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Human Rights, Humiliation, and Globalization

"Give me liberty or give me death" is a famous quote from a speech made by Patrick Henry to the Virginia House of Burgesses. "Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!"

The speech was given March 23, 1775 in St. John's Church in Richmond, Virginia and is credited with having single-handedly convinced the Virginia House of Burgesses to pass a resolution delivering the Virginia troops to the Revolutionary War. Reportedly, the crowd, upon hearing the speech jumped up and shouted "To Arms! To Arms!" (this example has been kindly provided by Didier Sornette and is retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Give_me_liberty_or_give_me_death,).

"Give me liberty or give me *death*": This exclamation should amaze every reader. It is a sentence of historic novelty and at the same time of deadly sincerity, literally. Consider, if all the downtrodden and oppressed people during the past centuries – all the slaves, the serfs, the bonded, the underlings and inferiors – if they had preferred death to their lowly fate: the world would be quite an empty place today! How could it happen that for centuries the underlings of the world accepted – and some still do today – the absence of liberty in their lives without seeking death? And how could it happen that at some point in history the situation changed, and such a sentence became possible? And how does the phenomenon of humiliation play in?

The background for these questions is my research on humiliation that I carry out since 1996. I conducted a four-year doctoral research project (1997-2001) at the University of Oslo. It was entitled *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*.[1] I carried out 216 qualitative interviews addressing Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi and their history of genocidal killings. From 1998 to 1999 the interviews were carried out in Africa (in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland, in Kigali and other places in Rwanda, in Bujumbura, capital of Burundi, in Nairobi in Kenya, and in Cairo in Egypt), and from 1997 to 2001 also in Europe (in Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and in Belgium).[2]

The questions that formed the starting point for my research were the following:[3] What is experienced as humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? When is humiliation established as a feeling? What does humiliation lead to? Which experiences of justice, honor, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? Which role do globalization and human rights play for humiliation? How is humiliation perceived and responded to

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[1] I thank the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo for hosting this project, and Reidar Ommundsen and Jan Smedslund from Oslo University, as well as Dennis Smith, Loughborough University, and Lee D. Ross, Stanford University, for being my academic advisers. See for an overview over articles published within this project http://folk.uio.no/evelinl.

[2] As the title of the project indicates, three groups had to be interviewed, namely both the conflict parties in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, and representatives of third parties who intervene. These three groups stand in a set of triangular relationships (at least this is the minimum version – where there are more than two opponents, as is the case in most conflicts, the pattern, obviously, has more than three corners). Both in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, representatives of the "opponents" and the "third party" were approached.

[3] I thank Dagfinn Føllesdal for his support in formulating these questions.

in different cultures? What role does humiliation play for aggression? What can be done to overcome violent effects of humiliation?

The *theory of humiliation* that I am currently working on, aims at forging one single theory that includes apparent contradictions in ways that make them fathomable and manageable.[4] This theory is necessarily interdisciplinary and unavoidably has to entail elements from anthropology, history, social philosophy, social psychology, sociology, and political science.[5]

I offer a tentative definition of humiliation:[6]

> Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honor or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will (or in some cases with your consent, for example in cases of religious self-humiliation or in sado-masochism) and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless.

In everyday language, the word humiliation is used threefold. Firstly, the word *humiliation* points at an *act*, secondly at a *feeling*, and thirdly, at a *process*: "I humiliate you, you feel humiliated, and the entire process is one of humiliation." In this paper the reader is expected to understand from the context which alternative is meant, because otherwise language would become too convoluted.

Feelings of humiliation are "flags" for violations of entitlements

Many scholars and experts identify *deprivation* as the main culprit of problems such as "grievances," "resentment," "embitterment," or "backlash"; however, I believe that this is too superficial an analysis. Victims of deprivation – poverty, low status, marginalization, and so on – do not automatically perceive this as a form of suffering that calls for action. A religious person may join a monastery and be proud of

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4 See, for example, Lindner (2000, 2001a,b,c,d,e, 2002a,b, 2003b,c).

5 The concept of humiliation may be deconstructed into at least seven layers (Lindner, 2001e), each requiring a different mix of interdisciplinary research and analysis. The seven layers include a) a core that expresses the universal idea of "putting down," b) a middle layer that contains two opposed orientations towards "putting down," treating it as, respectively, legitimate and routine, or illegitimate and traumatizing, and c) a periphery whose distinctive layers include one pertaining to cultural differences between groups and another four peripheral layers that relate to differences in individual personalities and variations in patterns of individual experience of humiliation.

6 see Lindner (2003a).

poverty, low status may be explained as God's will or a just punishment for sins perpetrated in an earlier life, and also marginalization may be the fundament for pride; not all minorities feel oppressed. Furthermore, poverty may motivate a person to work hard in order to get out of it, parents may sacrifice to enable their children to have an education and a better life, and every small incremental step towards a better quality of life may be celebrated.

The *Dictionary of Geography*, Mayhew (1997), explains the notion of *deprivation* as "lacking in provision of desired objects or aims," and explains further, "Within the less developed countries deprivation may be acute; the necessities of life such as water, housing, or food may be lacking. Within the developed world basic provisions may be supplied but, in comparison with the better-off, the poor and the old may well feel a sense of deprivation. This introduces the concept of *relative deprivation* which entails comparison, and is usually defined in subjective terms."

I suggest connecting the term of relative deprivation with the notion of humiliation as follows: What is significant for feelings of humiliation to occur is not just deprivation or relative deprivation, but a) *relative deprivation* that b) is felt to be perpetrated by a *perpetrator* to whom a certain state of mind is attributed – either of unforgivable disinterest or outright intention to humiliate – which furthermore, c), is embedded within an overall *normative framework* that does not legitimize the deprivation that has occurred. In other words, feelings of humiliation emerge when *illegitimate relative deprivation* is seen to be inflicted by a *perpetrator* – who is seen to act either out of haughty neglect or direct intention to hurt, and with relative deprivation being understood as perceived *entitlement to better faring*. And, as soon as feelings of humiliation emerge, they may indeed lead to "backlashes" – to acts of humiliation perpetrated on the perceived humiliator, setting off cycles of humiliation in which everybody who is involved feels humiliated, and is convinced that humiliating the humiliator is a just and perhaps even holy duty.

Case of domestic violence

Please consider the following scenario. A man beats his wife. He does this on the grounds that she does not give him respect for what he feels entitled to, namely that he ought to hold a superior position as compared to her. In his eyes, she ought to be more subservient. He deems that his honor is soiled and humiliated by his wife's disrespect and that he has to save his honor by "teaching her lessons" with the stick (today, Norway is the world number one of the Gender-related Development Index, GDI;[7] still, until as recent as 1868, Norwegian law obliged husbands to beat insub-

[7] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002) explains, "The human development index (HDI) is a simple summary measure of three dimensions of the human development concept: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a decent standard of living ... Thus it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income to allow a broader view of a country's development than using income alone, which is too often equated with well-being. Since the creation of the HDI in 1990 three supplementary indices have been developed to highlight particular aspects of human development: the human poverty index (HPI), gender-related development index (GDI) and gender empowerment measure (GEM)."

ordinate wives). – However, also this man's wife may invoke feelings of humiliation. She might state the square opposite to what her husband believes, namely that not he, but she is the one to feel humiliated since she is entitled to equal dignity and not at all compelled to bow for him. She might fight back, seek help outside and even file for divorce. In other words, both involved parties invoke feelings of humiliation and justify with the emergence of these feelings aggressive "defense" in form of humiliation-for-humiliation.

This case is currently being played out, in myriads of variations, all over the world. I would like to take this story as a starting point to suggest that feelings of humiliation represent emotional "flags" for violations of entitlements. Or, more precisely, they represent messages emanating from the emotional realm, emotional expressions, which indicate that entitlements are felt to be violated. Expected standards of treatment are perceived to be unmet.

Such entitlements are, for example, enshrined in the *entitlement to equal dignity* for every human being, as stipulated in the human rights declaration. The first sentence in the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to the Equality that is called for in the motto "Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity" as follows, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Thus, the central human rights message states that every human being has an inner core of dignity that is equal to the dignity of all other human beings and that this dignity ought not be made "unequal," lowered or humiliated.

In my work, I define dignity as follows:[8]

> Dignity is defined [in my theory of humiliation] as resembling pride and honor, however, as equipped with additional knowledge. People with dignity know how painful undue humiliation can feel, however, instead of resisting haughtily, they have learned humility. The notion of dignity as used [in the theory of humiliation] characterizes the psychological make-up of people and societies that base themselves on the human rights ideal. The first sentence in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

However, entitlement can also refer to the square opposite, namely the *entitlement to "unequal" dignity*. Aristocrats, for example, in the past – and sometimes even nowadays – considered themselves as *higher* beings, creatures of *more* worthiness and value than their inferiors. Aristocrats typically defended this entitlement against humiliation, for example in duels. And protecting entitlement to privilege was not a task they could take lightly; elites who did not maintain their superior position, were called "lazy." The so-called "lazy kings" (les rois fainéants) of the sixth and seventh centuries in France, for example, were ridiculed because they allowed their immediate subordinates, the "maires du palais," the managers of the palace, to usurp

[8] Lindner (2003a).

power (one of these "maires du palais" indeed eventually took over the throne in the year 751).

However, not only the aristocrats of the past adhered to worldviews of ranked worthiness; all supremacists, also nowadays – be it white supremacists or any other kind of supremacists – promote ranked worthiness. They adhere to what Robert Fuller (2003) calls *rankism*. In my theoretical thinking, I use the term *honor* to signify "unequal" or ranked worthiness. I define honor as follows:[9]

> Honor [in my theory of humiliation] is defined as pride that is ranked. The notion of honor is used to characterize the psychological make-up of people and societies that base themselves on the ideal of ranked societies of masters and underlings. Ritualized bowing is at the core of any honor order, as well as routine humiliation. Humiliation is the "lesson" that is taught to underlings so as to "remind" them of "where they belong." Underlings are expected to accept this treatment as a kind of "honorable medicine." In honor societies such practices are regarded as necessary so as to protect what they see as a divine order of rankings.

Thus, feelings of humiliation could be taken to be markers, markers for infringed entitlements – entitlements either to *equal* or to *unequal* worthiness, depending on the overarching worldview, which may be either ranked honor or unranked dignity. Humiliation is felt when somebody deems to be entitled to *equal* dignity and finds it disrespected; however, humiliation is also be felt when a person thinks that she is entitled to *unequal* dignity and *higher* honor. Thus, the core infringement that people translate into feelings of humiliation is that they feel lowered and put down from a level that they perceive as rightful. An aristocrat deems a *higher* level as rightful, while a human rights proponent deems only *equal* levels as legitimate.

An aristocrat in a traditional honor society defends his topdog place, and coerces his inferiors to accept their underdog position with humble subservience; in a traditional honor society only those high up, are allotted the right to feel humiliated when lowered. In a society that is based on human rights ideals of equal dignity, on the contrary, the right to feel humiliated moves away from the elites. Elites are now called upon to humble themselves without interpreting this as humiliation. Feelings of humiliation are reserved for the downtrodden; underlings acquire the right to view their lowly fate as violation of their dignity and encouraged to overcome it.

Case of human rights

We can link the story of the husband to other cases, not least to the faring of human rights ideals themselves. There are a number of controversies regarding human rights and the inherent notion that the violation of equal dignity may legitimately be translated into feelings of humiliation. One point of view is that human rights are

[9] Lindner (2003a).

universal and that every human being on the globe is entitled to develop feelings of humiliation in the face of unequal treatment and may enforce these rights, either through international courts or domestic law. The opposing view is that national sovereignty and cultural idiosyncrasies ought to be respected and not overridden by human rights. Mohamad Mahathir, former Malaysian Prime Minister, is one of the advocators of such a view. The claim that human rights are universal is perceived as a humiliating form of imperialism in which powerful rich Western countries dictate which rights they consider most important.

Case of honor killings

Other, related cases are to be observed everywhere. Honor killings, for example, are the result of and evoke feelings of humiliation in equally contradictory terms. A family might feel that family honor is soiled and humiliated by the being-around of a raped daughter. They might judge that killing her is the only remedy. "Cutting out the rotten part from the body," this is an explanation for honor killings that I was presented with when I was working as a clinical psychologist. What was my reaction? I felt that killing a raped girl would compound humiliation instead of alleviating it. I felt that her humanity, the family's humanity, and my humanity were insulted and humiliated by such an act. Yet, this reaction of mine, in turn, was perceived by the family as an arrogant and humiliating Western attitude toward non-Western customs and traditions. In other words, I felt humiliated by a proposed remedy for humiliation, and my interlocutors felt humiliated by my feelings of humiliation at their remedy.

Case of organizational structures

Or, consider a manager of a company who is convinced that only humiliated employees work diligently. He might feel it to be his duty to systematically belittle, demean, put down and humiliate his employees, believing that only such treatment infuses underlings with the necessary fear and humbleness to make them work hard and abstain from irresponsibly "doing what they want." Imagine the employees' reaction. They may respond that only motivated employees are able to be creative and diligent, people who indeed "do what they want," namely work hard for a company that provides them with a sense of personal satisfaction in an overall framework of equal dignity. A consultant might be called in. He might advise to create "flat hierarchies" and introduce "team work" with everybody enjoying equal dignity and freedom from humiliation. At that point, the manager of the company, in turn, might invoke feelings of humiliation on his part. He might point out that his "iron fist" efforts to keep his employees working hard are the only sure way to success and shareholder value and that he considers any criticism of his leader style to be a humiliating impertinence.

Case of inner dialogue

More so, similar processes may engulf a person's inner dialogue. Many women struggle with their own readiness to lower and humiliate themselves in front of men. Jane Fonda's speech from November 16, 2003, at the National Women's Leadership Summit Washington DC,[10] may illustrate this. Jane Fonda recounts,

> Before I turned sixty I thought I was a feminist. I was in a way, I worked to register women to vote, I supported women getting elected. I brought gender issues into my movie roles, I encouraged women to get strong and healthy, I read the books we've all read. I had it in my head and partly in my heart, yet I didn't fully get it. See, although I've always been financially independent, and professionally and socially successful, behind the closed doors of my personal life I was still turning myself in a pretzel so I'd be loved by an alpha male. I thought if I didn't become whatever he wanted me to be, I'd be alone, and then, I wouldn't exist.

Women nowadays typically have the choice between being a "nice girl" and bow, or not bow and thus be a "bad girl." In neither case women can be in harmony with themselves; there is no way of winning. Women are bound to be torn, and particularly intelligent and sensitive women detect and suffer from this conflict that current historic transitions force upon them. Years of experience in clinical psychology have given me profound insight into this female dilemma and the inner dialogue raging within many women.

The "nice-girl voice" says, "bowing is what is feminine, and if you do not bow, you are no woman." The "bad-girl voice" responds, "Bowing is humiliating, why should I do that! Why should I humiliate myself!" The "nice-girl voice" is not short of an answer, "If you do not bow, you are no woman. If you want to be a woman and feel good about it, you have to humiliate yourself. Rather call it being humble and modest! In fact, you are rather humiliating yourself now, by foolishly wanting to be like a man! Know your place! And, by the way, which man wants a bully in his bed! You will be alone if you do not bow! And you would not deserve better! Don't whimper! Do not expect compassion for your own failings!" The "bad-girl voice" tries to counter, "Why am I a bully when I want to be equal? I find this allegation outrageous and humiliating! I rather choose loneliness and death!"

Indeed, many women do choose death, not necessarily as a conscious deliberation, but rather as a desperate reaction to being caught in a dilemma. Young women, among them the most promising and intelligent, manage to kill themselves by not eating – we call this syndrome anorexia nervosa and, in the case of self-induced vomiting, bulimia – while others, those who do not induce vomiting, oscillate between asceticism and obesity. My field of psychological counseling from 1980-1984 was eating disorders, and I led therapeutic groups with women with such disorders.

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[10] It is to be found on many internet sites, for example on http://www.awakenedwoman.com/jane_fonda_talk.htm. I thank Linda Hartling for forwarding me Fonda's speech.

At this point, we have performed a full circle back to the beginning of this article, namely that people might choose *death* in the face of denied Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity. A young intelligent girl dies as a response to feeling unduly lowered, as much as an aristocrat is ready to die in a duel. Being unduly lowered, or humiliated, may have deadly effects. In Lindner (2001f), I write about young Palestinians, who, feeling unduly lowered, wish to either become suicide bombers (young male clients of mine), or give birth to suicide bombers (young female clients).

Feelings of humiliation entail an explosive potential

Dead rather than humiliated, this indicates the potential explosiveness of feelings of humiliation and their significance for killing – killing of oneself and/or others – and thus for violence, atrocities, wars and genocides. I call feelings of humiliation the "nuclear bomb of the emotions" that can transform otherwise "normal" people into "weapons of mass destruction."

It is because of their power to lead to violence, that instrumentalizing feelings of humiliation is so "effective" and "feasible" for humiliation-entrepreneurs. I coined the word "humiliation-entrepreneur" to label instigators of war and genocides such as Hitler. Hitler tragically demonstrated how feelings of humiliation can effectively be instrumentalized as deadly weapons. He, as well as the extremist Hutu elite in Rwanda, or the masterminds of nine-eleven 2001, all know how to use other people's feelings of frustration and humiliation, how to "collect" diverse feelings of frustration and humiliation, and then pour them into one single narrative of humiliation. Hitler's narrative was the rescue of German grandeur from humiliation, from real or imagined humiliation, and from past and future humiliation. As do many terrorists, also the Rwandan Hutu extremists – on the background of past humiliation, real or imagined – thought to "prevent" future humiliation by killings, atrocities and genocide. Humiliation entrepreneurs live inexpensively because of the power of these feelings, once instigated and bundled into collective action; in Rwanda the genocide was carried out with machetes and the victims were the ones to pay for bullets to be shot dead instead of being hacked to death; the nine-eleven terrorists even "borrowed" the victim's own planes; and suicide bombers reap havoc quite "pro bono."

To conclude, feelings of humiliation seem to provide a ferocious force that entails a considerable potential to flow into violence. This is threatening enough in "normal" times, however, I argue, in the following section, that humiliation is compounded in the current historic transition towards human rights.

In times of transition, humiliation is compounded

I believe that we live in times of transition. In the English language, the verbs *to humiliate* and *to humble* parted around 250 years ago. Their meanings and connotations went into diametrically opposite directions. Up to 1757 the verb *to humiliate* did not signify the violation of dignity. *To humiliate* was equivalent to *to*

lower or *to humble*. I quote from Miller (1996),[11] who informs us that "the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757."

The emergence of the new meaning of the word *to humiliate* (1757) closely precedes the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) and the French Revolution (August 4, 1789), both important starting points for the subsequent rise and canonization of human rights ideals. Undoubtedly, the ideas that feed into today's human rights ideas predate 1757. Not least important religions such as Christianity and Islam entail significant ideals of equality. However, these ideals seem to have gathered pace only about 250 years ago.

Historians are the ones to describe the transition that acquired significance around 250 years ago; this paper is not the place. However, I believe we live in the middle of this transition; we are far from having arrived "on the other side." Old honor norms and related feelings of humiliation are still alive and well-alongside with new dignity norms and their respective emotional expressions.

What is important for the topic of humiliation is, as discussed above, that with the advent of human rights ideals, the notion of humiliation changes its attachment point. It moves from the top to the bottom, from the privileged to the disadvantaged. In the new framework, the downtrodden underling is given the right to feel humiliated. The master, who faces calls to become humbler, is not anymore given permission to resist this call by labeling it as humiliating. Elites who arrogate superiority lose their age-old right to cry "humiliation!" when they are asked to descend and humble themselves.

The human rights revolution could be described as an attempt to collapse the master-slave gradient back to the line of equal dignity and humility. The practice of masters arrogating superiority and subjugating underlings is now regarded as illicit and obscene, and human rights advocates invite both, masters and underlings, to join in shared humility at the line of equal dignity.

It is important to note that the horizontal line is meant to represent the line of equal dignity and humility. This line does not signify that all human beings are equal, or should be equal, or ever were or will be equal, or identical, or all the same. This horizontal line is to represent a worldview that does not permit the hierarchical ranking of existing differences of human worth and value. Masters are invited to step down from arrogating *more* worthiness, and underlings are encouraged to rise up from humiliation, up from being humiliated down to *lower* value. Masters are humbled and underlings empowered.

In my theory of humiliation, I base myself on the work of William Ury (1999). I suggest that we can describe a historical development from hunting-gathering to complex agriculturalism and finally to the global information and knowledge society. Thus, I propose that globalization is significant for the current human rights' call for collapsing the master-slave gradient.

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[11] Miller (1993), p. 175, italics in original.



Figure 1: The historic transition to egalization.

I propose that "globalization critics" do not oppose all aspects of *globalization* – global civil society, for example, benefits from the coming-together of humankind – however, that they are uneasy about what I call *egalization.*

Lindner (2003a) defines globalization as such:

> In [the theory of humiliation] *globalization* is defined as the *coming together* of humankind, both physically and psychologically in *One single global village*. Globalization promotes the coming-into-being into an interdependent *global village* combined with an awareness of how small and vulnerable the planet is that humankind inhabits. Both, growing interdependence as well as increasing awareness, are driven by myriads of large and small processes that coalesce and are powered by a growing world-wide communication network (telecommunication, air traffic, satellites, and television).
> This technology promotes the perception of the world as *One single global village* on a small planet in a vast universe. Globalization is thus the physical, mental and emotional coming together of humankind on the tiny planet Earth. The process of globalization affects the hearts and minds of an ever increasing number of the world's population.

Lindner (2003a) defines egalization as follows:

> The word *egalization* has been coined by the author in order to match the word *globalization* and at the same time differentiate it from words such as equality, because the main point is not equality. The point is rather equal dignity, even though there is a connection between equality and equal dignity. (The connection is "hidden" in the human rights stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect human dignity.)
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> The term egalization is meant to avoid claiming that everybody should become equal and that there should be no differences between people. Egality can coexist with functional hierarchy that regards all participants as possessing equal dignity; egality can not coexist, though, with hierarchy that defines some people as lesser beings and others as more valuable.
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> If we imagine the world as a container with a height and a width, *globalization* addresses the horizontal dimension, the shrinking width. *Egalization* concerns the vertical dimension, reminiscent of Hofstede's power distance. Egalization is a process away from a very high container of masters at the top and underlings at the bottom, towards a flat container with everybody enjoying equal dignity.
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> Egalization is a process that elicits hot feelings of humiliation when it is promised but fails. The lack of egalization is thus the element that is heating up feelings among so-called "globalization-critics." Their disquiet stems from lack of egalization and not from an overdose of globalization. What they call for is that *globalization* ought to marry *egalization.*

As becomes clear from these definitions, I prefer to speak about the *vertical ranking of human worth and value*, and less about *inequality*, *hierarchy*, or *stratification*. This is because the significant point for my discussion is not the absence or presence of hierarchy, inequality or stratification, but whether human worthiness is ranked or not. Hierarchy, inequality and stratification can very well coexist with the absence of ranking human beings as unequal. The important point is that a system that condones the vertical scale of human value *essentializes* hierarchy, inequality, and stratification. In such a social framework, a street sweeper not only does a lowly *job*, the lowliness of the task is essentialized as inner core of his entire being: He or she is a lowly *person*. Something that could very well be peripheral to this person's essence, namely the task of sweeping the street, is turned into her core definition: this person is deemed to be of lower human value and worth. This act of essentialization is what we find in many, if not most, traditional societies. For them, rankism is mainstream doctrine.

To conclude, we find ourselves in times of transition, a transition from hierarchical rankings of human worthiness to equal dignity as stipulated in human rights ideals. "Globalization critics," according to my view, burn for globalization that is infused with egalization and oppose globalization which lacks egalization.

They do not oppose globalization. The transition that causes hot feelings – not least feelings of humiliation – is the transition towards egalization.

In times of transition, old and new worlds clash

There are at least two major problems that occur in times of transition; the first problem is that the old worldviews clash with the new ones; the second problem is that the slowness of a transition usually wears and tears everybody. In times of transition, all tend to feel humiliated, proponents of the old order by being asked to abandon it, and proponents of the new order by its lack of realization.

As long as traditional honor societies were homogenous and everybody was adhering to the belief that the existence of hierarchically structured societies, with *higher* and *lesser* beings, are god's will or nature's order, putting down people in order to create inferiors, may have represented quite an efficient approach. During many centuries, not only elites, also underlings often believed that their topdog or underdog positions, respectively, were "given." Underlings did not necessarily include the sufferings emanating from being lowered – being put down, even beaten and abused – into their happiness equation. Being an underling was often accepted – even if painful – like a natural disaster.

As long as societies are organized in hierarchical ways, with masters at the top and underlings at the bottom, and this structure is seen to be a divinely ordained way of keeping communities together, humiliating people in order to humble them is a core practice that is seen as necessary and indispensable. In the course of the past centuries, if masters did not protect their privileges and hold down subordinates in their *sub* position, they were called *lazy*. The "lazy kings" (les rois fainéants) of the sixth and seventh centuries in France, for example, were ridiculed because they allowed their immediate subordinates, the "maires du palais," the managers of the palace, to usurp power. One of these "maires du palais" indeed eventually took over the throne in the year 751.

Within traditional societal structures – and they are in place in many communities around the world also nowadays – humiliation and humbling are intertwined. In case of power struggles, typically the strongest and mightiest wins and enforces a hierarchical order, using what Sidanius & Pratto (1999) call legitimizing myths to justify it. Thus, not achieving *equal* dignity is the aim in power struggles in traditional hierarchical societies, but achieving *unequal* dignity. As mentioned earlier, I equate this "unequal dignity" with the honor that is attached to different echelons in collectivist hierarchical societies.

The advent of human rights ideals, or, more precisely, the fact that such ideals have increasingly developed into mainstream ideals, introduces a grave and confusing dilemma and contradictory situation. The contradiction is inserted by human rights ideals "undermining" previous acceptance of lowliness. Putting people down no longer necessarily brings home the message of "prosocial" humbling. Human rights ideals turn practices that previously were legitimate, into illegitimate practices: Human rights ideals call for equal dignity; human rights no longer condone ranked worthiness of masters and underlings.

As soon as human rights enter the scene, old traditions, customs, beliefs, norms, and practices come under scrutiny and criticism. Adherents of the old order slide into opposition to promoters of the new world view. Mohamad Mahathir, the former Malaysian Prime Minister, for example, brands international criticism of human rights abuses, for example in South East Asia, as intrusive, humiliating, and arrogant breaches of Asian sovereignty in the name of alien Western values. At the same time, human rights organizations in his own country call for the observation of precisely the rights he criticizes. The claim that human rights are universal lies at the center of this debate.

In times of transition, the slowness of change wears

Usually, when new ideas emerge, their implementation lags behind, and in between, we have empty rhetoric. Those, who would rather maintain the old order try to slow down the transition, those who have bought into the new ideas, try to hasten it. Both get frustrated. The potential for conflict that compounds the already difficult transition is great. Those who adhere to the old worldviews reject the new one as imperialistic imposition, humiliating as it were, while those who promote the new order feel victimised and humiliated by old style oppression.

Particular the phase of empty rhetoric is prone to breed feelings of humiliation.

Figure 2 illustrates how the curve of feelings of humiliation may be linked to the curve of awareness of human rights ideals. Awareness of human rights rises while at the same time reality lags behind, and thus feelings of humiliation fill the gap.[12]

Human rights ideals represent an invitation: The poor and downtrodden of the world are invited as members of equal dignity into the family of humankind. This invitation is usually issued by Western countries; they are the ones to advocate human rights. However, at the same time reality flies into the face of the advocated ideals; or, more precisely, the poor get poorer. As is widely known, the gap between the haves and have-nots, both locally and globally, is growing; fair global trade rules or attention to deteriorating resources are wanting. Thus, the downtrodden of the world are first presented with ideals, by the West, that subsequently are violated – by their very preachers. Whereas in former times God or nature were held responsible for poverty and wretchedness, now the rich are seen to violate their own ideals by letting the poor linger in abject misery – worse than that, by even making the poor more miserable.

[12] see also Davies' famous J-Curve: Davies (1962, 1969); see also Boudon (1986).



Figure 2: The curve of feelings of humiliation.

Morton Deutsch writes in 2002 on the problem of *rising expectations*:

> Many social scientists, before and after Tocqueville, have written insightfully about the "revolution of rising expectations" to explain the paradox that social discontent and even revolutionary activity is more likely to occur after social conditions have improved, when there is rising hope, not bleak despair. The explanation generally follows two major lines. First, improvement of social conditions increases aspirations by increasing what is perceived to be possible to attain. Demand may increase at a faster rate than the actual gains received, with a resulting increase in relative deprivation and in the sense of injustice. The increased discontent is most likely to occur if the gains are discontinued or reversed after the initial gains have heightened further expectations.
>
> The second explanation of the effects of gains is that, the increase is not uniform in all areas in which the victimized are disadvantaged. Improvement in one area, such as education, only makes one more sensitive to the injustice one is experiencing in other areas such as employment, police protection, and housing. Many social

> scientists have advanced the proposition that status-disequilibrium (such that there are differences in one's relative statuses in income, education, social prestige, and the like) is a source of tension and discontent. Thus, a very effective way of enhancing the sense of injustice of the victimized is to increase their education and little else.[13]

What has been done or the current state-of-the-art

Few researchers have studied humiliation explicitly. In many cases the term humiliation is not differentiated from other concepts; humiliation and shame, for example, are often used exchangeably, among others by Silvan S. Tomkins (1962–1992) whose work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson. Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of altogether nine affects, namely as a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, October 1, 1999).[14]

In Lindner's work, humiliation is distinctly addressed on its own account and differentiated from other concepts. Humiliation is, for example, not regarded simply as a variant of shame. Dennis Smith, professor of sociology at Loughborough University, UK and founder of LOGIN, has been introduced to the notion of humiliation through Lindner's research and has since incorporated the notion actively into his work in a fascinating way.[15]

The view that humiliation may be a particularly forceful phenomenon is supported by the research of, for example, Suzanne M. Retzinger (1991) and Thomas J. Scheff and Retzinger (1991),[16] who studied shame and humiliation in marital quarrels. They show that the suffering caused by humiliation is highly significant and that the bitterest divisions have their roots in shame and humiliation. Also W. Vogel and Lazare (1990) document *unforgivable humiliation* as a very serious obstacle in couples' treatment.[17] Robert L. Hale (1994) addressed *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder*.[18] Humiliation has also been studied in such fields as love, sex and social attractiveness,[19] depression,[20] society and identity formation,[21] sports,[22] history, literature and film.[23]

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[13] Deutsch (2002), p. 27-28.

[14] see also Nathanson (1992).

[15] see Smith (2000a,b, 2001, 2002a,b).

[16] Retzinger (1991), and Scheff & Retzinger (1991).

[17] Vogel & Lazare (1990). See also Anatol Rapoport (1997), who writes that "... the most intense feelings experienced by human beings are probably those engendered by conflict and by love" (Rapoport, 1997, xxi).

[18] Hale (1994). See also Lehmann (1995); Schlesinger (1998).

[19] see, for example, Baumeister et al. (1993); Brossat (1995); Gilbert (1997); Proulx et al. (1994).

[20] see, for example, Brown et al. (1995); Miller (1988).

[21] see, for example, Ignatieff (1997); Markus et al. (1996); Silver et al. (1986); Wood et al. (1994).

[22] see, for example, Hardman et al. (1996).

Donald Klein's very insightful work on humiliation dates back to 1991, in, for example, the *Journal of Primary Prevention* that devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation in 1991,[24] 1992,[25] and 1999.[26] Linda Hartling (1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (Humiliation Inventory)[27] where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring *being teased, bullied, scorned, excluded, laughed a*t, *put down, ridiculed, harassed, discounted, embarrassed, cruelly criticized, treated as invisible, discounted as a person, made to feel small or insignificant, unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service, called names or referred to in derogatory terms*, or viewed by others as *inadequate*, or *incompetent*. The questions probe the extent to which respondents had felt harmed by such incidents throughout life, and how much they feared such incidents.

Scheff and Retzinger extended their work on violence and Holocaust and studied the part played by *humiliated fury* (Scheff 1997, p. 11; the term was coined by Helen Block Lewis (1971)) in escalating conflict between individuals and nations (Scheff (1988, 1990a,b, 1997)[28]). Also psychiatrist James Gilligan (1996) focuses on humiliation as a cause for violence, in his book *Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and How to Treat It*.[29]

Vamik D. Volkan[30] and Joseph Montville[31] carried out important work on psycho-political analysis of intergroup conflict and its traumatic effects,[32] as did Blema S. Steinberg (1996).[33] Furthermore, Ervin Staub's work is highly significant.[34] See also the journal *Social Research* in 1997, whose special issue was stimulated by the *Decent Society* by Avishai Margalit (1996).[35]

Nisbett and Cohen (1996) examined an honor-based notion of humiliation.[36] The honor to which Cohen and Nisbett refer is the kind that operates in the more traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds.[37] William Ian

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[23] see, for example, Peters (1993); Stadtwald (1992); Toles (1995); Zender (1994).

[24] Klein (1991). See for further work Broom & Klein (1999); Klein (1992a).

[25] Barrett & Brooks (1992); Klein (1992b); Smith (1992).

[26] Hartling & Luchetta (1999).

[27] Hartling & Luchetta (1999).

[28] See also Masson (1996); Vachon (1993); Znakov (1990). See, furthermore, Charny (1997), and his analysis of excessive power strivings.

[29] Gilligan (1996).

[30] See, for example, Volkan (1988, 1992, 1994, 1997); Volkan & Harris (1995).

[31] See, for example, Montville (1993); Volkan et al. (1990); Montville (1990).

[32] Together with their colleagues at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction of the University of Virginia, Harris (1994), Stein & Apprey (1990); and Ross (1993, 1995b).

[33] Steinberg (1996).

[34] See Staub (1989, 1990, 1993, 1996). See for more literature on psychological approaches to the field of international relations, for example, Cviic (1993); Luo (1993); Midiohouan (1991); Steinberg (1996); Urban (1990).

[35] Margalit (1996), see also Frankfurt (1997); Honneth (1997); Lukes (1997); Mack (1997); Margalit (1997); Pettit (1997); Quinton (1997); Ripstein (1997); Oksenberg Rorty (1997); Schick (1997).

[36] Nisbett & Cohen (1996).

[37] See other evidence relating to blood feuds in Boehm (1984), Malcolm (1998), and Rodina (1999). I owe these references to Adam Jones.

Miller (1993), wrote a book entitled *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence*, where he links humiliation to honor as understood in *The Iliad* or Icelandic sagas, namely humiliation as violation of honor.

There is a significant literature in philosophy on *the politics of recognition*, claiming that people who are not recognized suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence.[38] Max Scheler set out these issues in his classic book *Ressentiment* (1912/1961).[39] In his first period of work, for example in his *The Nature of Sympathy* (1913/1954),[40] Scheler focuses on human feelings, love, and the nature of the person. He states that the human person is at bottom a loving being, *ens amans*, who may feel *ressentiment*.[41]

This overview does not exhaust the contributions to be found in the literature on the topic of humiliation – or rather on related issues, since, to my awareness, only Miller, Hartling, and the two above-mentioned journals explicitly put the word and concept of *humiliation* at the centre of their attention. In Lindner (2003c), other authors will also be introduced and cited.

However, as soon as we turn to issues that are related to humiliation then a wide field of research opens up: Research on mobbing and bullying touches upon the phenomenon of humiliation and should therefore be included.[42] Research on mobbing and bullying leads over to the field of prejudice and stigmatization,[43] which in turn draws on research on trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder PTSD,[44] aggression (see further down), power and conflict,[45] stress,[46] and emotions.[47]

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[38] see also Honneth (1997), on related themes.

[39] *Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil*, by Scheler (1912), published in English under the title *Ressentiment*, Scheler (1961). See also Liah Greenfeld, who suggests that ressentiment plays a central role in nation building, Greenfeld (1992, 1996).

[40] *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haß*, by Scheler (1913), published in English under the title *The Nature of Sympathy*, Scheler (1954).

[41] It was Dagfinn Føllesdal, later Thomas Cushman, editor of Human Rights Review, and Reidar Ommundsen, who drew my attention to Scheler and Honneth.

[42] See especially Heinz Leymann for work on mobbing, Leymann (1990, 1996); Leymann & Gustafsson (1996), as well as Dan Åke Olweus on mobbing and bullying at school, Olweus (1993, 1997). The confusion around the use of the terms mobbing and bullying stems from the fact that these phenomena are addressed differently in different countries. Leymann suggests keeping the word bullying for activities between children and teenagers at school and reserving the word mobbing for adult behavior at workplaces.

[43] Edvard E. Jones (1984), *Social Stigma – The Psychology of Marked Relationships* is a central book on stigmatization.

[44] There exists a huge body of research and literature, see, for example, Bremner et al. (1992); Eitinger (1990); Everly (1993); Figley (1989); Gerbode (2000); Havermans (1998); Horowitz et al. (1995); Kardiner (1941); Lavik et al. (1999); McCann & Pearlman (1992); Nadler & Ben Shushan (1989); Pearlman (1994, 1998); Perry (1994); van der Kolk et al. (1984); van der Kolk (1994); van der Kolk & van der Hart (1989, 1991); van der Kolk & Kadish (1987).

[45] Political scientists P. Bachrach & Baratz (1962), were among the first to address power and conflict in their article "The Two Faces of Power" that is placed within the context of the civil rights movement in the USA of the nineteen sixties. See also Tedeschi et al. (1973) on Conflict, Power, and Games: the Experimental Study of Interpersonal Relations.

[46] Standard reading on stress psychology is Richard S. Lazarus (1966), *Psychological Stress and the Coping Process* and Lazarus & Folkman (1984), *Stress, Appraisal and Coping*. Stress is not necessarily negative, it may also be a stimulating challenge – and there are individual differences why some

Conflict and peace are topics that have been widely studied; thousands of publications are to be found that cover a wide range of conflicts, from interpersonal to intergroup and international conflict. The search word *terrorism* renders thousands of hits in databases.[48] Instead of presenting large lists of publications at this point I would like to mention some of those that had particular significance for my research project on humiliation. A pioneer of conflict studies in social psychology was Morton Deutsch,[49] the founder of the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) at Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.[50] Also Herbert C. Kelman was among the first to work in this field.[51] David A. Hamburg's work for prevention, as President of the Carnegie Corporation, has been highlighted earlier.

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people thrive under stress and others break. See, for example, *Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages* by Carver (1998); *Embodying Psychological Thriving: Physical Thriving in Response to Stress* by Epel et al. (1998); Q*uantitative Assessment of Thriving* by Cohen et al. (1998); *Beyond Recovery From Trauma: Implications for Clinical Practice and Research* by Calhoun & Tedeschi (1998); *Exploring Thriving in the Context of Clinical Trauma Theory: Constructivist Self Development Theory* by Saakvitne et al. (1998).

[47] Antonio R. Damasio (1994), with his book *Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, provides a perspective on the important "constructive" role that emotions play for the process of our decision making; it shows how the traditional view of "heart" versus "head" is obsolete. Daniel Goleman (1996), in his more widely known book *Emotional Intelligence* relies heavily on Damasio. Goleman gives, among others, a description of the brain activities that lead to post-traumatic stress disorder. *The Handbook of Emotion and Memory* by Christianson (1992) addresses the important interplay between emotions and memory. Humiliation is a process that is deeply embedded in the individual's interdependence with her environment, and therefore relational concepts of mind such as Gibson's ecological psychology of "affordance" are relevant. Gibson "includes environmental considerations in psychological taxonomies" writes de Jong (1997) (Abstract). M. A. Forrester (1999) presents an related approach that he defines as "discursive ethnomethodology," that focuses on "narrativization as process bringing together Foucault's (1972) discourse theory, Gibson's (1979) affordance metaphor and conversation analysis. I thank Reidar Ommundsen and Finn Tschudi for kindly helping me to get access to psychological theories on emotion, especially as developed by Tomkins and Nathanson. Silvan S. Tomkins (1962) developed one of the most interesting theories of the human being and emotions; see his four volumes of Affect Imagery and Consciousness. See also Virginia Demos (1995), editor of *Exploring Affect*, a book that eases the otherwise difficult access to Tomkins' thinking. Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on script, shame, and pride. Scripts are "the structures within which we store scenes;" they are "sets of rules for the ordering of information about SARS" [Stimulus-Affect-Response Sequences], Nathanson (1996). Tomkins does not always differentiate between humiliation and shame and uses it exchangeably, while Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of nine, namely a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, 1st October 1999 in Oslo). See for work on scripts also Eric Berne (1972), with his book *What Do You Say After You Say Hello?* that illuminates script theory from the clinical perspective. Abelson (1976) addresses the issue from the cognitive perspective, compared to Tomkins personality-psychological perspective. Also the sociology of emotions is relevant; see especially the work of Thomas J. Scheff on violence and emotions such as shame.

[48] See, just to give two examples, Reich (1990), or Gilbert (1994).

[49] See, for example, Deutsch & Coleman (2000); Deutsch (1973, 1976, 1994); Deutsch & Hornstein (1975); Deutsch & Krauss (1965).

[50] For an overview over social psychology of conflict see also Stroebe et al. (1988), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict*.

[51] See, for example, Kelman (1992, 1997, 1999); Kelman & Hamilton (1989); Kelman & Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (1965).

Lee D. Ross, principal investigator and co-founder of the *Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN)*, addresses psychological barriers to conflict resolution.[52] William Ury, Director of the *Project on Preventing War at Harvard University*, and co-author of *Getting to Yes*,[53] and author of *Getting to Peace*[54] focuses in his anthropological work on conflict. Monty Marshall, founding director of the *Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR)* program at the *Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM)*, University of Maryland, wrote a seminal book on protracted conflict and the hypothesis of *diffusion of insecurity* (Marshall (1999)). Bar-On and Nadler (1999) call for more attention to be given to conflicts in contexts of power asymmetry.[55]

In cases where humiliation shall be studied in cross-cultural settings, cross-cultural psychology has to be included,[56] and the anthropological, sociological and philosophical embeddedness of processes of humiliation in different cultural contexts has to be addressed. If humiliation between groups or even nations is to be studied then history and political science play a central role.

Concluding remarks

Philosopher Thomas Pogge (2002) writes: "A society cannot secure for all of its members a happy love life or a trip to the moon. Rights to such benefits would therefore be mere manifesto rights" (p. 30). Indeed, he continues, "A human right to basic necessities, as postulated for instance in Article 25 of the UDHR…involves no duty on everyone to help supply such necessities to those who would otherwise be without them" (p. 36). Pogge outlines the path to go, "It rather involves a duty on citizens to ensure that any coercive social order they collectively impose upon each of themselves is one under which, insofar as reasonably possible, each has secure access to these necessities (p. 66) …Each member of society, according to his or her means, is to help create and sustain a social and political order under which all have secure access to the objects of their civil rights" (p. 69). Pogge closes with Darwin, "Surprisingly perhaps, this duty was well expressed by Charles Darwin more than a century ago: 'If the misery of our poor be caused not by laws of nature, but by our own institutions, great is our sin'[57]" (p. 67).

Avishai Margalit (1996) wrote the book *The Decent Society*, in which he calls for institutions that do not anymore humiliate citizens. He states that it is not suffi-

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[52] See, for example, Ross & Ward (1995, 1996); Ross (1995a); Ross & Nisbett (1991); Ross & Samuels (1993).

[53] Fisher et al. (1991).

[54] Ury (1999).

[55] Bar-On & Nadler (1999).

[56] See, example the work of Michael Harris Bond that has been already mentioned. I can only present a small selection of important books and some articles, Bond (1992, 1997, 1998), Smith & Bond (1999). Harry Charalambos Triandis is an important name as well, see, for example, Triandis (1980, 1990, 1995, 1997), Schwartz (1994). Richard W. Brislin is another very relevant name, see, for example Brislin (1993), Cushner & Brislin (1996), Landis & Brislin (1983).

[57] Quoted by Gould (1991), p. 19.

cient to merely aspire to building *just* societies, *decent* societies should be implemented that do not entail humiliation. Humiliating living conditions are not only unjust; they are also *obscene*. Decency reigns when humiliation is being minimised, humiliation in relationships, but particularly humiliation inflicted by institutions. Decency rules when dignity for all is made possible.

We could argue that the world has survived for centuries, and more, without "decency," why should we need it now? If humiliating people is a way to build stable societies imbued with calm and order, why not apply humiliation? And if humiliating people is a venerated and accepted custom and tradition, why not apply it? And if the introduction of human rights ideals is perceived as an act of humiliating imperialism, why introduce them?

In my *theory of humiliation* – see, for example, Lindner (2003c) – I suggest that human rights norms – with their push toward what I call egalization – are brought to the fore by globalization (defined as coming-together of humankind), this is the first argument, and secondly, that human rights norms are more suitable in a globalizing world than old honor codes. I argue that the reality and imagery of the coming-together of humankind into *One* single in-group – the "global village" – expands "in-group ethics" onto the entire global village; this is the first argument. Secondly, in a global knowledge society of win-win framings (Ury, 1999), equal dignity is more appropriate than honor norms as promoter of skills that increasingly are in demand, namely creativity, motivation, and flexibility.

Of course, this is not an ethical or moral argument or discussion; however, I wish to refrain from making a moral argument at this point. I propose that human rights ideals may be conceptualized as an outflow and at the same time reflexive adaptation to increasing international interdependence, or globalization when defined as the "coming-together of humankind."

And indeed, sustainability, both socially (long-term justice and peace) and ecologically (state of the biosphere that enables human survival), requires humility, and not humiliation. I define humility as follows:[58]

> Humility is the renouncement of arrogance. Humility is a virtue that requires bowing. Arrogant people believe they can take down the sky and do the impossible. Humble people, on the other side, recognize that there may be limits. Shaming often tries to elicit humility. Shaming is therefore the current business of civil society. Corporations and governments are being *shamed* into abiding to the promises of humility they made. They are asked if they are not ashamed of cutting down the trees that are the backbone of a healthy global climate. Humility is the acknowledgement of the embeddedness of every living creature on Earth within a fragile bio-sphere. Humility is also the acknowledgement of equal dignity for every human being, and the acknowledgment of dignity also for animals.

[58] see Lindner (2003a).

I would like to conclude this paper by calling for a *Moratorium on Humiliation*.[59] A *Moratorium on Humiliation* stipulates that for a global village to be *sustainable*, *egalization* is to be promoted, which in turn requires a mindset of *decency* and *humility* and not of arrogant humiliation. As discussed earlier, the transition is difficult. Typically, as stated above "there are at least two major problems that occur in times of transition; the first problem is that the old worldviews clash with the new ones; the second problem is that the slowness of a transition usually wears and tears everybody. In times of transition, all tend to feel humiliated, proponents of the old order by being asked to abandon it, and proponents of the new order by its lack of realization."

I would like to encourage all players on the present world stage to refrain from compounding an already difficult transition by instigating cycles of humiliation that only make this transition more painful. It is to be expected that feelings of humiliation increase as soon as underlings adopt the human rights view that their lowly fate no longer is legitimate. Human rights teachings must be expected to increase feelings of humiliation among the downtrodden, who no longer explain their misery by God's will or nature's order. And emerging feelings of humiliation have the potential to fuel cycles of humiliation-for humiliation. Nelson Mandela, in South Africa, showed to the world, how emerging feelings of humiliation can be poured into constructive social change towards what I call egalization, instead of brutal violence, war and genocide. Mandela did not inflict humiliation on anybody, not on victims and not on perpetrators, when he responded to being humiliated and to feeling humiliated. His life work in many ways embodies the *Moratorium on Humiliation*.

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[59] Similar to the Moratorium On Trade In Small Arms, or the Moratorium On Commercial Whaling. Read, for example, Patten & Lindh (2001).

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