Negotiation Is the Road to Mideast Peace
By Herbert C. Kelman
Boston Globe, 4/8/2004

PRIME MINISTER Ariel Sharon of Israel is seeking US support for his
government's planned unilateral steps to address the current
Israeli-Palestinian crisis, including the construction of a barrier around
and within the West Bank and the removal of Israeli settlements and troops
from the Gaza Strip. Such unilateral steps would have disastrous
consequences.
They would divide the West Bank into disconnected, fenced-off enclaves and
further erode the Palestinian economy and quality of life. They would make
Gaza ungovernable and probably put it under the control of Islamic
extremists. They would make it impossible to form a viable Palestinian
state and to resolve the deadly conflict between the two peoples.
The US administration should strongly discourage these unilateral steps
and promote a return to serious negotiation of a comprehensive, final
agreement between the parties. Negotiations are the only way to develop a
formula for ending the conflict that meets the basic needs of both
parties, that engenders their commitment, and that is conducive to stable
peace, mutually enhancing cooperation, and ultimate reconciliation between
the two societies.
Sharon's argument in favor of unilateral steps is that there is no partner
for peace on the other side. This view has been widely shared within the
Israeli public since the breakdown of the Camp David talks in 2000 and the
onset of the second intifada. Indeed, this view is mirrored on the
Palestinian side, where there is an equally strong belief that there is no
Israeli partner for a solution that would establish an independent, viable
Palestinian state.
These mirror images are dangerous because they justify acts of violence
and unilateral steps that create self-fulfilling prophecies: The belief or
claim that there is no negotiating partner on the other side -- that the
only language "they" understand is force -- leads to actions that destroy
the possibility of negotiations. There is ample evidence that these images
are not only dangerous, but unwarranted.
Public opinion data on both sides continue to show majorities in favor of
negotiations and of a compromise based on a two-state solution (while
believing that the other side is not ready for such a compromise).
Furthermore, in recent months, politically influential Israelis and
Palestinians have issued joint proposals for resolving the conflict on the
basis of a mutually acceptable two-state formula.
The most elaborate of these proposals is the Geneva accord, developed
under the leadership of Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo, Cabinet
members and leading negotiators of the Israeli and Palestinian
governments, respectively. The Geneva initiative represents a particularly
significant contribution to the peace process.
Given the character, background, and experience of the prime movers of
this initiative and of the people who joined them in the effort, it
suggests very strongly that there is a credible negotiating partner on
each side. Given the specific and detailed agreements it achieved on many
of the most contentious issues in the conflict, it suggests very strongly
that there is a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution that
can be successfully negotiated.
The Geneva accord itself is not a negotiated agreement in any formal sense
of the term, but it is a first-class simulation of such an agreement. As
such, it offers a powerful demonstration that a mutually acceptable
agreement can be negotiated. It does not substitute for official
negotiations, but it provides an impetus for renewed negotiations, by
highlighting the principles on which an agreement must and can be based.
Moreover, it should help speed up the negotiation process because it
offers concrete ideas for dealing with many of the difficult practical and
political issues that a final agreement would have to encompass. Above
all, it breaks through the pervasive pessimism, mistrust, and despair that
have hampered return to the negotiating table.
The Geneva initiative has already gained considerable support around the
world, including the United States. The possibilities for successful
negotiations that it demonstrates can serve as an effective counterweight
to Sharon's argument that he has no partner for peace and hence no
alternative to the unilateral use of force.
But gaining American and international support is only part of the problem
faced by the architects and promoters of the Geneva initiative. The
critical challenge they confront is to garner public support for the
principles and terms of the accord within their own societies. The
compromises envisaged by the Geneva accord entail high costs for the two
peoples.
In particular, there is strong resistance to provisions requiring them to
relinquish claims heavily laden with emotion and symbolic meaning and
central to their national identities and associated narratives -- such as
those touching on the right of return of Palestinian refugees or
sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem. Even among the majorities in
each public who support compromise to achieve a two-state solution, there
is great reluctance to bear these costs in the face of profound distrust
in the other side's willingness or ability to reciprocate and to conclude
a genuine, acceptable agreement.
These concerns are exacerbated by a structural problem in the way
proponents of the Geneva accord present it to their respective publics.
For understandable reasons, they may emphasize to their own constituencies
how favorable the accord is to their own interests and how much the other
side has conceded.
What may encourage their own public, however, may well discourage the
public on the other side -- who inevitably also hear these messages -- and
may reinforce the prevailing distrust. For example, when Palestinians hear
Israelis stress that Palestinians have in effect given up the right of
return, and Israelis hear Palestinians deny that this is the case, both
may come to feel that the accord is a bad deal or that it is sufficiently
ambiguous to allow the other side to exploit it to their own side's
disadvantage.
There is a need, therefore, for common messages, jointly constructed by
thoughtful and credible representatives of both sides, and brought to both
populations. Joint construction is essential to ensure that proponents of
the Geneva initiative avoid working at cross-purposes as they seek to
mobilize their own constituencies -- to ensure that their messages are
responsive to the concerns and sensitivities of each side without unduly
threatening the other side.
Furthermore, to build on the enormous achievement represented by the
Geneva accord, its provisions must be communicated in a way that captures
the publics' imagination and generates trust and hope. The two publics
must be persuaded that a solution along the lines envisioned in the Geneva
accord is not only necessary, but that it is possible, that it is safe,
that it is fair, and that it promises a better future.
To this end, the Geneva initiative -- as inserted into the public debate
-- should be framed in terms of a principled peace that represents, not
just the best available deal, but a historic compromise, which meets the
basic needs of both societies, validates the national identity of each
people, and conforms to the requirements of attainable justice.
I envisage three central elements to a jointly constructed framework for a
principled peace:
* Acknowledgment of the other's nationhood and humanity, through explicit
recognition of each people's right to national self-determination in a
state of its own, acceptance of each other's authentic links to the land,
and rejection of language that denies the other people's political
legitimacy and historical authenticity; and through words and actions
demonstrating that the other side's lives, welfare, and dignity are
considered to be as valuable as one's own.
* Affirmation of the meaning and logic of a historic compromise, by
framing the agreement as a commitment to end the conflict and share the
land both sides claim through the establishment and peaceful coexistence
of two states, in which the two peoples can fulfill their respective
rights to national self-determination, give political expression to their
national identities, and pursue independent, secure, and prosperous
national lives; and by clearly spelling out the implications of such a
commitment in terms of both the costs that the logic of the historic
compromise imposes on each side, and the benefits provided by a principled
peace.
* Creating a positive vision of a common future, by framing the agreement
as an opportunity for the two peoples to build a common life in the land
they share and to which they both have emotional attachments, rather than
as an arrangement being forced on them by outside pressure and the
unending cycle of violence.
Consistent with the high degree of interdependence between the two
societies, the agreement should be presented to both publics as the
foundation of a future relationship based on mutually beneficial
cooperation in many spheres, conducive to stable peace, sustainable
development, and ultimate reconciliation.
Herbert C. Kelman is Richard Clarke Cabot Research Professor of Social
Ethics and co-chair of the Middle East Seminar at Harvard University.
This story ran on page A15 of the Boston Globe on 4/8/2004.