, demonstrating a resilience that is now so apparent that we are obliged to recognise them as peoples capable of governing themselves and treasuring valuable knowledge and ways of living that are contributing to a better understanding of the planet as a dynamic system.

The international community recognised their importance with the belated adoption of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2004), following on the ILO’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights to Informed, Prior and Free Consent on development projects that might affect them or their territories (1991).

As many others, I feel disgusted by what could be called the ‘decadence’ of the West. In my book on a dignity economy, I spell out the reasons. With chagrin, I observe the loss of happiness and the many futile searches for compensations. I feel surrounded by *fog of war*, to speak with Carl von Clausewitz, when blessings for all are promised, yet, social and ecological disintegration unfold. Either those aims are being missed, or professed in bad faith. Indeed, as a psychologist, I cannot avoid observing that the social glue that traditionally was provided by the extended family cannot be expected to flow from the abstract contracts of the market.

New relational neuroscience shows how the human brain and physiology function best when people are embedded in webs of caring relationships. Isolation and exclusion activate the same neural pathways as physical pain. There are life-long mental damages flowing from being neglected, while feeling loved renders long-term physical and mental health benefits. While damages in otherwise healthy adults may be healed, in children, they may become structural. The brains of neglected children are smaller than those of loved children, since brain cells grow and cerebral circuits develop in response to an infant’s interaction with the main caregivers. Nature and nurture are entangled. The genes for brain function, including intelligence, may not even become functional if a new born is neglected during the first two years of life. In cases where brains have not developed properly as a consequence of neglect in the first two years of life, youths may later be incapable of responding to the incentives and disincentives meant to guide society away from crime, and they may end up as persistent offenders. If a society wishes to maintain its social-psychological health over several generations, what is needed are relationships that foster psychological growth. What is important is the quality of relationships, rather than quantities.

Sociocide makes itself palpable when the loving care that is needed to nurture a healthy next generation, is not available. Young mothers now sit in front of their crying offspring with their cell phones, not knowing what to do with their baby. Brigitte Volz, consultant in early childhood development in Germany, and a member of our dignity fellowship, shared that she observes that the number of babies and young children with insecure attachment is increasing: parents no longer are able to understand their offspring’s signals. Her message is that society as a whole will need to understand its responsibility to create contexts that enable parents to
give their children an adequate start in life. What is needed in educational settings is attention to creating connection, rather than merely delivering instruction.\textsuperscript{853}

Where do all these problems come from? Howard Richards summarises: ‘The dynamic of capital accumulation has been a major, perhaps the major, dynamic of modern history; as has social exclusion, which is another consequence of the same normative structure’.\textsuperscript{854} Richards’ conclusion, after having analysed these issues for the past five decades, is that the problem is not a psychological one, it is not greed among certain elites, and is not the lack of regulations either. Implementing more regulations will not work. Deeper change is needed. We have to go back more than two thousand years, if we want to understand what is needed to rectify, namely, the ground pillars of our economic institutions.

Roman law, especially \textit{jus gentium}, made it easier for the Roman empire to collect tribute and to protect merchants, as it abstracted from the empire’s multicultural diversity and applied to Roman citizens and non-citizens alike.\textsuperscript{855} An ancient Roman magistrate, the \textit{praetor}, was tasked with the settling the disputes within \textit{jus gentium}. The modern world is built on successors of Roman law. This serves the interest of a few in the short term, but is being paid for with a very high price, namely, that is serves nobody’s interest in the long term.\textsuperscript{856}

There are many ways by which Roman law rules contribute to the shredding of our social cohesion. Here is one: ‘This is not my responsibility!’ is a cry that I hear all around the world, and it increases in synchrony with contemporary neoliberal versions of Roman law rules being implemented ever more thoroughly. The civil law, designed using the Roman distinction between private law and public law (now global), allows people to believe that there is no responsibility when there is no contract. \textit{Alterum non laedere} imposes a duty not to harm, but no duty to help.\textsuperscript{857} This legitimises de-solidarisation and promotes an impersonal way of relating to other people as mere abstract role-bearers in contracts. It delegitimises the personal desire to engage in solidarity and weakens the traditional family spirit of communal sharing, a setting in which everybody would receive according to need and give according to ability.\textsuperscript{858} Worse even, it feeds the myth that individual independence is the norm for the health of a person and of society, and that this is achievable only through an abstract societal system, a system to which everybody ought to turn for livelihood and social contacts. Solidarity is supposedly administered through that system, such as through giving to charity (in the Anglo-Saxon world, for instance), or paying taxes (in Continental Europe). People who still engage in direct solidarity are derogated as lacking ‘independence’, and for breeding ‘losers’ who ‘live off others’ who fail to ‘stand on their own feet’. As such mind-sets gather influence, even marriage can be replaced by the purchase of temporary closeness.\textsuperscript{859} Also dignity is believed to be something that can be bought.\textsuperscript{860}

In this context of sociocide, young people are now being socialised into excluding the most fulfilling forms of interpersonal interdependence – the Buberian meeting of souls of I-Thou\textsuperscript{861} – and are prevented from learning to combine dependence and independence into rich interdependence and mutual interconnection. In short, profound psychological damage is inflicted on individuals and society; the space that humans need to unfold their potential is curtailed and amputated.\textsuperscript{862}

All this, says Richards, represents an overstretch of the monological trend in philosophy – from Kant to Charles Taylor’s notion of authenticity – at the cost of the dialogical embeddedness of human life, as sociologist George Herbert Mead emphasised when he conceived of the notion of the self as a relational construction.\textsuperscript{863} This overstretch hurts individuals and society alike. Problems that politicians ought to take responsibility for are being redefined as mere technical problems.\textsuperscript{864} Richards concludes:

It was the time when the \textit{Gemeinschaften} of the Middle Ages were disintegrating; the time when the evils of feudalism were being superseded by the evils of capitalism; a time, one

\[\text{Evelin Lindner}\]
of many times, when the dominium of some meant the exclusion of many, when the consensual contract facilitated the commercial transactions of those who offered products that somebody else wanted to buy, while the dissolution of personal bonds, and their replacement by the arms-length transactions defined by the jus gentium, isolated those who had only labour power to sell, inspiring fear in those who succeeded in selling their labour power today but who knew they might not succeed tomorrow, and despair in those who did not succeed.  

As touched upon earlier, Howard Richards offers a brief overview over the march of Roman law to its present triumph of defining the ethics of our time and ruling the world. Richards follows John Dewey’s naturalistic pragmatism and the more recently developed critical realism. He draws on, among others, Charles Taylor and John Searle in that constitutive rules govern our bargaining society. He follows Roy Bhaskar in that generative mechanisms produce the phenomena we observe. He follows Anthony Giddens in saying that today’s post-modern condition is one of radicalised modernity. And he follows Immanuel Wallerstein in pointing out that it is one single set of constitutive rules that defines the modern world-system, namely, Roman law principles. Richards calls for a new logic of cooperation and solidarity to become strong enough to limit the running amok of the current systemic imperative, as Ellen Meiksins Wood calls it.

These systemic imperatives have formed the backdrop for colonialism with its massive deconstruction of indigenous cultures, as much as they stand behind what is now known as neo-liberalism, which, Richards suggests, should be called neo-Romanism. It also drives the so-called war on terror, in its thrust not just against people identified as extremists, but generally against traditional ways of life that resist the ethics of modernity.

My seven years of working as a psychotherapist in Cairo, Egypt, have taught me many lessons that relate to Richards’ diagnosis of our time. I have learned to value the ability of traditional collectivist societies to create social glue among its members. Yet, I have also seen how destructive it can be when collectivism turns into oppression. I therefore welcome the liberation from those oppressive aspects of traditional collectivist society models. Neither Richards nor I wish to return to some idealised past. I see the advantages of creating larger and more abstract networks of relationships, I am an admirer of Paulo Freire’s colleague Clodomir de Morais who calls it the ‘artisan weakness’ not to let go of control. Yet, there is a ‘too little’ or ‘too much’, and what individualistic Western societies do is ‘too much’. Driven by the promise of equal dignity, individualism went too far. In the course of this process, the very solidarity has been sacrificed that was still present in collectivist settings, notwithstanding their oppressive elements. Now, the result is anomie in the midst of rising inequality.

By ripping the individual out from the collective in Western societies, the baby was thrown out with the bath water, so to speak, and instead of manifesting the ideal of equal dignity for all, what has happened so far is the opposite, namely, a global colonisation campaign that empties the world of its social and ecological resources. In short, the ability of collectivist communities to create social glue should be valued, protected, and nurtured, not sacrificed.

Sociologist Mark Granovetter has researched whether strong or weak social ties are more useful, and he comes down on the side of weaker ties. He builds on sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) and his differentiation of Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft. In a Gemeinschaft, people have strong ties and thoroughly share norms, a setting that is easily disrupted by even minimal dissent. Having many weak ties to a number of people, as in a Gesellschaft, in contrast, provides more space for individual autonomy and diversity, argues Granovetter. My personal life path confirms this insight, yet, only partly.

Together with author Frank Schirrmacher, I warn that the weakening of ties can go too far.
Schirrmacher is critical of the shrinking of social relationships to a minimum, of the dissolution of the family and its capacity as ‘survival factory’. In situations of emergency it becomes apparent how dangerous this is. Schirrmacher uses as illustration the tragedy of the settlers of the Donner Party, a group of American pioneers who set out for California in a wagon train in May 1846. They had to spend the winter of 1846 to 1847 snowbound in the Sierra Nevada. Those who were alone, without family, died in the snowstorms, while those who were with family survived. In our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship we combine both, strong and weak ties.

Novelist Ayn Rand has many enthusiastic followers among young American students, particularly after the 2008 economic crisis. In her public appearances, Ayn Rand praised the 1917 February Revolution in Russia and the spirit of liberation from oppression that carried it. Then came the October Revolution, which hijacked the process and co-opted people back into oppression. It did so, in part, by abusing the argument of altruism, asking people to offer themselves to the state. This is why Ayn Rand came to reject altruism and highlight the virtue of uninhibited self-interest instead. Ayn Rand had a painfully oppressive mother, which may have made her defensive, hard, even arrogant, and opposed to not just oppression, but also to warmth and solidarity. In her rejection of bondage in a hierarchy she went too far, she also rejected loving mutual connection among peers. Solipsistic arrogance was the result. By now, arrogance is being misperceived as mastery by her followers, and wherever this misperception is ‘mainstreamed’, it helps lend legitimacy to coldness throughout society. Ayn Rand is quoted as saying: ‘We can evade reality, but we cannot evade the consequences of evading reality’. This lesson has indeed been inflicted on her followers and on the world as a whole by the ongoing and never-ending economic crisis. All ‘systems’ have failed so far – it did not help to remove the altruism motive and instead democratise the profit motive – all systems were carried to pre-eminence by enthusiastically hopeful followers who become defensive when reality tells they they are wrong, as this simply is too humiliating. Now is the time to remove the profit motive ‘from determining production in human society’ and instead create ‘a system of participatory democracy’, this is a position supported by economists such as Kamran Mofid, founder of the Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative (GCGI).

In conclusion, people are being dislodged from their relationships too far, ‘unfrozen’ too far. Terrorism experts speak of ‘unfreezing’ when young people become dislodged from their familiar social contexts and fall prey to terrorism entrepreneurs. Similarly, whole societies can ‘unfreeze’ their members, disconnect them to the point that they become willing to partake in a rat race, a race that, once it defines all of society and has ‘hooked’ enough people, becomes ever more brutal.

Can we rise from humiliation?

Aristocratic French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), in his classic text, The Ancien Régime and the revolution (1856), wrote that the danger of revolution is greatest, not when poverty is so severe that it causes apathy and despair, but when conditions had been improving, and, in particular, when a few are benefitting and not the rest. What Tocqueville alluded to is the expectation gap that arises when improved conditions create hopes, while at the same time providing the means to react with significant impact when those hopes are betrayed. Expectation gaps can set in motion a whole range of reactions. In India, for instance, female suicide rates are highest in the parts of the country with the best education and
economy, ‘probably because women grow up with greater aspirations only to find their social milieu limits them’, explains psychiatrist and researcher Vikram Patel.\textsuperscript{390} Or, another example. Erik Solheim was Minister of International Development in Norway, when our conversation took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, on 10th January 2011.\textsuperscript{891} He reminded me that, interestingly enough, the colonial period was perceived as humiliation at the end of the colonial era, at a point when those who had been colonised were already much better off, particularly in Africa.

Since Alexis de Tocqueville’s time, social mobilisation theory has flourished. Social scientist Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), for instance, wrote about the psychology of the crowd in 1895.\textsuperscript{892} In 1950, sociologist David Riesman spoke about the lonely crowd.\textsuperscript{893} Later, sociology spawned a rich plethora of terminology and looked at phenomena such as relative deprivation,\textsuperscript{894} and framing,\textsuperscript{895} all built on a rational choice approach.\textsuperscript{896}

Alexis de Tocqueville did not live to see labour movements engage in class conflict. He did not live to see how those movements later waned, and new ‘middle-class’ identities moved to the fore, inspiring anti-war campaigns and movements to protect the environment and civil rights. Names of scholars who followed Tocqueville were, among others, Alain Touraine,\textsuperscript{897} Ronald Inglehart,\textsuperscript{898} Jürgen Habermas,\textsuperscript{899} and Charles Tilly.\textsuperscript{900}

Early scholars usually did not regard emotions as important for social mobilisation. Recently, this has changed. Sociologist James Jasper, for instance, explicitly recognises the role of emotions in his theorising on moral shock. He writes about social movements: ‘Especially after humiliations, revenge can become a primary goal’.\textsuperscript{901} Moral shock is a term that describes visceral unease and outrage, triggered by events that may be personal or public, and that bring together emotional, moral, and cognitive dynamics. Even a film can trigger this shock by depicting stark images of injustice and cruelty. As a consequence, a person may become inclined toward political action even ‘without the network of personal contacts’ that is emphasised ‘in mobilisation and process theories’.\textsuperscript{902}

Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel helped the term Holocaust solidify this word’s association with Nazi atrocities against the Jews. In 1986, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in speaking out against violence, repression and racism. When accepting the prize, he said:

\begin{quote}
I swore never to be silent whenever and wherever human beings endure suffering and humiliation. We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented. Sometimes we must interfere. When human lives are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national borders and sensitivities become irrelevant. Wherever men or women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, that place must – at that moment – become the centre of the universe.\textsuperscript{903}
\end{quote}

As already Tocqueville observed, it is not easy to stand up rather than stand by, even when this is what the situation calls for. A new situation, or new information, however important and pressing, does not mean that people necessarily take it in, let alone react to it. It seems that sometimes the need to maintain a coherent map of the world, a map one is familiar with, is stronger than the need to accommodate ideas to reality. Even those who live in pain, those who live in disadvantaged positions, may choose familiarity over rebellion and prefer to continue living in pain.

Evidently, this does not mean that learning is impossible. Classical social psychology research suggests that ambiguous and conflicting information can also engender new interpretations and attitudes at all levels, individual, interpersonal, and collective levels.\textsuperscript{904} Intercultural research shows that when cultural assumptions are called into question, a ‘stress-
adaptation-growth’ process can unfold,\textsuperscript{905} and that creativity can be enhanced through ‘interactions of mutually contradictory but equally compelling forces’.\textsuperscript{906} Disorienting dilemmas can unsettle fundamental beliefs and call dearly held values into question, something that can bring about transformative learning.\textsuperscript{907} Epistemic crisis is what philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre calls ‘the moment in which we must say: if this is true, then everything else that I have thought was true up until now is not. I need to revise everything’.\textsuperscript{908}

However, also the opposite can happen. There is an inverse relation between information ambiguity and transformation as well. Uncertainty may be more difficult to bear than certainty, even if this certainty is painful and opting for change would decrease pain. Uncertainty might even harden existing belief systems, as dysfunctional as they may be; loss aversion might override the most relevant new information. ‘Unwittingly manipulated into self-humiliation’ is the title of a section in my book emotion and conflict,\textsuperscript{909} where I offer a list of concepts and words that capture the dynamics of what I call voluntary self-humiliation. It is disastrous when learned helplessness transforms into what may be called learned perpetration.

**Understanding self-humiliation**

If we ask where this acquiescence with one’s own oppression may come from, to the point of the ‘banality’ of learned perpetration – to borrow Hannah Arendt’s formulation of the banality of evil\textsuperscript{910} – then it seems to flow from two sources: first, the basic human need for coherence, familiarity, recognition, connection and belonging, and, second, from millennia of cultural learning within the dominator model of society. As mentioned earlier, Riane Eisler, social scientist and activist, has developed a cultural transformation theory, through which she describes how, during the past millennia, otherwise widely divergent societies all over the globe followed what she calls the dominator model of society, rather than a partnership model.\textsuperscript{911} The dominator model turns people into tools in the hands of their superiors, with deeply mutilating effects on people and societies, from macro to micro levels. The art of humiliation, as I call it, takes this mutilation furthest – it turns involuntary mutilation into voluntary mutilation. It victimises its victims doubly, insofar as it co-opts them into becoming co-perpetrators, co-oppressors, not only of others, but also of themselves. It is the ultimate refinement of the art of domination to bring people into voluntary self-humiliation, to co-opt underlings to maintain their own bondage voluntarily and misrecognise it as ‘honour’ and ‘heroism’, or even ‘freedom’.\textsuperscript{912} Concepts such as méconnaissance (misrecognition) and naturalisation were used by Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault (among others).\textsuperscript{913} It is the inculation, into a population, of what philosopher Immanuel Kant called selbst verschuldete Unmündigkeit,\textsuperscript{914} often translated as ‘self-incurred immaturity’, or, how I would translate it, ‘voluntarily relinquishing independent critical thinking’.\textsuperscript{915}

Already philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn observed that the map of the world one is familiar with may override the most relevant new information. Even scientific paradigms resist change, despite the fact it is the very essence of scientific methodology to be open to new evidence.\textsuperscript{916} Psychologist Kenneth Gergen illustrates what happens:

Although departments of knowledge are social creations, once they are established as departments, strong survival motives are set in motion. On the one hand this means protecting one’s traditions of study – including subject matter, methodology, and forms of expression. In spite of major changes in the global context, most departments of knowledge remain weighted by these traditions. Their practices were established long ago,
and there is little room for challenges that fall outside the perimeter. And... there is also competition with other departments. Each demands its share of the economic pie. As a result, there is virtually no pie remaining for potential newcomers. In both respects, there is little room for new topics, concerns, or challenges to enter the establishment. If they do not fit within the established departments, they may go unaddressed.⁹¹⁷

Before paradigms shift – not just in academia but in general – they rigidify, due to those who identify with and benefit from it, and who therefore stand up for it. Paradigms are thus sustained even as ever more ‘stubborn facts’ cast them in doubt: ‘I know, but I can’t believe it’. This situation persists until a tipping point lets the dam break and space opens for a new paradigm. If the paradigms that dominate an entire global Zeitgeist shift, space opens outside of traditional disciplines and world views, it opens for rebels who come with approaches that were unthinkable before.⁹¹⁸ ‘First they ignore you, then they ridicule you, then they fight you, then you win.’ This is a quote associated with Mahatma Gandhi. It may only be a new generation of people who are able to ask radically enough new questions and undermine the edifice.

Social psychology research sheds light on the psychological factors that increase such rigidification and attitude polarisation.⁹¹⁹ It begins with people overestimating their awareness of factual evidences and being unaware of their own ignorance.⁹²⁰ Then they seek out information that resonates with their existing preferences,⁹²¹ and when they encounter new information, they will incorporate it in ways so biased that the information will strengthen their current preferences.⁹²² They will associate with likeminded people,⁹²³ and expect that other people’s views are as extreme as their own.⁹²⁴

Sociologist Amitai Etzioni has reflected on the reasons for such persistence. To form a normative paradigm, and a legal code that underpins it, requires great effort and investment:

Decades of moral dialogue, consensus building, legislation, court cases, and public education slowly build such a paradigm. Millions of people come to believe in it, weave it into their world view and political preferences, and even intertwine it with their personal identities. Hence the strain of dissonance between the paradigm and reality may be high before one can expect a paradigm to break down and it be replaced with a new one.⁹²⁵

Legitimising myths are at the core of normative paradigms, and they may entail chosen traumas. This combination can be so compelling that it leads to blind trust overriding any critical inquiry. Psychiatrist Vamik Volkan wrote a book with the title Blind trust,⁹²⁶ where he lays out his theory of collective violence and chosen trauma. When a chosen trauma is experienced as humiliation and not mourned, this may lead to feelings of entitlement to take revenge and, under the pressure of fear and anxiety, to collective regression and ultimately violence.⁹²⁷ James Edward Jones, professor of world religions and African studies, speaks of a post-victim ethical exemption syndrome.⁹²⁸

Political scientist Stuart Kaufman speaks of myth-symbol complexes, and how violence can be the result when populations are being moulded around them.⁹²⁹ Psychologists Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto explain the role of legitimising myths, or compelling cultural ideologies, that are taken as self-apparently true in society, and how they disguise the use of force and discrimination and make it acceptable.⁹³⁰ They describe how such myths can maintain inequality among different groups in society, and how this materialises through three mechanisms: Slavery can exemplify the first mechanism, the ‘official terror’ of institutional discrimination; second, there is the aggregated individual discrimination of one individual against another, an effect that becomes palpable at a larger scale when many people commit it, rather than just a few; third, there is the behavioural asymmetry of keeping people in ‘their
place’, an asymmetry that is accepted and upheld by superiors and inferiors alike. The passive and active cooperation of subordinates with their own oppression is what ‘provides systems of group-based social hierarchy with their remarkable degrees of resiliency, robustness and stability’.931

System justification theory, as developed by psychologist John Jost and his colleagues, have been mentioned earlier.932 The fields of philosophy, sociology, and psychology offer many concepts. Philosopher Peter Strawson, for instance, speaks of shared conceptual schemes that form an interconnected web of our conceptions of the world, determining how we, as humans, think about reality.933 Horizon is a term used by philosophers Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, or William James. Philosopher John Searle’s background speaks to the same phenomena,934 as does the tacit knowledge of polymath and philosopher Michael Polanyi.935 Social psychologist Daryl Bem speaks of zero-order beliefs.936 Social researcher Hugh Mackay introduced the invisible cage as a metaphor for the tacit effects of life experience, cultural background, and current context on an individual’s view of the world.937 Humans have mental models,938 on which they base ‘preferences without inferences’, says social psychologist Robert Zajonc,939 and linguist George Lakoff speaks of frames ‘that allow human beings to understand reality – and sometimes to create what we take to be reality’.940

Interpretive frames have surface frames and deep frames, with deep frames shaping our deepest assumptions about human nature and the social order: ‘Without the deep frames, there is nothing for the surface message frames to hang on’.941 Not least, conflict ‘is framed by the structure, and the conflict parties may limit their perspectives on the conflict, so that structural aspects of the conflict remain invisible’, teaches sociolinguist Basil Bernstein.942 Peace researcher Johan Galtung points at deep culture or deep cosmology as something that contains codes and building blocks that may predispose for, or legitimise violence.943

Psychologist Peter Coleman and his colleagues developed the dynamical systems theory, where they included, among others, social dominance theory944 and system justification theory,945 and then went further: they acknowledge that systems are dynamic, not just static. Coleman identifies attractors, or dominant mental and behavioural patterns, that offer a coherent map of the world to people, and a stable platform for action.946 Like Tocqueville and others after him,947 also Coleman observes the counter-intuitive effect that members of disadvantaged groups often agree with their own oppression and discrimination and even justify a status quo that hurts them.948

Critical discourse analysis shows how such power dynamics produce and are reproduced by dominant discourses.949 Elites, as they have disproportionate access to the means of cultural production, can shape such dominant discourses – wittingly or unwittingly – according to their interests. As a result, social realities are constructed and taken for granted that advantage ‘some participants at the expense of others’.950

The aforementioned term subaltern has its place here as used by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s,951 as has Jürgen Habermas’ notion of the colonisation of the lifeworld,952 or Patricia Hill Collins’ controlling images,953 as well as Johan Galtung’s term penetration.954 Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality is relevant, as are the concepts of méconnaissance (misrecognition) and naturalisation. Also the Stockholm syndrome has been referred to before, as another name for capture-bonding, when hostages identify with their captors.955

Human beings are social and cultural beings, and they wish to belong. As mentioned earlier, beliefs guide not just our relationship with our ecosphere, but also our relationship with our sociosphere, which means that we need to live with ourselves and with others.956 This makes us vulnerable to being manipulated, making it easy for penetration to work. To belong, we are willing to internalise ideologies into our psychological structures, and this may include ideologies of submission and domination that justify our own abdication.957 I speak of
The art of domination, or, as noted above, self-humiliation. The world offers myriad examples of such processes. Here comes one. Nanci Adler is a Russianist who studies the Soviet terror and the fate of Gulag returnees. She has explored how Russian society comes to terms with its Communist past and how the institutional aftermath of mass victimisation unfolds. Soviet terror was a system that enforced its ideology by executing, imprisoning, and exploiting dissenters, alleged dissenters, and suspected associates of dissenters. To her astonishment, Adler found a great paradox: Still today, many Gulag victims retain their allegiance with this system and still venerate its leaders.

Psychological phenomena such as defensive avoidance play a role here. Psychotherapist Carol Smaldino writes the following about mechanisms of denial and resistance: ‘When, however, people in general cannot change focus or perspective in the midst of seeing the facts of any matter, statistically, educationally and in the flesh, we have what you might call a serious resistance. And when there is a resistance that insists on denial at any cost, we have a clinical problem that is both pervasive and alarming. ’ Smaldino sees the health of today’s world society as a whole in danger when scientists are getting tired of explaining the dangers of ‘present ways of mining, and farming and fracking’, because their information lands on deaf ears. She calls on therapists like her, who know that, where there is resistance to information, there are underlying reasons such as fear, greed, desperation, or panic: ‘When people are afraid to change, they have reasons, which also deserve respect, not pummelling with repetitions of the same information again and again. We know this: we know addicts don’t change for the nagging, and that many of us in general have an allergy to being lectured’. Smaldino hopes that society can heal and remember the lessons we see in the sciences and in history, and in our imaginations, namely, ‘that the ways of studying and the ways of implementing information can be experimental, can be new, and can involve the energy of people who are witness to a difficulty they care about.’

In other words, leaving behind the status quo is not easy, even if ever so necessary, and only a few people will do so. Even if reinforcing feedback loops among elements within a dominant attractor become weakened and the attractor loses its pull, as Coleman would formulate it, and new information provides new platforms for action, people might still not wake up. Only those with a particular set of resources will act, the proverbial child who sees that the emperor has no clothes, and, who, in addition, also has the courage to say this out loud.

Once people do rise up, however, there is another danger: from bowing too low, they may rise up too far. Their former reluctance to carry their heads high may turn into its opposite, into turning their noses up too arrogantly, into what James Edward Jones calls post-victim ethical exemption syndrome. They may turn the golden rule on its head: ‘Do bad unto others because they (or someone else) did something bad to you’. The Rwandan genocide is a striking example where subordinates overrode all inner barriers and meted out unspeakable cruelty on their former masters.

**The current state-of-affairs of uprisings in this world**

At the current historic juncture, two new forces – what is called ‘globalisation’, in concert with the rise of the human rights ideals – create expectation gaps, or better, dignity gaps, that destabilise the old dominant attractor. It is in this context that humiliation comes to the fore in unprecedented intensity.

Globalisation as it stands now has two expressions, first, the ingathering of the human tribes, or the coming-together of humankind, and, second, the global exploitation of social and ecological resources. Both, when combined with the human rights promise of equality in
dignity, are a recipe to increase feelings of humiliation, which, in turn, can become fuel for uprisings, be they destructive – the Hitler path – or constructive – the Mandela path.

In former times, absolute deprivation existed in many parts of the world. Yet, as long as people lived in isolation far apart from each other, this was not understood as relative deprivation. Nowadays, Western soap operas and Western tourists walking about are teaching the less privileged in the most far-flung regions of the world to recognise their own deprivation. At the same time, human rights promise equality in dignity and rights for all, meaning that all human beings are part of one family where all members enjoy equality in dignity. In this way, the underprivileged of this world, and those who identify with them, learn that poverty and exploitation represents no divinely ordained karma, but a deprivation that is no longer acceptable. Now it represents a violation of human rights, indeed, a violation of the very humanity of the one human family. Those who are deprived, when see how the gap between the poor and the rich grows ever wider locally and globally, and they understand that much of the elites’ human rights rhetoric is empty, they have reason to suspect that the rich and powerful peddle empty human rights rhetoric precisely to maintain and even increase their dominant position. At that moment, life at the bottom turns from karma not just into relative deprivation, but into humiliating victimhood at the hands of the rich and powerful of the world. The famous ‘one per cent’ transmute into humiliators.

In this situation, it would be a mistake to believe that the solution would lie in simply offering more material wealth to the poor. This can only be one element, though an important one. Even a world of equal material wealth for all would not suffice. The reason is that being given wealth without being respected as equal in dignity, may humiliate all the more. It could be perceived as being paid off for foregoing dignity, it might feel like losing face, the face of honour and dignity. Furthermore, this wealth may in addition provide the very means to act on this disaffection in violent ways. This is what Tocqueville observed.

Erik Solheim was introduced earlier. He recounted how a high Norwegian diplomat, an ambassador, once told him: ‘You must never humiliate anyone! You make enemies for life. Whatever you think about a person, never humiliate them!’ What does it mean to humiliate anyone? Solheim’s answer was that it varies from person to person and culture to culture, however, that the feeling is always the same. Solheim offered important examples of the role of humiliation and how it can trump material wealth:

Apartheid was systemic humiliation. When Gandhi was not allowed to sit in the first class on the train, it was about humiliation, not the third class’s poor conditions. He was not afraid of simple life, it was the humiliation that was at stake.

Solheim continued by referring to the colonial period, which was perceived as humiliation only at the end of the colonial era, at a point when the colonised already enjoyed better conditions, particularly in Africa (with China and India as exceptions, since they were already wealthier before). Solheim mentioned Tibet as another example: ‘It would be much poorer without China. Tibet would be the poorest place in the region without China. Yet, it perceives it as humiliating to be “forced” into prosperity by China.’

Norbert Müller was a member of the board of Schura, a merger of mosque associations in Hamburg, Germany, when our conversation took place on 22nd October 2010. He shared his views on the reasons for why highly educated young men from Hamburg set out to commit terror in New York on 9/11 in 2001:

Those, who came from Hamburg and participated in the 9/11 attacks in New York, were highly educated and academically successful. They did not experience social, but discursive humiliation. As academics, they had success, but as people of faith, they felt: ‘I
can make a good career here, but only if I abrogate my heritage and my religion, for my Muslim identity is always degraded. There is a dominant culture here that is Western, and if I am living my religious identity, I experience condescension. And I feel this disdain all the more, since I also see myself as a successful graduate. In this way, humiliation is amplified: ‘I expect recognition and respect, but experience degradation’, this is psychologically disparaging.\textsuperscript{968}

Personally, I cherish the promises made by human rights ideals. To me, these ideals are anchored in the potential of humans to be humane, in all cultures on all continents. They are not simply a Western invention, and they are the only script that can secure a dignified future for humankind.\textsuperscript{969} I highly value the privilege of having been born into a societal context that gave me enormous opportunities. I follow Tocqueville in that I use my privileges to respond to humiliation also on behalf of those who are too downtrodden, depressed, and too overwhelmed by the struggle for mere survival. I feel my own humanity being terrorised, tortured, and humiliated on my global path whenever I watch dignity being violated. And I work to wake up those who are too disconnected to stand up and who therefore simply stand by. In that way, I follow psychologist Ervin Staub, who, in his work, has shown that the Nazi regime was possible only because so many people stood by.\textsuperscript{970} I follow Nelson Mandela, who transformed humiliation into dignity. I do not follow terrorism entrepreneurs, those who simply keep on turning cycles of humiliation ever further.

I am acutely aware that rising up from humiliation, in the past, simply meant turning the tables. Former underlings became the new masters. The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, for instance, was carried out by underlings who had risen to power and wanted to secure it through eradicating their former masters. In a human rights context, trying to turn the tables can no longer be regarded as a viable strategy. It means going too far, even humiliating the very humanity of the revolutionaries.

Therefore, human rights defenders need to be aware that empowerment can go too far. The social worker may try to empower the wife to feel humiliated by her violent husband and call on her to rise up from this humiliation, however, the social worker ought not encourage the wife to humiliate or even kill her husband. The self-esteem movement in Western societies fell into this trap and it has produced narcissistic societies.\textsuperscript{971} It has elevated everybody to the former elite sense of entitlement and transformed anger into a narcissism epidemic, into chronic indignation and anger entrepreneurship by all against all.\textsuperscript{972} Therefore, I avoid using the term \textit{empowerment} and replace it with \textit{entrustment}.\textsuperscript{973} I also use the phrase \textit{sense of worth} in the place of the phrase \textit{self-esteem}.\textsuperscript{974} If dignity humiliation is to be healed, only dignified and dignifying remedies can do so; it goes too far when the script for responding to honour humiliation is turned to (what I call cross-over).

While working as a clinical psychologist in Egypt (1984–1991), young Palestinian clients came to me because they were depressed. They felt they should help their suffering families in Palestine, instead of studying in Cairo, and preparing for a happy life.

Farida, a young woman, not yet 20 years old, cried heart-wrenchingly\textsuperscript{975}:

My father wants me to study, get married, and have a normal life. But I cannot smile and laugh and think of happy things, when my aunts and uncles, my nieces and other family members face suffering in Palestine. Their suffering is a heavy burden on me. I feel it in my body. Sometimes I cannot sleep. I feel tortured.

I know Palestinians my age who do not care. They go to the discotheque and dance – they even drink alcohol. I think this is disgusting. Our people are suffering and we should stand by them. If we cannot help them directly, we should at least not mock them by living immoral lives or be heartless and forget them altogether. I feel I have no right to enjoy life
as long as my people suffer.

I respect my father and I try to obey him and concentrate on my studies. If it were not for him, I would go to my homeland, get married, have as many sons as possible, and educate them in the right spirit. I would be overjoyed to have a martyr as a son, a son who sacrifices his life for his people.

I feel that suicide bombers are heroes, because it is hard to give your life. I want to give my life. I want to do something. I cannot just sit here in Cairo and watch my people suffer and be humiliated. I feel humiliated in their place, and feel that I humiliate them more by not helping them. I feel so powerless, so heavy; sometimes I can hardly walk.  

Farida’s involvement was of profound sincerity; it was intense, pure, deep, and selfless. She was a highly intelligent and strong woman, with a sensitive awareness of justice; in sum, her future could only be bright. Yet, she was in danger of wasting her entire future because she was overwhelmed by the violence, neglect, thoughtlessness, and humiliation she saw her people suffer. Dreaming about sacrificing her life as the mother of sons who would give their lives to defend their people was what gave her consolation.

Some of my male Palestinian clients had similar dreams; only that they wanted to give their own lives in violent resistance. Both girls and boys were appalled by some of their friends who would choose to ‘forget’ about their people’s suffering and instead ‘enjoy life’ by feasting and drinking.

None of these young people was driven by any ‘will to power’ or inherent ‘hatred’ of enemies, nor were they motivated by religious fervour, nor did they mistake intifada for yet another form of fun, nor did they expect sexual gratifications, not before death and not afterwards. They were only overwhelmed by despair. They suffered from too much empathy. They deeply empathised with their people’s pain of humiliation – a noble, sincere, and valuable commiseration.

They belonged to those caring-compelled individuals that social psychologists Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko describe, ‘who strongly feel the suffering of others and feel a personal responsibility to reduce or avenge this suffering’; they do not belong to those disconnected-disordered individuals ‘with a grievance and weapons experience who are social loners and often show signs of psychological disorder’.  

Research on mirror neurons suggests that one may indeed feel as humiliated on behalf of victims one identifies with as one would feel if one were to suffer the same pain oneself. Clearly, this phenomenon is magnified when media give access to the suffering of people in far-flung places.

Evidently, my young clients were vulnerable to being recruited by humiliation-entrepreneurs, who would instrumentalise their empathy for acts of destruction. Our conversations took place in a therapy room not far from the famous Tahrir Square in Cairo. It felt as if novelist Alaa Al-Aswany, who worked in his dental clinic a few streets away from where we spoke, or novelist Mohsin Hamid from Pakistan, or Orhan Pamuk from Turkey had secretly listened in on us and later written novels that would express the painful dilemmas and emotional journeys we reflected on. I explained to my clients that my personal life path had followed a similar desire to transcend personal material interests, and tried everything to describe to them the advantages of the path of a Mahatma Gandhi or a Nelson Mandela.

I thought of these clients when I listened to a letter that a young man from Marseilles wrote to his mother in 2015, just before he died as a so-called foreign fighter in Syria:

When you read these words, then I have left life on this toilsome world behind me, this
very troublesome world, especially since I left you. I hope you understand why I did all this, why I left everything, even though I lived in a stable situation, a wonderful family, and had a job. Why all these sacrifices? Because the community of Mohammed was humiliated. Allah has rewarded us with the reconstruction of the Caliphate. Finally, Muslims have regained their pride. A successful life is not only work, having a house, a car, a wife and children. A successful life is to worship Allah and to have his blessing.  

When a terrorist act hits the news, many exclaim, ‘How can people be so cruel! These terrorists are evil monsters, not humans!’ In other words, they suggest that extremists are simply ‘evil’, that they ‘hate freedom’, or are incomprehensible purveyors of a ‘hateful ideology’, and that reflecting on humiliation would mean naïvely doing the bidding of terrorists and serving as the terrorists’ lackey.  

Indeed, many of my Western friends feel personally attacked when they hear that foreign fighters with a high education and good career prospects claim to be motivated by humiliation. They feel that a person with a stable career in ‘our society’ ought not feel humiliated, because ‘we’ offer the best of all worlds. Through my work and my life path, I seem to create a similar sense of insult in some. Why does Evelin not live a ‘normal’ life? She has everything, two doctorates! What does she sacrifice her life for?  

The white apartheid elite in South Africa cried out loud: ‘We treat our black people much better than others! Look at the beautiful lives our black people live in our country, compared to other African countries!’ Slave owners were convinced: ‘Our slaves have a good life with us, they would not know how to live free lives, we must protect them!’ Those in the Global North who live in bubbles of relative financial safety can protect themselves from knowing what the rest of the world looks like, and from knowing to what extent ‘we’ are rich because others are not. And they can be oblivious of the fact that the quantity of consumption fails as a dignity marker. It is those who are ignorant of this, who are offended by my work.  

The letter from Marseilles shows that the young man felt a lack of meaning in life. Consumerism as dignity marker failed him and it fails me. The difference between me and him is that I try to create a future where what I call big love serves as marker for worthiness, dignity, and meaning-making. The young man from Marseilles turned back to an honour-oriented past and tried to recreate it, a disastrous path, particularly so in a globally interconnected world.  

I do not claim that humiliation always leads to violence and terrorism, nor that violence and terrorism always originate in humiliation. I also acknowledge that the humiliation-terrorism argument is being used to legitimise or delegitimise, rightly or falsely, claims that terrorists are in fact heroic freedom fighters, or, inversely, that terror is a declaration of war that requires war-like responses.  

Anthropologist Scott Atran found that it is neither (direct) humiliation nor religion, but ‘jihadi cool’ and solidarity among comrades that inspired so-called foreign fighters to travel from Britain to Syria. As long as humiliation results in submissiveness, humiliation is a negative predictor for violence. The situation is different, however, in second or third generations of immigrants to Britain who feel that their parents were humiliated. Also religion seemed to play no significant role. Atran found that most young fighters initially had no idea of religion; religious education even was a negative predictor for support for ‘jihad’, and madrassas had little influence.  

Jihadi cool was what propelled them, self-organised, self-motivating, and self-sustaining, and primarily social: friends, who played soccer together, radicalised together.  

There are those who become so-called foreign fighters ‘for fun’, for ‘jihadi cool’, for the ‘pleasure of terror’. Some young men have adopted the Western way of consumption as a path to masculine honour and find their ambitions better fulfilled in Syria by serving Da’esh.

Evelin Lindner
(Arabic acronym for Islamic State, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as ISIS). In the West, such a young man may not be able to buy the sports car he dreams of, or get the access to girls he wishes for, he can only watch pornography on his mobile phone. In Raqqa, when it still was Da’esh’s capital, he got access to women – he could even marry several, and he could even have sex slaves.

What is humiliation?

What is humiliation? This question has been discussed earlier, in the section ‘Are humiliation, shame, and humiliation part of the same continuum?’ Allow me to continue here.

Linda Hartling explains that humiliation can lead to very different outcomes – from being cast down to wanting to rise up, either violently or peacefully. From a broad perspective, humiliation can be examined as:

1. an internal experience (a feeling, an emotion),
2. an external event (such as a degrading interpersonal interaction, bullying, abuse, violent conflict, and genocide), or
3. as systemic social conditions (such intractable inequality, discrimination, or forced dislocation).

Humiliation is a word that is used for a very complex set of conditions. It is used for the act of humiliation perpetrated by an offender, as well as for the feeling of a victim who feels humiliated. The same word is used for humiliation made into a system, as it was under apartheid. An ‘offender’ who is accused of perpetrating humiliation might only want to offer help. When help is felt to humiliate, then only the recipient defines the situation as humiliating, not the perpetrator. Then the term humiliation may be used only by a third party. The social worker, for example, who wants to ‘save’ a wife from the humiliation she suffers at the hands of her violent husband, might be rebuked by her assuring him that beating her is how her husband expresses his love. Karl Marx spoke of ‘false consciousness’ when workers failed to feel humiliated and rebel.

Here is the complexity of humiliation condensed into one paragraph: Humiliation is the enforced lowering of a person or a group, a process of submission, which violates or robs the pride, honour, and/or dignity of victims. To be humiliated means to be brought, often in an extremely painful manner, into a situation that is very much lower than one feels entitled to. The act of humiliation contains demeaning behaviour toward others; it is behaviour that transgresses established limits and expectations. Humiliation may involve coercion, including violence. At the centre is the idea of pressing down, of holding down to the ground. One of the definitional characteristics of the process of humiliation is that the victim is forced into helplessness and passivity. However, the role of the victim is not always clear: One might expect that humiliation is avoided. However, there are people looking for humiliation, for example, in sadomasochistic contexts or religious rites, where people flagellate and humiliate themselves to praise God. Another victim may simply laugh off attempts to humiliate her, or proudly refuse to feel humiliated. Another victim may feel humiliated even in the absence of any intentional humiliating acts; this might happen as a result of misunderstandings, for example, or as a result of individual or cultural differences in the definition of what respectful behaviour ought to entail. Or the ‘victim’ may even invent a story of humiliation to manoeuvre a counterpart into the role of a despicable perpetrator.

As to reactions to humiliation, also here the situation is complex and people react in different ways. Some react with depression, others develop open aggression; others hide their
anger and plan long-term revenge. A person who plans revenge, can under certain circumstances become the leader of a movement.

In short, a perpetrator may have the intention to humiliate others without necessarily succeeding. A ‘helper’ may, without meaning to, humiliate those whom she wants to help. And a third party may see victims who themselves do not define themselves as victims, or overlook victims who actually are victims. Further, as has been noted above, humiliation may be desired and not rejected.

Complex as it is, the concept of humiliation can be systematically analysed. One way to analyse it is to deconstruct it into seven layers. First, there is a core that expresses the universal idea of ‘putting down.’ Then there is a middle layer that contains two opposed orientations towards putting down, treating it as, respectively, legitimate and routine, or illegitimate and traumatising. Then, at the a periphery, one layer pertains to cultural differences between groups and another four layers relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experiences of humiliation.

Feelings of humiliation generate anger and/or shame when they are accompanied by the inability to redress a degradation felt to be so undeserved. A Somali proverb says, ‘A man deserves to be killed and not to be humiliated’. In other words, a proud culture of noble warriors does not allow humiliation to prevail. Norway looks back on an equally proud Viking past that may still shine through today in Norwegians having an ‘alarming tendency to quarrel with their neighbours’. Dag Are Borresen of the insurance company HELP Forsikring reports: ‘It’s seen as a matter of honour not to give in to a neighbour’s demands, and we expect or hope that the other side will take the initiative for some sort of reconciliation’.

Yet, most people do not live in proud warrior cultures. Many are worn down by humiliation-attrition to the point of apathy, depression, and inertia. They turn their rage inward and become depressed. Research shows that the combination of loss and humiliation is the strongest predictor of major depression. It also shows that humiliation is a very intense human emotion. It leads to a mobilisation of more processing power and a greater consumption of mental resources than other emotions: ‘humiliation is a particularly intense and cognitively demanding negative emotional experience that has far-reaching consequences for individuals and groups alike’. Protracted cycles of humiliation can lead to the paralysis and apathy that engenders ‘learned helplessness’. A seemingly ‘peaceful’ society can be the result, yet at a high price. The price is hiding structural violence. It is paid with the pain of some of its members.

However, there are limits to achieving peace by using humiliation to hide pain. Even my most peace-loving Palestinian friends, for instance, admit that it is possible to drive even them to ‘madness’, to ‘going black’, by subjecting them to the continuous experience of humiliation. While apathy and depression may be the first reaction to humiliation, at some point the ‘nuclear bomb of the emotions’ may explode, violently. Then, rage can be turned outward and become hot, desperate, and destructive, burst out in humiliated fury, as psychologist Helen Block Lewis has called it. The story was told earlier of young Ahmed, who felt that perpetrating violence would liberate him. Violent retaliation, even if self-destructive, can be experienced as a ultimate liberation from one’s own shame over one’s helplessness at the hands of one’s humiliators. Passionate murder and/or suicide might be the result.

As mentioned above, experiences like Ahmed’s show that humiliation cannot be conceptualised simply as part of the shame continuum, particularly not when human rights promises of equality in dignity have become salient. When such ideals are promised, and at the same time betrayed, feelings of humiliation may occur without feelings of shame. Nelson Mandela refused to feel ashamed when he was being humiliated and felt humiliated.
Ahmed was just one young man among many young men, and his violence was of little consequence for society at large. Yet, it is another story, when leaders mobilise an entire movement to counter-act humiliation. Humiliation entrepreneurs use feelings of sullen humiliation brewing in the masses to mobilise collective violent action. Nelson Mandela mobilised for social change; Adolf Hitler mobilised into mayhem. Hitler told his followers they should refuse feeling ashamed of Germany’s defeat after World War I, that they had the right to feel intolerably humiliated and fight back. Then he set out to redress this humiliation by inflicting unspeakable humiliation on supposed humiliators, thus unleashing new and horrific spirals in the cycles of humiliation.

It is in this situation that humiliation shows its full potential as utterly ‘cost-effective’ ‘nuclear bomb of the emotions’. The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda demonstrated this potential: the machetes that were used to kill almost one million people were house-hold items which were turned into deadly weapons by a humiliation propaganda that was disseminated from a radio station. The Hitler-script seemed to be the very template also for recent efforts to bring back a glorious caliphate.1008

Cycles of humiliation destroy the social fabric of communities wherever they occur, locally and globally. The international community, the global bystander, including every single citizen, therefore carries the responsibility to stand up rather than by.1009 Everyone who values social cohesion is called to build antidotes to cycles of humiliation. In today’s world where equal dignity has been promised, ending cycles of humiliation requires keeping the promise by delivering the dignity. It requires institutional structures that ensure a decent and dignified life for all.1010

It is time now, says Paul Raskin, neither for naïve optimism, nor for dystopian despair, but for pragmatic hope:

The signature feature of the Planetary Phase – the enmeshment of all in the overarching proto-country, Earth – suggests an answer. The natural change agent for a Great Transition would be a vast and inclusive movement of global citizens. The world now needs citizens without borders to come together for a planetary community…The challenge is extraordinary, but so are the times. In transformative moments, small actions can have large consequences. The efforts of an active minority can ripple through the cultural field and release latent potential for social change1011.

If disconnection is our contemporary condition, and the present-day’s neo-Roman law principles the root problem, then integration is the solution of our time, so Howard Richards. In other words, if it takes a village to raise a child, then the global village has to become robust enough to actually do so, namely, raise its children. In that situation, local governments cannot be counted on for help, as their whole duty is to serve post-Roman law, enforce contracts, and protect the security of investments, forbidden to interfere with the free mobility of factors across borders. Even improved global regulatory rules would not help to create a level playing field for all, what is needed are new global constitutive rules.1012 Richards has studied the example of Scandinavian countries, and he found that even though they have a tradition of equality and have done better for a while, also their model is ultimately inherently unviable.1013

Howard Richards lives in Chile and often works in South Africa. I had the privilege of joining him in both places.1014 As mentioned above, people in South America are highly aware of how an entire society can advance human dignity or violate it. Impunity can be considered to be an on-going form of systemic torture, perpetrated by society. This is the message of psychologists and doctors in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru, and of all those who work with torture survivors and families of disappeared persons. My colleague Nora
Sveaass is one of their messengers. Sveaass is the chair of the board of Health and Human Rights Info platform of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). The platform works to bridge the gap between health care professionals and human rights activists, including legal professionals in the field. ‘Justice, truth, dignity’ is the motto of the International Center for Transitional Justice, and this is their vision: ‘We strive for societies to regain humanity in the wake of mass atrocity. For societies in which impunity is rejected, dignity of victims is upheld, and trust is restored; where truth is the basis of history. We believe that this is an ethical, legal, and political imperative and the cornerstone of lasting peace’. The renowned Joinet/Orentlicher principles stipulate the right to know, the right to justice, the right to reparation, and, fourth, the guarantee of non-recurrence.

Philosopher Howard Richards, in his work, suggests a number of methodologies to make our social structures fit our ecological contexts. First and foremost, Richards recommends correcting the basic cultural structures derived from Roman law:

- **Suum cuique** (to each his own) needs to be corrected by socially functional forms of land tenancy and socially functional forms of property in general, since otherwise it gives legitimacy to those who have monopolised economic capital in their own hands, and it allows them to maintain or even increase this inequality.

- **Pacta sunt servanda** (agreements must be kept) needs to be corrected by mutual beneficial reciprocity and responsibility for one another’s welfare regardless of whether there is a contract or not. Otherwise it legitimises negative externalities, as there is no responsibility where there is no contract. Indeed, there is no written contract with the next generation and with nature. Human action should seek to promote positive externalities and avoid negative ones. As Linda Hartling formulates, healthy relationships are a ‘centrality’ to survival of humankind, not an externality.

- **Honeste vivare** (to live honestly) needs to be corrected by recognising that our very identity is relational.

- **Alterum non laedere** (not hurting others by word or deed) needs to be corrected to promote an ideal of service to others above and beyond the obligation not to harm them. **Honeste vivare** and **alterum non laedere** risk entitling perpetrators of sociocide and ecocide to regard their deeds as legitimate as long as they do not violate the first two principles.

Howard Richards suggests that these corrections will clear away obstacles that stand in the way of rebuilding the present one-size-fits-all global regime of capital accumulation. These corrections will loosen what Ellen Meiksins Wood calls ‘systemic imperatives’. Once these obstacles are cleared away, it will be possible to support human life and all life on planet Earth. There are multiple ways to provide goods and services that can support and generate a dignified life on Earth. If we think of the health of the Earth’s citizens, for instance, how come that the pharmaceutical industry and other industries, rather than putting useful discoveries to use, can buy them up and sit on them to prevent their competitors from using them? We should not allow a narrow neo-Roman concept of property rights to stand in the way of ameliorating human life and all life on Earth. Howard Richards has collaborated with many colleagues in South Africa and put into practice multiple ways of providing goods and services, in the limitless variety of material practices called **unbounded organisation**.

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PART III: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Let me now summarise and recapitulate what was discussed so far, and then reflect on the way forward into the future.

In the year 1757, a new meaning of the verb to **humiliate** became visible in the English language, ultimately leading up to a new vision of the social contract for a society,\(^{1025}\) based on the idea of equal dignity for all. It began with the individual becoming detached from the collective, and later, in a next step, each individual was endowed with equal worthiness.

Many psychological, social, societal, and political transitions accompany, mirror, and showcase this trend, and many historians have described how deep and radical the intellectual transformations of this time have been.\(^{1025}\) Around 1750, for the first time, travellers began to insert themselves as subjects with a personal perspective into their travel reports more openly, after Michel de Montaigne began with the ‘birth of the self’ in his *Essays* in 1575.\(^{1026}\) The American Declaration of Independence came on 4th July 1776, the French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen on 4th August 1789, and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10th December 1948.

The message of the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution was so revolutionary and controversial that only America and France opened up to it; much more caution reigned in Britain and elsewhere. It was new that individual rights can be universal – not particular for any given country – and that government was to secure these rights. Article 1 of the of the 1948 Human Rights Declaration states that ‘All human being are born with equal rights and dignity. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’ (we would add sisterhood today). In former times such utterances were unconceivable – and they still are unconceivable in certain segments of world society still today. A very different version of this sentence was regarded as divinely ordained or nature-given: ‘All human beings are born unequal in dignity and rights. Some are endowed with more reason and conscience and should act towards inferiors in a spirit of superiority’. Or: ‘All human beings are born unequal in worthiness and rights – people are born into their rank and they are meant to stay there, only some might move up or down due to their own doing or undoing – and, as an unavoidable consequence, there will always be some who are more free than others; there will always be elites who preside over their subordinate collectives’.

William Ian Miller has traced in minute detail how the articulation and conceptualisation of the individual and the self changed in the context of Romanticism, industrialisation, and capitalism. Until about 250 years ago, humiliation was not seen as hurtful, to **humiliate** did not signify the violation of honour nor dignity. To humiliate meant merely to lower or to humble, and ‘to remind underlings of their due place’, and this was widely regarded as pro-social. Over time, however, in the English language, the connotations of **humiliation** and **humility** parted, splitting into opposite directions, humility staying pro-social, while humiliation became anti-social.\(^{1027}\)

Human rights endow every single human being with an inner core of equal dignity that should not be held down, that ought not be humiliated. In this way, the human rights revolution turns formerly legitimate humbling of underlings into illegitimate humiliation. In the world of honour, holding down underlings is not a violation; it only becomes a violation in a human rights context where equal dignity for all is the norm. In the world of honour, only elites – not their underlings – have the right to interpret an attempt to put them down as a violation and, for instance, go to duel. A beaten wife is not meant to challenge her husband to duel but to learn docile humility from being humiliated, to learn respect for his supremacy. Human rights ideals thus democratise the right to become angry when put down, and extend this right to millions of downtrodden people who formerly endured humiliation quietly in
meek humility. This is why the notion of humiliation becomes more important in our times. Human rights ideals of equal dignity have the potential to inspire anger where there was docility before.

In former times, tyrants were toppled, but not the system – after victory, rebels and revolutionaries typically became the new tyrants. Human rights ideals today introduce a second transformation after the first: first, the dismantling of the tyrants of the world, and, second, the dismantling of the very system of tyranny, and all this by peaceful means without violence. Human rights ideals today call for entirely new arrangements of relationships and engagements on planet Earth, both with each other and with nature: competition for domination is to be replaced with partnership, collaboration, mutuality, and dialogue. Wherever human rights ideals are established as a norm, both underlings’ meek humility and superiors’ haughty arrogance are expected to transform into mutual care in the spirit of dignified humility.

Today’s human rights ideals represent an invitation and a promise: an invitation to all human beings to share a ‘spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood’, considering themselves to be part of one single human family, a promise stipulating that all family members will be respected as equal in dignity. As a result, grievances are now felt that were not felt before: feelings of humiliation and anger now emerge that were absent before.

Humiliation and anger double when human rights ideals are preached with noble pathos, only to turn out to be empty rhetoric: ‘To recognise humanity hypocritically and betray the promise humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed’. In the language of political science, an expectation gap opens up when hopes are created only to be disappointed. When this happens, those who have the necessary psychological strength and inclination, and the material resources, may set out to express their disappointment with violence.

Human rights advocates need to be aware that the hope they create can open up a dignity gap that feeds feelings of humiliation. Some people may react with submissive humility to those feelings, just as in former times, since the majority of the world’s population is still socialised into accepting as true that it is divinely ordained or nature’s order that ‘higher’ beings preside over ‘lesser’ beings. Others may have learned the human rights lesson and they will expect to be treated as equal in worthiness, yet, they may not be courageous enough to turn their rage outward and will react with apathy and depression to their disappointment. In both cases, the overall situation will remain ‘peaceful’ on the surface.

Clearly, however, rage may also turn outward. The second human rights transformation indicates that this anger ought to be invested into peaceful systemic change, into Nelson Mandela’s path guided by a sense of humility that is inspired by equal dignity, no longer following the traditional rebel script of arrogating elite superiority. However, not everybody may follow this script. There are many examples for this happening. For instance, the self-esteem movement in Western societies seems to have democratised the former elite sense of entitlement, and transformed anger into a narcissism epidemic, into chronic indignation and anger entrepreneurship.

Anger may also explode in acute episodes of violence, such as in school shootings. In the worst case, anger may be stoked and channelled by humiliation entrepreneurs into mass violence. The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, for instance, was carried out by former subordinates who had risen to power. They attempted to kill their former patrons, cleansing them from society, as well as cleansing themselves from their own shame over ever having been submissive to them.

History offers a long list examples, from Adolf Hitler as humiliation entrepreneur to contemporary recruiters who lure youths to commit acts of terrorism. Cross-over is the term I use when I see feelings of dignity humiliation being responded to with tools from the tool kit.
of honour humiliation. It is when the Hitler path is taken in response to dignity humiliation rather than the Freire-Gandhi-Mandela path, when only the first part of the revolution is carried out, and this with violence, while the second part falls by the wayside.

Throughout the past four decades, a new, more insidious systemic way of breaking the human rights promise has emerged. The short-term interests of an elite few have hijacked institutional structures that promised to protect the common good. Processes of socioicide and ecocide are the result. Feelings of humiliation and anger increase also in this context. Examples abound also here. As discussed before, the field of psychology can serve as one example. The profit-motive has hijacked the field when it ends up selling short-term psychological solutions to individuals where structural problems ought to be addressed, thus contributing to increasing socioicide rather than alleviating it. Development theory is another example. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, professor of Global Studies and Sociology, asks: ‘Development is the management of a promise – and what if the promise does not deliver?’

Critical post-development voices warn that ‘it is not the failure of development which has to be feared, but its success’. Pieterse warns that there is a kind of double hijack hidden in post-development anti-standpoints, namely, by going too far and arriving ‘at development agnosticism by a different route’ as neoliberalism, while sharing ‘the abdication of development with neoliberalism’. Pieterse speaks up for reflexive modernity as a more enabling position, and reflexive development as a corollary in relation to development. Development specialist and scholar Benedicte Bull sheds light on the decades between 1980 and 2000, on what she calls a ‘perverse twist’:

On the one hand, from the 1980s, there were governments, businesses, international organisations and intellectuals – often lumped into the neoliberal category – that argued for a continued focus on growth and modernisation, but rejected the developmentalists’ focus on knowledge, technology and industrialisation. Moreover, in a perverse twist on the modernisation schools’ belief in linear evolution, they saw development as an immanent process in all societies that would naturally take place if hindrances were removed. They thus rejected the developmentalists’ notion of development as a purposeful process pursued by development actors, first and foremost the state, and considered it rather a natural process that would unfold if state interventions were removed and the market were allowed to regulate prices and encourage entrepreneurship.

In my beloved Egypt, where I lived and worked for seven years (1984–1991), I could observe the effects of broken promises up close, and how it can end in all-out disappointment. Amitai Etzioni writes: ‘The Western media faithfully reports every twist and turn in the evolution of the Egyptian democracy’, assuming that what the Egyptian people ‘really’ want is a secular, Western-minted democracy, while the main dynamic in Egypt is an economic one. Indeed, the letters I got from my friends in Egypt laid bare the utter desperation they felt when they knew they would never be able to marry due to lack of resources – and this is only one of myriad dark shadows hanging over their lives. They yearn for dignity, for a decent life, for a decent livelihood, for jobs. Not without reason was their revolution called a ‘Dignity Revolution’. Yet, they were unaware that global economic structures stand in the way of their understanding of dignity.

Author Amin Maalouf explains the situation, as it unfolded not only in Egypt: The discourses of Islam and the West both have the necessary internal theoretical consistency to create hope; yet, in their practices, both betray their own ideals: The West is unfaithful to its own values, which disqualifies it in the eyes of the people it claims to acculturate to democracy. And the Arab-Muslim world no longer has either the legitimacy of the family or the patriotic legitimacy around which it was structured historically.
It was the Egyptian avant-garde who stood up in 2011, confirming Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that the danger of revolution is greatest not when poverty is so severe that it incapacitates people, but when conditions have been somewhat improving, and, in particular, when a few are benefiting and not the rest.\textsuperscript{1039} The Egyptian avant-garde had the emotional and material resources to rise up, and they toppled Hosni Mubarak.\textsuperscript{1040} They asked for dignity, and what they meant by dignity was a decent livelihood, which basically meant jobs. Then Egyptian voters elected a completely different, religious group, and, again, those voters wanted only one thing: a decent livelihood. The religious group that was elected went ahead and sought to impose their particular version of Sharia on the nation. By now, a strict military rule is in power that is not very different from Hosni Mubarak’s rule, many would say, it is even more authoritarian. None of those regimes can offer jobs and a decent livelihood, not in the world’s current global context that is organised to protect the privileges of a few global players rather than serve the dignity of the exploited.

This essay could end here; however, there is more to say. There are a few more ideas to introduce, drawing on the ideas previously discussed. Let me first take a step backward and reflect on where we come from, and then look forward into the future. I will then consider several harbingers of future dignity, such as the partnership model of society, egalisation, dignism, and unity in diversity. I will end with a call to action.

**How we got here**

We live in historically unprecedented times. Humankind awakens to its fundamental anchoring in the cosmos. This happens through the increase of social and ecological interdependence and circumscription – meaning that we progressively reach the limits of our finite resources. This is driven by the ingathering of the human tribes on a planet of limited resources, a process that moves the Zeitgeist beyond the particularities of cultures and nation-states. These are the dynamics that unfold down on the ground of planet Earth, and they are amplified by the revolutionary image of the Blue Planet from afar, from the astronaut’s perspective.

It is in this context that the social body frame of dignity finds space to come to the fore. Discourse analyst Michael Karlberg was quoted earlier as saying that the social body frame of dignity has roots in diverse cultures, and that ‘it has been re-emerging in a modern form over the past century, in response to the ever-increasing social and ecological interdependence humanity is now experiencing on a global scale’.\textsuperscript{1041} In other words, the historical linguistic journey of the notion of humiliation that we observe in the English language – with the year 1757 as an interesting marker – was not limited to the English language. Human rights ideals are not Western ideas.

In my work, I give an historical explanation of why human rights ideals have re-emerged in the West during the past centuries, and why this leads to the misperception that these ideals are Western inventions.\textsuperscript{1042} I conceptualise the Neolithic Revolution – or the rise of complex agriculture from the foraging and gardening cultures that existed before – as the endpoint of humanity’s first round of globalisation, since this was the time when Homo sapiens had populated the entire planet, at least the easily accessible regions. The Neolithic Revolution was the first major turning point in human history; it introduced a whole new set of realities, namely, a radical transition from a win-win context to a win-lose context.\textsuperscript{1043} Circumscription kicked in, which comes from Latin circum, around, scribere, ‘to write’, which means limitation, enclosure, or confinement.\textsuperscript{1044} Circumscription means that something that used to be taken for granted as unlimited, suddenly proves itself to be limited. At the time of the Neolithic Revolution it was the fact that planet Earth has a finite surface that began to make
itself felt. If planet Earth had a larger size, we might still be living as migrating foragers.

Let me compare my view with that of anthropologist William Ury. Ury drew up a simplified depiction of history where he pulls together elements from anthropology, game theory, and conflict studies to describe three major types of society in chronological order: simple foragers, complex agriculturists, and the current knowledge society.¹⁰⁴⁵ I use Ury’s historical periods as a frame to insert the historical and social development of pride, honour, and dignity. I do that in the spirit of sociologist Max Weber’s ideal-type approach, which allows for analysis and action to proceed at different levels of abstraction.¹⁰⁴⁶

- I label the first 95 per cent of human history, when foraging and small-scale garden cultivation were prevalent and circumscription did not yet set limits for migration, as the era of pride, or, more precisely, the era of pristine untouched pride.
- I call the past five per cent of human history, the period of complex agriculturalism, the era of honour, or, more precisely, the era of collectivist ranked honour.
- I am dedicated to work for a future of dignity, which could be named the era of dignity, or, more accurately, a future of equality in dignity for all, as individuals in solidarity with each other and our planet.

A number of significant historical changes have brought this chronology to us, and in my work, I attempt to make Homo sapiens’ journey through time and space more visible and deepen the transition toward partnership and dialogue intentionally rather than letting it grow or shrink haphazardly.

The first round of globalisation, as I call it, ended with the Neolithic revolution, when all continents of planet Earth had been populated by Homo sapiens, and this marked the endpoint of the first and most definitorial part of human history, the first 95 per cent, when humankind learned to cooperate in small egalitarian bands. The second round of globalisation reaches the limits of planet Earth’s carrying capacity now. The year 1757 could be seen as linguistic marker in the English language for the initiation of this second transition. The significance of the Neolithic transition that commenced about twelve millennia ago is matched only by the significance of present times: a similarly important transition waits to be manifested at the present juncture in human history. After about ten millennia of hierarchical domination, subjugating people or putting/pushing/holding down people is now widely regarded as a violation. The new Zeitgeist urges the dismantling of the vertical gradient of human worth and value, it urges the discontinuation of ‘higher’ beings presiding over ‘lesser’ ones. What masters and underlings once colluded in calling benevolent patronage is now criticised as humiliating domination. Truly benevolent hierarchies remain welcome – good parents should still be parents and good teachers still be teachers – what becomes injurious is rankism, or the essentialisation of hierarchy.¹⁰⁴⁷

Cultural anthropologist Christopher Boehm offers very interesting reflections that I deeply resonate with. First, he acknowledges the human inclination toward domination and he traces it back to primates.¹⁰⁴⁸ Homo sapiens’ closest relatives, the chimpanzees, usually develop social systems of strict dominance orders, and it is plausible that early hominids have followed this script. Boehm was surprised, however, when he tried to reconstruct the social system of our Pleistocene ancestors and did not find similar orders of dominance. What he found was that the ‘vast majority of indigenous societies living in bands today are characterised by a strongly egalitarian structure’.¹⁰⁴⁹ Boehm concluded that ‘egalitarianism and the rejection of strong dominance hierarchies is a basic attribute of human sociality’.¹⁰⁵⁰ He came up with the following hypothesis: Due to growing cognitive abilities, early humans may have realised that, if they themselves could not dominate, it would be best to also prevent others from doing so. As brainpower in humans increased, ‘strategic thinking, proto-political
finessing, and coalition-seeking behaviour’ became feasible, which meant that wherever certain group members attempted to impose themselves on the group, the group collectively ‘tamed’ such dominance strivings.\textsuperscript{1051} I deeply resonate with Boehm’s hypothesising. In my view, it was the onset of circumscription and the change from a win-win to a win-lose frame that threw the coalition-seeking behaviour off balance that is needed to maintain an egalitarian situation. It took ten thousand years, until now, and humankind finds itself at the very same point again: As dominators now endanger even human survival on planet Earth, it would be best to prevent them from doing so.

Riane Eisler, social scientist and activist, has been mentioned earlier. She developed a cultural transformation theory through which she describes how otherwise widely divergent societies followed what she calls a dominator model rather than a partnership model during the past millennia (and in many segments of world society this is still the norm).\textsuperscript{1052} It was seen as normal and morally correct to have masters and underlings, that masters were ‘higher’ beings, who could show underlings ‘down where they belonged’, who, in turn, had to respectfully learn submissive humility when humiliated.

The dominator system, however, always had an underbelly. A lingering memory from more egalitarian historical times prior to the onset of the security dilemma seems to have prevailed.\textsuperscript{1053} The awareness that everybody deserves to be treated as equal in dignity is embedded in many world philosophies. This means also that today’s concepts of human rights began to be articulated and to some extent also practiced long prior to 1757 all over the world, not just in the West.

The first chiefdoms emerged in West Asia roughly 7,500 years ago, and the first archaic states appeared circa 5,000 years ago. At some point, a ‘legitimation crisis of the early state’ occurred, explains philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas.\textsuperscript{1054} ‘Prophet-like’ figures emerged, who risked their lives to hold existing power structures accountable to a universally egalitarian ethic.\textsuperscript{1055} The axial age is a term coined by philosopher Karl Jaspers for philosophical, religious, and technical developments that arose in relatively independent cultural regions in the world in a relatively short period of time, from eight to two hundred years before the Common Era.\textsuperscript{1056} The list is long, from Confucius and Laozi in China, to the Brahmans in late Vedic India, Buddha’s teachings in India, Israel’s biblical prophets, Zoroaster in Iran, in Greece the epic poems \textit{Iliad} and \textit{Odyssey}, the natural philosophers (such as Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes), and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.\textsuperscript{1057} The charter of Cyrus the Great (580–529 BC) is hailed as the first statement of human rights.\textsuperscript{1058}

Many founders of religions and philosophies were ‘renouncers’, critics of power.\textsuperscript{1059} They had followers precisely because they re-kindled the revolutionary message of equality in dignity – no longer wanting higher-placed ‘dignitaries’ to have the sole access to divinity. They all asked questions such as: ‘Are not all people equally worthy?’ ‘Is it not illegitimate to oppress people in the name of God?’ Is not also the degradation of our environment a violation?\textsuperscript{1060} Buddhism has a claim for having pioneered ideals of equal dignity, as has Islam, the Sikh religion, and so forth. Orthodox Confucianism regards all people as being equally good by nature: ‘Just as all water has a down-going tendency, all people have a tendency toward goodness’, these were the words of Chinese philosopher Mencius (372–289 BCE; alt. 385–303/302 BCE).\textsuperscript{1061} The traditional African \textit{ubuntu} philosophy emphasises living together and solving conflicts in an atmosphere of shared humility: ‘I am because of you’.\textsuperscript{1062} In the Bible’s New Testament, the divine love relationship was ‘democratised’ – God sacrificed his son out of love for all of humankind, not just for a few leaders.\textsuperscript{1063} Theologian Martin Luther (1483–1546) opposed the humiliation of ‘papal tyranny’.\textsuperscript{1064}

The Arabic word for dignity, \textit{karama}, comes from the Arabic word \textit{karam} or generosity, reflecting the centrality of generosity in the arid deserts of North Africa and the Near East, where generosity was not a luxury but ‘a matter of survival’.\textsuperscript{1065} Many of my Islamic feminist

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friends get angry when the West monopolises the idea of equality. Amal Al-Malki, for instance, writes, ‘The Muslim woman who criticises Muslim practices is not usually rebuking her heritage in favour of Western ideals – the kind of rebuke that hits best-seller lists in the West and that feeds Western stereotypes about the religion – but is instead encouraging other Muslims claiming allegiance to Qur’anic teachings to live up to its highest principles’.

Many religious movements were imbued with the message of equality at their outset. Yet, messages of equality did not have the chance to survive long during the past millennia: they were co-opted by hierarchical social and societal structures. As soon as religious awakenings of equality in dignity aimed to become institutionalised, they had to become part of the dominator society that surrounded them, and in this process they usually turned against their own message and built hierarchical structures. There is a German saying, ‘Sagt der König zum Bischof: Halt Du sie dumm, ich halte sie arm’, translated, ‘Says the king to the bishop: You keep them dumb, I keep them poor’. It is only today, in an increasingly interconnected world, that space opens again for the original ideals, and they are called human rights ideals.

The year 1757 falls in a time when the First British Empire took shape during the early seventeenth century, with the English settlement of North America and the smaller islands of the Caribbean, and the establishment of joint-stock companies such as the East India Company administering colonies and overseas trade. The British Empire reached a territorial size larger than that of any other empire in history, an ‘empire in which the sun never sets’.

This was a period in which it became obvious that planet Earth is a wondrous shared and finite homestead – the cabinets of curiosities in the colonisers’ manor houses filled up with encyclopaedic collections of objects from all over the world. The coming into being of the British Empire thus increased social and ecological interdependence – together with the knowledge of it – and saw the beginnings of the ingathering of all human tribes of the globe. This shrinking of the world has continued since and driven social complexity to unprecedented levels, so that by now we see a ‘liquid modernity’.

It was in the context of transitions that the modern meaning of the verb to humiliate began to emerge around 1757. Humiliation turned from being seen as pro-social to being deemed anti-social, while humility remained pro-social. We are in the midst of this transition now, and, characteristically, it proceeds two steps forward, only to fall back one step again. It could be said to represent history’s first continuous revolution (or refolution), a refolution that will never ‘finish’ and will always be somewhat precarious, since it depends on being held alive by large populations from one time period to the next (refolution is a term coined by Timothy Garton Ash to connote a mix of reform and revolution).

**Humankind is growing up**

We may ask: How did the transitions of the past centuries open space for a new meaning of humiliation? Was it a humbling or a humiliating process? Are human rights ideals an expression of humility or of arrogance?

Revolutionary scientific insights about the size and fragility of planet Earth may have had a humbling effect on humankind. In 1867, Charles Kingsley (1819–1875), professor of modern history at Cambridge, said this: ‘Inductive Physical Science, which helped more than all to break up the superstitions of the Ancien Regime … set man face to face with the facts of the universe’. Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) developed a heliocentric model, with its humbling implication that planet Earth is not the centre of the universe. At first, this view was too outrageous to be accepted by the scientific consensus. Perhaps it was too humiliating a thought that the species *Homo sapiens* may not be as *sapiens* (Latin ‘wise, judicious’) and not as mighty as once thought. Even supportive evidence subsequently produced by Galileo

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Galilei (1564–1642), Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), and Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) was, for a long time, not enough to convince the doubters. Only on 31st October 1992, did Pope John Paul II express regret for how the Galileo affair had been handled, and he officially conceded that the Earth was not stationary. Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) later added ever more humbling lessons. Darwin showed that Homo sapiens is just another animal. Freud showed that it was an animal that is not even in control of itself; dreams and hypnosis indicate that there is life in human souls they know little about. The field of psychology continues to be impacted until today. As reported earlier, qualitative psychology was able to come to the fore and be more acknowledged only after 1970, with the arrival of ‘liquid modernity’, with the emergence of a new dynamic, multiperspectival, and emergent social complexity that cannot easily be captured with the use of quantitative methods.

All those lessons in humility speak to what Stephen Purdey calls ‘the paradox of exceptionalism’:

We are at once Earthbound and transcendental beings, wonderfully alive to a morally charged universe yet grounded in a mortal physicality. These two features of our existence should be harmonious, but our sense of exceptionalism has made us arrogant, imperiously dismissing any dependence on our natural setting.

Sociologist Michael Ott summarises how modern enlighteners such as Nicolaus Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud, with their scientific discoveries, ‘inflicted the deepest wounds on the narcissism of the human species, and thus produced the inversion of the theoretical focus from self-love to object-love’:

The earth is not the centre of the universe; humanity is not high above the animals; human beings are not equal but organised into antagonistic social classes that have fought each other throughout history; moral values are not higher than values of vitality; Ego is not the master in its own psychic house.

**Some become more arrogant, others more humble**

The same historical processes could, however, also be interpreted inversely, namely, as the coming of humankind to itself, as a process of owning our own humanity, taking over responsibility from God, more even, of humans arrogating a god-like status. This leaves us with the question: Which interpretation is correct? Did humankind become more humble or more arrogant in response to the new horizons that opened up throughout the past centuries? Are human rights ideals an expression of humility or of hubris?

The short answer is: both. It depends on how human rights ideals are defined and used. Human rights ideals can be tweaked to provide a frame for disconnected autonomy as well as for mutual solidarity; they can be used by ruthless individualists who compete for the most glitzy dignitary decorum, or it can inspire individuals who want to humbly shoulder the responsibility for mutual care and solidarity, who aim to dignify our relationships with each other and with our ecosphere, who acknowledge that we only are a small part of this ecosphere.

If we look at our forebears prior to the Neolithic revolution, they lived in small egalitarian groups in dialogue with their environment. ‘Egalitarian hunter-gatherers, especially the animists, are the best societies this world has ever witnessed’, explains archaeologist Ingrid
Fuglestvedt, and ‘this is not a reference to the Garden of Eden; it is to acknowledge that some systems are better than others in taking care of everybody’s integrity, both human and animal’.\textsuperscript{1074} If we describe those early animists as wise and humble adults, then something which could be called infantilisation began after the first round of globalisation, namely, when people were pressed into dominator systems. Most people became the ‘children’ of their respective overlords, and with monotheism they also became children of one God. The second round of globalisation that we all are participants of now could be interpreted as a process where space opens for those children to reach adulthood again. Humanity can grow up again, figuratively speaking.

However, there is a catch: Not all parents like to let their children go. The heliocentric model empowers the average man and woman as it disempowers elites by undermining the elites’ justification that God has put them into power, it subverts the parent role they thought they had, it humiliates them. It might be therefore, that it took more three hundred years for the Catholic church to acknowledge the new situation and get to grips with the fact that many of their children became rather unruly. It required to translate the initial sense of humiliation into humility. There is also a second catch: Growing up does not necessarily render adults of dignified and wise humility. Growing up can also render arrogant adults who maintain the narcissistic exceptionalism of early childhood and reject the humbling lessons of adulthood as too humiliating.

Psychoanalysts such as Heinz Kohut place the ‘narcissistic phase’ of childhood development at about the age of two until the age of three to four. The child develops a sense of ‘I’ and begins to say with authority ‘mine!’ and ‘me’, in other words, it becomes egocentric, relating to the whole world as being only about ‘me’. This is what we learn from psychotherapists: ‘In a sense it is all about them in this phase, and this is healthy. The child must develop a strong sense of self before it can relax that sense of demanding and infallible, and more realising of their truly dependent state. The child must then become aware of the need for a “we” or social engagement with others as a way of being in life’.\textsuperscript{1075} The latter transition, however, may not take place, not all children grow up to become adults of humble wisdom, particularly not children of parents with narcissistic tendencies. When researchers studied the roots of narcissism in children, they found parents who overvalued their children, who, in turn, internalised their parents’ inflated ideas of them, and this extended into the next generation when narcissistic children grew up and became parents themselves.\textsuperscript{1076} Moreover, narcissistic parents impact not only their own children, they also ‘contaminate’ the rest of society when they compete with other parents on whose children are best. Growing up in such a context inflicts severe trauma on the children; they covertly struggle with insecurity the rest of their lives,\textsuperscript{1077} even though they may overtly display very high self-esteem.\textsuperscript{1078}

When we look at human history, roughly ten millennia ago, humans adapted to the new win-lose situation of circumscription by learning to compete for domination, and even the most peace-loving and wise overlord could not escape the security dilemma’s grip. In other words, circumscription gave a systemic advantage to the those holding on to narcissistic exceptionalism, and it disadvantaged those who had transcended it: for millennia, humanity saw ruthless and brutal dominators being victorious in overpowering wise and humble collaborators.

At the current juncture in history, in our second round of globalisation, ever new rounds of global domination expose that it is not only the surface of planet Earth that is limited, clean water is limited, clean air, rare minerals, and the planet’s ability to digest the human-made waste, in sum, we exceed our planet’s carrying capacity on all fronts. Also war and weapons are no longer paths to victory in an interconnected world, where a lone hacker in one part of the world can bring down entire countries’ infrastructures on the other side of the globe.\textsuperscript{1079} In

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this situation, our narcissistic exceptionalist dominators continue to maximise this adaptation in child-like arrogant hubris, seemingly oblivious that it no longer spells victory but collective demise.\textsuperscript{1080}

As the competitors gamble away human survival at the present point in history, it is time for the collaborators to gather and come to rescue. And, indeed, the ingathering of the human tribes fosters \textit{empathic identification} throughout the world, as author Charles Eisenstein elaborates:

The horror we feel at the prospect of, say, nuking Pyongyang or Tehran is not the dread of radioactive blowback or retributive terror. It arises, I claim, from our empathic identification with the victims. As the consciousness of interbeing grows, we can no longer easily wave off their suffering as the just deserts of their wickedness or the regrettable but necessary price of freedom. It as if, on some level, it would be happening to ourselves.\textsuperscript{1081}

What Eisenstein calls empathic identification is a designation for the moral sentiment that gives emotional force to human rights ideals that condemn handling fellow human beings in ways that degrade their equality in worthiness. Individuals operating within the new moral paradigm feel encouraged to stand up in civil disobedience if manipulated into the collectivist context of fear that characterised a divided world with its security dilemma. These individuals feel humiliated if equal dignity is violated. And they feel justified to become angry; as mentioned earlier, the right to feel violated by debasement and humiliation has been democratised: no longer are only aristocrats allowed to resist the violation of honour, human rights ideals endow everybody with the right to resist the violation of dignity.

This process is a global one, and it is not a Western idea, although it could be called an unintended consequence of Western global domination: It began with Western domination reaching the limits of the globe and thus setting off globalisation; this, in turn, opened space for ideas of equal dignity to gain visibility in Europe; and these ideas then travelled from Europe back into the rest of the world. For instance, Indians who were educated in London, learned ideas that made them ask for independence from the British Empire.\textsuperscript{1082} In other words, there is now a global \textit{Zeitgeist} that ‘allows’ for the idea of equal dignity to move to the forefront. It grows out of a newly emerging global interconnectedness, and out of a newly emerging humility.

The scope of ethics and of empathic identification that a village usually reserves for itself within its borders, is now slowly including the entire global village. Human rights ideals are \textit{global in-group ethics}, the very ethics that the global village needs if it wants to create a decent future. And it is the Lévinasian approach, more than the Kantian definition of human rights ideals, that serves this aim best.\textsuperscript{1083}

Ever more people begin to sense that the adaptations that humanity learned during the past ten millennia in its efforts to live in a win-lose frame, are inviable and even collectively suicidal in an interconnected world. The West, due to its ‘success’ in colonising the entire world, has simply been impacted earlier than the rest by those new realities. They undermined the old adaptations in a steady but subliminal way and opened space for a new \textit{Zeitgeist} of dignity to seep in. First, the individual was detached from the collective, giving the individual a sense of ranked \textit{decorum}, and finally it unranked human worthiness, promising to extend equal dignity to all individuals as part of one family. The new realities of rising global empathic identification in the face of increasing global sociocide and ecocide make the old moral universe of honour ever more unfeasible, or, more precisely, they make unfeasible the traditional collectivist norms of ranked and ‘mask-like’ honour.

In this new situation of globality, what humanity is called on to do, is to adapt to the new situation by learning completely new ways of arranging our human affairs on our shared
planet. It means leaving behind all remnants of traditional dominator culture, together with all remnants of divided-world thinking. The task at hand is to ‘harvest’, in a joint global effort, from all the cultural realms of this planet whatever practices and skills can nurture equality in dignity for all in the future.\textsuperscript{1084} However, clearly, there is no lack of retrograde trends. The dominators do not give up that easily, and they can count on the majority of people feeling more familiar with the dominator system than the partnership approach. We can read statements such as this:

I prefer the old Adam of strife and carnage to the new Prometheus of peace and human rights. Better a world torn apart by Husseins and Qaddafis, better a war to the knife between the PLO and the Likud Party, between Zulus and Afrikaaners, than a world run by George Balls and Dag Hammarskjölds, because a world made safe for democracy is a world in which no one dares to raise his voice for fear that mommy will put you away some place where you can be re-educated.\textsuperscript{1085}

Not always are human rights ‘entrepreneurs’ attacked by ‘antipreneurs’ so blatantly. Often both sides will gravitate to the same analysis of the problem, but their paths will part when it comes to the proposed solutions. All sides may resonate with the argument, for example, that much of the recent ‘therapeutic’ turn in Western culture that provides psychologists with customers is far from an enlightened shift towards emotions but may rather unduly individualise structural problems.\textsuperscript{1086} Antipreneurs will go on and use terms such as emotocracy to denounce seekers of solidarity and fairness as neurocrats.\textsuperscript{1087} In general, they will use any critique of science as a pretext for an anti-science stance. Human rights entrepreneurs, in contrast, will try to save the field of psychology – or science in general – from abuse and remind it of its emancipatory mission. They will act out of faith in the original mission and not suspect abuse to be the mission. In the case of psychology, they will refrain from branding psychologists as willing perpetrators, they will refrain from using the abuse of psychology as an excuse to jettison its mission and will rather choose to view psychologists as well-intentioned but unwittingly co-opted.\textsuperscript{1088} All sides may also agree that much of what is called ‘progress’ may simply be another word for a false sense of control among the powerless – yet, there will be dissents as to who are the powerless. Human rights entrepreneurs most likely will not follow post-Cold War ‘paleo’-conservatives in that aborted babies are among those powerless victims:

Abortion and totalitarianism both represent new possibilities of some men’s power over others, and both are defended by certain ideologies of ‘progress’. We hear of human ‘autonomy’ and of man’s ‘control of his own destiny’. But the autonomy is enjoyed by a select (or self-selected) few, and the control is exercised by a shrinking elite; those who are powerless, whether unborn children or the subjects of a totalist dictatorship, simply don’t count.\textsuperscript{1089} Let us conclude this section with writer Charles Eisenstein’s reflections:

To be sure, there is no shortage of human rights abuses, death squads, torture, domestic violence, military violence, and violent crime still in the world today. To observe, in the midst of it, a rising tide of compassion is not a whitewash of the ugliness, but a call for fuller participation in a movement. On the personal level, it is a movement of kindness, compassion, empathy, taking ownership of one’s judgements and projections, and – not contradictorily – of bravely speaking uncomfortable truths, exposing what was hidden, bringing violence and injustice to light, telling the stories that need to be heard. Together,

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these two threads of compassion and truth might weave a politics in which we call out the
iniquity without judging the perpetrator, but instead seek to understand and change the
circumstances of the perpetration. From empathy, we seek not to punish criminals, but to
understand the circumstances that breed crime. We seek not to fight terrorism, but to
understand and change the conditions that generate it. We seek not to wall out immigrants,
but to understand why people are so desperate in the first place to leave their homes and
lands, and how we might be contributing to their desperation.1090

As mentioned earlier, it is an enthymeme that we encounter when human rights defenders
use the phrase dignity. Enthymeme means that only certain parts of an argument are spelled
out, not the entire argument, because the rest of the argument is presupposed to be held in the
mind (en thymo) of the audience. It is not respect, nor pride, nor honour, nor simply dignity
alone that marks the core of the new moral universe, it is respect for equal dignity for all, as
individuals in solidarity.

At the core of the new era stands non-domination, in the words of philosopher and political
theorist Philip Pettit,1091 or non-humiliation as philosopher Avishai Margalit calls for,1092 or
non-degradation to use the phrase from philosopher of criminal justice John Kleinig.1093 What
is happening and what is needed to happen is nothing else but the dismantling of the
dominator structure and the construction of a partnership structure, to use Riane Eisler’s
parlance; nothing else but the delegitimisation of the practice of ranking people into higher
and lesser beings, nothing else but denouncing such practices as rankism.1094

In my terms, a dignity transition is needed to exit from the security dilemma and to prevent
and heal the dignity dilemma. A formerly divided world is in the process of uniting, and this
process needs careful guidance, rather than being hampered or even arrested by cycles of
humiliation. The security dilemma reigns in a divided world where armament may safeguard
security in the short term, yet, at the price that it undermines security in the long term. In a
world where all people feel part of one family, they yearn not just for security, they yearn to
have their equality in dignity respected. Therefore a dignity dilemma reigns in a united world,
where humiliating others may bolster one’s particular identity in the short term, yet, at the
price of undermining dignified unity in diversity of all in the long term. It is always a
dilemma when problems call for solutions but solutions risk failure.
The Journey of Dignity and Humiliation

What makes the present historical juncture so challenging

The year 1757 provides a linguistic marker for a historical ‘humbling of Homo sapiens’

Conquests such as colonisation had a number of unintended consequences. Among them was that the fact began to make itself felt that humankind is one single species living on one single planet. Globalisation is a result of competition for domination: ‘man’ (sic), regarding himself as divinely ordained dominator, conquered the world. Not only is it one small planet, Copernicus added the humbling finding that Earth is also not at the centre of the universe. Some learned humility from these insights, others felt too humiliated and resisted. Domination continued, now carried forward by ‘man feeling god-like’. At present, globalisation connects people, for better or worse, and exposes more than ever that there is only one planet, and it exposes, in addition, how vulnerable and circumscribed this planet is. In other words, the dominator model of society increasingly undermines itself. A void is opening now, since the solution to the problem, namely, the partnership model, is not yet established. Now it is time to accept the humbling lessons without resisting them as being too humiliating. Now it is time to learn the humility that has long been overdue. The year 1757 offers a linguistic marker for this process, from the arrogant decorum of dignitaries to the dignity of human beings who know due humility and understand that they are part of an interconnected world, rather than arrogantly holding on to the illusion that they can stand above a world to be conquered.

Human rights ideals are perceived as humiliating by supremacists

In a ranked honour system, humiliators aim to engender meek humility in inferiors, and they often succeed. Anger is legitimate only among equal superiors, they are expected to fight for victory or death in duels, or engage in duel-like wars to remedy humiliated honour. Since human rights ideals have arrived, many inferiors have gladly embraced them as a chance to be lifted up. Superiors, however, are to be expected to perceive such ideals as a humiliating debasement and reason to resist violently. They want to violently suppress uprisings rather than engage in dialogue, rather than joining everybody else in the realm of equal dignity. Superiors who wish to save their privileges, therefore resist the call to adopt humility. Some do so openly, others by hijacking the discourse of equal dignity to cover up for inequality on the ground. Masters who openly suppress such calls argue that they are entitled to their privileges and cannot accept the humiliation of humility; they defend their arrogation of superiority against attempts to humble them by crying out loud: ‘foul! humiliation!’ Those who resist more covertly, do so, for instance, by disconnecting ideals from reality, or by distorting ideals into strawmen to make them appear aversive. The strawman approach has been used, for instance, when the abolishment of slavery was sought. It was forecasted that this would lead to the break-down of society, aside from slaves being psychologically unable to handle freedom anyway. Alternatively, slaves were told that they, albeit unequal in status, were equal in dignity to their masters, and that they therefore should ‘coexist peacefully’ with their masters and refrain from demanding the abolishment of slavery. Similarly, even the most benevolent contemporary ideas, such as a basic income for all, may be used to maintain inequality.
Dignity humiliation is more painful than honour humiliation

Wherever human rights ideals are successfully established as a norm, this introduces a new expectation, namely, to be treated as an equal member in a single united human family. When betrayed, this expectation creates a new sense of humiliation, different from humiliation within a ranked honour system. We can call it dignity humiliation, or the humiliation of equal dignity, felt in the face of a dignity gap. Dignity humiliation is more existential than honour humiliation, as the violation of one’s equality in dignity excludes one from the human family entirely, while honour systems provide a large range of possible rankings.

Feelings of dignity humiliation represent the ‘nuclear bomb of the emotions’

Dignity humiliation denies a person’s humanity and therefore has the potential to lead to disappointment and anger that is more deep-felt than in the case of honour humiliation. The promise of equality for all is higher than what ranked honour has on offer, therefore also its violation is more painful. Therefore, feelings of dignity humiliation represent the ‘nuclear bomb of the emotions’.

Feelings of dignity humiliation represent the strongest obstacle to cooperation

At the current point in history, humankind faces life-threatening global challenges and needs to cooperate to address them. Human rights ideals represent the value orientation that is capable of offering a dignified survival on Earth to humankind. These values represent an invitation to be part of a united human family of equally respected and responsible members. The strongest obstacle on this otherwise beneficial path are feelings of dignity humiliation, be they authentic or stirred up by humiliation entrepreneurs. Feelings of dignity humiliation risk creating divisions that are deeper than divisions that flow from honour humiliation. It is tragic that this happens in precisely those historical times when global cooperation is more needed than ever.

The right to get angry is democratised

Wherever human rights ideals are established as a norm, anger becomes legitimate for everyone who feels debased. Millions of former inferiors who used to meekly accept lowliness, now learn that they have a right to become angry. This increases the amount of anger around the world.

The cross-over from dignity to honour humiliation is more dangerous than dignity humiliation or honour humiliation alone

Ideally, anger from dignity humiliation should give rise to conscientisation (Freire, 1968/1973), and be invested into trust-inducing dialogue and the realisation of the partnership model of society, locally and globally. In short, the Freire-Gandhi-Mandela path should be sought as path out of humiliation. Yet, cross-overs are to be expected, meaning that angry humiliated people, particularly males, cross over from feeling dignity humiliation to responding with honour humiliation’s toolkit for duel-like violence. Since dignity humiliation

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is more intense than honour humiliation, and access to violent responses is democratised, the outcome is potentially more destructive than ever before.

***Access to new and old weapons is democratised***

Humiliation-entrepreneurs can exploit the script of the heroic and glorious aristocratic warrior and the humbly obedient underling, as has happened, among others, in Rwanda, where radio propaganda and garden machetes sufficed to bring about horrific genocidal killings. Or, Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik, while using modern ammunition, felt he was a ‘Templar Knight’. He used the ‘toolkit’ for violent revenge for honour humiliation, formerly reserved to superiors. This path is now democratised and accessible globally to all who may feel angry, and a single angry hacker can attain glory by destroying entire countries’ infrastructures.

***Glory in combat is a core marker of masculinity, too valuable to let go of***

Duel-like violence entails a promise of glory that has a prominent place in the dominator system but no place in a partnership context. Yet, during the past millennia, glory has become part of the core identity of being a man, and for those who embrace traditional masculinity, letting go of it is too painful a loss. Rather than allowing partnership to grow, they might prefer to engage in humiliation entrepreneurship and create hostile divisions to regain arenas for glorious confrontations. For instance, they might re-stoke the security dilemma – if needed with false flag operations – just when there is a chance to weaken it. What they do could be called a collective Münchhausen syndrome by proxy, as suffering and destruction are brought to the world and opportunities for future generations are being destroyed for the sake of the honour and glory of a few ‘heroes’ here and now. Münchhausen syndrome by proxy is a phrase used for caregivers who fabricate, exaggerate, or induce health problems in those who are in their care, with the motive of gaining attention and recognition. If we were to use the terminology of honour killing, then this could be said to represent global honour killing.

***What once was ‘realism’ transmutes into illusionary utopism***

While ‘realists’ try to stay within the paradigm of a strong security dilemma, reality has now overtaken them and turned their realism into misguided utopism. When one single angry hacker can bring down entire infrastructures from anywhere in the world in far removed locations, preparations for traditional warfare represent ‘slag i luften’ – air blows. ‘Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben’ (those who are late will be punished by life), is a sentence ascribed to Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev in East Berlin in 1988. Humankind as a whole faces precisely this predicament.

***Accidents are the result when a transition between two irreconcilable systems is carried out too slowly and too uncoordinatedly***

The transition from norms of unequal worthiness to equal worthiness can be illustrated by using traffic as a metaphor: this transition resembles that from left- to right-hand driving. If such a transition is not carried out quickly, preferably at a specific hour known to all,
accidents are the result. It is not possible for a society to grant people the freedom to drive on either side if they prefer so. In case of human rights ideals, this is precisely what happens: the transition proceeds in uncoordinated and fragmented ways and thus causes many accidents. Worse even, many of those who preach right-hand driving practice left-hand driving on the ground; they do so when they replace the notion of equal dignity in solidarity with calls for autonomy in competition. Accidents result and many blame the new rules, calling for a return to the old system.

**Dialogue between equals is needed but is unfamiliar and difficult to master**

In a society used to left-hand driving, right-hand driving is unfamiliar and has to be practiced before it can feel comfortable. This is also the case with equality in dignity. The necessary skills are not taught in a dominator system. In addition to being unfamiliar, dialogue among equals is inherently more complicated than domination.

**Unity in diversity is a necessary but unfamiliar motto**

Unity in diversity is the motto that makes equal dignity work. People who are socialised into competition for domination mistake unity in diversity for a win-lose maxim. They think that unity is only achievable through sacrificing diversity, and vice versa. What needs to be understood is that unity and diversity can be increased together, and that maintaining unity in diversity is a continuous balancing act. The need for adaptations will never end and this is not a sign of weakness but of strength.

**Hitherto unknown conflict fault lines are created**

As long as people live far apart from each other and do not know about each other’s existence, there is no need to be afraid of being conquered or raided. This was the situation of early *Homo sapiens*: they were few and lived far apart. Roughly 12,000 years ago, to say it simplified, the situation changed dramatically. The ‘next valley’ began to be occupied by other people and the human condition transmuted from the win-win situation of early foragers who migrated freely surrounded by untouched abundance, into the win-lose of ‘either we have the resources or they have the resources’. The result was the security dilemma, which means that arms races brought insecurity, even though the intention was to create security. This is the classical security dilemma, with fault lines running between states or ethnic groups. It can be healed by global trust building, when humankind embraces the fact that it inhabits a single global village, meaning that a ministry for global internal affairs is needed, rather than local foreign or defense ministries.

If humankind wishes to survive, such a ministry of global internal affairs will need to be guided by Gandhi’s motto *There is no path to peace. Peace is the path*. Several new fault lines stand in the way, however. Among them is a fault line that runs between a global ‘superclass’ and the rest of the planet’s population. While the motto of the classical security dilemma is *If you want peace, prepare for war*, the motto of the new dilemma is *If you want wealth, invest in exploitation*. This fault line can only be healed by new global institutions that manifest the awareness that planet Earth is like Titanic: we either all swim together or all sink together.
In this situation yet another new fault line is added. In former times, when the world still was divided, when people staged uprisings, the dominators were toppled, yet, the dominator system itself was kept in place. In an interconnected world, also the system of domination needs to be deconstructed. This adds a conflict fault line between those who aim to rise up and ‘stop in the middle’ so as to build a world where all meet as partners, and those who wish to ‘rise to the top’ and create a global dominator system. The latter want to ‘take up the gun’ and accuse the first of ‘selling out’ if they refuse to join in. In this situation, the duty of the first is to explain that in an interconnected world it is precisely the path of the gun that sells out humankind’s future.

This fault line can go even deeper. Some sympathise not just with a dominator culture in general, they would like to also re-fracture the world and undo the present level of interconnectedness. This fault line is deeply embodied: Conservatives respond to threat with more fear than liberals and become parochial, while liberals are rather universalists. Of six moral foundations – care/harm, fairness (equality)/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation – liberals tend to endorse primarily the care and equality foundations, whereas conservatives tend to resonate with all six foundations. This difference can be found across cultures, nationalities, race, and ethnicity, with different labels for the Anglo-Saxon terminology of ‘conservatives versus liberals’. Liberals have problems putting themselves into the shoes of conservatives, while conservatives can easily describe liberal views, and, they are deeply horrified by what they see. Authoritarians have strong gag reflexes and react with disgust, for instance, to homosexual orientations. ‘Rightists’ all around the world go to the barricades these days in increasingly angry disgust, raging against liberal universalism and liberal emphasis on diversity. In Germany, for instance, rightists accuse liberals of running an irreversible ‘Umvolkung’, a ‘permanent replacement of the German people by 98 per cent illegal intruders’. In Norway, a young man, Anders Behring Breivik, killed social democratic youths in Norway in 2011, because he believed that their party drives a Cultural Marxist plot to undermine traditional values of the fatherland.

If we consider that humankind has lived in the grip of a fear-inducing security dilemma throughout the past millennia, and that a context of threat brings the parochial conservatism of the dominator model to the fore, it is unsurprising that the moral matrix in most societies has moved toward conservatism during that period. As I observe it, the human ‘default’ orientation is ‘liberal’, and I see it therefore as the liberals’ task at the present point in history, to explain to conservatives that their suggested strategies, as understandable as they are, will have suicidal consequences: When social psychologists let authoritarians play the so-called global change game, the outcome was dramatic; the simulated future of the world became highly militarised and eventually entered the stage of nuclear war until the entire population of the Earth was declared dead. Liberals need to help conservatives handle their fear by supporting them to understand that unity in diversity is not a zero sum game, on the contrary, that unity and diversity can be nurtured together. In a world of global unity in diversity, all can be united in efforts to protect cultural and biological diversity, which means that ever smaller peoples can claim their unique cultural and geographical space. And disgust can be unlearned: Initially, people reacted with disgust to the teachings of Copernicus, as his thoughts were regarded as a violation of a beautiful divine order. Today, people enjoy the very beauty of Copernicus’ insights.
Human rights advocates are blind to their own betrayal

Throughout the past decades, the partnership ideal has been preached in rhetoric, but betrayed in practice, particularly by the privileged in the West/North, a betrayal many of those who are privileged are blind to. For instance, under the banner of freedom and well-being for all, the presently reigning economic system has ‘lifted’ many people into an ultimately unsustainable lifestyle, brought misery to others, and this at the price of widespread ecocide. This system has been treated as if it were a natural law, namely, that investors are needed to create jobs so that people can earn a living, pay taxes, and finance government and state institutions. The problem is that it is not partnership, care, and responsibility that is promoted by such a system, it is competition for domination and exploitation: ‘We are no charity’ is the motto, and ‘If you want wealth, invest in exploitation’. For a long time, most Westerners were unaware of the betrayal that is entailed in this path and that they are complicit. They were unaware, among others, because the painful consequences of this strategy were largely outsourced out of sight – only people and nature on other continents were exposed to suffering – therefore it comes as a surprise when backlashes come their way. While the victims in those exploited places take to their heels and migrate or even bring terror, those in the West/North react with indignation when they are reminded of their participation. When also they are negatively impacted by their own betrayal – when sociocide and ecocide also come to the West/North – many choose to scapegoat those worse-off victims, the refugees and migrators, rather than questioning the overall arrangement.

The human need to belong and receive recognition can be an obstacle to necessary change

Humans wish to belong and receive recognition, and they tend to cooperate within their in-group. When people cooperate, this increases the impact of their group’s goals, and negative biases against out-groups can even amplify this success. A problem arises in cases where an in-group denies reality and all members cooperate. Then the consequence may be suicidal, namely, that all in-group members voluntarily contribute to their own humiliation and even to their own demise. Many Germans, for instance, still believed in the Endsieg, or final victory, when its impossibility was already utterly obvious. Today it is Homo economicus who still believes in the possibility of final victory over nature.\textsuperscript{1107} In my parlance, this is voluntary self-humiliation.\textsuperscript{1108}

Furthermore, whenever in-group loyalty is based on out-group enmity, this stands in the way of unifying processes. When a global village is to form from a diverse range of local ‘villages’, out-group enmity can no longer serve as ‘in-group glue’.

Human biases can hamper necessary change

\textit{Loss aversion} is the human tendency to hold on to familiar entitlements instead of embracing new realities, even if those new realities would far outperform the old ones. Loss aversion contributes to cultural inertia in the face of necessary changes. Other biases stand in the way of necessary change as well, such as reactive devaluation, or the attribution error, or the tendency to ‘solve’ cognitive dissonance with denial. In case of climate degradation, denial can ultimately lead to collective demise, namely, when unreversable tipping points are surpassed before denial becomes so blatantly exposed that it is possible to recognise it as such.\textsuperscript{1109} Furthermore, the human mind is easily fooled by shifting baselines, and humankind might suffer the fate of the boiling frog in the fable that describes a frog being slowly boiled.
alive: The planet’s ecosphere degrades both too slowly and too rapidly for people to understand that it is happening at all, and that they must influence it proactively and constructively.

**Humans fall for covert manipulation**

Human-rights based contexts delegitimise exploitative domination. Yet, it is often practiced anyway, only that open domination is replaced by covert manipulation. Covert manipulation strategies use human vulnerabilities as entry points.

Strategies of covert manipulation may include offering false choices and inducing unnecessary conflicts to create an overload so that important choices and necessary conflicts are crowded out and overlooked. Another strategy is to make empty promises, for instance, invite potential opponents to exhaust themselves for promises that ultimately are empty (Bourdieu’s deferred elimination). It may also entail divide and rule strategies, or the creation of enemy images and scapegoats, including the re-stoking of the security dilemma.

Strategies of manipulation may also target vulnerabilities in the human body and psyche. The human body offers several entry points. For instance, when humans indulge in addictive behaviour, this initially feels good, while the negative consequences follow later. In the human body, long-term contentment is related to the serotonin system, while short-term pleasure is related to dopamine, with the result that the more pleasure one seeks, the less happy one becomes. It has been argued that the confusion of pleasure and happiness began with the United States Declaration of Independence, and that this ultimately undermined all three of the Declaration’s promises – life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Hooking a society on consumerism plays on this confusion. Other strategies target the dopamine system more directly, for instance, when the corporate food industry develops habit-forming products.

Also the human infant’s dependency on a nurturing environment offers entry points for manipulation. While black pedagogy produces childhood trauma openly, thus maintaining honour culture also in the next generation, the commercialisation of childhood renders similar results, albeit more covertly, for instance, by fracturing families. People tend to repeat scenarios of humiliation that they once were unable to process in early childhood; I use the term humiliation addiction, a conceptualisation that is somewhat related to Wiederholungszwang, in English repetition compulsion, a term that was coined by Sigmund Freud.

**Political and economic institutions incentivise too short a time and space horizon**

Throughout the past millennia, the indigenous seven-generation rule did not find institutional anchorings, and it cannot manifest itself in present-day societal contexts either. In dictatorial contexts, the time-horizon of leaders is their life-time; in Western democratic contexts, many politician’s time-horizon lasts until the next election; in the corporate world and the world of finance, short-term profit drives the system; and people in general find themselves in an exhausting rat race and cannot plan far ahead either.

The seven-generation rule is impossible to uphold in a context where short-term competition for domination trumps long-term cooperation. The commons dilemma transmutes into the tragedy of the commons, as ecologist Garrett James Hardin has called it. Commons face two threats: invaders from outside and free-riders from the inside. In 2007, Hardin wrote: ‘An unmanaged commons in a world of limited material wealth and unlimited
desires inevitably ends in ruin. Inevitability justifies the epithet ‘tragedy,’ which I introduced in 1968.1117
‘The so-called tragedy of the commons is one of the most condensed embodiments of patriarchal thinking, and has been refuted by Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’ adds sociologist Miki Kashtan, and continues, ‘We are designed by evolution to be part of life and to engage with each other and nature collaboratively to care for life. We have forgotten, and we can restore this capacity’.1118 Indeed, what Hardin describes may rather be the tragedy of the market, argues the Schumacher Center,1119 and economist Elinor Ostrom proved that it is possible, even for larger groups, to protect their commons; she received the Nobel Prize for Economics 2009 for her work.1120
Related to the time horizon is the space horizon. Those who profit from social and ecological exploitation – colonisers in the past, or present-day’s Global North – have the resources to shield themselves from the destruction they cause through geographical distance. This has the consequence that they are not motivated to invest in change, even though they have the resources to effect change, while those who have the motivation lack the resources. Only when global processes such as climate change affect all, will this spatial disconnection seize to have its protective effect.

*Every economic system is a human-made construction and far from natural law*

The International Monetary Fund now re-examines its activities throughout the past decades and asks: Has neoliberalism been oversold?1121 The proposition that it is a truism that needs no proof that more investor-friendly reforms will serve the common good, is beginning to shake. Voices such as that of philosopher Howard Richards now have a chance to be heard. He points out, for instance, that ‘the historical conditions of the possibility of unemployment did not exist until Africa was conquered by Europeans’.1122 Politicians of the ‘left’ now lose elections to the far-right all around the world, and they begin to ask themselves whether they did not succumb too naïvely to the belief that ‘the market’ has the status of a natural law to which humans have to adapt. They ask whether they ought not rather have heeded the fact that ‘the market’ is a societal construction that humans have created and therefore can also re-structure.1123 People are still caught in cycles of humiliation between ‘belief in socialism’ and ‘belief in capitalism’, both claiming to represent scientific truisms, and these feelings of humiliation create a fog of war that clouds reality. What has to be appreciated instead is the reality that planet Earth represents the basis of all human life, and that Elinor Ostrom’s insights as to how to protect humankind’s commons might be the best advice.

*Double standards discredit human rights ideals*

Human rights ideals are not a Western idea – they have anchorings in many cultures, the African ubuntu philosophy is only one example.1124 Yet, as the West appeared to be its main champion for a while, Western double standards contributed to discrediting human rights ideals as imperialistic Western ideas.1125 Double standards have by now created an large dignity gap with deeply humiliating effects and dire consequences, from the emergence of extremist violence in form of terrorism to extremist political parties being voted in by those who are privileged enough to have access to elections, while the less privileged can only vote with their feet. Strongmen ‘from Abe to Erdogan, Modi, Putin, and Xi’ now co-opt democracy around the world, in countries once humiliated by the West, writes peace researcher Johan Galtung.1126
Domination has no inherent endpoint except total destruction, global ecocide and sociocide are the result

Human rights values delegitimise competition for domination and call for strategies of dialogue and partnership to replace it. What has continued on the ground, in practice, including under the cover of human rights rhetoric, is competition for domination. Domination as a strategy, however, has no inherent endpoint except for total destruction. Locusts can illustrate the outcome: locusts destroy their substrate and can only survive by moving on. Humankind has no other planet to move on to after it committed global ecocide on planet Earth, and even if, ecocide and sociocide would turn also the next planet into a humiliating and undignified place.

Homo sapiens, through being a super-co-operator and super-competitor, is also a super-predator

Homo sapiens has been successful in conquering planet Earth as no other species before, not least because humans are able to cooperate with each other, thus scaling up whatever aim they want to pursue to the group level.\textsuperscript{1127} However, success transmutes into its opposite when unlimited competition for domination meets circumscription. Planet Earth provides a limited set of conditions, and only cooperation for global partnership can create sustainable success.

Creativity is being wasted

Coordination and motivation are foundational mechanisms in each society.\textsuperscript{1128} During the past millennia, domination undermined motivation. Superiors secured coordination among their subordinates by forcing their own goals upon them with open domination or ‘carrot and sticks’ strategies. In a context of domination-submission, motivation is being sacrificed for coordination, thus undermining intrinsic motivation. This leads to creativity hiding in niches, at best, or being curtailed and blocked altogether. Creativity, however, is sorely needed in times of crisis, when humankind has to muster the transition toward a more dignified world.

Human rights ideals are not optional, they are without alternative if humankind wishes to survive

In a finite world, a world that is globally interconnected, global trust-inducing dialogue and partnership is the only feasible way forward, while competition for domination risks leading to all-out homicide, sociocide, and ecocide. This means that human rights ideals of unity in diversity, of partnership in equality in dignity, are without alternative for human survival, for a dignified life for future generations. Only then can Gandhi’s motto of There is no path to peace. Peace is the path replace the ultimately suicidal mottos of ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’ and ‘If you want wealth, invest in exploitation’.

Yet, supremacists resist covertly and overtly, while the majority is helpless, confused, co-opted and divided.

There are islands of hope, though. I appreciate the Humboldtian tradition, the traditional emphasis on the common good in continental Europe.\textsuperscript{1129} I value public arenas where the
Humboldtian spirit comes to the fore, and allow me to end this section by recommending one example. A highly educative programme is conducted by journalist Gert Scobel each Thursday on public television in Germany. Selbstsabotage was the title of the programme of 17th May 2018. The programme’s lead questions were the following:

Why do we humans fail to do what is good for us? We know so well what is good for us – for our health, the environment, and for society – yet, we fail to act accordingly. Why? What is behind our self-sabotage systems? Are there any ways to turn them off, at least occasionally?1130

The programme featured social psychologist Harald Welzer, who pins his hope on the human ability to learn, and the fact that history always brought to the fore an avant-garde that showed the way to a new normality. Psychologist Susann Fiedler, another participant in the programme, places her hope on the human desire to maintain a high reputation, meaning that a certain behaviour can become a new normality when a large enough group validates it, and this can include future-oriented pro-social and pro-ecological behaviour. She recommends, for instance, for social science classrooms to conduct social simulations of possible futures. Biologist Barbara König calls for species selection to receive more attention, rather than merely individual selection. Psychiatrist Wolfgang Merkle speaks up for a more nurturant approach to parenting, where the currency is love, rather than obedience or performance.

In other words, these voices resonate with Margaret Mead’s saying, ‘Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.’ These voices call for a return to the indigenous seven-generations horizon, as this serves the survival of a species best, rather than sacrificing it for short-term interests of individuals. They call for the nurturing of love, the nurturing of loving relationships among the human species, including the next generation, and including loving relationships with our life-giving ecosphere.

In our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network, we attempt to follow and manifest all those recommendations.

What now? Egalisation, dignism, and unity in diversity

Already Leo Tolstoy asked: ‘What then must we do’?1131 Which kinds of global futures could emerge from the turbulent changes now shaping our world? This is the core question asked by physicist Paul Raskin.1132 He considers three scenarios: conventional worlds, barbarisation, and great transitions. Conventional Worlds, or business-as-usual, is a utopian fantasy that is doomed to fail. Barbarisation will be the result if the utopian fantasy is being blindly maintained and civilisation descends into anarchy or tyranny. The only hope for humankind lies in bringing about a Great Transition. This means to ‘envision profound historical transformations in the fundamental values and organising principles of society’.1133

Also critical theory foresees three possible futures. Philosophers Rudolf Siebert and Michael Ott explain: Future I is the totally administered society, future II is the entirely militarised society enwrapped in chronic warfare, including illegal and immoral drone assassination attacks, and future III describes a society, in which personal sovereignty and universal solidarity are reconciled. Future III represents a society of real freedom, freedom from all involuntary and voluntary enslavement, ‘a society, in which the religious and the secular, the sacred and the profane, revelation and enlightenment, as well as personal autonomy and universal, i.e. anamnestic, present and proleptic solidarity would be newly reconciled... a society, in which nature and spirit will no longer be commodified, but will be

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liberated, and will be allowed to be what they are in the process of their mutual mediation, reconciliation and liberation. In short, critical theory envisions a society where nature will be humanised and human beings will be naturalised.

Michio Kaku, renowned physicist, concludes his book *Parallel worlds* with the following paragraph:

The generation now alive is perhaps the most important generation of humans ever to walk the Earth. Unlike previous generations, we hold in our hands the future destiny of our species, whether we soar into fulfilling our promise as a type I civilisation [meaning a civilisation that succeeds in building a socially and ecologically sustainable world] or fall into the abyss of chaos, pollution, and war. Decisions made by us will reverberate throughout this century. How we resolve global wars, proliferating nuclear weapons, and sectarian and ethnic strife will either lay or destroy the foundations of a type I civilisation. Perhaps the purpose and meaning of the current generation are to make sure that the transition to a type I civilisation is a smooth one. The choice is ours. This is the legacy of the generation now alive. This is our destiny.

This essay is written in support of a great transition into a future III, type I civilisation, into a future of dignity. Linda Hartling is the former associate director of the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute at the Wellesley Center for Women at Wellesley College. After Jean Baker Miller’s passing in 2006, she became the full-time director of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies. Linda and I practice collaborative leadership, where we strive to ‘valuate’ rather than ‘evaluate’. We attempt to engage in humble, mindful, authentic, selfless servant leadership that is relational and transformational. We avoid autocratic ‘big-ego’ styles of leadership in our group, and follow Jean Baker Miller in ‘waging good conflict’. We have adapted David Cooperrider’s appreciative inquiry concept for our dignity work, and resonate with Peter Drucker’s suggestion that organisations are like orchestras. We have looked at Edward de Bono’s recommendations for decision making, and value Kenneth Gergen’s emphasis on positive sharing, adding value, and reality building. If we include also Peter Senge’s concept of learning organisations, we can say that Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies is a ‘global network of local learning orchestras’.

Dignity and humiliation are foundational forces that we need to consider if we wish to achieve a dignified future, and they are not theoretical concepts, they are lived experiences. Through my work on humiliation and dignity, since 1996, I have been in many ways ahead of time in contributing to the ‘emotional turn’ that is now slowly unfolding in several fields of inquiry, including in the field of psychology itself, and also in areas such as international relations theory. Recent conceptualisations of emotions have moved away from rigid categorisations, rather viewing affect, feeling, and emotion as nonlinear, dynamic, and relational. There is no discourse that is ‘purely’ based on rationality; it always depends on what the participants feel constitutes rationality.

In my personal work I follow pioneer Jean Baker Miller in her relational-cultural theory, which signals an emotional-relational turn, not just an emotional turn that would still be stuck in Western lone-hero individualism. Miller was an early leader emphasising the role of relationships and community, building on Lev Vygotsky and cultural-historical activity theory. I resonate with relational realism, with the ‘relational subject’ approach (more than with a ‘plural subject’ approach), and tend to regard the relation itself as having causal effects.

The year 1989 provided a window of opportunity to unite the human family. The West’s casual display of power and triumphalism, however, seems to have humiliated the ‘losers’ to
the point that they now attempt to rise from below – not as friends but as rivals: ‘In the U.S.,
the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a military victory, which led to a spirit of
triumphalism and a feeling of omnipotence as the “sole superpower”’.\textsuperscript{1151} Clearly, the lesson
has not yet been learned that the humiliation of ‘losers’ can have disastrous consequences.
Historians discuss how the humiliation of Germany after World War I fuelled a new world
war. In my doctoral research I studied how the ‘casual display of power’ of helpers in Somalia
in 1993 led to an angry crowd dragging a dead American soldier through the streets of
Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{1152} The more the world grows interconnected, the more those who feel humiliated
have access to tools of destruction, the more it becomes irresponsible to overlook the deadly
dynamics of humiliation.

I have coined the word \textit{egalisation}, meaning equal dignity, or the undoing of humiliation.
This phrase aims to match the word globalisation and differentiate equal dignity from notions
such as equality, equity, egalitarianism, or identicalness. Clearly, there is a connection
between equality and equal dignity, and the connection is ‘hidden’ in the human rights
stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect
human dignity: equal dignity means equal chances to unfold diversity, and this presupposes a
certain amount and a certain kind of equality on the ground. The point is that this equality is
not to be confused with uniformity or that everybody has become the same. The confusion of
equality with uniformity, as I see it, has served as a particularly destructive popular strawman.
Dignity is not truly equal in a context of unequal chances. Equal chances make diversity
possible, which is the opposite of uniformity. ‘Equal dignity should not be misconstrued as a
strategy to equalise individuals through social conformity’.\textsuperscript{1153}

The term egalisation is short for equal dignity for all and avoids claiming that everybody
should become the same or that there should be no differences between people. Equality can
perfectly coexist with hierarchy when this hierarchy regards all participants as possessing
equal dignity. It cannot coexist, though, with a hierarchy that defines some people as more
worthy than others, some as lesser beings and others as higher beings. To give an example:
The pilots in a plane have a clear leadership role vis-à-vis their passengers when in the sky:
utter hierarchy and stark inequality characterise this relationship. This does \textit{not} mean,
however, that the pilot team can look down on their passengers as \textit{lesser beings}.\textsuperscript{1154} Discourse
analyst Michael Karlberg explains that, indeed, a dignified social order would not be without
hierarchy. Hierarchy, however, would no longer be a structure of dominance or an outcome of
power-seeking behaviour: ‘Organic hierarchy provides the organisation, coordination, and
efficiency by which the diverse potentialities of autonomous individuals can be realised and
their energies can be applied in productive ways that promote the common good’.\textsuperscript{1155}

If we imagine the human world as a container with a height and a width, globalisation
addresses the horizontal dimension, the shrinking width. \textit{Egalisation} speaks to the vertical
dimensions, the degree of authority ranking, the degree of power differentials and inequality.
Egalisation is a process away from a very high container of masters at the top and underlings
at the bottom, toward a flat container where all enjoy equal dignity, as individuals in
solidarity.

The horizontal line in the middle of Figure 1 presented further down represents the line of
equal dignity in shared humility. It illustrates a world view that resists essentialising and
ranking secondary differences into differences at the core of human worthiness, in other
words, it resists rankism.\textsuperscript{1156} The passengers in the plane may sit in the cheapest economy
class, yet, this is secondary; their essence as human beings is untouched, they are equal in
dignity to the pilots. In other words, the middle line in the figure does not signify that all
human beings are equal, or should be equal, or ever were or will be equal, or identical, or all
the same. There is no problem with people being diverse, there is no need for everybody to be
the same, it is equal dignity that unites all.

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Egalisation invites masters to step down from arrogating superiority, and encourages subordinates to rise up from humiliation, up from being held down and ascribed lesser value. Masters are humbled and underlings elevated, and all are entrusted with the co-creation of a new future of equality in dignity for all, as individuals in solidarity.

![Figure 1: The historical transition to egalisation](image)

The way to operationalise egalisation is the principle of unity in diversity. Symbiosis (mutually beneficial relationships) and diversity are pillars of evolution. The ubuntu philosophy manifests both: ‘we are two, and we are one, and this at the same time’.

Put in a different way, what is expressed here is nondualism. Nondualism means separation and connection; agreement and disagreement; one and two. It needs competency in nondualist thinking to grasp the value of unity in diversity and how it can become a synergistic win-win game: Unity is not necessarily the same as oppressive uniformity, and diversity is not the same as unrestricted freedom for divisiveness. Unity and diversity can grow together if kept in mutual balance and nurtured and celebrated simultaneously.

Although different thinkers view it differently, philosophy of mind can for the most part be defined as the study of the ontology (or ‘nature’) of the mind, of mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body. The dominant Western orientation in the philosophy of mind during its expansion throughout the past centuries has been a dualism, a metaphysics that holds that ultimately there are two kinds of substance. René Descartes’ mind-body dichotomy has been the most seminal and widely known form of dualism. Dualism is to be distinguished from pluralism, which claims that ultimately there are many kinds of substances, as well as from monism, which is the metaphysical and theological view that all is one, either the mental (idealism) or the physical (materialism and physicalism). All of these are to be distinguished from philosophies that for one reason or another decline to get involved in answering questions about how many kinds of substance there are.

When I lived in Japan, I learned new perspectives on dualism and on the other Western metaphysics. I was introduced to intercultural communication scholar Muneo Yoshikawa who has developed a nondualistic double swing model, which can be graphically visualised as the infinity symbol, or Möbius strip ∞. Unity is created out of the realisation of differences, and in that way, individuals, cultures, and intercultural concepts can blend in constructive
ways. Yoshikawa brought together Western and Eastern thought by drawing on Martin Buber’s idea of *dialogical unity* – the act of meeting between two different beings without eliminating the otherness or uniqueness of each – and connecting it with the notion of *soku*, the Buddhist nondualistic logic of ‘not-one, not-two’, the twofold movement between the self and the other that allows for both unity and uniqueness. Yoshikawa calls the unity that is created out of such a realisation of differences *identity in unity*: dialogical unity does not eliminate the tension between basic potential unity and apparent duality. Judith Martin, Thomas Nakayama, and Lisa Flores’s dialectical approach was the third source of Yoshikawa’s model, emphasising the processual, relational, and contradictory nature of intercultural communication. Nondualism is not a preserve of the East, though. Even though current political events are contravening the realisation of this ideal in the U.S. now, it remains present, for instance, in the motto on the Great Seal of the United States, *E pluribus unum*, Latin for ‘out of many, one’. The Center for Multicultural Education at the University of Washington, Seattle, has assembled recommendations for the United States titled, *Diversity within unity: Essential principles for teaching and learning in a multicultural society*. There we read: ‘*E pluribus unum* diversity within unity is the delicate goal toward which our nation and its schools should strive’.

One approach to creating more unity and at the same time more diversity in the world is by studying many (in principle all) human cultures and ‘harvesting’ those cultural world views, practices, and social-psychological skills that have unifying and egalising effects. A rich harvest can be found on all continents. *Living Well* is an expression used to translate the Spanish *Vivir Bien*, which in turn translates the Quichua phrase *Sumak Kaways*, and similar terms in other indigenous Latin American languages, and it names an indigenous social system that focuses on reciprocity between people and Earth. Catherine Odora Hoppers is the former Chair of Development Education at the University of South Africa, and she speaks of ‘transformation by enlargement for the academy’, whereby she means including also Indigenous Knowledge Systems. 2014 was the last year of the UN Decade for Indigenous peoples, and Kjell Skyllstad, global dignity advocate, warns: ‘We cannot ignore what amounts to genocide in our continued contribution to the eradication of the peoples who contain the key to our own survival’.

The field of indigenous psychology is on a similar path. From the point of view of indigenous psychologists, currently dominant Western thinking in the field of psychology subscribes to a decontextualised vision with an extreme focus on individualism, mechanism, and objectivity. Indigenous psychologists ask mainstream psychologists to muster the self-reflexivity of competent multiculturalism and see themselves in a new light, namely, as adherents of an indigenous psychology that is rooted in the historical and cultural context of Europe and North America. The view from nowhere that natural sciences claim, must change into local views from somewhere, and a synergy of multiculturalism and internationalism can create a shift from ‘one somewhere’ to ‘another somewhere’. Together, the local constructions of meaning and global consciousnes can draw on multiple ‘somewheres’ to arrive at shared visions and goals. In my work, I therefore call for ‘harvesting’ from all world cultures.

The traditional African philosophy *ubuntu* has been mentioned earlier. It is a philosophy for living together and solving conflict in an atmosphere of shared and dignified humility. It dovetails with Martin Buber’s I-Thou approach and is in harmony with the idea of equal dignity as enshrined in many religions around the world as well as in human rights.

Maintaining unity in diversity is a balancing act that requires a high degree of cognitive sophistication, interpersonal sagacity, and dignifying communication skills. The first hurdle to be overcome is the misconception that unity in diversity is a zero-sum game so that if one
wants more unity, one has to sacrifice diversity, and vice versa. This misconception leads to thinking only in dualities: ‘cosmopolitanism versus communalism, statism versus anarchism, and top-down versus bottom-up’. There seems to be a very high mental hurdle that keeps people from grasping that unity in diversity is not a zero-sum game, that both unity and diversity can be increased together. The benefits are immeasurable. Linda Hartling’s mentor, pioneer in women’s psychology Jean Baker Miller, speaks of waging good conflict, and how zest of life will be the reward.

The two prongs of unity and diversity, global responsibility and regional autonomy, are both essential and they are complementary. I deeply resonate with cognitive scientist Bruce Schuman’s project of reviving the ancient wisdom found in many cultures and showing how the tension between Many and One ‘extends across the entire range of human thinking’. His view is that if humankind is to succeed in the radical transition that is now called for, then the core challenge is to accept this tension. It has endless practical implications, expressed in a form that is essentially mathematical (the term ‘versus’ always signals them).

The challenge, however, is not just to transcend dualities but also to embrace processual thinking. Embracing processual thinking means going from clinging to fixities to moving in flux. In a first step, this means leaving behind the expectation that fixity should exist, rather, the tension between unity and diversity must be balanced by all involved parties in a never-ending process, it can never be made permanent once and for all. Moreover, balance is to be achieved by dialogue, not with violent protests being launched whenever the balance is felt wanting. Going with the flow is an art. ‘Only dead fish go with the flow’, is a saying that warns against overdoing it, that sometimes ‘standing by’ is not enough and firmly standing up is needed. The art is to stand up in ways that make maximum use of the flow. Kim Stafford’s story of the poet describes the way. Or author H. Jackson Brown’s reminder, ‘In the confrontation between the stream and the rock, the stream always wins — not by strength but by perseverance’. All this means that societal systems need to be created, and dignifying communication skills learned, that allow for fluid adaptations to this balance.

Scandinavia may serve as an interesting historical case. Why did the World Happiness Report rank Norway as the ‘happiest’ country in the world in 2017? I would suggest that a major cause of this happy result has been that Norwegians have applied a Fabian strategy, or what philosopher Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering, or what I am now labelling as processual thinking. This means refraining from rigid dogmaticism, listening to all and silencing none, counting on respectful dialogue and on insights from science to enlighten political processes.

To make unity in diversity work in practice, the principle of constrained pluralism is indispensable. It comprises three complementary sub-principles: irreducibility, subsidiarity, and heterogeneity:

Irreducibility affirms One World: the adjudication of certain issues necessarily and properly is retained at the global level of governance. Subsidiarity asserts the centrality of Many Places: the scope of irreducible global authority is sharply limited and decision-making is guided to the most local level feasible. Heterogeneity grants regions the right to pursue forms of social evolution consonant with democratically determined values and traditions, constrained only by their obligation to conform to globally mandated responsibilities.

Holarchy or regulatory pyramids are additional related concepts that I find useful to bear in mind when balancing the One and the Many. They come from brain research that found that the human brain embeds subordinate loops into superordinate loops. Legal thought contributes notions such as legal pluralism, complementarity, and qualified
The European Union, in principle, but unfortunately not always in practice, uses the subsidiarity principle. It means that local decision-making and local identities are retained to the greatest extent possible, while allowing for national, regional, and also international decision-making when needed. Also governance systems for large-scale environmental problems can only be effective through such nested layers. The turmoil in Europe, with Brexit as its most recent expression, illustrates how subsidiarity can never be a system that is fixed once-and-for-all. It is always ‘in crisis’, and necessarily so, since a continuous recalibration of superordinate and subordinate layers is its normality.

The case of Rwanda can illustrate the delicacy of the calibration of the One and the Many. After the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Rwanda has been using a so-called single re-categorisation policy. This means that the traditional group boundaries are replaced by a superordinate identity, in the case of Rwanda, all of its citizens are regarded as citizens of Rwanda and no longer identified as Hutu or Tutsi. Scholars often recommend dual re-categorisation as preferable, to avoid ‘identity threat’ and backlash, as dual re-categorisation makes both superordinate and subordinate identities salient. Yet, the case of Rwanda, where single re-categorisation is the policy, shows that there is no simple solution, particularly not in a post-genocide context.

Whatever may be the balance between unity and diversity, in all cases, what has to be avoided is unity that degrades into uniformity and diversity that degrades into division. This is perhaps the most important task humankind faces now: Humanity needs to protect unity from being turned into uniformity, be it through oppressive domination or through supposedly voluntary consumerism in a mass market. And humanity needs to protect diversity from being turned into division, be it division between nations, ideologies, classes and/or religions, or be it everybody-against-everybody as in the extreme individualism of hyper-capitalist contexts.

The recent rise of authoritarian populism around the world signals that uniformity has been overdone. Extremist nationalism could be interpreted as a backlash against this uniformity, a backlash that turns diversity into division. It started with double standards, oblivious of the fact that double standards can be more destructive to ideals than open betrayal, and that double standards have the potential to generate humiliation. Defenders of globalisation have long advertised its blessings; however, for many, it has turned out to be a curse. The term ‘globalisation’ hides many meanings. For some it means the globalisation of care, for others it means the globalisation of exploitation. Throughout recent decades, since shortly after World War II, a globalisation of exploitation has occurred behind a veil of a rhetoric of care. Globalisation unfolded in much more exploitative ways than the rhetoric of freedom and rising-boats for all proclaimed. Whether due to intellectual error, or due to conscious attempts to deceive, the theory that ‘the market’ is a thoroughly wise natural force and that global markets will bring happiness to all, created illusions that turned to disappointment that turned to anger. Globalisation critics do not oppose all aspects of globalisation; they do not oppose global civil society, for instance, a great benefit that flows from the coming-together of humankind. What they highlight with their criticism, is global systemic humiliation. It is the lack of egalisation, when equal dignity is promised but fails, and this heats up hot feelings, hot feelings of humiliation. Now, when the credibility of free market theories is thinning, the time is ripe for truly opting for the globalisation of care and responsibility, and for egalisation and solidarity. Unfortunately, however, globalisation critics have so far not been able to use this window of opportunity constructively, and the anger that has accumulated in populations is being used by populists to create hostile divisions.

Many of those in America and Europe who were hurt by the exploitative aspects of globalisation, experienced them as oppressive uniformity imposed by dictatorial Washington, or tyrannical Brussels. People in America and Europe are the most privileged among the
victims of the globalisation of exploitation, since they are in a position to vote. They are now increasingly voting for populists who turn against the other victims in the rest of the world, those who are even more destitute and have only their feet to vote with. The poorer are turned against the poorest. Populists promise ‘freedom for us from them’, thus re-fracturing the world into hostile division, where ‘freedom for all’ through a globalisation of care would be the solution. With the election of Donald Trump as president in the United States, we see what economic policy expert Bruce Fisher has aptly called a ‘turn from a neoliberal Wilsonian globalised system of trade and alliances to a Hobbesian nation-centred system organised by thug capital (oligarchs in Russia, hedge-fund and private-equity in the greater US)’. At the end, the recently emerging global economic security dilemma – a global superclass pitted against the rest – is re-spawning also the classical security dilemma of states pitted against other states.

In my work, I call for double standards to be turned into one single standard by aligning deeds with professed ideals and work for a globalisation of care and responsibility. I suggest that the key concept of subsidiarity can be re-thought and made part of a path to making the globalisation of care and responsibility happen. A path to the globalisation of care and responsibility is also a path to conceptualise the seven layers of humiliation,1199 and it is a path for healing a person’s identity. Let me explain what I mean by using myself as an example.

My own identity is built in this way: ‘Sunflower identity’ is the name I have coined for my personal global unity-in-diversity identity of fluid subsidiarity. Through my global life, the core of my identity (the core of the sunflower, so to speak) is anchored in our shared humanity, not just in theory but in forty years of global practice. It is thus more securely anchored in shared humanity than any human identity ever had the opportunity to be in history. An ethos of globalism, a patriotism for Earthland, offers a much stronger mooring than any we-against-them nationalism, simply because its territory is the entire planet, rather than imaginary state boundaries. All identifications are fickle, except for one, sociologist Norbert Elias said it already in 1939: ‘Only the highest level of integration, belonging to humanity, is permanent and inescapable’.1200

Now the technological means to reach the limits of our globe are more advanced than ever before – be it by plane or social internet platform. And my experience has shown me that it is psychologically perfectly feasible to relate to all human beings as fellow family members and that most people are able to respond in kind. I am often asked: ‘Where are you from?’ and I reply, ‘I am a human being’, ‘a citizen of this planet, like you’. I avoid saying, ‘I am of this or that nationality’, or ‘I am of this or that profession’, and so forth. I would rather say, ‘I am born with a certain passport’, or, ‘I have studied medicine and psychology’. I would even avoid saying, ‘I am a woman’. I am extremely careful with the little word am, as it connotes essence, it connotes the core of my identity.

At the periphery of my identity (the nested petals of the sunflower, so to speak), it is profoundly enriching for me to find safety in learning to ‘swim’ in the flux of diversity rather than to ‘cling’ to fixed positions. The mastery of movement provides a greater sense of security than fortress walls. Rather than seeking safety in one particular local culture, I find fulfilment through the nurturing of loving relationships globally. It is a pleasure to continuously pendulate in the spirit of nondualism, to have a protean self.1201 It is a pleasure to be a voyager.1202 A voyager uses the challenges of cultural diversity and intercultural conflicts for forging new relationships and new ideas, while a vindicator vindicates pre-existing ethnocentrism and stereotypes.

I am trying to contribute to globalisation becoming humanised and dignified; I am trying to bring flowers to the ceremony where globalisation marries egalisation; I am trying to integrate fraternité into liberté et égalité.1203 Globegalisation is a neologism that draws

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together liberté et égalité. If we wish to also include fraternité/sisterhood or solidarity, then the task of our time could be expressed as: co-globegalisation.\textsuperscript{1204}

Co-globegalisation is sorely needed. It is indicative that the ideal of solidarity, although it is expressed in the last of the three terms in the motto of the French revolution, liberté, égalité, fraternité, has been neglected. These three ideals clearly did not, and still do not, manifest in unison. While liberté and égalité have gained significance, solidarity fell by the wayside. Sociologist Juliet Schor is a scholar who addresses the co-globegalisation challenge. She wishes to bring the American Dream back to its full meaning and rescue it from its current manifestation that propels people into rat-races, which, at the end, lead to anomie in the midst of rising inequality.\textsuperscript{1205}

A dangerous definition of liberty and its synonym freedom is often a core element of the derailment of ideals that leaves equality behind and solidarity ignored. People who call for freedom may use or presuppose a definition of freedom that in effect calls for the untrammeled abuse of economic power, namely, for might to become right.\textsuperscript{1206} A culture that defines freedom as absence of restraints, including freedom for dominators to turn might into right, tends to keep those dominators in power, dooming the broader masses to the role of exploited victims. Collective bondage is the result of liberty without solidarity; liberty without equality and fraternity leads to betraying its very own raison-d’être, namely, to meet human needs in harmony with the natural environment.\textsuperscript{1207} Wherever freedom is just another word for ‘the market’, invaluable traditions of community care are lost. To say it with the motto of the French revolution: Liberty must be made compatible with a duty to share, only then can also equality and fraternity be expressed. When solidarity (fraternité) is sold out for a misguided definition of liberté, when solidarity is seen as nemesis for individual freedom, égalité likely is lost as well.\textsuperscript{1208} Only a culture that defines liberty as a level playing field protected by appropriate constitutive rules, nurtured in the spirit of servant leadership can protect liberty as a common good for all.\textsuperscript{1209} ‘Community’ is a word that suggests defining freedom as Martin Luther King Jr. defined it, namely, as a call to moral responsibility, or as Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen define it, as capability to do things.\textsuperscript{1210} So be careful when you cry freedom, and be wary when others cry it! So much depends on what the word is taken to mean!

Indigenous psychologist Louise Sundararajan recommends studying Fiske’s insights carefully, not least because many indigenous communities give primacy to communal sharing as guiding principles for their social and societal life, combined with the caring version of authority ranking, rather than allowing life and society be defined and thus impoverished by less comprehensive frameworks, such as equality matching or market pricing.\textsuperscript{1211} As anthropologists have found, market pricing is not an improvement over indigenous ways of dealing with each other, as it is rather reciprocity and giving forward that is practiced in indigenous communities, not exchange.\textsuperscript{1212} And reciprocity and giving forward are superior to market pricing. Giving forward is even superior to reciprocity, because reciprocity still involves calculating, it still hinders the spontaneity of generosity. In my life, I have indeed found that it is much more functional and fulfilling if I just think: ‘What can I give?’ rather than ‘What do I get in return?’

Consumerism is in resonance with a culture of ranked honour more than with equal dignity, despite of its official portrayal as being progressive. After all, the promise is that more consumption will provide a higher rank. Equal dignity can only emerge in the context of communal sharing, combined with what Fiske calls authority ranking, and only when that ranking takes the form of care rather than domination. Equal dignity can flourish only as long as quality is protected from being overly quantified.

Indigenous psychologist Louise Sundararajan concurs and warns of the disappearance of relational values by market pricing:

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All emotions are relational; our brain is not evolved to interact emotionally with strangers. Globalisation changes that. Sales clerks are trained to wear a smile for all. This is fine so far as superficial emotions go. But real emotions in the stranger context tend to become aberrant – sex with strangers is either rape or prostitution; weakness or inferiority in front of strangers turns a quotidian experience of humbling into that of traumatic humiliation. Of the four types of relational cognition that Alan Fiske delineated, Market Pricing, the type of relational transactions among strangers, has the least capacity to sustain a meaningful relationship – yet this is the type of relational context we are left with when all the other, richer relational contexts liquidify with globalisation.\footnote{1213}

Here comes an example for the disquiet that current dysfunctional understandings of freedom and neglect of caring create. A study by medical scholars Hartzman and Groopman offers an explanation of why many physicians no longer wish to tolerate feeling ‘nickelled and dimed’ by insurers:

Researchers have described two types of relationships that involve giving a benefit to someone else. In a market relationship, when you provide goods or services, you expect to receive cash or bartered goods of similar value in return. In a communal relationship, you are expected to help when there is a need, irrespective of payment… Caregivers should be appropriately reimbursed but should not be constantly primed by money. Success in such a model will require collegiality, cooperation, and teamwork – precisely the behaviours that are predictably eroded by a marketplace environment.\footnote{1214}

I suggest that we, as the human family, may want to reinstate what Alan Page Fiske calls communal sharing as the leading frame for how we arrange our affairs on this planet, globally and locally. I define myself as 

\textit{Homo amans}, a ‘loving being’; the \textit{Homo economicus} model is profoundly alien to me and humiliates the core of my humanity. It profoundly hurts me to see how the current primacy given to market pricing eats into our humanity and diminishes it at all levels and in all contexts.\footnote{1215} It saddens me when this humiliation is not healed but made worse by capitalism-versus-socialism hate-speech. To replace the terminology of capitalism, socialism or communism as catch words, to overcome those cycles of humiliation that divide the world, I have coined the term \textit{dignism} (dignity + ism).\footnote{1216} The aim is to point at the positive goals of \textit{co-globegalisation}.

Dignism describes a world, where every new-born finds space and is nurtured to unfold their highest and best, embedded in a social context of loving appreciation and connection, where the carrying capacity of the planet guides the ways in which everybody’s basic needs are met, a world, where we are united in respecting human dignity and celebrating diversity, where we prevent unity from being perverted into oppressive uniformity, and keep diversity from sliding into hostile division.

When the world was not yet as interconnected as now, ‘honourable’ might-is-right competition sometimes rendered short-term victories. Traditional cultures of collectivist ranked honour, as well as contemporary cultures of individualistic might-is-right, do not serve humankind’s sustainable well-being anymore now, and they will not in the future. Cooperation out-performs competition. The eminent social psychologist Morton Deutsch has dedicated his life work to show this point. His work, and that of many other researchers,
entitles us to regard it as an established fact. Competitors are well aware of it and enforce cooperation within their in-groups so as to be stronger against their opponents. Indeed, this is at the core of the security-dilemma inspired culture of honour of the past millennia. Cooperation made competition more deadly.

Today’s global interconnectedness is a radical game changer. It represents the ultimate deterrent for traditional power-over competition – be it power over others or over nature. Now the time has come to unleash the best that cooperation can offer, and to unleash it to all of humanity. The time has come for global cooperation, in respect for equality in dignity – coglobegalisation.

A call to action

We humans are proud of our adaptability, therefore we call ourselves Homo sapiens (Latin ‘wise, judicious’). Unfortunately, during the past ten thousand years, we have had to adapt to an environment that was characterised by the hardships of circumscription and the unforgiving grip of a security dilemma, and we did so by creating so-called dominator cultures. Now our task is to live up to the name we have given ourselves, by showing that we really can be wise and judicious. We need to adapt to the hard fact that in the long run only dialogical relationships are feasible. The long run has arrived.

Now it is possible, and absolutely necessary, to recover the cooperative social characteristics of human beings that ‘are still there in the blood and in the cells, even though they have been to a large extent warped and overridden by recently dominant social structures driven by competition for scarce resources’, so Howard Richards, philosopher of social science and scholar of peace and global studies. We Homo sapiens, if we are really sapiens, will create a diverse mosaic of unity, harvesting the cultural resources of the globe’s many traditions to meet the emotional and physical needs of all our sisters and brothers in the human family, in harmony with our mother, the Earth. So Howard Richards, formulating my thoughts better than I could do it myself.

The present state-of-the-world manifests two terrible degradations of the motto of unity in diversity, namely, uniformity without diversity, and division without unity. We observe increasing global uniformity in the form of a worldwide homogenisation of cultures – some call it ‘McDonaldisation’ – generating a tragic loss of cultural and biological diversity. The institutional mechanisms generating global uniformity are cemented into place by the constitutive rules that define the modern world-system; in other words, by the homogenising effects of the legal and ethical framework of the global economy. The economic power the constitutive rules generate is being used and abused by a few powerful more or less veiled global players, also called ‘superclass’. Within this global frame, nations jealously defend what remains of their sovereignty. And by doing so, they create division without unity, as exemplified whenever the United Nations expose themselves as Disunited Nations.

The antidote will be a new, wise, and judicious adaptation. It will deconstruct the world and reconstruct it. It will deconstruct domination, and it will construct global governance structures that realise what I call dignism. The notion of dignism makes dignity into an ‘ism’ replacing worn-out terms like capitalism and socialism. It calls for ending the cycles of humiliation generated by the broken promises of a world where human rights are assured but not delivered. It appeals to the enormous counter-power of the aspiration to equal dignity that modernity has created but not satisfied. The antidote furthers the common good of all of humankind as co-inhabitants of a finite habitat; it builds governance structures that humanise and dignify globalisation, turning it into co-globegalisation under the motto of unity in diversity, operationalising this co-globegalisation through appropriate subsidiarity and the

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harvesting of all dignifying aspects from all cultures that ever existed on this planet.\textsuperscript{1221}

The ingathering of the people of this world – as manifested, for instance, in worldwide social media – can help us. \textit{Ingathering} denotes the shrinking of the world and how it enables people to communicate with each other globally more easily than before. Now that the currently reigning global culture is leading our species and the biosphere to physical extinction, our task is to fuse this ingathering with the sort of meaning that human rights ideals embody. \textit{Caminos de regreso} (return paths) are the order of the day.\textsuperscript{1222} \textit{Caminos de regreso} refer to diverse but complementary paths to functional cooperation. This means walking into the future by turning our attention back to the deep emotional nature of human beings that evolved during the first long stretches of the existence of \textit{Homo sapiens} on the planet, prior to the Neolithic revolution. Only when we succeed with the right kind of \textit{caminos de regreso} can we arrive at Martin Luther King Jr.’s vision for the future where the human family shares its world house in dignity.\textsuperscript{1223} Indeed, as King warned in 1967, ‘we still have a choice today: nonviolent coexistence or violent co-annihilation’.\textsuperscript{1224}

At the present juncture in human history, space opens for the global community to actually succeed with such a project. The shrinking of the world, the coming-together of humankind, its growing understanding of its humble place in the universe, all this affords possibilities to undo the dominator culture of the past millennia. Even the dis/belief of being ‘god-like’ can help us, namely, when it means that we accept our own responsibilities down on the ground of planet Earth, in humility and wisdom, rather than lazily offloading our very own duties to the heavens, when we steer clear of feeding quasi-religious beliefs, for instance, the belief that the actions of \textit{Homo dominans} will per definition create a glorious future. We have the possibility now to regain some of the pristine humble pride that may have characterised the first 95 per cent of human history, even though pride can be pristine no more now, after having been mutilated by ten millennia of humiliation. Celebrating diversity through unity in equality in dignity is the new hoped-for future.

Modern humans emerged roughly 300,000 to 200,000 years ago on planet Earth.\textsuperscript{1225} Since then, we faced many challenges. Conditions of life have changed dramatically. We have survived as a species because we are so adaptable. So far, our adaptation efforts were more or less haphazard. To a large extent we were puppets of history and were always late, adapting to problems only post-hoc, including problems we created ourselves. Now, we find ourselves in a transitional phase similar to the one we began to traverse about 12,000 years ago, a transition from a previous set of conditions to which we had adapted to a radically new and different set of conditions. The first revolution occurred rather unsystematically and this was unavoidable, since our forebears did not yet have all the knowledge about the world that we have today. Now, we can embark on a much more foresighted transition.

We have entered what Paul Raskin calls the Planetary Phase of Civilisation, where strands of interdependence weave humanity and Earth into a single community of fate on its way to \textit{Earthland}. Raskin reflects on the pace of social evolution and how it has quickened throughout human history, whether this acceleration is a mere coincidence or the manifestation of an underlying historical principle:

The complexification and enlargement of society also quickens the pace of social evolution. Just as historical change moves more rapidly than biological change (and far more rapidly than geological change), so, too, is history itself accelerating. As the figure suggests, the Stone Age endured about 100,000 years; Early Civilisation, roughly 10,000 years; and the Modern Era, now drawing to a close, began to stir nearly 1,000 years ago. If the Planetary Phase were to play out over 100 years, this sequence of exponentially decreasing timespans would persist.\textsuperscript{1226}
Throughout the past millennia, good ideas had to ‘go into exile’ to find space to flourish when they disturbed power. When Constantinople was conquered by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II in 1453, many Byzantine scholars fled to Europe and ‘seeded’ the Enlightenment. Spain became intellectually impoverished through the Inquisition, as it made its scholars leave Spain. Anti-Semitism impoverished Germany, while the rest of the world benefited from Jewish immigrants, not least present-day American universities that are deeply indebted to their immigrants’ legacy and ongoing inspiration.

Today, we, as humankind, can intentionally co-create a global context that welcomes good ideas for new adaptations. Today, we have an understanding of our place in the cosmos that is much more advanced and comprehensive than that of our forebears, and we have all the tools to shape our fate in purposeful ways. Today, we can sit together and reflect, we can act more deliberately and effectively than ever before in our history. We can understand that the tragic security dilemma of the past millennia is attenuating through globalisation, and that we can keep on attenuating it intentionally. We can do so by creating a global community of mutual trust, care, and responsibility, a global community that manifests the fact that we are one single family of Homo sapiens. By building global trust, we can prevent cycles of humiliation from re-stoking security dilemmas and re-fracturing the world.

Ours is a historically unprecedented situation that humankind is unprepared for, and many have not yet grasped its novelty. Anthropologist William Ury summarises this novelty in one single sentence: ‘For the first time since the origin of our species, humanity is in touch with itself’.

No history lesson can provide a road map or a blueprint. History does not go in circles. Continuing with business-as-usual now represents an impossible utopian fantasy, for the reason, not least, that globalisation makes the phenomenon of humiliation much more salient than before. Globalisation – the coming-together of all humankind – provides opportunities for comparison that were not there earlier, also to people who formerly were isolated. This turns absolute deprivation into relative deprivation for them. This would be unproblematic if it were not for human rights ideals being disseminated at the same time. These ideals deem relative deprivation to be illegitimate, thus removing former justifications for inequality: a human rights defender cannot justify inequality as divinely ordained or as nature’s order. As a result, rage and anger are rising and are likely to rise further among those who feel betrayed. In the language of dignity humiliation, it is humiliating to be shown the amenities of modern life in Western soap operas and to be invited into the family of equal human beings by human rights rhetoric, while simultaneously being deprived of those very amenities, and this not through natural disasters or divine intervention, but through exploiters who hide behind empty human rights rhetoric and double standards. Ill feelings, including feelings of humiliation, must be expected to increase under such circumstances. Deprivation thus transmutes into humiliation, and humiliators may be sought out, who then become targets of revenge. I call it cross over when something begins with feelings of dignity humiliation, with all their heightened intensity, and ends in honour humiliation’s violent revenge strategies.

In this situation, even a world of equal material wealth for all would not necessarily remove humiliation. Material wealth offered without respect for equal dignity may humiliate all the more. Wealth without dignity can be felt like selling out one’s dignity for money, losing face, the face of honour and of dignity. In addition, as has been pointed out several times in this essay, material resources provide the very means to turn this disaffection into action, including violent action. This is what early sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 1856, when he said that the danger of revolution is greatest, not when poverty is so severe that it causes apathy and despair, but when conditions have been improving, and, in particular, when a few are benefiting and not the rest.

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In this situation, true Realpolitik means embarking on the very visionary ‘idealism’ that formerly was denigrated as ‘unrealistic’. For the first time in human history, self-interest converges with global common interest – nobody can survive alone on the globe, let alone in opposition against others. It is now in the interest of everybody to join hands in cooperation among equals to solve our global social and ecological crises. Ideals of solidarity and equality in dignity and rights for all represent a normative framework that is uniquely suited for an emerging globally interconnected knowledge society. It is the only framework for humanity’s survival, and, moreover, it entails a promise of well-being and meaningfulness that is higher than the promise of the traditional honour order – ethically, psychologically, practically – both for the individual and for societies at large. The promise of unity in diversity is higher than that of division without unity. Human rights ideals are far from a mere Western imposition, the knowledge of and desire for equal dignity are embodied in all human beings. After forty years of living globally, I can attest for that.

Allow me to briefly insert here a few more thoughts on my personal experiences and choices, to explain why the promise of equal dignity is higher than the promise of honourable status. As mentioned earlier, dignity can be manifested through unity in diversity, and this can be operationalised through the subsidiarity principle. I use the same approach also in my private life. ‘Sunflower identity’ is the name I coined for my personal global unity-in-diversity identity built with fluid subsidiarity.1232

My personal global life design is the result of many years of deep reflection on the issues discussed here, and of profoundly principled choices. I wish to walk my talk, to be the change, not just to talk about change. It would insult my life philosophy and it would severely damage me psychologically, if I were to define my purpose in life in terms of dominance over others, be it through power or money or a combination of both. Filling my life with momentous excitements over ‘owning’ stuff, excitements to which one quickly adapts, is absurdly void of meaning to me. It would leave me equally empty, were I only to live for diversion and distraction. Being reduced to being a supplier or a target of sales of products and services would leave me deeply depressed. Allowing myself to feel deficient unless I buy or sell something, would humiliate my humanity to its core, as my dignity is independent of my ability to produce sellable products or services. I react with disgust when I am called upon to buy something because it is ‘cheap’ or discounted, or to pay a high price because ‘you are worth it’. I am appalled by advertisements, as I do not appreciate being abused as a wallet on two legs. I profoundly resent being taken for a person of substandard intelligence by advertisements: I am not so ignorant that I am unaware that only connection can create happiness.1233 Already ancient philosopher Socrates refused to be paid for his philosophical teachings. Charging for beauty, he argued, is prostitution, so it is that money cannot be exchanged for wisdom.1234 I agree. Many centuries later, philosopher Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) regarded the trope of prostitution as the epitome of a money-based society and its I–It relationships (Martin Buber), a society where everybody is a seller and a commodity at once, where everybody is continually encouraged to buy or sell, where the best thing is to sell oneself, to prostitute oneself. I agree. If I were to reduce even my own creativity to serve ‘personal branding’, so as to become a product of and for myself, I would feel like I were stranded in the dead-end world of the movie Pleasantville.1235 Therefore, I refrain from seeking relief in the present mainstream paradigm of market pricing, therefore I prefer to endure constant economic pressure. I am only too aware of the legacy of slavery informing modern forms of ‘scientific’ management, and I do not wish to be part of the insidious language of ‘human resources’.1236 I do not wish to partake in being fooled by the term ‘free’ market when this means that public services are being ‘dismembered, outsourced, closed down, the source of profit for a few and an impoverished society for the many’.1237 I follow philosopher Immanuel Kant when he says that ‘everything has either a price or a dignity’, and

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that ‘whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity’. I therefore refuse to ‘have a price’. I wish to have a life, not a job. I have studied economics enough to know that society would be better off if it organised itself without the concept of job. How come that the same people who eschew marrying ‘for money’ accept living for money and confuse livelihood with monetary income? My mission is to nurture I-Thou inter-human solidarity – not just inter-cultural tolerance – as an alternative to a world where human relationships are hollowed out through economical ‘imperatives’ (Meiksins Wood). I connect my own good with everybody’s good, because owning or using products beyond what furthers the common good cannot create meaning. Only connection creates the kind of happiness that flows from meaningfulness, only connection with us humans and the nature we are part of can provide fulfilment. I see myself as a gardener, a nurturer of our sociosphere and our ecosphere. Once trained as a clinical psychologist and medical doctor, and now I attend to the health of all of humankind in its symbiosis with planet Earth. And I do so with love, humility, and with a deep sense of awe.

For the world, I see no alternative to creating trans-national and trans-local caring capacities, which means interlinking, globally, the efforts of all local ‘civic and ethical entrepreneurial networks that are currently in development’. In short, the ‘global street’ is now called on to come into action. This is why I invest my life-time into creating a dignity movement not just locally, but globally. I speak up for the global village’s responsibility to co-create dignifying relationships. I decline joining in distributing blame to individuals for personal vices such as greed or callousness. ‘All-encompassing compassion is possible; if I am in you, and you within me, then mutual caring should replace antagonism’, says psychologist Kenneth Gergen. Gergen calls on us to replace the Hobbesian dystopia of ‘all against all’, with a vision of ‘all with all’.

There are many precedents that we can harvest now, as we try to change mind-sets in ways that facilitate cooperation and sharing. When we look at the pantheist tradition, from the early work of Heraclitus and Plotinus, to Spinoza, and Ralph Waldo Emerson, God is all. There is no separate entity or bounded being called God as in theist traditions. Eco-theology sees the sacred in the wholeness of nature. Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) was a mathematician, philosopher, and ‘father’ of process religion and process philosophy, which has since inspired a wide variety of disciplines, including ecology, theology, education, physics, biology, economics, and psychology. Process philosophy sees the fundamental reality as one of continuous change, of continuous becoming, where what we take as enduring reality only is a momentary concrescence, a momentary coming together of ‘occasions of experience’. Buddhists would call it co-dependent origination, or pure relatedness of all, or inter-being, where everything is in everything else. ‘Emergent from a dynamic field of possibilities’ is how theorist Karen Barad formulates it, basing her work on physicist Niels Bohr’s insights. Actor network theory regards causality not as linear but sees humans and non-humans in relation with one another, any element in a system having ‘the capacity to enrol the actions of any other element in its functioning’. In her theory of agential realism, Barad goes beyond actor-network theory and speaks of intra-action, where phenomena are not ideational concepts, not assemblages of humans and nonhumans (as in actor-network theory), but the condition of possibility of humans and non-humans in their very materiality.

Some of my wealthy American friends dream of a world without any government, kept afloat by ‘free’ competition. Some would add charity, others not. I would say that my friends do not understand that they misunderstand freedom. Whoever supports ‘freedom for might to become right’ does not create well-being for all in equality in dignity, but a world of vast inequalities and suffering for most. And this suffering cannot be adequately addressed even by the best-intentioned philanthropy. Whoever wishes to build a ship will understand
that for a ship to function, a masterplan is needed. It would be insufficient to approach a few wealthy friends for donations: one friend may love sails, another motors, a third furniture, in short, the result would never be a functioning ship, or functioning global and local economic systems for that matter. Charity donations can therefore not be the path to global strategies. If the masterplan is left to be drawn up by a few powerful wealthy individuals – as well-intentioned as they may be – who analyse the world’s needs and place their investments according to their personal preferences, decent global systemic design making will remain wanting, not to speak of charity’s potentially disempowering impact. Think of the sinking Titanic: The wealthy might see cracks in their luxury cabin and repair them, while overlooking the holes in the bulk of the ship further down, where all the poor people live.

‘When restless billionaires trip on their toys’ is the title of an article that warns:

Welcome to the age – and whimsy – of the new billionaire class and the precariousness of vanity projects. With so much money sloshing around, and more and more of the super wealthy pushing into areas beyond their expertise, it is likely we will see more headlines about the failure of some of these fanciful investments and philanthropic experiments.

Might-is-right competition, even if combined with the world’s best philanthropy, can no longer be allowed to dominate the design of global strategies. Profound global systemic change is needed, or what physicist Paul Raskin calls a Great Transition, brought about by a global citizens movement, and this transition can only succeed with ‘a systemic transformation from a market-centric to a commons-centric form’. In my work, I call for a globalisation of trust, care, and responsibility, rather than the presently prevailing globalisation of extraction, exploitation, and domination. This is precisely my work: I help bring together a global family of dignity, I call for a globalisation of trust, care, and responsibility, rather than the presently prevailing globalisation of extraction, exploitation, and domination.

How can we realise in practice the unity in diversity of ‘all with all’ and a globalisation of solidarity? Global governing systems represent the highest macro-level frame for our planet. Global generative mechanisms, and constitutive rule shape all the layers and spaces below them. Only when communal sharing – Alan Page Fiske’s concept of solidarity – guides the design of such rules, can unity in diversity and dignity flourish at all levels. Only then can it be ensured, qua system, that face-to-face inter-human solidarity can unfold also at micro local levels. It is only then that dignifying actions such as giving to charity can find their deserved space. In contrast, the result will be more social and ecological degradation, if market pricing is allowed to continue being the definatorial guiding principle, and the social and ecological damage it inflicts is simply abetted through charity and, at most, through regulatory rules. Buberian I-Thou relationships are crowded out when inter-human relationships are defined and dominated by abstracts contracts based on monetary exchanges. As long as global constitutive rules are defined by market pricing, the capacities of local movements and nation-states to effect change are severely restricted. The resulting power vacuum at the global level invites global terror into all segments of life also locally. At the present point in time, this creates precisely the global tyranny that is feared by those who aim to avoid big government, indicating that the argument of small government versus big government is a false choice. Somalia’s government is too small, while North Korea’s is too big: the solution is neither too much nor too little government, but good government. And good government means informing constitutive rules by the subsidiarity principle, and this is as valid for local as for global governance.

Paul Raskin uses the trope of a ship when he speaks of Earthland, which is his name for the multiterried world we live in today, that ‘overlays globalised dynamics across a mosaic of
modern, pre-modern, and even remnants of Stone Age cultures’:

On board, white-knuckled passengers are awakening to their existential quandary. They tremulously inquire about location and direction, but bewildered cabin attendants can provide only disjointed information and unpersuasive reassurances. In the cockpit, the insouciant captains cast desultory glances at the flight screens or doze, awaiting instructions from perplexed navigators.1268

Raskin crafts artful formulations to describe the passengers’ psychological responses to sailing on a ship in distress: Some discount all dangers with ‘sweet denial, finding distraction in passing amusements and baubles, and seeking succour in the false panaceas of free markets, religious rapture, or individual beatitude’.1269 Others are despondent and confront their plight open-eyed, but, ‘seeing no way out’, they ‘turn away in fatalistic despair’, while most ‘are just trying to muddle through, keeping their heads down and hoping for the best’.1270

This is the insight most people do not dare face: In the new situation of global interconnectedness, familiar isolationist and/or power-over strategies become obsolete. When a new global superordinate system is in formation and ‘global-scale processes increasingly influence the operation and stability of subsystems’, reductive partitioning into ‘semi-autonomous entities – states, ecosystems, cultures, territories – becomes inaccurate and misleading’.1271 Also ‘Zombie ideologies’ such as ‘territorial chauvinism, unbridled consumerism, and the illusion of endless growth’ held dear by a ‘myopic and disputatious political order’, need to transform into ‘coherent responses to systemic risks of climate change, economic instability, population displacement, and global terrorism’, to name only the most emblematic.1272 Most of the mathematical modelling that mainstream economists engage in, is too limited and many have even characterised it as bogus.1273 When life depends on investments and on sales, which both are fragile and tend to fail, and when ‘the physical welfare and the sense of self-worth of the people depend on an unreliable economic motor with built-in tendencies toward social chaos and ecological disaster’, systemic change is called for.1274 Fordist/Keynesian regimes of accumulation cannot be remedied with a neoliberal regime of accumulation, nor vice versa.1275

Does Raskin aim for utopia? Do I aim for utopia? Yes and no. If anything, continuing with business-as-usual is an impossible utopia. But there is also necessary utopia, there are innovative visions for a better future: ‘In immoderate times, moderation becomes imprudent – madness in reason’s mask. The business-as-usual utopianism of Market Forces ideology is an egregious case of crackpot realism’, is Raskin’s verdict, borrowing a phrase from C. Wright Mills.1276 Also I stand for such radical new visions. For example, for the vision of an empathic civilisation as brought forward by social theorist and activist Jeremy Rifkin,1277 or the vision of a decent society by philosopher Avishai Margalit.1278

As the previous paragraph shows, this essay gives the floor to many scholars and their insights, reflections, and recommendations. Some readers might be confused by so many voices. However, this is done to manifest the unity in diversity of ‘all with all’ also in the way this essay is written.

Here are a few more of these voices. Intercultural psychologist Anthony Marsella, for instance, calls on us to move beyond our identification and pre-occupation with humanity altogether (such as humanism, humanitarian, or humanistic) and to ‘move to an identity with life – lifeism’.1279 This is what philosopher Val Plumwood identifies as our responsibility to Earthothers.1280 It means reclaiming our commons, locally and globally: ‘The so-called tragedy of the commons is one of the most condensed embodiments of patriarchal thinking, and has been refuted by Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’ writes sociologist Miki Kashtan, ‘We

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are designed by evolution to be part of life and to engage with each other and nature collaboratively to care for life. We have forgotten, and we can restore this capacity.\textsuperscript{1281}

Howard Richards points at very practical steps to achieve the systemic change that is needed now. The modern world is built on successors of Roman law, and many Roman law rules have become ‘systemic imperatives’ that lead to the shredding of our social and ecological foundations of life.\textsuperscript{1282} The Roman distinction between private law and public law (now global), for instance, allows people to believe that there is no responsibility when there is no contract. Roman law imposes a duty not to harm, but no duty to help.\textsuperscript{1283} This legitimises de-solidarisation and promotes an impersonal way of relating to other people as mere abstract role-bearers in contracts. And narrow neo-Roman concept of property rights stand in the way of ameliorating human life and all life on Earth. Richards suggests simple corrections that will clear away those obstacles and make it possible to dignify human life and all life on planet Earth. Richards has collaborated with many colleagues, for instance, in South Africa, where they put in place, in very practical and down-to-earth ways, multiple ways of providing goods and services, in a limitless variety of material practices, and they call it \textit{unbounded organisation}.\textsuperscript{1284}

This essay has so far attempted to embed the journey of humiliation and dignity into the larger context of human history – where we come from, where we stand now, and where we go – and has tried to shed light on why dignity and the phenomenon of humiliation become more salient nowadays. If we say that modern humans emerged roughly 300,000 to 200,000 years ago on planet Earth, we have survived as a species because we are so adaptable.\textsuperscript{1285} So far, to a large extent, we were, however, puppets of history, our adaptation efforts were more or less haphazard, and we were always late, adapting to problems only post-hoc, including problems we created ourselves. I call the first 95 per cent of human history the \textit{era of pristine untouched pride}. It was when we, \textit{Homo sapiens}, lived in small mobile groups and followed wild food wherever it was abundant, not yet aware that planet Earth is limited in its surface. I call the past five per cent of human history the \textit{era of honour}, or, more precisely, the \textit{era of collectivist ranked honour}. It was the period during which we were sedentary and lived in fear of our neighbours. I dedicate my life to working for a future of dignity, and hope it will be an \textit{era of dignity}, or, more accurately, an \textit{era of equality in dignity for all, as individuals in solidarity with each other and our planet}.

Now, we find ourselves in a transitional phase similar to the one we began to traverse about 12,000 years ago, a transition from a previous set of conditions to which we had adapted, to a radically new and different set of conditions. The first revolution occurred rather unsystematically and this was unavoidable, since our forebears did not yet have all the knowledge about the world that we have today. Now, we can embark on a much more foresightful transition. Now is the time for the global village to become serious about its responsibility to create a \textit{decent} world, a world with institutions that do not humiliate its citizens.\textsuperscript{1286} Now is the time to humanise globalisation, to create superordinate goals and structures that can bring humanity together and manifest \textit{dignism} (dignity + ism). It is the time to humanise globalisation by merging globalisation with egalisation to form \textit{globegalisation}. It is the time to bring \textit{liberté, égalité, fraternité}, or \textit{solidarité}, together into \textit{co-globegalisation}.\textsuperscript{1287}

We, as humankind, have to embark on this journey together, lovingly, despite all backlashes, if we wish to offer our children a future worth living in. And we can succeed when we nurture solidarity in equal dignity and prevent feelings of humiliation from turning our benign opportunities malign.

In my first book in 2006, I suggested that there are \textit{four basic logics} at the core of the human condition. Table 2 displays those four basic logics of the human condition, as there are the \textit{pie}, the \textit{security dilemma}, the \textit{future time horizon}, and \textit{social identity}.\textsuperscript{1288}

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1. The question of whether and to what extent resources are expandable (game theory, as developed by the discipline of philosophy),
2. The question of whether the security dilemma is weaker or stronger (international relations theory, developed by political science),
3. The question as to what extent long-term or short-term future time horizons dominate (as described in many academic disciplines, among others cross-cultural psychology, the famous seven-generation sustainability rule),
4. The question of how the human capacity to tighten or loosen fault lines of identification is calibrated (social identity theory, developed by social psychology).

If we inscribe these four logics into the chronology of human history on planet Earth, we can say that until roughly ten thousand years ago, human communities were enjoyed abundant expandable pies of resources in what I call the era of pristine pride (a). A dramatic alteration occurred when our species had populated all continents and thus completed what I call our first round of globalisation. In a very brief historical time span, abundant expandable pies of resources turned into fixed ones. Humanity responded with a completely new ethos and emotional coinage: The era of honour began, which legitimised the vertical ranking of human worth into ‘higher’ and ‘lesser’ beings (b). Presently, we are participants in yet another radical turn-around, as significant as the first one ten thousand years ago, this time aspiring to the ethos and emotional coinage of an era of equal dignity (c). This is our second round of globalisation, a fragile journey – at risk to fail at any moment – toward a global knowledge society that treats knowledge as an expandable pie, with humankind inviting everybody into one single in-group, where the security dilemma is intentionally attenuated through global trust-building, where long-term thinking becomes the norm, and practices of humiliation become delegitimised.

The most benign scenario is a combination of an absent or weak security dilemma with an expandable pie of knowledge, where an atmosphere of respect is nurtured and appropriate lessons are drawn from a long past time horizon for the sake of a long future time horizon. Conversely, the worst scenario brings together a short future time horizon, positioned in an environment that represents a fixed pie of resources, combined with a strong security dilemma, within which individuals or groups are exposed to humiliating treatment. If that happens, feelings of humiliation and their consequences might become so strong that they override and undermine otherwise benign scenarios in a downward spiral.

This model of the human condition can help us analyse social change over long time stretches and in different world regions, as well as aid future strategy planning for governments and international organisations. It warns that the destructive nature of the dynamics of humiliation becomes more visible the more the other parameters veer to the benign side.
At the present juncture in human history, creativity is sorely needed if humankind is to address its global challenges intelligently. This creativity can flow from the diversity of human cultures and human talent, embedded into respect for equal dignity for all. For the first time in human history, there is now a chance to change both the reality and culture of domination and terror. Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King, and many other historical figures can inspire us to shoulder our very individual responsibility. What is needed now is comprehensive and intentional global systemic creativity. To the best of my ability, and in collaboration with many others, I try to contribute to satisfying that need. This task is being facilitated by the fact that for the first time in its history, humankind is in a position to fully appreciate and act on the fact that we are one family. Unlike our ancestors, we can see pictures of our Blue Planet from the perspective of an astronaut. Unlike our forebears we can see with our own eyes how we humans are one species living on one little planet. And we have access to a much more comprehensive knowledge base about the universe and our place in it than our grandparents ever had. Let’s roll!

Table 2: The human condition

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<tr>
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<th>The future time horizon</th>
<th>Social identity</th>
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<td>Short</td>
<td>long</td>
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<td>The pie</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
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<td>The security dilemma</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>(a, c)</td>
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Notes


2 I thank David Crystal for his generous help with the Oxford English Dictionary.

3 For Dignity Dialogue Homes, see www.humiliationstudies.org/intervention/dialoguehome.php.

4 Miller, 1993, p. 175. Italics in original.

5 Ibid.

6 Stevenson, 2010.

7 The etymology of the noun humiliation goes back to French humiliation (fourteenth century, in Hatzfeld and Darmesteter), and to late Latin humilitātōn-em, which is the noun of the action deriving from the verb humiliāre, which means to humiliate. The OED says about the etymology of the verb to humiliate that it points at humilit-, the participial stem of late Latin humiliāre, and humiliāris, which is the adjective humble. In modern French the verb humiliére is being used, which means to humiliate. As to the noun humility, we have French humilité (earlier umilitet, in the eleventh century, in Hatzfeld and Darmesteter), and Latin humilitāt-em and humiliāris. Arsène Darmesteter (1846–1888) was a distinguished French philologist. He collaborated with Adolphe Hatzfeld in a Dictionnaire général de la langue française (2 volumes, 1895-1900).


9 Francisco Gomes de Matos in a personal communication, 10th November 2015.


14 Hartling, 1995.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


‘The sixties’ is present in the law school classroom through children marked by their parents who were marked by their times. Parents who were radicals, hippies, veterans, civil rights workers, musicians, poverty workers, social workers on reservations, Peace Corps volunteers. For their

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children, the question is whether to turn from their parents’ ghosts, or to live their parents’ lives right this time, or to do the opposite this time. The parents are often Jewish and/or WASP, or of different races, divorced sometime in the eighties as the tallest divorce wave in American history hit, and the sexual revolution crashed, and married men came out and left their wives, and the AIDS epidemic got under way. Your mother raised and pushed and supported you, but she also needed your support in return, big time. Your father was gone or dead or just never recovered from Vietnam or from his brother’s descent into schizophrenia. Maybe you lived in the country, without electricity and with water hand-drawn from a well, and now find yourself tossed up on the shore of middle-class lawyer success in a kind of daze, given what it was all like just a few years ago. Worried about betraying those fragile forebears, worried about betraying the universe of people you have been a part of but that your fellow classmates treat as more remote than Afghans. Also worried about having been betrayed, perhaps crippled, by the strangeness of the childhood they inflicted.

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. Italics in original.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 I thank philosopher Dagfinn Kåre Føllesdal for his support in formulating initial questions in 1996. I had the privilege of participating in his Ethics Programme at the Norwegian Research Council 1995–1996. Dagfinn Føllesdal’s publications span many decades. See, among others, Føllesdal, 1988, Føllesdal and Depaul, 2015. I was immensely touched by his personal support to my work, by his ethics seminars, and by his lectures. See, among others, How can we use arguments in ethics? his lecture at the Norwegian Academy of Science, Oslo, Norway, 30th January 1996. Dagfinn Føllesdal shared the following reflections with me in 1996:

In humiliation: the most important aspect is that it is a subjective notion, a subjective experience, less an objective notion. Although, of course, in some cases also an outsider can say: this is a humiliation. The subjective perspective is important. Therefore Husserl is helpful with respect to culture difference: How is humiliation experienced subjectively? People of different cultures will not be aware that they humble, and even if they do, they will not understand. People from the same culture would just abstain from doing something which humiliates.

What is experienced as humiliating? For example in a peace treaties, one has to be careful not to humiliate somebody who is falling. There is a spectrum of possible reactions, depending on the experience of justice: for instance, if it means an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

What is the role of anger? Sometimes anger is not caused by humiliation. Incidents need to be mapped out in rich descriptive studies to show what it was that caused feelings of humiliation. What is the role of ethics? Could there ever be justified humiliation? In Norway in the Middle Ages, outside of the church, there was a pranger, which was used as efficient way to stop crime. What about publishing the names of people who cheat on taxes in the newspaper? What about reputation, deterrent, and cost-effectiveness?

33 Random House Webster’s college dictionary, 1993, p. 635.
34 See www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/evelin/05.php:

Die Sprachkenntnisse sind weit gefächert und schwer zusammenzufassen. Deutsch ist die Sprache,


35 I very much thank David Crystal for his help with the *Oxford English Dictionary*. The following are some of the relevant links:

36 Sibson, 2013: Early interest in English vernacular pastoralia can be found in the work of European scholars such as Paul Meyer (1840–1917), Matthias Konrath (1843–1925), and Johan Vising (1855–1942).


41 Ibid.

42 See, for instance, www.sd-editions.com/AnaServer?HengwrtEx+0+start.anv.


44 *Random House Webster’s college dictionary*, 1993, p. 635. I thank Francisco Gomes de Matos for sharing this information with me.

45 Wright, 1843, Letter VIII, ‘Petition of the monks of Canterbury to the King’, pp. 22–24, http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc2.ark:/13960/t3ws8kr5z;view=1up;seq=5.
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46 See also Robbins, 1959, p. 93, and Kieckhefer, 1976.
47 Wright, 1843, p. 22.
48 Wright, 1843, p. 5.
49 Translated by Lindner.
52 Miller, 1993, endnote 3 of chapter 5.
56 See OED s.v. mortification, 6; mortified, 7; and mortify, 8.
57 Richardson, 1740.
58 Fontan, 2001, p. 7. See also Al-Khayyat, 1990. It is a privilege to have Victoria Fontan as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.
59 Matsumoto, 1988, and Ide, 1989. It is a privilege to have David Matsumoto as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.
60 Ho, 1976.
62 Sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer defines three dimensions in which recognition can be attained, dimensions that follow a similar path of differentiation as that described by Victoria Fontan in Iraq, formulating them, however, in a Western context: the sociostructural dimension of material goods can generate opportunities for positional recognition, the institutional dimension of fairness and justice can offer opportunities for moral recognition, while the personal dimension can provide opportunities for emotional recognition. See, among others, Heitmeyer, et al., 2011.
63 ‘The effects of humiliation on the economic, socio-cultural rights and access to justice of Muslim women in Mindanao’, by Imelda Deinla and Jessica Los Baños, in a contribution to Terrorism and humiliation: Why people choose terrorism, envisioned as a large research project in 2005, prepared by Evelin Lindner and Paul Stokes, invited by Ramesh Thakur, United Nations University (UNU), Tokyo, with nine research teams of young scholars and their academic advisors. Due to lack of finances, this project could not be realised. I would like to thank Lourdes Quisumbing and Patricia Licuanan for their insights at the UNESCO expert meeting ‘Towards a women’s agenda for a culture of peace’, 25th–18th April 1995, invited by Ingeborg Breines and supported by Betty Reardon. See also Lindner, 1999. It is a privilege to have Ingeborg Breines and Lourdes Quisumbing as esteemed members in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship. I also thank Betty Reardon for her untiring support for our dignity work.
65 Alexander Hamilton, whose portrait appears on contemporary ten dollar notes, died in a duel in 1804, and Andrew Jackson, who adorns the 20 dollar bill, was seriously wounded in two duels.
Social psychologist Bert R. Brown carried out experiments which showed that ‘when bargainers have been made to look foolish and weak before a salient audience, they are likely to retaliate against whoever caused their humiliation. Moreover, retaliation will be chosen despite the knowledge that doing so may require the sacrifice of all or large portions of the available outcomes’, Brown, 1968, p. 119.

Lévinas, 1961/1969, Lévinas, 1982, Lévinas, 1985b, Lévinas, 1985a. Emmanuel Lévinas (1906–1955) was a Jewish philosopher from Lithuania, who moved to France and wrote most of his works in French. His work focuses on the ethics of the Other: The Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object, as is posited by traditional metaphysics.


Tell-Truth, 1758, volume I, number 9, p. 147.

Tell-Truth, 1758, volume I, number 9, p. 147.

From what I can gather, on the French side, it was Théodore Chevignard de Chavigny, Comte de Touloungeon, who was Ambassador to Lisbon 1740–1743 and again 1746–1749. On the British side, I am not sure to whom Tell-Truth refers as representatives of Great Britain and the Portuguese Court: it could have been Lord Tyrrawley 1728–1742, Charles Crompton, Chargé d’affaires from 1741, and ambassador 1742–1745, Abraham Castres, Chargé d’affaires in 1745, Sir Benjamin Keene 1745–1749, or again Abraham Castres (1749–1757). On the Portuguese side, it might have been Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, 1st Marquis of Pombal, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and War, 1750–1756. See Shaw, 1998.

Tell-Truth, 1758, volume I, number 9, p. 144.

Tell-Truth, 1758, volume I, number 9, p. 143.

El Bernoussi, 2014. It is a privilege to have Zaynab El Bernoussi as esteemed member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

See also Lindner, 2006b, p. 8, and Dillon, 1995.

Cicero, 44BCE/1913, p. 105.

Pico della Mirandola, 1486/1948.

See the ‘Time line of Anglo-Portuguese relations’, at www.bhsportugal.org/time-line?sort_by=title&sort_order=DESC&page=11:

1762: Portugal seemed about to be invaded by franco-spanish troops in the context of the Seven
Year War. The Alliance was invoked and an expedition of 8000 British troops commanded by General Lord Tyrawley came to Portugal. In practice due to his advanced age command was taken over by his son Charles.

1756: D. Martinho de Melo e Castro was Portuguese envoy in London until 1762 and then again between 1764 and 1769. He was responsible for ordering the Cheere lead statues which are now in the Queluz gardens and the Presidential Palace of Belém.

1755: The Great Earthquake of Lisbon. The House of Commons voted £100,000 as a relief of the disaster. The Bridgitine nun, Catherine Witham writes an interesting account in a letter to her mother. The British Consul in Lisbon was Abraham Castres who survived.


89 Pantham, 2009.

90 Acres of diamonds was a speech delivered by Russell Conwell over 5000 times at various times and places from 1900–1925. See audio and text on www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/rconwellacresofdiamonds.htm. His view of poverty was in many ways in resonance with defenders of the Indian caste system:

Some men say, ‘Don’t you sympathise with the poor people?’ of course I do, or else I would not have been lecturing these years. I wont give in but what I sympathise with the poor, but the number of poor who are to be with is very small. To sympathise with a man whom God has punished for his sins, thus to help him when God would still continue a just punishment, is to do wrong, no doubt about it, and we do that more than we help those who are deserving. While we should sympathise with God’s poor—that is, those who cannot help themselves—let us remember that is not a poor person in the United States who was not made poor by his own shortcomings, or by the shortcomings of some one else. It is all wrong to be poor, anyhow. Let us give in to that argument and pass that to one side.

91 Acres of diamonds was a speech delivered by Russell Conwell over 5000 times at various times and places from 1900–1925. See audio and text on www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/rconwellacresofdiamonds.htm.

92 Norgaard, 2015.

93 Polanyi and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Foreword), 1944/2001. See also Richards, 2013.

94 Polanyi and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Foreword), 1944/2001.


97 Pursglove, 2012. See also Holme, 1976. See also Chong and Druckman, 2007.


99 In 1917, author Basil Joseph Mathews, 1917, began the prologue of his book Three years’ war for peace, as follows, p. vii:
The slogan war for peace was used in 1991 by Svetozar Marović, when he was the vice president of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists in Montenegro, to justify the Montenegrin reservists’ assault on Dubrovnik and Konavle in 1991. Later Marović became the president of Serbia and Montenegro (until June 2006, when Montenegro declared its independence). Historian Nikola Samardžić, in his testimony at the trial of Slobodan Milošević 2002–2005, pointed out that the onslaught on Dubrovnik ‘was an unjust war against Croatia, and a war in which Montenegro disgraced itself by putting itself in the service of the Yugoslav army and Slobodan Milošević’, see Pavlović, 2006. On 10th September 2003, Marović delivered a public apology for ‘all evils done by any citizen of Montenegro and Serbia to anyone in Croatia’. See ‘Marović i Mesić razmenili izvinjenja građanima Hrvatske i SCG’, B92, 9th September 2003, www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=09&dd=10&nav_id=119131.

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101 Lindner, 2017.


103 Snow and Benford, 1988, p. 213. See also Benford and Snow, 2000. See, furthermore, Ryan and Gamson, 2006, p.14:

Like a picture frame, an issue frame marks off some part of the world. Like a building frame, it holds things together. It provides coherence to an array of symbols, images, and arguments, linking

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them through an underlying organising idea that suggests what is essential – what consequences and values are at stake. We do not see the frame directly, but infer its presence by its characteristic expressions and language. Each frame gives the advantage to certain ways of talking and thinking, while it places others ‘out of the picture’.

104 McKinlay and McVittie, 2008.
105 Harris and Morrison, 2013.
106 Suttner, 1889.
107 Howard Richards in a personal communication, 8th March 2018.
109 Moral education for structural change, by Howard Richards, 2018, chapter 4, following Douglas Porpora, 1993, Porpora, 2015. Social structures are consequences of cultural rules that constitute social positions that establish material relationships. See for the concepts of social structure and the related concept of cultural structure also Richards and Andersson, 2018. See also The relational subject by Donati and Archer, 2015.
111 Joseph A. Camilleri, Emeritus Professor of La Trobe University, Melbourne, in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Human rights: Advancing the frontier of emancipation’, 9th March 2018, in response to Sikkink, 2018. See also www.josephcamilleri.org.
113 Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.
120 Polanyi and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Foreword), 1944/2001.
122 Blower, 1782, volume I, p. 81.
123 Minto, 1868, chapter VIII, p. 250:

Early in September Lord Grantham notified to Mr. Elliot his appointment to the Mission at Copenhagen, and on the 29th Hugh wrote to his sister Isabella that he had accepted ‘an offer which, considering the circumstances of the times and my brother’s political line, I think exceedingly handsome on the part of those who made it. I was very humiliatingly treated by the demigod of the blackguards…’

125 Margalit, 2002. It was a privilege for me to meet with Avishai Margalit in his office at the Faculty of Law at Hebrew University of Jerusalem at Mount Scopus on 16th November 2003.
126 Jones, 2006, paper presented at the 3rd Workshop on Humiliation and Violent Conflict, Columbia University, 14th–15th December 2006. Jones writes:

Persons affected by the PVEE syndrome often defend, minimise and/or rationalise the most
outrageous attitudes held and acts carried out by themselves or members of their particular group. When you talk to such people, you will quickly find that the reason that they take such a usually untenable position is because ‘their people’ either are or have been victimised by one or more other groups. This is the golden rule turned on its head: ‘Do bad unto others because they (or someone else) did something bad to you’. It is a deceptively simple and somewhat pervasive point of view...

It is a privilege to have James Edward Jones as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


129 Lukianoff and Haidt, 2018.

130 Claire Fox is the director of the Institute of Ideas and she argues, ‘If today’s students believe that hearing a dissenting opinion can kill them, it’s because we taught them to think like that’. ‘Generation Snowflake: How we train our kids to be censorious cry-babies’, by Claire Fox, The Spectator, 4th June 2016, www.spectator.co.uk/2016/06/generation-snowflake-how-we-train-our-kids-to-be-censorious-cry-babies/. I thank Ole Jacob Madsen for making me aware of Fox’s work.

131 The 2018 book The coddling of the American mind is authored by First Amendment expert Greg Lukianoff and social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. They criticise a culture of ‘safety’ and intolerance of opposing viewpoints that ‘has left many young people anxious and unprepared for adult life, with devastating consequences for them, for their parents, for the companies that will soon hire them, and for a democracy that is already pushed to the brink of violence over its growing political divisions’. Others, however, oppose Lukianoff and Haidt’s position. See, for instance, ‘Coddled students? That’s not the problem’, by David Palumbo-Liu, Huffington Post, 2nd September 2015, www.huffingtonpost.com/david-palumbolius/coddled-students-thats-not-the-problem_b_8080166.html. Palumbo-Liu argues that ‘instead of preparing students for college, and the exciting range of ideas, experiences, and learning opportunities they will face, the ‘college prep’ system has made them utterly incapable of being successful in college in any other than a pre-professional way’. He sees as reason that the students’ ‘very ability to navigate their way into college is predicated on their submission to a process of “college preparation” that for all intents and purposes begins with pre-school’. In this context, ‘their programming is simply toward greater and greater efficiency, competitiveness, and performance quality’. Even the teachers themselves are ‘measured by how quickly and efficiently they move students through the knowledge mill, and score well on the standardised tests’. Palumbo-Liu concludes: ‘If students are supposed to emulate teachers, then the educational system right now has created some horrible kinds of behaviour for students to model themselves after’.

Emotion researcher Lisa Feldman Barrett wrote the article ‘When is speech violence?’ in New York Times, on 14th July 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/opinion/sunday/when-is-speech-violence.html. She argues that ‘certain types of speech can be a form of violence’. Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff had responded with ‘Why it’s a bad idea to tell students words are violence’, in The Atlantic, 18th July 2017, www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/07/why-its-a-bad-idea-to-tell-students-words-are-violence/533970/. In this article, Lukianoff and Haidt refer to Anthony Kapel ‘Van’ Jones saying: ‘I don’t want you to be safe, ideologically. I don’t want you to be safe, emotionally. I want you to be strong. That’s different. I’m not going to pave the jungle for you. Put on some boots, and learn how to deal with adversity. I’m not going to take all the weights out of the gym; that’s the whole point of the gym. This is the gym’. Lukianoff and Haidt continue with a warning: ‘The implication of this expansive use of the word “violence” is that “we” are justified in punching and pepper-spraying “them”, even if all they did was say words. We’re just defending ourselves against their “violence”. But if this way of thinking leads to actual violence, and if that violence triggers counter-violence from the other side (as happened a few weeks later at Berkeley), then where does it end? In the country’s polarised democracy, telling young people that “words are violence” may
in fact lead to a rise in real, physical violence’. Also psychologist Jean Twenge, 2017, has her place here, with her book IGen: Why today’s super-connected kids are growing up less rebellious, more tolerant, less happy – and completely unprepared for adulthood – and what this means for the rest of us. She presents the results of four large national datasets on the mental health of teenagers and college students and baby boomers, followed by Gen-X, and the millennials are all markedly different from iGen, the generation born after roughly 1994, where the rates of anxiety, depression, loneliness, and suicide spike upward. Twenge suggests that social media had a detrimental effect on the nature of iGen’s social interactions.


133 See the work of psychologist Twenge and Campbell, 2009, Twenge, 2014, Twenge, 2017.


These insights resonate with those of psychologist Carol Dweck, 1999, who found that the challenges of life can be approached better with a task-oriented learning-mastery orientation than an ego-oriented performance orientation, or as Linda Hartling would express it, better with a growth mindset than a fixed mindset.


See also ‘Column: This is what happens when you take Ayn Rand seriously’, by Denise Cummins, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 16th February 2016, www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-this-is-what-happens-when-you-take-ayn-rand-seriously/. Cummins presents two case studies that show the disastrous consequences of following Ayn Rand’s philosophy, namely, the company Sears, and the country Honduras. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article. Also psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut has worked on narcissistic injury. See Kohut, 1972, p. 380:

One sees the need for revenge, for righting a wrong, for undoing the hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting compulsion in the pursuit of all these aims which gives no rest to those who have suffered a narcissistic injury – these are features which are characteristic for the phenomenon of narcissistic rage in all its forms and which sets it apart from other kinds of aggression.

I thank David Lotto, 2016, for reminding me of this quote.


136 Minto, 1868, chapter VIII, p. 250.


138 Lakoff and Johnson, 1999. See also Lindner, 2005.

139 Marsella, 1998, p. 1282. See also Marsella, 2012. It is a privilege to have Anthony Marsella as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

140 Marsella, 2013.
141 Lindner, 2007b.
142 For the ‘Lazy School’ and ‘Lazy University’ concept of Karen elder Joni Odochaw and his village in Northern Thailand, see www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/videos.php#lazyschool.
144 MacDonald, 1867, chapter XIII ‘Young weir’, pp. 273–274.
146 Brinkmann, 2017.
150 Brinkmann, 2017.
155 Madsen, 2014a, p. 610.
156 Valsiner, 2012.
158 Valsiner, 2015, p. 9.
159 Valsiner, 2015, p. 10.
160 Valsiner, 2015, p. 10. Italics in original.
161 Making enemies: Humiliation and international conflict is my first book on dignity and humiliation and how we may envision a more dignified world, and it has been characterised as a path-breaking book and been honoured as ‘Outstanding Academic Title’ for 2007 in the USA by the journal Choice. Choice is a publication of the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL), a division of the American Library Association. See Lindner, 2006a. It came out in 2006 in Praeger, with a Foreword by the father of the field of conflict resolution, Morton Deutsch. The book discusses dignity and humiliation and how we may envision a more dignified world. It first lays out a theory of the mental and social dynamics humiliation and proposes the need for ’egalisation’ (the undoing of humiliation) for a healthy global society. It then presents chapters on the role of misunderstandings in fostering feelings of humiliation; the role of humiliation in international conflict; and the relationship of humiliation to terrorism and torture. It concludes with a discussion of how to defuse feelings of humiliation and create a dignified world. For more details, see www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/evelin/book/01.php.
162 I resonate with Georg Lohmann, 2014b, and his position that, in contrast to theories, which show meaning in a logical way, images and metaphors can make meaning palpable in an interpretative way, for instance, the meaning of the notion of a ‘good life’. See the original in German in Lohmann, 2014b, p. 11:

Auch hier muss und darf die radikale Endlichkeit nicht der Versuchung erliegen, eine absolute Konzeption des Guten Lebens zu suchen oder gar anbieten zu wollen. Sie kann stattdessen nur so etwas wie ein, man könnte sagen, ‘relativ Absolutes’ gewinnen und anbieten. Die frustrierenden und ambivalenten Erfahrungen des Unverfügbaren bewältigen wir durch eine mehr oder weniger
angemessene, argumentative Verständigung darf... able... bleiben... Hier durch... Verständigung... durch eine Interpretation... (von unterschiedlichen Elementen)... Außerdem... geschieht... durch... intuitive Lauf... die... Menschenbild... Leben... haut... mir... entspricht... unserer... „Dumm... Unendlichkeit“... die passende Philosophie der Endlichkeit.

Like Amitai Etzioni, I am not a legal scholar. I focus on the generalist perspective that I have developed throughout the course of my life-time. Etzioni, 2013, p. 334:

The discussion focuses on the normative part of the dynamic. That is, although I fully recognise that we must move on both ‘legs’ to proceed, currently the prevailing normative paradigms are particularly lagging behind the new international reality and hence warrant special attention. Also, I focus on the normative rather than the legal because I have no legal training and approach the subject of terrorism as a sociologist, social philosopher, and one who knows of combat first hand. Hence, that the expected review of the legal literature is not provided should not be viewed as a lack of respect for the work of legal scholars on these issues, but as an acknowledgment of my limitations.

163 I very much resonate with indigenous psychologist Louise Sundararajan when she uses the image of painting. She suggests that emotions have to be described with a ‘gentle paint brush, rather than to nail discreet emotions down, if there is such a thing, with codified labels and categorisations’, Sundararajan, 2015, p. 75. Sundararajan speaks about Chinese emotions in this quote, however, I would suggest that this approach is recommendable for social sciences in general.

I also appreciate the description of critical and post-structural inquiry given in ‘Thinking critically about critical thinking: whose thinking, whose benefits?’ by Hank Stam, professor of psychology at University of Calgary, for the Day in Qualitative Psychology, the opening meeting of the Special Interest Group (SIG) in Critical and Poststructural Psychology at the International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry (CCQI), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Wednesday, 17th May 2017, http://icqi.org/pre-congress-days/a-day-in-qualitative-psychology/:

We see poststructural inquiries as moving away from attempts to provide realistic, universal, and fixed representations and from referents and answers that are not situated in historical, political, and cultural positions. In underscoring the close link between knowledge and power, and the (im)possibilities of representation, poststructural forms of inquiry explore, participate in, and deconstruct experiences and meanings as part of discursive frames, linguistic practices, and relational realities. Knowledges become non-linear, fluid, and liminal between fields and disciplines, and outside of them. Rather than finding finite answers, inquiries open up possibilities, questions, and multiplicity, with an eye toward issues and constructions of social justice, inequality, and emancipation.

Aware of the political and agentic situatedness of every form of inquiry, critical researchers seek to achieve equality and/or foster resistance, usually through collaborative and mutual approaches to an identified social issue and the knowledge/practice that may be developed or performed for its amelioration. Research is transformed into a diffractive and political practice that contributes to the empowerment of participants and to their resistance against institutionalised and hierarchical knowledge.

See also the description of the purpose and history of the Coalition for Critical Qualitative Inquiry Special Interest Group, http://icqi.org/pre-congress-days/critical-qualitative-inquiry/:

For some time, researchers engaging in critical qualitative scholarship have called for the construction of a critical social science that challenges disciplinary boundaries and rethink...
threat to qualitative research of all types, and most importantly, to a construction of higher education that would facilitate diverse ways of being and challenge social and environmental injustice and oppression in any form. From within this neoliberal condition, critical work is of utmost importance. Additionally, as critical perspectives have brought to the forefront the anthropocentrism that dominates research, those concerned with the ‘more-than-human’ hope to challenge all forms of injustice. The main purpose of the Critical Qualitative Inquiry SIG within ICQI is to construct a Coalition of individuals from a range of fields who systematically work together to:

- Expand visibility for existing critical work, as well as newly emerging, post-human inquiry (e.g. feminisms, subaltern studies, queer theory, critical pedagogy, counter colonial critique, new materialisms, post-anthropocentric inquiry);
- Increase and maintain critical qualitative inquiry as an avenue for equity and social justice across, outside, and challenges to, disciplines;
- Construct new diverse forms of critical qualitative inquiry, related forms of activism, and innovative methods for sharing that work; and
- Systematically support critical qualitative scholars in the changing climate that is higher education, especially under contemporary neoliberal conditions that include the privileging of academic conservatism.

164 Mead, 1934.

165 Relational-cultural theory and cultural-historical activity theory fit here. Relational-cultural theory (CRP) evolved from the work of Jean Baker Miller, 1976/1986a, M.D., pioneer in women’s psychology. It assumes that humans have a natural drive toward relationships and it applies a growth-in-connection model of human growth and development to organisational settings. See for a recent overview, among others, Jordan, 2010. Linda Hartling is the former Associate Director of the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute, and it is a privilege to have her now as the director of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies. Linda builds on relational-cultural theory, as developed by her mentor Jean Baker Miller and colleagues, see, among others, Hartling, et al., 2008. It was a privilege to have Jean Baker Miller as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship until her passing in 2006, and we will always honour her spirit.

166 Cultural-historical activity theory builds on the work of Lev Vygotsky, 1978, and Aleksei Leontiev, 1975/1978. Its philosophical premise is that human physical and mental activity is integrally connected to large-scale cultural and historical processes and vice versa. It studies the culturally and historically situated, materially, and socially mediated process by which humans purposefully transform natural and social reality, including themselves. Community is seen to be central to all forms of learning, communicating, and acting, which means that community is central to the process of learning-by-doing, of making tools of all kinds, of communicating, and of making meaning and acting. The term cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) was coined by Michael Cole and used by Yrjö Engeström for the various lines of work that had been inspired by Vygotsky’s work. See for recent publications, for instance, Kaptelinin and Nardi, 2006, Roth, et al., 2012.

See also Richards and Andersson, 2015. I am indebted to Howard Richards and Gavin Andersson for bringing me to South Africa in 2013, and to the Organization Workshop (OW), a CHAT-based organisational learning method developed by Gavin Andersson, et al., 2016, as summarised in this Abstract:

Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), is a theoretical framework which traces its roots to activity theory approaches first developed in Russian Psychology (by Vygotsky and Leontiev, in particular). The Organization Workshop (OW) is a CHAT-based organisational learning method with its roots, unusually, in the global South. Among the many scholarly applications of CHAT-related approaches of the last two decades, the OW stands out – together with the Finnish Change Laboratory (CL) and the French Clinique de l’Activité/Activity Clinic (AC) – as a field praxis-oriented laboratory method specifically geared to the world of work. OW is a large-group capacitation method. Organisation is not taught. Participants achieve organisation. It was initiated in the 1960s by the Brazilian lawyer, sociologist, and political activist Clodomir Santos de Morais, who discovered, in his own experience, that a large group facing common challenges, given

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freedom of organisation, access to a common resource pool and appropriate support from facilitators, could learn to organise itself. From Brazil, the ‘laboratorios organizacionales’ spread out in the seventies to most of Latin America where they were applied at times on a national scale. The method was transferred in the eighties to English-speaking southern Africa where most of the theoretical work exploring its CHAT roots originated. Recently this eminently southern CHAT-based laboratory method has started to find applications in the North.

It is a privilege to have also Gavin Andersson as esteemed members in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, together with Howard Richards.

Donati and Archer, 2015, go far beyond the ‘plural subject’ of analytical philosophers and speak of the ‘relational subject’. They treat ‘the relation’ between people as real and regard relational ‘goods’ and ‘evils’ as having causal effects upon agents and their subsequent actions. See the book description:

Many social theorists now call themselves ‘relational sociologists’, but mean entirely different things by it. The majority endorse a ‘flat ontology’, dealing exclusively with dyadic relations. Consequently, they cannot explain the context in which relationships occur or their consequences, except as resultants of endless ‘transactions.’ This book adopts a different approach which regards ‘the relation’ itself as an emergent property, with internal causal effects upon its participants and external ones on others. The authors argue that most ‘relationists’ seem unaware that analytical philosophers, such as Searle, Gilbert and Tuomela, have spent years trying to conceptualise the ‘We’ as dependent upon shared intentionality. Donati and Archer change the focus away from ‘We thinking’ and argue that ‘We-ness’ derives from subjects’ reflexive orientations towards the emergent relational ‘goods’ and ‘evils’ they themselves generate. Their approach could be called ‘relational realism’, though they suggest that realists, too, have failed to explore the ‘relational subject.’

See also Jervis, 2006.

Valsiner, 2015, p. 12.


Kamran Mofid in a personal communication, 7th June 2018. Kamran Mofid is the founder of Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative (GCGI). It is a privilege to have Kamran Mofid as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


Gadamer, 1960/1989. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) grew up in Breslau and studied classics and philosophy in the University of Breslau, where also my mother was born in 1930. I thank Hroar Klempe for reminding me of Gadamer’s work in April 2016. It is a privilege to have Hroar Klempe as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Charles Eisenstein, 2014, asks, ‘why is it assumed without much debate that no one can have direct access to the subjective experience of another person (or non-person)? This is obvious only if we conceive and experience ourselves as fundamentally separate from each other. There are other stories of self, however. We could see ourselves, as many spiritual traditions do, not as separate beings but as ‘interbeings’, not just interdependent but interexistent’. It was a privilege to have Charles Eisenstein with us in our 2012 Workshop on Transforming Humiliation and Violent Conflict at Columbia University in New York City.

Laszlo, 2014:

By expanding our systemic consciousness and drawing on our relational intelligence skills,
we will be able to form what physicists term ‘coherence domains’ – patches of networked holons that are in phase with each other. This alignment or ‘meeting of the minds’ (not to mention of the hearts and spirit) is what creates the conditions for hyperconnectivity and gives rise to the systemic nurturance spaces so necessary as contextual complements to active engagement with of systemic leverage points we will identify.

I thank Dino Karabeg for introducing us to Alexander Laszlo and thank him also for accepting to become a member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

177 The notion of living translation is a methodological and theoretical framework originally developed by Pritzker, 2014, to understand the translation of Chinese medicine into practice in the United States. It means that ideologies of language, emotion, and personhood mediate embodied interactions, within which the meaning and implications of specific semiotic and linguistic registers are made and remade.

178 I thank philosopher Dagfinn Kåre Føllesdal for his support in formulating initial questions in 1996. I had the privilege of participating in his Ethics Programme at the Norwegian Research Council 1995–1996. Dagfinn Føllesdal’s publications span many decades. See, among others, Føllesdal, 1988, Føllesdal and Depaul, 2015. I was immensely touched by his personal support to my work, by his ethics seminars, and by his lectures. See, among others, How can we use arguments in ethics? his lecture at the Norwegian Academy of Science, Oslo, Norway, 30th January 1996.

Dagfinn Føllesdal shared the following reflections with me in 1996:

In humiliation: the most important aspect is that it is a subjective notion, a subjective experience, less an objective notion. Although, of course, in some cases also an outsider can say: this is a humiliation. The subjective perspective is important. Therefore Husserl is helpful with respect to culture difference: How is humiliation experienced subjectively? People of different cultures will not be aware that they humiliate, and even if they do, they will not understand. People from the same culture would just abstain from doing something which humiliates. What is experienced as humiliating? For example in a peace treaties, one has to be careful not to humiliate somebody who is falling. There is a spectrum of possible reactions, depending on the experience of justice: for instance, if it means an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. What is the role of anger? Sometimes anger is not caused by humiliation. Incidents need to be mapped out in rich descriptive studies to show what it was that caused feelings of humiliation. What is the role of ethics? Could there ever be justified humiliation? In Norway in the Middle Ages, outside of the church, there was a pranger, which was used as efficient way to stop crime. What about publishing the names of people who cheat on taxes in the newspaper? What about reputation, deterrent, and cost-effectiveness?

179 Matsumoto, et al., 2007, p. 92: With Emotion Regulation (ER), ‘people voyage through life; without it, they vindicate their lives’. It is a privilege to have David Matsumoto as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

180 O’Neill, 2007, 2009. Maggie O’Neill’s particular research focus is on prostitution, women’s experiences, routes into prostitution, affected communities, and forced migration. It is a privilege to have Maggie O’Neill as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

181 Adams, et al., 2015.

182 See Lindner, 2007c, or Lindner, 2012a. See also Jackson, 1999.


184 Tomkins, 1962.


186 Donald L. Nathanson in a personal communication, 1st October 1999.


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188 Silver, et al., 1986.


190 My book titled *Making enemies: Humiliation and international conflict* came out in 2006 in Praeger with the term humiliation hesitantly accepted in the title, while other publishers had not wished this term to be part of the title of a book. The only book that had been published before, at least to my awareness, with the phrase humiliation in the title, was William Ian Miller, 1993, and his book *Humiliation: And other essays on honor, social discomfort, and violence*. My book was subsequently honoured as ‘Outstanding Academic Title’ by the journal *Choice* for 2007 in the USA.


192 Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 29th August 2016.


> The relatively tame Danish political cartoons that ran in 2005 unleashed a torrent of protests among Political Islamists on three continents, threats of mass murder, and actual violence and killings.
>
> What does this reaction have to do with any reasonable sense of humiliation?
>

> Now that’s a great expression – ‘reasonable sense of humiliation’. Any discussion of ‘humiliation’ should include what’s ‘reasonable’. For example, any discussion of ‘humiliation’ at checkpoints needs to address the reason for the checkpoints, the incredible shame to Islam that these checkpoints exist because of a death-cult that sends over women and children as suicide terrorists, and the fact that – viewed reasonably – Israeli checkpoints are a mild response to an outrageous provocation. Only the ability of demopaths to argue against the ‘Apartheid Wall’ renders the ‘humiliation’ of checkpoints the cause, not the consequence of the problem.
>
> See also Lindner, 2006a, on Somali warlord Osman Ato p. 85, italics in the original:

> A warlord may indeed cover up power lust by using humiliation rhetoric. Ato may or may not be using humiliation to shield ulterior motives. The situation could be mixed – perhaps he sometimes feels genuinely humiliated and sometimes merely uses the humiliation argument to his political advantage. We do not know. What we know, and what a researcher has to report, is that he uses the humiliation argument, genuinely or not. An impartial researcher must recount this, nothing more and nothing less. A researcher cannot discount a person’s claims to feeling humiliated.

194 Lindner, 2017.


196 Hartling and Lindner, 2016b.


198 See this conceptualisation in Lindner, 2000c.

199 Pless, et al., 2017. I thank Heidetraut von Weltzien Høivik for making me aware of this article. It is a privilege to have Heidetraut von Weltzien Høivik as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

200 Margalit, 2002.

Persons affected by the PVEE syndrome often defend, minimise and/or rationalise the most outrageous attitudes held and acts carried out by themselves or members of their particular group. When you talk to such people, you will quickly find that the reason that they take such a usually untenable position is because ‘their people’ either are or have been victimised by one or more other groups. This is the golden rule turned on its head: ‘Do bad unto others because they (or someone else) did something bad to you’. It is a deceptively simple and somewhat pervasive point of view...

It is a privilege to have James Edward Jones as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


204 Leidner, et al., 2012.


206 Otten and Jonas, 2013, p. 33.

207 See for research on inertia, for instance, Leidner, et al., 2012. According to anthropologist Scott Atran, humiliation is a negative predictor for terrorism, since those who feel humiliated become submissive. However, it is different to act on behalf of others’ exposure to humiliation, such as the second or third generation of Muslims in Britain who believe that their parents were humiliated. See, among others, Ginges and Atran, 2008. See for an illustration, ‘Wave of indigenous suicides leaves Canadian town appealing for help’, by Liam Stack, New York Times, 18th March 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/americas/canada-youth-suicide.html. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.

208 Galtung, 1969.


‘Canada’s indigenous populations demonstrate the deleterious effect of continuous humiliation: they are driven into waves of suicide as an outflow of ‘cumulative humiliation’, of a lingering trauma of colonialism and prejudice, of ‘cultural genocide’.


De Morais, in contradiction to Freire, sets forward not two but three levels of awareness. He adds to Freire’s two, which are: the naïve level and the critical level. The third is the organisational level of awareness. At the naïve level a person is aware of problems but is unable to understand their cause (and so may blame God or the Fates). The critically conscious person is able to identify the factors responsible for problems, and their inter-relationship. Organisational awareness is reached when the person has the ability to act together with others to address a problem or attain particular results. Organisational awareness manifests what de Morais calls a ‘methodological rationality’.

212 Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 29th August 2016.

213 Margalit, 1996.

214 Quinton, 1997, p. 87.

215 Clark McCauley, in the 2006 Workshop on Transforming Humiliation and Violent Conflict at
Columbia University in New York City, 14–15th December 2006, www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/annualmeeting/08.php. It is a privilege to have Clark McCauley as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

216 Hartling, 1995.


218 Hartling, 1995, p. 17.

219 See also Lindner, 2000c.


221 Lindner, 2000a.


224 Miller, 1993.

225 See The Journal of Primary Prevention, 12, 2, December 1991, The humiliation dynamic: viewing the task of prevention from a new perspective, part I:

- Donald C. Klein, 1991b, ‘The humiliation dynamic: An overview’: This paper describes what people experience and how they react when they feel humiliated. It discusses ways in which our society is humiliation-prone and emphasises the ubiquitous nature of the humiliation dynamic in every-day life.
- Carolyn F. Swift, 1991, ‘Some issues in inter-gender humiliation’: This paper discusses the part humiliation plays in the lives of women and men. Further, it addresses the elimination of power inequities that contribute to inter-gender humiliations.
- Jean T. Griffin, 1991, ‘Racism and humiliation in the African-American community’: This paper examines the relationship between the humiliation dynamic and individual, institutional, and cultural racism. It concludes with suggestions for reducing humiliations based on racism.
- Hal Kirshbaum, 1991, ‘Disability and humiliation’: This paper describes how disabled people have coped with humiliations imposed by able-bodied people.

226 See The Journal of Primary Prevention, 12, 3, Spring 1992, The humiliation dynamic: viewing the task of prevention from a new perspective, part II:

- Thomas Gullotta, ‘Editor’s note’.
- Donald C. Klein, 1992b, ‘Introduction to the issue ‘The humiliation dynamic: Viewing the task of prevention from a new perspective, part II’.
- Lori M. Secouler, 1992, ‘Our elders: At high risk for humiliation’: This paper focuses on our views of the aging process and the prejudicial way in which elderly people are treated. Recommendations for change are discussed.
- J. Steven Smith, 1992, ‘Humiliation, degradation and the criminal justice system’: This paper takes a macro-systemic look at how humiliation pervades the criminal justice system.
- Patrick J. Barrett and Brooks, 1992a, ‘Transcending humiliation: An ancient perspective’: Drawing upon Ayurvedic teachings, this paper raises the possibility of transcending the humiliation dynamic through higher states of consciousness.
- Leonard Duhl, 1992: ‘Superfluous people in tomorrow’s society’: This paper looks to a future in which society makes creative use of ‘superfluous’ people.
- Donald C. Klein, 1992a, ‘Managing humiliation’: This paper reviews findings concerning ways
that people have found to minimise or avoid humiliation. It concludes with a discussion of addressing the task of creating humiliation-free institutions.


- Harry Frankfurt, 1997, ‘Equality and respect’: An article about the alleged moral value of equality. Topics: Rejection of the presumption that egalitarianism is an ideal of any intrinsic moral importance; morality of the equal distribution of valuable resources according to philosophers; ideals of an egalitarian; modes of equality; difference between equality and respect.


- Steven Lukes, 1997, ‘Humiliation and the politics of identity’: An article about the moral and political aspects of humiliation. Topics: Types of maltreatment; classifications of humiliation; questions related to the interpretations and arguments on the concept of humiliation; definition and kinds of discrimination; discussion of the concepts of humiliation and decency.

- Philip Pettit, 1997b, ‘Freedom with honor: A republican ideal’: An article about freedom with honour as a Republican ideal. Topics: Definition of a decent society; importance of honour to human beings; elaboration of the orthodox understanding of the concept of freedom; ways in which Republicans construe freedom; reason behind the wide consensus on the understanding of liberty.

- Anthony Quinton, 1997: ‘Humilation’: An article about the concept of humiliation. Topics: Correlation between humiliation and self-respect; instances of humiliation; discussion of the public element in humiliating situations; kinds of ground for respect; clarification for the definition of a decent society.

- Arthur Ripstein, 1997, ‘Responses to humiliation’: An article about the concepts of humiliation and a decent society. Topics: Ways in which institutions humiliate people; structures of group discrimination; categories of humiliation requiring institutional response; link between crime and humiliation.

- Amelie O. Rorty, 1997, ‘From decency to civility by way of economics: “First let’s eat and then talk of right and wrong”’: An article about social decency, civility and justice and their effects on social and economic relations. Topics: Relation between humiliation and bureaucratic regulations and social problems; discussion of the conceptual and theoretical resources of a decent society; analysis of the basic principles of justice; multiplication of social divisions, right and wrong.

- Frederic Schick, 1997: ‘On humiliation’: An article about the concept of humiliation. Topics: Comment on the definition of humiliation in the book The decent society; concept of humiliation in terms of rejection; analysis of the historian’s view of humiliation; role of an institution in the humiliation of an individual; contrast in the demands of decency and justice; theories of justice.

- Avishai Margalit, 1997: ‘Decent equality and freedom: A postscript’: An article about the relation between a non-humiliating society and the values of equality and freedom. Topics: Extent to which the decent society must be egalitarian; relation between the decent and the just society; questions that must be addressed concerning the issue of equality; complexities of the caste society in India; religious categories involved in the administration of holiness.


230 Papers, texts, and comments prepared for Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies and its

231 ‘Humiliation and history in global perspectives’, a special issue of Social Alternatives, 25, 1, first quarter, 2006, invited by Ralph Summy,


237 See, for example, Averill, 2001. See also Feierabend, et al., 1972.

238 Dan Olweus, 1993, is a pioneer in research on bullying. See also www.violencepreventionworks.org.

239 See, among others, Smith, et al., 2006.

2014. It is a privilege to have Dov Cohen, Suzanne Retzinger, Thomas Scheff, together with Aaron Lazare and Wyatt-Brown, whose memory we honour, as esteemed members in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Deutsch, 2004, 2006. The Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship is honoured to have Morton Deutsch (who sadly passed away in 2017) and Peter Coleman, together with Claudia Cohen, Beth Fisher-Yoshida, Andrea Bartoli, and many other of their colleagues, as esteemed members of the first hour in our global advisory board. See also Coleman, et al., 2009, Goldman and Coleman, 2005b, a.


Fuller and Gerloff, 2008. In a human rights context that stipulates that all human beings ought to be treated as equal in dignity and rights, hurtful psychological dynamics of humiliation are set in motion when rankism is practiced, when, for instance, ‘women’ are regarded as a lowly category, or ‘children’, ‘the elderly’, ‘foreigners’, and so forth. It is a privilege to have Robert Fuller as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Eisler, 1987. Her most recent book is Eisler, 2007. Eisler describes how, from the samurai of Japan to the Aztecs of Meso-America, people lived in very similar hierarchies of domination and under a rigidly male-dominant ‘strong-man’ rule, both in the family and state. Hierarchies of domination were maintained by a high degree of institutionalised and socially accepted violence, ranging from wife- and child-beating within the family to aggressive warfare at the larger tribal or national level. It is a privilege to have Riane Eisler as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

John Wear Burton (1915–2010) was an Australian public servant, High Commissioner, and an academic international affairs expert who developed a similar system – he spoke of a power-and-war paradigm versus a dialogue paradigm. Only the latter paradigm opens space for conflict to be an opportunity for growth and trust-building between partners rather than opponents. See Burton, 1969, 1972, 1990b, a, 1996, 1997, Karin Utas Carlsson, 1999, pp. 104–109. Philosopher Karl Popper, 1945, spoke of irrational tribal emotions to describe the adoration of strong men and hatred of people with a different ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or political ideology. See also, for instance, Kautsky, 1982, as recommended by historian Richard Landes, who offers a list of elements that characterise what he calls a prime-divider polity in contrast to a civil polity. See ‘Civil polity vs. prime-divider polity’, by Richard Landes, The Augean Stables, 26th July 2006, www.theaugeanstables.com/ reflections-from-second-draft/civil-society-vs-prime-divider-society/. A prime-divider polity would contain the following main features:

- legal privilege for the elites (including exemption from taxation, lighter sentences for their misdeeds and heavier penalties for offenses against them),
- self-help justice in which clans defend their members regardless of legal issues like intent (blood revenge, vendetta, feud, duel),
- mystery surrounding political authority (e.g., monarchy above the law),
- commoner populations illiterate, controlled by intimidation (Machiavelli’s: a ruler should be feared not loved)
- manual labour stigmatised, vast majority (masses) excluded from public sphere except on choreographed occasions,
- elites with a monopoly on literacy, weaponry, rapid transportation, and political power.

Civil polity would entail the following interlocking elements:

- same rules for all (equality before the law, what the ancient Greeks called isonomia, independent law courts that determine fair judgments and pre-empt private (self-help) justice, public transparency and accountability of people in power (free press, freedom of speech),
- commoner populations empowered by education to assert and protect their own legislated rights,
- commitment to voluntarism as a principle form of social interaction and political organisation,

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...emphasising, mutual trust, contractual obligations, and moral autonomy,

- manual labour is not stigmatised, and manual labourers and their children can participate in public discourse and if sufficiently successful, enter the elite.


Feldman believed authoritarianism could be an important factor in American politics in ways that had nothing to do with fascism, but that it could only reliably be measured by unlinking it from specific political preferences. For Feldman, authoritarianism was a personality profile rather than a political preference, and in his questionnaires he therefore asks about parenting goals. He developed the definitive measurement of authoritarianism by asking four simple questions that appear to focus on parenting but are in fact designed to reveal how highly the respondent values hierarchy, order, and conformity over other values. This were his questions: Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have:

- independence or respect for elders?
- obedience or self-reliance?
- to be considerate or to be well-behaved?
- curiosity or good manners?


249 O’Mara, 2015.

250 United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014.


Nearly a half-century later, a pair of military psychologists became convinced that the theory provided a basis for brutal interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, that were supposed to eliminate detainees’ ‘sense of control and predictability’ and induce ‘a desired level of helplessness’, the Senate report said.

See also Seligman, 1974, or Hoffman, et al., 2015.

252 The psychologists had previously been Air Force trainers in a programme called SERE (Survival Evasion Resistance Escape), which subjected military members to mock interrogations mimicking those ‘used against American servicemen during the Korean war to produce false confessions’. See ‘The psychologists who taught the C.I.A. how to torture (and charged $180 million)’, by Katherine Eban, Vanity Fair, 10th December 2014, www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2014/12/psychologists-cia-torture-report.


In the ‘Salt Pit’, a then-secret CIA prison in Afghanistan, John ‘Bruce’ Jessen watched carefully in late 2002 as five agency officers rushed into a darkened cell and grabbed an Afghan detainee named Gul Rahman. ‘It was thoroughly planned and rehearsed’, Jessen later explained, according to a CIA investigator’s report. ‘They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape’, before beating him and forcing him to run wearing a hood. When he fell, they dragged him down dirt passageways, leaving abrasions up and down his body. Jessen added a critique. ‘After something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to give [him] something to think about’, he told the investigator. On Nov. 20, 2002, Rahman was found dead in...
his unheated cell. He was naked from the waist down and had been chained to a concrete floor. An autopsy concluded that he probably froze to death... On April 15, 2002, they [Jessen and Mitchell] were at a secret CIA prison in Thailand supervising an interrogation of the CIA’s first Al-Qaeda prisoner, Abu Zubaydah, who had been captured in Pakistan. The early interrogation was relatively benign. Zubaydah, who was recovering from gunshot wounds, was put in an all-white room with bright lights. Guards wore all black uniforms, including gloves, ski masks and goggles, and communicated only by hand signals. Loud rock music was played to ‘enhance his sense of hopelessness’.


Far from being shamed or humiliated by the detailed exposure of their criminality, those most implicated in the establishment and operation of the torture chambers have brazenly defended their conduct…. From former Vice President Dick Cheney to ex-CIA directors George Tenet, Michael Hayden and Porter Goss, to the operational head of the interrogation programme, Jose Rodriguez, they have displayed a well-justified confidence that the Obama administration will protect them from any consequences.


258 Ibid.

259 Ahmed, personal communication, 2004. I heard accounts similar to that of Ahmed in many variations many times also from other people. They all tell me that living in perpetual despair forces one into experiences one would have thought to be impossible before.

260 I had several conversations with members of security police in different countries. Trond Hugubakken is communications director at Politiets sikkerhetsstjeneste, PST (the Norwegian Police Security Service is the police security agency of Norway, comparable to the British MI5 Security Service), and Josefine Aase was a senior advisor, when our conversation took place in the Oslo headquarters on 4th February 2011.


263 Lindner, 2009a.


265 Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 22nd July 2007.

266 Lindner, 2009b, p. 84.


I thank Sarmad Ali for reminding me of the potential offensiveness of such categorisations in April 2018. For relevant research, see, for instance, the work of social psychologist Peter B. Smith, et al., 2017, and their article, ‘Culture as perceived context: An exploration of the distinction between dignity, face and honour cultures’.

In the introduction to their article, Smith et al. explain that ‘the identification of cultural dimensions that was initiated by Hofstede, 1980, has provided a substantial basis for interpreting nation-level differences in a broad range of social behaviours’, however, that ‘the mechanism whereby nation-level context could influence individual level behaviours has come under increasing scrutiny’. Smith, et al., 2017, p. 2569:

The measures of values, beliefs and norms that are typically used to define and construct nation-level dimensions are found to show much greater variability within nations than between nations (Fischer and Schwartz, 2011). This renders less plausible the assumption that individual behaviours within a nation are guided by an implicit or explicit awareness of the values, beliefs and norms that are most typically endorsed within their nation.

Campbell and Manning, 2014.


While writing these lines, I see the documentary film Ungleichland – Wie aus Reichtum Macht wird, Das Erste, 7th May 2018, www.daserste.de/information/reportage-dokumentation/dokus/sendung/ungleichland-wie-aus-reichtum-macht-wird-folge-2-100.html. Das Erste (The First), is a television channel that is coordinated by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ARD, a consortium of public broadcasters in Germany, a joint organisation of Germany’s regional public-service broadcasters. In this documentary, economist Joseph Stiglitz, 2012, calls for a new social contract, and Thomas Piketty, 2013/2014, explains how the post-WWII period did not represent a long-term upward trend toward more equality, but rather an exception from a larger trend toward rising inequality. Sociologist Brooke Harrington, 2016, has studied how the ‘one per cent’ continues getting richer despite financial crises and taxes, and she laments that the legitimate anger about this situation among the electorate is now being channelled toward scapegoats who have nothing to do with it – for instance, toward migrants, refugees, or minorities. Economist Branko Milanović, 2016, studies global inequality, and Markus Goebel and Grabka, 2011, have looked at rising inequality in Germany. Economist Raj Chetty laments the ‘fading American Dream’, and that children can no longer expect to earn more than their parents through hard work and education.

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parents (www.equality-of-opportunity.org). Political theorist Yascha Mounk, 2017, has looked into ‘luck, choice, and the welfare state’, while Marcel Helbig, a researcher on education and social inequality in Germany, reports on a rise of 30 per cent in private schools. Sociologist Jutta Allmendinger, et al., 2010, another education expert, recommends the European social model of unity in diversity as an alternative to the American form of market capitalism and its promotion of economic growth without regard for solidarity and social progress. Sociologist Michael Hartmann, 2007, has researched the sociology of elites, and psychologist Paul Piff, et al., 2012, found that higher social class predicts increased unethical behaviour.

279 Peter B. Smith, et al., 2017, based their research on, among others, Nisbett, et al., 2001, who suggested that members of individualistic cultures more frequently think analytically and therefore can be expected to be able to differentiate between all three – dignity, face, and honour values. Therefore Smith et al. formulated as their first hypothesis that ‘those who perceive their nation to be based on dignity values will perceive it not to be characterised by reliance on either face values or honour values’, Smith, et al., 2017, p. 2570. In contrast, ‘members of the face cultures of East Asia more frequently think holistically’ (ibid.), giving preference to the preservation of harmony and face, and they will therefore welcome dignity values of equality as basis for interpersonal harmony, while rejecting honour values of assertion and defense against threat. Smith’s second hypothesis was that respondents from face cultures will see dignity and face values as opposed to honour values. Those who perceive their nation to be based on face values will also perceive reliance on dignity values as contributing to face. Their third hypothesis dealt with honour culture, where reliance on face and dignity values would be rejected as ineffective to uphold honour. Smith et al. found their first hypothesis confirmed by respondents in UK and Finland, the second hypothesis appeared to be confirmed in China and Malaysia, while the third hypothesis was confirmed by respondents from Lebanon, Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico, who perceived honour values as contrary to dignity and face values.

280 Nisbett and Cohen, 1996.

281 Kim, et al., 2010, Abstract. See also Aslani, et al., 2013. It is a privilege to have Dov Cohen as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

282 Campbell and Manning, 2014.

283 Minkov, 2011.

284 Matsumoto, et al., 2007, p. 92: With Emotion Regulation (ER), ‘people voyage through life; without it, they vindicate their lives’. It is a privilege to have David Matsumoto as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


286 Ray and Anderson, 2000. I thank Steve Halls for giving me Ray and Anderson’s book in Osaka, Japan, in 2004, when he was leaving his post as director of International Environmental Technology Centre (IETC) in Osaka and cleared his desk.

287 Sociologist and philosopher Theodor Adorno is known for having shed light on authoritarianism. Three core components were originally listed by Adorno, et al., 1950, p. 148:

• authoritarian submission (submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealised moral authorities of the in-group),
• authoritarian aggression (a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by the established authorities),
• conventionalism (adherence to conventional, middle-class values).

See also Altemeyer, 1981, 1996, 2003, 2009, and the archive of Altemeyer’s original Global Change Game Website, http://web.archive.org/web/20020805124207/www.mts.net/~gcg/index.html. See Stenner, 2005, for more recent work on authoritarianism, and how it can be latent until it is activated by a perception of threat (social threat theory), read also Hetherington and Weiler, 2009, on authoritarian views being expressed under threat. See Suhay, 2015, for the insight that an increase in
threat may trigger political behaviour, and that physical threats such as terrorism may even lead non-authoritarians to behave like authoritarians, while more abstract social threats, such as the erosion of social norms or demographic changes, do not have that effect. See for a readable summary, ‘The rise of American authoritarianism’, by Amanda Taub, Vox, 1st March 2016, www.vox.com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism#change, where Jonathan Haidt speaks of a button being pushed that says: ‘In case of moral threat, lock down the borders, kick out those who are different, and punish those who are morally deviant’. The article goes on to describe the five policies that authoritarians generally and Donald Trump voters specifically were likely to support:

- using military force over diplomacy against countries that threaten the United States,
- changing the Constitution to bar citizenship for children of illegal immigrants,
- imposing extra airport checks on passengers who appear to be of Middle Eastern descent in order to curb terrorism,
- requiring all citizens to carry a national ID card at all times to show to a police officer on request, to curb terrorism, allowing the federal government to scan all phone calls for calls to any number linked to terrorism.

I thank William M. Lafferty for making me aware of this article.


In his 2016 campaign to become president of the United States, Donald Trump skilfully targeted the fears related to terrorism and immigration among authoritarians, focusing less on topics such as abortion or small government, thus following the path to success scripted in Hetherington and Suhay, 2011.


Interestingly, views on parenting styles are the strongest predictors of authoritarianism. See the work on parenting styles by Feldman, 2003, 2013, or Hetherington and Weiler, 2009, and compare it with the work by Lakoff and Johnson, 1999. See also Lindner, 2005. The rise of ideals of equal dignity creates alternatives that were not present in the past, when, for instance, spanking was universally accepted as proper pedagogy, and erodes boundaries that once were fixed. It seems that authoritarians have stronger gag reflexes than liberals and react with strong disgust, for instance, to homosexual orientations, see Terrizzi, et al., 2010. After 9/11, ‘the disgusting terrorist, was constructed using the performativity of disgust, see, for instance, Sara Ahmed, 2004. Ideologies are being experienced and embodied, they are not simply ideas or concepts, see Wilce, 2009.

Listen to The United States of anxiety, episode 7: This is your brain on politics, WNYC (non-profit, non-commercial, public radio stations located in New York City), 3rd November 2016, www.wnyc.org/story/united-states-of-anxiety-podcast-episode-7. In this WNYC broadcast the field of biopolitics was being explored, the biology of political differences. See, among others, French, et al., 2014, Hibbing, et al., 2014, Wagner, et al., 2015. Biological information systems seem to play a role in forming differences between conservatives and liberals. Conservatives respond differently to fear than liberals and lock onto negative images more, while liberals seek novelty, new and pleasurable stimuli.

In short: conservatives are scared, liberals are creative. The journalists collaborated with researchers for a pilot study that showed that those higher on the stress hormone cortisol voted less, while the cortisol baseline for Trump voters was twice as high as compared to Hillary Clinton voters.

288 Duckitt, et al., 2010, p. 687. The traditional view was that Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) is a personality dimension, however, ‘new approaches have begun to suggest that RWA might be better conceptualised as social attitudes and values. A second issue, which arises partly out of this

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personality versus social attitude issue, is that of whether RWA is a unidimensional or multidimensional construct, John Duckitt, et al., 2010, pp. 686–687. ‘Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been conceptualised and measured as a unidimensional personality construct comprising the covariation of the three traits of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism’, John Duckitt, et al., 2010, Abstract. However, so the authors continue, ‘new approaches have criticised this conceptualisation and instead viewed these three “traits” as three distinct, though related, social attitude dimensions’. See for more, among others, Duckitt and Fisher, 2003, or Mavor, et al., 2010. See also Duckitt, 1989, Feldman, 2003, Kreindler, 2005, Stellmacher and Petzel, 2005, Stenner, 2005. Duckitt and Fisher, 2003, Abstract:

Research has shown that social threat correlates with ideological authoritarianism, but the issues of causal direction and specificity of threat to particular ideological attitudes remain unclear. Here, a theoretical model is proposed in which social threat has an impact on authoritarianism specifically, with the effect mediated through social world view. The model was experimentally tested with a sample of undergraduates who responded to one of three hypothetical scenarios describing a future New Zealand that was secure, threatening, or essentially unaltered. Both threat and security influenced social world view, but only threat influenced authoritarianism, with differential effects on two factorially distinct subdimensions (conservative and authoritarian social control attitudes) and with the effects of threat mediated through world view. There was a weak effect of threat on social dominance that was entirely mediated through authoritarianism. The findings support the proposed theoretical model of how personal and social contextual factors causally affect people’s social world views and ideological attitudes.


See, among others, Niemi and Young, 2016, Abstract:

Why do victims sometimes receive sympathy for their suffering and at other times scorn and blame? Here we show a powerful role for moral values in attitudes toward victims. We measured moral values associated with unconditionally prohibiting harm (‘individualising values’) versus moral values associated with prohibiting behaviour that destabilises groups and relationships (‘binding values’: loyalty, obedience to authority, and purity). Increased endorsement of binding values predicted increased ratings of victims as contaminated (Studies 1–4); increased blame and responsibility attributed to victims, increased perceptions of victims’ (versus perpetrators’) behaviours as contributing to the outcome, and decreased focus on perpetrators (Studies 2–3). Patterns persisted controlling for politics, just world beliefs, and right-wing authoritarianism. Experimentally manipulating linguistic focus off of victims and onto perpetrators reduced victim blame. Both binding values and focus modulated victim blame through victim responsibility attributions. Findings indicate the important role of ideology in attitudes toward victims via effects on responsibility attribution.

I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this research. ‘Caring’ and ‘fairness’ are called ‘individualising values’ in this article, versus ‘loyalty-binding values’. I concur with Linda Hartling to call them ‘connectedness-compassion values’ versus ‘loyalty-binding values’. See also ‘Who blames the victim?’ by Laura Niemi and Liane Young, New York Times, 24th June 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/who-blames-the-victim.html.


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Stanley Feldman believed authoritarianism could be an important factor in American politics in ways that had nothing to do with fascism, but that it could only reliably be measured by unlinking it from specific political preferences. For Feldman, authoritarianism was a personality profile rather than a political preference, and in his questionnaires he therefore asks about parenting goals. He developed the definitive measurement of authoritarianism by asking four simple questions that appear to focus on parenting but are in fact designed to reveal how highly the respondent values hierarchy, order, and conformity over other values. These were his questions: Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have:

- independence or respect for elders?
- obedience or self-reliance?
- to be considerate or to be well-behaved?
- curiosity or good manners?

D’Agostino, 2018, pp. 185–186:

This chronic gender insecurity is like a thermostat that remains frequently in an error state and is unable to shut off the air conditioner, because hot air entering the room from an open window counteracts the effects of the air conditioner. Here the hot air is the nearly constant perception of being feminine (which may be unconscious), inherited from the man’s mother identification, which creates a chronic error signal when compared with the zero reference perception for ‘feminine’, resulting from his gender socialisation. Since the mother introjects cannot be banished from a man’s psyche, the only way to escape this double bind is to reset the reference perception to an androgynous self-ideal.

D’Agostino theorises that the behavioural output of ‘proving your manhood’ sets the reference perception of a control system one level down from the highest level, the level of the self, to the ‘principle level’ system that controls perception of the nation, and that this underlies the psychoanalytic process of displacement. It could be described as ‘a linkage between control systems at the self and principle levels, in which behavioural output from the self system becomes input (specifically, reference perceptions) for a system one level down that controls perception of a symbolic object, in this case the nation and its military power’ D’Agostino, 2018, pp. 186–187.


Anthony Marsella in a personal communication, 25th January 2014. Anthony Marsella is a past president of Psychologists for Social Responsibility, emeritus professor of psychology at the University of Hawaii, and past director of the World Health Organization Psychiatric Research Center in Honolulu. He is known nationally and internationally as a pioneer figure in the study of culture and psychopathology who has challenged the ethnocentrism and racial biases of many assumptions, theories, and practices in psychology and psychiatry. In more recent years, he has been writing and lecturing on peace and social justice. He has published 15 edited books, and more than 250 articles, chapters, book reviews, and popular pieces. It is a privilege to have Anthony Marsella as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Leighton, 1959.


According to Francis Hsu, different relationships are privileged in different societies: In China, the dominant dyad is father-son, in India mother-son, in Africa siblings. In Japan it is father-son, with

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In my work, I apply the ideal-type approach as described by sociologist Max Weber, 1904/1949. See Coser, 1977, p. 224:

Weber’s three kinds of ideal types are distinguished by their levels of abstraction. First are the ideal types rooted in historical particularities, such as the ‘western city’, ‘the Protestant Ethic’, or ‘modern capitalism’, which refer to phenomena that appear only in specific historical periods and in particular cultural areas. A second kind involves abstract elements of social reality – such concepts as ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘feudalism’ – that may be found in a variety of historical and cultural contexts. Finally, there is a third kind of ideal type, which Raymond Aron calls ‘rationalising reconstructions of a particular kind of behaviour’. According to Weber, all propositions in economic theory, for example, fall into this category. They all refer to the ways in which men would behave were they actuated by purely economic motives, were they purely economic men.

Also Michael Karlberg explains that analytical constructs never correspond perfectly with some presumably objective reality. See Karlberg, 2013, p. 9:

Care must be taken, therefore, not to reify these frames or over-extend the metaphors that inform them. These frames can, however, serve as useful heuristic devices for organising certain forms of inquiry and guiding certain forms of practice – such as inquiry into the meaning of human dignity and the application of this concept in fields such as human rights and conflict resolution.

In Christianity, mystic Meister Eckhart (circa 1260–1328) could be named in this context, or Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), who wrote about the holy in all religions (Otto, 1917/1923; see also Palmquist, 2015). Religious historian Mircea Eliade, 1957/1959, spoke of hierophany, or the manifestation of the sacred, the sense of awe in a sacred space (from Greek hieros, sacred/holy, and phainein, to bring to light). I see many indigenous peoples having a direct and holistic experience of Gaia as a godlike place inspiring hierophany, where they see all things acquiring reality, identity, and meaning through their participation in this experience, see Eliade, 1949/1954. In Dominator contexts, the majority population, in contrast, is rather cut off from direct religious experience; power elites reserve the right to hierophany and its interpretation for themselves.

Lindner, 2017.

Als Sportpalastrede wird die Rede bezeichnet, die der nationalsozialistische deutsche Reichspropagandaminister Joseph Goebbels am 18. Februar 1943 im Berliner Sportpalast hielt und in der er zur Intensivierung des ‘totalen Krieges’ aufrief. Translated from the German original by Lindner:

Die Engländer behaupten, das deutsche Volk wehrt sich gegen die totalen Kriegsmaßnahmen der Regierung. Es will nicht den totalen Krieg, sagen die Engländer, sondern die Kapitulation. Ich frage euch: Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg? Wollt ihr ihn, wenn nötig, totaler und radikaler, als wir ihn uns heute überhaupt erst vorstellen können?

See the full text at www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0200_goe&object=translation&l=de, and see also https://youtu.be/i8TDbz2FK1g.

Diener, et al., 1995.


Since solidarity is a moral obligation rather than a law, a relationship rather than a status, social concord rather than a contract, and communal rather than individual, fraternité is the most delicate part to be integrated into the motto. Fraternity was defined in the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Citizen of 1795 (Déclaration des droits et des devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen de 1795) as such: ‘Do not do to others what you would not wish to be done to you; always do the good to others
the ideal-type approach as described by sociologist Max Weber, 1904/1949. See Coser, 1977, p. 224:

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I first began to learn about the significance of the notion of unity in diversity in 1994, when cross-cultural psychologist Michael Harris Bond from Hong Kong taught at a Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11th–16th July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany. See Bond, 1999. It is a privilege to have Michael Bond as an esteemed member from the first moment in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

I thank Charles R. Coil, 2009, for making me aware of Schachter’s work.

Mann, 1997, p. 12. I thank Charles R. Coil, 2009, for making me aware of Mann’s article.


‘Som et ledd i Stortingets forberedelser av grunnlovsjubileet i 2014 nedsatte Stortingets presidentskap 18. juni 2009 et utvalg med det oppdrag å utrede og fremme forslag til en begrenset revisjon av Grunnloven med det mål å styrke menneskerettighetenes stilling i nasjonal rett ved å gi sentrale menneskerettigheter Grunnlovs rang’. English translation: ‘As part of the Storting’s preparations for the constitution’s anniversary in 2014, the parliamentary presidency of the Storting set up a committee on 18th June 2009 with the task of investigating and promoting proposals for a limited audit of the Constitution aimed at strengthening human rights in national law by giving key human rights constitutional status’. See https://lovdata.no/static/SDOK/dok16-201112.pdf.

Menneskerettighetsutvalgsmedlem Carl I. Hagen har lenge vært usikker med hensyn til om det er fornuftig og hensiktsmessig med en blandingsgrunnlov hvor både klare rettsregler blandes sammen med uforpliktende programmerklæringer og symbolske langsiktige målsetninger.

Og videre:

Når nå utvalget skal vurdere å innføre de sentrale menneskerettighetene må imidlertid det tas en aktiv stilling til og foretas en vurdering av hvilke rettigheter som er omtalt i mange konvensjoner.

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som er de sentrale. Det er også slik at hvis en grunnlov fylles med idealistiske mål og programekkleringer som de fleste anser for å være urealistiske drømmer uten rettsvirkninger så kan det medføre at også de sentrale rettigheter svekkes både i omdømme og reell rettsvirkning’. Fremskrittspartiet slutter seg til disse synspunktene.

Etter Fremskrittspartiets vurdering er det først og fremst de civile og politiske rettigheter som bør grunnlovfestes. Grunnlovfesting av ØS-rettighetene, dersom de gis et reelt innhold, kan danne grunnlag for en meget kostbar velferdsstat som kan fremtvinge høye skatter og avgifter, som igjen kan kvele en fornuftig økonomisk utvikling.

316 John Hope Bryant, 2009, surely did not intend to instrumentalise the notion of dignity, however, those who read his work, may feel inclined to do so.

317 Achankeng, 2017, ‘Imperial dispossession of “others”’ by falsification of dignity’, paper presented at the 2017 Workshop on Humiliation and Violent Conflict, Columbia University, New York, 7th–8th December 2017. Fonkem Achankeng hails from British Southern Cameroon, and in his view ‘a close study of colonial and postcolonial exploits, existence of military bases and interventions in different regions of the world and ‘cooperation agreements’ reveals patterns of economic design and investment practices of imperial powers, and he discerns a falsification of the dignity of ‘Others’ as a means of enhancing imperialist policies of global domination for cheap natural resources:

On the basis of colonial and postcolonial theories, I argue that the imperial dispossession of others is sustained in the process by the portrayal of ‘Others’ as incomplete or imperfect rather than as humans of different ‘races’ and ‘cultures.’ I will make the claim, in agreement with Nicholas Thomas, 1994, p. 71, that the underlying epistemic operation of partitioning the human species by situating some ‘just above apes, and others as immature civilisations’ is not only humiliating, but enhances the dispossession of ‘Others.’ …for the dignity of nature, we must work for a world view that imagines a global world made up of only humans in the plurality of different ‘races’ and ‘cultures’.

It is a privilege to have Fonkem Achankeng as esteemed member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

318 Christina Mason, 2007, wrote a chapter on ‘true and false dignity’ in a book that resulted from a colloquium on dignity. In her daily work, she offers a service of palliative care to several London boroughs, particularly Tower Hamlets, Hackney and City, and Newham: ‘From the point of view of economic indicators, these boroughs are amongst the poorest in the whole UK, but in terms of cultural, ethnic, and religious variation they are wonderfully rich and vibrant’, Mason, 2007, p. 109. Mason speaks of the ‘dignity of role’ that ‘can be carried too far’ and ‘can act as a cloak or mask behind which to hide, and which impedes human connectedness’, Mason, 2007, p. 118.

319 Christina Mason, 2007:

In the colloquium, dignity was spoken about ‘from all our different perspectives but not one of us was able to capture the experience, known throughout time and throughout the world; the experience of suffering that comes to people when they are not accorded the dignity that is, I believe, their right. All of us I think need to stay alive to this tension in our work, whether it is based in a palliative care setting or in any other kind of environment dedicated to the relief of human suffering in the world at large’, Mason, 2007, p. 118.

320 Christina Mason, 2007:

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One of the many lessons of the recent presidential election campaign and its repugnant outcome is that the age of identity liberalism must be brought to an end. Hillary Clinton was at her best and most uplifting when she spoke about American interests in world affairs and how they relate to our understanding of democracy. But when it came to life at home, she tended on the campaign trail to lose that large vision and slip into the rhetoric of diversity, calling out explicitly to African-American, Latino, L.G.B.T. and women voters at every stop. This was a strategic mistake. If you are going to mention groups in America, you had better mention all of them. If you don’t, those left out will notice and feel excluded. Which, as the data show, was exactly what happened with the white working class and those with strong religious convictions. Fully two-thirds of white voters without college degrees voted for Donald Trump, as did over 80 per cent of white evangelicals.

I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.


Trump is not the first populist to shrug off bad press. In 18th-century London, there was another politician who, despite his openly scandalous personal life, achieved thunderous political success. John Wilkes was a well-known libertine and an outlaw convicted of seditious libel against the king – and he was tremendously popular. In the 1760s and early 1770s, London regularly resounded with shouts of ‘Wilkes and Liberty’ … Like Wilkes, he [Trump] has portrayed himself as a martyr. His followers believe he suffers the barbs of ‘fake news’ because he is willing to stand against P.C. culture. In their eyes, he is the only one courageous enough to make this stand – and thus the only one able to fix Washington and restore the values that generated American greatness.

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325 Campbell and Manning, 2014.


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culture. In their eyes, he is the only one courageous enough to make this stand – and thus the only one able to fix Washington and restore the values that generated American greatness.

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Persons affected by the PVEE syndrome often defend, minimise and/or rationalise the most outrageous attitudes held and acts carried out by themselves or members of their particular group. When you talk to such people, you will quickly find that the reason that they take such a usually untenable position is because ‘their people’ either are or have been victimised by one or more other groups. This is the golden rule turned on its head: ‘Do bad unto others because they (or someone else) did something bad to you’. It is a deceptively simple and somewhat pervasive point of view...

It is a privilege to have James Edward Jones as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


334 Ibid.


338 Ashcroft, 2005, p. 679. I thank Charles R. Coile, 2009, for making me aware of Ashcroft’s article.


341 See the writings on development and freedom of Amartya Sen, 1992, and Martha Nussbaum, 2000. Ashcroft also points at more recent articles in The Lancet, such as Marmot, 2004, or Horton, 2004.

342 Ashcroft describes this position as mainstream in European bioethics and theological writing on bioethical topics, as exemplified in Leon Kass, 2002.


344 Kant, 1785, chapter 1. See the German original on http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/grundlegung-zur-methaphysik-der-sitten-3510/1:

Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an dessen Stelle kann auch etwas anderes als Äquivalent gesetzt werden; was dagegen über allen Preis erhaben ist, mithin kein Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was a Prussian philosopher, regarded as one of history’s most influential thinkers and one of the last major philosophers of the Enlightenment, having a major impact on the Romantic and Idealist philosophies of the nineteenth century.

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346 Schiller, 1793, p. 205:

Anmuth liegt also in der Freiheit der willkührlichen Bewegungen; Würde in der Beherrschung der unwillkührlichen. Die Anmuth läßt der Natur da, wo sie die Befehle des Geistes ausrichtet, einen Schein von Freywilligkeit; die Würde hingegen unterwirft sie da, wo sie herrschen will, dem Geist.

347 See also Chong and Druckman, 2007. The field of Michael Karlberg’s study is discourse as a social force. See Karlberg, 2013, Conclusion:

As the examples above illustrate, the maturation of human dignity lies, ultimately, in the reframing of human consciousness. And as the preceding analysis explains, the work of reframing will have to occur, in part, at the level of discourse, because discourse is a primary medium through which the codes of human culture and consciousness evolve. Moreover, at this critical juncture in history, this reframing has become an evolutionary imperative. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has transformed the conditions of our own existence. Over seven billion people now live on this planet and our technologies have amplified our impact a thousand-fold. Inherited codes of culture and consciousness are proving maladaptive under these conditions.

In this context, reframing significant discourses according to the logic of organic interdependence is a vital adaptive strategy. Sceptics may, of course, dismiss this view as naïve and unrealistic. But is it realistic to assume that the prevailing culture of contest can be sustained indefinitely on a planet with over seven billion people wielding increasingly powerful and destructive technologies? Is it realistic to assume that narrowly self-interested motives can continue to drive human behaviour in this context? Is it realistic to assume that the struggle for power and domination can continue to define our social existence indefinitely under such conditions? What is needed, in this regard, is a new realism – a new interpretive frame. The logic of the social body frame offers this. And, in the process, it provides a genuine foundation for human dignity.

Also Karlberg applies the ideal-type approach described by sociologist Max Weber, 1904/1949, that I use in my work. Karlberg explains that analytical constructs never correspond perfectly with presumably objective reality. ‘Care must be taken, therefore, not to reify these frames or over-extend the metaphors that inform them. These frames can, however, serve as useful heuristic devices for organising certain forms of inquiry and guiding certain forms of practice – such as inquiry into the meaning of human dignity and the application of this concept in fields such as human rights and conflict resolution’. See also Coser, 1977.

348 Karlberg, 2013, p. 7.

349 Karlberg, 2013, p. 7.

350 Howard Richards in a personal communication, 27th January 2018. It is a privilege to have Howard Richards as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship and pillar of our World Dignity University initiative.

351 Howard Richards in a personal communication, 27th January 2018.


354 Karlberg, 2013.

355 Sikkink, 2018. I thank Paul Raskin for introducing Kathryn Sikkink to the Great Transition Network.


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Wergeland, 1843, p. 23:

Haard er den Himmel, som bedækker Norge, Klimatet er strength; vi ere Beboere af en hyperboræisk Afkrog paa Kloden, og Naturen har bestemt os til at savne saamange af de mildere Landes Fordele. Men Naturen, god midt i sin tilsyneladende Ubarmhjertighed, og retfærdig midt i sin Uretfærdighed, har aabenbar villet levne os Erstatning for hine Savn, og derfor besikket, at Norges, i nogle Henseender saa ufordeelagtige, Beliggenhed skulde i andre Henseender være saare velgjørende.

I thank Bernt Hagtvet and Nikolai Brandal for making me aware of this quote. It is a privilege to have Bernt Hagtvet as esteemed members in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Lindner, 2014.


Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 897. Eleanor Roosevelt certainly was a norm entrepreneur, as were the Scandinavian stated. See Ingebritsen, 1998.


It was a great privilege for me to receive the 2009 ‘Prisoner’s Testament’ Peace Award, www.aktivefredsreiser.no/fredsdagen/2009/takketale_evelin_lindner.htm.


I thank Georg Lohmann for his personal communication, 11th September 2016. He recommended Lohmann, 2016a, pp. 17–18 of an earlier unpublished version:


Lohmann, 2013, p. 179. Italics in original. Translated and summarised from German by Evelyn Lindner:

Kant, 1797/1996.

Howard Richards in a personal communication, 27th January 2018.

Howard Richards in a personal communication, 27th January 2018. See also Richards, 2008.

See also Lohmann, 2014a, 2015, 2016b.

Lohmann, 2012.

See the original in German in Lohmann, 2014b, p. 11:


Kant, 1797.


Howard Richards in a personal communication, 27th January 2018.

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Respekt for menneskets verdighet – en hovedfaktor i alle forsoningsprosesser, lecture by philosopher Tore Frost, representative of the prize committee, during the award ceremony of the Blanche Majors Reconciliation Prize 2012 being awarded to HRH Crown Prince Haakon, Peace House in Risør, Norway, 13th June 2012, www.aktivefredsreiser.no/forsoningspris/2012/hovedtale_respekt_menneskeverd.htm. Translated and summarised from the Norwegian original by Evelin Lindner:

Idéen om menneskets iboende verdighet umuliggjør forestillinger om gradert verdighet Mennesskets
verdighet er ikke lenger å förstå som et resultat av eksterne garantister, tvert om er menneskets verdighet begrunnet på en kvalitet som er naturgitt, nettopp iboende i menneskets natur. Uavhengig av såvel Gudsautoritet som fornuftsautoritet er det et faktum, slår Verdenserklæringen av 1948 fast, at mennesket har en verdighet (dignity).

377 _Respekt for menneskets verdighet – en hovedfaktor i alle forsoningsprosesser_, lecture by philosopher Tore Frost, representative of the prize committee, during the award ceremony of the Blanche Majors Reconciliation Prize 2012 being awarded to HRH Crown Prince Haakon, Peace House in Risør, Norway, 13th June 2012, www.aktivefredsreiser.no/forsoningspris/2012/hovedtale_respekt_menneskeverd.htm. Translated and summarised from the Norwegian original by Evelin Lindner:

Det er også klokt ikke å forsøke seg på definitve begrunnelser av denne karakter. Kravet om anerkjennelse av menneskets iboende verdighet er et postulat uten innhold.

378 Palmquist, 2015. I thank Mark Singer for making me aware of Stephen Palmquist’s work on philosopher Immanuel Kant. It is a privilege to have Kant expert Mark Singer as esteemed member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship. From my point of view, Palmquist rightly points out that religious _Schwärmerei_ as Kant calls it, is not correctly translated with ‘fanaticism’ nor ‘enthusiasm’. However, also Palmquist’s suggestion of ‘delirium’ does not resonate with me. The best translation for me, since it also encapsulates Kant’s disdain for this phenomenon, would be ‘puppy love’. I personally feel the same sentiment that Kant feels: I reject religion that expresses itself in any form of ‘puppy love’, while I do not reject ‘critical mysticism’.

379 Martin, 2016b. See also Martin, 2016a, and the Earth Charter, Unesco, 2000. It is a privilege to have Glen T. Martin as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

380 The _Third estate_ is a political pamphlet defining the soon-to-be-triumphant bourgeoisie and was written in January 1789, shortly before the outbreak of the French Revolution, by the French thinker and clergyman Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748–1836). For connections between its military triumph and the expression of its ideas in the establishment of rights see Foucault, 2003, especially the later lectures. See also Sewell, 1996.

381 Howard Richards in a personal communication, 27th January 2018.

382 Martin, 2016b.

383 Cicero, 44BCE/1913.


385 Pico della Mirandola, 1486/1948: ‘Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine’.

386 Swami Agnivesh, 2015.

387 Martin, 2016a.

388 The field of Michael Karlberg’s study is discourse as a social force. See Karlberg, 2013, Conclusion:

As the examples above illustrate, the maturation of human dignity lies, ultimately, in the reframing of human consciousness. And as the preceding analysis explains, the work of reframing will have to occur, in part, at the level of discourse, because discourse is a primary medium through which the codes of human culture and consciousness evolve. Moreover, at this critical juncture in history, this reframing has become an evolutionary imperative. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has transformed the conditions of our own existence. Over seven billion people now live on this planet and our technologies have amplified our impact a thousand-fold. Inherited codes of culture and consciousness are proving maladaptive under these conditions. In this context, reframing significant discourses according to the logic of organic interdependence.

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is a vital adaptive strategy. Sceptics may, of course, dismiss this view as naïve and unrealistic. But is it realistic to assume that the prevailing culture of contest can be sustained indefinitely on a planet with over seven billion people wielding increasingly powerful and destructive technologies? Is it realistic to assume that narrowly self-interested motives can continue to drive human behaviour in this context? Is it realistic to assume that the struggle for power and domination can continue to define our social existence indefinitely under such conditions? What is needed, in this regard, is a new realism – a new interpretive frame. The logic of the social body frame offers this. And, in the process, it provides a genuine foundation for human dignity.

Also Karlberg applies the ideal-type approach described by sociologist Max Weber, 1904/1949, that I use in my work. Karlberg explains that analytical constructs never correspond perfectly with presumably objective reality. ‘Care must be taken, therefore, not to reify these frames or over-extend the metaphors that inform them. These frames can, however, serve as useful heuristic devices for organising certain forms of inquiry and guiding certain forms of practice – such as inquiry into the meaning of human dignity and the application of this concept in fields such as human rights and conflict resolution’. See also Coser, 1977.

Respekt for menneskets verdighet – en hovedfaktor i alle forsoningsprosesser, lecture by philosopher Tore Frost, representative of the prize committee, during the award ceremony of the Blanche Majors Reconciliation Prize 2012 being awarded to HRH Crown Prince Haakon, Peace House in Risør, Norway, 13th June 2012, www.aktivefredsreiser.no/forsoningspris/2012/hovedtale_respekt_menneskeverd.htm. Translated from the Norwegian original by Evelin Lindner:

Vårt følelsesliv, i spennet mellom lidenskap og lidelse, konfronterer oss med kjærligheten som selve grunnpremissett for menneskelivet i hele dets kompleksitet. Kjærligheten er hva livet dreier seg om.

Emotional literacy is a book by Claude M. Steiner, 2003, a psychotherapist who has written extensively about Transactional Analysis (TA). I thank Janet Gerson of having reminded me of Steiner’s work.

Respekt for menneskets verdighet – en hovedfaktor i alle forsoningsprosesser, lecture by philosopher Tore Frost, representative of the prize committee, during the award ceremony of the Blanche Majors Reconciliation Prize 2012 being awarded to HRH Crown Prince Haakon, Peace House in Risør, Norway, 13th June 2012, www.aktivefredsreiser.no/forsoningspris/2012/hovedtale_respekt_menneskeverd.htm. Translated and summarised from the Norwegian original by Evelin Lindner:


In an author’s note, Havel writes, ‘This speech was written for the University of Toulouse, where I would have delivered it on receiving an honorary doctorate, had I attended’. Havel, of course, had no passport and could not travel abroad. At the ceremony at the University of

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Toulouse-Le Mirail on 14th May 1984, he was represented by the English playwright Tom Stoppard.

394 Richards, 2016b.
395 Richards, 2016b.
396 Lindner, 2006a, p. 66.
397 Jost and Ross, 1999. My gratitude goes to Lee Ross for having been one of my great doctoral advisers, and it a privilege to have him as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.
398 Habermas, 2010. See also Pless, et al., 2017. I thank Heidetraut von Weltzien Høivik for making me aware of this article.
400 It was a great privilege to have Don Klein as founding member of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship and member of its board of director until his passing in 2007, see www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/don.php. We will always honour his spirit.
401 Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010. I resonate with affect theology studying the heart of faith, tracking how human emotions become religious feelings. See http://revthandeka.org/affect-theology-thandeka.html:

The spiritual foundation of liberal faith, after all, is not a set of doctrinal claims or creeds or religious beliefs or ideas. Liberal faith begins with transformed and uplifted feelings that exalt the human soul and let us love beyond belief, come what may. I use affect theology’s core principle of love beyond belief when I work with congregations. The goal: to transform ‘corps cold’ churches (as Ralph Waldo Emerson put it) into sanctuaries that warm and elevate the human heart and inspire folks to stand strong on the side of love.

402 Frankl, 1946/1959. See also Pless, et al., 2017, p. 225:

According to Honneth, 1992/1995, individuals gain self-esteem and dignity in interpersonal processes by participating in different forms of social life, including family, community, culture and work. He distils love, solidarity and rights as the three core forms of recognition from his analysis of the early Hegel. Maak, 1999, broadens these conceptually and speaks of emotional recognition – mainly expressed through love and friendship, but also through espoused emotional intelligence; social recognition – whether in groups, communities or the workplace; and political recognition – expressed in civil and human rights.

404 I thank Mark Singer for making me aware of this quote. It is a privilege to have Mark Singer as

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esteemed member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship. For Albom’s website see www.mitchalbom.com.

In historian Morris Berman’s trilogy on the evolution of human consciousness, *Wandering god* is the third volume. See Berman, 1981, 1989, 2000. There, Berman traces the societal movement from the congruent, horizontal, egalitarian relations of Palaeolithic foragers to later vertical, hierarchical ones. For Berman, the Palaeolithic period was not a dark era of irrational mythical thinking, on the contrary, living-in-the-world protected against separating self and world.

My global experience resonates deeply with what Berman suggests, namely, that human beings are hard-wired to be on the move, with sedentism and agriculture having been ‘forced upon us by a combination of external circumstances and a latent drive for power and inequality’, Berman, 2000, p. 153. Nomads do not wish to ‘settle down’, usually governments nudge them or force them. Sedentary agriculture is a step forward only from the point of view of dominator mind-sets, for humankind as a whole, it is a step backward. What happened was that absolute paradigms took the place of the nomadic spirituality of openness to experience.


Adult rationalisation, denial and ethical blindness are rooted in early childhood conditioning and desensitisation leading to acceptance and eventual participation in many forms of animal exploitation and cruelty. Without question, these are cultural norms which children quickly learn to adopt to be accepted. This is vividly documented by British hunt saboteur Mike Huskisson showing children witnessing deer and fox hunting and being ritualistically ‘bloodied’ and receiving parts of the murdered animals to take home either to eat or as prized trophies, mementoes of their presence at the kill. See his book *Outfoxed: take two: Hunting the hunters and other work for animals*, published by Animal Welfare Information Service, www.acigawis.org.uk.

Michael Fox, 2017:

The sociology of mutualism is based on the sociobiology of symbiosis, mutually enhancing relationships as between the beneficial bacteria and other microorganisms in the soil and in our guts and the plants and us who cannot survive without them.


This essay by Kim Stafford is shared from Animashaun and Stafford, 2018 with the permission of the author.

Howard Richards in a personal communication, 8th March 2018.

Sir William Blackstone SL KC (1723–1780) was an English jurist, judge, and Tory politician of the eighteenth century, who wrote the *Commentaries on the laws of England*. I thank Howard Richards for making me aware of Blackstone’s work.

Western-liberal political philosophy sees the forms of dignity that can be legally respected and protected by a state as the right to self-determination, autonomy, and agency (Rosen, 2012). The concept of dignity-as-autonomy is consistent with the *social contest frame* of dignity. See Karlberg, 2013:

When human nature is conceived largely in terms of self-interested motives playing out within competitive social arenas, then the autonomy of individuals and groups to pursue their own interests, within a set of rules that apply equally to all, takes on paramount importance.

Habermas, 2010. See also Pless, et al., 2017. I thank Heidetraut von Weltzien Høivik for making me aware of this article.

The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrined human dignity in its preamble: ‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ In its judgment of 9 October 2001 in Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079, at grounds 70–77, the Court of Justice confirmed that a fundamental right to human dignity is part of Union law. It results that none of the rights laid down in this Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person, and that the dignity of the human person is part of the substance of the rights laid down in this Charter. It must therefore be respected, even where a right is restricted. Comment: These explanations were originally prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Although they do not as such have the status of law, they are a valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter.


420 Lindner, 2006b.


426 McCrudden, 2008, Abstract. I thank Francisco Gomes de Matos for making me aware of McCrudden’s work.

The topic of due to climate change Michael Logan (US), in the Inter (Canada), Alexandra Aragão (Portugal), other contributions to 2nd Virtual Workshop on Dignity Rights: Jari Taho (Albania), keynote delivered on 11st October 2016, http://echrblog.blogspot.se/2016/10/the discourse, making possible what Christopher Buyse for human rights, namely that they can be looked at in three ways: as norms, as tools, and as undefined, as a tool, that dignity can serve as a guidance (rather than as a straightjacket), and, third, that dignity is part of a legal discourse, making possible what Christopher McCrudden, 2008, has called the institutional use of dignity. See ‘Dignified law: The role of human dignity in ECHR case-law’, by Antoine Buyse, keynote delivered on 11st October 2016, http://echrblog.blogspot.se/2016/10/the-role-of-human-dignity-in-echr-case.html:

The first role will be most familiar to both law and ethics: human rights are norms. Norms that protect certain freedoms and entitlements of people and bind state behaviour. These norms are open in the sense of not completely pinning down what states can or cannot do: in almost all cases, a measure of leeway is left to states as to practical implementation. Guidance, but no straight-jacket. The second role of human rights is that they are tools. Tools for alleged victims of injustice to bring forward claims. In a very direct sense, in that rights such as free speech or the freedom assembly enable people to voice their views. But also because human rights protection systems offer avenues, both nationally and internationally to lodge these claims: the possibility to have a court look at your complaint and issue a binding decision on it, which the state then has to implement. Finally, a third role for human rights is that they are discourse. They are a way of talking about or framing issues in society. Is a large degree of homelessness an issue of poverty, of social injustice, or also a violation of human rights? An increasing amount of issues has slowly but surely come to be talked about as challenges of human rights, leading some to talk of human rights inflation or even of the colonisation by human rights of wider societal issues. What can be said, in any event, is that framing one’s claim as human rights gives more weight to that claim, connecting it to fundamental, legally recognised basic needs and interests of people.


Historian Greg Anderson in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Human rights: Advancing the frontier of emancipation’, 19th March 2018, in response to

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433 O’Mahony, 2012, Conclusion.

434 Miki Kashtan in a personal communication, 30th May 2018.


436 Ibid.


438 Dignity, explains also Rosen, 2012, p. 11, ‘originated as a concept that denoted high social status and the honours and respectful treatment that are due to someone who occupied that position’. See also Karlberg, 2013. Michael Karlberg speaks of the social command frame of dignity, in contrast to the social contest frame, and the social body frame, and explains:

This strongly hierarchical conception of dignity has, in turn, been adapted in various ways. Beyond signifying people of high rank, the term has also been used to signify an elevated or refined manner or bearing, as well as elevated or weighty discourse. What all of these meanings share in common is the signification of relative worth or value. Dignity thus denotes the relative worth or value of people, or of their bearing and manner, or of their thoughts and speech. All of these meanings thus denote social hierarchy in one form or another. In practice, such hierarchy has often been ascribed according to distinctions based on class, race, creed, genealogy, and other socio-economic categories.

439 Schleichert, 1999.

440 Schleichert, 1999, p. 17, translated from the German original by Lindner:

Das Enthymem ist eine im Alltag überaus häufig benutzte Form des Argumentierens. An ihm lässt sich sehr gut erkennen, wie sich die logische und die rhetorische Betrachtungsweise unterscheiden. Mit dem Begriff des Enthymems ist zweierlei gemeint:

i) In so gut wie allen alltäglichen Argumentationen erwähnt man nicht alle eigentlich nötigen Prämissen ausdrücklich, denn das wäre unnötig, langweilig, abstoßend, quälend. Wendet sich ein Redner an ein ihm wohlbekanntes Publikum, z. B. an Rechtsanwalte, Ärzte, Katholiken etc., so kann er bei seinen Zuhörern ohne weiteres bestimmte Kenntnisse und Urteile voraussetzen und muss sie nicht ausdrücklich erwähnen. Man argumentiert korrekt, aber enthymematisch, wenn man sagt: Sokrates ist sterblich, denn er ist ein Mensch. Durch explizites Hinzufügen des nur im Geiste (en thymo) formulierten, aber nicht ausgesprochenen Arguments Alle Menschen sind sterblich wird daraus die Standardform eines korrekten logischen Schlusses: Alle Menschen sind sterblich; Sokrates ist ein Mensch; also ist Sokrates sterblich. Bei Bedarf kann eine enthymematische Argumentation durch Hinzufügen der fehlenden Argumente also stets auf die Form eines vollständigen Schlusses gebracht werden. Der Unterschied zwischen einem logisch korrekten Beweis und einer rhetorischen Argumentation ist hier ein rein äußerlicher, technischer. Dies ist die erste Bedeutung von ‘Enthymem’.


441 See Isaiah Berlin, 1958b, or George Lakoff, 2006a. See the description of Lakoff’s book:
Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has relentlessly invoked the word ‘freedom’. Al-Qaeda attacked us because ‘they hate our freedom’. The U.S. can strike pre-emptively because ‘freedom is on the march’. Social security should be privatised in order to protect individual freedoms. The 2005 presidential inaugural speech was a kind of crescendo: the words ‘freedom’, ‘free’, and ‘liberty’, were used forty-nine times in President Bush’s twenty-minute speech. In Whose freedom? Lakoff surveys the political landscape and offers an essential map of the Republican battle plan that has captured the hearts and minds of Americans – and shows how progressives can fight to reinvigorate this most beloved of American political ideas.

442 Berlin, 1969, p. xlv. See also Berlin, 1958a, b. The 2017 documentary film Freedom for the Wolf by Rupert Russell takes its title from Isaiah Berlin. It is about the idea of freedom and how it is being hollowed out by the ‘wolves’. Yet, people all over the globe – from Tunisian rappers to Indian comedians, from America’s #BlackLivesMatter activists to Hong Kong’s students – struggle to regain freedom for the ‘sheep’. See www.freedomforthewolf.com. I thank Nicklas Viki for making me aware of this film.

443 Hayek, 1944.


445 Howard, 2018

446 Of the three dominant ideologies of the twentieth century – fascism, communism, and liberalism – only the last remains, writes Patrick Deneen, 2018, and it has failed. He notes that there were two phases in the liberal attempt to assert dominion over nature. In the first wave, the emphasis was on the conquest of the natural world, while in the second wave, by the late 1800s, liberal thinkers wanted to conquer also human nature itself. There are two revolutions, first anthropological individualism and the voluntarist conception of choice, and, second, the human separation from nature and even opposition to it. In this way liberty is defined as the most extensive possible expansion of the human sphere of autonomous activity.

I thank Kamran Mofid for bringing Deneen’s book to my attention. See ‘The rape of nature: Now is the time to know that all that you do is sacred’, by Kamran Mofid, Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative (GCGI), 8th June 2018, https://www.gcgi.info/blog/937-the-rape-of-nature-now-is-the-time-to-know-that-all-that-you-do-is-sacred.


448 Wetz, 2014. I thank Carsten Frerk for making me aware of this book. Summary of the book, translated from German by Lindner:

All know the feeling: Something just is not right. Somehow, just now, I am treated incorrectly and I feel a resistance in me, and the urge to rebel. But how can I describe this gut feeling make more precisely?

Based on the rather questionable concept of human dignity Wetz illuminates our self-esteem based on numerous real-life examples - without having to resort to traditional notions such as that human beings are created in God’s image. His alternative approach builds on biologically explainable striving for self-preservation. Wetz shows how self-esteem can be defined, justified and lived – even in extreme situations.

What social and personal requirements must be met to ensure that self-esteem can develop? What threatens it? When is it justified to feel humiliated and to resist it? When does self-respect become arrogance?

Conclusion: self-esteem is an ‘orthopaedic challenge’: It is the art to walk upright!

449 Karlberg, 2013.

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Alagic, et al., 2009. It is a privilege to have Adair Nagata, Mara Alagic, and Glyn Rimmington as esteemed members in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


Lakoff and Johnson, 1999.


Schroeder and Bani-Sadr, 2017, chapter 4: Middle East and West: Can common ground be found? Abstract, p. 89. I thank Sultan Somjee for sharing this manuscript with me.

Schroeder, 2012, Abstract: 'In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity'.

Schroeder and Bani-Sadr, 2017, chapter 4: Middle East and West: Can common ground be found? Abstract, p. 89.

Evelin Lindner’s invitation to join the World Dignity University initiative, a video where Evelin Lindner is being interviewed by Ragnhild Nilsen about her vision of the World Dignity University. This dialogue took place at the University in Oslo in Norway on 8th February 2011. See https://youtu.be/A8voZQ0t6bU. Lasse Moer, Chief Engineer for Audiovisual Technology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University in Oslo, was the technical director of this video. Ragnhild Nilsen uses the artist name Arctic Queen. See also a WDU introduction in pdf format and a flyer on www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/videos.php#wduinvitation. See a copy of this video on a site in China. It is a privilege to have Ragnhild Nilsen as esteemed members in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, from the first hour, and founding member of the World Dignity University initiative.

In my work, I apply the ideal-type approach as described by sociologist Max Weber, 1904/1949. See Coser, 1977, p. 224:

Weber’s three kinds of ideal types are distinguished by their levels of abstraction. First are the ideal types rooted in historical particularities, such as the ‘western city’, ‘the Protestant Ethic’, or ‘modern capitalism’, which refer to phenomena that appear only in specific historical periods and in particular cultural areas. A second kind involves abstract elements of social reality – such concepts as ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘feudalism’ – that may be found in a variety of historical and cultural contexts. Finally, there is a third kind of ideal type, which Raymond Aron calls ‘rationalising reconstructions of a particular kind of behaviour’. According to Weber, all propositions in economic theory, for example, fall into this category. They all refer to the ways in which men would behave were they actuated by purely economic motives, were they purely economic men.

I like the summary of political researcher Noha Tarek in her contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Feminism and revolution: Looking back, looking ahead’, 13th May 2018, in response to the essay of the same title by Julie Mattheai, 2018:

The ‘Great Chain of Being’, in which human dominates over life / nature / animals and plants, man dominates over woman, adult dominates over child, the able-bodies / healthy / powerful dominates over the disabled / ill / weak, the White dominates over the Black (and this is not only in Western societies, but in all societies), the wealthy / elite dominates over the poor / mass, the citizen / national dominates over the immigrant / stranger / foreigner, (recently) the Northerner dominates over the Southerner, & finally God ‘AlMighty & Powerful’ dominates over everyone else!

It is a privilege to have Noha Tarek as esteemed member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Lindner, 2006a.


For example, black feminists face the nationalist assertion of a black male right to ‘discipline’ black women and of a black community right to freedom from majority or state interference with this practice.

See also Frug, 1992, or Minow, 1999.

Derrida, 1982.


Chandhoke, 2009.


Scheler, 1913/1923/1954.


See more on the notion of misrecognition in chapter 5 and 8 of my book Emotion and conflict Lindner, 2009b, pp. 129–137.


Jost, et al., 2004, Abstract:

Most theories in social and political psychology stress self-interest, intergroup conflict, ethnocentrism, homophily, in-group bias, outgroup antipathy, dominance, and resistance. System justification theory is influenced by these perspectives – including social identity and social dominance theories – but it departs from them in several respects. Advocates of system justification theory argue that (a) there is a general ideological motive to justify the existing social order, (b) this motive is at least partially responsible for the internalisation of inferiority among members of disadvantaged groups, (c) it is observed most readily at an implicit, nonconscious level of awareness and (d) paradoxically, it is sometimes strongest among those who are most harmed by the status quo. This article reviews and integrates 10 years of research on 20 hypotheses derived from a system justification perspective, focusing on the phenomenon of implicit outgroup favouritism among members of disadvantaged groups (including African Americans, the elderly, and gays/lesbians) and its relation to political ideology (especially liberalism-conservatism).


Whereas Freud himself viewed conscience as one of the functions of the superego, in The still small voice: Psychoanalytic reflections on guilt and conscience, Carveth argues that superego and conscience are distinct mental functions and that, therefore, a fourth mental structure, the
conscience, needs to be added to the psychoanalytic structural theory of the mind. He claims that while both conscience and superego originate in the so-called pre-oedipal phase of infant and child development they are comprised of contrasting and often conflicting identifications. The primary object, still most often the mother, is inevitably experienced as, on the one hand, nurturing and soothing and, on the other, as frustrating and persecuting. Conscience is formed in identification with the nurturer; the superego in identification with the aggressor. There is a principle of reciprocity at work in the human psyche: for love received one seeks to return love; for hate, hate (the talion law).

Like Franz Alexander and Sandor Ferenczi before him, Carveth views the therapeutic task as the disempowerment of the superego. But unlike his forebears he does not propose its replacement by the rational ego for, in his view, rationality cannot serve as the source of values. Following Jean-Jacques Rousseau, he finds the roots of morality not in reason but in feeling, in sympathetic identification or ‘pity’. With Pascal, he holds that ‘the heart has reasons reason cannot know’. Such ‘reasons of the heart’ form the core of conscience. Unlike the torments inflicted by the demonic superego that merely uses transgression as an excuse to do what it wants – punish and torment the ego – the conscience, what Winnicott called ‘the capacity for concern’, is genuinely troubled by failures to love. The author claims we must face our bad conscience, acknowledge and bear genuine (depressive) guilt, and through contrition, repentance and reparation come to accept reconciliation and forgiveness, or be forced to suffer the torments of the damned – persecutory guilt inflicted by the sadistic internal persecutor and saboteur, the superego.

It is the author’s view that in human history the damage done by id-driven psychopaths amounts to nothing compared to that brought about by superego-driven ideologists. Freud and subsequent psychoanalysis has largely whitewashed the superego while demonising the id, the alleged ‘beast’ in man, when in reality animals are seldom beastly, at least not in the ways humans often are. While aware of its destructiveness in the clinical realm, psychoanalysts have largely ignored the ideologies of domination – the sexism, racism, heterosexism, classism and childism – that are internalised from unconscionable societies into the unconscionable superego. In the penultimate chapter, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, Terry Eagleton and others, Carveth critically reviews the concepts of psychopathy and evil. In the final chapter, he advocates a de-mythologising, de-literalising or deconstructive approach to the Bible as metaphor, but one that escapes Freud’s derogation of this approach by acknowledging, with Hegel at his most honest, that its result is a humanistic ethic no longer to be equated with religion.

484 Carveth, 2013. I thank Michael Britton for making me aware of this book. It is a privilege to have Michael Britton as esteemed member in the board of directors of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship. Donald Carveth is the director of the Toronto Institute of Psychoanalysis. Also Maria Montessori followed a similar line in her educational theory, when she called on instructors to ‘give priority to the inner teacher who animated’ the child. The trope of the wisdom of the inner teacher that sits at our hearts is also to be found, for instance, in Tibetan Buddhists. Psychoanalyst Susie Orbach, 2009, observed that parental and societal pressure leads to a false self in the sense of a skewed self, where certain aspects of the self are overemphasised, at the expense of others, making the person distrust herself, thus an inner splitting of mind and body leading to a falsified sense of one’s own body.

Sociologist David Riesman, et al., 1950/2001, may have had similar dynamics in mind when he identified three main cultural types: tradition-directed, inner-directed, and other-directed. The tradition-directed and other-directed types may tend to develop Carveth’s ‘unconscionable superego’, while the inner-directed person may have access to sympathetic identification.


488 See, among others, Chaturvedi, 2000, Mignolo, 2000, Verdesio, 2005. I thank Magnus Haavelsrud for making me aware of the latter publications. See also Haavelsrud, 2015. It is a privilege to have Magnus Haavelsrud as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and

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See ‘The ties that bind captive to captor’, by Frank M. Ochberg, Los Angeles Times, 8th April 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/08/opinion/oe-ochberg8. Frank M. Ochberg is a co-founder of the National Center for Critical Incident Analysis and former associate director of the National Institute of Mental Health. See also the book that one of the hostages, Kristin Enmark, 2015, wrote more than four decades after the event. See also Lindner, 2009b, p. 133.


See a discussion in chapter 8: How we can reinvent our contexts, in my book Emotion and conflict (Lindner, 2009b).

BCE stands for Before the Common Era, and is equivalent to BC, which means Before Christ.

See a discussion in chapter 8: How we can reinvent our contexts, in my book Emotion and conflict (Lindner, 2009b).

See also Lindner, 2017, chapter 3: Also human nature and cultural diversity fell prey to the security dilemma, in the book Honor, humiliation, and terror, pp. 27–35.

Crespi and Yanega, 1995. Several different levels of sociality are differentiated including pre-sociality (solitary but social), sub-sociality, para-social (including communal, quasi-social, and semi-social), and eu-social. The term eusocial originally includes those organisms (originally, only invertebrates) with the following features: 1. Reproductive division of labour (with or without sterile castes), 2. Overlapping generations, 3. Cooperative care of young.


Hobbes, 1651.

Rockström, 2015. See also Wijkman and Rockström, 2012.

Kennedy, 2002, pp. 191–192:

Loss of faith in legal reasoning bears a close analogy to one of the many kinds of experience of loss of faith in God. The atheist who believes that he or she, or ‘science’, has disproved the existence of God is analogous to the maximalist who believes that postmodern critical theory has proved the indeterminacy of legal reasoning. The other kind of maximalist is like the Catholic who becomes a
Protestant, rejecting authority while continuing to hold a theology. Loss of faith, by contrast, is not a theory and is not the consequence of a theory. I think of my own initial faith in legal reasoning as like the religion of eighteenth-century intellectuals who believed that there were good rational reasons to think there was a God, that the existence of a God justified all kinds of hopeful views about the world, and that popular belief in God had greatly beneficial social consequences. But they also had confirmatory religious experiences that were phenomenologically distinct from the experience of rational demonstration. They engaged in the work of critiquing extant rational demonstrations and in that of constructing new ones, without any sense that their faith was in jeopardy. And they had occasional experiences of doubt without any loss of interest in and commitment to the enterprise of rational demonstration (this is me in the first year of law school). Loss of faith meant they woke up one morning in the nineteenth century and realised that they had ‘stopped believing’.


Of course, critique has been crucial to the dominant ‘rightness’ faction of leftism – that is, critique as ground clearing for the erection of new edifices of rightness. In the Marxist tradition, the slogan of the ‘scientificity’ of Marxism was the repository of the impulse to be right. For the non-Marxist left, the slogans of ‘planning’, ‘rational social policy’, and ‘the public interest’ played the same role.

Kennedy, 2002, p. 221. Kennedy calls for critique to problematise the very category of theory. Critique should not be in the service of ultimate rightness, as an affirmation of faith in theory as a way to rightness. Such a project of reconstruction would look, from a left and modernism/postmodernism (‘mpm’) point of view, ‘like the reification or fetishism of theory, in a mode parallel to the fetishism of God, the market class, law, and rights’:

Left/mpm, by contrast, is caught up for better or worse in the ‘viral’ progress of critique, and in so much as there is a lesson from the progress of the virus it would seem to be to anticipate loss of faith in theory in general and general theory in particular. But I hasten to add once again that losing faith in theory doesn’t mean giving up doing theory–it just means giving up the expectation of rightness in the doing.


How can we use arguments in ethics? lecture by Dagfinn Kåre Føllesdal at the Norwegian Academy of Science, Oslo, Norway, 30th January 1996. See also Føllesdal, 2008, or Føllesdal and Walløe, 2000.

Kennedy, 2002, p. 188.
Loss of faith in legal reasoning bears a close analogy to one of the many kinds of experience of loss of faith in God. The atheist who believes that he or she, or ‘science’, has disproved the existence of God is analogous to the maximalist who believes that postmodern critical theory has proved the indeterminacy of legal reasoning. The other kind of maximalist is like the Catholic who becomes a Protestant, rejecting authority while continuing to hold a theology. Loss of faith, by contrast, is not a theory and is not the consequence of a theory.

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Lakoff and Johnson, 1999. See also Lindner, 2005.


*Acres of diamonds* was a speech delivered by Russell Conwell over 5000 times at various times and places from 1900–1925. See audio and text on www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/cconwellacresofdiamonds.htm. His view of poverty was somewhat in resonance with defenders of the Indian caste system:

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Some men say, ‘Don’t you sympathise with the poor people?’ of course I do, or else I would not have been lecturing these years. I wont give in but what I sympathise with the poor, but the number of poor who are to be with is very small. To sympathise with a man whom God has punished for his sins, thus to help him when God would still continue a just punishment, is to do wrong, no doubt about it, and we do that more than we help those who are deserving. While we should sympathise with God’s poor-that is, those who cannot help themselves-let us remember that is not a poor person in the United States who was not made poor by his own shortcomings, or by the shortcomings of some one else. It is all wrong to be poor, anyhow. Let us give in to that argument and pass that to one side.

539 Karpin and Friedman, 1998.


543 Anthropologist Laura Nader, 2013, finds a ‘missionary-like zeal’ that reminds of Judeo-Christian ethics in American corporate culture and how it manufactures lifestyles, tastes, and desires, yet, also fractures families by commercialising childhood. ‘In this sense fundamentalism is as intimately connected to a type of economic system as it is to religious belief’, Nader, 2013, chapter 5, p. 147. It was a privilege to learn from Laura Nader at the Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11th–16th July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany.

544 Veblen, 1899.

545 Acres of diamonds was a speech delivered by Russell Conwell over 5000 times at various times and places from 1900 to 1925. See audio and text on www.americanhistoric.com/speeches/rconwellacresofdiamonds.htm. His view of poverty was in resonance with defenders of the Indian caste system. See also ‘Trump’s success shows many Americans believe only in America’, by Giles Fraser, The Guardian, 3rd March 2016, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2016/mar/03/donald-trump-success-shows-many-americans-believe-only-in-america:

When the Pilgrim Fathers got in their little boats and sailed to the new world, they took with them a narrative that had begun to build in England, that the protestant English were actually the chosen people. America, then, was to be the new Israel. The pilgrims had landed safe on Cannan’s side, the promised land. The original 13 colonies in North America ‘were nothing other than a regeneration of the twelve tribes of Israel’ as one American newspaper put it in 1864.

In other words, America became its own church and eventually its own god. Which is why the only real atheism in America is to call into question the American dream – a dream often indistinguishable from capitalism and the celebration of winners. This is the god Trump worships. He is its great high priest. And this is why evangelicals vote for him. But the God of Jesus Christ it not. The death of God comes in many diverse and peculiar forms. In America, it is the flag and not the cross that takes pride of place in the sanctuary.

546 Der Club der Reichen – wie viel Ungleichheit verträgt das Land? Hart aber fair, Das Erste, 7th May 2018, www.l.wdr.de/daserste/hartaberfair/sendungen/derclubderreichen-100.html. Entrepreneur Christoph Gröner, one of the participants in this programme, is not part of the global leisure class but a hard-working entrepreneur and is therefore be regarded by many as a more ‘credible’ defender of inequality. In this programme, he explains that he deserves his riches, not least because he works harder than, for instance, his doorman. For example, he comes to work even when he is sick. What he overlooks, in my view, however, is that the majority of the world’s population works even harder than
him without earning any riches, and, furthermore, that he needs a society to enable him systemically to
do his work, a society that gives priority to the common good and not to profit maximisation for a few.
If society enables successful dominators to enlarge the luxury first floor on spaceship Earth, so to
speak, without limits, the entire ship will sink.
Das Erste (The First), is a television channel that is coordinated by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der
öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunksenden der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ARD, a consortium of
public broadcasters in Germany, a joint organisation of Germany’s regional public-service
broadcasters.

547 See, among others, Barth and Moene, 2015.

548 The expression ‘sour grapes’ originated in The fox and the grapes, one of Aesop’s fables, and
means pretending that one doesn’t want something, because one does not or cannot have it.

549 Ury, 1999, p. xvii.

550 See Quincy Wright, 1942. I thank Klaus Schlichtmann, 2017, for reminding me of the foundational
text by Wright.

education, co-director of the Global Development And Environment Institute at Tufts University
(www.gdae.org) and project director of the Social Science Library (www.socialsciencelibrary.org), in
her contribution to the Great Transition Network Initiative discussion titled ‘The degrowth
alternative’, 30th January 2015:

…the 21st century is likely to become known as the century of loss. Species, opportunities, travel,
places where it is safe to live, many aspects of what we know as our lifestyles, will be seriously
diminished. We already see signs of it; the destruction of coral reefs; loss of fish, bird, and animal
species is just the tip of the (shrinking) iceberg. Carolyn Raffensperger speaks of Pre-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (www.commodityfacts.org/views/2013/01/24/prescription-injuries-soul-healing earth-healing-us) – as people know unconsciously what they don’t let themselves know
consciously.

On 2nd June 2016, in her comment to Escrigas, 2016, Neva Goodwin recommended the Heterodox
news website, www.heterodoxnews.com, when asked by students where they should go if they wanted
to learn about economics in the real world. Under ‘study programs’, this site provides an annotated list
of universities throughout the world that offer at least some courses which go beyond the mainstream.
I had the privilege of meeting Neva Goodwin at the Thirtieth Annual E. F. Schumacher Lectures
‘Voices of a New Economics’, in New York City on 20th November 2010.


553 Forbes, 2008, p. xvi.

554 Howard Richards in his upcoming book Economic theory and community development.

555 Ibid.

556 Arturo Escobar in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic
of ‘Feminism and revolution: Looking back, looking ahead’, 21st May 2018, in response to the essay
of the same title by Julie Matthaei, 2018. Italics added by Lindner.

557 Ibid.

558 Ibid.


560 Miki Kashtan in her contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic
of ‘Feminism and revolution: Looking back, looking ahead’, 15th May 2018, in response to the essay
of the same title by Julie Matthaei, 2018.

561 Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010. I thank Linda M. Hartling for sharing her
impressions of meeting Gandhi’s grandson Arun M. Gandhi at the ‘Messages of Peace’ Conference at

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Marylhurst University in Oregon, USA, 20th September 2009. Gandhi described the crucial lessons he learned from his grandfather about the lifelong practice of nonviolent action. He also offered a rare glimpse into how the women in his grandfather’s life shaped the development of nonviolent principles and practices. ‘You cannot change people’s hearts by law’, Grandfather said. Gandhi, 2003, p. 91: ‘You can only change hearts by love’. See also arungandhi.org.

564 See Pettit, 1997a.
565 Fuller and Gerloff, 2008. In a human rights context that stipulates that all human beings ought to be treated as equal in dignity and rights, hurtful psychological dynamics of humiliation are set in motion when rankism is practiced, when, for instance, ‘women’ are regarded as a lowly category, or ‘children’, ‘the elderly’, ‘foreigners’, and so forth. It is a privilege to have Robert Fuller as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.
566 Moisi, 2007, p. 8. I thank Selina Köhr for making me aware of this commentary by Dominque Moisi. See also Moisi, 2009. It is a privilege to have Selina Köhr as esteemed members in the core team of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.
567 Huntington, 1996.
568 Lindner, 2006a, p. 172.
570 Adapted from Lindner, 2006a, pp. 171–72.
571 Both constructivists and realists need explanations for how change occurs, this is what constructivist scholars of international relations explain: ‘Norm shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the balance of power are to the realist’, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 894. For the constructivist field of inquiry, when it looks at norm diffusion, or the localisation of global norms, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation in the ideational international structure. ‘Norms represent the legitimating core of global governance’ so global governance scholar Wiener, 2014, p. 19.

The contemporary scholarship on international practices connects structure and agency: ‘dynamic material and ideational processes enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents reproduce or transform structures’, Adler and Pouliot, 2011, p. 6. Practices are both extensions and manifestations of international norms, so Tholens, 2015.

Critical constructivists describe how state ‘antipreneurs’ challenge existing normative architectures with a range of strategies, for instance, demanding renegotiation, denying that consensus has ever been achieved (Claes, 2012), ‘counter-framing’ (Adachi, 2017), ‘fact-based reasoning’ (Campbell-Verduyn, 2017), and ‘ungrafting’ (Bob, 2017). Antipreneurs may be individuals, rival advocacy coalitions, or states that resist changing the normative status (Bloomfield and Scott, 2017, Bob, 2012).

Political scientist Jeffrey Lantis, offers an overview over the historical journey of the constructivist field and how it only slowly understood the power of ‘antipreneurs’ and ‘norm challengers’, who either openly contest norms or covertly contribute to ‘legitimacy gaps’. The first-generation constructivist approach to studying international cooperation still focused on positive cases of norm development, implementation, and success. It saw three stages of norm life: emergence, broad acceptance, and internalisation, so Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 895. Eleanor Roosevelt certainly was such a norm entrepreneur, as were the Scandinavian states (Ingebritsen, 1998). It was the second-generation of critical constructivist scholars who ‘woke up’ to the negative cases in the international discourse, where norms are contested (Tully, 2002, Reus-Smit, 2007), challenged, rejected, or modified by leaders or governments (Adamson, 2005, De Nevers, 2007). Norms, to be successfully diffused, need more than being included in legal frameworks and social practices, they also need cultural validation – they require formal validity, social validity, and cultural validity, for which reflexive, relational, and historical interpretation is needed (Giddens, 1979). What is open to contest is both the application and the justification of norms. Justificatory discourses are often more

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radical, drawing their legitimacy from the universalisation principle as formulated by philosopher Jürgen Habermas, 1992/1996. Following Habermas, a moral principle must be validated in intersubjective processes of communication rather than be derived from thought experiments in the isolated individual’s head, and those affected by a norm must be able to participate in arguing its validity.

Antje Wiener calls it ‘meaning-in-use’ when international norms come to mean different things when combined with pre-existing local cultural and historical contexts, see Wiener, 2014, p. 14. Wiener identifies a ‘legitimacy gap’ between ‘fundamental norms’ that often enjoy a high level of acceptance and consensus, and the ‘standardised procedures’ or means of implementing these norms that often are highly contested, for example, military intervention to prevent atrocities, or environmental protection interventions. Wiener, 2014, p. 10: ‘Norm challengers’ have the potential to erode norms in public discourse, yet, they can also help fill the ‘legitimacy gap’.

In the third-generation scholarship on international practices four different schools of literature on contestation have emerged. First, contestation can arise in the norm development process itself, second, already established normative architectures can be contested, third, alternative patterns of norm diffusion and localisation may interfere with the internalisation of norms in standard ways at the state level, fourth, norm entrepreneurs may clash with ‘antipreneurs’ (Bloomfield and Scott, 2017). Western evangelical Christian groups, for instance, or the U.S. gun lobby, have worked with groups in the developing world to contest the development of so-called liberal norms (Bob, 2012, Bob, 2016).

572 Stephan Feuchtwang in a personal communication, 14th November 2002.


574 Lindner, 2015 – 2018. Many may remember the work of ethologist Konrad Lorenz, 1963/1966, who, in his book *On aggression*, describes intergroup aggression as being different from intragroup aggression. Among animals, fights for rank are seldom fatal, while, by contrast, groups of animals might fight to the death among each other, willing to kill or be killed in defense of their community. Consider also Larry Brendtro, et al., 2009, who point out that saying ‘you no longer belong to our group’ amounts to the ultimate form of punishment, namely, by social death. I thank Mechthild Nagel, for making me aware of Brendtro’s work. See also the work of sociologist Michèle Lamont, who speaks of a *recognition gap* in: ‘Addressing the recognition gap: Destigmatisation and the reduction of inequality’, by Michèle Lamont in a seminar in the President’s Seminar series, part of the Rethinking Open Society project, 4th December 2017, https://youtu.be/VrrHb6mUNAo.

575 Lindner, 2006a, p. 28–29. This table is adapted from Smith, 2001, p. 543. I thank him for coining the words conquest/relegation/reinforcement/inclusion humiliation. It is a privilege to have Dennis Smith as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

576 Lindner, 2001a.

577 Opperman Lewis, 2016. It is a privilege to have Hélène Opperman Lewis as esteemed member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


579 Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

580 Trehwhela, 2009.

581 Philosopher Howard Richards lives in Chile, and works often in South Africa. I had the privilege of joining him in both places. See Lindner, 2012b, Richards, et al., 2015a.


583 Political researcher Noha Tarek in her contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Human rights: Advancing the frontier of emancipation’, 14th March 2018, in response to the essay of the same title by Kathryn Sikkink, 2018. See
The reaction of entrenched-interest holders to the events of 1848 in Europe and the Civil War in the United States was heavy-handed and, in the short term, successful. By the summer of 1849, open revolutionary conflict in Europe had already ended. Revolutionaries and their sympathisers were persecuted all across Europe. In the United States, Reconstruction inaugurated a new era of conservative hold on power and racial oppression on the ground. But historical time, as even then the conservatives knew all too well, is measured on a larger scale. To tame the wild surges of mass politics once and for all would require a feat of thought: nothing less than the creation of a form of consciousness capable of limiting reform while speaking in the language of the revolutionary reformers. The Great Alliance of legal historicism and rationalism would bring this creation into being.
612 Barrozo, 2015, pp. 268.
613 Coleman, et al., 2007, Coleman, 2011, Coleman, et al., 2008, Vallacher, et al., 2010. See for more, ‘Project on dynamical systems, peace, conflict and social change’, by Peter T. Coleman, http://ac4.ei.columbia.edu/ac4-supported-initiatives/dynamical-systems-theory-at-columbia-university-v2/. Peter Coleman is professor of psychology and education director of the Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (MD-ICCCR). He and his colleagues use a dynamical systems approach to conceptualise the intransigence entailed in intractable conflict. The Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship is honoured to have Morton Deutsch (who sadly passed away in 2017) and Peter Coleman, together with Claudia Cohen, Beth Fisher-Yoshida, Andrea Bartoli, and many other of their colleagues, as esteemed members of the first hour in our global advisory board. See also Coleman, et al., 2009, Goldman and Coleman, 2005b, a.
614 Hassan Abdi Keynan in a personal communication, 15th March 2018. It is a privilege to have Hassan Keynan as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.
615 Archer, 2011.
616 ‘The mission creep of dignity: Dignity has less to do with autonomy or independence than with intrinsic worth and the ability to flourish’, by Mark Regnerus, MercatorNet, 20th January 2015, www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_mission_creep_of_dignity. I thank Hilarie Roseman for making me aware of this article.
617 Western-liberal political philosophy sees the forms of dignity that can be legally respected and protected by a state as the right to self-determination, autonomy, and agency (Rosen, 2012).
619 Smith, 2010.
620 See also McCruden, 2013b, and his analysis of Siegel, 2012, where she discusses the use of dignity terminology by the Catholic Church in relation to abortion and same-sex marriage, where she differentiates ‘dignity as autonomy’, from ‘dignity as equality’, and ‘dignity as life’. McCruden rejects any monolithic representation of Catholic thought and highlights that there ‘is an intense discussion currently occurring within the community of Catholic theologians and within communities of Catholics more generally about human rights, the role of women, and gay rights, with a wide variety of different viewpoints being expressed and debated’.
I thank Francisco Gomes de Matos for sending me also Human dignity is the right of all, by Fr. Shay Cullen, The People’s Recovery Empowerment and Development Assistance (PREDA) Foundation, 4th November 2016, www.preda.org/fr-shays-articles/human-dignity-is-the-right-of-all/.
621 Beattie, 2018, p. 44:

God confers upon all humans ‘an infinite dignity’ (Evangelii Gaudium, 178) and ‘no one can strip us of the dignity bestowed upon us by [Christ’s] boundless and unfailing love’ (EG, 3).
I thank Francisco Gomes de Matos for introducing me to Tina Beattie.

Life, human life above all, belongs to God alone. Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to guarantee this’.
623 Beattie, 2018, p. 45.

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625 See the work of international law expert Alfred Verdross (1890–1980), who, in his legal philosophy, drew on the common good purpose of the state laid out by Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. See, among others Verdross and Gorby, 1979, Verdross and Simma, 1984.

626 Bischöfliches Hilfswerk MISEREOR, 2015, Reder, et al., 2015.

627 McCrudden, 2013b.


629 It was an honour to be in touch with Benjamin Harnwell, Hon. Secretary of the Working Group on Human Dignity in the European Parliament, and Founder and President of the Board of Trustees, Dignitatis Humanae Institute, since 2012, among others, through the introduction by Francisco Gomes de Matos.


• having regard to the Charter of Liberties (1100),
• having regard to Magna Carta (1215),
• having regard to the Warsaw Confederation and Henrician Articles (1573),
• having regard to the Bill of Rights (1689),
• having regard to the five invocations to God in the United States Declaration of Independence (1776),
• having regard to the ‘presence’ and ‘the auspices of the Supreme Being’ invoked by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789),
• having regard to the United States Bill of Rights (1791),
• having regard to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
• having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (1950),
• having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965),
• having regard to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),
• having regard to the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966),
• having regard to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (1984),
• having regard to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987),
• having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000).

631 Karlberg, 2013. See also Chong and Druckman, 2007.


634 Karlberg, 2013, p. 12.

635 See also the work by Margaret Archer, 2011, and Mark Regnerus. See, for instance, ‘The mission creep of dignity: Dignity has less to do with autonomy or independence than with intrinsic worth and the ability to flourish’, by Mark Regnerus, MercatorNet, 20th January 2015, www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_mission_creep_of_dignity. I thank Hilarie Roseman for making me aware of this article.

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638 Metz, 2012.

639 Metz, 2012.

640 Metz, 2012.


642 Mokgoro, 1998, p. 3.


644 Iroegbu, 2005, p. 442.


646 ‘The torture colony’, by Bruce Falconer, The American Scholar, Essays - Autumn 2008, 1st September 2008, https://theamericanscholar.org/the-torture-colony/. In a remote part of Chile, an German evangelist cult leader built a utopia community whose members helped the Pinochet regime torture and kill dissidents. See also Fröhling, 2012. Unfortunately, I failed to realise my plan to visit this community when I was in Chile in 2012.


648 Psychologist Stanley Smith Stevens, 1946, has developed the best known classification of measurement with four levels, or scales: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio.

649 Scheler, 1914–1916/1957. Scheler sees that the human being, before she can be an ens cogitans (‘a thinking being’) or an ens volens (‘a volitional being’), is an ens amans, a ‘loving being’.

650 Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) was a major contributor to sociological theory and field studies. Tönnies, 1887/1955, is best known for his distinction between two types of social groups – Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. He explains that community is based on family life, rests on harmony, and is developed and ennobled by folkways, morals, and religion, with morality being an expression of religious beliefs and forces, intertwined with family spirit and folkways.

651 Szirtes, 2012, p. 139.

652 In a recent article, social philosopher Nancy Fraser, 2014, explores the strengths and weaknesses of the classic 1944 book The great transformation by Karl Polanyi and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Foreword), 1944/2001, where he traced the roots of capitalist crisis to efforts to create ‘self-regulating markets’ in land, labour and money. Fraser, 2014, Abstract:

The effect was to turn those three fundamental bases of social life into ‘fictitious commodities’. The inevitable result, Polanyi claimed, was to despoil nature, rupture communities and destroy livelihoods. This diagnosis has strong echoes in the twenty-first century: witness the burgeoning markets in carbon emissions and biotechnology in child-care, schooling and the care of the old and in financial derivatives. In this situation, Polanyi’s idea of fictitious commodification affords a promising basis for an integrated structural analysis that connects three dimensions of the present crisis: the ecological, the social and the financial.

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I thank Mai-Bente Bonnevie for reminding me of Fraser’s work in this context. It is a privilege to have Mai-Bente Bonnevie as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Sugarman, et al., 2015, p. 113. Sundararajan quotes Sugarman as saying that when rationality of the economic order prevails over that of democracy, we have neoliberalism, or, as Solovey and Cravens, 2012, would say, we have capitalistic democracy.


Hans Rosling and Steven Pinker have been criticised of having a positivity bias, also called Pollyannism, which means remembering pleasant items more accurately than unpleasant ones. The 1913 novel Pollyanna by Eleanor H. Porter describes a girl who tries to find something to be glad about in every situation.

See also A confused statistician, by Anne H. Ehrlich and Paul R. Ehrlich, Millennium Alliance for Humanity and Biosphere, 12th November 2013, http://mahb.stanford.edu/blog/a-confused-statistician. See also David Pilling, 2018, and his related analysis. I thank Michelle Brenner for making me aware of Pilling’s work.

Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

Galtung, 1990.

Milani, 2008.

Styhre, 2017.


Richards, 2016a. See also historian Philipp Ther, 2014/2016, p. x, and his summary of the main pillars of neoliberal ideology:

Blind belief in the market as an adjudicator in almost all human affairs, irrational reliance on the rationality of market participants, disdain for the state as expressed in the myth of ‘big government’, and the uniform application of the economic recipes of the Washington Consensus.


Styhre, 2017.

Lindner, 2009b, p. 85.

See, among others, the book by Deresiewicz, 2014, Excellent sheep, www.billderesiewicz.com/books/excellent-sheep:

Excellent sheep takes a sharp look at the high-pressure conveyor belt that begins with parents and counsellors who demand perfect grades and culminates in the skewed applications Deresiewicz saw first-hand as a member of Yale’s admissions committee. As schools shift focus from the humanities to ‘practical’ subjects like economics and computer science, students are losing the ability to think in innovative ways. Deresiewicz explains how college should be a time for self-discovery, when students can establish their own values and measures of success, so they can forge their own path. He addresses parents, students, educators, and anyone who’s interested in the direction of American society, featuring quotes from real students and graduates he has corresponded with over

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the years, candidly exposing where the system is broken and clearly presenting solutions.


As to the UK, see ‘Coalition of thinkers vow to fight marketisation of universities’, by Shiv Malik, *The Guardian*, 8th November 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/education/2012/nov/08/coalition-thinkers-fight-marketisation-universities, where we read that the ‘purpose of university is being’ grossly distorted by the attempt to create a market in higher education’. See also: ‘Why I am not a professor OR the decline and fall of the British university’, by Mark Tarver, 2007, www.lambdassociates.org/blog/decline.htm.

For Germany, see Münch, 2011. See how the corporate sector in Germany has developed a ‘master plan’ for how to change the educational system, in *Die Hochschule der Zukunft: Das Leitbild der Wirtschaft*, by Dieter Hundt, Präsident, Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände e. V. (BDA), and Hans-Peter Keitel, Präsident, Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V. (BDI), Berlin, February 2010, www.arbeitgeber.de/www%5Carbeitgeber.nsf/res/Hochschule_der_Zukunft.pdf/$file/Hochschule_der _Zukunft.pdf. I thank Ines Balta for making me aware of this publication.

Kamran Mofid in a personal communication, 21st March 2018. It is a privilege to have Kamran Mofid as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Tim Weiskel in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘A higher calling for higher education’, 1st June 2016, in response to Escrigas, 2016.

Lindner, 2009b, Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014a. It is a privilege to have Clark McCauley as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Snow, 1959.


Habermas, 1968/1972, p. 4. See also Fatemi, 2014.

Billig, 2013. It was a privilege to meet Michael Billig at the University of Oslo in 2006, and listen to his fascinating lecture.

Lindner, 2009b, p. 133.

See the book that one of the hostages, Kristin Enmark, 2015, wrote more than four decades after the event.


Chege, 1996.

Kevin Clements in a personal communication, 21st August 2007. It is a privilege to have Kevin Clements as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Pieterse, 2000, p. 182. It was a privilege to meet with Pieterse on 23th September 2002 in Paris.

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See the videos that we made to document the important hours of learning in Joni Odochaw’s Pgak’ Nyau (Karen) village Ban Nong Thao, at www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/videos.php#thailand.


See, among others, Rogers, 1977, Kirschenbaum and Henderson, 1990, Rogers, et al., 2014. Reinhard Tausch, a student of Carl Rogers, was my professor when I studied psychology and specialised as clinical psychologist at the University of Hamburg, Germany, 1974–1978.

See Belenky, et al., 1997a, Belenky, et al., 1997b, Clinchy, 1996. In connected knowing ‘one attempts to enter another person’s frame of reference to discover the premises for the person’s point of view’, explain Clinchy and Zimmerman, 1985. See also Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.


Belenky, et al., 1997b.

Heller, 1984. See also social psychologist, feminist, and politician Berit Ås, 2008. Berit Ås explained her concept of male master suppression techniques to Evelin Lindner in her home in Asker, Norway, 31st May 2014, https://youtu.be/mRASpPcI8hk. She explains how she started out with five master suppression techniques and later extended them. Berit Ås is professor of social science, the first female party leader in Norway (Democratic Socialists, AIK), a peace activist and feminist. She has been a Member of Parliament and founder of the Norwegian Women’s University. Her areas of research are accident and consumer research and in-depth women’s studies. She is a Knight of the Order of St. Olav first class. She has lectured on her theory of five male master suppression techniques in more than forty countries on four continents. Among others, she refers to Robert Merton (damned if you do and damned if you don’t), Ingjald Nissen, and her mentor Harriet Holter. It was a privilege to have Berit Ås as opponent when I defended my doctoral dissertation in 2001 at the University of Oslo, and to have her as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


On 16th November 2011, writer and peace scholar Janet Gerson took me to Zuccotti Park and The Atrium in New York City, where most of the Occupy Wall Street activities took place. Janet Gerson shared with me her doctoral research and I thank her for reminding me of the significance of the notion of grappling. See www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/evelinpics11.php.#OWS. It is a privilege to have Janet Gerson as esteemed member in the board of directors of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

As to the concept of nudging, see, among others, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, or Sunstein, 2016. For reflections on conditions of freedom, see, for instance, John MacMurray, 1949/1991, and on resistance to manipulation, see, among others, Thomas Teo, 2015. I thank Louise Sundararajan for making me aware of Teo’s work.

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The formulation ‘waging good conflict’ was coined by Jean Baker Miller, 1976/1986a. Jean Baker Miller’s husband Seymour ‘Mike’ Miller, has reflected on sociologist Joseph Michels, 1911/1915, and his classic concept iron law of oligarchy with respect to left-wing organisations. Miller, 2008b:

Many of these organisations flourished mainly because they had a charismatic leader who dominated their thinking and activities. While I am all for democracy, I have realised from my many activities and involvements that the quality of organisational leadership is crucial. Unfortunately, too few studies of social movements adequately explore the ongoing life of organizations that seek to change a neighbourhood, company, the nation or the world. Nor has that literature explored how some social movements achieved important transformations.

It was a privilege to have Jean Baker Miller as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, until her passing in 2007, and we will always honour her spirit. It is equally gratifying to have also her husband Seymour M. (Mike) Miller in our global advisory board.

Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 4th June 2009.


Cristina Escrigas, 2016, is the former executive director of, and current adviser to, the Global University Network for Innovation (GUNi), an organisation created by UNESCO, the United Nations University, and the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC).

Michael Karlberg in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘A higher calling for higher education’, 13th May 2016, in response to Escrigas, 2016.

Berlin, 1969, p. xlv. See also Berlin, 1958a, b. The 2017 documentary film Freedom for the wolf/ by Rupert Russell takes its title from Isaiah Berlin. It is about the idea of freedom and how it is being hollowed out by the ‘wolves’. Yet, people all over the globe – from Tunisian rappers to Indian comedians, from America’s #BlackLivesMatter activists to Hong Kong’s students – struggle to regain freedom for the ‘sheep’. See www.freedomforthewolf.com. I thank Nicklas Viki for having made me aware of this film!

Blanqui, 1872, p.76, French original:

Toujours et partout, dans le camp terrestre, le même drame, le même décor; sur la même scène
Étroite, une humanité bruyante, infatuée de sa grandeur, se croyant l’univers et vivant dans sa prison comme dans une immensité, pour sombrer bientôt avec le globe qui a porté dans le plus profond dédain, le fardeau de son orgueil.


_Sociocide_, the killing of a society’s capacity to survive and to reproduce itself, should become equally and prominently a crime against humanity. A society is a self-reproducing social system. So are human beings, with our basic needs for survival, wellness, identity, freedom. Society is also an organism, with a lifespan far beyond that of individuals. For humans to survive as humans, their basic needs have to be met. For that to happen the society has to survive. For the society to survive the basic social _prerequisites_ must be met:

• for _security_, against violence, killing, wounding the members;
• for _economic sustainability_, against their starvation, illness;
• for _identity_ culturally, a meaning with life, against alienation;
• for _autonomy_ politically, to be a master of their own house.

As society unfolds, so do humans, and vice versa. Life breeds life. This also holds for nomadic societies based on hunter-gatherers. Monasteries are incapable of self-reproduction biologically when based on one gender, but are highly viable societies based on recruitment.

Under modernity, identity is carried by the _nation_, with four characteristics: an _idiom_, a _religion-world view_, a _history_ – of the past, present and future – and _geographical attachment_. _Time, space_, with the means to communicate and something to believe is crucial.

Under modernity the state is the key executor of all the above. _Sociocide is the intended wounding-killing of a society by eliminating the prerequisites for a live, vibrant, dynamic society._

_Sociocide_ molests the human members. In the longer run, lethally. _Sociocide_ is what Western, and not only Western, colonialism has done for centuries, denying others their autonomy, imposing their own identity – language and world-view – moving others out of their own historical dialectic and into history as Western periphery, denying them the land they are attached to with their hearts and minds. And their bodies for security and sustenance, for food, water, health.

See also Cormann, 2015.

716 Higgins, 2016.

717 Fox, 2017.


719 Fox, 2017.


721 Oppenlander, 2011. See also _Cowspiracy: The sustainability secret_, a 2015 environmental documentary following filmmaker Kip Andersen as he shows that animal agriculture is the leading cause of deforestation, water consumption, and pollution, is responsible for more greenhouse gases than the transportation industry, and a primary driver of rainforest destruction, species extinction, habitat loss, topsoil erosion, ocean ‘dead zones’, and virtually every other environmental ill. See www.cowspiracy.com, https://youtu.be/S-XP79o8gqQ.


723 Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.


725 Ibid.

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Is economic growth ‘a rising tide lifting all boats’, and is ‘capital trickling down to everybody’? The United Nations claims that extreme poverty worldwide has been halved. The number of people living on less than 1.25 dollars a day fell from 47 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2010. There are still 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty, but a new middle-class is emerging worldwide, even if the success in the numbers is due basically to Brazil, China and India. So, the argument from the defenders of the present economic model is ‘if there are a few super rich, why do we ignore the enormous progress that has created 1 billion new middle-class citizens?’ The neo-liberal period unleashed by the Washington Consensus advantaged financial capitalism over productive capitalism.

Problems:

- Inequality, with extreme wealth for a few, the middle class shrinking in rich countries, and permanent unemployment for ever more,
- the rich are not paying taxes as before, because of a large number of fiscal benefits and fiscal paradises,
- politics has become subservient to economic interests,

- Ibid.
- Raskin, et al., 2002. See also Raskin, 2008, and Brangwyn and Hopkins, .
- It is a privilege to have Luis Razeto and Howard Richards as esteemed members in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.
- Maria Dahle, at the occasion of the United Nations’ 60-years Jubilee in 2008 in Oslo, and the OSCE conference in 2011 in Warsaw. She shared her insights with me in person in Oslo on 13th February 2013. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is the principal institution of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). ODIHR organises an
annual meeting in Warsaw to review the implementation of a broad range of OSCE human dimension commitments, including in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, elections, the promotion of tolerance, use of the death penalty, and the rights of national minorities. The Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) lasts 10 working days and is attended by representatives of OSCE participating States, NGOs, and international organisations and institutions. See Dahle, 2011, and also Dahle, 2008. It is a privilege to have Maria Dahle as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


Takis Ioannides in a personal communication, 13th April 2014. It is a privilege to have Takis Ioannides as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Scharmer, 2007. Otto Scharmer is a Senior Lecturer at MIT and founding chair of the Presencing Institute. See also Scharmer and Kaufer, 2013. I thank Lynn King, Chinese American Global Leadership Coach, Trainer, and Consultant, for talking to me about Otto Scharmer’s work. Lynn King is originally from Shanghai and has now returned there, after being raised in Hong Kong and New York. It is a privilege to have Lynn King as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


‘Depression is the second most common cause of disability worldwide after back pain, according to a review of research. See Ferrari, et al., 2013.


Ecology and Society is a leading journal for the discussion of nature-society interactions, for which the term social-ecological and similar expressions have become mainstream terminology.


Kolbert, 2014.

Young, et al., 2015.


Westdeutscher Rundfunk Köln, WDR, West German Broadcasting Cologne, is a German public-broadcasting institution based in the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia with its main office in Cologne.


Norddeutscher Rundfunk, NDR, North German Broadcasting, is a public radio and television broadcaster, based in Hamburg.

See also Neiderud, 2015.

Rees, 2018:

Reinforcing the neurological evidence, studies have found associations directly between air pollution exposure and cognitive outcomes, including reduced verbal and nonverbal IQ, memory, test scores and grade-point averages among school children, as well as other neurological behavioural problems, Rees, 2018, pp. 12–22.

... Air pollutants inhaled during pregnancy can cross the placenta and affect the developing brain of a foetus, with potential lifelong effects. Research shows an association between prenatal exposure to high levels of air pollution and developmental delay at age three, as well as psychological and behavioural problems later in childhood, including symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety and depression, Rees, 2018, pp. 23–27.

... One study reports a four-point drop in IQ by the age of 5 among a sample of children exposed in utero to toxic air pollution, Rees, 2018, p. 28.


Rigaud, et al., 2018.

Bardi, 2013.

Professor in physical chemistry at the University of Florence, Italy, Ugo Bardi, in ‘Der geplünderte Planet – der Club of Rome und die globale Ressourcen-Krise, ttt – titel thesem temperamente, ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Consortium of public broadcasters in Germany, a joint organisation of Germany’s regional public-service broadcasters), 16th June 2013, www.daserste.de/information/wissen-
kultur/ttt/sendung/hr/sendung_vom_16062013-114.html. Translated from the German original by Lindner: ‘Es ist keine Lösung des Energieproblems, es ist ein ohnmächtiger Versuch, um jeden Preis weiterzumachen, obwohl man genau weiß: Es ist Dead End’.


Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London promotes the rigorous study of international questions and is independent of government and other vested interests. I thank Dan Smith, director of International Alert, for discussing this report in his blog ‘Resources – the coming crunch and some things that could be done about it’ on 7th January 2013, dansmithsblog.com/2013/01/07/resources-the-coming-crunch-and-some-things-that-could-be-done-about-it/.

I thank Dan Smith for his support when he was the director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and I devised research proposals for my doctorate, see Lindner, 1995b, Lindner, 1995a.

766 In 2017, the scientists in charge of the Doomsday Clock set the clock at just two and a half minutes from the apocalypse, considering that the Earth is now closer to oblivion than it has ever been since 1953, at the height of the nuclear confrontation between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. See http://thebulletin.org/timeline. See also the William J. Perry Project (www.wjperryproject.org) that was created by the former U.S. secretary of defense to work toward a world in which nuclear weapons are never used again.


768 ‘Food is the new oil; land, the new gold’, by Lester R. Brown, president of the Earth Policy Institute, Human Wrongs Watch, 7th February 2016, human-wrongs-watch.net/2013/02/09/20442/.


771 FIVAS is working to map out and spread information on issues affecting water in the global south. We aim to influence national and international policies to maintain the rights of individuals and to protect the environment. Bearing forth the voice of affected groups is central to our work towards Norwegian authorities, Norwegian companies and in international networks. www.fivas.org/ENGLISH.aspx.

772 See, among others, Capra and Mattei, 2015, or Angus, 2016.

773 Stephen Purdey, international relations specialist and research affiliate of the Waterloo Institute for Complexity and Innovation at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, in his contribution to the Great Transition Network Initiative discussion titled ‘Journey to Earthland: Making the great transition to planetary civilisation’, 24th October 2016, in response to Raskin, 2016. Herman Greene is the President of the Center for Ecozoic Societies, www.ecozoicsocieties.org.


776 ‘Klimawandel “Gleicht einem kollektiven Suizidversuch”’, Interview with Hans Joachim Schellnhuber von Alex Rühle, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14th May 2018, www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/klimawandel-gleicht-einem-kollektiven-suizidversuch-1.3978878?reduced=true. Translated from the German original by Lindner:


777 ‘Climate scientist goes off the rails: “Climate change is like an asteroid strike”’, by Anthony Watts, Watts up with that? (this is a climate change denial blog that opposes the scientific consensus on climate change), 16th May 2018, https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/05/16/climate-scientist-goes-off-the-rails-climate-change-is-like-an-asteroid-strike/.


781 I therefore planned for a postdoctoral research project where I would contact TNC boards to find out more, see Lindner, 2000d. See also Collins, 2016. For classism, have a look at Barbara Jensen, 2012.


783 Carol Smaldino in a personal communication, 21st April 2013. It is a privilege to have Carol Smaldino as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


785 Collins, 2016, p. 4. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of Collins’ book.


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788 Polly Higgins, in a personal message, 3rd October 2013. I am very thankful to Sumudu Atapattu, 2016a, of the University of Wisconsin Law School for sharing the syllabus of his course ‘Selected problems in international law: Climate change, human rights, and the environment’ of Fall 2017 with the Global Network for the Study of Human Rights and Environment on 14th February 2018. The main documents that any interested reader needs to look at are: The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, the Declaration of the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the IPCC 5th Assessment Report of 2013, the Bali Action Plan of 2007, the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, the Doha Climate Gateway of 2012, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change of 2015, and the Sustainable Development Goals of 2015. Furthermore, Atapattu’s students are advised to look at Naomi Klein, 2014, and Gus Speth, 2008, for an overview, to read about causes, impacts, and uncertainty in the publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2007, to read about climate change within the context of international environmental law in Sands, et al., 2018, and about the politics of climate change and the North-South divide, and international legal frameworks in Hunter, et al., 2015, and in Maguire and Jiang, 2015. Students are advised to learn about the Paris Agreement on Climate Change from Burleson, 2016, and about sustainable development, the precautionary principle, the inter-generational equity principle, and the common but differentiated responsibility principle in Wold, et al., 2009b. The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) was formalised in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, acknowledging that all states have shared obligations to address environmental destruction, while affirming that the responsibility with regard to environmental protection has to be differentiated and cannot be equal for all states. Atapattu’s students are advised to read about environmental protection and human rights, among others, in Shelton, 2015, to read about climate change and human rights in Knox, 2009, and Atapattu, 2016b; about environmental/climate justice as a framework in Gonzalez, 2013, and Osofsky, 2005; about human rights implications of adaptation and mitigation options in Hall and Weiss, 2012, and Stillings, 2014; about climate refugees in Mcadam, 2012, and Williams, 2008; about the challenge of the disappearances of states, among others, in Burkett, 2011; about reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) and indigenous rights in Kronk Warner, 2015; about adjudicating climate change in Hunter, 2009; and, finally, about novel approaches to state responsibility in Atapattu, 2009, and about the future of international climate change law in Wold, et al., 2009a.

789 Femke Wijdekop, 2016.


Climate litigation has been steadily rising for the past decade across jurisdictions. In early 2017, there were over 1,200 laws and policies related to climate change in 164 countries, while in 1997 there were only 60. In the USA, around 20 new climate lawsuits are now filed each year, up from just a couple in 2002. Outside the USA, 64 climate cases have been filed in the past 15 years, 21 of which have been filed since 2015.

The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre is an international NGO that tracks the human rights impacts (positive and negative) of over 7500 companies in over 180 countries making information available on its eight language website. I thank Erin Daly for informing us of this report. It is a privilege to have Erin Daly as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

791 Linda Sheehan, Executive Director of the Earth Law Center in Redwood City, California, in her contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Against ecocide: Legal
protection for Earth’, 31th July 2016, in response to Femke Wijdekop, 2016:

We have taken great strides in the last century to recognise the inherent rights and dignity of people. The next step is to expand our recognised community further, to embrace the inherent rights and dignity of the natural world. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1 recognises that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. As articulated by the Declaration’s Drafting Committee, ‘the supreme value of the human person…did not originate in the decision of a worldly power, but rather in the fact of existing’. Just as we protect humans’ inherent rights from the excesses of potentially harmful governing bodies, so too should we protect our partners on Earth from the excesses of humans and human governance systems. The rights of all beings, including our own, are limited to the extent necessary to maintain the integrity, balance and health of the larger whole.

Examples are the so-called Aarhus Convention, signed on 25th June 1998 in the Danish city of Aarhus, entering into force on 30th October 2001. The Aarhus Convention establishes a number of rights of the public with regard to the environment. See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/.

792 The conflict horizon 3: Only connect, Dan Smith’s blog, 25th April 2014, http://dansmithsblog.com/2014/04/25/the-conflict-horizon-3-only-connect/. See, among many other relevant publications, also Ahmed, 2017. I thank Dan Smith for his support when he was the director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and I devised research proposals for my doctorate, see Lindner, 1995b, Lindner, 1995a. See also, among many other relevant publications, Ahmed, 2017.

793 Mazzetti, 2013. See the book description:

The most momentous change in American warfare over the past decade has taken place in the corners of the world where large armies can’t go. The CIA, originally created as a Cold War espionage service, is now more than ever a paramilitary agency ordered by the White House to kill off America’s enemies. In The way of the knife, Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times reporter Mark Mazzetti recounts the untold story of America’s shadow war, one that blurred the lines between soldiers and spies and lowered the bar for waging war across the globe. This new approach – carried out by CIA operatives and special operations troops – has been embraced by Washington as a lower-risk and cost effective alternative to the messy wars of occupation, but as Mazzetti demonstrates in this revealing book, the way of the knife has created enemies just as it has killed them.


795 Marsella, 2014. It is a privilege to have Anthony Marsella as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship. Marsella sees the causes of mass acts of violence as being specific to the people, forces, and circumstances of each instance, yet, also as residing in larger and enduring sets of forces and events that exist at different levels of our lives, and that interact and cascade off one another in an ever amplified and self-defeating cycle of individual and societal deviancy.

Marsella sees the roots of violent shooting and bombing events in:
(1) formative causes (e.g., genetics, temperament, early life experiences, characterological dispositions, social structural circumstances, race, poverty),
(2) precipative causes (e.g., bullying, rejection, humiliation, perceived abuses by government),
(3) exacerbative causes (e.g., membership in violence groups, gun availability and accessibility), and
(4) maintenance causes (e.g., membership in a broader culture and/or milieu that justifies violence, sanctions it, and legitimates it as a way to resolve individual and social inequities):

Within this framework of multiple and interactive causality, events, forces, practices, and values at macro-social levels (i.e., government, social structure, economic system) ‘trickle down’ to microsocial levels (i.e., family, schools, workplaces, media), and then ‘trickle down’ to individual psychological and behavioural levels (e.g., beliefs, emotions, values). In a few words, we are socialised by the culture in which we live. This socialisation can prepare us for becoming

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productive and responsible citizens, or demented and sociopathic persons committed to violence and destruction, driven by an ends justifies the means mentality.

... Think back to the 2012 presidential election in the United States. There was an obvious absence of substantive discussions about major societal issues, including materialism, consumerism, commodification, greed, distribution of power, celebrity fixations, abuses of constitutional human rights, local, national, and international militarism, injustice and humiliation of the poor, immigrants, and certain religious and cultural groups. At best, if these were spoken, it was minimal in words and time, and the election focused on specific events (e.g., Libyan assassinations, national debt, abortion, candidate personality). The clever use of media (i.e., TV political ads, image creations and management) kept us from raising or even addressing major problems we face as a nation -- our identity, our values, our role as a resource for peace rather than war, for justice rather than its miscarriages, for people rather than corporations, for decency rather than humiliation, and for democracy rather than ‘hypocrisy’.

... Say what you will in argument and contention, the United States of America is a ‘Culture of Violence’, and we are exporting that culture in all of its manifestations and forms across the world as we encourage greed, profit, consumerism, materialism, commodification, environmental exploitation, demonisation of nations and cultures, militarisation of societies, abuses of human rights, criminal acts of assassination under the guise of protection, and endemic and epidemic fear. Think of Sandy Creek in a new light: A ‘unique’ emotionally troubled and confused individual gradually becomes socialised to intolerable levels of hate, anger, and alienation, and soon becomes immune to the horrors of death and destruction that he fantasises. He is immersed daily in a culture that accepts and approves violence via a media, entertainment, and public and private institution that glorifies and justifies ‘power’, ‘domination’, ‘force’ and ‘dehumanisation’. With easy access to assault weapons, his constructs a deviant reality with each passing day. Finally, it becomes time (1) for him to be an avenging angel (note how many movies, TV shows, and honour this theme), (2) for all others to suffer at his hand, (3) for him redeem the abuses seen or witnessed each day on streets, schools, workplaces, and (4) to act as an armed militaristic hero righting wrongs. Everyone becomes his target, in a final gesture of contempt and protest toward a family, school, and life that has denied him any semblance of worth as a person. Yes, he pulled the trigger, but so did our culture of violence. And, we must ask, is it only guns that cause mass violence acts? What happens when toxins, viruses, bombs, automobiles, and drones begin to exact a toll. Guns were a means to an end, and there are hundreds of millions still out there, and more being purchased and stored each day. Anger and rage will find other means, because violence is nurtured in a cultural milieu that supports it and sustains it.

... We can lament, apologise, pray, change some laws regarding gun control, and even speak correctly of the need for improvements in prevention-oriented school mental health services. But the major cause, our ‘culture of violence’ that socialises all of our minds and behaviour each day, is not being addressed, nor even acknowledged by our local and national leaders. Rather, they have focused on how we must guard against and control ‘demented individuals’, who are the trigger-pullers, but not the sources that socialise minds.

... We need a national dialog that will yield an action agenda. This agenda must simultaneously address the many cultural forces that shape the context of our lives. As individuals and a nation, we must choose peace over war, empathy over detachment, responsibility over self-interest, connection over separation, civility over exploitation, and justice over all. We need to build a culture of peace. And to do so, we will have to give priority to a new moral code that prizes peace.

Buffett: ‘There are lots of loose nukes around the world’, interview with Lou Dobbs, CNN, 25th May 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/05/10/buffett/index.html. See also ‘In class warfare, guess which class is winning’, by Ben Stein, New York Times, 26th November 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/business/yourmoney/26every.html?_r=0, with a similar quote: ‘There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and
we’re winning’.
See, furthermore, ‘Socialism? The rich are winning the US class war: Facts show rich getting richer, everyone else poorer’, by Bill Quigley, Common Dreams, 25th October 2010, www.commondreams.org/views/2010/10/25/socialism-rich-are-winning-us-class-war-facts-show-rich-getting-richer-everyone. Bill Quigley is associate director of the Center for Constitutional Rights and a law professor at Loyola University New Orleans:

The rich talk about the rise of socialism to divert attention from the fact that they are devouring the basics of the poor and everyone else. Many of those crying socialism the loudest are doing it to enrich or empower themselves. They are right about one thing – there is a class war going on in the US. The rich are winning their class war, and it is time for everyone else to fight back for economic justice.

Nick Hanauer is another among the extremely wealthy, who believes that the super-rich need to wake up and realise that life in fortress-like ghettos is not worth living. See Beinhocker and Hanauer, 2014. Hanauer foresees pitchforks coming for his ‘fellow .01 percenters’ – just as during the French Revolution in the eighteenth century – if the super-rich do not address the issue of increasing wealth inequality: ‘The pitchforks are coming... For us plutocrats’, by Nick Hanauer, Politico Magazine, July/August 2014, www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-pitchforks-are-coming-for-us-plutocrats-108014.

In Germany, a group of wealthy individuals calls for higher taxes for the wealthy. Retired physician Dieter Lehmkuhl, for example, says that it is time the wealthy came to the aid of their country. Lehmkuhl ‘reckons that if the 2.2 million Germans who have personal fortunes of more than €500,000 ($750,000) paid a tax of five per cent this year and next, it would provide the state with €100 billion’. See ‘Wealthy Germans launch petition for higher taxes’, The Local, 22nd October 2009, www.thelocal.de/money/20091022-22755.html.


798 ‘The change within: The obstacles we face are not just external’, by Naomi Klein, The Nation, 12th May 2014, www.thenation.com/article/179460/change-within-obstacles-we-face-are-not-just-external#. I thank Rigmor Johnsen for making me aware of this article.

799 Merz, 2012.

800 Merz, 2012.

801 Bastiat, 1848: French original:

Lorsque la Spoliation est devenue le moyen d’existence d’une agglomération d’hommes unis entre eux par le lien social, ils se font bientôt une loi qui la sanctionne, une morale qui la glorifie.

802 Bastiat, 1848. French original:

Je parle à quiconque tient la Richesse pour quelque chose. – Entendons par ce mot, non l’opulence de quelques-uns, mais l’aisance, le bien-être, la sécurité, l’indépendance, l’instruction, la dignité de tous.

803 Bastiat, 1850.

804 Bastiat’s reflections remind of the way of thinking that Ayn Rand later brought to the United States later; see my analysis in chapter 4 of Lindner, 2012d.

805 Against Foucault: Middle Foucault, part twelve, video lecture by Howard Richards, Pretoria, South Africa, 26th May 2013, recorded by Justine Richards, youtu.be/voUdwSZPAR0. See also the book that resulted from these lectures and dialogues, Richards, et al., 2018. It is a privilege to have Howard Richards, Catherine Odora Hoppers, and her brother George, as esteemed members in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship. In this lecture, Richards analysed the middle period of Foucault’s thinking (1970–1976):

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Even before Foucault cast power in the role of general enemy, power had been groomed for the role because it had played a somewhat similar role in the past. Whatever else ‘power’ (‘le pouvoir’) denoted, power was the entity that had re-established itself by putting down the revolts in France in 1848, in 1870, and in 1940, Foucault and Deleuze, 1972, p. 308. It tended to be the word that named whatever put down popular revolts anywhere; so that if the revolt was successful one said the people won; if the revolt failed one said power won.

Richards, 2014:

So we have a problem: Nothing authorises us to believe that humanity today is so different from humanity in the past that we can get our act together and work in concert to solve our problems without sharing a metanarrative that tells us who we are and what our role is in the great scheme of things. But liberal economics is a toxic brew. It shreds community more than it builds it. It smothers diversity and imposes the crudest and most violent forms of cognitive injustice. Its growth imperative and its systematic demand to create conditions for capital accumulation and ever more capital accumulation are killing the biosphere very rapidly, so rapidly that if we think in a perspective of geological time the end of life on this planet is the equivalent of only a few seconds away. Sometimes we seem to face a cruel choice: either no metanarrative or a toxic metanarrative. Either civil wars between mutually incompatible ethnic fundamentalisms which in principle can share no common ground, or else a secular state imposing certain death by liberal economics on one and all.

... My second simple question is: ‘Where are we going?’ The beginning of a simple answer is: ‘We are going to a green future’. The simple reason why we are going to a green future is that we cannot possibly go to any other future. Failing to maintain the delicate equilibriums of the biosphere is not an option. Human cultures whose constitutive rules and basic norms are incompatible with the laws of physics, the laws of chemistry, and the facts of biology are not sustainable.

Against Foucault: Middle Foucault, part twelve, video lecture by Howard Richards, Pretoria, South Africa, 26th May 2013, taped by Justine Richards, youtu.be/voUdwSZPAR0. See also the book that resulted from these lectures and dialogues, Richards, et al., 2018. In this lecture, Richards analysed the middle period of Foucault’s thinking (1970–1976).

Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 30th May 2016.

Critical realism is being associated with names such as Roy Bhaskar, Rom Harré, Margaret Archer, Heikki Patomaki, and others. See for an overview over critical realism, Archer, et al., 1998.

Against Foucault: Early Foucault, part three, video lecture by Howard Richards, Pretoria, South Africa, 6th May 2013, taped by Justine Richards, http://youtu.be/OD001HfydoY. See also the book that resulted from these lectures and dialogues, Richards, et al., 2018.

Inspired by Howard Richards’ lecture Against Foucault: Early Foucault, part ten, Catherine Odora Hoppers and Evelin Lindner engaged in a dialogue with Howard Richards, Pretoria, South Africa, 22nd May 2013, taped by Justine Richards, https://youtu.be/wZoikaoun7E. See also the book that resulted from these lectures and dialogues, Richards, et al., 2015b:

Howard Richards: My general perspective is that humans create cultures, which then can be more or less successful as adaptations to physical reality.

Evelin Lindner: I think Antonio Gramsci somewhere said something similar, that the role of the intellectual is to adjust culture to physical reality…

Howard Richards: …which perhaps amounts to the same thing as John Dewey seeing the brain, the body, the mind, culture, and language, all as having evolved to solve the problems that life presents…

Catherine Hoppers: …from which it would follow that the societies honoured today as ‘developed’ are not nearly as ‘evolved’ as they think they are, because they cannot solve their problems…

Howard Richards: …I would say first and foremost their ‘meta-problem’.

Evelin Lindner: Do you mean ‘metaphysical problem’.

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Howard Richards: I think I do, but I would be afraid people will misunderstand me. Most people would say the meta-problem is an economic problem.
Evelin Lindner: You mean problems like debt, poverty, inequality, inflation, unemployment. But here ‘what most people would say’ is itself a meta-problem. Most people think the problems of economics have solutions within economics…
Catherine Hoppers: …you mean they think they pose questions economists can answer…
Evelin Lindner: …so if we would be brave and say the meta-problem is metaphysical, or that solving it requires a paradigm shift, or a culture-shift, or re-inventing politics…
Catherine Hoppers: …or second level indigenisation…
Evelin Lindner: … I am tempted to say revolution, but I refrain because I do not want to imply violence followed by central planning and repression. But we have to say something that pushes the envelope of conventional thought to wake people up.
Catherine Hoppers: We could say the meta-problem is not an economic one because it cannot be solved within the constitutive rules provided by the mainly Roman law legal framework of the global economy.
Howard Richards: Let me say what the problem is.
Evelin Lindner: You mean the meta-problem.
Howard Richards: The meta-problem, the one that raises the stakes to the level of categories of thought…
Catherine Hoppers: … and practice. The metaphysics of a people is not just thought, it is lived. Foucault helped me to see this too.
Howard Richards: The meta-problem is not just that we cannot get our priorities straight. As I was saying if we had our priorities straight there would be more therapeutic communities…
Catherine Hoppers: …or maybe we should just say more mutual support among human beings so as not to confine ourselves within the somewhat ethnocentric and pseudo-medical concept of ‘therapy’…
Howard Richards: And if we had our priorities straight there would be a massive shift to green technologies and sustainable lifestyles…
Evelin Lindner: And so on. We could make a list of what ought to be.
Catherine Hoppers: It could be almost a consensus list. Actually we already have what amounts to a consensus on what ought to be in the universal declarations of rights declared in international treaties and conventions.
Howard Richards: But when we try to move from what ought to be into practice we are paralysed. We have to do what the economy requires.
Evelin Lindner: So we are saying…
Catherine Hoppers: …with help from Michel Foucault…
Evelin Lindner: …that economics as we know it works within the imperatives of a system rooted in basic categories of thought/practice most people take for granted. Maximising profits trumps mental health, ecology, human rights and so on not because capitalists are greedy but because profit-maximising is the mainspring that moves the system that generates everybody’s daily bread. If you break the mainspring you get unemployment, stock market crashes, capital flight, businesses closing, banks failing, prices rising, the value of money falling, savings wiped out, cutbacks in public services like health and education -- and yet if you do not break the mainspring, if you do everything you can to create a business-friendly environment, sooner or later you get some of these same things anyway, along with rising inequality, falling real wages, and a dying biosphere. So until we convert to a ‘dignity economy’ running on different categories of thought/practice, we are trapped.
Howard Richards: Karl Marx once wrote that we are still living in the pre-history of humanity. The history of humanity properly so-called will not begin until we are free to create institutions that solve our problems.

813 Lewis Coser, 1956, differentiates realistic from un-realistic conflict. First and foremost, conflict simply presupposes a relationship and social interaction. Not all hostile impulses lead to social conflict, and not every conflict is accompanied by aggressiveness. Realistic conflicts are those that

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arise from frustration of specific demands and are pursued toward the attainment of specific results. Other pathways than conflict are taken if available. Realistic conflict is thus a means, unlike non-realistic conflict, which is an end in itself. It is fed by one antagonist’s need to release tension. The main point is the release of aggressiveness, and the target of hostility can easily change. Clearly, realistic conflicts can also be accompanied by distorted sentiments. Conflict may be motivated by both, realistic conflict issues and parties’ affective investment in the conflict. See a summary of Coser, 1956, by the University of Colorado’s Conflict Research Consortium Staff, at www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/coser.htm.


815 World drug report 2016, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf. Heroin use and related overdose deaths have increased sharply over the last two years in some countries in North America and Western and Central Europe, with new psychoactive substances remaining a serious concern: ‘heroin continues to be the drug that kills the most people and this resurgence must be addressed urgently’.

816 ‘Overwhelmed by these social services, the spirit of community falters: families collapse, schools fail, violence spreads, and medical systems spiral out of control. Instead of more or better services, the basis for resolving many of America’s social problems is the community capacity of the local citizens’, McKnight, 1995, book description. I thank Howard Richards for making me aware of the book by John McKnight, see also McKnight and Block, 2010. The Community Development Program at the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, has established the Asset-Based Community Development Institute based on three decades of research and community work by John P. Kretzmann and John L. McKnight.

817 Lane, 2000.

818 Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 30th May 2016.

819 Rosa, 2005, Rosa, 2010. Hartmut Rosa is a professor of Sociology at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena in Germany, and the head of the Max-Weber Center of Advanced Cultural and Social Studies of the University of Erfurt. See also Why are we stuck behind the social acceleration? TED talk by Hartmut Rosa, published on 11th March 2015, https://youtu.be/7uG9OFGld3A. The lead question is: How to have a good life in light of rapid social acceleration? Rosa’s argument is that modern societies are subjected to too close-meshed time regimes that regulate, coordinate, and control them outside of any ethical concepts.


Der alltägliche Konkurrenzkampf wird von den Menschen verabsolutiert, versubjektiviert und personalisiert und als naturgegeben und alternativlos akzeptiert, wenn nicht gleich zum Reich der Freiheit deklariert. Damit üben die Menschen jene Ausschließungsmechanismen ein, die ihnen durch die Institutionen vorerzogen wurden.

English translation by Lindner:
Daily competition is made absolute by people, made subjective and personal, and accepted as natural and without alternative, if not even declared to be part of the realm of freedom. In that way, people practice and internalise the very exclusion that is shown to them by the institutions.

821 Trojanow, 2013. Translated from the German original by Lindner:
An essay on human dignity in late capitalism. Those who produce nothing and consume nothing are superfluous, according to the murderous logic of late capitalism. Overpopulation is the biggest problem of our planet, this is the opinion of international elites. But if humanity is to be reduced,
then who is going to disappear, asks Trojanov in his humanist polemic against the superfluity of humans. In his penetrating analysis, he runs the gamut from the ravages of climate change on the mercilessness of neo-liberal labour market policies to the mass media apocalypses that we, the apparent winner, follow with enthusiasm. But we deceive ourselves: It is also about us. Everything is at stake.

German original:


823 Linda Hartling in a personal communication, 30th May 2016.


827 Oxley, 2012.


829 Akte D: Das Versagen der Nachkriegsjustiz (1), Das Kriegserbe der Bahn (2), Die Macht der Stromkonzerne (3), ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Consortium of public broadcasters in Germany, a joint organisation of Germany’s regional public-service broadcasters), 2014.
A recent book by Schlosser, 2013, is based on previously classified material that the author discovered through the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S.A. There are many more examples of ‘glitches’, among others, the 1979 NORAD Computer Glitch. Read on www.history.com/news/history-lists/5-cold-war-close-calls:

By the late 1970s, both the United States and the Soviets relied on computer systems to detect possible nuclear attacks. But while the new technology was more sophisticated, it also came with a fresh set of risks in the form of false alarms and glitches. Perhaps the most famous of these errors occurred at Colorado’s North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD. On the morning of 9th November 1979, technicians at the site received an urgent alert that the Soviets had launched a barrage of missiles at North America. Convinced a nuclear attack was imminent, the U.S. air defense programme scrambled 10 interceptor fighter planes, ordered the president’s ‘doomsday plane’ to take off, and warned launch control to prepare its missiles for a retaliatory attack.

The panic soon subsided after NORAD consulted its satellite data and realised the nuclear warning was little more than a false alarm. Upon further inspection, they discovered that a technician had accidentally run a training programme simulating a Soviet attack on the United States. The incident sent shock waves through the international community – Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev even wrote President Jimmy Carter a letter noting the ‘tremendous danger’ caused by the error – but it was not the last time a computer issue led to a nuclear scare. Computer chip failures would later lead to three more false alarms at NORAD in the following year.

R. Buckminster Fuller said the following in ‘The New York Magazine environmental teach-in’ by Elizabeth Barlow, New York Magazine, 30th March 1970, books.google.de/books?id=cccDAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false, p. 30:

We should do away with the absolutely specious notion that everybody has to earn a living. It is a fact today that one in ten thousand of us can make a technological breakthrough capable of supporting all the rest. The youth of today are absolutely right in recognising this nonsense of earning a living. We keep inventing jobs because of this false idea that everybody has to be employed at some kind of drudgery because, according to Malthusian Darwinian theory he must justify his right to exist. So we have inspectors of inspectors and people making instruments for inspectors to inspect inspectors. The true business of people should be to go back to school and think about whatever it was they were thinking about before somebody came along and told them they had to earn a living.

Since I wrote the book A dignity economy (Lindner, 2012d), the topic of inequality has become ever more prominent. Already when I wrote the book, everybody told me about Richard Wilkinson’s and Kate Pickett’s work. See, among others, Wilkinson, 2005, and Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009. See also https://youtu.be/zYDzA9hKCNQ. See, furthermore, the Equality Trust at www.equalitytrust.org.uk. Since then, more authors have become household names, such as Stiglitz, 2012, Thomas Piketty, 2013/2014, Atkinson, 2015, or Frank, 2016. See also a publication by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2015, for why all benefit from more equality.

Partners in crime? The EU, its strategic partners and international organised crime, FRIDE: A European Think Tank for Global Action (FRIDE ceased its think tank activities on 31st December 2015 for economic reasons), www.fride.org/descarga/WP5_EU_Strategic_partners_and_international_organised_crime.pdf, page 7:

Increasingly, terrorist groups resort to criminal activities to fund their campaigns, when they have not traded political aims for economic gain.

In March 2016, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism – better known as START – launched an online course on ‘The terror-crime nexus & Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats’ (START is a university-based research and...
education centre comprised of an international network of scholars committed to the scientific study of the causes and human consequences of terrorism in the United States and around the world), www.start.umd.edu/news/start-launches-online-course-terror-crime-nexus-and-cbm.


835 Atuahene, 2016, p. 796:

Involuntary property loss is ubiquitous. During conquest and colonialism, European powers robbed native peoples of their lands; wars and civil conflicts have undermined and rearranged ownership rights; communist regimes have upended existing ownership rights in attempts to usher in a more egalitarian property distribution; and most constitutional democracies sanction the forced taking of property as long as the state pays just compensation and it is for a public purpose. In some of these examples, state or nonstate actors have taken property from an individual or a group and material compensation is an appropriate remedy. In other instances, however, the property confiscation resulted in the dehumanisation or infantilisation of the dispossessed, and so providing material compensation is not enough because they lost more than their property – they were also deprived of their dignity. In *We want what’s ours: Learning from South Africa’s land restitution programme* (Atuahene 2014a), I labelled this dual harm a ‘dignity taking’ and argued that the appropriate remedy is something more than mere compensation for things taken (reparations). What is instead required, I argue, is ‘dignity restoration’, which addresses deprivations of both property and dignity by providing material compensation to dispossessed populations through processes that affirm their humanity and establish their agency.

Bernadette Atuahene is a Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I thank Michael Perlin for making us aware of this article. It is a privilege to have Michael Perlin as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


838 Haldane, 2004. Another author is Adair Turner, 2012, working with the Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET), a think tank financed by the hedge fund billionaire George Soros.


Is economic growth ‘a rising tide lifting all boats’, and is ‘capital trickling down to everybody’? The United Nations claims that extreme poverty worldwide has been halved. The number of people living on less than 1.25 dollars a day fell from 47 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2010. There are still 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty, but a new middle-class is emerging worldwide, even if the success in the numbers is due basically to Brazil, China and India. So, the argument from the defenders of the present economic model is ‘if there are a few super rich, why do we ignore the enormous progress that has created 1 billion new middle-class citizens?’ The neo-liberal period unleashed by the Washington Consensus advantaged financial capitalism over productive capitalism.

Problems:

• Inequality, with extreme wealth for a few, the middle class shrinking in rich countries, and permanent unemployment for ever more,

• the rich are not paying taxes as before, because of a large number of fiscal benefits and fiscal paradises,

• politics has become subservient to economic interests,

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840 Polanyi and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Foreword), 1944/2001.

841 See also Why the P2P and commons movement must act trans-locally and trans-nationally, by Michel Bauwens, P2P Foundation, 12th June 2016, https://blog.p2pfoundation.net/p2p-commons-movement-must-act-trans-locally-trans-nationally/2016/06/16. I thank Uli Spalthoff for making me aware of this article. Bauwens recommends Karatani, 2014. Like Alan Page Fiske, 1991, in Structures of social life, also Karatani recognises four basic modes of social life, and these modes exist at all times and in all places.


843 ‘The next great American consumer: Infants to 3-year-olds: They’re a new demographic marketers are hell-bent on reaching’, by Brian Braiker, Adweek, 26th September 2011, www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/next-great-american-consumer-135207. According to Victor C. Strasburger, professor of paediatrics at the University of New Mexico School of Medicine, children under the age of seven are ‘psychologically defenceless’ against advertising. ‘We’ve created a perfect storm for childhood obesity – media, advertising, and inactivity’, said Strasburger as lead author of a policy statement published 27th June 2011, by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) Council on Communications and Media. ‘American society couldn’t do a worse job at the moment of keeping children fit and healthy – too much TV, too many food ads, not enough exercise, and not enough sleep’, he said, quoted from aap.org/advocacy/releases/june2711studies.htm, referring to the Council on Communications and Media, 2011. See also Strasburger, et al., 2013.

In Sweden, all advertisements aimed at children under the age of twelve have been banned. In the U.S., business is trying to prevent regulation on advertising to children. See ‘Will food industry’s new marketing guidelines satisfy the feds?’, by Katy Bachman, Adweek, 15th July 2011, www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/will-food-industries-new-marketing-guidelines-satisfy-feds-133437.

It seems that the language of ‘values’ and ‘ecology’ has been applied to the market in particularly blunt ways in the U.S. See the self-representation of the Right Media Exchange, the Platform for Premium Digital Advertising, www.rightmediablog.com, italics added by the author:

Right Media launched digital advertising’s first exchange platform in the spring of 2005 and is currently the largest exchange in the industry. Our success stems from the principles we started with: transparent, fair, open and efficient. We’ve stayed true to these values throughout a variety of market cycles. Since Yahoo! acquired the company in 2007, we have been working to build a premium exchange with more than 300,000 active global buyers and sellers and more than 11 billion daily transactions. Today, the Right Media platform supports an ecosystem of leading digital advertising companies, including differentiated ad networks, direct advertisers in our non-guaranteed marketplace, data providers, technology innovators, and global agencies. Our strategy includes focusing on: premium buying and selling, data-driven valuation, audience sourcing, interoperability. As the industry changes, Right Media is evolving to change with it. The Right Media platform is designed to help all participants in the digital advertising ecosystem conduct business with one another in a seamless fashion, and deliver marketers the greatest number of options in how they define and reach their relevant audiences.

844 Lebow, 1955.

845 Ibid.
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Lindner, 2012d.

Woo, et al., 2014.

See, among others, Schore and Sieff, 2015.


Brigitte Volz in a personal communication, 28th September 2016. She recommends the training programs for parents and pedagogues by STEP (Systematische Training für Eltern und Pädagogen, www.insteponline.de), or SAFE (Secure Attachment Family Education, www.safe-programm.de). It is a privilege to have Brigitte Volz as esteemed member in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

In Richards, 2013. See also Richards, 1995, Richards and Swanger, 2006. I am sure that Howard Richards is familiar with George, 1879, on public revenue from land rent, an idea that obtained its greatest popularity in the U.S. in the late 1800s. See also Foldvary, 2006.


My point about Roman Law is that it deliberately abstracted from primary groups and local culture in order to create a Law of Nations suitable for organising their vast empire and commerce within it on the basis of a few simple rules applicable to everybody. Now their civil law has become the frame for the global economy.

See for a recent overview over Roman law and society, Ando, et al., 2016. Roman Law (Latin: ius romanum) has its origins in ancient Rome, including the Roman military jurisdiction and the legal developments spanning a thousand years of jurisprudence, from the Twelve Tables or lex duodecim tabularum (ca. 449 BCE) to the Corpus Juris Civilis (529 CE) by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I. It got renewed attention in the early Middle Ages. English and North American common law, among others, is strongly influenced by Roman law, actively using a Latin legal glossary, for example stare decisis, culpa in contrahendo, pacta sunt servanda.


Already in the second century after Christ the Romans needed a Great Simplification. Like the British in the nineteenth century, the Romans in the second century found that they could not trade or govern in a vast diverse empire without imposing some simplicity on it. Roman Law, and especially the jus gentium that applied alike to Roman citizens and to non-citizens, was a Great Simplification, and by the same token it was an eclipse of community. The empire was an overwhelming military force interested in collecting tribute and in protecting merchants, but not interested in how its component ethnic groups gave meaning to their lives and exchanged matter and energy with the physical environment. The law abstracted from the empire’s multicultural diversity with its wealth of languages, spiritual and material practices, moral codes, kinship and
marriage obligations, patterns of mutual obligations, ceremonies, rituals, and stories. Simplifying for the sake of commerce and for the sake of public administration, it classified certain rules as ‘natural’. The word ‘natural’ meant ‘the same everywhere.’ In practice, ‘everywhere’ meant ‘wherever Rome rules’.

Fast forwarding past the Middle Ages, a millennium and a half later, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the successor states of the Roman Empire were constructing the cultural and social structures of modernity. For their Great Simplification, they ‘received’ the ideal of rule of law that antiquity had bequeathed them, but only to encounter another obstacle to modernisation. Living in a Europe (formerly known as ‘Christendom’) dotted with great cathedrals, the modernisers had to achieve a certain distance from God. God had then and still has today the inconvenient trait of telling people what to do. (‘Islam’ means ‘submission’ or ‘submission of desires to the will of God’.) It was impossible to build a social and cultural structure around market exchange while God was constantly butting in commanding people to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, bury the dead, shelter the traveller, comfort the sick, and ransom the captive (the traditional Seven Works of Mercy, roughly following Matthew 25: 31-46). Enlightenment minds like Jean-Jacques Rousseau rose to the occasion by substituting ‘Nature’ for ‘God’ (comparing the Spiritual exercises of Saint Ignatius and Emile by Rousseau will show that wherever Ignatius wrote ‘God’ Rousseau wrote ‘Nature’). What Nature commanded was first and foremost what Roman Law said was natural, which was in turn first and foremost the constitutive rules of markets. Although the idea that Nature had decreed laissez faire economics framed by a social contract guaranteeing pre-existing natural rights, encountered much opposition in France and in England with their long and complex intellectual traditions, it encountered little opposition in the new United States of America. As has been outlined above, once such ideas and their corresponding institutions are in place it becomes inevitable, or nearly so, that the physical welfare of the people will come to depend on an always precarious confidence of investors. It was not the 1% who created the double whammy to serve their own interests, and it was not created during Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the 1980s. The double whammy was created by history; its roots go back at least to an eclipse of community in the second century; and it does not serve anybody’s interests.


Anthropologist Alan Page Fiske describes basic relational models. Fiske found that people, most of the time and in all cultures, use just four elementary and universal forms or models for organising most aspects of sociality. These models are: (1) Communal Sharing, CS, (2) Authority Ranking, AR, (3) Equality Matching, EM, and (4) Market Pricing, MP. See Fiske, 1991, 2004, Fiske and Fiske, 2007, and an introduction on www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/fiske/relmodov.htm.

Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

Ferguson, 2008.

Buber, 1923.


One sees the need for revenge, for righting a wrong, for undoing the hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting compulsion in the pursuit of all these aims which gives no rest to those who have suffered a narcissistic injury – these are features which are characteristic for the phenomenon of narcissistic rage in all its forms and which sets it apart from other kinds of aggression.

I thank David Lotto, 2016, for reminding me of this quote.

Mead, 1934.

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Edkins, 2000. I thank Zaynab El Bernoussi for reminding me of Edkins’ work.

Richards, 2013.


My point about Roman Law is that it deliberately abstracted from primary groups and local culture in order to create a Law of Nations suitable for organising their vast empire and commerce within it on the basis of a few simple rules applicable to everybody. Now their civil law has become the frame for the global economy.

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Critical realism is being associated with names such as Roy Bhaskar, Rom Harré, Margaret Archer, Heikki Patomaki, and others. See for an overview over critical realism Archer, et al., 1998.


Giddens, 1990. Radicalised modernity grew out of industrial modernity with its focus on order, calculability, science, and instrumental rationality, as well as social control by institutions. Radicalised modernity lays bare its negative after-effects: consumerism and individualism breaking down the family and other socialising institutions, time-space distanciation leading to social contact becoming impersonal, and mutual trust diminishing. See also Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of a *liquid* modern world, Bauman, 2000.

Wallerstein, 1974–1989. See also Harvey, 2005, or Hudson, 2003. Howard Richards in a personal communication, 23rd October 2016: ‘According to Immanuel Wallerstein the global economy is the one and only object of study of the social sciences today; everything else is caught up in a web of causes and effects where the structure of the global economy is the principal cause’. See also Lindner, 2012d.


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developments spanning a thousand years of jurisprudence, from the Twelve Tables or *lex duodecim*
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*tabularum* (ca. 449 BCE) to the Corpus Juris Civilis (529 CE) by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I. It got renewed attention in the early Middle Ages. English and North American common law, among others, is strongly influenced by Roman law, actively using a Latin legal glossary, for example *stare decisis*, *culpa in contrahendo*, *pacta sunt servanda*.


875 Mies, 1986.

876 Howard Richards refers to Vivienne Jabri, 2007, director of the Centre for International Relations and Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.


878 Since I wrote the book *A dignity economy* (Lindner, 2012d), the topic of inequality has become ever more prominent. See a longer overview in endnote 1 of chapter 11 in my 2017 book *Honor, humiliation, and terror*.

When I wrote the book, everybody told me about Richard Wilkinson’s and Kate Pickett’s work. See, among others, Wilkinson, 2005, and Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009. See also https://youtu.be/zYDzA9hKCNQ. See, furthermore, the Equality Trust at www.equalitytrust.org.uk. Since then, more authors have become household names, such as Stiglitz, 2012, Thomas Piketty, 2013/2014, Atkinson, 2015, or Frank, 2016. See also a publication by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2015, for why all benefit from more equality.

Evidence has accumulated that ‘inequality damages family life by higher rates of child abuse, and increased status competition is likely to explain the higher rates of bullying confirmed in schools in more unequal countries’.

See ‘The Spirit level authors: Why society is more unequal than ever: Five years after the spirit level’, by Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson, *The Guardian*, 9th March 2014, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/09/society-unequal-the-spirit-level. I thank Rigmor Johnsen for drawing my attention to this article where Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson look back on their path-breaking publication from 2009 and report on recent research that backs up their views on the iniquity of inequality. Wilkinson and Picketty write: ‘...human beings have deep-seated psychological responses to inequality and social hierarchy. The tendency to equate outward wealth with inner worth means that inequality colours our social perceptions. It invokes feelings of superiority and inferiority, dominance and subordination – which affect the way we relate to and treat each other’. See also Due, et al., 2009, Eckenrode, et al., 2014, and Johnson, et al., 2012.


880 Tönnies, 1887.

881 Schirrmacher, 2006. I thank Axel Rojzyck for making me aware of this book.

882 See ‘Column: This is what happens when you take Ayn Rand seriously’, by Denise Cummins, *Public Broadcasting Service* (PBS), 16th February 2016, www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-this-is-what-happens-when-you-take-ayn-rand-seriously/. Cummins presents two case studies that show the disastrous consequences of following Ayn Rand, the company Sears, and the country Honduras. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.


884 Lindner, 2012d, pp. 57–58.


886 Professor of economics Julie Matthaei in her response to the contributions to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Feminism and revolution: Looking back, looking ahead’, on 19th June 2018, a discussion that was based on her essay of the same title, Julie Matthaei, 2018.

887 McCauley, et al., 2013. It is a privilege to have Clark McCauley as esteemed member in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


889 Lindner, 2015 – 2018. Consider also Larry Brendtro, et al., 2009, who point out that saying ‘you no longer belong to our group’ amounts to the ultimate form of punishment, namely by social death. I thank Mechthild Nagel, for making me aware of Brendtro’s work. See also the work of sociologist Michèle Lamont, who speaks of a *recognition gap*, highlighting ‘the centrality of stigmatisation (feeling underestimated, ignored, and misunderstood) over discrimination (being deprived of resources)’, in ‘Addressing the recognition gap: Destigmatisation and the reduction of inequality’, by Michèle Lamont in a seminar in the President’s Seminar series, part of the Rethinking Open Society project, 4th December 2017, https://youtu.be/VrrHb6mUNAo. In the context of post-materialism theory, political scientist Ronald Inglehart, expects that dignity will become part of self-expression values: ‘Throughout history, survival has been insecure for most people, forcing them to give top priority to survival needs. But in advanced industrial societies, the economic miracles of the post-war era and the emergence of the welfare state gave rise to conditions under which much of the post-war generation grew up taking survival for granted; they give increasingly high priority to post-materialist values such as belonging, self-expression, and free choice’, Inglehart, 1971, Abstract. Clearly, it is to be expected that both, materialist and post-materialist orientations will merge whenever a decent livelihood is perceived as a human right.

890 ‘Suicide is now the biggest killer of teenage girls worldwide. here’s why’, by Nisha Lilia Dju, *The Telegraph*, 25th May 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-health/11549954/Teen-girls-Suicide-kills-more-young-women-than-anything.-Heres-why.html#comment-2045825875. Vikram Patel was the founding director of the Centre for Global Mental Health at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and now spends much of the year in Delhi, where he works for the Public Health Foundation of India.

891 Erik Solheim was Minister of International Development when the interview took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, Norway, on 10th January 2011. Until being appointed minister, he was as a diplomat and a participant in the Norwegian delegation that worked to resolve the Sri Lankan Civil War before the outbreak of Eelam War IV. On 3rd May 2016, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that Solheim will take over the post of executive director of UNEP, the United Nations’ Environment Programme, in June 2016.

892 Le Bon, 1895/1896. Edward Louis Bernays, 1928, the nephew of Sigmund Freud, combined Freud’s psychoanalytical concepts with the work of Gustave Le Bon on crowd psychology, and with Wilfred Trotter, 1916, and his ideas on the instincts of the ‘herd’. See also Clark, 1988. Bernays was among the first to influence the market, for instance, the market of cigarettes, by luring women into smoking by manipulating images of women smokers as torches of freedom. I thank Diane Summer for being the first to make me aware of this manipulation, in 2007, in Brisbane, Australia.

893 Professor of economics Julie Matthaei in her response to the contributions to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Feminism and revolution: Looking back, looking ahead’, on 19th June 2018, a discussion that was based on her essay of the same title, Julie Matthaei, 2018.

894 A sense of deprivation or inequality, both in relation to others or in relation to expectations, can drive social movements. When expectations have outgrown actual material situations, the “J-curve” model developed by James Chowning Davies, 1969, is thought to be appropriate to explain political
revolutions. See also Gurr, 1970, Davies, 1971.

895 Benford and Snow, 2000, Snow and Benford, 1988.

896 In *Theories of political protest and social movements*, sociologist Karl-Dieter Opp, 2009, presents his version of rational choice theory, where he includes a number of cultural concepts and shows that several other approaches rely on rational-choice assumptions without being aware of it or making it explicit.

897 Sociologist Alain Touraine focuses and social and political conflict in his work. I would have liked to attend the debate moderated by Michel Wieviorka in Paris in 2014. See Castells, et al., 2014. It is a privilege for me to be associated with the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris since 2001, first through social psychologist Serge Moscovici. The first two conferences of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies were inspired and hosted by Hinnerk Bruhns, and supported by Michel Wieviorka at the Maison des Sciences in 2003 and 2004, see www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/annualmeetings.php. It is a privilege to have Hinnerk Bruhns and other renowned colleagues as esteemed members in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

I follow sociologist Alain Touraine, when he asks how a transnational economy can be reconciled with the reality of introverted communities, and when he replies that a few social rules of mutual tolerance and respect for personal freedom are not sufficient, that deeper bonds must and can be forged. Touraine argues that people can and should create a personal life-project and construct an active self or ‘subject’, with the ultimate aim to form meaningful social and political institutions. See Touraine, 2000, and Touraine, 2003. See, furthermore, Lindner, 2014, 2018.

898 The motivations for movement participation is seen as a form of post-material politics and newly created identities, particularly those from the ‘new middle class’. See the work of Ronald Inglehart, for instance, the most recent Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map – World Values Survey wave 6 (2010–2014) on www.worldvaluessurvey.org/images/Cultural_map_WVS6_2015.jpg, explained on www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp. Note also Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, and Norris and Inglehart, 2011.


900 The work of sociologist and political scientist Charles Tilly (1929–2008) spanned several decades. See McAdam, et al., 2001, Tilly, 1978. Tilly distinguishes between three kinds of claims for social movements: *identity* claims declare that ‘we’ constitute a unified force, such as ‘we, the Cherokees’, *standing* claims assert ties to other political actors, for example excluded minorities, while *programme* claims support or oppose actual or proposed actions (Tilly, 2004). Tilly argues that regimes shape contentious repertoires by determining zones of prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden repertoires, by constituting potential claimants and potential objects of claims, and by producing issues, events, and governmental actions around which social movements rise and fall (Tilly, 2010).


903 *Elie Wiesel’s Acceptance Speech*, on the occasion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, 10th December 1986, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1986/wiesel-acceptance_en.html. I thank Linda Hartling for alerting me to the news of Wiesel’s passing, and pointing out his important words on humiliation.


See, for example, Mezirow, 2000. See also Fisher-Yoshida, et al., 2009. Beth Fisher-Yoshida has been the academic director of a Master of Science in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the School of Continuing Education at Columbia University, ce.columbia.edu/Negotiation-and-Conflict-Resolution/Beth-Fisher-Yoshida-Biography?context=974. It is a privilege to have her as a member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network, together with Adair Linn Nagata, and Barnett Pearce (whom we so tragically lost much too early). See www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/board.php. See also Alagic, et al., 2009, Nagata, 2006, 2007.

MacIntyre, 2007, pp. xii–xiii. Miki Kashtan in a personal communication, 30th May 2018. I very much thank Miki Kashtan for reminding me of MacIntyre’s work in this context! Miki Kashtan speaks of being a conscious disruptor.

Lindner, 2009b, pp. 130–137.


See more on the notion of misrecognition in chapter 5 and 8 of my book Emotion and conflict, Lindner, 2009b, pp. 129–137. Concepts such as méconnaissance (misrecognition) and naturalisation were used by Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault (among others). They address how power structures use the concealed nature of habitus to manipulate not just overtly but covertly and stealthily, making it much more difficult to rid oneself of these manipulations.

The term méconnaissance was first introduced by psychologist Henri Wallon (1879–1962).

Kant, 1784.

I sense that the security dilemma’s most recent cultural product, Western individualism, has usurped the English translation. Maturity is an individualistic concept, and it has something to do with growing up. My point is that this Unmündigkeit is not an individual psychological problem, nor general human forgetfulness. It is the result of large-scale social pressure and it would be a category mistake to seek solutions at the wrong level of analysis and action.

Kuhn, 1962.


Sociologist Michael Mulkay, 1985, pioneer of reflexive studies and epistemological diversity, spoke of rebellion rather than transforming an existing field by a so-called Kuhnian paradigm shift.

Fernbach, et al., 2013, p. 945. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.

Kruger and Dunning, 1999.

Nickerson and Salovey, 1998.


Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954.

Van Boven, et al., 2012.

Etzioni, 2013, p. 334.


Persons affected by the PVEE syndrome often defend, minimise and/or rationalise the most outrageous attitudes held and acts carried out by themselves or members of their particular group.
When you talk to such people, you will quickly find that the reason that they take such a usually untenable position is because ‘their people’ either are or have been victimised by one or more other groups. This is the golden rule turned on its head: ‘Do bad unto others because they (or someone else) did something bad to you’. It is a deceptively simple and somewhat pervasive point of view...

It is a privilege to have James Edward Jones as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


931 Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, p. 44.

932 Jost, et al., 2004, Abstract:

Most theories in social and political psychology stress self-interest, intergroup conflict, ethnocentrism, homophily, in-group bias, out-group antipathy, dominance, and resistance. System justification theory is influenced by these perspectives – including social identity and social dominance theories – but it departs from them in several respects. Advocates of system justification theory argue that (a) there is a general ideological motive to justify the existing social order, (b) this motive is at least partially responsible for the internalisation of inferiority among members of disadvantaged groups, (c) it is observed most readily at an implicit, nonconscious level of awareness and (d) paradoxically, it is sometimes strongest among those who are most harmed by the status quo. This article reviews and integrates 10 years of research on 20 hypotheses derived from a system justification perspective, focusing on the phenomenon of implicit outgroup favouritism among members of disadvantaged groups (including African Americans, the elderly, and gays/lesbians) and its relation to political ideology (especially liberalism-conservatism).

933 Strawson, 1959. See also his thoughts on resentment, Strawson, 1974.

934 Searle, 1983.

935 Polanyi, 1967.


937 Mackay, 1994.


939 Zajonc, 1980.

940 Lakoff, 2006b, p. 25. See also www.rockridgeinstitute.org.

941 Lakoff, 2006a, p. 12. Book description:

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has relentlessly invoked the word ‘freedom’. Al-Qaeda attacked us because ‘they hate our freedom’. The U.S. can strike pre-emptively because ‘freedom is on the march’. Social security should be privatised in order to protect individual freedoms. The 2005 presidential inaugural speech was a kind of crescendo: the words ‘freedom’, ‘free’, and ‘liberty’, were used forty-nine times in President Bush’s twenty-minute speech. In Whose freedom?, Lakoff surveys the political landscape and offers an essential map of the Republican battle plan that has captured the hearts and minds of Americans—and shows how progressives can fight to reinvigorate this most beloved of American political ideas.


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Coleman, et al., 2007, Coleman, 2011, Coleman, et al., 2008, Vallacher, et al., 2010. See for more, ‘Project on dynamical systems, peace, conflict and social change’, by Peter T. Coleman, http://ac4.ei.columbia.edu/ac4-supported-initiatives/dynamical-systems-theory-at-columbia-university-v2/. See also Coleman, et al., 2009, Goldman and Coleman, 2005b, a. Peter Coleman is Professor of Psychology and Education Director at the Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (MD-ICCCR). He and his colleagues use a dynamical systems approach to conceptualise the intransigence entailed in intractable conflict. The Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship is honoured to have Morton Deutsch (who sadly passed away in 2017) and Peter Coleman, together with Claudia Cohen, Beth Fisher-Yoshida, Andrea Bartoli, and many other of their colleagues, as esteemed members of the first hour in our global advisory board.

Such as Kuhn, Sidanius, Pratto, and Jost.

Lerner, 1980.


Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 15. See also Karlberg, 2013.

Guha and Spivak, 1988. See also Chaturvedi, 2000, Mignolo, 2000, Verdesio, 2005. I thank Magnus Haavelsrud for making me aware of the latter publications. See also Haavelsrud, 2015. It is a privilege to have Magnus Haavelsrud as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


Lindner, 2009b, p. 133.


Carveth, 2013.

See more on the notion of misrecognition in chapter 5 and 8 of my book *Emotion and conflict*, Lindner, 2009b, pp. 129–137. Concepts such as *méconnaissance* (misrecognition) and naturalisation were used by Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault (among others). They address how power structures use the concealed nature of habitus to manipulate not just overtly but covertly and stealthily, making it much more difficult to rid oneself of these manipulations.


See, for example, Janis and Mann, 1977, Jervis, et al., 1985, Lebow, 1981


Ibid.


Persons affected by the PVEE syndrome often defend, minimise and/or rationalise the most outrageous attitudes held and acts carried out by themselves or members of their particular group.

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When you talk to such people, you will quickly find that the reason that they take such a usually untenable position is because ‘their people’ either are or have been victimised by one or more other groups. This is the golden rule turned on its head: ‘Do bad unto others because they (or someone else) did something bad to you’. It is a deceptively simple and somewhat pervasive point of view...

It is a privilege to have James Edward Jones as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Lindner, 2015 – 2018. Consider also Larry Brendtro, et al., 2009, who point out that saying ‘you no longer belong to our group’ amounts to the ultimate form of punishment, namely, by social death. I thank Mechthild Nagel, for making me aware of Brendtro’s work. See also the work of sociologist Michèle Lamont, who speaks of a recognition gap: ‘Addressing the recognition gap: Destigmatisation and the reduction of inequality’, by Michèle Lamont in a seminar in the President’s Seminar series, part of the Rethinking Open Society project, 4th December 2017, https://youtu.be/VrrHb6mUNAo.


Until being appointed minister, Erik Solheim was as a diplomat and a participant in the Norwegian delegation that worked to resolve the Sri Lankan Civil War before the outbreak of Eelam War IV. On 3rd May 2016, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that Solheim will take over the post of executive director of UNEP, the United Nations’ Environment Programme, in June 2016.

Erik Solheim was Minister of International Development when the interview took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, Norway, on 10th January 2011. Solheim’s reflections are summarised and translated from Norwegian by Lindner. It is a privilege to have the support of Erik Solheim for the World Dignity University initiative.

Norbert Müller was on the board of Schura Hamburg (SCHURA – Rat der islamischen Gemeinschaften in Hamburg e.V.), a merger of mosque associations in Hamburg, Germany, when our conversation took place on 22nd October 2010. Müller’s reflections are summarised and translated from German by Lindner. Müller sees two groups being radicalised, apart from the highly educated group mentioned already, there is a second group:

Then there are the outsiders with criminal backgrounds, petty criminals who were once in jail, young men who then discover religion for themselves and find a holding point there. This is a new-islamisation, a re-conversion, just like there are born-again Christians and Muslims, where religion is used as identity reinforcement.

Sikkink, 2018:

The tendency to attribute human rights ideology to the Global North may also stem from the fact that the Europeans were the first to create a regional human rights regime. From 1950 to 1953, Europe established the first overarching human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, and a regional human rights court, the European Court of Human Rights.

See also Sikkink, 2011.


One sees the need for revenge, for righting a wrong, for undoing the hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting compulsion in the pursuit of all these aims which gives no rest to those who have suffered a narcissistic injury – these are features which are characteristic for the phenomenon of narcissistic rage in all its forms and which sets it apart from other kinds of

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aggression.

I thank David Lotto, 2016, for reminding me of this quote.

973 Steve Kulich, professor of intercultural communications at Shanghai International Studies University, said at the Second International Conference on Multicultural Discourses in Hangzhou, 13–15th April 2007: ‘First I have empowered my students. Then they became nasty people. Today, I no longer use the word empowerment. I use entrustment’. See also Lindner, 2007a.

974 See the work by Jean Baker Miller, for instance, Miller, 1976/1986b, 2008a.

975 Lindner, 2006a, pp. 113–114.

976 Farida’s predicament resonates with what Toni Morrison, 1987, describes in her novel Beloved, where she describes the killing of a baby so as to protect it from the fate of slavery. I thank Morton Deutsch for making me aware of this novel.

977 McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014b. It is a privilege to have Clark McCauley as a member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


979 See also Lindner, et al., 2009.


981 See also Røislien and Røislien, 2010, for a discussion ‘the logic of Palestinian terrorist target choice’. I thank Kristian Berg Harpviken, director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), for reminding me of this author in 2010. It is a privilege to have Kristian Harpviken as esteemed members in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


983 See also Røislien and Røislien, 2010, for a discussion ‘the logic of Palestinian terrorist target choice’. I thank Kristian Berg Harpviken, director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) for making me aware of this article.

984 See two documentaries made in France:


• Djihad, les contre-feux, documentary film by Laetitia Moreau, Arte France, 2015, www.arte.tv/guide/fr/060819-000-A/djihad-les-contre-feux?autoplay=1#details-description. In this film, a mother in Marseilles is presented who lost her young son in Syria. This is the letter he wrote to her before his death translated by Lindner from the French original:

When you read these words, then I have left life on this toilsome world behind me, this very troublesome world, especially since I left you. I hope you understand why I did all this, why I left everything, even though I lived in a stable situation, a wonderful family, and had a job. Why all these sacrifices? Because the community of Mohammed was humiliated. Allah has rewarded us with the reconstruction of the Caliphate. Finally, Muslims have regained their pride. A successful life is not only work, having a house, a car, a wife and children. A successful life is to worship Allah and to have his blessing.

French original:

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Si tu lis ces mots, ce que j’ai quitté cette vie sur terre, éprouvante, très éprouvante, surtout depuis que je suis vous quitté. J’espère que tu as compris pourquoi j’ai fait tout ça, pourquoi avoir tout quitté, alors que j’avais une situation stable, une famille merveilleuse, un travail. Pourquoi tous ces sacrifices? Parce que la Communauté de Mohammed est humilié. Allah nous a honoré avec la reestablishment du Califat, ou les musulmans retrouvé enfin la fierté. Reussier sa vie c’est pas juste travailler, avoir une maison, une voiture, une femme et des enfants. Reussier sa vie c’est adorer Allah et avoir sa satisfaction.

See also the work by French anthropologist Dounia Bouzar, 2016, and how she dissects how vulnerable teenagers are recruited into a desire to sacrifice themselves in ‘holy war’ by way of professionally organised integration methodologies that are also know from sects in general.


986 ‘Humiliation is the root of all terrorism’, by Tikkun editor at large Peter Gabel, TruthOut, 16th December 2015, www.truth-out.org/speakout/item/34062-humiliation-is-the-root-of-all-terrorism. I thank Seymour M. (Mike) Miller and Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article. Gabel writes, ‘...longing and vulnerability when met with non-recognition leads to humiliation, which leads to substitute imaginary visions that resolve the pain of non-recognition through prideful grandiosity, perfect unity, and dehumanisation of those who dehumanised you’. Gabel offers a two-pronged strategy. First, in the short term, finding rational ways to protect ourselves in public places. Second, and this is a strategy addressing the sympathisers who make it possible for more violent actors to function, offering an ‘alternative ideology’:

…we should begin to relate to these humiliated populations of the world as we always should have, with empathy and compassion and generosity and care. We should see them as our fellow human beings and offer them the recognition and affirmation and respect that they were always entitled to, but which has been systematically and often ruthlessly denied to them for decades, or even centuries, from the Crusades to World War I to the Iraq War to the present-day exploitation for our benefit of their oil reserves. In repair of disrupting, destroying and demeaning their historical communities, we should enter into present community with them.

It was a privilege to have Jean Baker Miller as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, until her passing in 2007, and we will always honour her spirit. It is equally gratifying to have also her husband Seymour M. (Mike) Miller in our global advisory board.

987 John McFadden, 2016, writes:

Empathising with ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups does seem unthinkable. That is partly because, to most people, ‘empathy’ means ‘sympathy’, and sympathy for heinous murderers sounds blatantly ridiculous. A second less familiar reason is that violent people seem obviously to not care about their victims, so there is no point in trying to get through to them at all except by force. Therefore, empathy can only detract from reasonable efforts to control and get rid of terrorists.

John McFadden observes that relying on empathy toward terrorists, toward those who seemingly lack shame and conscience, for many ‘is a fool’s errand that can only detract from realistic attempts to prevent violence’. McFadden concludes: ‘...anti-empathy understanding is embedded in civilisation at every level of relationships, ranging from relations between parents and kids to relations between nations’. It is a privilege to have John McFadden’s support for our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


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Canada’s indigenous populations demonstrate the deleterious effect of continuous humiliation: they are driven into waves of suicide as an outflow of ‘cumulative humiliation’, of a lingering trauma of colonialism and prejudice, of ‘cultural genocide’.

989 See Talking to the enemy, by Scott Atran, uploaded on 18th November 2010, https://youtu.be/6ijmBd69878, where Atran explores the evolutionary origins of religions in connection with the mind-sets of extremist people in the twenty-first century. I thank Deeyah Khan for making me aware of this video.

990 Atran, et al., 2014.


992 Kühne, 2011. It is a privilege to have Thomas Kühne as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

993 The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), or Da’esh (Arabic: Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah fe Al-Iraq wa Al-Sham).

994 Hartling and Lindner, 2018b, p. 6.

995 See, for instance, Baumeister, 1997.

996 Lindner, 2001b. Abstract:
This article argues that the concept of humiliation may be deconstructed into seven layers, including a) a core that expresses the universal idea of ‘putting down’, b) a middle layer that contains two opposed orientations towards ‘putting down’, treating it as, respectively, legitimate and routine, or illegitimate and traumatising, and c) a periphery whose distinctive layers include one pertaining to cultural differences between groups and another four peripheral layers that relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experience of humiliation.


998 Leidner, et al., 2012.

999 See, among others, Sarraj, 2002, Sayler, 2004, Giacaman, et al., 2007, Elison and Harter, 2007, Walker and Knauer, 2011, Giacaman, et al., 2007, Sarraj, 2002. Protracted cycles of humiliation can lead to the paralysis and apathy that results from learned helplessness. See for research on inertia, for instance, Leidner, et al., 2012. According to anthropologist Scott Atran, humiliation is a negative predictor for terrorism, since those who feel humiliated become submissive. However, it is different to act on behalf of others’ exposure to humiliation, such as the second or third generation of Muslims in Britain who believe that their parents were humiliated. See, among others, Ginges and Atran, 2008. See for an illustration, ‘Wave of indigenous suicides leaves Canadian town appealing for help’, by Liam Stack, New York Times, 18th March 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/americas/canada-youth-suicide.html. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.


1001 Otten and Jonas, 2013, p. 33.

1002 See for research on inertia, for instance, Leidner, et al., 2012.

1003 Galtung, 1969.


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Canada’s indigenous populations demonstrate the deleterious effect of continuous humiliation: they are driven into waves of suicide as an outflow of ‘cumulative humiliation’, of a lingering trauma of colonialism and prejudice, of ‘cultural genocide’.

Lewis, 1971.

Phillips, 2011. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.


David Cook is a historian at Rice University, Texas, U.S.A., who studies Muslim apocalypticism. See, among others, Cook, 2010. According to Muslim apocalypticism, the battles preceding the Day of Judgment will take place in modern Syria, with a final showdown in the year 1500 of the Islamic Hijra calendar, or A.D. 2076.


Margalit, 1996.


Howard Richards and Catherine Odora Hoppers have been referred to previously, and their insistence that more regulatory rules are not enough, what is needed are new constitutive rules.

Richards and Swanger, 2006.

Lindner, 2012b, Richards, et al., 2015a.

‘An interview with Dr. Nora Sveaass: Why torture is wrong’, by Nilantha Ilangamuwa, CounterPunch, 11th–13th October 2013, www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/11/why-torture-is-wrong/. Nora Sveaass is an internationally renowned psychologist who became a member of the Committee against Torture in the United Nations (UNCAT). Sveaass is currently an associate professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Oslo, Norway, and an esteemed colleague, whose support during my doctoral research was crucial

See also the work of Beatriz Brinkmann, 1999. I thank Wolfgang Kaleck for making me aware of the Brinkmann’s work. You can learn about Brinkmann’s experience in prison in Chile in


Health and Human Rights Info, www.hhri.org/about/.

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is an international non-profit organisation specialising in the field of transitional justice, www.ictj.org. I thank Wolfgang Kaleck for making me aware of this organisation.

I thank Wolfgang Kaleck, et al., 2007, for explaining to me, during our meeting on 17th May 2011, in Berlin, that there is no standard model for dealing with the past, but that a number of precedents have been established through the work of special rapporteurs and experts of the United Nations on the issues of impunity, reparations, and best practices in transitional justice. The principles against impunity were initially formulated by Louis Joinet in 1997 and later revised by Diane F. Orentlicher in 2005. Louis Joinet was a long-time UN expert and one of the main architects behind the Convention against Enforced Disappearances, and Diane Orentlicher is professor of international law and co-director of the Center for Torture Victims (CINTRAS), in Chile, a centre for mental health and human rights, that works to alleviate the physical and emotional suffering of persons affected by torture or other forms of political repression. See www.iert.org. I thank Freimut Duve for his support for the Global Responsibility Festival ‘Hamburger Ideenkette’ that I organised in Hamburg, Germany, in 1993, see www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/evelin/03.php.

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Orentlicher, 2016.


Although the social relations (like the relation of buyer to seller, or the relation of employer to employee), the social positions (like the position of owner), and the social constructs (like contracts) are constituted by cultural rules, the social structure thus constituted is material.

Howard Richards in a personal communication reflecting on Norman Kurland’s work, 12nd January 2013:

I do not think it is responsible to be simply ‘in favour of private property’ or ‘against private property’ or to say ‘Marx was right’ or ‘Marx was wrong’. I do not think the words ‘capitalism’ or ‘socialism’ in most of the ways they are commonly understood can name something one can be simply ‘for’ or ‘against’. (In the end, however, I come out being ‘for’ both socialism and capitalism, properly defined, i.e. defined as I think it best to define them. I am working on these paradoxes in an essay I am working on in Spanish tentatively titled ‘How to achieve socialism without socialism’. They are also somewhat explained in my talk at University of Cape Town, where I explain also why the debate has to go back to indigenous practices of community and transcend modern western categories.)

... I met Adler when I was working for Robert Hutchins (I worked for him in 1960–1965) and I had the impression that he shared Hutchins’ view which is also that of Aristotle and is part of the social teachings of the Catholic Church and of most churches that property is in principle common (given by God or Nature) to everyone, while the separation of property into ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ is a practical arrangement due to the fact that holding property in common is often impractical. As St. Thomas says we who own property have legal dominion, but the duty to use the property to serve others. In Gandhi’s view we should regard ourselves as ‘trustees’ of our property... This is sometimes called in secular terms the view that property rights serve social functions. On the other hand Hutchins and traditional ethics generally are quite aware of the desirable function of property in establishing respect for persons and the integrity and freedom of human personalities. This does not need to lead to denying the social functions of property and the need to revise property institutions in the light of their social functions.

I agree with Norm that when Marx wrote that Communism consists of abolishing private property Marx was recommending something neither practical nor desirable. I do not want to underestimate the tragedy and human suffering that have resulted from that impractical and undesirable idea. But this does not imply that we have nothing to learn from Marx. Nor does it imply that we should underestimate the tragedy and human suffering that have resulted from imposing unenlightened ideas about private property by violence, torture, lies and all the rest –the latter being closer to home for one who writes from Chile.

I also think that unrestricted property rights (full respect for the dominium of Roman law) make it impossible to achieve social inclusion. As far as I can tell without taking time for more study, the Kelso idea is not really unrestricted property rights because it involves redistribution so that everybody has access to property. This would raise the issue how to make redistribution practical, how to carry it out without shutting down the dynamics that make the economy work (given that it does not in any case work very well)...

I thank Linda Hartling for emphasising the centrality of human relationships.


Richards and Andersson, 2015.

Locke, 1689.

and Quataert, 2009.

I thank Barnett Pearce for making me aware of Lyons, 1978. I thank Jon Elster for making me aware that the ‘birth of the self’ actually began much earlier, with Michel de Montaigne, 1575, in his Essays. See, furthermore, Bloom, 1999, on Shakespeare and ‘the invention of the human’, or the Baudelairian flâneur, or the emigrant of W. G. Sebald, 1992/1996, or, more recently, Cole, 2011. It was a privilege to have Barnett Pearce as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship until his passing, and we will always honour his spirit.

Lindner, 2006a.

I thank Stephan Feuchtwang in a personal communication, 14th November 2002. See also Hartling and Luchetta, 1999, Lindner, 2006a, and Lindner, 2009b.


One sees the need for revenge, for righting a wrong, for undoing the hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting compulsion in the pursuit of all these aims which gives no rest to those who have suffered a narcissistic injury – these are features which are characteristic for the phenomenon of narcissistic rage in all its forms and which sets it apart from other kinds of aggression.

I thank David Lotto, 2016, for reminding me of this quote.


Sachs, 1992, p. 3.


Bull, 2015, p. 25.


Maalouf, 2009. I thank Mai-Bente Bonnevie for making me aware of this book. It is a privilege to have Mai-Bente Bonnevie as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship. See a summary of the Maalouf, 2009, on CDurable.info, http://cdurable.info/Amin-Maalouf-Le-dereglement-du-monde,1660.html, translated from French by Lindner:

The central thesis of this long essay could be summarised as follows: the maladjustment of the world has less to do with a ‘clash of civilisations’ and more with the simultaneous depletion of civilisation. Humankind has reached its ‘moral threshold of incompetence’. The age of ideological divisions and its debates is now followed by divisions of identity, where there is no more debate. Islam and the West: both discourses have their theoretical consistency, but each, in practice,
betrays its own ideals. The West is unfaithful to its own values, which disqualifies it in the eyes of the people it claims to acculturate to democracy. The Arab-Muslim world no longer has neither the legitimacy of the family nor the patriotic legitimacy around which it was historically structured. Living in humiliation and regressive nostalgia for its ‘Golden Age’, the era of Islamism succeeding the era of nationalism, it is condemned to a headlong rush into radicalism. These ‘symmetrical maladjustments’ are only one element of a broader global derangement that requires humanity to come together to deal with the emergencies, like climatic degradation which threatens all peoples. And if prehistory of humanity ended before our eyes, opening in the great convulsions, a new chapter of human history begins?

French original:

La thèse centrale de ce vaste essai pourrait être ainsi résumée: le dérèglement du monde tient moins à la ‘guerre des civilisations’ qu’à l’épuisement simultané des civilisations, l’humanité ayant atteint en quelque sorte son ‘seuil d’incompétence morale’. A l’âge des clivages idéologiques qui suscitaient le débat succède celui des clivages identitaires, où il n’y a plus de débat. Islam et Occident: les deux discours ont leur cohérence théorique, mais chacun, dans la pratique, trahit ses propres idéaux. L’Occident est infidèle à ses propres valeurs, ce qui le disqualifie auprès des peuples qu’il prétend acculturer à la démocratie. Le monde arabo-musulman n’a plus ni la légitimité généalogique ni la légitimité patriotique autour desquelles il s’était historiquement structuré. Vivant dans l’humiliation et la nostalgie régressive de son ‘Age d’or’, l’ère des islamismes ayant succédé à l’ère des nationalismes, il se trouve condamné à une fuite en avant dans le radicalisme. Ces ‘dérèglements symétriques’ ne sont qu’un des éléments d’un dérèglement planétaire plus global qui exige que l’humanité se rassemble pour faire face à des urgences qui, à l’exemple des perturbations climatiques, menacent tous les peuples. Et si la Présentation de l’humanité prenait fin sous nos yeux, ouvrant dans les convulsions le grand chapitre d’une nouvelle Histoire de l’homme qui commence?


1040 See, among others, Delkatesh, 2011. There are voices, however, who suspect that more sinister intentions were behind the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings and the chaos in the Middle East in general, namely, that it rather was a chaos stoked from outside. See ‘Barack Obama’s meager legacy of incomplete accomplishments and of provoked wars: What happened?’ by Rodrigue Tremblay, 30th May 2016, www.thecodeforglobalethics.com/pb/wp_0b5e796a/wp_0b5e796a.html#LEGACY. See more by Canadian economist Rodrigue Tremblay, 2010. See also ‘The redirection: Is the administration’s new policy benefitting our enemies in the war on terrorism?’ by Seymour M. Hersh, New Yorker, Annals of National Security, 5th March 2007, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/03/05/the-redirection.

1041 Karlberg, 2013, p. 7.

1042 Lindner, 2006a.

1043 Ury, 1999.

1044 In the case of territorial circumscription, it is landscape (mountains, rivers, ocean) that stands ‘in the way’, while social circumscription means that other people ‘stand in the way’. Circumscription theory has been developed by anthropologist and curator of the American Museum of Natural History in New York City, Robert Leonard Carneiro. See, among others, Carneiro, 1970, 1988, 2000, 2010, 2012. See, furthermore, Sanderson, 2007, and Schacht, 1988. It is a privilege to have Robert Carneiro as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

1045 Ury, 1999, p. 108. It is a privilege to have William Ury as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

1046 In my work, I apply the ideal-type approach as described by sociologist Max Weber, 1904/1949. See Coser, 1977, p. 224:

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Weber’s three kinds of *ideal types* are distinguished by their levels of abstraction. First are the *ideal types* rooted in historical particularities, such as the ‘western city’, ‘the Protestant Ethic’, or ‘modern capitalism’, which refer to phenomena that appear only in specific historical periods and in particular cultural areas. A second kind involves abstract elements of social reality – such concepts as ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘feudalism’ – that may be found in a variety of historical and cultural contexts. Finally, there is a third kind of *ideal type*, which Raymond Aron calls ‘rationalising reconstructions of a particular kind of behaviour’. According to Weber, all propositions in economic theory, for example, fall into this category. They all refer to the ways in which men would behave were they actuated by purely economic motives, were they purely economic men.

*1047* Fuller and Gerloff, 2008. In a human rights context that stipulates that all human beings ought to be treated as equal in dignity and rights, hurtful psychological dynamics of humiliation are set in motion when *rankism* is practiced, when, for instance, ‘women’ are regarded as a lowly category, or ‘children’, ‘the elderly’, ‘foreigners’, and so forth. It is a privilege to have Robert Fuller as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


*1051* Ibid.

*1052* Eisler, 1987. See her most recent book, Eisler, 2007. She describes how, from the samurai of Japan to the Aztecs of Meso-America, people lived in very similar hierarchies of domination and under a rigidly male-dominant ‘strong-man’ rule, both in the family and state. Hierarchies of domination were maintained by a high degree of institutionalised and socially accepted violence, ranging from wife- and child-beating within the family to aggressive warfare at the larger tribal or national level.


Dominance and submission were characteristics of the social interactions of our primate ancestors, a pattern that had been overcome by the egalitarian hunter-gatherer groups, and now re-emerged. Egalitarian sentiments still present as part of the genetic endowment of those who now found themselves in a subordinate position must, by necessity, have been frustrated. This may explain the frequent violent upheavals against the ruling hierarchy and the dominators’ use of draconian, public punishment of insurgents to deter and suppress such sentiments.


*1056* BCE stands for Before the Common Era, and is equivalent to BC, which means Before Christ.

*1057* Jaspers, 1949. See also Bellah, 2011.

*1058* The Cyrus Cylinder was put on display at the Iran National Museum (INM) for the first time in 2008. See, for example, www.chnpress.com/news/?section=2&id=7423.


*1060* Opposition to environment degradation seems to have played a role. Mark D. Whitaker, 2008,
studied environmental sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. In his 2008 doctoral dissertation, he argues that environmental movements are not a novel feature of world politics, but a durable feature of a degradative political economy. He has analysed China, Japan, and Europe over 2,500 years and shows how religio-ecological movements arose against state-led environmental degradation:

As a result, origins of our large scale humanocentric ‘axial religions’ are connected to anti-systemic environmental movements. Many major religious movements of the past were ‘environmentalist’ by being health, ecological, and economic movements, rolled into one. Since ecological revolutions are endemic to a degradation-based political economy, they continue today.

I thank Michael Bauwens for making me aware of Whitaker’s research.

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1061 Mencius, 2017.
1062 See, for instance, Battle, 1997.
1064 Stadtwald, 1992, Abstract:

Despite the fact that modern historians know the episode to be apocryphal, Alexander’s step on Fredric Barbarossa’s neck was as neuralgic for many sixteenth-century German political commentators as it was widely believed. The incident is the production of humanists, who were impressed with and encouraged by Emperor Maximilian and who interpreted a twelfth-century confrontation between pope and emperor in light of the current turn-of-the-century tug-of-war. ‘The step on the neck legend’ lived on into the 1520s and 1530s as an image of papal tyranny in the political commentaries of such humanists as Jakob Ziegler. Martin Luther used the incident and the humanist notion of papal tyranny in his own pamphlet The Pope’s threat (1545).

1068 ‘Vatican admits Galileo was right’, New Scientist, 7th November 1992, www.newscientist.com/article/mg13618460-600-vatican-admits-galileo-was-right/.
1070 Brinkmann, 2017.
1071 International relations specialist and research affiliate of the Waterloo Institute for Complexity and Innovation at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, Stephen Purdey, in his contribution to the Great Transition Network Initiative discussion titled ‘Journey to Earthland: Making the great transition to planetary civilisation’, 24th October 2016, in response to Raskin, 2016.
1072 Siebert and Ott, 2016, p. 6.
1073 See, among others, the work of historian of science, Ernst Peter Fischer, 2009.
relationships/. See also, among many others, Twenge and Campbell, 2009, and Campbell and Miller, 2011.

1076 Brummelman, et al., 2015.

1077 See, among others, Twenge and Campbell, 2009, and Campbell and Miller, 2011. Narcissistic parents tend to react in one of two ways, first, they may simply lose interest in their children, or, second, they may use their offspring as ‘trophy kids’ for self-advancement, view their children as a reflection and part of themselves like their own arm or leg, and be overly involved and controlling. Both reactions are traumatic for the child, as both mean disconnection, since also overly involved narcissistic parents lack warmth and are emotionally detached. As a result, children of narcissists will struggle with doubt and insecurity the rest of their lives.

1078 Baumeister, et al., 1996, in Madsen, 2014a, p. 612: ‘The philosophy of enhancing self-esteem has been heavily criticised by psychological research, suggesting it is flawed, either making people with low self-esteem worse off, or possibly creating a generation of egotistical youths with prone to pick on others’.


1080 Solomon, 2005.


1082 Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon (1896–1974), for example, was an Indian nationalist, diplomat and politician, who led the overseas wing of the Indian independence movement, launching the India League in London.

1083 Lindner, 2006a, p. 66.

1084 Lindner, 2007b.


1086 Critical psychologist Ole Jacob Madsen, 2014b, looks at the increasing prevalence of psychology in several areas of Western society, such as Western consumer culture, contemporary Christianity, self-help, sport and politics. He warns that psychologists do the people they are meant to help a disservice when individual psychological solutions are used for structural problems, when the embeddedness of individual suffering in major historical and political changes in society is overlooked. See also Illouz, 2008, Furedi, 2004, Rose, 1999, Nolan, 1998, Lasch, 1991.

1087 ‘Ending emotocracy: Moving democracy from neuroticism to logic’, by R. Rados, Poletical, 1st November 2012, www.poletical.com/emotocracy.php. The author of this article describes politicians such as Barack Obama as ‘neurocrats’ and ‘ancient ideas of collectivism and fairness’ as having ‘destroyed civilisations throughout history’. Clearly, this writer has a point – as long as the security dilemma was strong, collectivism within in-groups was enforced so as to stand strong in the face of the enemy. Rados writes further that ‘collectivism should always be voluntary and not enforced by any government’. Indeed, the global community can attenuate the security dilemma intentionally and voluntarily, by building global trust, which, in turn, diminishes the need to enforce collectivism. By now, however, humanity faces new challenges – not ancient enemies but severe global ecological

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limits, and in this situation, it is prudent for the global community to voluntarily create forms of
collectivism that follow the unity in diversity principle.

Psychologists Jeroen Jansz and Peter van Drunen formulate three basic assumptions that constitute
the ‘positivist view’ of psychology: (a) Practical psychology is believed to rest on scientific
knowledge developed within academic psychology, (b) this knowledge is further thought to be
progressive and value-free, and (c) the application of this psychological knowledge is generally
perceived as being beneficial for society and humankind. The opposite view, ‘the revisionist view’,
holds three different basic assumptions: (a) Practical psychology originates from societal forces rather
than from academic psychology, (b) psychological knowledge does not necessarily imply progress and
is never value-free, and (c) psychology often represses or conceals society’s real conflicts. Jansz and
van Drunen emphasise ‘that the positivist view’, far from being a correct reflection of the history of
psychology, ‘is first and foremost an article of faith, since psychology’s utility and role in society has
been oppressive just as often as it has fostered social progress’, Jansz and Drunen, 2004, as quoted in
Madsen, 2014a. See also Lindner, 2001c.

Foreword to *Single issues*, by Joseph Sobran, 1983, posted at Sobran’s: The real news of the
month website, www.sobran.com/pdf/Single_Issues_pdfs/00_foreward.pdf. Sobran used to identify as
a paleoconservative similar to Samuel T. Francis, Pat Buchanan, and Peter Gemma.

Stephen Pinker & NY Times Nicholas Kristof: Wrong about Western “progress”*, by Charles
See also Eisenstein, 2011, 2014. It was a privilege to have Charles Eisenstein with us in our 2012
Workshop on Transforming Humiliation and Violent Conflict at Columbia University in New York City.

See Pettit, 1997a.


See, among others, Kleinig, 2011, Kleinig and Evans, 2013.

Fuller, 2003. In a human rights context that stipulates that all human beings ought to be treated as
equal in dignity and rights, hurtful psychological dynamics of humiliation are set in motion when
rankism is practiced, when, for instance, ‘women’ are regarded as a lowly category, or ‘children’, ‘the
elderly’, ‘foreigners’, and so forth. It is a privilege to have Robert Fuller as esteemed member in the
global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

I had the privilege of participating in the launch of the Coexistence Initiative in Belfast in 1999,
and was impressed by the various ways coexistence can be conceptualised. See also Weiner and
(Foreword), 1998.

*Neoliberaler Kahlschlag – Butterwege: Grundeinkommen wäre Ende des Sozialstaats*, 3sat, 13th
October 2016, www.3sat.de/page/?source=/makro/magazin/doks/189268/index.html. 3sat is a public,
advertising-free, television network in Central Europe.

*Wer zu spät kommt...: Gorbatschow hat den berühmten Satz nie gesagt*, by Christoph Bock, *Die
Welt*, 6th October 2014, www.welt.de/geschichte/article132968291/Gorbatschow-hat-den-
beruehmten-Satz-nie-gesagt.html.

Witt and Schwesinger, 2013. Groups that grow larger and want to fission and migrate into a
separate territory need unoccupied land.

Ury, 1999.

Under the conditions of the security dilemma, the Hobbesian fear of surprise attacks from outside
one’s nation’s borders reigns. Barry Posen and Russell Hardin discuss the emotional aspects of the
security dilemma and how they play out between ethnic groups as much as between states, see Posen,

Rothkopf, 2008. See for a more recent account of ‘who owns the world’, Jakobs, 2016. See also

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Robinson, 2017, on how the transnational capitalist class (TCC) made up of the owners and managers of transnational capital, has emerged as the agent of global capitalism.


Für ihn läuft derzeit eine ‘irreversible Umvoklung’, ein ‘permanenter Austausch des deutschen Staatsvolks durch zu 98% illegale Eindringlinge’.


…allows thosesmarting from a loss of privilege to be offered the shroud of victimhood, by pointing to a shadowy, omnipresent, quasi-foreign elite who are attempting to destroy all that is good in the world. It offers an explanation for the decline of families, small towns, patriarchal authority, and unchallenged white power: a vast, century-long left wing conspiracy. And it distracts from the most important factor in these changes: capitalism, which demands mobility, whose crises have eroded living standards, and which thus, among other things, undermines the viability of conventional family structures and the traditional lifestyles that conservatives approve of.

1105 ‘Separation is beautiful’, by Uri Avnery, Human Wrongs Watch, 7th October 2017, https://human-wrongs-watch.net/2017/10/14/separation-is-beautiful/. Ury Avnery asks ‘why smaller and smaller peoples want independence, when the world is creating larger and larger political units? It looks like a paradox, but really isn’t:

We in this generation are witnessing the end of the nation state, which has dominated world history for the last few hundred years. It was born out of necessity. Small countries were unable to build modern mass industries which depended on a large domestic market.

They could not defend themselves, when modern armies required more and more sophisticated weapons. Even cultural development depended on larger language-areas.

So Wales and Scotland joined England, Savoy and Sicily created Italy, Corsica and the Provence joined France. Small nationalities joined larger ones. It was necessary for survival.

History is moving on, and now even the nation-State is not large enough to compete. States unite in ever-larger units, such as the European Union. I have no doubt that by the end of this century, there will be in place an effective world government, turning the entire world effectivity into one state. (If some extra-terrestrials threaten this world, it will help.)

So how does the separation into smaller and smaller states fit this trend? Simply, if the state of Spain is not necessary anymore for economic and military purposes and its central functions are moving from Madrid to Brussels, why shouldn’t the Catalans and the Basques secede and join the Union under their own flags? Look at Yugoslavia, look even at the Soviet Union. Germany is the great exception but it is quite large by itself.

The two processes are not contradictory, they complement each other.”

1106 Physicist Sabine Hossenfelder, 2018, uses this argument to criticize modern physic. She argues that modern physicists’ obsession with beauty has rendered wonderful mathematics but bad science.

1107 Of the three dominant ideologies of the twentieth century – fascism, communism, and liberalism – only the last remains, writes Patrick Deneen, 2018, and it has failed. He notes that there were two phases in the liberal attempt to assert dominion over nature. In the first wave, the emphasis was on the conquest of the natural world, while in the second wave, by the late 1800s, liberal thinkers wanted to conquer also human nature itself. There are two revolutions, first anthropological individualism and the voluntarist conception of choice, and, second, the human separation from nature and even...
opposition to it. In this way liberty is defined as the most extensive possible expansion of the human sphere of autonomous activity.

I thank Kamran Mofid for bringing Deneens’s book to our attention. See ‘The rape of nature: Now is the time to know that all that you do is sacred’, by Kamran Mofid, Globalisation for the Common Good Initiative (GCGI), 8th June 2018, https://www.gcgi.info/blog/937-the-rape-of-nature-now-is-the-time-to-know-that-all-that-you-do-is-sacred.

Kamran Mofid also recommends philosopher Philip Sherrard, 1987, and his book The rape of man and nature: An enquiry into the origins and consequences of modern science.

1108 See a discussion in chapter 8: How We can reinvent our contexts, in my book Emotion and conflict (Lindner, 2009b).

1109 If Mr. Frog were suddenly dropped into a saucepan of hot water, he would swiftly jump out; the water is hot and he does not want to be cooked. But if Mr. Frog is placed in a saucepan of comfortably warm water that is heated very slowly, he does not notice that he is being cooked. Likewise, the moderate speed of change can mask its significance. The Bedouins were like frogs; they were being ‘cooked’ without knowing. The process of change was slow enough to make them miss how dramatic it was – the change was still powerful enough to change their lives forever.

1110 In my book on A dignity economy (Lindner, 2012d), I walk through some of the humiliating effects that flow systemically from present-day economic arrangements: (1) scarcity and environmental degradation, (2) ubiquitous mistrust, (3) abuse as a means, (4) debilitating fear, (5) false choices, and (6) psychological damage.

1111 Endocrinologist Robert Lustig, 2017. See also The hacking of the American Mind with Dr. Robert Lustig, University of California Television (UCTV, www.uctv.tv), published 6th September 2017, on https://youtu.be/EKkUTrL6B18. I thank Harvey Neuman for making me aware of this interview. Robert Lustig explores ‘how industry has contributed to a culture of addiction, depression and chronic disease’. Lustig recommends the four Cs of connect, contribute, cope, and cook: First, interpersonal connection activates empathy (for instance, through activating mirror neurons), an effect that religion can bring about, among others, while platforms such as Facebook produce a dopamine rise and thus create unhappiness. Second, the contribution to goals larger than yourself can produce long-term contentment, for example, through volunteerism. Third, coping means reducing stress through mindfulness, sufficient exercise, enough sleep, and the avoidance of multitasking. Fourth, Lustig recommends cooking real food oneself, rather than consuming processed or restaurant food.

1112 Lustig, 2017. Long-term consequences are a life span reduction, 75 per cent of health care expenditure going to chronic metabolic diseases, while liberty is absent when a person’s salary is determined by where she was born, and the happiness of contentment is lost. Industrial food production contributes with 40 per cent to climate change, thus negatively impacting all three promises of the Declaration of Independence. See also Eyal and Hoover, 2014.

1113 Miki Kashtan in her contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Feminism and revolution: Looking back, looking ahead’, 15th May 2018, in response to the essay of the same title by Julie Matthaei, 2018:

If indeed patriarchy emerged from trauma, and we have never since had the necessary conditions for digesting and metabolising and healing from this trauma, we are then individually and collectively primed to pass on what has been done to us, generation after generation. When such individual internalisation is reinforced by structures of exchange, accumulation, coercive governance, competitive economics, and war, it no longer surprises me that even our attempts to create change are encased within patriarchal thinking.

1114 Anthropologist Laura Nader, 2013, finds a ‘missionary-like zeal’ that reminds of Judeo-Christian ethics in American corporate culture and how it manufactures lifestyles, tastes, and desires, yet, also fractures families by commercialising childhood. ‘In this sense fundamentalism is as intimately connected to a type of economic system as it is to religious belief’, Nader, 2013, chapter 5, p. 147. It was a privilege to learn from Laura Nader at the Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11th–16th July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany.

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‘How indigenous land-use practices relate to community land trusts & the commons’, by Aaron Fernando, Shareable Net, 1st November 2017, www.shareable.net/blog/how-indigenous-land-use-can-inform-the-real-sharing-economy. In this article, the Schumacher Center’s development and communications director, Aaron Fernando, writes about similarities between indigenous land stewardship, the community land trust model, and the commons. He argues that Hardin was not really describing a commons: ‘He was describing an open-access regime that has no rules, boundaries or indeed no community. In fact, the situation he was describing – in which free riders can appropriate or damage resources at will – is more accurately a description of unfettered markets. You might say Hardin was describing the tragedy of the market.

Ostrom, 1990, 2010. *Altruistic punishment* is a term coined by economists Fehr and Gächter, 2002. Their research is relevant for the discussion as to whether it is possible or not to protect commons. Their research documented that people willingly give up some of their own resources in order to punish those who behave selfishly in a group context. See also ‘What a simple psychological test reveals about climate change: If everyone’s success depended on it, would you share – or be selfish?’ by Dylan Selterman, *National Geographic magazine*, June 2018 issue, www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/06/embark-essay-tragedy-of-the-commons-greed-common-good/.

Richards, 2016a. See also historian Philipp Ther, 2014/2016, p. x, and his summary of the main pillars of neoliberal ideology:

Blind belief in the market as an adjudicator in almost all human affairs, irrational reliance on the rationality of market participants, disdain for the state as expressed in the myth of ‘big government’, and the uniform application of the economic recipes of the Washington Consensus.


Sikkink, 2018:

The tendency to attribute human rights ideology to the Global North may also stem from the fact that the Europeans were the first to create a regional human rights regime. From 1950 to 1953, Europe established the first overarching human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, and a regional human rights court, the European Court of Human Rights.

See also Sikkink, 2011.

Human rights norms as they evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are best understood as an expression of the dominant Western, and more specifically Anglo-American, tradition. Daniel Skubik, 1992, has identified five key attributes as constituting the core of this tradition:

1. individuality: each human being is considered to be a separate, distinct whole;
2. moral agency: each person, is a free, autonomous agent;
3. moral equality: each individual is deemed inherently equal;
4. rationality: each individual has access to reason;
5. individual integrity: each individual has an inherent dignity concomitant with his or her individuality.


1127 Nowak and Highfield, 2011.

1128 Witt and Schwesinger, 2013.

1129 Lindner, 2011.

1130 scobel: Selbstsabotage, 3sat, 17th May 2018, www.3sat.de/page/?source=/scobel/196700/index.html. 3sat is a public and advertising-free television network in Central Europe. Translated by Lindner from the German original:

   Warum tut der Mensch nicht das, was gut für ihn ist? Wir wissen durchaus, was gut für uns ist - für unsere Gesundheit, die Umwelt und die Gesellschaft - dennoch handeln wir nicht danach. Warum? Was steckt hinter dem System Selbstsabotage? Gibt es Möglichkeiten, das System – zumindest gelegentlich – auszuschalten?

1131 Tolstoy, 1886/1935.


1134 Siebert and Ott, 2016, p. 12.

1135 Kaku, 2005, 361.


1138 Bass and Riggio, 2006. I thank Avi Shahaf of reminding me of Bass’ transformational leadership theory. Transformational leaders hold positive expectations of their colleagues and care about their personal growth. Transformational leadership occurs when engagement in a group results in leaders and followers raising one another to increased levels of motivation and morality. Four components ‘I’ describe transformational leadership:

   • Idealised Influence (II): a transformational leader ‘walks the talk’, and is admired for this.
   • Inspirational Motivation (IM): a transformational leader inspire and motivate others.
   • Individualised Consideration (IC): a transformational leader is genuinely concerned with the personal growth of their colleagues.
   • Intellectual Stimulation (IS): a transformational leader challenges others to attain their highest goals.

Many in our HumanDHS network are reflecting on leadership, among others, Weltzien Hoivik, 2002, Hamburg, et al., 1999.

1139 The formulation ‘waging good conflict’ was coined by Jean Baker Miller, 1976/1986a.

1140 Cooperrider and Whitney, 2005.


1142 Edward de Bono holds Da Vinci Professor of Thinking chair at University of Advancing Technology in Tempe, Arizona, U.S. He originated the term lateral thinking, and became popular with his decision making heuristic using a metaphor of six hats, www.debonogroup.com/six_thinking_hats.php:

   • The White Hat calls for information known or needed. ‘The facts, just the facts’.

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• The Yellow Hat symbolises brightness and optimism. Under this hat you explore the positives and probe for value and benefit.
• The Black Hat is judgment – the devil’s advocate or why something may not work. Spot the difficulties and dangers; where things might go wrong. Probably the most powerful and useful of the Hats but a problem if overused.
• The Red Hat signifies feelings, hunches and intuition. When using this hat you can express emotions and feelings and share fears, likes, dislikes, loves, and hates.
• The Green Hat focuses on creativity; the possibilities, alternatives, and new ideas. It’s an opportunity to express new concepts and new perceptions.
• The Blue Hat is used to manage the thinking process. It’s the control mechanism that ensures the Six Thinking Hats guidelines are observed.

1143 Kenneth Gergen, 2009, emphasises ‘positive sharing, adding value, and reality building’, Gergen, 2009, p. 334. In our dignity work, we nurture a very broad sharing of visions, values, and insights, we nurture the emergence of ideas and proposals from the midst of our global network of relationships rather than having them dictated by a single ‘leader’, and we build reality through narrating ‘we’ stories. See also Hersted and Gergen, 2013.


1145 See, for instance, political scientist Simon Koschut’s overview over relevant publications relevant for the ‘emotional turn’ in international relations theory: Åhäll and Gregory, 2015; Bially Mattern, 2011; Edkins, 2003; Fattah and Fierke, 2009; Hall and Ross, 2015; Hutchinson, 2016; Koschut, 2014; Leep, 2010; Ross, 2013; Solomon, 2014; Van Rythoven, 2015; Wilcox, 2015. The narrative of humiliation in the Middle East, for instance, shows the intertextuality of emotions: ‘emotions have a history’, Fattah and Fierke, 2009, p. 70.
See also an interview that Alexandros Koutsoukis conducted with Steven C. Roach on 2nd November 2016, as part of a series of interviews under the motto ‘resurrecting IR theory’, where Roach discusses affective values in international relations, the value of resilience, and how to theorise emotional actions, www.e-ir.info/2016/11/02/interview-steven-c-roach/.

1146 Lindner, 2009b, pp. 18–20. One among myriad ways of describing emotions is to say that they are ‘socially recognised, structured episodes of affectively valenced response, such as joy or fear… a sub-category of patterned affective reactions’, in contrast to ‘affective dynamics’ that are ‘the range of ways embodied mental processes and the felt dimensions of human experience influence thought and behaviour’, Hall and Ross, 2015, p. 848. Indigenous psychologists, however, are critical of Western approaches. See, for instance, Louise Sundararajan, 2015, p. 200:

In contrast to the Western notion of emotion as a disruptive force to be regulated by reason and cognition… the Chinese consider the human capacity for responding to impact affectively as a positive quality to be enhanced through expanding consciousness. Consciousness expands not by reason or cognition but by mind-to-mind transactions.

1147 Elster, 2003. It was a great inspiration for me to meet with Jon Elster on 26th November 2003, in Paris.

1148 Relational-cultural theory and cultural-historical activity theory fit here. Relational-cultural theory (CRP) evolved from the work of Jean Baker Miller, 1976/1986b, M.D., pioneer in women’s psychology. It assumes that humans have a natural drive toward relationships and it applies a growth-in-connection model of human growth and development to organisational settings. See for a recent overview, among others, Jordan, 2010. Linda Hartling is the former Associate Director of the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute, and it is a privilege to have her now as the director of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies. Linda builds on relational-cultural theory, as developed by her mentor Jean Baker Miller and colleagues, see, among others, Hartling, et al., 2008.
Cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) builds on the work by Lev Vygotsky, 1978, and Aleksei Leontiev, 1975/1978. Its philosophical premise is that human physical and mental activity is integrally connected to large-scale cultural and historical processes and vice versa. It studies the culturally and historically situated, materially, and socially mediated process by which humans purposefully transform natural and social reality, including themselves. Community is seen to be central to all forms of learning, communicating, and acting, which means community is central to the process of learning-by-doing, of making tools of all kinds, of communicating, and of making meaning and acting. The term cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) was coined by Michael Cole and used by Yrjö Engeström for the various lines of work that had been inspired by Vygotsky. See for recent publications, for instance, Kaptelinin and Nardi, 2006, Roth, et al., 2012. I am indebted to Howard Richards and Andersson, 2015, for bringing me to South Africa in 2013, and the Organization Workshop (OW), a CHAT-based organisational learning method developed there by Gavin Andersson, et al., 2016, as summarised in this Abstract:

Cultural-historical Activity Theory (CHAT), is a theoretical framework which traces its roots to activity theory approaches first developed in Russian Psychology (by Vygotsky and Leontiev, in particular). The Organization Workshop (OW) is a CHAT-based organisational learning method with its roots, unusually, in the global South. Among the many scholarly applications of CHAT-related approaches of the last two decades, the OW stands out -- together with the Finnish Change Laboratory (CL) and the French Clinique de l’Activité/Activity Clinic (AC) -- as a field praxis-oriented laboratory method specifically geared to the world of work. OW is a large-group capacitation method. Organisation is not taught. Participants achieve organisation. It was initiated in the 1960s by the Brazilian lawyer, sociologist and political activist Clodomir Santos de Morais, who discovered, in his own experience, that a large group facing common challenges, given freedom of organisation, access to a common resource pool and appropriate support from facilitators, could learn to organise itself. From Brazil, the ‘laboratorios organizacionales’ spread out in the seventies to most of Latin America where they were applied at times on a national scale. The method was transferred in the eighties to English-speaking southern Africa where most of the theoretical work exploring its CHAT roots originated. Recently this eminently southern CHAT-based laboratory method has started to find applications in the North.

It is a privilege to have Howard Richards and Gavin Andersson as esteemed members in our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Donati and Archer, 2015, go far beyond the ‘plural subject’ of analytical philosophers and speak of the ‘relational subject’. They treat ‘the relation’ between people as real and regard relational ‘goods’ and ‘evils’ as having causal effects upon agents and their subsequent actions. See the book description:

Many social theorists now call themselves ‘relational sociologists’, but mean entirely different things by it. The majority endorse a ‘flat ontology’, dealing exclusively with dyadic relations. Consequently, they cannot explain the context in which relationships occur or their consequences, except as resultants of endless ‘transactions.’ This book adopts a different approach which regards ‘the relation’ itself as an emergent property, with internal causal effects upon its participants and external ones on others. The authors argue that most ‘relationists’ seem unaware that analytical philosophers, such as Searle, Gilbert and Tuomela, have spent years trying to conceptualise the ‘We’ as dependent upon shared intentionality. Donati and Archer change the focus away from ‘We thinking’ and argue that ‘We-ness’ derives from subjects’ reflexive orientations towards the emergent relational ‘goods’ and ‘evils’ they themselves generate. Their approach could be called ‘relational realism’, though they suggest that realists, too, have failed to explore the ‘relational subject.’

See also Jervis, 2006.


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Sam Engelstad was the UN’s Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, and on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1994. On 9th December 1992, the United States led Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, a country ravaged by civil war, with many people dying from hunger. The goal was to calm the situation so that much needed food supplies could reach the southern part of the country. However, like the interventions that preceded it, also this one failed. In 1993, an angry crowd dragged a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu. In other words, the offer of help to an impoverished and ravaged country, Somalia, was responded to with acts of humiliation perpetrated against the helpers. Engelstad wrote to me (I quote with his permission):

> During my time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent.1152

Engelstad added that, ‘Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us’.1153

1152 Hartling and Lindner, 2018a.

1153 Lindner, 2006a, p. 52.

1154 Karlberg, 2013.

1155 Fuller and Gerloff, 2008. It is a privilege to have Robert Fuller as esteemed members in the global advisory board of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


1160 See also Lindner, 2007b.


1162 Catherine Alum Odora Hoppers edited the International Journal of Development Education and Global Learning, volume 7, number 2, ‘Development education in the global south’, 2015, http://ingentaconnect.com/content/ioep/ijdegl/2015/00000007/00000002/art00002. It is a great privilege to have not only Catherine Odora Hoppers and her brother George, but also other authors in this issue as esteemed members in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship, namely, Richards, 2015, Haavelsrud, 2015, and Sewchurran and McDonogh, 2015. Crain Soudien, 2015, recommends drawing on the concept of the ‘transaction’ in John Dewey for a new approach to knowing, while Haavelsrud uses Odora Hoppers’ term of transformation by enlargement for the academy, by scientific methodologies inspired by forms of transdisciplinarity,
praxis, and *trilateral science* as described by Johan Galtung, 1977. The concept of trilateral science describes the relationship between three worlds, the empirical, the foreseen, and the ideal world, or, in other words, the world *as it is* (the data or facts positively given), the world *as it will be* (the world as predicted or theorised) and the world *as it ought to be* (values). The gaps and differences between the three worlds can be reduced by transformations in all three. The aim of science should be to achieve greater *consonance* among the three: ‘The world as it is can be changed, and if so the foreseen world will also be changed. Values may be modified’, Haavelsrud, 2015, pp. 54–55.


See also Odora Hoppers and Richards, 2012, Richards, et al., 2015a.

Kjell Skyllstad in a personal communication, 15th December 2014.

See also Marsella, 2009.

Gergen, et al., 1996, quoted in Marsella, 2015. Marsella warns that North American psychology is wrongly driven by a commitment to the following:

1. **Individuality** – The individual is the focus of behaviour. Determinants of behaviour reside in the individual’s brain/mind, and interventions must be at this level rather than the broader societal context.

2. **Reductionism** – Small, tangible units of study that yield well to controlled experimentation are favoured.

3. **Experiment-based Empiricism** – An emphasis on experiments with controls and experiment group comparisons and uses of ANOVA analyses that often account for 5–10 per cent of the variance, and this is considered ‘science’. Lab studies are often favoured over field studies.

4. **Scientism** – The belief that methods of the physical sciences can be applied similarly to social and behavioural phenomena, which results in spurious methods and conclusions that are inappropriate to the subject under study or that avoid studying certain subjects.

5. **Quantification/Measurement** – ‘If something exists, it can be measured’, said Edward Thorndike. Unless something under study can be quantified, it is not acceptable for study. This, of course, leads to ‘operationalism’ as the standard for assessing concepts.

6. **Materialism** – Favours variables for study that have a tangible existence rather than higher order constructs – I can see it and touch it under a microscope.

7. **Male Dominance** – Years of male dominance favours particular topics, methods, and populations for study – remember ‘involutional melancholia’, the psychiatric disease of middle-aged women, or the labelling of transgender as an illness. While this is changing, we must be alert to its legacy.

8. **‘Objectivity’** – Assumption that we can identify and understand immutable aspects of reality in a detached way, unbiased by human senses and knowledge.

9. **Nomothetic Laws** – Search for generalised principles and ‘laws’ that apply to widespread and diverse situations and populations because of an identification and admiration for the physical sciences.

10. **Rationality** – Presumes a linear, cause-effect, logical, material understanding of phenomena and prizes this approach in offering and accepting arguments and data generation.


Nagel, 1986.

Taylor in Lowman, 2013, pp. 52–53.

Lindner, 2007b.


Raskin, 2016, p. 84.
Bruce Schuman in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic of ‘Journey to Earthland: Making the great transition to planetary civilisation’, 24th September 2016, in response to Raskin, 2016.

Latin: ‘Pisces mortui solum cum flumine natant’.


Norway has jumped from 4th place in 2016 to 1st place this year, followed by Denmark, Iceland and Switzerland in a tightly packed bunch. All of the top four countries rank highly on all the main factors found to support happiness: caring, freedom, generosity, honesty, health, income and good governance. Their averages are so close that small changes can re-order the rankings from year to year. Norway moves to the top of the ranking despite weaker oil prices. It is sometimes said that Norway achieves and maintains its high happiness not because of its oil wealth, but in spite of it. By choosing to produce its oil slowly, and investing the proceeds for the future rather than spending them in the present, Norway has insulated itself from the boom and bust cycle of many other resource-rich economies. To do this successfully requires high levels of mutual trust, shared purpose, generosity and good governance, all factors that help to keep Norway and other top countries where they are in the happiness rankings.

Shaw, 1889.

Brandal, et al., 2013. Howard Richards added in a personal communication, 20th January 2018: ‘Unbiased science was a key pillar of Karl Popper’s concept of how democracy was supposed to work’.

Raskin, 2016, p. 84.

For essayist Arthur Koestler’s theory of holons and holarchies, see Koestler, 1967, 1970, 1978. I thank John Bunzl for reminding me of Koestler’s work. It is a privilege to have John Bunzl’s support for our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

Braithwaite, 2002. It is a privilege to have John Braithwaite as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.


I had the privilege of listening to Phil Clark and Joanna Quinn during the International Symposium on Restorative Justice, Reconciliation and Peacebuilding, at the New York University School of Law, 11th–12th November, 2011, www.iilj.org/RJRP/about.asp. They introduced me to the work of Sally Engle Merry and Mark A. Drumbl. See Goodale and Merry, 2007, and Drumbl, 2007. I learned that British colonisers set up a ‘relationships commission’ as far back as 1898. Lord Lugard wrote about the ‘dual mandate’ in Africa. See Lugard, 1965. See also Clark, 2010.


Gaertner, et al., 2012.


The Journey of Dignity and Humiliation

Evelin Lindner

1195 Escobar, 2012. I thank Howard Richards for reminding me of Arturo Escobar’s work.


1197 Lindner, 2014.

1198 Lindner, 2001b. Abstract:

This article argues that the concept of humiliation may be deconstructed into seven layers, including a) a core that expresses the universal idea of ‘putting down’, b) a middle layer that contains two opposed orientations towards ‘putting down’, treating it as, respectively, legitimate and routine, or illegitimate and traumatising, and c) a periphery whose distinctive layers include one pertaining to cultural differences between groups and another four peripheral layers that relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experience of humiliation.

1199 Lindner, 2012c. See also Svašek and Skrbiš, 2007.


1202 Matsumoto, et al., 2007, p. 92: With Emotion Regulation (ER), ‘people voyage through life; without it, they vindicate their lives’. It is a privilege to have David Matsumoto as esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies fellowship.

1203 See also Lindner, 2006a, p. 27.

1204 Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010, pp. 149–153.

1205 Juliet B. Schor is the co-founder of the Center for a New American Dream, www.newdream.org.

1206 Lakoff, 2006a. Book description:

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has relentlessly invoked the word ‘freedom’. Al-Qaeda attacked us because ‘they hate our freedom’. The U.S. can strike pre-emptively because ‘freedom is on the march’. Social security should be privatised in order to protect individual freedoms. The 2005 presidential inaugural speech was a kind of crescendo: the words ‘freedom’, ‘free’, and ‘liberty’, were used forty-nine times in President Bush’s twenty-minute speech.

In Whose freedom?, Lakoff surveys the political landscape and offers an essential map of the Republican battle plan that has captured the hearts and minds of Americans – and shows how progressives can fight to reinvigorate this most beloved of American political ideas.

Chinese President Xi stressed during the first day of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, 4th–5th September 2016, that inequality measured by the GINI coefficient has reached 0.7, surpassing the alarm level, which stands at 0.6. The topic of fairness and inclusiveness was mentioned in every intervention. An official admitted: ‘Leaders have realised that they cannot ignore it anymore’. See ‘China convinces G20 nations with ‘fair’ communique’, by Jorge Valero in Hangzhou, EurActiv, 6th September 2016, www.euractiv.com//section/global-europe/news/china-convinces-g20-nations-with-fair-communique/.


Although the social relations (like the relation of buyer to seller, or the relation of employer to employee), the social positions (like the position of owner), and the social constructs (like contracts) are constituted by cultural rules, the social structure thus constituted is material. It cashes out on the ground as some eating and others not, some sleeping under dirty blankets on sidewalks while others sleep between clean sheets in beds, some living and others dying. Agreeing with Jürgen Habermas that in our contemporary world the primary institution is the market, and that
governments are secondary to it, I use the phrase ‘social structure’ mainly to refer to the relations and positions established by the legal and moral rules that constitute markets. Those rules can be placed in these four categories that I call the four sides of ‘the box’: 1 is property. 2 is contract. 3 is the individual autonomous juridical subject. 4 is the duty not to harm others with the conspicuous absence of a duty to help others.

The basic social structure also might be summarised in three words as ‘liberty without solidarity’. (Thinking, as Milton Friedman and similar thinkers often do, of 1 2 3 and 4 as four aspects of the one idea of liberty, also called freedom). In five words the basic social structure is ‘liberty without equality and fraternity’.

Since solidarity is a moral obligation rather than a law, a relationship rather than a status, social concord rather than a contract, and communal rather than individual, fraternité is the most delicate part to be integrated into the motto. Fraternity was defined in the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Citizen of 1795 (Déclaration des droits et des devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen de 1795) as such: ‘Do not do to others what you would not wish to be done to you; always do the good to others you wish to receive’ (Ne faites pas à autrui ce que vous ne voudriez pas qu’on vous fît; faites constamment aux autres le bien que vous voudriez en recevoir).


Sundararajan, 2012.

Graeber, 2011.

Louise Sundararajan in a personal communication, 29th October 2012. See also Sundararajan, 2012.

Hartzband and Groopman, 2009, p. 103. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.

Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

Lindner, 2012d.


Howard Richards in a personal communication, 20th January 2018. He also reminded me of the book On becoming human by Nancy Tanner, 1981, where she shows that the human body has evolved as the body of a cultural animal and that culture is not added to physical reality but is already part of physiology.

Ritzer, 2013.

Rothkopf, 2008. See for a more recent account of ‘who owns the world’, Jakobs, 2016. See also Robinson, 2017, on how the transnational capitalist class (TCC) made up of the owners and managers of transnational capital, has emerged as the agent of global capitalism.

For ‘harvesting’ from all cultures, see Lindner, 2007b. See as a foundational text, Wright, 1942. Much has been written since, here are just some recent examples, Daly, 2013, Dupré, 2015, Schlichtmann, 2017, or Cabrera, 2017.

Howard Richards in a personal communication, 20th January 2018. Richards recommends the talk of Ela Gandhi titled Designing a miracle to save South Africa, given on 18th January 2018, as a message explaining the camino de regreso, and also the sermon of Pope Francis held two days earlier in Santiago de Chile.

King, 1967.

Martin Luther King Jr. in his Riverside Church speech titled Beyond Vietnam: A time to break
“silence”. It was delivered exactly one year before his 4th April 1968 assassination in Memphis.

Modern humans might have emerged already 300,000 years ago, not 200,000 years ago, as was the established scientific consensus until recently. However, it is being debated whether the 315,000-years-old remnants of early humans found in Morocco indeed can be categorised as *Homo sapiens*, or not. Jean-Jacques Hublin, the director of human evolution at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, found that 300,000 years ago, even though human brain size resembled present-day humans, brain shape did not. Early humans had a more elongated skull and less globular brain than modern humans. Human brain shape – and perhaps also cognitive abilities – reached present-day human variation only between about 100,000 and 35,000 years ago. See Neubauer, et al., 2018, and Hublin, et al., 2017. Hublin’s suggestions parallel the archaeological records of the origin of the species until it reached full behavioural modernity in the Later Stone Age and the Upper Palaeolithic. Hublin’s insights might also shed light on the timing of the primary out-of-Africa event that genetic studies indicate happened circa 65,000 to 55,000 years ago. There is fossil and lithic evidence of early waves of human migration from Africa toward the Levant and Arabia, where *Homo sapiens* met and mated with Neanderthals. These early waves seem to have occurred when warm and wet conditions in the north of Africa moved the border of Africa somewhat northwards. The big question is why *Homo sapiens*’ early migration waves died out and *Homo sapiens* managed to fully ‘break out’ of Africa only 60,000 years ago, when it colonised Eurasia and populated the rest of the world rather rapidly. By 40,000 years ago, *Homo sapiens* had spread throughout Eurasia, and a major competing species, the Neanderthals, became extinct. Peter deMenocal of the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, New York, suggests that it was the drying up of a formerly green Sahara that motivated people to leave. See Tierney, et al., 2017. Jean-Jacques Hublin adds the insight that also increases in cognitive ability might have played a role. See also Avery, 2018, Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?

Raskin, 2016, p. 11.

Ruben Nelson in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic ‘Journey to Earthland: Making the great transition to planetary civilisation’, 5th October 2016, in response to Raskin, 2016:

In the past, all transitions in the forms of civilisation were slow, local/regional, exclusive, optional and unconscious. Today, we are faced by the need to undertake a GT in our dominant form of civilisation that, in contrast, must be fast (by any historic standard), scalable to the whole planet, inclusive of all 7.4 billion of us, recognised as required and conscious. This last requirement also implies that today we must not only be conscious about change at every scale, but must develop a capacity for meta-consciousness about change at every scale.

Ury, 1999, p. xvii.

Lindner, 2006a, p. 43.


Lindner, 2012c.

Read about ‘the economics of manipulation and deception’ in Akerlof and Shiller, 2015.


*Pleasantville* is an Academy Award-nominated 1998 film written, produced, and directed by Gary Ross. See also *The clonus horror* (1979) or *The island* (2005), or *Ready player one* (2018). As to ‘personal branding’, see Lair, et al., 2005. I discussed this topic in 29th January 2007, in Harrania,
near Cairo, Egypt, with Sophie Wissa-Wassef, who makes a point of protecting her artists’ creativity by not disclosing to them whether their art sells or not. See www.humiliationstudies.org/intervention/art.php#ramseswissawassef or www.wissa-wassef-arts.com/intro.htm. See also Rushkoff, 2009. I thank Keith Grennan for this reference.


1238 Kant, 1785, chapter 1. See the German original on http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/grundlegung-zur-methaphysik-der-sitten-3510/1:

Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an dessen Stelle kann auch etwas anderes als Äquivalent gesetzt werden; was dagegen über allen Preis erhaben ist, mithin kein Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde.

1239 Jensen and Meckling, 1994, p. 10:

Like it or not, individuals are willing to sacrifice a little of almost anything we care to name, even reputation or morality, for a sufficiently large quantity of other desired things; and these things do not have to be money or even material goods.

1240 Tom Bowerman, director of PolicyInteractive Research, policyinteractive.org, February 1, 2017:

The top five ordering of priorities for workplace choice from highest to lowest are: 1) doing a job I can be proud of; 2) enjoying work, having fun; 3) being with people I respect; 4) earning a good salary; and 5) learning new things, having new experiences.


1242 Scholar Vandana Shiva received the Right Livelihood Award in 1993.

1243 Singh, 2013. See also Kasser, 2017. Kasser discusses suggestions that engaging in pro-ecological behaviours (PEBs, such as recycling, eating locally, political activism) increases people’s measures of subjective well-being (SWB, such as happiness, life satisfaction, and hedonic balance), and vice versa. In other words, pro-ecological behaviour makes happy, or, happy people might engage in pro-ecological behaviour. Other variables may be the prioritising of intrinsic values over extrinsic values such as money or status, or mindfulness, or a choice to lead a more simple lifestyle. Tim Kasser writes in his contribution to the Great Transition Network (GTN) discussion on the topic ‘Sustainability and well-being: A happy synergy’, 12th March 2017, in response to Barrington-Leigh, 2017:

a) prioritising intrinsic values (for personal growth and relationships) over extrinsic values (for money, image and status); b) how mindful one is (i.e., how focused a person is on accepting and attending to one’s momentary experiences); and c) whether one has made a choice to work less and lead a more voluntarily simple lifestyle. Each of these three variables has been empirically associated with BOTH greater SWB and more engagement in PEBs, suggesting each could potentially explain the documented positive correlation.

1244 See also Why the P2P and commons movement must act trans-locally and trans-nationally, by Michel Bauwens, P2P Foundation, 12th June 2016, https://blog.p2pfoundation.net/p2p-commons-movement-must-act-trans-locally-trans-nationally/2016/06/16. I thank Uli Spalthoff for making me aware of this article. Bauwens recommends Karatani, 2014, who does not see capitalism as a mere mode of production, with state and nation as mere epiphenomena of capital, but as a triarchy combining Capital-State-Nation. Bauwens also reminds us of The great transformation by Karl Polanyi and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Foreword), 1944/2001, a history of the emergence and perpetuation of capitalism from the late eighteenth century to the 1940s, in which Polanyi sees a double movement at
play, namely, between the market forces or the ‘Smithian’ capitalism of the nineteenth century on one side, and society on the other side, or the nation, to speak with Karatani, who forces the market back into a more ‘social’ order. For example, the Fordist period inspired a labour movement to force a realignment of society around the welfare state, with the backlash starting in the eighties, when these social protections were ‘deregulated’ again in favour of the 1 per cent, with the result that workers are impoverished again in favour of the oligarchic elites. In other words, the nation, or what remains of community and reciprocity dynamics, revolts and mobilises, and, if successful, it forces the state to discipline capital.

Bauwens observes what also I observe all around the world, namely, that after the systemic crisis of 2008, this uprising fails, even though a Polanyian backlash can be found nearly everywhere on the globe: Both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 U.S. electoral cycle ‘represent the Polanyian double movement, and are reacting against the effects of neoliberalism and its destruction of the U.S. middle class’, writes Bauwens. Trump speaks for the white middle class and workers and wishes to bring back a better past, while Sanders represents those who suffer from precarity and envision a different future. The problem, however, is that this time, the Polanyian double movement is hindered by capital having developed a transnational logic and capacity. Financial neoliberalism has globalised and fundamentally weakened the capacity of the nation-state to discipline its activities:

Faced with an all-powerful trans-national capitalism, the various nation-state systems have proven pretty powerless to effect any change. Dare to challenge the status quo and paralysing capital flight is going to destroy your country! This is one of the explanations of the deep distrust that people are feeling towards the current political system, which simply fails to deliver towards any majoritarian social demand. Look at how the moderately radical Syriza movement in Greece was put under a European protectorate and had to abandon Greek sovereignty; or look at how the more antagonistically-oriented Venezuelan government is crumbling, along with other progressive governments in Latin America. So, while the electorate may vote for parties that promise to change the status quo and eventually bring to power movements like Podemos, a Labour Party under the leadership of Corbyn, or a Democratic Party strongly influenced by the Sanders movement, their capacities for change will be severely restricted.

The solution that Bauwens sees, resonates with my global observations, namely, that there is no alternative to creating trans-national and trans-local capacities, which means globally interlinking the efforts of all the local ‘civic and ethical entrepreneurial networks that are currently in development’. This is why I invest my life time into creating a dignity movement not just locally, but globally.

1247 The Western relationship to nature has been criticised from the Hindu perspective, for instance, by Vandana Shiva, and from the Muslim point of view, for example, by liberal Muslim theologian Seyyid Hossein Nasr. Sufism sees God as devoid of any specific form or quality, yet inseparable from every phenomenon. Theologian Martin Buber has been an influential Jewish voice. For Christian eco-theology, we can look at early voices such as that of Jesuit priest, palaeontologist, and geologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (who taught in Cairo, where also I worked for seven years), or that of process theologian Alfred North Whitehead. In Protestantism, we find John Cobb, Jr., or Jürgen Moltmann. Ecofeminist theologians are Rosemary Radford Ruether, Catherine Keller, and Sallie McFague.
1250 Karen Barad, 2003, p. 819:

Discourse is not what is said; it is that which constrains and enables what can be said. Discursive practices define what counts as meaningful statements. Statements are not the mere utterances of the originating consciousness of a unified subject; rather, statements and subjects emerge from a field of possibilities. This field of possibilities is not static or singular but rather is a dynamic and contingent multiplicity.

Evelin Lindner
Karen Barad earned her doctorate in theoretical physics, building on insights from Niels Bohr, and is known for her theory of \textit{agential realism}, where she follows Niels Bohr in questioning the dualisms of object/subject, knower/known, nature/culture, and word/world. Karen Barad, 2003, asks: Does scientific knowledge represent an independently existing reality accurately? Does language accurately represent its referent? Does a given political representative, legal counsel, or piece of legislation accurately represent the interests of the people allegedly represented? (p. 804). Barad explains that for Bohr, ‘things do not have inherently determinate boundaries or properties, and words do not have inherently determinate meanings’; Bohr ‘calls into question the related Cartesian belief in the inherent distinction between subject and object, and knower and known’ (p.813).

Barad builds also on Donna Haraway’s work on the practices through which the differential boundaries between categories of ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ are being stabilised and destabilised. Names such as Donna Haraway, Judith Butler, Andrew Pickering, Bruno Latour, and Joseph Rouse are relevant to Barad with respect to \textit{performativity}.

In her 2003 article ‘Posthumanist performativity: Toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter’, Barad offers a deep analysis of her relational ontology that rejects the metaphysics of \textit{words and things} (p. 812), that rejects the \textit{thingification} – the turning of relations into ‘things’ and ‘entities’ (p. 812). It rejects representationalism as a Cartesian by-product, it rejects the ‘particularly inconspicuous consequence of the Cartesian division between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ that breaks along the line of the knowing subject’ (p. 806). It rejects that there are ‘representations on the one hand and ontologically separate entities awaiting representation on the other’, that ‘representationalism separates the world into the ontologically disjoint domains of words and things, leaving itself with the dilemma of their linkage such that knowledge is possible’ (p. 811). Barad observes that both scientific realists and social constructivists believe that scientific knowledge mediates our access to the material world, scientific knowledge as it presents itself in its multiple representational forms such as theoretical concepts, graphs, particle tracks, photographic images. Both groups – scientific realists and social constructivists – subscribe to representationalism, they differ only on the question of referent, whether scientific knowledge represents things as they really are in ‘nature’, or represents objects that are the product of culture (pp. 805–6).

Barad instead recommends ‘a performative understanding, which shifts the focus from linguistic representations to discursive practice’ (p. 807). ‘Reality is not composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but “things”-in-phenomena’ (p. 817). In an ‘ongoing flow of agency… “part” of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another “part” of the world’, and in this way, ‘local causal structures, boundaries, and properties are stabilised and destabilised’, something which does not take place in space and time ‘but in the making of spacetime itself’ (p. 817). ‘The universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming’ (p. 818). For Barad, the primary ontological units are not ‘things’ but \textit{phenomena}, namely, dynamic topological reconfigurings – or entanglements, relationalities, \textit{(re)}articulations. \textit{Words} are not ‘primary semantic units’, but ‘material-discursive practices through which boundaries are constituted’ (p. 818). This dynamism of ongoing reconfigurings of the world is \textit{agency}, where the term \textit{humans} refers to phenomena, to ‘beings in their differential becoming, particular material \textit{(re)}configurings of the world with shifting boundaries and properties that stabilise and destabilise along with specific material changes’ (p. 818). \textit{Humans} are neither pure cause nor pure effect but part of the world in its open-ended becoming (p. 821). \textit{Meaning} is not a property of individual words or groups of words. ‘In its causal intra-activity, “part” of the world becomes determinately bounded and propertied in its emergent intelligibility to another “part” of the world. Discursive practices are boundary-making practices that have no finality in the ongoing dynamics of agential intra-activity’ (p. 821). \textit{Knowing} means that part of the world makes itself intelligible to another part. Practices of knowing and being are mutually implicated and not isolatable. It is not possible to obtain knowledge by standing outside of the world: we know because we are of the world, we are part of the world in its differential becoming. ‘The separation of epistemology from ontology is a reverberation of a metaphysics that assumes an inherent difference between human and nonhuman, subject and object, mind and body, matter and discourse. Onto-epistem-ology – the study of practices of knowing in being – is probably a better way to think about the kind of understandings that are needed to come to terms with how specific intra-actions matter’ (p. 829).

\textit{Human bodies} and \textit{human subjects} do not pre-exist as such and are no mere end products either.

Evelin Lindner
‘Matter is not little bits of nature, or a blank slate, surface, or site passively awaiting signification; nor is it an uncontested ground for theories... matter is substance in its intra-active becoming – not a thing, but a doing, a congealing of agency. Matter is a stabilising and destabilising process of iterative intra-activity... matter refers to the materiality/materialisation of phenomena, not to an inherent fixed property of abstract independently existing objects of Newtonian physics... Neither discursive practices nor material phenomena are ontologically or epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained in terms of the other. Neither has privileged status in determining the other’ (p. 822). Matter is substance in its intra-active becoming – not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency, not a fixed essence (p. 828).

The reconceptualisation of materiality offered by Barad allows for the empirical world to be taken seriously again, yet, not as the seeming ‘immediately given-ness’ of the world, but with the understanding that phenomena are the objective referent. All bodies, not merely ‘human’ bodies, ‘come to matter through the world’s iterative intra-activity’. Bodies are not objects with inherent boundaries and properties, they are ‘material-discursive phenomena’. ‘Human’ bodies are not different from ‘nonhuman’ ones (p. 823), there is no exterior observational point where a ‘knower’ can stand in externality to the natural world being investigated. The condition of possibility for objectivity is exteriority within phenomena, agential separability, not any absolute exteriority. ‘We’ are not outside observers of the world, and we are not located at particular places in the world either, we are part of the world in its ongoing intra-activity... ‘we are a part of that nature we seek to understand’ (p. 828). Humans are part of the ‘worldbody space in its dynamic structuration’ (p. 829).

1251 Gergen, 2009, p. 379. From the relational perspective, actor network theory is more interesting than its precursors in the development of network analysis, such as concepts of sociometry, graph theory, and path analysis.

1252 See Berlin, 1958b, or Lakoff, 2006a. See the description of Lakoff’s book:

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has relentlessly invoked the word ‘freedom’. Al-Qaeda attacked us because ‘they hate our freedom’. The U.S. can strike pre-emptively because ‘freedom is on the march’. Social security should be privatised in order to protect individual freedoms. The 2005 presidential inaugural speech was a kind of crescendo: the words ‘freedom’, ‘free’, and ‘liberty’, were used forty-nine times in President Bush’s twenty-minute speech.

In Whose freedom? Lakoff surveys the political landscape and offers an essential map of the Republican battle plan that has captured the hearts and minds of Americans – and shows how progressives can fight to reinvigorate this most beloved of American political ideas.


1254 In the section Love, help, and humiliation, in my book Making enemies: Humiliation and international conflict (Lindner, 2006a), I write on page 79:

Cases of misunderstandings that have humiliating effects are difficult to deal with. Cases of help and love that are ‘misunderstood’ as humiliation are even more difficult. We find benevolent helpers on one side, no evil perpetrators at all, yet help and love sometimes cause deep feelings of humiliation in the recipients. Only one participant identifies this event as humiliation, the other labels it as help or love. The following vignette may illustrate the case of help and humiliation:

I have cancer. I have no money for medicine. You come to help me. You bring me chocolate. You feel good. I appreciate your good intentions. However, don’t you see that I need medicine?

Evelin Lindner
Don’t you see that you serve your own interests more than mine by bringing me chocolate? You have proved to yourself and your friends that you are a helpful human being. But what about me? You buy yourself a good conscience and I pay the price. I feel painfully humiliated by your blindness and ignorance. I am bitter. I understand you do not know better. You are naïve and well-intentioned, but to me, you seem either stupid or evil. A little more effort to understand my situation would really help! And by the way, how much money did you earn with these pesticides that caused my cancer?

See also Lindner, 2010. See, furthermore, Nadler and Halabi, 2006, or Rosen, 1983.


1256 John Fullerton, now a new member of the Club of Rome, in his contribution to the Great Transition Network Initiative discussion titled ‘Journey to Earthland: Making the great transition to planetary civilisation’, 31st October 2016, in response to Raskin, 2016:

I particularly liked Paul’s near dismissal of the ‘Conventional Worlds’ scenarios – both Market Forces and Policy Reform variations, what Paul calls ‘the false god of moderation that invites us to passively drift down the garden path to barbarisation’. Of course, this is precisely the path we (collectively) are on, with all the well-meaning focus on ‘green growth’, internalising ‘externalities’ (an oxymoron), calls for greater market transparency with Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics (our idolatry of markets and their ability to guide us is a deadly confusion of means and ends), Divest/Invest campaigns, quantifying in monetary terms ecosystem services offered by vital and priceless ecosystem function, circular economy manufacturing processes, impact investing, carbon demand-side reduction targets, more progressive taxation regimes, and on and on. ALL are essential incremental change, part of any ultimate solution. All are important work. But mostly what they accomplish is the extension of our runway, not systemic change, because they do not involve a fundamental change in the way we think. They could lull us into false confidence that we are on the right track. Collectively, they are the result of our intellectually lazy or simply ignorant preference to worship what Paul calls the ‘false god of moderation’, or simply represent the only way we can have our voices heard. We must see this for what it is, our ongoing 500-year-old Modern Era (and thus deeply ingrained literally into our DNA) reductionist mind-set of treating symptoms like carbon emissions rather than seeking and then addressing root causes, holistically understood.


1258 It is important to note that a global citizens movement, or global civil society, does not mean NGOs that are funded by interests that stand against the creation of global dignity for all. Anthropologist David Harvey, scholar of critical geography, for instance, speaks of ‘co-revolution’, ‘co-evolution’, ‘subversion’, ‘the movement’, the ‘Party of Indignation’, or a ‘slow movement across the spheres’. In his book The enigma of capital, Harvey, 2011, introduces seven ‘activity spheres’ – such as technologies and organisational forms; social relations; institutional and administrative arrangements; production and labour processes; relations to nature; human reproduction; and mental conceptions of the world – and describes how capital ‘revolves through’ these spheres ‘in search of profit’. Harvey, 2011, p. 260:

Perhaps we should just define the movement, our movement, as anti-capitalist or call ourselves the Party of Indignation, ready to fight and defeat the Party of Wall Street and its acolytes and apologists everywhere, and leave it at that.

1259 Michael Bauwens, in his contribution to the Great Transition Network Initiative discussion titled ‘Journey to Earthland: Making the great transition to planetary civilisation’, 31st October 2016, in response to Raskin, 2016. Bauwens points at macro-historian Kojin Karatani, 2010/2014, as one voice among others providing maps of civilisational transitions. Karatani suggests that a key element of such transitions is a reconfiguration of modes of exchange, and that a future civilisation will have to return to both the commons and reciprocity mechanisms as key drivers for the exchange of human value and...
natural resources. For the past years, Bauwens has also built on Alan Page Fiske, 1991, and his *Structures of social life*, and on David Ronfeldt, 1996, and his TIMN framework (Tribes, Institutions, Markets, and Networks). Bauwens writes:

Karatani takes a multi-modal approach. This means he recognises and shows that at least four modes of exchange have existed throughout history and throughout all regions of the world, but what matters is their internal configuration, and especially, what is the dominant mode of exchange in any given system, which acts as an ‘attractor’ for the others. Karatani starts with describing the dominance of pooling in early nomadic societies based on kinship bands, the dominance of reciprocity and the gift economy in tribal federations; the dominance of state and rank-based redistribution (‘Authority Ranking’) in pre-capitalist class formations and finally, the dominance of the capitalist market. This means that civilisational transitions, marked by the evolution of one dominant exchange system to another, are regular occurrences in world history, and they are quite systematically described in Karatani’s remarkable synthesis. On the European continent, the two last of such transitions were the 10th transition of the post-Roman plunder economy into the feudal land-based economy, brilliantly described in Robert Moore’s First European Revolution, and the 15th century start of the transition to a market-based economy.

Lindner, 2014. See also lawyer Amy Chua, 2003, and her discussion of how exporting market democracy may breed ethnic hatred and global instability. See sociologist Peter Evans, 2008, for the potential of counter-hegemonic globalisation movements to challenge the contemporary view of globalisation as neoliberal globalisation.

Historian Niall Ferguson, 2018, shows how network theory – concepts such as clustering, degrees of separation, weak ties, contagions and phase transitions – can transform our understanding of both the past and the present.

Lindner, 2014. See also lawyer Amy Chua, 2003, and her discussion of how exporting market democracy may breed ethnic hatred and global instability. See sociologist Peter Evans, 2008, for the potential of counter-hegemonic globalisation movements to challenge the contemporary view of globalisation as neoliberal globalisation.


See also Lindner, 2017.

See ‘Column: This is what happens when you take Ayn Rand seriously’, by Denise Cummins, *Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)*, 16th February 2016, www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-this-is-what-happens-when-you-take-ayn-rand-seriously/. Cummins presents two case studies that show the disastrous consequences of following Ayn Rand, the company Sears, and the country Honduras. I thank Linda Hartling for making me aware of this article.


Raskin, 2016, p. 2.

Raskin, 2016, p. 2.

Raskin, 2016, p. 2.

The Journey of Dignity and Humiliation

Evelin Lindner

1272 Raskin, 2016, p. 21.

1273 Lawson, 2015. I thank Howard Richards for making me aware of this book.


Consequences of the basic social structure: 1A. There is a chronic insufficiency of inducement to invest. It is not only the case that the bread and butter of the people, their employment and their dignity, depend on the confidence of investors. It is also the case that investor confidence perpetually flags, lags, and threatens to collapse… 2A. There is a chronic insufficiency of effective demand. This is no small matter because profits depend on sales, while investment, and therefore output and employment, depend on expectations of profit.

1275 Harvey, 1990. I thank Howard Richards for making me aware of this book.


1279 Plumwood, 2002.


1283 Richards and Andersson, 2015.

1284 Modern humans might have emerged already 300,000 years ago, not 200,000 years ago, as was the established scientific consensus until recently. However, it is being debated whether the 315,000-years-old remnants of early humans found in Morocco indeed can be categorised as Homo sapiens, or not. Jean-Jacques Hublin, the director of human evolution at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, found that 300,000 years ago, even though human brain size resembled present-day humans, brain shape did not. Early humans had a more elongated skull and less globular brain than modern humans. Human brain shape – and perhaps also cognitive abilities – reached present-day human variation only between about 100,000 and 35,000 years ago. See Neubauer, et al., 2018, and Hublin, et al., 2017. Hublin’s suggestions parallel the archaeological records of the origin of the species until it reached full behavioural modernity in the Later Stone Age and the Upper Palaeolithic. Hublin’s insights might also shed light on the timing of the primary out-of-Africa event that genetic studies indicate happened circa 65,000 to 55,000 years ago. There is fossil and lithic evidence of early waves of human migration from Africa toward the Levant and Arabia, where Homo sapiens met and mated with Neanderthals. These early waves seem to have occurred when warm and wet conditions in the north of Africa moved the border of Africa somewhat northwards. The big question is why Homo sapiens’ early migration waves died out and Homo sapiens managed to fully ‘break out’ of Africa only 60,000 years ago, when it colonised Eurasia and populated the rest of the world rather rapidly. By 40,000 years ago, Homo sapiens had spread throughout Eurasia, and a major competing species, the Neanderthals, became extinct. Peter deMenocal of the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, New York, suggests that it was the drying up of a formerly green Sahara that motivated people to leave. See Tierney, et al., 2017. Jean-Jacques Hublin adds the insight that also increases in cognitive ability might have played a role. See also Avery, 2018, Where do we come from? What are...
we? Where are we going?


1287 Lindner and Desmond Tutu (Foreword), 2010.

1288 Adapted from Lindner, 2000a, p. 439. See also Lindner, 2006a, p. 48.

1289 Lindner, 2006a, p. 45.

1290 Lindner, 2006a, p. 45.

