Common Ground News Bulletin 15-21 July 2008
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Please find below the Common Ground News Bulletin 15-21 July 2008.
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Brian Ward
Common Ground News Bulletin 15-21 July 2008
The Common Ground News Service (CGNews) aims to promote constructive perspectives and dialogue on a broad range of issues affecting Arab-Israeli & Muslim-Western relations. CGNews is available in Arabic, English, French, Hebrew, Indonesian and Urdu. To subscribe, click here. For an archive of past CGNews articles, please visit our website at www.commongroundnews.org .
Inside this edition 15 - 21 July 2008
Surviving the Turkish political minefield
by Diba Nigar Goksel
Senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative in Turkey and editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly, Diba Nigar Goksel provides a retrospective look at where the Justice and Development Party (AKP) went wrong, and explores how Turkey can return to a path of democratisation.
(Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2007)
A fresh start for Iraq?
by Jonathan Steele
Guardian columnist Jonathan Steele discusses the current challenges to the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and suggests steps the United States could take to ease the hurdles standing in the way of a sovereign Iraq.
(Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008)
United States and Syria should talk (about everything)
by Theodore H. Kattouf
Theodore H. Kattouf, former US ambassador to the UAE and Syria, and current president and CEO of AMIDEAST, analyses the ramifications of US policy toward Syria and discusses the benefits of a grand bargain.
(Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008)
Syria and Lebanon, more than just neighbours
by Sami Moubayed
Why are Syrian-Lebanese relations so important? Syrian political analyst and writer Sami Moubayed looks at both countries’ shared history and its effect on their relations today.
(Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008)
~Youth Views~ Iranian women a force to be reckoned with
by Talajeh Livani
Talajeh Livani, an Iranian consultant at the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa division looks at the surprisingly low number of women in Iran’s new government in light of their otherwise very active role in Iranian society.
(Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008)
Surviving the Turkish political minefield
Diba Nigar Goksel
Istanbul, Turkey - Two weeks ago, the Turkish police detained an additional round of suspects for their affiliation with Ergenekon, described as a mafia-like gang of largely ultra-nationalist Turks, many of whom are linked to various state institutions. It is rumoured that they are plotting to bring down the government through a bevy of methods, ranging from creating chaos to staging a military coup.
Eighty-six people were formally charged on Monday with membership in Ergenekon, some of whom have been in custody since last summer, without being indicted. This most recent operation took place in parallel with the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) hearing. The ruling party has been charged with seeking to establish an Islamic state, sparking what some are calling a “power showdown” and raising speculations of a possible ban if it is found guilty.
On the other end of the spectrum, there are media commentators who imply that Ergenekon is fabricated by the AKP so the government might have the right to detain opponents with whom it has problems. Conspiracy theories abound in Turkey’s environment of distrust.
For a few years in the early 2000s, Turkey’s society seemed to hold consensus about the future, rallying around Turkey’s accession to the EU. This consensus was lost in early 2005 when opposition parties played on increased sentiments of nationalism, and mixed feelings about prospective EU membership in certain European circles decreased both the prospects and the push for European accession.
Since winning the elections, the AKP has been playing its hand well enough to appease half the groups in the country. Unfortunately, at times, it has departed from a pluralistic agenda that would have increased measures aimed at ensuring freedom of expression.
On freedom of expression, the party opted against genuine reform in favour of more cosmetic changes. Regarding minority rights, the AKP has appeared to not want to counter the agenda of so-called nationalists, which is suspicious of minorities and sees them as tools of foreign powers, aiming to weaken Turkey.
The party could have increased its credibility among critics who believe it favours Sunni Muslim religious conservatives by objecting to nationalist reservations on these issues. However, faced with the need for support from nationalist forces in society, the state and the parliament, it is likely that the AKP found it politically expedient not to take a stand on these issues.
Ultimately, they misjudged the benefits of acting in conjunction with the Nationalist Action Party in parliament when, together, they voted for the constitutional amendments allowing women with headscarves to enter universities, a policy later overturned by the Constitutional Court.
Left-leaning secularists who do not support the AKP are not represented by other mainstream parties either. There is no party that supports reforms for EU accession other than the socially conservative AKP.
The interruption of democracy as a result of the court case, which threatens to dissolve the AKP, will not help those hoping for reforms towards greater freedoms. Instead, influential AKP critics should be working towards the establishment of a legitimate political opposition and demanding reforms that will safeguard institutional checks and balances within Turkey’s democratic structures.
Istanbulites displeased by the increased visibility of women in headscarves, or restaurants that do not serve alcohol, are blinded to the socio-economic change that both caused and resulted from recent decades of rapid urbanisation. This change was not created by the AKP and banning the AKP will not remedy the cultural clashes between recent settlers of large cities from Anatolia and the city’s elites.
In fact, if the party is charged, this can further strengthen the perception of a patronising state and feed existing insecurities, resentment, and economic challenges. Such a scenario, some fear, can lead to heightened instability.
To ensure this era is more than just another round in Turkey’s erratic style of democratisation, certain steps are needed: crackdowns on mafioso relationships with illegitimate power bases should be supported. Institutions that are immune from political or state pressure need to be set up to safeguard against corruption, discrimination and other forms of injustice. An efficient Ombudsman mechanism, suggested by the EU’s enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, to “protect basic civil rights”, must be developed. Laws need to be stripped of vague wording and contradictory articles which allow for abuse by authorities.
Formulas also need to be sought to bring accountability and transparency to religious sects (formally illegal thus organised “undergound”). Some of them have leaders who preach how Islam should be practiced and they are influential in society and politics. Followers of these groups are rumoured to be infiltrating state institutions for a “take over”. In the east, where tribal social structures prevail to the detriment of the rule of law, stronger investment is necessary in state social services that empower the individual.
The liberal constitutional draft, as envisaged last year, should serve as a domestic anchor for democracy. If, rather than using its political capital to portray leadership in this direction, the AKP opts against a renewal of the Constitution to protect itself from backlash from entrenched guardians of the status quo, it will continue to lose credibility among those who believed the party could be instrumental in changing paradigms in Turkey. In such a case, a self-fulfilling prophecy may be realised.
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* Diba Nigar Goksel is a senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative in Turkey and editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org .
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008, www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.
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A fresh start for Iraq?
Jonathan Steele
London - There’s an odd thing about Baghdad: Iran is the only regional power with an embassy, while US President George W. Bush’s best Arab allies – Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia – refuse to let their diplomats live there.
It is not for want of US effort. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has raised the anomaly several times with Iraq’s Arab neighbours, as have lesser emissaries. So far, to no avail.
Jordan remembers how its embassy in Iraq was bombed by al Qaeda in 2003, and Egypt grapples with its ambassador having been ambushed and murdered. Iran, meanwhile, celebrates the most cordial relations it has had with an Iraqi government for several decades.
The fall of Saddam Hussein allowed Iran to expand its influence in Iraq. It also enabled al Qaeda to train and dispatch thousands of young men to Iraq to attack Americans. No doubt many will turn up in other countries later, in search of new US targets. These are just two of the reasons why the US occupation has been such a defeat for Bush.
If security fears were the only factor behind Arab governments’ unwillingness to send diplomats to Baghdad, it would not be so bad for Bush. But politics come into play too. Arab leaders are reluctant to be associated with Iraq’s Shi’a-led government, which is seen by some as excessively sectarian and not genuinely sovereign. For many independent players, the current government lacks legitimacy and authority.
The division was underlined last month when the Accordance Front, the main Sunni grouping in the Iraqi parliament, suspended its decision to rejoin the government after withdrawing last year. Ever since Sunni tribal leaders in the Anbar province started to resist al Qaeda in 2006 in a movement called “The Awakening”, there has been political turbulence in Sunni-majority areas.
The older generation of Sunni politicians in Baghdad has worried more intently out of fear of being portrayed as weak in their dealings with the Shi’a-majority government and the Americans. Hence their refusal to participate in the government unless given serious evidence that Sunnis will have a real share of power.
But all is not well within Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s Shi’a front either. Moqtada al Sadr’s anti-occupation ministers dropped out of the coalition months ago. Now he is calling for weekly demonstrations against the long-term security agreement Washington wants to sign with Baghdad.
The pact is meant to be Bush’s legacy to the Iraqi people – a document that will allow US troops to remain in the country in perpetuity. There may be wording about “no permanent bases” but since the definition of non-permanent is infinitely flexible the door will be open for an American presence as long as the US president finds it sustainable with his electorate.
Al Sadr is demanding a referendum on the pact. Meanwhile, Ministers of Parliament from other parties are complaining that it is being drafted behind closed doors with no chance for the public to see the text and comment. Al Sadr’s referendum call is only the populist tip of an iceberg of unhappiness among wide sections of the Iraqi public who feel shut out of a key debate over sovereignty.
Amid the gloom, Bush points to the surge of 30,000 extra US troops as a victory. It has helped – along with several factors – to achieve a drop in attacks on Iraqi civilians, and that must be welcomed. But the levels of killing are still no better than 2005. More significantly, the surge has not resolved Iraq’s deep political divisions or given its government legitimacy, either at home or in the Arab world beyond.
The only way to give Iraq a fresh start is for the next US president to make a clear announcement of a short timetable for withdrawing all foreign troops. This will strengthen the Sunni nationalists who are confronting al Qaeda and undercut al Qaeda’s claim that their fighters are needed to provide resistance.
At the same time, there needs to be a broad-based conference, perhaps jointly hosted by the Arab League and the United Nations, to bring together a wide variety of Iraqis – including political and religious leaders, the commanders of al Sahwa and the other Sunni and Shi’a militias and civil society representatives – to prepare a coalition government of national re-construction. Elections at this stage will only be divisive – countries emerging from war cannot afford them.
Only when Iraqis know they are to regain their sovereignty will they look into the abyss and halt the drift to civil war. Political violence between Sunnis and Shi’as is a new phenomenon in the history of modern Iraq. In spite of the bitterness, bereavement, and bloodshed of the last three years, the cancer of sectarianism can be reversed. But for that to happen, Iraqis must become masters in their house again.
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* Jonathan Steele is a Guardian columnist, foreign correspondent and author who has been to Iraq on eight assignments since the invasion of 2003. His book, DEFEAT: Why America and Britain lost Iraq, is published by Counterpoint Press. This article first appeared in Washington Post/Newsweek’s Post Global and was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008, www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.
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United States and Syria should talk (about everything)
Theodore H. Kattouf
Washington, DC - The recent compromise on power sharing in Lebanon spares the country further bloodshed, and allows its people to return to a modicum of normalcy. However, the underlying causes of the conflict remain, and Lebanon continues to be an arena where external powers play out their rivalries.
Unless and until Syria and the United States reach a grand bargain, the Lebanese will continue to pay the price.
It should now be clear to the most casual observer that Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon was hardly the end of its influence there. Iran and Syria are in an alliance to thwart US and Israeli objectives in the region whenever and wherever they can. Despite the overwhelming military advantages the United States and Israel enjoy over their adversaries, Iran and Syria have been particularly adept at playing the spoiler through proxies such as Hizbullah, Hamas, Iraqi tribal groups, and Shi’a militias.
Through much of its second term, the administration of US President George W. Bush has been loath to engage in a prolonged and serious dialogue with Syria, instead preferring attempts to isolate and marginalise its leadership. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, for his part, has borrowed pages from his late father’s playbook to demonstrate that there are no lasting solutions to regional problems without Syria. Yet even Turkish-brokered negotiations between Israel and Syria have not enticed the United States away from its policy of ignoring Syria diplomatically while throwing verbal jabs at the regime whenever it can.
The Israelis have been more pragmatic by far in dealing with Syria than has the Bush administration. The current Israeli government and its military/security leadership have concluded that they are “better off with the devil they know than the devil they don’t.”
This reasoning helps to explain why Israel went to great lengths in the summer of 2006 to assure Syria that it was not the target of Israel’s war with Hizbullah. It also helps to explain the lack of Israeli leaks after the bombing of an alleged nuclear reactor in Syria. Meanwhile, even after the Bush administration tried to discourage indirect Israeli talks with Syria about the Golan, Israel cautiously went ahead.
Both Israel and Syria recently concluded that making these talks known is advantageous to them. In the Israeli case, they can pressure the Palestinians for more concessions by suggesting they have another option for peacemaking. The more strategic reason is of course the hope that Syria can be weaned from its 30-year alliance with a nuclear ambitious Iran.
For its part, Syria wants to ensure its relevance and better position itself with the next US administration while the clock runs out on the current one. However, both leaderships know that even if they can agree on the terms of peace, the US government’s role is indispensable to concluding, supporting, and enforcing a treaty.
All of this leaves Lebanon in limbo. Hizbullah has demonstrated that there is no combination of other forces in Lebanon that can challenge its military predominance. And Hizbullah’s leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has left no doubt that his spiritual guide is Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. As its influence with the group diminishes, Syria can no longer promise to disarm Hezbollah’s militia in the context of a peace treaty with Israel and a positive new relationship with the United States.
It can, however, shut down the Iranian supply pipeline to Hizbullah through Syrian territory. Syria could be even more Machiavellian and work with the United States and others to strengthen the more secular elements in Lebanese society in the context of full peace.
The Syrian regime cares first and foremost for its survival. If ushering in a new relationship with the United States and signing a peace treaty with Israel enhances its prospects for longevity, it will go that route – even at the expense of Iran and Hizbullah. If such a deal is not forthcoming, Syria will continue to play the spoiler role to the best of its considerable abilities.
It is important that a new US administration work with Israel and our Arab allies to concoct a strategy that can pry Syria away from Iran. Despite the longevity of their alliance, the two regimes – one secular, the other theocratic – have little philosophically in common other than their shared insecurities concerning Israel and the West.
Thankfully, Syria appears open to a grand bargain, including perhaps one that could stabilise Lebanon without compromising that country’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
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* Theodore H. Kattouf is a former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Syria. He is currently the president and CEO of AMIDEAST (www.amideast.org) and is on the Middle East board of Search for Common Ground. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org .
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008, www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.
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Syria and Lebanon, more than just neighbours
Sami Moubayed
Damascus - When the French occupied Syria in 1920, they famously dissected the country, giving four major parts to the newly created state of Lebanon. The French left Syria 26 years later, and Syrian lawmakers claimed that the division was null and void, asking President Shukri al-Quwatli to officially request the area be restored to Syria.
Quwatli angrily said, “Shame on you for asking that! What’s the difference anyhow between Syria and Lebanon? Are they not the same nation? These borders – created by the occupiers – mean nothing to us, and we do not recognise them. I won’t ask for a single inch back from the Lebanese. Having Syrian territory with Lebanon is just like having Syrian territory with Syria. And if the Lebanese need more land, all they need to do is ask, and they will get it!”
This story speaks volumes about how the Syrians regard their tiny neighbour, with whom they nevertheless have been at visible odds since the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005. Syria can, and will, accept an independent Lebanon, but not one that hosts a hostile regime. History provides the reason behind this insistence.
Twelve years after Quwatli’s statement, Syria decided to write off its parliamentary system for the sake of union with Egypt in 1958. In his justification, Syrian Foreign Minister Salah al-Din al-Bitar reminded his government that when independence from the French was being discussed in 1936, the Syrian negotiating team had not raised the issue of the annexed districts to Lebanon “because we believed that one day, at a certain point in history, we would be re-united with all of Lebanon. What is the use of taking back four districts when one day all of Lebanon will be restored to the mother nation, Syria?” That argument, he claimed, justified merging Syria into Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Egypt.
Neither Bitar nor Quwatli wanted to occupy Lebanon, but they believed that the borders of the modern Lebanese Republic were artificial since they were imposed, during their lifetime, on the residents of Greater Syria. Syrians had not been consulted on this appropriation of land in 1920; it was the brainchild of the infamous French general, Henri Gouraud.
There are Syrians who still remember a time when the residents of Beirut would describe themselves as “Syrian.” Until well into the 20th century, the residents of Tripoli in today’s north Lebanon would refer to themselves as residents of “Trablus al-Sham” – Syrian Tripoli – and, prior to 1918, degrees from the American University of Beirut even said “Granted in Beirut, Syria.”
The late President Hafez al-Assad, who died in 2000, never set foot in Lebanon, making only a quick trip to the sleepy town of Shtaura on the Syrian-Lebanese highway to meet with then President Suleiman Franjiyah in the early days of the Lebanese Civil War. Assad instead brought Lebanese leaders to Damascus, partly to maintain his paramount position of authority over Lebanon but mainly for security reasons.
This led many Lebanese to complain: “The President of Syria, who has troops in our country, never even visits, because he does not recognise its sovereignty.” This also explains why there was so much media attention surrounding President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Beirut on March 3, 2002 – it was the first of its kind by a Syrian leader in nearly 30 years.
Long before the Ba’athists came to power, the argument in Damascus has always been that, although we accepted an independent Lebanon, we will never tolerate or accept an anti-Syrian regime in Beirut. It’s just too close, too dangerous, and too interconnected with Syrian affairs. As a matter of fact, deep down, every Syrian administration since the republic was founded in 1932 has regarded Lebanon, albeit quietly, as a historical part of Syria.
A closer look at Syrian-Lebanese relations shows that when Bechara El Khoury became Lebanon’s president in 1943, he had the full backing of the nationalist government in Damascus. So interrelated were the Khoury and Quwatli administrations that when a military officer toppled Quwatli in 1949, Lebanon refused to recognise him. As a result, Husni al-Za’im, the new master of Damascus, began toying with the idea of “occupying Lebanon and returning it to its due place in Syria.” He even funded and trained a paramilitary group to invade and annex Lebanon, prompting the Syrians to eventually force him to resign in 1952.
But Syrians also forced Bechara El Khoury’s successor, Kamil Shamoun, to resign in the late 1950s, this time supplying the Lebanese with arms, funds, and logistics to bring down what Damascus described as an anti-Syrian and anti-Arab nationalist government in Beirut.
What the West fails to understand is that, from the Syrian perspective, it was not the least bit awkward or embarrassing to do any of this in Lebanon. From the Syrian perspective, the intruders were meddling in Syria.
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* Sami Moubayed, PhD is a Syrian political analyst and author. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org .
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008, www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.
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~Youth Views~ Iranian women a force to be reckoned with
Talajeh Livani
Washington, DC - Iran’s parliament convened last month for the first time since the April 2008 elections. The results of the parliamentary elections are in and all the votes have been counted. Surprisingly, or perhaps alarmingly, women now account for a mere 2.8 percent of this new conservative-dominated parliament. This is a decline from the already low 4.1 percent representation in the previous Iranian parliament.
Those familiar with Iranian society may find this shocking. Iran performs much better than other Middle Eastern countries on female education, health, and labour force participation. Iranian women comprise around two-thirds of university entrants, which has led to government-imposed quotas on university admittance, where women were dominating fields such as medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy. And, while lower than the world average of 58 percent, Iran’s female labour force participation – 42 percent – is the highest in the Middle East.
How is it then possible that the political representation of Iranian women is lagging, even when compared to other countries in the region; the average for the Middle East and North Africa is approximately 9 percent with Iraq having the highest female representation in parliament – 26 percent.
The answer to this question is complex. First, Iran does not use gender quotas for female political participation like some other Middle Eastern and North African countries; it is not certain how the other countries would have performed without the use of quotas and appointments.
Second, to qualify as a candidate in the parliamentary elections, the conservative Guardian Council – a powerful political body that has the power to veto candidates – has to be convinced of the prospective candidate’s belief in Islam and the Islamic Republic. Women in Iran have played a crucial role in shifting the conservative-liberal balance in the government. Many believe that women were an integral part in bringing to power former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Therefore, it may simply be that females who register to run are likely to be less conservative than their male counterparts leading to a lower qualification rate.
Third, some of Iran’s laws discourage women from rising to positions of leadership and decision-making. Women are not allowed to serve as judges or to run for the presidency. And the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, encourages women to stay at home and focus on the institution of family. Only two women hold secondary cabinet positions, the Centre for Women’s Participation has been renamed the Centre for Women and Family Affairs and Ahmadinejad has publicly announced support for larger families with women staying at home to take care of children.
Finally, in light of external pressure with regards to its nuclear program, the Iranian government has come to view domestic women’s groups as a threat to national security. There have been crackdowns on the One Million Signatures Campaign, a campaign aimed at collecting one million signatures in support of gender equality in Iran, peaceful women’s rights demonstrations, and over the dress code. And the premier women’s magazine, Zanan, was shut down in January 2008 allegedly because it offered a dark picture of the Islamic Republic and compromised the psyche and the mental health of its readers by providing them with “morally questionable information.”
Despite these challenges, Iranian women’s determination to break stereotypes cannot be underestimated. Today, Iranian women are present in every educational and employment field that is traditionally male-dominated. And they are active politically, especially at the local level. In the 2006 municipal elections, 44 seats out of the 264 on provincial capital councils went to women.
In addition, Iranian women represent such a large share of voters in local and national elections that they are able to significantly influence national politics. For instance, the 2008 parliamentary candidates had to adjust their election campaigns to attract women voters by vowing to change family and labour laws to ensure more equal treatment of women.
The government is slowly amending laws that are discriminatory towards women. The most recently passed laws by parliament allow some Iranian women married to foreigners to pass on their Iranian nationality to their children, which was previously not possible. And women suffering injury or death in a car accident are now entitled to the same insurance company compensation as men, whereas previously women received only half of the compensation given to men.
There is strong public support for greater gender equality in Iran. A recent poll conducted by World Public Opinion and Search for Common Ground finds that 78 percent of Iranians think that it is somewhat or very important for women to have full equal rights with men and 70 percent think that the government should make an effort to prevent discrimination against women.
As the world is watching developments in Iran, the women’s movement is likely to be on the forefront. And perhaps it will not be too long before Iranian women become as politically empowered as they are in other spheres of society.
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* Talajeh Livani is an Iranian who was raised in Sweden and is currently working as a consultant for the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa division. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org .
Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 15 July 2008, www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission is granted for publication.