From Humiliation to Retaliation: The Differential Effects of Collective- Versus Personal-level Humiliating Experiences

by

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ABSTRACT

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Jennifer S. Goldman

While extant theory and research suggest that humiliation plays a central part in prolonging cycles of aggression and violence, especially in the context of identity-based conflicts, there are still many gaps in the literature (Coleman, 2003; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2004; Friedman, 2003; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002, 2006). In particular, little research has addressed whether different types of humiliating events might provoke different types of responses, such that some responses might characterize helplessness while others might be characterized by prolonged anger and aggression and thus fuel long-term conflict. The present research examined whether reactions to humiliation involving collective-level identity characteristics (such as race, religion and nationality), as compared to personal-level ones, might produce more externally-focused angry and aggressive responses, both in the immediate- and longer-terms.

Two studies examined individuals' reactions to humiliating experiences involving collective- versus personal-level identity characteristics. Study 1 was an experimental on-line scenario study, and Study 2 was an online survey asking participants to recall humiliating experiences from their real lives. The results of both studies showed that individuals humiliated regarding a collective-level identity characteristic were significantly more likely to blame the humiliator or external circumstances for the experience, while individuals humiliated regarding an

individual-level characteristic were significantly more likely to blame themselves. Both studies also showed that people who blamed themselves for a humiliating experience were significantly more likely to feel an immediate sense of shame, and Study 1 suggested that they were also significantly more likely to feel both an immediate and prolonged sense of depression in the aftermath of the event.

Results suggest that those humiliated regarding an individual-level identity characteristic experienced a wide range of reactions (including self-blame, immediate and prolonged anger, shame and depression, and, in Study 1, intentions to aggress against the humiliator), while those humiliated regarding a collective-level identity characteristic had a narrower, primarily externally-focused range of reactions (including other-blame, immediate and prolonged anger and, in Study 1, intentions to aggress against the humiliator).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PAGE

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of my uncle, Dr. Robert Schachat, our family's first social psychologist. May his memory be a blessing.

Chapter 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

> *I will not enumerate the instances of our humiliation…We are all oppressed. We are all being humiliated…Today we, the whole Muslim [community], are treated with contempt and dishonor…There is a feeling of hopelessness among the Muslim countries and their people. They feel they can do nothing right…Our only reaction is to become more and more angry. Angry people cannot think properly.*
> - Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, 2003

> *The shameful photos are evil humiliation for Muslim men and women in the Abu Ghraib prison…Where is the sense of honor, where is the rage? Where is the anger for God's religion? Where is the sense of veneration of Muslims, and where is the sense of vengeance for the honor of Muslim men and women in the Crusaders prisons?*
> - Masked terrorist on a video of the beheading of American Nicholas Berg, 2004

Introduction

As the above sentiments suggest, humiliation is a central factor contributing to long-term conflict (Coleman, 2003; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2004; Friedman, 2003; Lindner, 2002). While examples of humiliation in current real world conflicts abound, our knowledge is limited regarding the precise role humiliation plays in conflict (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002, 2006). The purpose of the present research is to delineate specific conditions under which humiliation is likely to lead to protracted conflict and the social psychological processes by which this occurs.

Prior studies in this area suggest that individuals' perceptions of the social norms surrounding a humiliating encounter affect their responses to such encounters. These studies have found that when people perceive social norms to

privilege (rather than restrict) aggression, they are more likely to feel angry and intend to act aggressively, both in the immediate term and over time (Goldman & Coleman, 2004; Coleman, Kugler & Goldman, 2007). In addition, group-based concerns are considered to be at the core of many long-term conflicts (Coleman, 2003; Rothman, 1997; Lederach, 1997, 2005). In fact, research on relative deprivation, a basic source of conflict, has found that collective-level relative deprivation produces significantly more negative and hostile reactions than does personal-level relative deprivation (Applegryn & Nieuwoudt, 1988; Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983; Koomen & Frankel, 1992; Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Tripathi & Srivastava, 1981; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; Walker & Mann, 1987; Walker, et. al., 2002). Given the prevalence of humiliation in collective-level protracted conflicts around the world today, the present research builds on prior studies by examining whether the processes involved in collective-level humiliations produce more negative and prolonged reactions to humiliation than those involved in personal-level humiliations.

This paper has five chapters. The current chapter offers a review of the literature, outlining the relationships between protracted conflict, humiliation, collective identity, and rumination. It also presents a series of testable hypotheses. Chapter Two describes the method and results of a pilot study. Chapter Three outlines the methods for two additional studies, and Chapter Four presents the results of the two studies. Finally, Chapter Five offers a discussion of the findings, directions for future research, and limitations of the present research.

Protracted Conflict

Protracted conflicts can be broadly defined by three characteristics. First, they persist over a long period of time and are characterized by cyclical patterns, with frequent bursts of violence juxtaposed with periods of relative quiet as conflict brews beneath the surface (Putnam & Wondolleck, 2003; Coleman, 2000). Second, they continue despite repeated attempts to resolve or transform them. Third, they are waged in ways that the adversaries or third parties perceive to be destructive, as evidenced by devastating financial and infrastructure damage as well as extremely traumatic physical and emotional harm (Kreisberg, 2005; Coleman, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Lindner, 2002; Burgess & Burgess, 2005; Brendt & Scott, 2004; Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001; Brahm, 2005).

A sub-set of protracted conflicts can be characterized as *identity-based conflicts* (Gurr, 2000; Rothman, 1997). Identity-based conflicts tend to be rooted in individuals' need for dignity, recognition, safety and control. The longer a conflict continues, the more likely it is that these factors play a central role in the dispute (Rothman, 1997). In such conflicts, the very existence of the Other can come to be perceived as a threat to an individual's or group's own identity. This threat often results in a mutual denial or negation of the Other's identity (Kelman, 1999, 2001). This negation of identity, essentially being treated as if one does not exist, often involves intense feelings of humiliation.

Humiliation is considered to be a central emotion experienced by those in protracted conflict settings (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2004; Lindner, 2002; Coleman, 2003; Friedman, 2003). However, while the role that humiliation plays in

conflict has received some attention in qualitative research investigations as well as in the popular media (see Lindner, 2002; Friedman, 2003; Filkins, et. al., 2004; Sharkey, 2004), very little research exploring the specific processes by which humiliation operates in conflict situations has been conducted (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002).

Humiliation

The emotional experience of humiliation occurs in reaction to perceiving oneself as being coerced or degraded in a way that violates expectations for fair treatment. Lindner (2002) suggests that the emotional experience of humiliation occurs as a result of the "[e]nforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honor or dignity" (p. 126). She writes:

> To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations (p. 126).

Frijda (1986) suggests that some emotions, called blend emotions, are comprised of more than one more primary emotion. The emotional experience of humiliation is considered to be a blend of both shame and anger, including a unique combination of self-blame and other-blame. While shame is understood to be focused on the self, and anger is understood to be focused on the other, the hybrid view of humiliation suggests that humiliation is both self- and other-focused (Lewis, 1971; Negrao, et. al., 2004).

The emotional experience of humiliation is also tightly linked with identity. Hartling and Luchetta (1999) define the emotional experience of humiliation as "the

deep dysphoric feeling associated with being, or perceiving oneself as being, unjustly degraded, ridiculed, or put down—in particular, one's identity has been demeaned or devalued" (p. 264). In addition, Margalit (2002) suggests that humiliation shapes the way individuals think about themselves. He writes:

> Humiliation, I believe, is not just another experience in our life, like, say, an embarrassment. It is a formative experience. It forms the way we view ourselves as humiliated persons…[it] becomes constitutive of one sense of who we are" (2002, p. 130).

Thus, threats to identity often cause feelings of humiliation, and the experience of humiliation, in turn, impacts identity.

Taking into account the various aspects of humiliation outlined above, an integrated definition of humiliation is provided here. *The emotional experience of humiliation occurs in reaction to perceiving oneself as being coerced or degraded in a way that violates expectations for fair treatment. It is comprised of a blend of both shame and anger, including a unique combination of self-blame and other-blame.*[1]

[1] The words "humiliation" and "humiliating" are often used in the literature to refer both to an *emotional experience* and to an *event* that is perceived as humiliating by a target. The present research treats these as separate yet related aspects of the construct of humiliation. In addition, two further distinctions should be made. First, a humiliator does not need to intend to humiliate in order to leave a target feeling humiliated. For example, an airport security officer may think he is simply doing his job when he tells a passenger to stand aside while her belongings are searched; however, the passenger may be humiliated if she perceives the officer to have singled her out because of her ethnicity. Second, the opposite is also true: even if a humiliator intends to humiliate a target, the target may not accept the humiliation. For instance, in a school lunchroom, the class bully may attempt to humiliate a lunchroom aide by playing a prank joke on him in front of all the other students, but the aide may simply decide not to accept the humiliation that was intended.

Collective Identity

The topic of identity has a long history in the study of social psychology (Ashmore, et. al., 2004), much of which has focused on the individual's sense of unique identity, or what social identity theory calls *personal identity* (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). However, more recently, scholars have sought to understand the individual's identity within the context of the individual's relationships to others and to social groups (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) distinguishes between *personal identity* and *social identity*. While *personal identity* defines the individual in relation, or in comparison, to other individuals, *social identity* derives from membership in emotionally significant groups. In other words, *personal identity* refers to those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate the self from all others, while *social identity* refers to those aspects of the self-concept that reflect assimilation to others or significant social groups.

While the distinction between personal and social identity remains crucial to our understanding of identity, scholars have more recently identified *collective identity* as an important facet of identity (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Ashmore, et. al. 2004). While collective identity has been construed in slightly different ways by different theorists, Brewer and Gardner (1996) draw a useful distinction in describing it. They differentiate between two levels of social identity: *interpersonal identity* and *collective identity*.

Interpersonal identity derives from interpersonal relationships and interdependence with specific others. It derives from personalized bonds of

attachment present in intimate dyadic relationships like parent-child, lovers and friendships, and also membership in small, face-to-face groups that are essentially networks of such dyadic relationships. *Collective identity,* on the other hand, derives from membership in larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories. It does not require personal relationships among group members. Collective identity derives from impersonal bonds and common identification with some symbolic group or social category. Collective identity reflects internalizations of the norms and characteristics of important reference groups and consists of cognitions about the self that are consistent with that group identification (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).

Many collective identities are considered to be *ascribed* (as opposed to *achieved*) in the sense that they are acquired at birth rather than consciously chosen, such as family, racial, ethnic and national identities (Deutsch, 1973). *Ascribed identities* are usually unalterable (given that they are acquired at birth) and they tend to be socially significant. Thus, they often play a large role in determining one's sense of identity.

Self-construal is Contextual

While personal and social identities are considered mutually exclusive, individuals are thought to hold such identities simultaneously, and the degree to which one or the other identity is salient is considered to depend on contextual factors (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Depending on the context, individuals shift the way they think about themselves. For example, classification of oneself as a group member entails "a shift towards the perception of the self as an interchangeable

exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person" (Turner, et. al., 1987, p. 50).

Motivation is Dependent on Self-construal

Different levels of self-construal are associated with differences in the basic goals of social interaction. Brewer (1991) writes: "When the definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivations also changes accordingly" (p. 476). This means that the particular self-construal that is most salient for an individual can dictate changes in how he or she is motivated to behave, or respond, towards external stimuli.

For example, if personal identity is most salient for an individual in a certain situation, he or she will be most likely to be motivated in that situation by self-interest, in which case, the person might seek to gain some tangible reward for him- or herself. However, if the individual's collective identity is most salient, he or she will be most likely to be motivated by the perceived interests of his or her group, in which case, the person might seek to gain some reward for his or her group. In other words, individuals whose personal identity is salient are likely to be motivated by self-interest, whereas individuals whose collective identity is salient are likely to act on behalf of the welfare of the collective (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). For example, a collectivistic orientation has been found to strengthen one's sense of obligation to act on behalf of the welfare of the ingroup (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gaertner, Sedikides & Graetz, 1999).

Relative deprivation. Research on relative deprivation suggests that people respond differently when their sense of collective identity has been threatened than

when their sense of personal identity has been threatened. *Relative deprivation (RD)* is defined as a perceived discrepancy between what people have and what they feel entitled to. It is generally thought to be one of the major sources of interpersonal and intergroup conflict and violence (Gurr, 1970; Pruitt, 2006). However, an important conceptual distinction is made between *fraternal deprivation* (people's perceptions of their group's fortunes relative to what they expect for their group) and *egoistic deprivation* (people's perception of their personal fortunes relative to what they expect for themselves) (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Crosby, 1984; Tyler & Smith, 1998; Pruitt & Kim, 2004).

Research suggests that fraternal (or collective) RD, as opposed to egoistic (or personal) RD, leads to heightened levels of conflict and violence (Walker & Mann, 1987). For example, fraternal RD, as compared to egoistic RD, has been found to produce significantly higher levels of: antagonistic behaviors (Abeles, 1976; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972), intergroup prejudice (Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972), negative intergroup attitudes (Tripathi & Srivastava, 1981; Applegryn & Nieuwoudt, 1988), nationalist separatist attitudes (Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983), and intentions of militancy (Koomen & Frankel, 1992; Walker & Mann, 1987). In contrast, egoistic RD has been found to lead to higher levels of stress symptoms, including depression (Walker & Mann, 1987).

Causal attribution. What might explain these findings? Individuals are thought to make *external causal attributions* (i.e., blame the other) for negative events targeting collective-level characteristics but make *internal causal attributions* (i.e., blame themselves) for negative events targeting personal-level

characteristics (Applegryn & Nieuwoudt, 2001; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Individuals may make external attributions for negative collective-level events because in these situations, they have access to social and informational support suggesting that they should not feel personally to blame for the event since it occurred regarding a characteristic they share with others (Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Crosby, 1984). In contrast, in situations of egoistic RD, Crosby (1984) notes that people blame themselves because they don't have access to such information. In addition, in the context of fraternal RD, a social network is more likely to exist, which can provide social support that protects people against physiological stress and negative self-evaluations.

In turn, different causal attributions lead to different emotional and behavioral outcomes. Theory and research suggest that internal attributions for negative events lead to depression, while external attributions lead to anger (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1985; Flett, et. al., 1991; Neumann, 2000; Carmony & DiGiuseppe, 2003) and aggression (Applegryn & Nieuwoudt, 2001; Walker, et. al., 2002). For example, when people experience egoistic RD, they are likely to make internal attributions for their plight, and to direct attention towards the self, either by making efforts at self-improvement or becoming depressed. In contrast, when people experience fraternal RD, they have a sense that others share their fate and are therefore more likely to make external attributions, and thus seek to improve the lot of their group through actions aimed at changing others, including collective protest and violence (Appelgryn & Nieuwoudt, 2001; Walker, et. al., 2002).

How this relates to humiliation. The constructs of humiliation and relative deprivation both involve perceiving oneself as being "lower than" a referent party and experiencing a violation of expectations for fair treatment (see Lindner, 2002; Goldman & Coleman, 2004). They both involve a fundamental sense of injustice and often provoke negative emotional reactions which, under some conditions, can lead to aggressive behavior. Thus, just as fraternal RD has been found to cause more negative external reactions than egoistic RD, I expect that when a person's sense of collective identity is made salient and threatened, such as by being humiliated regarding a collective-level identity characteristic, more negative external responses are likely to ensue than when personal identity is made salient and threatened, such as by humiliation regarding a personal-level identity characteristic.

The above leads to the following hypotheses:

1a) Individuals who experience humiliation regarding a *collective-level* identity characteristic will be more likely to make *external* causal attributions for the humiliation than individuals who experience humiliation regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic.
1b) In contrast, individuals who experience humiliation regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic will be more likely to make *internal* causal attributions for the humiliation than individuals who experience humiliation regarding a *collective-level* identity characteristic.

2a) Individuals who make *external* causal attributions for a humiliating event will be more likely to *feel angry* and *intend to aggress* than individuals who make *internal* causal attributions for the event.
2b) In contrast, individuals who make *internal* causal attributions for the event will be more likely to *feel ashamed* and *depressed* than individuals who make *external* causal attributions for the event.

3) Type of *causal attribution mediates* the relationship between type of identity characteristic humiliated and resulting affective and behavioral responses.

Rumination

How does humiliation contribute to the protracted nature of some conflicts? Margalit (2002) writes, "The wounds of insult and humiliation keep bleeding long after the painful physical injuries have crusted over" (p.120). In other words, highly emotional negative events are relatively well retained, both with respect to the emotional event itself as well as to central information in the event that elicits the emotional reaction (Christianson, 1984; Christianson & Loftus, 1987, 1990, 1991; Christianson, et. al., 1991; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986, 1989). A number of studies have found that the process of forgetting events is slowed when the events have an emotional component, versus when the events are neutral or non-emotional (Reisberg & Heuer, 1992; Christianson, 1984).

Singer and Blagov (2004) suggest that self-defining memories, such as those involving humiliation, are likely to be repetitively recalled. In other words, they are likely to be ruminated about. *Rumination* (also known as dysphoric rumination or brooding) is defined as self-focused attention directed particularly on one's own negative mood (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). It involves reviewing over and over again in one's mind the details of a negative experience (Berkowitz, 1993; Pruitt & Kim, 2004).

Margalit writes, "[W]e can hardly remember insults without reliving them" (p. 120). As a result of reliving the experience, feelings of humiliation tend to impact individuals' reactions not only when they first occur, but also at the moment

of recollection. For example, in a situation in which a person is already angry, a series of empirical studies suggests that rumination increases the emotional experience of anger (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Bushman, Pedersen, Vasquez, Bonacci & Miller, 2001; Bushman, 2002) and aggressive behavior (Konecni, 1974; Bushman, 2002). In contrast to catharsis theory (which states that expressing negative emotions diffuses them), these studies suggest that the more individuals ruminate, the angrier they feel and the more aggressively they behave.

For instance, in one study, Bushman (2002) asked angered participants to hit a punching bag and either think about the person who had angered them (rumination condition) or think about getting in shape physically (distraction condition). After hitting the punching bag, participants reported the degree to which they felt angry. After this, participants were given the opportunity to administer loud blasts of noise to the person who had angered them. There was also a no punching bag control group. The results of the study demonstrate that participants in the rumination group felt significantly angrier and behaved more aggressively than participants in the distraction and control groups.

Similarly, based on extensive work in settings of protracted conflict, Lederach (2005) proposes that rumination about collective-level grievances often provides group members with justification for violent acts. He writes:

> In settings of protracted conflict the mixed history of violence among groups gives each, say Croats and Serbs, or Hutus and Tutsis, a collective memory of times when they were deeply violated by the other. The trauma remembered renews itself as part of the unconscious psyche of group identity and is passed down across generations… In many circumstances the chosen trauma provides justification for intergroup defense, preemptive violence, or even revenge (p. 142).

In contrast, in a situation in which a person is already depressed, rumination has been found to maintain or increase the severity and length of the depression (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). The above leads to the following hypothesis:

> **4a)** Individuals who *feel angry* about a humiliating experience and ruminate will experience more *prolonged anger* and *intentions to aggress* than individuals who *feel depressed* about a humiliating experience and ruminate.
> **4b)** In contrast, individuals who *feel depressed* about a humiliating experience and ruminate will feel more *prolonged shame* and *depression* than individuals who *feel angry* about a humiliating experience and ruminate.

Summary Figures

Figure 1. The social psychological process that occurs when humiliation involves a collective-level identity characteristic.



Figure 2. The social psychological process that occurs when humiliation involves a personal-level identity characteristic.



Chapter 2

PILOT STUDY

This chapter describes the method and results of a pilot study and concludes with recommendations for future studies based on its findings.

Method

A pilot study was conducted in order to test scenarios designed to manipulate the independent variable, to determine the content validity and reliability of the survey items, and to test a preliminary hypothesis.

Procedure

Participants (n = 52) were men and women, ages 18 and over, who had access to the Internet. In an on-line survey that began with a written scenario (following Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards, 1993; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; and Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), participants were asked to place themselves "in the shoes" of the main actor in the scenario who was humiliated by another actor. The scenarios varied by condition; in the first condition, the main actor was humiliated regarding a collective-level identity characteristic, in this case, being gay. In the second condition the main actor was humiliated regarding a personal-level characteristic, in this case, being an intellectual.

Participants answered a series of Likert-scale and open-ended questions to assess immediate affective, cognitive and intended behavioral reactions. The follow-up questionnaire assessed delayed affective, cognitive and intended behavioral reactions and the degree to which participants had ruminated about the scenario over the past week.

Statistical analyses were conducted to assess the reliability of the measures and to test the following hypothesis: Individuals humiliated regarding a *collective-level* identity characteristic will experience *more immediate and delayed negative affective and cognitive reactions, intentions to aggress, and rumination* than those humiliated regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic.

Measures

Each of the four sub-scales below began with an open-ended question followed by a series of Likert-scale questions. Each subscale was included in the initial survey as well as the follow-up survey one week later, unless otherwise noted.

Affect. *Negative affect* was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) (Watson, et. al., 1988) which consist of two 5-point, 10-item mood scales. The scales range from "not at all" to "extremely" and ask participants to rate the extent to which they feel each item at the present moment. The scales have been shown to be highly internally consistent and largely uncorrelated. In addition, *feelings of humiliation* was measured using five 5-point subscales: humiliation, inferiority, sadness, rage and happiness (with happiness being reverse coded), some of which were adapted from the Humiliation Inventory (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt each item at the present moment, with 1 being "not at all" and 5 being "extremely".

Cognition. *Cognitive reactions* was measured using five newly created sub-scales testing the extent to which participants: 1) thought the event would serve as a

formative, guiding force in their life; 2) thought the event could enable socially impermissible behavior to become permissible; 3) analyzed the credibility of the humiliator; 4) thought the event reflected who they are as a person; and 5) reflected on the motivations of the humiliator. The subscales asked participants to rate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement in the subscale, with 1 being "disagree" and 5 being "agree".

Intentions to aggress. The *intentions to aggress* subscales, following those used in Goldman and Coleman (2004) and Coleman, Kugler and Goldman (2007), were: physical aggression, emotional/verbal aggression, passive aggression, non-aggression, and the extent to which the participant would use personal discipline to counteract feelings of humiliation. On a scale from 1 to 5, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they would intend to engage in each action, with 1 being "not at all" and 5 being "extremely likely".

Rumination. Seven items assessing *rumination* were adapted using items from the 6-point Dissipation-Rumination Scale (Caprara, 1986). On a scale from 1 to 6, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which items were "completely false for me" (1) to "completely true for me" (6). The rumination items were used in the follow-up survey only.

Results

Tests for Reliability

The majority of the subscales were found to be reliable. Please see Table 1.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.]

Tests of the Hypothesis

Results partially confirmed the hypothesis. In sum, those who were humiliated regarding a *collective-level* characteristic tended to *feel more humiliated* ($F = 5.06$, $p < .05$), *experience more negative affect* ($F = 7.21$, $p < .05$), think the event would serve as a *more formative, guiding force in their lives* both immediately ($F = 22.88$, $p < .001$) and one week later ($F = 17.60$, $p < .001$), and *ruminate more* about the event ($F = 4.99$, $p < .05$) than those humiliated regarding a personal-level identity characteristic. Please see Figures 1 and 2. [INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE.]

The two groups did not differ significantly in the extent to which they intended to behave aggressively against the humiliator. Most participants reported that they would not intend to aggress very much (both groups' means were less than 2.06 on a scale from 1 to 5).[2] However, the effects were both almost significant, as indicated by the effect for immediate intended behavior, $F(1, 49) = 3.03$, $p = .088$, and the effect for delayed intended behavior $F(1, 37) = 2.56$, $p = .118$. An analysis of the means of each group indicates that the difference between the means is in the predicted direction. Individuals humiliated regarding a collective-level characteristic intended to behave more aggressively immediately after reading the scenario (M = 2.06, SD = .78) than individuals humiliated regarding a personal-level characteristic (M = 1.71, SD = .65). Similarly, they also intended to behave somewhat more aggressively one week later (M = 1.65, SD = .67) than individuals humiliated regarding a personal-level characteristic (M = 1.36, SD = .45).

[2] This is in line with Averill's (1982, 1983) finding that most respondents do not report acting aggressively on self-report measures.

Recommendations

A significant amount of insight was gained from the pilot study, resulting in recommendations for future studies. First, feedback suggested that the identity characteristics chosen for the pilot scenarios are not equal in existing American culture; being intellectual may be considered a positive attribute and may give rise to positive associations, while being gay may be a more controversial, somewhat stigmatized attribute that may give rise to negative associations. Thus, participants in the collective (gay) group may have reported more negative reactions because the humiliation took place regarding a more controversial, stigmatized identity characteristic than in the other scenario, rather than because of differences in the independent variable between the conditions.

In future studies, the scenarios should be held constant with regard to the social desirability of the identity characteristic. One effective way to do this is for the scenarios to be idiographic. That is, participants should choose an identity characteristic (personal or collective, depending on the condition) with which they identify strongly and which is a possible source of humiliation in their real lives. They should then read a scenario in which they are humiliated regarding the identity characteristic they have chosen. The identity characteristics chosen would likely be relatively equal with regard to social desirability.

Second, if it is true that most respondents do not report acting aggressively on self-report measures as Averill (1982, 1983) suggests, then future studies should include more items assessing indirect aggression and should measure the degree to

which participants would *like* to aggress, even if they wouldn't actually aggress in real life (Averill, 1982, 1983).

Chapter 3

METHOD

Study 1

Participants and Recruitment

Participants (N = 165) were recruited through the volunteers section of a national general interest website (www.craigslist.com) by an advertisement to participate in an online survey in exchange for the chance to win a $500 cash prize. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. Depending on condition, participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target of a humiliating event involving either a collective-level identity characteristic or a personal-level identity characteristic.

Comparable demographics were maintained between the two conditions, with no significant differences in participant sex, age, race, education or income level. Overall, 141 participants were women (86.5%) and 22 participants were men (13.5%); 105 participants were between the ages of 18-29 (64.4%), 38 participants were between the ages of 30-44 (23.3%), and 19 participants were 45 and over (11.7%). 125 participants were Caucasian / White (75.8%), 13 participants were African-American (7.9%), 15 participants were Asian / Asian-American (9.1%), 4 participants were Hispanic (2.4%), and 8 participants identified as Other (4.8%). 72 participants had a Bachelor's degree (43.6%), 48 participants had either a high school or Associate's degree (29.1%), and 45 participants had a Master's, professional or doctoral degree (27.3%). 56 participants had an income between

$25,000-$49,000 (34.1%), 48 participants had an income less than $25,000 (29.3%), 47 participants had an income between $50,000-$99,000 (28.7%), and 13 participants had an income $100,000 or higher (7.9%). (For additional demographic information, please see Table 8.)

Procedure

An experiment was conducted using an initial survey and a follow-up survey one week later (for access to all survey items, please see Appendix A). In the initial survey, participants were asked to list 5-10 personal- or collective-level characteristics (depending on condition) with which they identify strongly, and that have been, or could be, the target of severe ridicule in their lives. They were then asked to choose the characteristic that is the most important to their identity. (For an overview of the types of identity characteristics participants chose, please see Table 10.) Participants were then asked to vividly imagine a scenario (following Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards, 1993; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; and Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998) in which they were humiliated regarding the identity characteristic they chose. The instructions and scenario read as follows:

> Imagine that the event below is happening to you. Please read slowly. Imagine it as vividly as possible, including what you would feel, think, and do. Imagine yourself and people you know as characters in the situation.
>
> You recently arrived at a party, and you are surrounded by a group of acquaintances. Suddenly, the leader of the crowd, someone you know named Chris, looks directly at you and totally humiliates you about being [identity characteristic inserted here]. Chris puts you down and makes you feel degraded because you are [identity characteristic inserted here]. Then Chris sneers at you, and says, "You aren't welcome here. Get out!" Someone in the back of the crowd yells, "Yeah, get out!" This causes quite a stir and you hear

> laughter in the crowd. You look around and feel everyone in the room staring at YOU.

After reading the scenario, participants answered a series of items assessing attributions, and emotional and intended behavioral reactions. Manipulation checks were conducted and demographic variables were collected. In the follow-up survey, emailed to participants through a web-link one week later, participants were asked to recall the event as vividly as possible and to answer the same questions as the week before, in addition to items assessing rumination.

Measures

Attribution.

Attribution (i.e., the extent to which participants blame themselves or blame others for the humiliating event) was measured using three items that have been successfully used to assess the degree to which people blame themselves, blame others, or blame external circumstances for events in their lives (see Ferguson & Wells, 1980; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel & Baeyer, 1979; Anderson, Horowitz & French, 1983; and Flett, Blankstein & Kleinfeldt, 1991). When a categorical variable was needed for analysis, the score was derived from responses to one categorical item. When a continuous variable was needed, a composite score was derived from the responses to all three items. The categorical item asked participants to indicate whether the situation occurred due to "a characteristic of my own" or due to "other circumstances (people, situations, etc.)". One continuous variable used a 7-point Likert scale, asking participants to indicate the extent to which the cause of the event was "totally due to other people and circumstances" (1) or "totally due to me" (7). The other continuous variable used a

5-point Likert scale, asking participants to indicate the extent to which they believed the event was their fault, with 1 being "not at all" and 5 being "extremely".

Affect.

Quantitative measures of anger and shame. Anger and shame were measured quantitatively using the widely used Expanded Form of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, or PANAS-X (Watson, et. al., 1988; Watson & Clark, 1991, 1992). This 5-point scale asked participants to indicate the extent to which they felt each item at the present moment, with 1 being "not at all" and 5 being "extremely". A composite score for anger was derived by responses to the following six items: *angry, irritable, hostile, scornful, disgusted* and *loathing*. A composite score for shame was derived by responses to the following six items: *guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, angry at self, disgusted with self* and *dissatisfied with self*. Items for both sub-scales were interspersed with an equal number of other affective descriptors in PANAS-X, such as shyness, fatigue, and surprise, to disguise the nature of the sub-scales of interest.

Qualitative measure of anger. Anger was also assessed qualitatively. Immediate anger was assessed using participants' answers to the open-ended question, "How do you feel right now?" and prolonged anger was measured using answers to the open-ended question, "When you recall the situation, how do you feel?"

Intended aggression.

Quantitative measure of intended aggression. Intended aggression was measured quantitatively using a 6-item scale to assess direct and indirect aggression responses following Averill's (1982, 1983) framework. Participants were asked to assess the extent to which they "would do" and "would feel like doing" each of 6 actions on separate 3-point Likert scales, with 1 being "not at all" and 3 being "very much" for both scales.

Qualitative measure of intended aggression. A qualitative measure of intended aggression was derived using participants' qualitative answers to the open-ended question, "What would you do right now?" and a qualitative measure of prolonged intended aggression was derived using answers to the open-ended question, "If given the opportunity to see Chris again today, what would you do?".

Depression. The first list of the Depression Adjective Check Lists (DACL) was used to measure participants' state of depression (Lubin, 1965). The DACL has repeatedly performed as a successful measure of depression among non-clinical respondents, and it is designed to measure depression as a state, rather than as a trait (Shaver & Brennan, 1991). Participants were asked to use a check mark to indicate whether each adjective in the list "applies to me" or "does not apply to me" when they think about the scenario. The list contains 22 depressive items and 12 non-depressive items. The total score was derived by adding the number of depressive items checked, plus the number of normal (or non-depressive) items *not* checked. The higher the score, the higher level of depression.

Rumination. Items assessing rumination were slightly adapted from the Dissipation-Rumination Scale (Caprara, 1986). The scale contains 18 items, 13 of which assess rumination and 5 of which are filler items. On a 6-point scale ranging from "completely true for me" to "completely false for me," participants were asked to indicate the extent to which each item is true for them when they recall the scenario from the previous week. A composite rumination score was derived by responses to the 13 rumination items.

Demographic measures. Demographic variables were collected, including age, sex, ethnicity, highest level of education, nationality, and whether English is a first or second language.

Identity characteristics. The principal researcher and one independent rater coded the identity characteristic each participant wrote down as most central to his/her identity. The raters placed each identity characteristic in one of 15 different categories, such as "physical feature", "overweight", "nationality", and "religion". The inter-rater reliability for these coded items was .95. Please see Appendix B for the coding protocol describing how the identity characteristics were coded.

Data Analysis

Analyses were begun by computing composite variables using each of the single items in the various sub-scales of interest, as outlined above. Next, reliability analyses were conducted using Cronbach's alpha to test the extent to which all the items in each sub-scale were testing the same construct. Once composite variables were computed and a satisfactory level of reliability for each sub-scale was established, descriptives, frequencies, and Pearson correlations between all

variables in the study were collected to determine an overall framework of relationships. Next, analyses were conducted to test each of the four hypotheses as outlined in Chapter 1.

First, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test whether attribution differed significantly by condition (Hypothesis 1). Next, means and standard deviations of attribution were analyzed by condition, to determine whether the means were in the predicted direction. A standardized continuous composite measure of attribution was used.

Second, to test whether there were significant differences in shame, depression, anger and aggression between those who made internal versus external causal attributions (Hypothesis 2), a multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted using the four dependent variables and one dichotomous item that tested attribution.

In order to test for mediation effects (Hypothesis 3), the widely accepted Baron and Kenny (1986) method was used. First, Pearson correlations were collected to ensure that the dependent variables were correlated with the independent variable. Once correlations were established, three regression analyses were used to determine whether *attribution* mediated the relationships between *identity characteristic humiliated* and the four *dependent variables* (e.g., *shame, depression, anger* and *aggression*). First, the proposed mediator (the continuous composite variable for attribution) was regressed on the independent variable (type of identity characteristic humiliated). Second, each dependent variable was regressed on the independent variable separately. Third, each dependent variable

was regressed on both the independent variable and the proposed mediator (*attribution*).

Finally, analyses were conducted to test for significant differences in prolonged shame, depression, anger and aggression between those who were immediately angry and ruminated versus those who were immediately depressed and ruminated after reading the humiliating scenario (Hypothesis 4). First, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether rumination differed by condition. It was not hypothesized to differ by condition, and this was conducted to ensure that conditional differences would not be responsible for any differences found if only high ruminators were used. No significant effects were found for rumination between the conditions.

Next, since Hypothesis 4 seeks to test differences only among those who ruminate, a cut-off was established to distinguish between ruminators and non-ruminators. Using the frequencies collected for rumination (Mean = 2.94, Median = 3.00, Mode = 2.75) and the Likert scale of the rumination items (scale from 1-6, with 1 being no rumination and 6 being very high rumination), a filter was created so that only participants scoring 3 or above (i.e., at or above the mean, median and mode, and above the mean on the Likert scale items) were included in the following analyses.

Hypothesis 4 compares those who are immediately angry and ruminate versus those who are immediately depressed and ruminate. Thus, based on frequencies for anger and depression, only participants scoring above the mean for anger (3.733) and for depression (.62) were included in analyses. One-way

analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to determine whether significant differences between the groups existed. Frequencies for each dependent variable were also collected to determine whether any differences were in the predicted direction.

Additional analyses were performed to test hypotheses using only a sub-set of participants. Participants who chose certain personal-level identity characteristics (physical features, being overweight, and not "fitting in") were compared to participants who chose minority collective-level identity characteristics (minority nationality, race, religion, gender and sexual orientation). This was done to determine whether narrowing the types of identity characteristics might produce different results. In order to conduct these analyses, two independent raters coded the identity characteristics and reliability analyses were conducted using Cronbach's alpha to assess the extent to which the two independent raters had coded the identity characteristics similarly.

Finally, frequencies were collected regarding demographic information for participants overall as well as by condition. A multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to determine whether any significant differences existed demographically between the conditions.

Study 2

The recruitment and procedure for Study 2 replicates that of Study 1, except for the following changes.

Participants

74 participants completed Study 2. As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. However, in Study 2, participants were asked to recall a humiliating event from their real lives involving either a collective-level identity characteristic or a personal-level identity characteristic, depending on condition.

There were no significant differences in participant age, race, education or income level. However, the ratio of women to men who completed the survey for the collective humiliation condition was significantly higher (29 women and 3 men) than in the personal humiliation condition (25 women and 13 men) ($F = 6.842$; $p < .05$). Overall, 54 participants were women (77.1%) and 16 participants were men (22.9%); 35 participants were between the ages of 18-29 (49.3%), 21 participants were between the ages of 30-44 (29.6%), and 15 participants were between 45-59 (21.1%). 52 participants were Caucasian / White (72.2%), 3 participants were African-American (4.2%), 7 participants were Asian / Asian-American (9.7%), 7 participants were Hispanic (9.7%), and 3 participants identified as Other (4.2%). 21 participants had a Bachelor's degree (29.2%), 34 participants had either a high school or Associate's degree (47.2%), and 17 participants had a Master's, professional or doctoral degree (23.7%). 28 participants had an income between $50,000-$99,000 (38.9%), 20 participants had an income between $25,000-$49,000 (27.8%), 17 participants had an income less than $25,000 (23.6%), and 7 participants had an income $100,000 or higher (9.8%). (For additional demographic information, please see Table 9.)

Procedure

Participants were asked to recall as many humiliating experiences from their real lives as possible, choose the one that was most humiliating, and describe it in detail. They were asked to either write about an experience that involved a group characteristic or an individual characteristic, depending on the condition. (For an overview of the types of identity characteristics participants were humiliated about and chose to write about, please see Table 11.) The instructions (following Averill, 1982 and Flett, et. al., 1991) read as follows (with instructions for the *individual* condition in brackets):

> Please take a moment to think back over your life, from many years ago until today, and recall times when you felt humiliated. In other words, recall times when you were made to feel inferior, degraded, or put down.
>
> Specifically, think of times when you were humiliated about a group characteristic—that is, a characteristic that represents your membership in a group. For example, you may have felt humiliated regarding your religion, ethnicity, race, nationality, gender, professional group membership, etc.
>
> Please do **not** think of times you were humiliated about an individual characteristic, such as being incompetent, nerdy, unattractive, unathletic, too skinny, overweight, etc. (unless you were humiliated because one of these characteristics represented your group membership; if this is the case, please specify how they are connected).
>
> [*Individual condition:* Specifically, think of times when you were humiliated about an individual characteristic—that is, a characteristic that had to do specifically with you. For example, you may have felt humiliated about being incompetent, nerdy, unattractive, unathletic, too skinny, overweight, or vulnerable in some other way. Please do **not** think of times you were humiliated about a group characteristic such as your religion, ethnicity, nationality, gender, professional memberships, etc.]
>
> Write down 1 or 2 words about each situation in the space below.

> This is just to jog your memory, so there is no need to write more than a few words about each situation.
>
> Please take as much time as you need.
>
> When you feel you are done, click "submit" and go on to the next page.
>
> *On the next page:*
>
> Of the experiences you wrote about on the previous page, please write in detail about the one that is the most humiliating below. Include details such as:
>
> - what led up to the situation;
> - what you were humiliated about or for;
> - when it took place;
> - where it took place;
> - who was involved;
> - what you felt, thought and did;
> - what other people did; and
> - why this is your worst humiliating experience.
>
> The experience could be one that happened many years ago, a few weeks ago, today, or anytime in between. Don't worry about spelling or making it a formal essay, just write down what comes to you.

Participants then answered items assessing attributions, and emotional and intended behavioral reactions, and rumination. (For access to all survey items in Study 2, please see Appendix A).

Measures

Measures closely replicated those in Study 1. Item wording was slightly modified to fit the nature of Study 2. Items assessed participants' delayed reactions (i.e., how they feel or what they think at the present moment when they recall the situation), except for items regarding behavioral reactions, which asked participants to report what they did when the situation occurred.

Data Analysis

Analyses for Study 2 followed those described in Study 1 except for those testing Hypothesis 4, which were not included in Study 2 because data on immediate reactions, necessary to conduct this analysis, were not available in Study 2.

Chapter 4

RESULTS

Study 1

Tests for Reliability

The majority of the subscales were found to be reliable. Please see Table 2. [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE.]

Tests of the Hypotheses

Summary of results.

Results partially confirmed the hypotheses. Hypotheses 1a and 1b were both supported. Those who experienced humiliation regarding a *collective-level* characteristic were significantly more likely to make *external* causal attributions for the humiliation, while individuals who experienced humiliation regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic were significantly more likely to make *internal* causal attributions. Hypothesis 2b was fully supported. Those who made *internal* causal attributions for the event were significantly more likely to feel *ashamed* and *depressed* than those who made *external* causal attributions. Hypothesis 2a was partially supported. When taking into account only the responses of participants who chose certain identity characteristics in each condition, those who made *external* causal attributions for the event were significantly more likely to feel *angry* and to *intend to aggress* than those who made *internal* causal attributions.

With regard to mediation (Hypothesis 3), the conditions of mediation were met with regard to one dependent variable (*shame*). In other words, the relationship between the type of identity characteristic humiliated *(collective vs. personal)* and

the resulting immediate feeling of *shame* was mediated by the type of *causal attribution*.

Hypothesis 4b was fully supported, while Hypothesis 4a was not. While all participants felt a fair amount of prolonged anger and prolonged intentions to aggress, only those humiliated regarding an individual-level identity characteristic continued to feel significantly higher levels of depression and shame one week later.

Following is a summary of statistical results supporting the findings summarized above, listed by hypothesis.

> *Hypothesis 1: The effect of type of identity characteristic humiliated on causal attributions.*
>
> **Hypothesis 1a)** Individuals who are humiliated regarding a *collective-level* identity characteristic will be more likely to make *external* causal attributions for the humiliation than individuals who are humiliated regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic.
>
> **Hypothesis 1b)** In contrast, individuals who are humiliated regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic will be more likely to make *internal* causal attributions for the humiliation than individuals who are humiliated regarding a *collective-level* identity characteristic.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b were both supported. Those who experienced humiliation regarding a *collective-level* characteristic were significantly more likely to make *external* causal attributions for the humiliation ($M = 1.60$, $SD = .66$), while individuals who experienced humiliation regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic were significantly more likely to make *internal* causal attributions ($M = 2.18$, $SD = .79$), as evidenced by a significant effect using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the two groups ($F = 25.93$, $p < .001$).

For example, in response to an open-ended question asking participants who or what was the cause of the humiliating event in the scenario they read, two participants in the individual identity characteristic condition wrote about themselves being the cause of the humiliating episode:

> "My lack of social finesse and charisma."
>
> "Probably myself having difficulty finding common topics to talk about with others at the party."

In contrast, participants in the collective identity characteristic condition tended to think that Chris and other external circumstances were the cause of the humiliating event. For example, in response to an open-ended question asking who or what was the cause of the event in the scenario, the following two participants wrote:

> "Chris and his prejudices. He either has something against Jews or just likes to make people feel bad about themselves out of low self-esteem."
>
> "Societal oppression, the dominant worldview about queer people, as well as internal psychological issues going on for Chris."
>
> *Hypotheses 2a and 2b: The effect of type of causal attribution on anger, intentions to aggress, shame and depression.*
>
> **Hypothesis 2a)** Individuals who make *external* causal attributions for a humiliating event will be more likely to *feel angry* and *intend to aggress* than individuals who make *internal* causal attributions for the event.
>
> **Hypothesis 2b)** In contrast, individuals who make *internal* causal attributions for the event will be more likely to *feel ashamed* and *depressed* than individuals who make *external* causal attributions for the event.

In full support of hypothesis 2b, those who made *internal* causal attributions for the event were significantly more likely to feel *depressed* (M = .67, SD = .16)

than those who made *external* causal attributions (M = .58, SD = .18), (F = 4.68, p < .05). They were also somewhat more likely to feel *prolonged depression* (M = .52, SD = .20) than those who made *external* causal attributions (M = .43, SD = .19), as shown by an effect bordering on significance (F = 2.80, p. = .10).

In addition, those who made *internal* causal attributions were significantly more likely to feel *ashamed* (M = 3.50, SD = 1.03) as compared to those who made *external* causal attributions (M = 2.15, SD = 1.11), as shown by a significant effect using a multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) comparing the two groups (F = 27.33, p < .001).

In Hypothesis 2a, participants did not significantly differ regarding anger and intentions to aggress. Participants in both groups (*internal* and *external* causal attribution) were fairly angry and fairly likely to intend to aggress. On a Likert scale from 1 to 5, those who blamed themselves for the humiliating event were just as angry (M = 3.46, SD = 1.05) as those who blamed other people or circumstances for the humiliating event (M = 3.48, SD = .93). In addition, on a Likert scale from 1 to 3, those who blamed themselves (M = 1.93, SD = .46) were just as likely to intend to aggress as those who blamed external people or circumstances (M = 1.84, SD = .46).

However, significant differences between those who made *internal* versus *external* causal attributions for a humiliating event were found for *intended aggression* when participants who chose only certain types of identity characteristics were included in analyses. When only participants who chose certain personal-level identity characteristics (physical features, being overweight,

and not "fitting in") and participants who chose minority collective-level identity characteristics (minority nationality, race, religion, and sexual orientation) were included in analyses, a significant difference in *intentions to aggress* was found to exist, as evidenced by a multiple analysis of variance between the two groups (F = 4.65; $p < .05$). Those who made *external attributions* for the event were significantly more likely to *intend to aggress* (M = 1.69, SD = .48) than those who made *internal attributions* (M = 1.37, SD = .48). This suggests that if participants had been asked to choose more specifically only these types of characteristics in each condition, perhaps more significant differences between intentions to aggress may have been found.

Hypothesis 3: The role of causal attribution as a mediator.

> **Hypothesis 3)** Type of *causal attribution mediates* the relationship between type of identity characteristic humiliated and resulting affective and behavioral responses.

In order to determine whether type of *causal attribution* mediated the relationship between type of *identity characteristic humiliated (collective vs. personal)* and the affective and behavioral responses *(anger, intentions to aggress, shame,* and *depression),* a test for mediation was performed following the widely accepted Baron and Kenny method (1986), as described in Chapter 2. Three regressions were conducted to test whether Baron and Kenny's (1986) four conditions for mediation were met. The four conditions are: 1) the independent variable must affect the mediator; 2) the independent variable must affect the dependent variable; 3) the mediator must affect the dependent variable; and 4) the

effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must be less when it is measured along with the mediator than when it is measured alone.

All the required conditions were met with regard to one dependent variable (shame). In the first equation, as expected, there was a significant effect of the independent variable on the mediator ($F = 25.93$, $p < .001$, Standardized Beta = .372). In the second equation, the independent variable had a significant effect on one dependent variable *(shame)* ($F = 38.48$, $p < .001$, Standardized Beta = .439). In the third equation, the mediator had a significant effect on the dependent variable *(shame)* ($F = 38.03$, $p < .001$, Standardized Beta = .400). In addition, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable *(shame)* was less in the third equation (Standardized Beta = .287) than in the second equation, suggesting a mediation effect. Thus, the relationship between the type of identity characteristic humiliated (collective vs. personal) and the resulting immediate feeling of shame is mediated by the type of causal attribution.

Hypothesis 4: Prolonged anger, intentions to aggress, shame and depression.

> **Hypothesis 4a)** Individuals who *feel angry* about a humiliating experience and ruminate will experience more *prolonged anger* and *intentions to aggress* than individuals who *feel depressed* about a humiliating experience and ruminate.
>
> **Hypothesis 4b)** In contrast, individuals who *feel depressed* about a humiliating experience and ruminate will feel more *prolonged shame* and *depression* than individuals who *feel angry* about a humiliating experience and ruminate.

In full support of hypothesis 4b, those who felt *depressed* and ruminated felt significantly more *prolonged depression* (M = .52, SD = .16) than those who felt

angry and ruminated (M = .40, SD = .14), as confirmed by a one-way analysis of variance ($F = 4.52$, $p < .05$). In addition, as predicted, those who felt *depressed* and ruminated felt significantly more *prolonged shame* (M = 2.15, SD = .79) than those who felt *angry* and ruminated (M = 1.46, SD = .75), as confirmed by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the two groups ($F = 5.22$, $p < .05$).

Regarding hypothesis 4a, those who felt *angry* and ruminated did not experience significantly more *prolonged anger* and *prolonged intentions to aggress* than individuals who felt *depressed* and ruminated. Participants in both groups experienced a fair amount of *prolonged anger* and *prolonged intentions to aggress.* On a Likert scale from 1 to 5, those who those who felt depressed and ruminated experienced nearly as much prolonged anger (M = 2.55, SD = .72) as those who felt angry and ruminated (M = 2.85, SD = .91). In addition, on a Likert scale from 1 to 3, those who felt depressed and ruminated were as likely to intend to aggress (M = 1.43, SD = .36) as those who felt angry and ruminated (M = 1.40, SD = .50).

Study 2

Tests for Reliability

The majority of the subscales were found to be reliable. Please see Table 3.

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE.]

Tests of the Hypotheses

Summary of results.

Results partially confirmed the hypotheses and are quite similar to the results found in Study 1. Hypotheses 1a and 1b were both supported. Those who were humiliated regarding a *collective-level* characteristic were significantly more

likely to make *external* causal attributions for the humiliation, while individuals who were humiliated regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic were significantly more likely to make *internal* causal attributions. Hypothesis 2b was partially supported. Those who made *internal* causal attributions for the event were more likely to feel *ashamed* than those who made *external* causal attributions, but they were not more likely to feel *depressed*. In Hypothesis 2a, participants did not significantly differ regarding anger and intentions to aggress. However, there was a negative correlation between *shame* and *intentions to aggress*; in other words, the more ashamed a participant felt, the less likely he or she was to have aggressed. This suggests that the presence of shame may have served to somehow hamper aggression, and/or vice versa.

Regarding the test for mediation (Hypothesis 3), mediation was found only with regard to the same dependent variable as in Study 1 *(shame).* The relationship between the type of identity characteristic humiliated (*collective vs. personal*) and the resulting feeling of *shame* was mediated by the type of *causal attribution*.

Following is a summary of statistical results supporting the findings summarized above, arranged by hypothesis.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Internal vs. external causal attribution.

> **1a)** Individuals who experience humiliation regarding a *collective-level* identity characteristic will be more likely to make *external* causal attributions for the humiliation than individuals who experience humiliation regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic.
>
> **1b)** In contrast, individuals who experience humiliation regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic will be more likely to make *internal* causal attributions for the humiliation than individuals who

> experience humiliation regarding a *collective-level* identity characteristic.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b are both supported. Those who were humiliated regarding a *collective-level* characteristic were significantly more likely to make *external* causal attributions (M = 1.93, SD = .90) for the humiliation, while individuals who were humiliated regarding a *personal-level* identity characteristic were significantly more likely to make *internal* causal attributions (M = 2.74, SD = 1.19), as evidenced by a significant effect using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the two groups (F = 10.27, p = .002).

For example, in response to an open-ended question asking participants who or what was the cause of the humiliating event they described, two participants in the individual identity characteristic condition wrote about how they saw themselves as the cause of the humiliation they experienced:

> "The event was my fault for trusting his love enough to share this deep secret with him. I should have never told anyone."

> "As I described, I wasn't taking care of myself…like…wearing clothes without washing them, showing every 3-4 days…I was depressed and unhappy. It was all I could do to even get out of bed. I usually didn't do that on time. So two girls that I worked with complained to our direct manager that I smelled bad. I believe they implied that the smell was from between my legs. Ugh. Horrible."

In contrast, participants in the collective identity characteristic condition tended to write about their humiliators being the cause of the humiliating event. For example, the following two participants wrote:

> "I think the two who did it are the causes. That and their disrespect for women. I also realized that I shouldn't have teased, but that excuses nothing."

> "I'm certain that the person who made the comments was not very knowledgeable about the field. The person did not have much social tact…"

Hypotheses 2a and 2b: The effect of type of causal attribution on anger, intentions to aggress, shame and depression.

2a) Individuals who make *external* causal attributions for a humiliating event will be more likely to *feel angry* and *intend to aggress* than individuals who make *internal* causal attributions for the event.

2b) In contrast, individuals who make *internal* causal attributions for the event will be more likely to *feel ashamed* and *depressed* than individuals who make *external* causal attributions for the event.

In hypothesis 2b, those who made *internal* causal attributions for the event were somewhat more likely to feel *ashamed* (M = 2.77, SD = 1.30) than those who made *external* causal attributions (M = 2.16, SD = 1.19), but they were not more likely to feel *depressed*. The effect for *shame* using a multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) (F = 3.45, p = .07) borders on significance.

In Hypothesis 2a, participants did not significantly differ regarding anger and intentions to aggress. Participants in both groups (*internal* and *external* causal attribution) were fairly angry. On a Likert scale from 1 to 5, those who blamed themselves for the humiliating event were just as angry (M = 3.01, SD = 1.23) as those who blamed other people or circumstances for the humiliating event (M = 3.06, SD = 1.12). However, participants in both groups reported very little aggressive behavior. On a Likert scale from 1 to 3, those who blamed themselves (M = 1.19, SD = .48) were as unlikely to report aggressive behavior as those who blamed external people or circumstances (M = 1.24, SD = .48).[3]

[3] This is in line with Averill's (1982, 1983) finding that most respondents do not report acting aggressively on self-report measures.

However, it should be noted that a negative correlation between *shame* and *aggression* borders on significance (r = -.234, p = .08). In other words, the more ashamed a participant felt, the less likely he or she was to have aggressed. This suggests an interesting relationship between shame and aggression, such that the presence of shame may serve to somehow hamper aggression, and/or vice versa.

Hypothesis 3: The role of causal attribution as a mediator.

> **3)** Type of *causal attribution mediates* the relationship between type of identity characteristic humiliated and resulting affective and behavioral responses.

Using the same procedure as in Study 1, a test for mediation was performed following Baron and Kenny (1986). All the required conditions were again met only with regard to the same dependent variable as in Study 1 *(shame).* The relationship between the type of identity characteristic humiliated (collective vs. personal) and the resulting feeling of shame is mediated by the type of causal attribution.

In the first equation, as expected, there was a significant effect of the independent variable on the mediator (F = 10.27, p = .002, Standardized Beta = .36). In the second equation, the independent variable had a significant effect on one dependent variable *(shame)* (F = 11.11, p = .001, Standardized Beta = .37). In the third equation, the mediator had a significant effect on the dependent variable (F = 10.70, p = .000, Standardized Beta = .37). In addition, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable was less in the third equation (Standardized Beta = .21) than in the second equation, suggesting a mediation effect.

Chapter 5

DISCUSSION

While extant theory and research suggest that humiliation plays a central part in prolonging cycles of aggression and violence, there are still many gaps in the literature. For example, little research has addressed whether different types of humiliating events might provoke different types of responses, such that some responses might characterize helplessness while others might be characterized by prolonged anger and aggression and thus fuel long-term conflict. Against the backdrop of the raging war on terror, which can be considered an example of a protracted identity-based conflict (i.e., the "West" versus the "Arab world"), the present research sought to examine reactions to humiliation involving collective-level identity characteristics, as compared to personal-level ones. This research was based on the premise that there would be a difference in the way humiliating events were experienced and responded to, and it set out to test a series of hypotheses about how this process might work. This chapter offers an overview of some of the specific findings of this research as well as suggested directions for future research and some limitations of this work.

The results of Studies 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that individuals who are humiliated regarding a collective-level identity characteristic are more likely to blame the humiliator or external circumstances for the humiliating experience, while individuals who are humiliated regarding an individual-level identity characteristic are more likely to blame themselves. This supports and extends research on relative deprivation, which suggests that when people feel relatively

deprived regarding collective-level attributes they are more likely to make external attributions for their situation, while when people feel relatively deprived regarding personal-level attributes they are more likely to make internal attributions for the situation (Applegryn & Nieuwoudt, 2001; Smith & Ortiz, 2002).

Both of the present studies also support the notion that people who blame themselves for a humiliating experience are more likely to feel an immediate sense of shame, and Study 1 suggests that people who blame themselves are also more likely to feel both an immediate and a prolonged sense of depression in the aftermath of the event. These findings support and extend attribution theory and research which suggests that internal attributions for negative events are more likely than external attributions to lead to depression (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1985; Flett, et. al., 1991; Neumann, 2000; Carmony & DiGiuseppe, 2003).

There are a number of additional ways that the present research contributes to and extends existing theory and research. First, these studies indicate that humiliating experiences regarding both collective- and personal-level identity characteristics lead people to feel an immediate and a prolonged sense of anger towards the humiliator. This finding supports the existing theoretical notion that anger may be a primary element of what it means to feel humiliated (Lewis, 1971; Negrao, et. al., 2004). Perhaps humiliating experiences, in general, involve feelings of anger towards an external source. So while I did not hypothesize a priori that both groups would feel equal and large amounts of anger, this finding can be useful in moving towards a more robust and research-driven definition of humiliation.

Second, the findings from both studies suggest that when people are humiliated regarding an individual-level identity characteristic, they experience a wide range of emotions. Their reactions are both inwardly and outwardly focused. These participants felt immediate and prolonged anger and, in Study 1, intended to aggress against the humiliator, but they also blamed themselves for the event and felt both immediate and prolonged shame and depression. Their narratives underline these senses of both anger and shame. For example, one participant in Study 2 wrote:

> "I was going to surprise my friend and jump out on her. I was waiting outside the door of the wing she was going to come out of (in high school). Then another girl who saw me screamed out, 'What are you doing fatty?' It was horrible because everyone stopped talking and looked at me. I was only 135 at the time. It made me feel so worthless and horrible because I hadn't even MET the girl before or ever spoken to her. Yet she was personally attacking me."

This participant expresses feeling worthless, but the last sentence also signifies a sense of anger at the humiliator for making a remark that was out of line. These results, which suggest that personal-level humiliations involve a wide range of emotions including anger and shame, support Negrao, et. al.'s (2004) theory that humiliation consists of both anger (an externally-focused emotion) and shame (and internally-focused emotion). This is notable because this theory is rooted in clinical psychology, a tradition that is arguably more likely to reflect the experiences of individuals dealing with individual-level identity issues (as opposed to collective-level identity issues).

In contrast, people's reactions to being humiliated regarding a collective-level identity characteristic span a narrower range of emotions. Their reactions are

primarily externally focused. They blame the humiliator and/or other people and circumstances for causing the humiliating event, they feel immediate and prolonged anger and, in Study 1, intend to aggress against the humiliator. From their narratives, a sense of indignant self-righteousness and empowerment is apparent. For example, one participant wrote:

> "One experience took place one night when I invited a male 'friend' whom I'd recently met out with me, a few friends and my lesbian girlfriend. This took place about 8 months ago at a rowdy bar in the East Village. We were all having a fun time, laughing and joking around, when I turned my back and apparently this guy had slapped my girlfriend's butt in a demeaning way. I saw this is a humiliation because he didn't have any respect for me as a friend, my girlfriend as a human being, or my relationship with her. I didn't see it happen so I didn't know until she told me about it, at which point I went up to him and said not to ever do that to any woman, especially not my girlfriend. Told him how inappropriate it was. The night kind of ended soon after that and I never spoke to him again or returned his calls."

Similarly, another participant wrote:

> "Recently when the Virginia Tech Massacre happened as a Pacific Islander I would get stares from all kinds of other people which never happened previous to the incident…I was just ordering some food from a vending machine and saw this black girl staring right at me with a fierce look and walked away with a pompous attitude…I think that people like that are ignorant and they deserve the stereotype putdowns in their life as much as they give it out."

These research findings point to an important distinction between the experiences of humiliation regarding collective-level versus personal-level identity characteristics: those who are humiliated at the collective level are more purely externally focused, while those who are humiliated at the personal level are both externally and internally focused. While both groups may be quite angry at the humiliator and may even intend to aggress against him or her, there are fewer

mitigating factors involved for those who were humiliated at the collective level of identity. They are unabashedly angry, and indignant about it. In stark contrast however, those humiliated at the personal level are angry, but this is mitigated by a palpable sense of personal shame and depression over seeing oneself as having done something wrong, or as having deservedly brought the humiliating experience upon oneself.

Despite finding limited significant differences between experimental groups with regard to intentions to aggress, the data do show that the more ashamed one feels, the less likely one is to intend to aggress. In this way, shame and aggression can be seen as having dampening or inhibiting effects on one another. A useful next study could seek to determine the causal direction of the relationship between shame and aggression. For example, do feelings of shame decrease aggressive impulses, or does aggressive release decrease feelings of shame?

Limitations

There were a number of limitations in the present studies. The samples for both studies were based on convenience and were comprised of participants who were primarily White and female; thus, the samples are not necessarily generalizable to all Americans, or even to all Americans who use the internet. The participants were recruited through the volunteers section of www.craigslist.com and participated in exchange for the chance to win a cash prize. This recruitment method, while successful in recruiting a large number of participants in a short amount of time, may produce biased results because the method may attract certain

types of participants but not others (i.e., those in need of money and/or those who are likely to volunteer their time).

Using a survey in both studies provided a high level of confidentiality and therefore may have elicited more honest answers than an interview study might have. However, using the survey prevented the researcher from probing more deeply, which may have been particularly useful in eliciting deeper information, especially in Study 2, where participants wrote about experiences from their real lives. In addition, in Study 1, a scenario was used to describe a humiliating situation. This scenario had particular idiosyncrasies (such as a humiliator named Chris, to whom participants may have ascribed particular gender and racial identity characteristics). These idiosyncrasies may have impacted participants' reactions to the scenario. In future studies, multiple scenarios should be used as a way of helping to "wash out" the effects that specific scenario details might have on participants' responses.

In both studies, there was minimal variance in participants' anger and intended aggression across conditions, and accordingly, the significance of the differences between the experimental conditions on these variables was minimal. For example, in Study 1, participants in both conditions were fairly likely to respond with anger and intended aggression (means of approximately 4 on a scale of 1-5 for anger in both conditions, and means of approximately 2 on a scale of 1-3 for intended aggression in both conditions). In Study 2, participants in both conditions were less likely to respond angrily, and reported very little intended aggression (means of approximately 3 on a scale of 1-5 for anger in both conditions,

and means just above 1 on a scale of 1-3 for intended aggression in both conditions).

These results are in contrast to previous studies on humiliation conducted by Goldman and Coleman (2004), Coleman, Goldman and Kugler (2006), and Coleman, Kugler and Goldman (2007) which found greater variance in participants' anger and intended aggression, as well as significant differences between experimental groups on both of these variables. Two methodological differences between these prior studies and the present studies could explain this contrast in findings. First, the prior studies used only male participants, who have been found to show greater variance in anger and aggression in experimental situations than female participants (see Averill, 1986; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Cohen, et. al., 1996). In contrast, the majority of participants in both present studies were women. In Study 1, 86.5% of participants were women; in Study 2, 77.1% of participants were women. The fact that the majority of the participants in both of the present studies were female could explain, at least partially, the smaller amount of variance in anger and intended aggression found in the present studies than in the previous studies.

Second, while significant differences in intentions to aggress were not found between the groups in the present studies, this may be more of a reflection of low variance in scores on the items testing intentions to aggress rather than a true difference between the groups in participants' actual intentions to aggress. The prior studies used a larger Likert scale range to test intended aggression (i.e., a 7-point scale) while the present studies used quite a small Likert scale range (i.e., a 3-

point scale) following Averill (1986). In order to maximize variance in participants' responses regarding intentions to aggress in future research, a larger scale range should be used.

Finally, the present research takes a dynamic, complex social phenomenon (i.e., the experience of humiliation in a social setting) and reduces it to a series of simple, linear relationships for the purpose of testing those relationships experimentally, using quantitative research methods. These simple relationships cannot possibly thoroughly describe humiliating experiences. Rather, the present research is conceived as part of a broader research program (see Goldman & Coleman, 2004; Coleman, Goldman & Kugler, 2006; and Coleman, Kugler & Goldman, 2007) that seeks to make links between discrete variables in an effort to determine specific social psychological processes underlying such dynamic phenomena as humiliating experiences. By examining specific, linear relationships involved in humiliating experiences, this research seeks to identify particular "parameters" that can be used in future research, such as within a dynamical systems approach to understanding protracted conflict.

Directions for Future Research

The results of these studies raise a number of new questions about individuals' responses to humiliating circumstances. First, while the present research examines the ways in which conflict may be prolonged as a result of angry and aggressive responses to humiliation, future studies should explore the plethora of possible constructive responses to humiliation that tend to curtail long-term conflicts. For example, such studies should examine the social and psychological

factors that lead individuals to use constructive strategies to overcome feelings of humiliation (including religious background, personal belief systems and prior experience) as well as the strategies they use (or could use) to overcome feelings of humiliation (including humor, forgiveness, and using inner wisdom and emotional and mental discipline). Such research should address both the role the humiliated target plays (or could play) in overcoming the humiliation, as well as the role of others, such as the perpetrator and third parties. This research should also examine the impact such alternative response strategies have on whether conflict becomes prolonged or not.

Second, the present studies' findings raise the question of whether it is possible to experience the emotion of humiliation without experiencing a feeling of helplessness. Prior theory suggests that humiliation necessarily involves a feeling of helplessness (Lindner, 2002, 2006); however, the present studies suggest that different types of humiliating events may provoke different types of internal emotional experiences and that not all of them necessarily include feeling helpless and ashamed. Future research should explore whether helplessness is a central component of what it means to be humiliated. Some questions to ask include: If helplessness is a feature of humiliation, are there certain points at which one feels helpless but then may "get over it"? If so, what might precipitate those points?

Third, the present research tested whether there are differences in reactions to humiliations involving personal- versus collective-level identity characteristics. This dichotomy between collective and personal characteristics may overlap with differences between ascribed identity characteristics (i.e., those that an individual is

born with, such as race and height) versus achieved identity characteristics (i.e., those that an individual chooses or is given within the social context, such as professional affiliation). Future research should examine whether and how individuals' reactions to humiliation differ on this dimension.

Fourth, in Study 1, the level of social power between the target and the perpetrator was kept constant and as equal as possible between the conditions (i.e., the target and the perpetrator were acquaintances at a party rather than a worker and a boss), so that the targets (i.e., the study participants) would not feel inhibited or constrained from responding aggressively as a result of differential power dynamics. However, future studies should look specifically at power differences in humiliating events by varying the power differences between the target and the perpetrator by experimental condition, and measuring the types of responses targets use in reaction to otherwise similar humiliating events.

Finally, future research should use similar methodology to the present studies, but using a within-subjects design. It would be useful to see whether the same individuals would respond to humiliations involving collective- versus personal-level identity characteristics differently, and if so, in what ways they would differ. However, this type of design would need to control for testing, or repeated measures, effects.

Conclusion

The present studies' findings suggest that research on group versus personal relative deprivation (RD) and attribution theory may extend to the realm of humiliation. Research on relative deprivation and attribution suggests that because

people tend to respond to group-level relative deprivation by blaming the other, their emotional and behavioral reactions are more externally focused, while people tend to respond to personal-level RD by blaming themselves, thereby experiencing more internally focused reactions (Averill, 1983; Weiner, 1985; Flett, et. al., 1991; Neumann, 2000; Carmony & DiGiuseppe, 2003; Applegryn & Nieuwoudt, 2001; Walker, et. al., 2002). While the hypotheses in this research were not fully confirmed, the results of these studies can help us understand why and how humiliation at the collective level of identity may produce more externally focused negative outcomes than humiliation at the personal level of identity.

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Appendix A: Survey Weblinks

Study 1:

Individual Condition:

http://devcw.tc.columbia.edu/surveys/jsgd1/index.cfm

Collective Condition:

http://devcw.tc.columbia.edu/surveys/jsgd2/index.cfm

Follow-up:

http://devcw.tc.columbia.edu/surveys/jsgd3/index.cfm

Study 2:

Individual Condition:

http://devcw.tc.columbia.edu/surveys/jsgd4/index.cfm

Collective Condition:

http://devcw.tc.columbia.edu/surveys/jsgd5/index.cfm

Appendix B: Coding Protocol for Types of Identity Characteristics

Study 1

Instructions for coder:

1. Read each participant's response to the open-ended question: **"Of the characteristics you listed, please write below the one that is the most important to you"**
    a. Mark a "1" next to any response that pertains to a physical feature (such as height, baldness, hair color, etc.)
    b. Mark a "2" next to any response that mentions being overweight or fat.
    c. Mark a "3" next to any response that implies not "fitting in" or not belonging (for example, being "socially awkward" or "not friendly" or "sensitive" or "shy" or "unathletic"
    d. Mark a "4" next to any response that implies being "too smart" or "intellectual"
    e. Mark a "5" next to any response that is a positive trait (such as "compassionate" or "generous")
    f. Mark a "6" next to any response that describes a nationality (such as Japanese, Polish, American, Spanish, etc.)
    g. Mark a "7" next to any response that describes a race or ethnicity (such as White, Black, etc.)
    h. Mark an "8" next to any response that describes a religion (such as Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Pentecostal, etc.)
    i. Mark a "9" next to any response that describes gender (male or female)
    j. Mark a "10" next to any response that describes a profession (including "student")
    k. Mark a "11" next to any response that describes sexual orientation
    l. Mark a "12" next to age
    m. Mark a "13" next to any response that describes someone's place of origin (i.e., where they are from, but that is not a nationality)
    n. Mark a "14" next to any response describing political affiliation (such as Republican or Democrat or Liberal or Conservative)
    o. Mark a "15" next to any response that describes a hobby
    p. In addition to the above, also mark an "M" next to any response that describes being part of a "minority group" in the categories of nationality, race, religion, gender, and sexual orientation (such as being Black, Jewish, Muslim, Asian, Indian, Polish, gay, lesbian, or female).

Study 2

Instructions for coder:

2. Read each participant's response to the open-ended question: **"Of the experiences you wrote about, please write about the one that is most humiliating below"**
    a. Mark a "1" next to any response that pertains to a physical feature (such as height, baldness, hair color, etc.)
    b. Mark a "2" next to any response that mentions being overweight or fat.
    c. Mark a "3" next to any response that describes being incompetent, or being seen as incompetent
    d. Mark a "4" next to any response that describes being rejected by someone else
    e. Mark a "5" next to any response that describes embarrassing oneself
    f. Mark a "6" next to any response that describes feeling unfairly blamed by someone else
    g. Mark a "7" next to any response that implies not "fitting in" or not belonging (for example, being "socially awkward" or "not friendly" or "sensitive" or "shy" or "unathletic"
    h. Mark a "8" next to any response that describes a nationality (such as Japanese, Polish, American, Spanish, etc.)
    i. Mark a "9" next to any response that describes a race or ethnicity (such as White, Black, etc.)
    j. Mark an "10" next to any response that describes a religion (such as Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Pentecostal, etc.)
    k. Mark a "11" next to any response that describes gender (male or female)
    l. Mark a "12" next to any response that describes sexual orientation
    m. Mark a "13" next to any response that describes a profession (including "student")
    n. Mark a "14" next to age
    o. In addition to the above, also mark an "M" next to any response that describes being part of a "minority group" in the categories of nationality, race, religion, gender, and sexual orientation (such as being Black, Jewish, Muslim, Asian, Indian, Polish, gay, lesbian, or female).

Table 1

Reliabilities for Pilot Study Measures

Sub-scales	**N of items**	**N of participants**	**Reliability (Alpha)**
Affect			
Positive affect	10	49	.778
Negative Affect	10	50	.831
Humiliation			
- humiliation	6	52	.827
- inferiority	4	51	.920
- sadness	3	51	.866
- rage	3	51	.871
- happiness (reverse coded)	3	51	.885
Cognition			
Formative, guiding force	2	52	.796
Socially impermissible behavior becomes permissible	3	51	.845
Analyze the credibility of the humiliator	3	51	.732
Event reflects who I am as a person	3	51	.735
Motivations of the humiliator	3	52	.533
Intentions to Aggress			
Physical aggression	3	52	.958
Verbal aggression	3	51	.769
Passive aggression	2	52	.311 (not reliable)
Non-aggression	3	52	.379 (not reliable)
Uses personal discipline to counteract feelings of humiliation	3	52	.765
Rumination	7	39	.852

Figure 1. Immediate reactions to a humiliating event



Figure 2. Delayed reactions to a humiliating event



Table 2

Reliabilities for Study 1 Measures

Sub-scales	**N of items**	**N of participants**	**Reliability (Alpha)**
Attribution	3	163	.492 / standardized = .680
Affect			
Anger	6	162	.805
Shame	6	163	.926
Prolonged anger	6	121	.904
Prolonged shame	6	121	.911
Intended Aggression			
Intended aggression	6	158	.753
Prolonged intended aggression	6	119	.760
Depression			
Depression	34	165	.887
Prolonged depression	34	124	.909
Rumination	12	91	.906

Table 3

Reliabilities for Study 2 Measures

Sub-scales	**N of items**	**N of participants**	**Reliability (Alpha)**
Attribution	1	72	.695 / standardized = .748
Affect			
Anger	6	73	.890
Shame	6	74	.925
Aggression	6	58	.760
Depression	34	73	.913
Rumination	12	73	.882

Table 4

Study 1: Means and Standard Deviations For All Variables as a Function of Type of Identity Characteristic Humiliated

			Type of Humiliation				
	Scales		Individual		Collective		
Variable	Lo	Hi	M	SD	M	SD	N
Causal Attribution	1 (ext.)	3.6 (internal)	2.17	.78	1.60	.66	163
Anger	1	5	3.46	.99	3.48	.93	162
Shame	1	5	2.93	1.23	1.87	.94	163
Intentions to Aggress	1	3	1.56	.48	1.51	.41	158
Depression	0	1	.61	.19	.57	.17	165
Rumination	1	6	3.11	.89	2.81	1.08	91
Prolonged Anger	1	5	2.65	1.03	2.72	1.02	121
Prolonged Shame	1	5	2.03	.92	1.60	.67	121
Prol. Int. to Aggress	1	3	1.33	.38	1.36	.37	119
Prol. Depression	0	1	.44	.20	.44	.18	124

Table 5

Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations For All Variables as a Function of Type of Identity Characteristic Humiliated

			Type of Humiliation				
	Scales		Individual		Collective		
Variable	Lo	Hi	M	SD	M	SD	N
Causal Attribution	1 (ext.)	3.6 (int.)	2.73	1.19	1.93	.90	72
Anger	1	5	3.12	1.25	2.99	1.06	73
Shame	1	5	2.86	1.37	1.92	.99	74
Aggression	1	3	1.17	.28	1.19	.42	58
Depression	0	1	.51	.22	.42	.19	73
Rumination	1	6	3.11	1.22	2.92	.83	73

Table 6

Study 1: Correlations Between All Variables

	anger	shame	intentions to aggress	depression	attribution	prolonged anger	prolonged shame	prolonged intentions to aggress	prolonged depression	rumination
anger	1	.129	.354(**)	.168(*)	.017	.433(**)	.115	.233(*)	.149	.528(**)
shame	.129	1	.039	.582(**)	.503(**)	.176	.513(**)	.056	.241(**)	.237(*)
intentions to aggress	.354(**)	.039	1	.013	-.021	.309(**)	.121	.577(**)	.035	.566(**)
depression	.168(*)	.582(**)	.013	1	.259(**)	.249(**)	.337(**)	.196(*)	.532(**)	.250(*)
attribution	.017	.503(**)	-.021	.259(**)	1	.054	.297(**)	.050	.146	.176
prolonged anger	.433(**)	.176	.309(**)	.249(**)	.054	1	.495(**)	.428(**)	.407(**)	.480(**)
prolonged shame	.115	.513(**)	.121	.337(**)	.297(**)	.495(**)	1	.151	.475(**)	.267(*)
prolonged intentions to aggress	.233(*)	.056	.577(**)	.196(*)	.050	.428(**)	.151	1	.215(*)	.445(**)
prolonged depression	.149	.241(**)	.035	.532(**)	.146	.407(**)	.475(**)	.215(*)	1	.357(**)
rumination	.528(**)	.237(*)	.566(**)	.250(*)	.176	.480(**)	.267(*)	.445(**)	.357(**)	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 7

Study 2: Correlations Between All Variables

	anger	shame	aggression	depression	attribution	rumination
anger	1	.421(**)	.027	.435(**)	-.094	.398(**)
shame	.421(**)	1	-.234	.400(**)	.447(**)	-.039
aggression	.027	-.234	1	.004	-.075	.182
depression	.435(**)	.400(**)	.004	1	-.046	.228
attribution	-.094	.447(**)	-.075	-.046	1	-.171
rumination	.398(**)	-.039	.182	.228	-.171	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8

Study 1: Demographic Variables

Variable	Coding	Frequency	Percentage
Sex	1= Male	22	13.5%
	2= Female	141	86.5
Age	1= Under 18	1	0.6%
	2= 18-29	105	64.4
	3= 30-44	38	23.3
	4= 45-59	15	9.2
	5= 60-75	4	2.5
	6= Over 75	0	0.0
Race	1=African-American	13	7.9%
	2= Asian / Asian-American	15	9.1
	3= Caucasian / White	125	75.8
	4=Hispanic / Latino	4	2.4
	5= Other	8	4.8
Education	1= High school	31	18.8%
	2= Associate's degree (AA, AS)	17	10.3
	3= Bachelor's degree	72	43.6
	4= Master's degree	26	15.8
	5= Professional degree (MD, DDS, LLB, JD)	11	6.7
	6= Doctoral degree	8	4.8
Income	1= Less than $25,000	48	29.3%
	2= $25,000 - $49,000	56	34.1
	3= $50,000 - $99,000	47	28.7
	4= $100,000 – $175,000	10	6.1
	5= Over $175,000	3	1.8

Table 9

Study 2: Demographic Variables

Variable	Coding	Frequency	Percentage
Sex	1= Male	16	22.9%
	2= Female	54	77.1
Age	1= Under 18	0	0.0%
	2= 18-29	35	49.3
	3= 30-44	21	29.6
	4= 45-59	15	21.1
	5= 60-75	0	0.0
	6= Over 75	0	0.0
Race	1=African-American	3	4.2%
	2= Asian / Asian-American	7	9.7
	3= Caucasian / White	52	72.2
	4=Hispanic / Latino	7	9.7
	5= Other	3	4.2
Education	1= High school	19	26.4%
	2= Associate's degree (AA, AS)	15	20.8
	3= Bachelor's degree	21	29.2
	4= Master's degree	11	15.3
	5= Professional degree (MD, DDS, LLB, JD)	4	5.6
	6= Doctoral degree	2	2.8
Income	1= Less than $25,000	17	23.6%
	2= $25,000 - $49,000	20	27.8
	3= $50,000 - $99,000	28	38.9
	4= $100,000 – $175,000	3	4.2
	5= Over $175,000	4	5.6

Table 10

Study 1: Types of Characteristics Participants Chose

Identity Characteristic	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Personal characteristic condition		
Feeling like I don't fit in	35	22.3%
Being overweight	12	7.6
A physical feature	6	3.8
Being too smart / too intellectual	6	3.8
Having a positive trait	5	3.2
Collective characteristic condition		
Gender	30	19.1%
Religion	16	10.2
Profession	14	8.9
Race	12	7.6
Nationality	8	5.1
Sexual Orientation	5	3.2
Place of origin	3	1.9
Political affiliation	3	1.9
Age	1	.6
Hobby	1	.6

Table 11

Study 2: Types of Characteristics Participants Chose

Identity Characteristic	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Personal characteristic condition		
A physical feature	13	17.6%
Being overweight	8	10.8
Being incompetent / perceived as being incompetent	6	8.1
Feeling like I don't fit in	4	5.4
Being rejected	4	5.4
Embarrassing myself	3	4.1
Being unfairly blamed	2	2.7
Collective characteristic condition		
Nationality	10	13.5%
Race	8	10.8
Gender	7	9.5
Religion	5	6.8
Sexual Orientation	2	2.7
Profession	1	1.4
Age	1	1.4