

The 'Framing Power' of International Organizations, and the Cost of Humiliation

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Abstract

The analysis undertaken in this paper introduces social psychological research into the domain of global governance. The paper addresses the question: 'What is the framing power contained in the empirical reality of globalization?' I will present research on the Prisoners' Dilemma to illustrate the powerful force of 'framing.' This force is played out not only in experimental settings but also in real life. I demonstrate that the growing interdependence of the global village has increased the influence of an inherently constructive Community logic. I argue that this logic may be replaced by an inherently destructive Wallstreet logic as a result of the process of humiliation. Two sources of humiliation are identified, namely inequality and the 'loss of face' in international relations. I conclude that multilateralism and international organizations should become more aware of their power to frame relationships within the global context in terms of Community logic. If they use this power purposefully, this will then influence global and local decision-making in a way that advances a benign form of globalization built on human rights.

Introduction

This paper will address the effects of globalization on relationships between people and their leaders and present some contributions from experimental social psychology and game theory.

Alan B. Slifka is a New York investment manager. His world is the Wallstreet. Typically, we imagine Slifka in his office accumulating money. 'Wallstreet' is a word that opens up a semantic field indicating 'fighting for money without moral considerations.' Slifka should therefore not be a man you and I would want as a neighbor.

But Alan B. Slifka does not fit into our stereotype. He is chairman of the board and co-founder of the Abraham Fund.¹ In 1989 he wrote the foreword in *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*.² He works for co-existence: 'The Existentialist would say first comes Existence then comes Co-existence. The Co-Existentialist would say there can be no Existence without Co-existence. The truth is that we must learn to both Exist and Co-exist, ... otherwise our lives are meaningless.'³

What brings a successful Wallstreet investment manager like Slifka to care about the world's long-term well-being? Should he not give his undivided attention to the well-being of his bank account, the size of his villas, his cars or golf courses? He must be an especially laudable moral person. Or, he might, for example, have grandchildren. When Lee D. Ross⁴ leads negotiations where people are locked into bitter confrontation, he usually asks, 'What kind of world do you want for your grandchildren?'⁵ According to Ross this question has the powerful effect of orienting opponents' minds towards long-term peace rather than shortsighted self-interest.

This paper puts forward the hypothesis that globalization 'seduces' people to increasingly ask exactly that question, namely: 'What kind of world do I want for my grandchildren?' Leaders in international organizations have to become more aware of this trend. Global leaders can use this framing power actively and in a constructive way.

A central argument of this article is that globalization has a long-term 'framing power' that will shift global and local societal proceedings towards coexistence and cooperation, except for a transitional period where feelings of humiliation obstruct this tendency (that is, until they are understood, healed and prevented).

Humiliation means the 'violation of human rights, the violation of a person's profoundest personal dignity as a human being.'⁶ Humiliation is significant as the most powerful obstacle to 'Community Game' frames, and thus a hindrance to successful leadership in a global

¹ The Abraham Fund was founded in 1989. It is a non-for-profit organization established to raise awareness about and support for coexistence.

² Eugene Weiner, *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence* (New York: Abraham Fund Publication, 1998).

³ Alan B. Slifka, *Coexistence of Man With Man and Nature* (Belfast: Paper presented at the 'State of the World Forum, Co-existence Initiative,' 2.-9.5.1999, 1999): Slifka explains Existentialism as being 'A chiefly 20th century philosophical movement embracing diverse doctrines but centering on analysis of individual existence in an unfathomable universe and the plight of the individual who must assume ultimate responsibility for his acts of free will without any certain knowledge of what is right and wrong or good or bad.' Slifka introduces Co-Existentialism as 'A 21st century philosophical movement embracing diverse doctrines but centering on analysis of individual shared existence in an unfathomable universe and the plight of the individual who must assume ultimate responsibility for his acts of free will as regards his existence with others without any certain knowledge of what is right or wrong or good or bad.'

⁴ Ross is a professor of psychology at Stanford University and is a principal investigator (and co-founder) of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN). The author or co-author of four books and scores of chapter and journal articles, he was elected in 1993 to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Ross' seminal research on attributional biases and other shortcomings in human inference exerted a major impact not only within social psychology but also in the emerging field of judgment and decision-making.

⁵ Lee D. Ross at the Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11. - 16 July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany.

⁶ Jan Smedslund (1997) in a personal conversation. See also Jan Smedslund, "How Shall the Concept of Anger be Defined?," *Theory and Psychology* 3, 1 (1993): 5-33, and Jan Smedslund, *The Structure of Psychological Common Sense* (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997).

information society. This is because humiliation destroys motivation and self-respect. Without self-respect 'nothing may seem worth doing – and we may sink into apathy and cynicism' (John Rawls, 440).⁷ However, the nature and role of humiliation are not well understood. The purpose of this article is to shed light on the notion of humiliation and its potential to introduce destructive framing, and its implications for leadership at global levels.

This paper draws upon theoretical ideas developed in order to help explain data gathered in the course of a research program carried out by the author.⁸ This research, based at the University of Oslo, is concerned with the notion of humiliation. The object is to clarify the part played by humiliation⁹ as a factor in massacres (Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing, civil

⁷ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

⁸ The project is entitled: *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*. See www.uio.no/~evelinl. The project is supported by the Norwegian Research Council and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am grateful for their support, and would also like to thank the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo for hosting the project. I extend my warmest thanks to all my informants in and from Africa, many of whom survive under the most difficult life circumstances. I hope that at some point in the future I will be able to give back at least a fraction of all the support I received from them!

More than 200 interviews have been carried out in Europe and Africa (1997-1999): In Hargeisa (Somaliland), Kigali and other places in Rwanda, Bujumbura (Burundi), Nairobi (Kenya), Cairo (Egypt), Oslo (Norway), in Germany, in Geneva (Switzerland), in London (England), and in Brussels (Belgium). About 400 contacts have been established to researchers who work in related fields. See Evelin Gerda Lindner, *The Anatomy of Humiliation. Or 'What Is Our Common Sense Definition of Humiliation?'* (Oslo: Unpublished manuscript, 2000), and Evelin Gerda Lindner, *Globalisation and Humiliation: Towards a New Paradigm* (Oslo: Unpublished manuscript, 2000), and Evelin Gerda Lindner, *How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences: The Psychology of Intercultural Communication* (Oslo: Unpublished manuscript, 2000), and Evelin Gerda Lindner, *Humiliation and How to Respond to It: Spatial Metaphor in Action* (Oslo: Unpublished manuscript, 2000), and Evelin Gerda Lindner, "Humiliation and the Human Condition: Mapping a Minefield," *Human Rights Review* forthcoming, (2000), and Evelin Gerda Lindner, *What every negotiator ought to know: Understanding Humiliation* (Oslo: Unpublished manuscript, 2000).

⁹ The theory of the humiliation process will be developed further in a book I am currently writing in collaboration with Dennis Smith. Smith is professor of sociology at Loughborough University (UK), see his publications: Dennis Smith, "Civilization and Humiliation: Going Beyond Elias," *Organization* forthcoming, (2000); : Dennis Smith, "'The Civilizing Process' and 'The History of Sexuality': Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault," *Theory and Society* 28, (2000): 79-100; Dennis Smith, *Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory* (London: Sage, 2000); Dennis Smith, *Zygmunt Bauman: Prophet of Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Dennis Smith, *Civilization and Totalitarianism in the Work of Norbert Elias and Hannah Arendt* (Toronto: American Sociological Association Annual Conference, August 1997, 1997); Dennis Smith, *The Civilizing Process and the Care of the Self: Comparing Elias and Foucault* (Bielefeld: Norbert Elias Centenary Conference, June 1997, Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung, University of Bielefeld, 1997); Dennis Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); Dennis Smith, "Discovering Facts and Values: Barrington Moore," *Skocpol* 1984 (1984): 313-355; Dennis Smith, "Norbert Elias- established or outsider?," *Sociological Review* 32, 2 (1984): 367-389; Dennis Smith, *Barrington Moore. Violence Morality and Political Change* (London: Macmillan, 1983); Dennis Smith, *Conflict and Compromise. Class Formation in English Society 1830-1914* (London: Routledge, 1981).

war¹⁰), both between opponents,¹¹ and in relation to the international community¹² who may try to intervene.¹³

In what follows, the Prisoners' Dilemma (P. D.) will be explored as a means of offering global leaders a useful framework in terms of which to orient themselves within the complexities of the current historic situation. First, recent research will be introduced that deals with the effects of 'framing' on the P. D. play. In other words, it will be explained that the same basic structure of the game leads to opposing results depending on the 'frame' within which it is presented. Subsequently the state of the world's order will be examined, - whether it looks like a 'Community Game' or 'Wallstreet Game,' - and humiliation will be identified as major force undermining potentially benign aspects of globalization.

The paper will conclude with the assertion that leaders are well advised, - if they want to maximize relations both globally and locally, - to become aware of their framing power and use it to help strengthen existing benign trends within globalization. Thus they can increase global readiness for a global ethical framework of justice of human rights.

'Community Game' versus 'Wallstreet Game'

The Prisoners' Dilemma is widely known: Two burglars are caught with stolen goods. The police says to A: 'If you confess, then you will only get 3 months, but B will get 10 years.' The police tells A that they are making the same offer to B. In fact, if they both squeal, they will both get 8 years. If nobody squeals, they will each get one year.

Table 1 presents the P. D. with not confessing meaning that the prisoners cooperate with each other, and confessing meaning that they defect.

		Prisoner B	
		<i>Not Confess ('Cooperate')</i>	<i>Confess ('Defect')</i>
Prisoner A	<i>Not Confess ('Cooperate')</i>	1 year each	10 years for A and 3 months for B
	<i>Confess ('Defect')</i>	3 months for A and 10 years for B	8 years each

¹⁰ Robert B. Zajonc uses the word 'massacre' to subsume for example Holocaust, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, see Robert B. Zajonc's forthcoming book: Robert B. Zajonc, "Massacres: Animal Instinct or Moral Imperative?," (Stanford: Draft of a Chapter for a forthcoming book, 1999).

¹¹ Opponents may be the parties and/or perpetrators and victims in massacres committed in the contemporary world.

¹² The international community may be represented, for example, by the United Nations and international humanitarian organisations.

¹³ The results of this research present a picture where mutual humiliation seems to pervade the core of the examined relationships leading, in the 'best' case, to apathy and cynicism, and violence in the worst cases as, for example, international terrorism.

Table 1: ‘The payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma. Each player must decide, in isolation from the other, whether to confess to a crime that the judge is sure they both committed. By confessing, each will implicate the other; their joint best strategy is for both to keep quiet’ (Easterbrook, 1992, 10).¹⁴

Negotiation techniques are taught everywhere nowadays, especially at fashionable law and business schools, and in this context the Prisoners’ Dilemma is played as a game. The game’s unique feature is that it obliges players to decide between cooperation and defection under circumstances where in any one instance cooperation promises a worse outcome than defection for an individual player, but *joint* defection leaves both players worse off than joint cooperation. Communities of cooperators prosper while communities of defectors do increasingly worse, both in absolute terms and relative to the cooperators. The groundwork for the application of the P. D. to all situations where cooperation versus defection is relevant has been carried out by Axelrod, and Rapoport.¹⁵

This article draws upon the repeated or iterative version of the P. D. game. Any political or business strategy depends on expectations concerning the other players’ intentions to either ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’ in the future. Leaders who operate at the global level have an especially difficult task when evaluating other players’ intentions, since culture differences and feelings of humiliation versus respect enter the equation of international relations today to a much higher degree than ever before.

What can we expect from other human beings? Should we expect them to cooperate with each other, or do should we anticipate defection? Under which circumstances may we expect which behavior? One common belief claims that human beings act according to their character, or according to their past behavior and reputation, in other words, that they are ‘known’ to be either aggressive defectors, or peace-loving cooperators.

Ross carried out important experiments showing the effect of ‘framing.’¹⁶ He asked players to play the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. One group of players was told that they would be playing a game called a ‘Community Game.’ Another group was told that they were going to play a ‘Wallstreet Game.’ Players who thought that they played a community game tended to cooperate, players who thought they were playing a Wallstreet game tended to defect. Although the structure of the game was identical, in both cases the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, the mere difference in the label had a profound effect upon whether or not players cooperated.

Surprisingly the actors’ reputations (of being ‘cooperators’ or ‘defectors’) proved NOT to be reliable predictors of who would and who would not cooperate. The name of the game, Ross argues, influences how people think they should play, not their reputation (or past behavior). The name of the game influences how they think the other person will play (which of course further dictates how they think they themselves should play). And the name of the game also influences

¹⁴ Steve Easterbrook, *CSCW: Cooperation or Conflict?* (London: Springer-Verlag, 1992).

¹⁵ Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-based Models of Competition and Collaboration* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (London: Penguin Books, 1990); Anatol Rapoport, *Games, Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1960); Anatol Rapoport, *The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers, 1995) and Anatol Rapoport and Chammah, *Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1970).

¹⁶ Lee D. Ross and Samuels, *The Predictive Power of Personal Reputation versus Labels and Construal in the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University, 1993).

how they think the other person expects them to play (and thus how the other person would be likely to play) and so forth. And since in the P. D. Game mutual cooperation on the first attempt tends to perpetuate cooperation, and anything else tends to end up in mutual defection, the effects of the name of the game, or in other words, how the situation and the expectations of the players are construed, dictate what happens in subsequent rounds as well.

The Wallstreet/community game study thus makes the point that the play may depend less on the dispositions or values or life experiences of the parties than it does on how they construe or frame the situation. What the Ross shows is that this construal, and hence the rate of cooperation, can be manipulated. Indeed, he shows that the relevant manipulation is powerful enough in its effects so that people with a reputation for being uncooperative, but who are playing the community game, turn out to cooperate more often than people with a reputation for being cooperative who are playing the Wall Street Game (even though the operative payoff matrix is the same, and, only the name of the game and hence the meaning of the situation to the players, differs).

In everyday life we are confronted with such framing processes all the time, when we go to play tennis, for instance, we assume we enter a Wallstreet game, when we work as social workers, we assume we enter a community game. Often both games occur together. Different professions entail varying combinations of both, for example lawyers' daily professional life entails the community game as far as they are not allowed to sell their client out, and the Wallstreet game insofar as they are adversaries in course of judicial argument.

Ross¹⁷ mentions the election of the pope as an example of 'framing' in the real world, involving a task that should be impossible to solve given the vastly divergent positions involved. The negotiations are carried out, however, in the spirit of 'we must have a pope.' Failure is not an option; the label given to the pope election 'game' means that cooperation is unavoidable.

The point which is relevant for this paper is that organizations and their leaders may expect their co-players to have the capacity and the understanding to be either cooperative or non-cooperative, despite their individual personality and temperament differences. The crucial factor is, whether they see themselves in a stable long-term relationship, or not, and whether the operative norms support the expectation that cooperation will be met with cooperation by the other party, or with exploitation.

The following section will address the question of how the P. D. game relates to globalization and the role of organizations and their leaders within it. It will ask: 'Which labels are connected with globalization?' 'Which framing power is contained in the empirical reality of globalization and which labels emerge in connection with globalization processes?' And 'Which trends will leaders in the global arena be confronted with in the future?'

¹⁷ Lee D. Ross during his teaching at the Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11. - 16 July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany.

Is Globalization a ‘Wallstreet Game’ or a ‘Community Game’?

Is globalization promoting a Wallstreet game or a community game? What kind of ‘framing’ does globalization provide? To what kind of ‘game’ do global leaders have to orient themselves?

Today’s modern technology has formed what we call the global village.¹⁸ Modern technology has shrunk distances and makes it possible today to fly from New York to Japan in hours, whereas it took weeks or months in former times. Economists speak of a global market place, and transnational corporations make national borders seem unimportant and national sovereignty look weak. The main actors in the global village are no longer just states and nations, but also, partly at least, transnational corporations, along with international organizations such as United Nations and International NGOs. Global interdependence between all these actors is increasingly becoming a reality; the very emergence of the term global village in itself illustrates this.

Has this transformation towards an interdependent global village brought us peace and a spirit of community?

Yes and no. Yes, because ‘global interdependence’ could safely be taken as just another word for community game framing. The P. D. simulates interdependence and shows that it is more rational to cooperate, since all players then do better in the long run.¹⁹ Coercion is not rational if I am dependent on your cooperation. Persuasion and consensus within a framework of mutual respect, egalitarian teams searching together for creative solutions, and global leaders building international societal structures guided by human rights are all more rational approaches. This is because they promise much more success for everybody in the long run than oppression, exploitation, war, and violence.

But, is this today’s reality? No. Bloody conflicts dominate media headlines. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, civil war, terrorism, in other words, massacres are today’s horror words.²⁰ Furthermore the gap between the rich and the poor is widening both globally and locally. The ‘global village’ seems to mean nothing more than ‘global pillage.’²¹ The ‘logic of the global market’ seems to create opportunities for exploitation rather than cooperation. International businesses today operate in a state of ‘frictionless capitalism’ and thus appear to have transcended traditional imperial warfare to modern economic warfare. And poverty kills as effectively as warfare.

Why is the world in such a deplorable state? Why do humans not understand that rational cooperation is better for them than mutual destruction? Is it because humans are essentially non-rational and do not understand their own good? Or is it that humans are essentially ‘bad’? Ross’s experiments show that humans have the capacity to be both, ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ depending on the ‘frame’ in which they see themselves. Is it then that competition for scarce resources in an ever more populated world ‘frames’ the world as a Wallstreet game? Is it scarcity that compels

¹⁸ Marshall McLuhan and Fiore, *War and Peace in the Global Village* (NY: Bantam Books, 1986).

¹⁹ The term ‘rational’ is understood in this paper as choice which serves informed self-interest, see Kristen R. Monroe, *The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

²⁰ Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, "Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, (1994): 333-349.

²¹ Jeremy Brecher and Costello, *Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction From the Bottom Up* (Boston: Massachusetts: South End Press, 1994).

players to take part in war, violence and exploitation? Perhaps not, since, after all, competition for scarce resources may also lead to cooperation where the relationship between potential contestants is a constructive one.

I propose that humiliation is the main driving force for seemingly ‘irrational’ behavior. My research focuses on the dynamics of humiliation, their significance, their role and aftermath, especially their consequences for global human and ecological sustainability and how they are intertwined with the effects of the global market. I suggest that it pays for global leaders, not only in international organizations, but also in the corporate sector, to try to understand the effects of humiliation, since not just peace and sustainability but also global business success may be affected by their aftermath.

Today’s buzzwords for success are empowerment, creativity, motivation, and teamwork, none of which works under circumstances of humiliation. Humiliation destroys community game frames. This is because, as quoted above, without self-respect ‘nothing may seem worth doing – and we may sink into apathy and cynicism’ (Rawls, 440). And people who feel humiliated may not only sink into ‘apathy and cynicism,’ they may even resort to violence. At the societal micro-societal level mobbing and bullying²² are some of the manifestations of humiliation, - and they are good examples of how humiliation hampers productive cooperation where it occurs. At the global macro-level humiliation also plays a significant destructive role.

Poverty as Source of Humiliation

One very important source for feelings of humiliation at the macro-level, I found in my fieldwork in non-Western countries, is the gap between rich and poor world regions. Leaders, especially from the West, clearly have problems understanding that poverty does not only entail material hardship, but that is also humiliates. Poverty wreaks psychological havoc, in addition to and connected with material misery. Leaders rarely have the experience of being humiliated because they are the ones at the top of the pyramid of power. Therefore it is beneficial for them to listen to those among the humiliated who have the capacity to verbalize their plight.

During my fieldwork in Africa (1998-1999), but also during my seven years of psychological practice in Egypt, I listened to intellectuals. Intellectuals in the poor regions of the world are outraged when the West talks about human rights, - norms that judge inequality²³ as being morally wrong, - while the West itself upholds inequality. This is perceived as humiliating.

The author’s research in Africa unequivocally confirms that ‘divided standards’ are the most powerful humiliating device which the rich inflict on the poor today, obviously without the rich being sufficiently aware of it. Even international aid is often perceived as humiliating, because it is seen as covering up for the lack of Western political will fundamentally to change the global political and economic structure towards more equality. Graham Hancock’s book

²² ‘I suggest keeping the word bullying for activities between children and teenagers at school and reserving the word mobbing for adult behavior at workplaces. Other expressions found in the literature are harassment or psychological terror’ in Heinz Leymann, *The Mobbing Encyclopaedia. Bullying; Whistleblowing* <http://www.leymann.se/English/00010E.HTM>, (2000).

²³ See for example Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, *Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

*Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business*²⁴ expresses the views of many intellectuals in countries who receive aid.

How can people living in the rich West fathom the feelings of the poor towards aid? Perhaps illness can serve as parallel narrative, since even rich people get ill and die. I therefore choose to illustrate the feelings of those intellectuals towards the rich with the story of a cancer patient who receives some sweets (aid) instead of real medicine (global restructuring), and is expected to be thankful for those sweets as if they were real medicine. Such a patient feels not only humiliated by the 'donor's' thoughtless negligence in not realizing that sweets do not cure cancer, but also by the 'donor's' selfish wish to appear 'good' while in fact neglecting the core ill. This is humiliating for the 'recipient.' The deepest humiliation, however, stems from the patient being a victim to his or her own yearnings for sweets (aid), for his or her inability to reject the sweets. Many a patient feels that she humiliates herself by not proudly announcing: 'If you do not want to see that your help does not really help me, then I do not want your hypocritical gifts!'

The world today harbors millions of people who are being exploited and feel humiliated. Their spirit is discouraged, while their hopes for better quality of life are fuelled, - both by the promotion of human rights to have a decent life, and by 'advertisements' for technological products as TV, refrigerator, car, etc. Humiliation and exploitation combined with intensifying but unfulfilled yearnings for more quality of life are painful reminders for the poor from whom the rich 'defect' if they can, and also a powerful incentive for the poor to retaliate with 'defection' instead of 'cooperation' wherever they see a chance. As mentioned above, mutual humiliation seems to pervade the core of relationships leading to apathy and cynicism in the 'best' cases and violence in the worst cases (for example international terrorism).

'Globalization' in this context is a label meaning 'divided standards,' which is just another expression for 'cruel Wallstreet logic.' 'Cruel' because community game rhetoric (rhetoric of human rights for example) covers up for Wallstreet reality. Globalization in this context is nothing but a label for destruction, a label which indicates that Western players, while pretending to cooperate, are abandoning their responsibility for the poor (defecting), and deserve nothing better than retaliation by the poor who defect in their turn, perhaps even turning to terrorism. Globalization in this context is a synonym for humiliation and betrayal.

Western business leaders, especially, may think that the example of development aid is not relevant for them. Yet, they should reconsider their view for three reasons. The first one is that leaders who operate globally have, increasingly, to deal with non-Western business-partners who harbor feelings of humiliation towards the 'rich' in the world, and these feelings and their aftermath will color the relationship with a Western business partner, - who should be better aware of it. Secondly, the example of aid illustrates better than other examples the powerful force of humiliation. Aid is beneficial; recipients profit from it and need it. Aid therefore should create an ideal situation for harmonious relationships between donors and recipients; recipients have every reason to be thankful, and donors every reason to feel good. Aid thus should provide optimal conditions for successful cooperation. If, even under such conditions, feelings can become as bitter as was shown above, then this indicates that humiliation under less favorable

²⁴ Graham Hancock, *The Lords of Poverty. The Power, Prestige and Corruption of the International Aid Business* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989).

conditions will be even more destructive.²⁵ Thirdly, the example of aid shows that an overall unethical framework hampers all relationships within it, even where ‘doing good’ is the aim.

The Loss of Power as Source of Humiliation

Another important example of humiliation at the global level refers to the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thematized by Huntington 1996.²⁶ The West, especially the United States, as the leading power in a unipolar world, finds itself confronted with former powers such as the Arab world, or, more recently, Russia, or past and future rivals such as China. All these societies may feel humiliated by their subordinate position in the ranking of the world’s pyramid of power. The ‘clash of civilizations’ that Huntington fears, may, in fact, prove to become more a ‘clash of humiliated with their humiliators.’²⁷

During my work in Egypt (1984-1991) I learned how humiliating it is for a culture like the Egyptian, which built pyramids when Europe still lived in the Stone Age, to bow to the fate of having become a beggarly petitioner to these former ‘primitives.’ The Arab world reached heights of knowledge and civilization when Europe had its dark ages, and many Arabs are more than nostalgic. It is difficult to lose out, feelings of being ‘entitled’ to more linger on. France, England, Spain, Portugal, all had global colonial empires and are now secondary to the only world power left, the United States. Losing out is not easy. Germany is a classic example. It welcomed Hitler because Germany felt humiliated after World War I,²⁸ and this shows how humiliation can even lead to war and massacres.

Japan, India and China in their relation to the West are cases relevant for the future, as Huntington indicates. Swami Agnivesh from India is a highly influential Indian holy man.²⁹ He abhors the destructive conflict running through his country’s politics and urges the Indian ‘government and all political parties, scientists, labor and socio-religious organizations to wage a united battle against starvation, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, bonded labor and other social evils.’³⁰ However, in 1998 this man, so dedicated to peace, congratulated Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for conducting a series of nuclear tests. He approved of the tests because, in his

²⁵ See Evelin Gerda Lindner, *How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences: The Psychology of Intercultural Communication* (Oslo: Unpublished manuscript, 2000).

²⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

²⁷ Experience and data collected by the author in China and South East Asia (1981, 1983, 1987) and during seven years of psychological work in Egypt (1984-1991), suggest these hunches. See also Evelin Gerda Lindner, *Lebensqualität im ägyptisch-deutschen Vergleich. Eine interkulturelle Untersuchung an drei Berufsgruppen (Ärzte, Journalisten, Künstler)* (Hamburg: University of Hamburg, 1994).

²⁸ by the Treaty of Versailles (28th June 1919), see Sebastian Sebastian Haffner and Bateson, *Der Vertrag von Versailles. Mit Beiträgen von Sebastian Haffner, Gregory Bateson u. a.* (München: Matthes und Seitz, 1978), and Norbert Norbert Elias, *The Germans. Power struggles and the development of habitus in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

²⁹ Swami Agnivesh is the president of the Bonded Labour Liberation Front and a prominent Arya Samaj leader in India.

³⁰ See The Indian Express, *Swami Agnivesh lauds nuclear tests* Monday, May 18, <http://www.financialexpress.com/ie/daily/19980518/13851384.html>, 1998).

view, they showed that India would not bow down before the humiliating ‘nuclear blackmail’ of foreign countries like America.

Russia in its dealings with NATO is another example. Russia would like to be taken much more seriously than its factual weight warrants. However, discarding Russia’s psychological problem as irrelevant would be dangerous, since their leaders rightly can claim that they have the power to destabilize the world, even if only by supplying international terrorists with some nuclear fuel.

Kimmel identifies the same dynamics in gender relations. He observes how men feel ‘entitled’ to power, as opposed to women’s rights, even if they do not have this power. Men tend to say, ‘this women “stole” MY job!’ feeling unduly humiliated when a woman gets a job the man had hoped for.³¹

Like persons, nations, who feel that they are entitled to more are edgy, they are sensitive. It is difficult to live with a discrepancy between one’s expectations and factual realities. If nothing else, at least ‘face’ must be saved. This is especially relevant in Asia, where ‘face saving’ is a strong cultural value.³² Nation and people who find themselves in secondary positions while feeling entitled to have leading roles readily yield to feelings of humiliation, suspiciously waiting for signs of disrespect in their more powerful counterparts.

Humiliation hampers ‘Community Solutions;’ humiliation furthers ‘Wallstreet Frames.’ How can this be counteracted?

How Global Leaders Can Use ‘Framing Power’ to Advance Peace and Sustainability

Humiliation stemming from poverty, as well as humiliation stemming from loss of power, both hamper global and local cooperation, in spite of the fact that they have to be evaluated as being ethically profoundly different. The poor have human rights on their side. An ‘enabling environment’ can only be created if the economic, social and cultural rights entailed in human rights are taken seriously.³³ Losing power, on the other side, is something losers ought to ‘digest’ without wreaking havoc around them. Social change may involve egalitarian structures emerging that level out power differences, or they involve the rearrangement of the ranking order within hierarchies of power. Both changes may evolve peacefully as long as those who lose power are prevented from tearing the world apart just because they cannot lead anymore.

³¹ Michael Kimmel, *Reducing Men's Violence: The Personal Meets the Political*. Paper presented at the expert group meeting on 'Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace,' Oslo, Norway, 24-28 September 1997, 1997), see also Michael Kimmel, *The gendered society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

³² This I experienced very closely during my fieldwork in China and South East Asia in the beginning of the 1980s.

³³ See Mary Robinson, "Through Economic Rights to Human Rights," *Terraviva* November 1999, 34 (1999): 1-1. See also Wiseberg (Human Rights Internet, HRI, www.hri.ca) for the currently increasing attention to economic, social and cultural rights entailed in human rights, as opposed to only focusing on political and civil rights (Laurie S. Wiseberg at the ‘Seminar om Sosial Utvikling og Menneskerettigheter,’ 10th February 2000, Diakonhjemmets Internasjonale Senter, Oslo).

In both cases the 'victims' of humiliation need help. The poor need the help of the rich insofar as the rich have to get serious about restructuring the world economy in a way that enables all to live under decent conditions.³⁴

The losers of power need help as well. A Hitler would not have had followers if feelings of humiliation had not been present in the German population. Serbians unite in their feelings of being humiliated by the occident.³⁵ But losers of power need another kind of help. In former times, in traditional coercive hierarchical societies, the only hope for 'losers' was that at some point in the future they would be able to subjugate the victor again, and this is what Hitler tried by occupying all Europe.

Today, the human rights revolution provides a profoundly new vision.³⁶ The idea of human rights asserts that every human being, including every nation, has an inner core of dignity that stays untouched by any power structure. Human rights mean that wherever hierarchy exists it ceases to be a matter of defining a human being as low or high, that hierarchy may be functional if tasks can only be carried out in that fashion (steering a ship for example), but that hierarchy is denuded of any value connotations relating to the identity of the people involved. Thus, the 'losers' of today can be told that losing is not important anymore, being part of a global egalitarian society where everybody cooperates with everybody for the long-term common good is what counts.³⁷

Changes in International Relations Theory reflect the current transition.³⁸ Whereas Classical and Structural Realism saw the world as being guided by 'anarchy' - anarchy as the 'state of nature' (Hobbes) - with the ensuing 'Security Dilemma' within which only states are actors. Liberalism, on the other hand, considers firms, NGOs, and international organizations as also being actors and proposes that through cooperation the 'Security Dilemma' may be overcome.³⁹

³⁴ Recent demonstrations at WTO meetings and global business gatherings as at Davos, Switzerland, address exactly this point.

³⁵ Slobodan Milosevic can hardly be disputed when he says: 'When national interests are at stake, there is no difference between the authorities and the opposition. You have democrats and republicans who fight each other. But when national interests of America are at stake, then there is no conflict. Then all of them stand together. It is the same in our country. We have opposition in Parliament, major opposition party is that of Mr. Draskovic, SPO. But when it comes to Kosovo they are on the same track. (see <http://www.sps.org.yu/engleski/documents/Intervju/index.html> for a Washington Post interview with Slobodan Milosevic, published as an abridged version of the interview on December 13, 1998).

³⁶ See Evelin Gerda Lindner, "Humiliation and the Human Condition: Mapping a Minefield," *Human Rights Review* forthcoming, (2000).

³⁷ There exists the well known and sore problem with the protection of human rights of citizens as opposed to the protection of state sovereignty. The rule is that the sovereignty – or dignity – of a state ought to be respected even if human rights are violated within it. Such a state may deny third parties from outside to interfere in their inner dealings, see Michael Jacobsen and Stephanie Lawson, "Between Globalization and Localization: A Case Study of Human Rights Versus State Sovereignty," *Global Governance* 5, 2 (2000): 203-220, and Duane Bratt, "Peace over Justice: Developing a Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations in Internal Conflicts," *Global Governance* 5, 1 (1999): 63-82, and Lynn H. Miller, "The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security," *Global Governance* 5, 3 (1999): 303-332.

³⁸ See for example Ngaire Woods, *Explaining international relations since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

³⁹ Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th-25th July 1997.

The atmosphere in the Bretton Woods institutions reflects change as well.⁴⁰ Joseph Stiglitz, chief-economist of the World Bank stated that the ‘strategies of the past, even when they have been assiduously followed, have not guaranteed success. Furthermore, many of the most successful countries have not actually followed the “recommended” strategies, but have carved out paths of their own.’⁴¹ Not just a few scattered idealistic NGOs, but also World Bank President James Wolfensohn speaks of empowerment and good governance.⁴²

How can ‘losers’ be persuaded to believe that they should accept their fate peacefully, and how can the rich be convinced that ‘winning’ is not everything either, and that they have to restructure the world economy in the direction of greater equality? How can a global framework of ethical credibility and justice be created, a framework that is necessary to make relationships globally and locally turn to a successful community mode, instead of destructive Wallstreet mode? How can an overarching community mode be implemented globally that may safely harbor pockets in which Wallstreet games occur, as the profession of the lawyer indicates? How can it be made palpable that the other way round does not work, that an overarching Wallstreet framework has the potential to spoil every pocket of community game within it, as the example of aid illustrates?

There are two ways. The first is factual global interdependence, the second is ‘framing.’

Increasing global interdependence lets factuality do the job of convincing human kind of the rationality entailed in cooperation. But, and this is the point of this paper, global leaders should help. Leaders who wish to maximize global peace and sustainability, as well as business relations both globally and locally, should advertise the message sent by the terminology of the ‘global village’ and ‘global interdependence,’ namely that cooperation is rational because it is beneficial for all players in the long run. Leaders should help to make the global village a place where the rational choice, namely cooperation, is not obstructed by ‘irrational’ reactions which are bound to be triggered in the psyche of those who are forced to live under humiliating conditions of life.

Ross’s example of the election of the pope can serve as guidance. The framing idea ‘we must have a pope’ excludes the possibility of failure and makes cooperation among potentially deeply divided participants unavoidable.⁴³ The planet earth is in no different situation.

A *decent* global village is a global society of equality built on human rights. Margalit describes what a decent society is, namely a society whose institutions don’t humiliate people.⁴⁴ Global interdependence makes it rational to build a decent global village of cooperation, and this gives birth to the moral ought to build a decent global society. Global interdependence makes

⁴⁰ See also Marie-Josée Massicotte, "Global Governance and the Global Political Economy: Three Texts in Search of a Synthesis," *Global Governance* 5, 1 (1999): 127-148.

⁴¹ See Mary Robinson, "Through Economic Rights to Human Rights," *Terraviva* November 1999, 34 (1999): 1-1 and Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1998/99: Beyond Financial Crisis* (New York: World Bank, www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep98-99/toc.htm, 1998).

⁴² Ngaire Woods, "Good Governance in International Organizations," *Global Governance* 5, 1 (1999): 39-62; Cecelia Lynch, "The Promise and Problems of Internationalism," *Global Governance* 5, 1 (1999): 83-102; Christopher Joyner, "The United Nations and Democracy," *Global Governance* 5, 3 (1999): 333-358.

⁴³ See also Ross’s experiments where he manipulates the extent of failure allowed. When participants are told that failure to come to a consensus decision is excluded, they usually come to a common conclusion, whereas they fail otherwise, see Lee D. Ross and Samuels, *The Predictive Power of Personal Reputation versus Labels and Construal in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University, 1993).

⁴⁴ Avishai Margalit, *The decent society* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996).

'do-gooders' who base their work on pity jobless, since a better world is not just a matter of pity for the poor, and not a matter of hating the powerful either, but fundamentally a matter of professional rationality.

Merely pitying the poor and hating the powerful is a bad strategy, since it polarizes unnecessarily. It forgets for example that power makes people blind. Michael Kimmel illustrates very well how privilege is invisible: 'I got up one morning and looked into the mirror. Suddenly I understood something I never really "knew," that I was not just a "normal human being" but a "white middle class man"!' ⁴⁵ The powerful have to be taught that they may cause feelings of humiliation in the less powerful - sometimes without being aware of it - and they must understand that also they cannot escape violence in an unequal and unjust world, violence caused by inequality and the potential of deprivation to fuel feelings of humiliation and their violent aftermaths. ⁴⁶

International organizations, from United Nations to transnational corporations, and their leaders, have a unique tool in their hands: the moral and rational ought inherent in global interdependence to engage in a community game of cooperation. Multilateralism embodies this moral and rational ought. ⁴⁷ International organizations as the United Nations are in a better position than anybody else to 'market' the 'frame' of 'we must have a decent global village' ('we must have a pope') and exploit the power which lies in this framing, a power which overcomes seemingly unbridgeable divisions - in the election of the pope, and in the global village.

Conclusion

The analysis undertaken in this paper started out by introducing the Prisoners' Dilemma and the powerful force of 'framing,' a force that is also played out in real life: The interdependent global village has an inherent community game logic similar to the logic guiding the election of the pope 'we must have a pope.' The community frame forces cooperation among deeply divided participants.

The paper claims, on the basis of recent research in Africa and Europe, that the community frame is vulnerable of being turned towards a destructive Wallstreet logic by 'irrational' responses emanating from victims of humiliation. As an example the fact was highlighted that relations between the poor and the rich in the global village seem to be permeated by reciprocal feelings of humiliation.

⁴⁵ At the expert group meeting on 'Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace,' Oslo, Norway, 24-28 September 1997. See also Michael Kimmel, *Reducing Men's Violence: The Personal Meets the Political*. Paper presented at the expert group meeting on 'Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace,' Oslo, Norway, 24-28 September 1997, 1997), and Michael Kimmel, *The gendered society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁴⁶ 'The human rights revolution extends reference groups and intensifies the experience of humiliation entailed by deprivation.' The foundation document of 'The Loughborough and Oslo Globalization Institute and Network' (LOGIN), written by its initiators Dennis Smith and Evelin Lindner, January 2000.

⁴⁷ See for example Helge Ole Bergesen, *Dinosaurs or Dynamos? The United Kingdoms and the World Bank at the Turn of the Century* (Oslo: Paper presented at The Multilateral Aid System concluding conference 12th October 1999, 1999).

The paper concludes that existing benign trends entailed in the empirical process of globalization give rise to a moral ought – the imperative to strengthen a global framework of justice of human rights - and that this objective can be greatly enhanced by multilateralism which embodies the very community frame. Leaders of international organizations are in the unique position of being able to do more than simply re-act to demands for cooperation forced by factual growing global interdependence. Social psychological research on framing should make them aware that they can hasten the process by promoting the frame of ‘we must have a decent global society.’

Alan B. Slifka understood this lesson. He is a man of the Wallstreet and knows its logic. He knows that implementing an overarching framework of respectful and tolerant co-existence is the rational choice in the global village, - and he is courageous enough to engage himself in the very endeavor to market it. I repeat his words quoted above: ‘The Co-Existentialist would say there can be no Existence without Co-existence.’