Humiliation

A New Basis for Understanding, Preventing, and Defusing Conflict and Violence in the World and Our Lives

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Acknowledgements

This manuscript partly builds on a research project that examined Rwanda and Somalia and compared their cases with Hitler's Germany. The project has been carried out at the University of Oslo (1997-2001) and was entitled *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*. It has been funded by the Norwegian Research Council and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I would like to express my great gratitude for their support.

I thank the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo for hosting the project. I highly appreciate the kind welcome and home I was granted at this institute. I especially thank Reidar Ommundsen for taking up the heavy and difficult task of being my academic supervisor. I furthermore thank Jan Smedslund for so supportively accompanying my way over the years and heading my doctoral committee in 2001 (In 2001, I was awarded a Ph.D. in psychology for the research on humiliation; it added to my first PhD, in medicine, that I had received in 1994 in Germany for my comparative research on quality of life in Egypt and Germany).

Since many of my interlocutors and informants in and from Africa survive under the most difficult life circumstances I wish to extend especially warm thanks to them. I hope that at some point in the future I will be able to give back at least a fraction of all the support I received from them. I also thank my interlocutors from all parts of the world who work with genocide, conflict resolution, peace, development, and humanitarian aid in international and national organizations (from United Nations to international and national NGOs). They all helped me graciously with understanding their fields of activities by letting me participate in their lives.

I furthermore received generous international academic support from a wide range of academic disciplines, such as social anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, philosophy, and political science. I would like to fill many pages with the names of my generous supporters; however, space does not permit this. I would therefore like to select four personalities even though my deep-felt thanks go to so many more. The project could not have been carried out without the invaluable help of Dennis Smith, professor of sociology at Loughborough University (UK). Dennis Smith has been introduced to the notion of humiliation through my research and has since incorporated the notion actively into his work in a fascinating way. Furthermore, without Lee D. Ross's continuous and never-ending encouragement my research would not have been possible. Lee Ross is a principal investigator and co-founder of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN). Later in the course of the project I met Morton Deutsch, Director Emeritus & E.L. Thorndike Professor Emeritus, and founder of the International Center for Cooperation & Conflict Resolution, Teachers College, Columbia University, and received his absolutely invaluable support. I would like to thank Morton Deutsch, Lee Ross, and Dennis Smith very warmly. Very recently, I also met with David A. Hamburg, former President of the Carnegie Corporation and his account encouraged me immensely. I would now like to add a list of around 500 international academic contacts that were essential for my research. Unfortunately, there is not space to name all of them. I received support and advice in numerous ways, via email, in discussions, and conversations; it was always extended generously and fills me with great gratitude.

This book moreover draws on my experience as a clinical psychologist and counselor and I thank my clients for extending their confidence to me. From 1980 I

did counseling work in Germany, alongside my medical studies, from 1984-1987 I spent time as a psychological counselor at the American University in Cairo, and from 1987 to 1991 in my own private practice in Cairo. I offered counseling in English, French, German, Norwegian, and, after some years, also in Egyptian-Arabic. My clients came from diverse cultural backgrounds, many from the expatriate community in Cairo, such as Americans, Europeans, Scandinavians, Palestinians, and citizens of other African countries, as well as from the local community, both Western-oriented, and traditionally-oriented Egyptians. Part of my work was what could be called *culture-counseling*, meaning that foreigners working in Egypt asked me for my support in understanding Egyptian culture, Arab culture, and Islam. Before coming to Egypt, from 1974-1984, I studied and worked in New Zealand, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Israel, West Africa, USA, Germany, and Norway, as a student of both psychology and of medicine. I thank all those people who kindly opened their minds and houses for me during the years of my international work.

Finally I would like to thank my family. The impact of the trauma of World War II weighs heavily on them, even today, decades after the end of this war. Their courageous handling of this trauma gave my work its direction and motivation.

Foreword by Morton Deutsch

I first met Dr. Evelin Lindner in December 2001 when she was the speaker at a Colloquium of the Peace Education Program at Teachers College, Columbia University. I was attracted to attend the Colloquium by the title of her talk, "Humiliation and the Roots of Violence." At her talk, I was impressed by the importance and originality of her ideas. She showed how humiliation – a profound emotion which, unfortunately, has been little studied by psychologists – has often played a critical role in leading to destructive international and interpersonal conflicts. Her talk was illustrated by fascinating examples drawn from her rich and varied international experiences in such countries as Rwanda, Somalia, Egypt, Germany, and the United States.

As a result of her talk, she was invited to teach a Workshop course on the psychology of humiliation in the Program on Conflict Resolution at Teachers College during the summer sessions of 2002 and 2003. Her course was extremely well-received by the students and faculty in the Program. During the summer of 2002, I read many of Dr. Lindner's papers and had an opportunity to talk with her about her work. I was very much impressed and urged her to write a book which would present her ideas to a wider social science audience as well as to policy makers and the intelligent lay public. During the period from the Fall of 2002 through the Spring of 2003, she wrote the book despite a very painful illness.

This book is a very valuable and original contribution to understanding how the experience of humiliation can lead to destructive interaction at the interpersonal and international levels. She aptly describes humiliation as the "nuclear bomb of emotions." It has profound and devastating effects. It shakes the foundation of one's identity by devaluing one's worth and by undermining one's inherent human right to care and justice.

Dr. Lindner develops, with great insight, the important idea that humiliation has emerged only recently as an increasingly powerful and pervasive experience in human affairs. She attributes this emergence to two phenomena: *egalization* and *globalization*. Egalization refers to the development of the political ideal of equal dignity, during the 18th century, which was reflected in the American and French revolution of 1776 and 1787. Globalization refers to the increasing interdependence and interconnectedness of the peoples throughout the world. Thus a woman in Afghanistan who has previously accepted that her husband has the natural right to beat her if she disobeys him begins to feel humiliated when she learns (through her exposure to television) that, in other parts of the global village, women are viewed as equal to men and husbands are imprisoned for beating their wives.

Dr. Lindner is a very thoughtful woman who has read widely and deeply in the social sciences. She has also had a rich, varied experience in many countries as a researcher doing interviews, as a psychotherapist and counselor working with clients, and as a global citizen immersing herself in and embracing diverse local cultures. As a result, this book is of unique value. It is well-grounded in the relevant social science literature and its ideas are richly illustrated with interesting case studies and interviews. In addition to its main ideas, throughout the book there are many thoughtful comments and useful psychological suggestions which reflect her wisdom and professional experience. Finally, her passionate commitment, as a global citizen, to helping our world become a global village in which all of its inhabitants can live with human dignity permeates the book and leads her to devote a major section of the book to what can be done about humiliation. Here, she addresses what a victim can

do, what the United States can do, what the UN can do, and what the reader can do.

The book should be of interest to a wide audience. Psychologists and other social scientists will find new ideas to enrich their understanding of how humiliation contributes to destructive conflict and violence at the international as well as interpersonal levels. Policy makers will not only be exposed to these new ideas but also to their policy implications. And, beyond the foregoing, all readers – whether they have a professional interest or not – will find much of value to their personal lives.

Morton Deutsch

E.L. Thorndike Professor Emeritus of Psychology and Education &

International Center for Cooperation & Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) Director Emeritus

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Prologue

The horrific events on September 11, 2001, in the United States shook the world. Osama bin Laden acted as the ultimate humiliator of the Western world. Taking down the World Trade Center's Twin Towers, the symbols of Western power, was a cruel message of humiliation.

Prior to this, for years, I feared much worse. The simmering resentment worldwide was only too apparent to open-eyed global citizens. My yearlong angst was that hundreds of thousands of people or even millions would die. I wrote in numerous publications that the world was lucky that no Hitler-like leader had yet seized on the rage boiling around the world and devised grand strategies of destruction. Then, on September 11, shock and awe[1] were spread with an effect so overwhelming as if millions had died.

It is common knowledge to assume that World War II was triggered, at least partly, by the humiliation that the Versailles Treaties inflicted on Germany after the First World War. The urge to redress and avert humiliation was the "fuel" that powered Hitler and provided him with followers. Hitler unleashed war on his neighbors to remedy past humiliation inflicted on Germany. And he perpetrated the Holocaust to avert future humiliation that he, in his delusion, feared from "World Jewry." The Aryan race, he hallucinated, was to do "good" and "save" the world from humiliation. This, he believed, was the noble task that "providence" had put on his shoulders.

And, sadly, the German population harbored enough feelings of frustration and humiliation to feed into Hitler's hallucinations. Hitler on his own would have been a lone player; what made him dangerous was the resonance that his *narratives of humiliation* found in the larger population. Mussolini, in Italy, was put aside, quietly, by his people, already in 1943. Not so Hitler. Hitler galvanized a sufficiently large number of German people until as late as 1945, at a time when it was increasingly obvious that the price was self-destruction and, in effect, suicide.[2] Without this resonance, Hitler would have been void. Earlier, during World War I, Hitler was an isolated human being, scorned for his strange pathetic ramblings. He resembled those disturbed creatures, who babble wretched gobbledygook at street corners and believe that they are god-chosen. What people normally do is shake their heads and pass.

This portrayal of recent history entails a social-psychological hypothesis, namely that humiliation leads to simmering rage that may be infused in mass violence such as war and Holocaust in case leaders are available who channel feelings of frustration and humiliation burning in the hearts of masses. This hypothesis has been taken seriously by politicians and historians at the highest international level. After the Second World War the Marshall Plan was devised and it did not humiliate Germany again. And, indeed, Germany has not started a World War III. Instead it became a respected member of the European family. What we learn from this history lesson, in Europe, is that humiliation may lead to war, whereas avoiding humiliation may lead to peace.[3]

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[1] See Ullman and Wade, 1996, on the political/military strategy of *shock and awe* going back to Sun Tzu, the warrior-philosopher of ancient China.

[2] compare also Ullman and Wade, 1996, and the case of Japan in 1945 and its suicidal resistance, a resistance that was "halted" by the nuclear bombs' "shock and awe."

[3] Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirmed this when he spoke at Harvard University June 5, 1972, at the commemoration of George Marshall's speech 25 years earlier (Brandt, 1999). Brandt's speech was entitled: *1945 Different Than 1918*. Willy Brandt declared: "Victories, too, can be bitter, especially if they carry the seed for future conflicts as in 1918, when the

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have brought this lesson home to the United States and the entire world. Or, to be more precise, this lesson is still waiting to be brought home. Therefore I write this book. This book suggests that humankind has learned very valuable historic lessons that now ought to be applied not least to the *war on terror*. We all should remember the effects that the Treaties of Versailles had after World War I, as compared to the outcome of the Marshall Plan after World War II. The first instilled humiliation and subsequent violence, the latter respect and dignity and subsequent peace.

Recently, Hitler's Germany has been invoked with regard to Iraq's Saddam Hussein and it was widely felt that war was needed to "take out" evil. This book proposes to learn the German/European lesson with a more long-term punctuation of historic time. The lesson does not start with Hitler. It starts with the Treaties of Versailles. And, I suggest, it is not a lesson about evil but about humiliation.

The lesson of the Marshall Plan teaches us that long-term prevention through the instilment of respect and dignity may be a more effective handling of human affairs than short-term emergency policing after having overlooked the potential backlash looming after humiliation. It teaches us that humiliation has to be avoided so as to dry out the waters in which tyrants and instigators of terror swim. Hitler's regime could possibly have been prevented if there had been a Marshall Plan after World War I. Then there would have been no tyrant and no need to disarm him. Humiliated hearts and minds may represent the only "real" weapons of mass destruction.

Europe was a hotbed of war and death. The Marshall Plan – whatever ulterior motives it may have had apart from discontinuing a cycle of humiliation – indeed introduced respect and dignity. Implementing it was a courageous act – against strong political forces that wanted to humiliate Germany again. Executing the Marshall Plan was more courageous than mopping up Europe after a Third World War would have been. The Marshall Plan brought peace to Europe. Who would have predicted the emergence of a European Union? Is not this an unthinkable thought, "a union of arch enemies"? The Marshall Plan teaches us important lessons about courage, serenity and resolve, about what these terms really mean for the safety of *our loved ones*, and where the will to act and stand firm has to focus.

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war was won, and peace was lost for want of reason on the part of the winners and the losers, through stubborn mistrust on the one side, through resentment of the humiliated on the other... George Marshall and others agreed that victory did not relieve his country of its responsibility. The United States did not for a moment claim that responsibility for itself, it shared it with its allies...With his plan George Marshall roused Europe's stifled self-confidence. He gave many citizens of the old continent a concrete stimulus to bring down from the stars the vision of a Europe united in lasting peace... the Marshall Plan was productive proof that America needs a self-confident Europe capable of forming a common political will... it waits for Europe to grow into an equal partner with whom it can share the burden of responsibility for world affairs...1947 marked the beginning of the Cold War, not because of, but in spite of the Marshall Plan."
There is a controversial discussion as to the "real" motives behind the implementation of the Marshall Pan, pertaining to geopolitical situation with the Soviet Union, for example, and as to the "real" economic impact of the Marshall Plan. This discussion will not be deepened here. Instead, the aspect is highlighted that the Marshall Plan, indeed, as Willy Brandt pointed out, roused self-confidence and respect.

Current analysis of terror and violence, both in their local and global expressions, usually lacks the element of humiliation. If not pure unfathomable evil, then poverty, deprivation, or marginalization are often pinpointed as driving people into terrorist activities or other forms of violence, somehow automatically. However, why do we then see well-to-do and highly educated terrorists organizing and perpetrating atrocities? Why do poverty, deprivation, marginalization, ethnic incompatibilities, or even conflict of interest and struggles over scarce resources sometimes lead to cooperation and innovation and only sometimes to violence? When there is too little bread, we may share and not fight. Thus, all so-called "hard" explanations for violence and war may falter, because at times the very same conditions lead to innovative peaceful solutions instead of violent confrontation.

Humiliation is presented in this book as the "missing link" that explains why conditions at times are perceived as illegitimate violations justifying counter-violence, at other times not, and why wealthy people may organize and perpetrate terror. Particularly in a globalized and interdependent world humiliation may work as a *nuclear bomb of emotions* that hampers more moderate reactions and solutions.

In 1996, I wondered whether the hypothesis regarding the link between humiliation and different forms of war and violence has ever been explored by social psychology proper. I had many questions. Does humiliation always lead to war, Holocaust, genocide, terror and violence? If yes, then today as much as in past history? Or is the humiliation hypothesis relevant for bygone history only? And is it relevant only in politics? Or does it also play a role in organizations, corporations, private lives, and perhaps even with regard to the ways in which we think about ourselves? If it is relevant today and not only in past times, then, I concluded, the planet's chances for survival may depend on our handling of humiliation.

A literature search showed that the term humiliation was not really an academic term, not anywhere, social psychology included. At the same time the phenomenon of humiliation, more precisely, the reality of it, is clearly ubiquitous. It permeates virtually all research on trauma, violence, or aggression. Yet, the notion of humiliation has hardly ever been researched on its own account, except by a handful of particularly insightful researchers who, however, usually include humiliation into the category of shame. In my work, on the contrary, humiliation is distinctly addressed on its own account and differentiated from other concepts. I do not regard humiliation merely as a variant of shame.

In 1996, I designed a doctoral research project with the aim to focus on the concept of humiliation, differentiate it from other notions, and explore its role, not only in the distant past, but also in more recent events of violence, genocide and war. I interviewed over 200 people, who were either implicated in or knowledgeable on the genocides in Rwanda and Somalia; this fieldwork was backed up by interviews with people involved in German history (Lindner, 2001k).

From 1997-2001, this project was financed by the Norwegian Research Council (on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the Research Programme on Multilateral Development Assistance). In 2001, I defended my doctoral dissertation on humiliation at the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo, and thus earned my second Ph.D., in social psychology, subsequent to a doctorate in social medicine in 1994 that addressed the notion of quality of life in Egypt and Germany.

In other words, in this book I draw on my research in social psychology, on my medical experience, as well as on my work as a clinical psychologist and counselor (1980-1984 in Germany, 1984-1991 in Cairo, Egypt). Since 1997, I have concentrated

on building a *theory of humiliation* and have through this work in many ways contributed to create a new multidisciplinary subfield in the academic landscape.[4] It is important to note that not only psychology feeds into this theory, but anthropology, history, sociology, political science, and philosophy.

The *theory of humiliation* is, however, still in its infancy. Much future research, both qualitative and quantitative, with experiments, surveys, interviews, is required. This book thus aims at only tentatively demarcating a *new subfield* in social psychology, namely *research on humiliation* and invites the reader to join in. A *research agenda* is currently being developed by the author and interested scholars, and an *international network organization for humiliation studies*, waiting for your contributions, is in the process of being founded. The book invites readers to contribute to the *theory of humiliation* with their own reflections and research.

The *theory of humiliation* addresses humiliation in the political realm, but not only. Humiliation, these are the insights, permeates also the inner workings of organizations and corporations, as well as our private lives and even every person's inner dialogue and how we frame our selves. The dynamics of humiliation affect all levels, from macro to micro level.

The *theory of humiliation* stands in the service of prevention. It answers the call "never again!," never again violence, war, Holocaust, and terror. It is indebted to David Hamburg's saying "An ounce of prevention is worth many pounds of cure" (Hamburg, 2002). In this book, I attempt to be an educator, advocate and social scientist. The book is not only descriptive, but also educative, advocative and therapeutic. It is therapeutic in the sense that it attempts to attenuate aggressive expressions of rage. Yet it does more. In the chapter about the United States, a therapeutic message is sent to Americans that is designed to counteract and outweigh the message of "we hate you" that Americans received on September 11, 2001. The therapeutic aim is not necessarily to make everybody love everybody else, but to at least reach "a minimum standard for human relations" as it is formulated by the Coexistence Initiative.[5]

The book delineates tendencies and asks which ones are worth strengthening and which should better be mitigated for the sake of a *benign* future for the *global village*.[6] This book does not ask questions such as "Was the Iraq war right or wrong?" or, "Are the Americans right or wrong?" or, "Are the French right or wrong?" Such questions are regarded as less beneficial for building inclusive global peace.

The questions that are asked in this book are "Which tendencies can we observe?" and "Which tendencies would benefit from being strengthened?" or, "Which strategies fit particular circumstances?" Often strategies are "right" within particular contexts and "wrong" within others, thus making them both "right" and "wrong"

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[4] See for Lindner's publications, Lindner, 2005d, Lindner, 2005b, Lindner, 2005c, Lindner, 2005a, Hudnall and Lindner, 2004, Lindner, 2004c, Lindner, 2004d, Lindner, 2004b, Lindner, 2004a, Lindner, 2003c, Lindner, 2003b, Lindner, 2003a, Lindner, 2003e, Lindner, 2003d, Lindner, 2002e, Lindner, 2002f, Lindner, 2002g, Lindner, 2002b, Lindner, 2002a, Lindner, 2002c, Lindner, 2002d, Lindner, 2001f, Lindner, 2001d, Lindner, 2001b, Lindner, 2001c, Lindner, 2001g, Lindner, 2001i, Lindner, 2001j, Lindner, 2001h, Lindner, 2001e, Lindner, 2001a, Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000t, Lindner, 2000i, Lindner, 2000j, Lindner, 2000k, Lindner, 2000u, Lindner, 2000e, Lindner, 2000d, Lindner, 2000c, Lindner, 2000s, Lindner, 2000r, Lindner, 2000g, Lindner, 2000h, Lindner, 2000f, Lindner, 2000l, Lindner, 2000p, Lindner, 2000a, Lindner, 2000b, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000n, Lindner, 2000m, Lindner, 1999b, Lindner, 1999c, Lindner, 1999a, Lindner, 1999d, Lindner, 1998.

[5] See www.coexistence.net; see also Weiner (Ed.), 1998.

[6] The term *global village* has been coined by McLuhan and Fiore, 1986, in their book *War and Peace in the Global Village*.

depending on how the context is defined. This book invites adherents of "old" contexts and solutions to enter the "new" context of the emerging *global village* and the novel solutions that are "right" in this new situation. In that way this book is peace-promoting.

The framing of the human condition that is suggested in this book is also deeply hope-inducing. It stipulates that there may be a *benign future* in store for the *global village* in the long term, if only we manage to *steer clear* of the *malignancies* threatening from the mine fields that loom in the short term. I conclude the book with a call for a *Moratorium on Humiliation*.

Introduction

> The Olympic Committee advertises *Ideals of Olympism*[7] as follows and sends the following message *to the opponent*:
>
> You are my adversary, but you are not my enemy.
> For your resistance gives me strength.
> Your will gives me courage.
> Your spirit ennobles me.
> And though I aim to defeat you, should I succeed, I will not *humiliate* you.
> Instead, I will *honour* you.
> For without you, I am a lesser man.

Olympic ideals are a fitting starting point for this book, because they link *defeat*, *humiliation* and *honor* in a very distinct way and at the same time make clear two of the book's aims. Firstly, they highlight that this book is written for people who are as highly focused and motivated as Olympic medal winners. It is written for those who wish to show leadership and make a difference in this world, instead of descend in finger-pointing, hand-wringing and depression. It is written for those who want to win medals not only for themselves but for humankind. This book aims at helping all of us to win the Nobel Peace Prize for our world.

The other point highlighted by the *Ideals of Olympism* is that the topic of humiliation is a significant one. Reflecting on the phenomenon of humiliation, and attempting to avoid humiliating people, is nothing for whining losers, but a noble task for courageous winners. I want to underline this aspect because this book wants to reach out to the leaders of this world, those who have the power to make big changes. Psychology is often neglected as "soft factor," secondary to "hard facts," particularly by men, and even more so by men in power.

Yet, the *Ideals of Olympism* suggest that psychology may be at the heart of success, the hardest fact of all. It is with good reason that top sports-men and -women are invited as coaches by top leaders in the corporate and political sector. Gold medal winners often know a lot about the psychology of success and the psychology of failing. Knowing about the psychology of humiliation is crucial for success; not only for successful leadership, but for mankind's sustainable survival altogether, this is my view.

The book covers the role played by the phenomenon of humiliation in the context of globalization and human rights, culture differences and inter-group conflict, cooperation and violence, competition and negotiation, and power and trust.

September 11, 2001, the global threat of terrorism, daily occurrences of violence in countries, cities, schools, and families, all elicit the question of "why can we humans not live in peace together?" This book opens new perspectives on this question. It argues that feelings of humiliation have the potential to lead to acts of humiliation perpetrated on the perceived humiliator, setting off cycles of humiliation in which everybody who is involved feels humiliated and is convinced that humiliating the humiliator is a just or even holy duty. As soon as cycles of humiliation are in motion, they are extremely difficult to halt. Therefore it is the more important to prevent such cycles from occurring at all. In order to prevent this, special insights and skills are

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[7] Celebrate Humanity campaign 2002, see http://www.olympic.org/. The italic emphasis is added.

required. These are laid out in this book.

One important point – surprising for many – will be that feelings of humiliation do not only occur as response to intentional acts of humiliation; they emerge also in absence or "perpetrators." Even help can humiliate, without the helper being aware of it. Thus, resentment and violent backlashes often come as shocking surprise to those who thought they were doing good. In such cases only close analysis reveals that not "unexplainable evil" is at work, but feelings of humiliation, elicited by actions that were not meant to humiliate.

Furthermore, humbling may humiliate. I may want to humble you, yet you may perceive this as humiliation and give me staunch defiance. I may not at all be aware that I humiliate you and your rage may hit me unprepared and make me conclude that you are beset by "unfathomable evil." In other words, in order to avoid cycles of humiliation, the ways in which actions affect others – beyond the intentions of the actors – require closer attention. This is what this book is about.

Another important point in this book is that globalization is central to newly emerging feelings of humiliation. As soon as people move closer to each other, expectations rise and disappointments are bound to occur. Closely linked is the human rights revolution. Human rights ideals with their notion of dignity and respect are deeply interlinked with the concept of humiliation. The first sentence in the in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Thus, the central human rights message stipulates that every human being has an inner core of dignity that ought not to be humiliated.

This means that wherever the human rights message is heard and accepted by people around the globe, people feel that their humanity is being humiliated when their dignity is violated or soiled. Human rights ideals squarely oppose hierarchical rankings of human worthiness that once were regarded as "normal" – and still are "normal" in many parts of the world. In the cross-fire between both paradigms, particularly hot feelings of humiliation emerge.

A little note before you delve further into the book: In everyday language, the word humiliation is used threefold. Firstly, the word *humiliation* signifies an *act*, secondly a *feeling*, and thirdly, a *process*: "I humiliate you, you feel humiliated, and the entire process is one of humiliation." In this book it is expected that the reader understands from the context which alternative is the one applied at a given point, since otherwise language would become too convoluted.

The book is organized in three parts. Each part has four chapters. The first part of this book is entitled "What is humiliation?" It starts by unfolding the *mental landscape of humiliation* that forms the backdrop for any dynamic of humiliation. It describes how humiliation is regarded as highly legitimate tool in traditional honor societies, whereas it is seen as a profoundly illicit violation of dignity wherever human rights render the moral and ethical framework. *Globalization and humiliation* is the title of the last chapter or Part I. It describes in which way *globalization* has the potential to elicit humility and turns domination into a painful violation.

Part II of the book addresses how humiliation operates in the world and in our lives. Its first chapter suggests that humiliation is at the core of *egalization*. In the following chapter it is discussed how *misunderstandings* can elicit feelings of humiliation. *Addiction to humiliation* is the ensuing chapter that addresses a crucial problem, namely that victims of humiliation may stay addicted to it and pull their neighbors into malign cycles of humiliation. Part II ends with a chapter on *Love and Help* and how both activities, albeit well-intentioned, may end up evoking feelings of

humiliation.

Part III of the book discusses what we can do about humiliation. It proposes ways out of humiliation. It makes suggestions to all players, to those who are victimized by humiliation, as well as to those who may want to protect against humiliation. Throughout the book, examples are introduced that stem from international, national, organizational and private spheres.

In writing this book, an effort is made to avoid dry jargon. Kenneth Gergen (1997) complains as follows,

> Professional writings in social psychology inherit stale traditions of rhetoric; they are intelligible to but a minute community of scholars, and even within this community they are overly formal, monologic, defensive, and dry. The nature of the social world scarcely demands such an archaic form of expression. Constructionism invites the scholar to expand the repertoire of expression, to explore ways of speaking and writing to a broader audience, perhaps with multiple voices, and a richer range of rhetoric (Gergen, 1997, p. 17).

In order to make reading more agreeable, small vignettes and examples from psychotherapy and research are inserted in text boxes throughout the book. The names used are not real names and the identities of the people described are obscured so as to protect their privacy except in those cases where I obtained their consent. As mentioned earlier, I carry out psychotherapy and counseling, as well as interviewing within the framework of research, in English, French, German, Norwegian (Danish, Swedish), and Egyptian-Arabic (in addition to having an insight into several more languages). Many of the examples that are presented in this book are translated into English by me, and in many cases – again in order to protect the identity of the person in question – I do not indicate from which language I translate. I often paraphrase and summarize in my words what I heard from my sources.

Several important topics cannot be expanded on in this book due to lack of space. Among them are very important themes, such as how social and cultural change unfolds, how the individual interacts with the group and vice versa – even a *group self* has been conceptualized – and in which epistemological spirit this book is written. A host of literature would have to be quoted and many chapters filled with discussions. Only very short comments will be given in the following few paragraphs.

Paul Ricoeur, renowned French philosopher, writes, "What would we know of love and hate, of moral feelings and, in general, of all that we call the self, if these had not been brought to language and articulated by literature?" (Ricoeur, 1981, p.143). This sentence reflects the stance taken in this book, namely that group, individual, and historical cultural and social change, are intricately intertwined.

Further down in the book you will read sentences such as "humankind understood…" This is not intended to mean that humankind collectively sat down and consciously reflected on a problem and "understood" it. Social and cultural change, clearly, occurs in more complex ways and with considerable inertia. Sometimes it is slow, sometimes there are tipping points and situations transform suddenly. Hunting and gathering hominids refined their lifestyle over millions of years, then, suddenly, in a very short time span, almost everybody on Earth became a farmer. Farming was invented in several places on the globe independently – at first in what is Turkey today about 10,000 years ago. From Turkey it "dissipated" over the whole of Europe. Today, however, at least in Western countries, almost nobody is a farmer anymore, and again this happened as a comparably "sudden" transformation.

Not only historic change, the relationship between the individual and the group is

equally complex. Sometimes individuals have new ideas, and these ideas take root, or they do not, or only after a long delay. It took 300 years for the church to accept Copernicus's finding that the Earth revolves around the sun and not the other way round. Sometimes situations are *ripe* for ideas, sometimes not. Individuals are embedded into this process of *ripeness*. Individuals may resonate with the feelings of masses, or they may not. Hitler was a nobody during World War I, an isolated "strange" guy, then, suddenly, time was *ripe* for him.

Worldviews, *cultural mindsets*, *scripts*, *paradigms* or *Zeitgeists* are often defended for long time stretches, only to crumble in a moment. Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) describes how *paradigms* shift (Kuhn, 1962). First they rigidify, people identify with them and stand up for them, only to be toppled by a new generation who asks new questions that undermine the edifice. Anderson (1991) explains how communities can be *ideated* and *imagined*; however, such *imaginations* can also suddenly change.

The question of social and cultural change has been addressed by many, not least by evolutionary biology in an attempt to integrate sociobiological knowledge into sociological theory. Evolutionary psychology and its view on the generation of culture (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (Eds.), 1992) is a related field. It would require much more space than available here to discuss these concepts. Discussion would be interesting as to what extent these approaches turn humans into passive objects of impersonal forces outside of their control, or how and to what extent impersonal forces indeed do impinge on individuals and societies.

Whether social change is a *constructive* group "adaptation" or a *destructive* one, is often decided only in hindsight. Surely, most of us agree that the church did well in accepting Copernicus's heliocentric worldview. Consenting to Hitler's ideas, however, was suicidal and brought mayhem. Over longer stretches of time, some group "adaptations" may filter out as more "useful" than others and form long-term cultural traits. For example, perhaps once communities existed on Earth who sent out daughters as warriors to die in war and not sons. However, such communities would probably have died out since male lives are "redundant" at a younger age as they can beget more children and do this in a shorter time span than women; what we indeed observe, all over the globe, and throughout almost all of human history, is that sons and not daughters were trained to become defenders of security and prepare for early death in war (Goldstein, 2001). The relationship between limitations given by "reality" on one side (in this case male-female procreative differences), the cultural mindsets that prescribe ways of handling this reality on the other side (male warrior culture), and the individual on the third side (the men and women born into this environment) may thus be adaptive or maladaptive, but in any case it is always mutually interwoven.

So, when you read "humankind understood…" then all this complexity is contained in this shorthand way of writing. The relationship between the individual and the group is not seen as one-way. The individual is seen as actor and as acted upon, as shaper of the world and as shaped by the world. Deliberations made and feelings felt by an individual may resonate with nobody else in a given community and thus remain singular. Or, they may resonate with many others, in which case whole communities may move in one direction. It is when this happens on a large scale that "humankind" makes a move.

In this book the term *master* will frequently be used for the powerful, and *underling* or even *slave* for the less powerful (see Hegel's theme of *Lord* and *Bondsman*). Certainly persons or groups of persons can be masters and underlings at the same time, since most underlings are also masters who rule over even lower

underlings; only a few top-masters have nobody above them. The category of *underlings* employed here contains such categories as *the colonized, people of color, women, advocates on behalf of nature, feelings, creativity,* or *individual freedom* as opposed to the *master category* entailing *the colonizers, the white man, men, humankind's control over nature, ratio, intellect,* and *normative control*.

Then we come to the *epistemological spirit* in which this book is written. The *epistemological spirit* of this book is best described with the *reflective equilibrium*. It is as if a ship is being built while at sea. Dagfinn Føllesdal,[8] explains that the *reflective equilibrium,* or *circular thinking,*[9] is "en vogue" since the 1950s. It is employed in Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971), and defended, for example, by Nelson Goodman. Aristotle still rejected *circular thinking* as *circular fallacy*. Philosophers always concentrated on *deduction*. In other words, they wanted to build the ship on secure ground. However, even though it is understandable that fear of uncertainty may make people wish for certainty, it is not sure that it is attainable. The *reflective equilibrium* thus is a "humble" epistemology that does not try to do the impossible or call for the impossible to be possible. The *reflective equilibrium* has six features: it is 1) a method of justification,[10] 2) it emphasizes coherence, 3) it entails total corrigibility, 4) it includes different fields of academia, 5) it does not exclude pre-reflective intuitive acceptance, and 6) it draws on different sources of evidence.

Related to the notion of the *reflective equilibrium* is the concept of the *hermeneutic circle*. This book repeatedly "travels around" the *hermeneutic circle* whereby the analyst journeys back and forward between the particular and the general, producing generalizations in which the subtleties of particular cases are embodied. It is the essence of this approach that some landmarks are passed more than once and on each subsequent occasion the reader hopefully understands them better and in a more complex way.

Another voice that influenced the epistemological stance of this book is Jan Smedslund. Smedslund argues that human beings create *meta-myths* that are explicable in terms of common-sense psychology or *Psycho-Logic* (Smedslund, 1988).[11] Smedslund is interested in the stable core meanings, rules and elements that are entailed in ordinary words.[12] He cautions psychological research not to overlook these core meanings, rules and elements. He warns social scientists against trying to appear "scientific" by mistaking "scientifically looking" methods for sound science in places where core rules are blatantly apparent and studying "infinite objects" would be silly. He writes: "The finding that all bachelors are in fact unmarried males cannot be said to be empirical." Smedslund warns that a lot of psychological research is as pointless as trying to make surveys in order to find out "whether bachelors really are

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[8] See for his publications, for example, Føllesdal, 1988, and Føllesdal, 1996b.

[9] Føllesdal, 1996a, in a presentation at Det Norske Vitenskaps-Akademi (Norwegian Academy of Science), January 30, 1996.

[10] Or at least a method to settle disagreement; this was the position to which Rawls later retreated, a move that is not shared by Føllesdal.

[11] See also Smedslund, 1997, and Smedslund, 1998.

[12] "Even though ordinary words have very variable meanings, they also have a stable core meaning, and many partly overlapping words may also refer to the same core meaning. In summary, it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language… A formulation of such a system can only approximate some of the psychologically relevant features of ordinary language and must necessarily ignore others. However, one may envisage successively more complex scientific language, including an ever higher number of psychologically important distinctions" (Smedslund 1988, p. 5).

all males" (Smedslund, 1988, p. 4). This, Smedslund states, would be an inexcusable waste of time and resources, and in addition a basic confusion of "the *ontological status*" (p. 4, italics in original) of psychology's research object.

In the spirit of *Psycho-Logic* this book reflects on the human condition in sometimes rather social philosophical ways. It asks which *options* human beings have under certain circumstances, and how humankind, intentionally or not, with conscious awareness or not, brought these options to the fore in the course of human history. Without their tool-making talent, for example, humans may never have adopted the practice of humiliating fellow human beings into slavery. In early civilizations, humiliation was merely a way of turning human beings into tools; the practice of humiliation was embedded in a mindset of tool-making and did not carry the connotation of violation. Thus, this book employs *reflection* on basic *options and logics* so as to avoid the trap that Smedslund describes, namely that it would be silly to go out and collect data to prove that *bachelors indeed are unmarried*. However, this book is not based on reflection only. Thirty years of international medical, psychological and cross-cultural experience flow into it as well, along with many years of qualitative research on humiliation (since 1996), including hundreds of interviews (Lindner, 2001k).

This book is the first book that I know of that treats humiliation as central concept for a social philosophical model of the human condition and does not view humiliation as variant of something else, for example of shame (see further down particularly regarding closely related themes such as the notion of *decency*, as well as the concept of *ressentiment,* and what is called the *politics of recognition*).

This book can be criticized for not being based on a large body of established empirical research. This criticism is well-placed. However, novel worldviews would not be novel if they were based on a large body of established empirical research. Novelty by definition entails the problem that it is more a proposal and an invitation to the reader than a final conclusion.

In order to make this invitation as compelling as possible, stark, and sometimes provocative statements are applied. Thus, this book can also be criticized for sometimes making too stark statements. This criticism is well-placed, too. The concept of humiliation may often seem to be overused. However, this is due to the fact that the core element of humiliation, a *downward movement*, is taken as entry point into analysis. This book is not dealing with feelings of humiliation alone, or acts of humiliation alone. It includes the wide spectrum of *downward movements* that have been applied during human history.

You are invited to reflect upon and hopefully draw up research on the questions that form the core for the present author's research on humiliation, questions such as: What is experienced as humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? When is humiliation established as a feeling? What does humiliation lead to? Which experiences of justice, honor, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? How is humiliation perceived and responded to in different cultures? What role does humiliation play for aggression? If humiliation played a role after World War I for Germany, is humiliation just as relevant in more recent cases of war and genocide, such as Rwanda, Somalia, Cambodia, and so on? Is humiliation also relevant for relationships at even higher macro-levels, for example between "civilizations" or cultural regions such as was described by Samuel P. Huntington, 1996? What can be done to overcome violent effects of humiliation?[13]

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[13] I thank Dagfinn Føllesdal for helping me to draw up these questions in 1996.

Let me conclude this introduction with a thought from history. In 1905, Norway and Sweden stood at the brink of war. Norway wished to liberate itself from the "union" with Sweden (for Norway "union" was a euphemism for "Swedish occupation"). The great Norwegian researcher, explorer, diplomat, and Nobel Peace Prize winner Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), was a crucial player in the peaceful dissolution of this "union." He said:

> We are just as little desirous of inflicting humiliation as we are of suffering it. Such desires, aside from being bad politics, are the mark of inferior breeding. It is, therefore, reasonable and politic for us – to try to help Sweden by concessions and liberality, so that the dissolution of the Union may be carried through without the Swedish people's feeling humiliated.[14]

Related reading

As mentioned above, contrary to this book, *humiliation* and *shame* are often used exchangeably, among others by Silvan S. Tomkins (1962–1992), whose work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson. Nathanson describes humiliation as a *combination of three innate affects* (out of altogether nine affects), namely as a combination of *shame, disgust* and *dissmell* (Nathanson in a personal conversation, October 1, 1999).[15]

Read about on Hegel's theme of *Lord* and *Bondsman*,[16] and note that Hegel's discussion of the *struggle for recognition* is the subject of an extensive literature in contemporary political theory (see, among many others, Honneth, 1995, or Bauman, 2001), this being a broader concept than the North American individualistic "need for positive self-regard" (see Heine et al., 1999). Max Scheler set out these issues in his classic book *Ressentiment* (1912/1961).[17] In his first period of work, for example in his *The Nature of Sympathy* (1913/1954),[18] Scheler focuses on human feelings, love, and the nature of the person. He states that the human person is a loving being, *ens amans,* who may feel *ressentiment*.[19] There is a significant literature in philosophy on

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[14] Quoted from http://www.fni.no/christ.htm.

[15] I thank Reidar Ommundsen and Finn Tschudi for kindly helping me to get access to psychological theories on emotion, especially as developed by Tomkins and Nathanson. Silvan S. Tomkins, 1962, developed one of the most interesting theories of the human being and emotions; see his four volumes of *Affect Imagery and Consciousness*. See also Virginia Demos (Ed.), 1995, and *Exploring Affect*, a book that eases the otherwise difficult access to Tomkins' thinking. Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on script, shame, and pride. Abelson, 1976 addresses the issue from the cognitive perspective, compared to Tomkins personality-psychological perspective.

[16] Trejo (1999) summarizes the masterly and servant self consciously as follows, "MASTERY SELF CONSCIOUSNESS, the mindframe of the Ruler, brings the demand and the fear to daily life, as a stimulus for progress. But the Master does not progress, otherwise, he wouldn't be the Master! His job is to fight and retain Mastery, never thanking anyone, never deferring to anyone, just retaining this Mastery, without any further development. So, all development belongs to the Servant Class. SERVANT SELF CONSCIOUSNESS not only evolves new technologies and sciences to serve the Master, but also endures its own private hells and torments, so that philosophy itself ferments, and not just technology. The Servant has all the ideas and inventions in the workplace, but at home in his or her hearth, the Servant comes up with philosophical justifications for his or her position" (Trejo, 1999, capitalization in original).

[17] *Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil,* by Scheler, 1912, published in English under the title *Ressentiment*, Scheler, 1961. See also Liah Greenfeld, who suggests that ressentiment plays a central role in nation building (Greenfeld, 1992, Greenfeld, 1996).

[18] *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haß*, by Scheler, 1913, published in English under the title *The Nature of Sympathy*, Scheler, 1954.

[19] It was Dagfinn Føllesdal, later Thomas Cushman, editor of Human Rights Review, and Reidar

the politics of recognition, claiming that people who are not recognized suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence (see Honneth, 1997, on related themes). Wendt, 2003, observes "an intriguing possibility that the struggle for recognition may actually explain much of the *realpolitik* behavior, including war, which Neorealists have attributed to the struggle for security" (Wendt, 2003, pp. 510-511, see also Ringmar, 2002).

Read furthermore on the *origins of the Second World War*,[20] *social psychology*,[21] on *scripts*,[22] on *social representation* and *constructionism*,[23] on *complexity theory*,[24] on *cultural change*,[25] on how the *individual interacts with the group* and vice versa,[26]

Ommundsen, who drew my attention to Scheler and Honneth.

[20] See, for example, Crozier, 1997, Henig, 1991, Martel (Ed.), 1999, or Overy, 1998.

[21] See for an overview, for example, Brewer and Crano, 1994, Brown, 1986, Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, 1998, Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, and Stephenson (Eds.), 1997, Hogan, Johnson, and Briggs (Eds.), 1997, Hogg and Vaughan, 1995.

[22] Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on *script*, shame, and pride (Nathanson, 1987, Nathanson, 1992, Nathanson, 1996). Scripts are "the structures within which we store scenes;" they are "sets of rules for the ordering of information about SARS" (Stimulus-Affect-Response Sequences) (Nathanson, 1996). See for work on scripts also Eric Berne, 1972, with his book *What Do You Say After You Say Hello?* that illuminates script theory from the clinical perspective.

[23] See related texts in Burr, 1995, Danziger, 1990, Edwards and Potter, 1992, Edwards, 1999, Campos, Ramos, and Bernal, 1999, Billig et al., 1988, Edwards, 1988, Gee, 1999, Shotter and Gergen (Eds.), 1989, Gergen, 1965, Gergen, 1973, Gergen, 1982, Gergen and Gergen, 1986, Gergen and Gergen, 1988, Gergen, 1994, Gergen, 1997a, Gergen, 1999, Gergen, 2000b, Ibanez, 1991, Mead, 1934, Middleton and Edwards (Eds.), 1990, Moscovici, 1976, Moscovici, 1985, Moscovici, 1998, van Rappard, 1997, Potter and Edwards, 1999, Rorty, 1991, Sampson, 1978, Sampson, 1991, Shotter, 1993, Spence, 1982, Vygotsky, 1978, Wetherell and Potter, 1998, Woofitt, 1992; and see for emotions in this context Lutz, 1988, and Tavris, 1989.

[24] "Complexity theory is a new interdisciplinary approach to understanding dynamic processes involving the interaction of many actors. A primary methodology of complexity theory is agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling involves specifying how individual agents (such as people, nations, or organizations) interact with each other and with their environment. Computer simulation is then used to discover the emergent properties of the model, and thereby gain insights into dynamic processes that would be too difficult to model with standard mathematical techniques" (quoted from Robert Axelrod's website http://www-personal.umich.edu/~axe/PS793_W03.htm).

[25] See, for example, Harvey, 1990.

[26] See, for example, Brown, 1997, Brown, 1994. Also Argyle writes extensively about social relations (Argyle and Henderson, 1990, Argyle and Cook, 1976, Argyle, 1994, Furnham and Argyle (Eds.), 1981, Argyle and Colman, 1995, Argyle, Collett, and Furnham, 1995, Argyle, 1992, Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, Argyle, 1974, Humphrey and Argyle, 1962, Argyle, Furnham, and Graham, 1981). I thank Ragnvald Kalleberg for introducing me to this literature. See furthermore Ettin, Fidler, and Cohen (Eds.), 1995, or Lichbach, 1998. A vast amount of literature can be drawn upon.

on *group dynamics*,[27] on *cognition* as an *interpersonal* process,[28] on "*group self*,"[29] *theories of social order*,[30] on *tipping points*,[31] on *imagined communities*,[32] on *evolutionary psychology* and *memetics*,[33] and on the *hermeneutic circle*.[34]

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[27] For example, Forsyth, 1999.

[28] "Using such rubrics as socially-shared cognition, distributed cognition, and contextualized cognition, investigators are focusing on cognition as an interpersonal as well as an intrapersonal process. Without negating the importance of information processing at the individual level, social psychologists (as well as developmental and organizational psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and educational researchers) are exploring the implications of viewing cognition as a fundamentally social activity." (Thompson, Levine, and Messick (Eds.), 1999, Introduction). See also Augoustinos and Walker, 1995, Higgins, 1992, Hinsz, Tindale, and Vollrath, 1997, Levine, Resnick, and Higgins, 1993, Nye and Brower, 1996, Resnick, Levine, and Teasley (Eds.), 1991, Thompson and Fine, 1999.

[29] Group analysis, self psychology, and modern hermeneutics all examine the group. Among the numerous approaches to the investigation of the group, even a group self has been stipulated. Kohut (1976) introduced the concept of a group self as follows: "It will have become obvious to those who are familiar with my recent work that I am suggesting, as a potentially fruitful approach to a complex problem, that we posit the existence of a certain psychological configuration with regard to the group – let us call it the 'group self' – which is analogous to the self of the individual. We are then in a position to observe the group self as it is formed, as it is held together, as it oscillates between fragmentation and reintegration, etc. – all in analogy to phenomena of individual psychology to which we have comparatively easy access in the clinical (psychoanalytic) situation" (Kohut, 1976a, p. 206).

[30] See, for example, Hechter and Horne (Eds.), 2003.

[31] See, for example, Gladwell, 2000.

[32] *Imagined Communities*, by Benedict Anderson, 1991. See also Berger and Luckmann, 1966.

[33] *Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process*, by Lumsden and Wilson, 1981. See also for a more recent evaluation *Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science*, edited by Robert Aunger (Ed.), 2000. See furthermore classics such as Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (Eds.), 1992.

[34] The idea of the hermeneutic circle was introduced by Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911), a philosopher and literary historian who is generally recognized as the 'father' of the modern hermeneutic enterprise in the social and human sciences. "Dilthey argued that the human world was sufficiently different from the natural world that special methods were required for its study. Hermeneutics, the deliberate and systematic methodology of interpretation, was the approach Dilthey proposed for studying and understanding the human world" (Tappan, 2000, Abstract). Dilthey's intellectual biographer H. P. Rickman explains, "We cannot pinpoint the precise meaning of a word unless we read it in its context, i.e. the sentence or paragraph in which it occurs. But how can we know what the sentence means unless we have first understood the individual words? Logically there is no escape from this absence of priority; in practice we solve the problem by a kind of mental shuttlecock movement' (Rickman, 1979, p. 130).

Part I: What Is Humiliation?

The Mental Landscape of Humiliation

Scientific research has become increasingly fragmented. Every academic field is divided into numerous strands of research, into which each researcher contributes. Each strand develops its own language that is difficult to understand outside of the community that identifies with it. Few scholars dare to get out of their academic "box" and try to look at the entire situation. The dangers are too great. Nobody can be an expert in all fields, and the existing diverse academic idioms resist being drawn together.

In this book the attempt is made to use an old language in a new way, namely the language of humiliation and humility, and explain the human condition from this vantage point. In the course of doing so, other academic idioms are drawn in, yet, not in depth, so as to preserve the thread of the here presented framing. The results that are thus achieved are new perspectives on the world, which, even though they do not include all existing academic strands and idioms, do hopefully open up for useful new conclusions. The underlying endeavor is as much an intellectual effort to discover new angles or combine familiar viewpoints in new ways, as it is an experiential and empirical one, based on thirty years of international cross-cultural experience, both in research and practice.

In the first part of the book, I would like to invite you into the mental landscape of humiliation and humility. Humiliation has to do with *putting down* and *holding down*. The word humiliation has at its core *humus*, which means *earth* in Latin. Indeed, on September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers were taken down to the level of the ground, into the dust of the earth. Whatever these towers stood for was cruelly *debased* and *denigrated*.

On April 9, 2003, similar dynamics of humiliations unfolded in front of the eyes of the world. The statue of Saddam Hussein in Paradise Square in Baghdad was brought down to the ground. This statue had only been erected a year earlier, with Saddam Hussein's arm pointing to Jerusalem.

First, some young Iraqis tried to tear the statue down by themselves, however they couldn't. They enlisted American help. An American armored vehicle arrived on the scene and the statue was pulled down to the cheers of the group of people that had assembled in the theatre. First the statue came down half, Saddam Hussein's head hanging down. This was the beginning of a strong symbolic marking of the ultimate humiliation of Saddam Hussein and his regime. In disgust, the Iraqis who had gathered threw at his head what they could grab. Then the core of the statue fell to the ground and the Iraqis chanted and jubilated, jumped up and down and danced on Saddam's body. They smacked him with their shoes, a highly offensive gesture of inflicting humiliation in Iraq (meaning something like "I throw the dust under my feet into your face!"). Half an hour later they dragged his head down the road.

Tearing the statue of Saddam Hussein to the ground, into the dust of the earth, smacking it with shoes, dancing on his body and dragging away his head, all these were acts of strong symbolism of humiliation. A tyrant was being debased and denigrated. This was the first dynamic of humiliation that unfolded in this scene. An Iraqi guest in the BBCWorld studio expressed how absolutely delighted he was to witness this iconoclastic scene of the ultimate symbolic debasement of Saddam Hussein, the destruction of his icon.

However, there was a second dynamic of humiliation that occurred when for a small moment Iraqi national feelings, more so, Arab national feelings, were being humiliated and a big Arab country appeared to be conquered and not liberated. This moment came when an American soldier climbed to the neck of the statue of Saddam and put an American flag on Saddam Hussein's face. The Iraqi, in the BBCWorld studio, shrieked "Oh, NO!" Putting the American flag, a symbol of conquest as opposed to liberation, was, as a BBC reporter said, "a moment of thoughtless triumphalism." However, a minute later, this flag was removed and an old Iraqi flag was placed, thus remedying this sour moment of national Iraqi humiliation.

World community thus witnessed the power of humiliation as it unfolded, and in this case two processes were to be observed that were intertwined in the same event.

Debasement, denigration, degradation, these words contain the prefix *de-*, which signifies *down from* in Latin, *from great heights down to the ground*. In the case of the Twin Towers, thousands of innocent victims had to pay with their lives for this powerful "message of humiliation" that was "sent" to the mighty masters of today's world in the act of "taking down" something that was seen to symbolize the rich West. In the case of Saddam Hussein, taking down and humiliating his statues sent the powerful message to him that his supremacy was broken.

The first case, the Twin Tower tragedy, we decry, the second case, the deposing of a tyrant, we welcome. Thus, it seems that the same mechanism, namely humiliation, seems to work for good and for evil. Yet, this is not the case. We will understand this better in the further course of this book. What is lacking so far in this description is a differentiation of humiliation and humility. Humiliation is not the only word with roots in Latin *humus*. There is also *humility* and *humbleness*. Both can be wonderful assets. Not humiliation is the opposite of arrogance, but humility. Humility and humbleness stand for the humble acknowledgement of limits and the absence of arrogated superiority.

I would like to invite you further into the mental landscape of humiliation and humility with the following narration:

Julius Paltiel, a Norwegian Jew, was imprisoned in the "SS Strafgefangenenlager Falstad" during World War II. Falstad is situated in the midst of a breathtakingly beautiful landscape, in the middle of Norway, not far away from Trondheim (something like the latitude of Anchorage, albeit much milder because of the Gulf Stream). Falstad, a large building almost forlorn in this lovely nature, wrapped around a rectangular courtyard, was once a special school for handicapped boys. However, in 1941, it was taken over by the German occupying power and turned into the "SS Strafgefangenenlager Falstad," a detention camp for political prisoners. I met Julius Paltiel in October 2002. He lived through a deeply gripping and thought provoking episode:[35]

Once, one of the prisoners was asked to sing. SS officers and prisoners, including Julius Paltiel himself, stood in the courtyard, listening. The prisoner who sang was a very knowledgeable German Jew who had an extremely beautiful voice. He was able to recite several deeply reflective songs from the German cultural heritage, in a perfect manner, in German. He sang these songs so wonderfully and touchingly that the German SS officers were taken in to a degree that they stood still and listened in

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[35] Julius Paltiel relates this story in a documentary film, Skygger fra Falstad, 2002, by Frida Jørstad Krüger.

silence; in complete silence. Julius Paltiel explained that this had never happened before; the SS officers never used to be silent, on the contrary, they continuously shouted insults and orders.

After a quarter of an hour of beautiful sounds filling the air, there was a pause. Complete silence. After a moment, however, this silence was ended by a dog. Incited by the songs, he began to howl. This "woke up" the SS officers. They immediately set out to "cover up" for their vulnerability with an excess of humiliation. They quickly made up an argument saying that a Jew was incapable of singing either beautifully or correctly and that the proof was provided by the dog's howling: even a dog could recognize how bad the Jewish singing was.

The SS officers ordered the Jewish prisoners to go to the tree in the middle of the courtyard and shake off its leaves; it was autumn. Then they ordered them to lie down on their stomachs and crawl to the leaves, take them up one by one with their mouths and bring them to one of the corners of the courtyard, all this while dragging themselves ahead on their stomachs. Thus the prisoners had to lie on the ground and use their mouths to "clean" the courtyard from the leaves that they first had been ordered to shake off the tree! The non-Jewish prisoners were ordered to stand by, watch and shout. However, many of them turned their backs.

The beautiful songs and their touching appeal seem to have undermined the hierarchy of *Übermensch* and *Untermensch* that the SS officers otherwise attempted to maintain. In their minds they were not "supposed" to feel and be touched in the same way as other people. Being mere human beings among other human beings, this was not their world; they believed to be *higher* beings. However, the songs confronted them with a truth they did not want to acknowledge, namely that they, indeed, were mere human beings like anybody else, and no more. When they "woke up," they remembered the ideological frame they had subscribed to, namely a hierarchy of *lesser* and *higher* beings where they were supposed to occupy the seat of the *master*.

Interestingly, they did not beat the prisoners "mindlessly" or treated them with mere physical brutality, no, they perpetrated a highly symbolic and intelligent "message" to both prisoners and themselves: they reinstated physically, mentally and emotionally the hierarchy of *Übermensch/Untermensch* by sending the prisoners literally *down*, down to the dust of the ground and let them carry out "services" that were so *low* that there could be no doubt of who was the master.

Thus, we could conclude that the beauty of the songs performed by the prisoner elicited *humility* in the SS officers, at least for a few minutes, a humility that we also find at the core of the human rights message of equal dignity for every human being. Humiliation, on the contrary, characterizes a world of inhumane inequalities and brutal rankings of human worth and value into *higher* and *lower* beings.

Top and bottom: How the vertical dimension can be used

The word *humiliation* literally describes what happened to the prisoners of Falstad. The prisoners were ordered down to the level of the ground. The proud symbols of global business, the World Trade Twin Towers, too, were leveled to Ground Zero. In short, what we observe here is a painful downward push, from respected heights down to lowly grounds.

The word *humiliation* thus paints a vivid picture. It is a picture of a three-dimensional mental space where humiliation is played out along the vertical dimension: from the heights of superiority down to the dust of the ground. The prisoners of Falstad and the employees in the Twin Towers tragically met perpetrators who perceived them to be arrogating superiority and they were cruelly humiliated, devastatingly brought down.

You and me, we are appalled. We do not agree with these framings, and we do not deem it to be any good to bring down people in that way. However, the perpetrators seem to have reasoned differently. In order to avoid such atrocities in the future, we have to get acquainted with the inner workings of the phenomenon of humiliation, even if it is painful and difficult to step into the perpetrators' shoes.

Whatever language we search for words that signify humiliation, we always find a downward spatial orientation. Consider the words *de-gradation*, *ned-verdigelse* in Norwegian, *Er-niedrig-ung* in German, or *a-baisse-ment* in French. The syllables *de*, *ned*, *niedrig*, and *bas* all mean the same, namely *down from*, *low*, or *below*. *To put down, to degrade, to denigrate, to debase, demean, derogate, lower, lessen,* or *belittle*, all these words are built on the same spatial, orientational metaphor, namely that something or somebody is pushed down and forcefully held down. These spatial metaphors are, at least to my linguistic knowledge, to be found in all languages; they are global. This suggests that the mental landscape that entails the vertical scale is global, too.

Figure 1 (as initially developed in Lindner, 2001c) tries to depict the mental landscape of arrogation, humiliation, and humility. The Aryan *Übermensch* arrogates superiority and defines himself as posited far above *lesser* beings called *Untermenschen* or *sub*-humans. *Über* means *above* in German, *unter* means *below*, and *Mensch* means *human being*. The *Über*mensch is a *higher* human being and the *Unter*mensch a *lesser* human being. In the middle of this mental landscape we can imagine a line of equality, humility, and humbleness as to shared humanity that is despised by the Übermensch. In other words, the Übermensch lives in a world where human beings differ in value and worth, some are of higher value, others of lesser value. The Übermensch puts in place a vertical scale of human worthiness ranging from *above* to *below*. I call this the *hierarchy of human worthiness*, or the *vertical scale of human worth and value*, or *the vertical scale of human worthiness*.

The Vertical Scale of Human Worthiness

| Master | | Top of |
*Über*mensch	↑	the
Arrogation		scale
Humility	──┼──	Line of
		equal dignity
Underling	↓	Bottom of
*Unter*mensch		the
Humiliation		scale

Figure 1: The vertical scale of human worthiness

The vertical scale evidently is more than merely a geometrical figure that we humans use to orient ourselves in our physical environment. However, its core indeed is a geometrical figure. Let me explain.

Our physical environment displays heaven and the blue skies *above* us, the ceiling of our living room as well, while the floor is *down* to our feet, the basement of the house even *lower*, and the source of water emerges from the depths of darkness far *down* in the earth. Why do we organize the world thus in our minds? Perhaps because of gravity. Gravity keeps our feet on the ground and suggests such ordering of the physical world. If we were designed to hover about in irregular ways without gravity keeping us put, we would perhaps not have developed the language of *up* and *down*. After all, if we think carefully, for an observer from the universe, this way of viewing ourselves in the cosmos may seem a bit hilarious; why should the surface of planet Earth be *down* and the Sun *up*: one day extraterrestrials may query us, laugh at us, and doubt our judgment.

Yet, for us earth-dwellers this vertical scale is useful in our daily lives when we have to climb mountains or go down into caves. Since we all share the experience of gravity, the use of the vertical scale, of words such as *up* and *down*, gives a common reference framework to all humans. Furthermore, it seems that this scale serves us well in designing an order of good and bad and high and low. We apply this scale to categorize the value and worth of things and beings. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) address this activity, when they speak about *moral ranking*, a ranking of moral *up* and moral *down* (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

We indeed apply such rankings to our evaluations of both, the abiotic and the biotic world. Gold, for example, is worth much, it is high *up* on the scale of worth and value, silver a little less, dirt is worth little and thus somewhere far *down*. This is the abiotic world. When we turn to the biotic world, to living beings or those we regard as such, we see divine powers usually being placed at the absolute top, somewhere in heaven, far *above* humans. The human scale begins just *below* gods and angels. At its "pinnacle" the human scale champions divinely ordained masters. Fortresses, castles

and mansions "glue" worldly elites to the upper divine world by the help of chapels and temples. The human scale then continues downwards and reaches down to the lowest underlings in their dirty holes at the bottom of the pyramid of value, close to the scale of animals. Those deemed sub-human are being localized even *below* humanity's scale, ever closer to where hell is being imagined, namely in some dark abyss.

Thus the scale of human worth and value is inserted between divine powers above it and animals, demons and other dark forces below it. Even animals are being ranked; many put the lion at the top, as the king of animals, whereas "vermin" is to be found at the bottom of the scale. I have not met any culture or language on this planet that does not use such rankings in some way or another.

History is full of examples where the ranking scale of human value is even applied literally. Having one's head higher than the emperor was forbidden, not only in the former Chinese empire. Even in today's life we may come across the literal relevance of the vertical scale in our minds and hearts. Recently, a business man told me about his visit to Africa. He was to hire employees, and was extremely annoyed by the way some of the applicants were sitting in their chairs in front of him. Especially one very tall young African man almost slipped out of his chair; this sloppiness seemed to make him unfit for any serious job. At least this was the employer's interpretation, yet, only until he learned that in the respective African cultural context it was regarded as unfitting to have one's head higher than a person of older age and rank. Thus, the tall African tried to keep his head lower than his Western interlocutor's head, so as to avoid humiliating his future boss, and he therefore risked almost falling out of his chair and appearing "sloppy."

To summarize and conclude this section, its aim was to introduce the reader into the world of the vertical scale with arrogation at the top and humiliation at the bottom. In daily life we use this vertical scale – like we use other tools – usually without reflecting on it or being overly aware of it. This section intended to begin a process, in the reader, of heightening awareness as to the vertical scale and its often literal expression in our lives. The next section will carry on with this endeavor.

Lesser and higher beings: How the vertical scale can be applied to human worthiness

We, all human beings, entertain an inner world where we see the top of the mountain and the depth of the valley and apply the vertical dimension of *up* and *down* in metaphorical ways to other spheres. As discussed above, divine forces are placed *up* in the skies or on the top of mountains. Earthly elites, as well, are usually somewhere *up*. They are traditionally being regarded as *higher* beings, worth more than the rest. The word slave, on the other side, smacks of *lowliness*. Slaves are *underlings*, *lesser* beings, worth less than the rest. In one way or the other, we all, through the language we learn as children, apply the vertical dimension derived from the physical word to our categories of the worthiness of things and beings.

Applying the vertical dimension to things and beings seems harmless enough. Yet, a single little fragment of the sentence above, namely "in one way or the other," can bring immense suffering and pain. Slavery and Apartheid, for example, had the vertical ranking on human worthiness stringently institutionalized. Human rights, on the other hand, firmly aim at institutionalizing the square opposite, namely the

dismantling of such practice. Human rights aim at collapsing the gradient between *top* and *bottom* into *One single line of equal dignity*.

Throughout history there has always been room for controversial applications in between these two extremes. The backdrop is the fact that there is no automatism that indicates that the vertical scale must be applied on human worthiness in a way that ranks human worth hierarchically. To apply the scale to achieve hierarchical rankings, or to apply it to meet at a middle line of equal dignity, these are profoundly ideological decisions. And disagreement about the vertical scale's applications can be hot and hurtful.

For many centuries Jews, just to give one of many possible examples, have been met by the accusation that they "arrogate superiority" and need to be "taught the lesson" as to "where they belong." Pogroms in Eastern Europe, or the Holocaust, were fueled by such thinking. They aimed at "teaching the lesson" to Jews to that they had to consider themselves as "lesser beings."

At the same time Jews themselves were merely trying to survive. From an impartial bystander's point of view the accusations hurled at them were wrong, cruel, and nothing but evil scapegoating.[36] Whatever privileges Jews had acquired were either hard-earned or brought about by their exclusion from other ways of living (denial of the right to own land, for example).

We thus observe two opposing applications of the vertical scale around: From the Jewish point of view there was no arrogation of undue superiority whatsoever, on the contrary, but a hard and uphill struggle for life under harsh circumstances. Their torturers drew a totally different landscape and justified atrocities with an opposing mental version of the social landscape.

All participants, bystanders, Jews, as well as their tormenters, used the vertical scale, however, in different ways. Bystanders and Jews reckoned that Jews were not placing themselves unduly high on the scale, far from it, while their tormentors disagreed and vowed to "bring them down."

Genocide is perhaps the cruelest example of the application of the vertical scale on human beings. Genocide is about killing, this is the usual assumption, about killing another ethnic group. However, this seems to be an inaccurate conception. If genocide were merely about killing, bringing victims to death would be "sufficient." Yet, killing is only the last act and, unfathomably for outsiders, there are victims who almost yearn for it. They yearn for death because it seems that something else is much more important for the *genocidaires*, the perpetrators of genocide, namely humiliating their victims. In the genocide in Rwanda, grandmothers were forced to parade naked in the streets before being killed and daughters raped in front of their families. Victims paid for bullets and begged to be shot rather than slowly hacked to death.

"There had not been enough guns to go around, and in any case bullets were deemed too expensive for the likes of Tutsis: the ubiquitous flat-bladed machetes (pangas), or any farm or kitchen implement, would do the job just as well. Thus the Rwandan tragedy became one of the few genocides in our century to be accomplished almost entirely without firearms. Indeed, it took many strong and eager arms to carry out the strenuous work of raping, burning, and hacking to death a half-million people (and mutilating many thousands more by slicing off their hands, their breasts, their genitals, or their ears) with pangas, kitchen knives, farm hoes, pitchforks, and hastily

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[36] Read René Girard's work on *scapegoating* (Girard, 1982, Girard, 1986, Girard, 1977).

improvised spiked clubs" writes Elliott Leyton (2000) in his report on *Médecins sans Frontières* (Leyton, 2000, p. 3).

Human Rights Watch (1999) reports the following: "Some killers tortured victims, both male and female, physically or psychologically, before finally killing them or leaving them to die. An elderly Tutsi woman in Kibirira commune had her legs cut off and was left to bleed to death. A Hutu man in Cyangugu, known to oppose the MRND-CDR, was killed by having parts of his body cut off, beginning with his extremities. A Tutsi baby was thrown alive into a latrine in Nyamirambo, Kigali, to die of suffocation or hunger. Survivors bear scars of wounds that testify better than words to the brutality with which they were attacked. Assailants tortured Tutsi by demanding that they kill their own children and tormented Hutu married to Tutsi partners by insisting that they kill their spouses. Victims generally regarded being shot as the least painful way to die and, if given the choice and possessing the means, they willingly paid to die that way.

   Assailants often stripped victims naked before killing them, both to acquire their clothes without stains or tears and to humiliate them. In many places, killers refused to permit the burial of victims and insisted that their bodies be left to rot where they had fallen. Persons who attempted to give a decent burial to Tutsi were sometimes accused by others of being 'accomplices' of the enemy.[37] The Hutu widow of a Tutsi man killed at Mugonero in Kibuye expressed her distress at the violation of Rwandan custom, which is to treat the dead with dignity. Speaking of Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana of the Adventist church, she stated:

   What gives me grief is that after the pastor had all these people killed, he didn't even see to burying them, including his fellow pastors. They lay outside for two weeks, eaten by dogs and crows[38]" (Des Forges and Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 119).

Genocide is about humiliating the personal dignity of the victims and denigrating their entire group below what is human. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 provides a gruesome catalogue of intricate practices designed to *bring down* the victims' dignity. The most literal way of achieving this debasement was, as Human Rights Watch reports and as I got numerous accounts of, cutting the legs of tall Tutsi so as to *shorten* not only their bodies, but also their alleged *arrogance*.

   The verb *to arrogate* is deeply inscribed within the linguistic web of humiliation and is opposed to the verb *to derogate*. Both verbs are built on the Latin verb *rogare*, which means *to ask*. *Rogare* is either combined with the prefix *de*, which means *down from*, or the prefix *ad*, which means *toward*. To *arrogate superiority* means to appropriate superiority (Latin *to ask toward*), and to *derogate* means to belittle, denigrate, and minimize a person (Latin *to ask down from*). Tutsi were perceived to have *arrogated superiority*, and by cutting their legs *short* they were derogated, cruelly forced to *come down*.

   It is extremely important to develop awareness for the arbitrariness of the application of the vertical scale on human worthiness. Ranking human worthiness hierarchically, or not doing it, these are ideological decisions. There is no "fixed" or "natural" connection between human worthiness and *lesser* and *higher* categorizations. In other words, everybody, people who reject the legitimacy of

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[37] Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Brussels, February 26, 1997.

[38] Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Kigali, September 9, 1995.

ranking human worthiness as well as those who condone it, have this scale mentally available as a potentially applicable classification system. It is a principle, or a tool, that can be used in different ways. There is the one option to regard it as legitimate to use this tool so as to extend a gradient between *lesser* and *higher* beings. However, this usage can also be rejected and deemed to be an illegitimate application of the same tool; its application may only be permitted to collect all humankind at *One middle line of equal dignity*. In both cases, the tool is available as a principle. It is like a hammer that can be used to hit nails into the wall, or to wiggle them out of the wall. It is a tool that is always there even when some of its potential uses are outlawed.

All words that we know for humiliation describe a push downwards along this vertical scale as in sentences such as "I degrade you; I push you down the scale of human worthiness." Those who regard the application of this scale on human worthiness as legitimate regard humiliation as morally justified humbling, and they complete the sentence as follows, "I degrade you, I push you down the scale of human worth and value, and you deserve it and better accept it." Those who regard its application as illegitimate, reject humiliation as a violation; the say, "You are being degraded, somebody pushes you down the scale of human worth and value, however, you do not deserve it and better refrain from accepting it; more even, the very use of the vertical scale on human worthiness is illegitimate."

However, as stated before, the vertical scale as applied on human worth and value is much more than a source of suffering, it steers wonderful wisdom as well. Painful humiliation is not the only manifestation of this scale's application, wise and mature humility is another. To use the hammer metaphor, humiliation stands for hitting nails into the wall, and humility for wiggling them out again. Adolf Hitler stands for cruel humiliation and Nelson Mandela for wise humility. Let us therefore, in the following chapters, delve a little deeper into the workings of the vertical scale and understand to which extent it steers and permeates our lives.

This section highlighted the fact that the vertical scale is a tool that has been used to rank human worth and value throughout human history, sometimes in horrific ways, however, it also states that this use is not compulsory. It can also be rejected.

The entire chapter was designed to sharpen the reader's eyes for the option that a vertical scale may be applied to human worth and value, however, that this option indeed is optional and has been negotiated in various ways throughout human history. The following three chapters will spell out in which ways precisely the vertical scale has been applied throughout human history. Later it will be discussed what this signifies for our contemporary lives.

Reading related to this chapter
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe orientational metaphors as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. Humiliation clearly is down. "These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial environment: for example, HAPPY IS UP" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 14, capitalization in original). If up is happy, then down must be unhappy: being put down thus makes unhappy. No empirical research should be necessary to find this – Smedslund's argument seems perfectly correct – the analysis of the utilized metaphors suffices. And since the same metaphors are used in many languages, perhaps in all languages, no research except linguistics is necessary to claim that "being put down" has the potential to cause unhappiness in all cultures.

Humiliation as "Honorable Medicine": The Old Order of Honor

Not only Nazi Germany deemed it as legitimate to rank human beings as beings of more or less worth and value, even though Nazi Germany drove this practice to extreme cruelty. The Holocaust was of unspeakable horror. The vertical scale was applied so as to push certain categories of people out of humanity entirely, into the abyss of "sub-human vermin." Other genocidal killers, too, have dehumanized their victims in this way and have labeled them as vermin and pests. In Rwanda, in 1994, for example, the Tutsi were humiliated as "cockroaches," or "inyenzi."

However, I do not want to discuss the unspeakable cruelty of ranking people as sub-human at this point. I would like to shed light on something perhaps even more difficult to accept, namely the *normalcy* with which the vertical scaling of human worth was regarded as legitimate throughout human history. For thousands of years, humankind believed in hierarchically ordering human value. This was called the *order of nature* or *divine order*. The cradle of democracy, the Greek city state of about 2,000 years ago, was adamant that women and slaves could not have a voice. And not least the *American Declaration of Independence*, stipulating that all men are created equal and having "unalienable rights that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," was signed by people who owned slaves.

Know your place! How humiliation can lack the notion of violation

The vertical scale and the debate as to its legitimacy may be conceptualized as one of the center pieces of our entire human history and of how we, Homo sapiens, define ourselves. Human history may be narrated as a discourse circling around questions concerning the vertical scale: whether the vertical scale is known to people, whether they are aware that it can be applied, and to what extent they believe it is legitimate to apply it.

For millions of years, hominids evolved towards Homo sapiens sapiens and roamed the globe as hunters and gatherers. They did this in small bands of something like two hundred people, with rather egalitarian societal institutions, and with a considerable amount of good quality of life. There is no proof of organized fighting among hunters and gatherers (Ury, 1999). "The Hobbesian view of humans in a constant state of 'Warre' is simply not supported by the archaeological record" (MacArthur, 2003). Even though the absence of evidence for homicide clearly is no evidence for its absence, yet, the *educated hunch* may be dared that organized killing indeed started later (suggesting that "man" is perhaps not so much aggressive by nature, but rather by circumstances).

It is certainly wrong to idealize hunters and gatherers or to romanticize them as some kind of harmonious golden age dwellers. Yet, in the face of dissonance, conflict, disharmony, disease, or danger, the core ethos, the core moral sentiment and moral economy among them seems to have been egalitarian. Or in other words, human worth and value was not ranked hierarchically in any deep institutionalized form. Every single individual faced the world with considerable pristine pride.

At some point in history, hunters and gatherers increasingly "hit the wall." Over as long as ninety percent of human history, hunters and gatherers had proceeded to fill the planet "at their leisure," with pristine pride. However, there came a time when slowly they were confronted with the fact that the globe has a limited surface, and that the abundance they were used to was by no means guaranteed.

In some ways we could call this "hitting of the wall" humankind's *first round of*

globalization, meaning that they had managed to populate the entire globe, or at least most of the surface that was known to them and that was easily habitable. In the language of anthropologists this set of circumstances is labeled as *circumscription*.[39] *Circumscription* means that there was simply not enough for everybody anymore, not enough space that could easily be populated and not enough resources that could easily be consumed. Simply, our planet is small, and it gives the illusion of being unlimited only as long as one has not yet reached its limits.

However, humankind countered this challenge. Though the problem had been building up slowly, humankind seized a specific, *quite short* moment in history. Homo sapiens had developed specific toolkits over a long time, and were sufficiently pre-adapted, when the global climate changed dramatically. 11,600 years ago the world climate transformed surprisingly fast and profoundly. Pleistocene's last ice age ended, and the Holocene[40] period of relatively warm, wet, stable, CO2 rich environments began.

> Our argument here is that a near step-function change in the earth's environment from Pleistocene to Holocene climatic conditions about 11,600 years ago transformed the world from a place where agriculture was impossible anywhere to a place where it was possible on a large fraction of the earth's surface. The various trajectories of agricultural origin and spread in different parts of the world thus result from a single, strong, "manipulation" (Richerson, Boyd, and Bettinger, 1999, p. 2).

Hence, there was a moment in historic time when the experiment of *intensification* became possible and feasible. *Intensification* meant domesticating plants and animals so as to develop into what we call agriculture. This was an alternative way to increase resources in a situation where the old methods to increase them by simply wandering off into untouched abundance met their limits (raiding neighbors was another alternative method, which will be discussed further down).

In other words, humans began to *subdue* Earth, as commended in the Bible. We read in the Bible, Genesis 1:28 (New International Version of the Bible): "God blessed them and said to them, 'Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the Earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.'"

For 10,000 years, until only very recently, humankind was profoundly satisfied with this strategy. Not least in the Bible, to subdue the Earth was introduced as a divine order. And we call ourselves Homo *sapiens*, the *wise* human. *Wise* because we pride ourselves of language mastery and tool making, both practices that can be conceptualized as being applications of the idea of *putting down*. And we are still proud today. Everybody who loves technological gadgets (like me) is in this camp.

> Zygmunt Bauman (1992) writes that nature from then on was the victim of a declaration of hostilities that made the unprocessed, pristine world into the enemy. As is the case with all genocide, the world of nature…had to be beheaded and thus deprived of autonomous will and power of resistance…The world was an object of willed action: a raw material in the work guided and given form by human designs…Left to itself, the world had no meaning. It was solely the human design

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[39] Latin circum = around, scribere = to write, circumscription means limitation, enclosure, or confinement. The terms territorial or social circumscription address limitations in these respective areas.

[40] Greek holo = entire; whole, cene = recent.

that injected it with a sense of purpose. So the earth became a repository of ores and other 'natural resources,' wood turned into timber and water – depending on circumstances – into an energy source, waterway or the solvent of waste(Bauman, 1992, x-xi).[41]

What can be added to Bauman's description is that the same way *wood* turned into *timber*, *human beings* turned into *underlings* and *slaves*. *Intensification* set off a chain of events that slowly evolved into the erection of an ever more stark vertical scale of human value, or power distance, with *higher* beings, the *masters*, at the *top* and *lesser* beings, the slaves and *under*lings, at the *bottom*. For the period of the last 10,000 years this order defined most communities and societies formed by humankind.

This hierarchical order was regarded as profoundly legitimate, either divinely ordained or prescribed by nature. It was held dear as the backbone of civilization and its maintenance was deemed to be indispensable for human life on Earth. Within such a hierarchical order, humiliation is seen as a necessary injury inflicted on lower beings, lest they forget their lower position and disturb the holy order. Just like surgery hurts but has to be endured because it is "good for you," humiliation "had" to be perpetrated and the accompanying pain accepted.

Most communities on the globe turned into hierarchical societies and people thought that maintaining hierarchies of *higher* and *lesser* beings was central to what we called *civilization*. Admittedly, it was hard work to keep up such a gradient; however, those involved were convinced that the efforts were well invested. If you did not hold down your subordinates in their *sub* position, you were even called *lazy*. The "lazy kings" (les rois fainéants) of the sixth and seventh centuries in France, for example, were ridiculed because they allowed their immediate subordinates, the "maires du palais," the managers of the palace, to usurp power (one of these "maires du palais" indeed eventually took over the throne in the year 751).

Marvin Harris (1997) provides a description of the laboriousness of the task of keeping a vertical scale of human worthiness in place. He writes about the necessity of having "specialists who perform ideological services in support of the status quo":

> The elaborate religions of the Inca, Aztecs, ancient Egyptians, and other nonindustrial civilizations sanctified the privileges and powers of the ruling elite. They upheld the doctrine of the divine descent of the Inca and the pharaoh, and taught that the entire balance and continuity of the universe required the subordination of commoners to persons of noble and divine birth. Among the Aztecs, the priests were convinced and sought to convince others that the gods must be nourished with human blood, and they personally pulled out the beating hearts of the state's prisoners of war on top of Tenochtitlán's pyramids. In many states, religion has been used to condition large masses of people to accept relative deprivation as necessity, to look forward to material rewards in the afterlife rather than in the present one, and to be grateful for small favors from superiors lest ingratitude call down a fiery retribution in this life or in a hell to come. (Harris, 1997, p. 299).

Not only coercion was applied, seduction also worked, explains Harris,

> A considerable amount of conformity is achieved not by frightening or threatening people but by inviting them to identify with the governing elite and to enjoy vicariously the pomp of state occasions. Public spectacles such as religious

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[41] I owe this reference to Dennis Smith.

processions, coronations, and victory parades work against the alienating effects of poverty and exploitation. During Roman times, the masses were kept under control by encouraging them to watch gladiators killing each other, chariot races, circuses, and other mass spectator events (Harris, 1997, pp. 299-300).[42]

Thus the *normalcy* of the vertical scale's application as legitimate social classification system of human worthiness began roughly ten thousand years ago with the invention of agriculture (Ury, 1999) and in subsequent *early civilizations* as they emerged in Mesopotamia, along the Nile and many other places. In his book on *Early Civilizations*, Bruce Trigger (1993) reminds us that "because of the pervasiveness of inequality, no one who lived in the early civilizations questioned the normalcy of this condition. If egalitarianism was known, it was as a feature of some of the despised, barbarian societies that existed beyond the borders of the 'civilized' world" (Trigger, 1993, p. 52).

   You, if you are a modern Western person, perhaps even a human rights advocate, will have great difficulties in understanding this mindset. Still, what we observe during long stretches of human history is that inequality, or more precisely, the vertical ranking of human worthiness, was not merely some kind of reluctantly tolerated evil; it was hailed as the very core of civilization for thousands of years around the world. Equality was seen as "barbaric."

Once low, always low! How peripheral characteristics can be ranked and essentialized

As you already noticed, I prefer to speak about the *vertical ranking of human worth and value,* and less about *inequality*, *hierarchy*, or *stratification*. This is because the significant point for my discussion is not the absence or presence of hierarchy, inequality or stratification, but whether human worthiness is ranked or not. Hierarchy, inequality and stratification can very well coexist with the absence of ranking human beings as unequal. Robert W. Fuller (2003) describes this most vividly in his book *Somebodies and Nobodies*; according to Fuller, humiliation is not the *use* of rank, but the *abuse* of rank. A pilot, for example, in a plane, or the captain of a ship, is the master over his passengers when in the sky or at high sea; clear hierarchy and stark inequality characterize this situation. Yet, nonetheless, the pilot need *not* look down on his passengers as *lesser* beings.*

   In other words, using concepts such as hierarchy, inequality or stratification, would be somewhat misleading here, because they would invite statements and objections such as, "There have always been differences between people! Human beings have never been the same and never will be! Are you a dreamer who believes that we could or should all to be the same? This is not only impossible, but also boring!"

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[42] Deutsch (2002, p. 10) writes about the basic ways by which high power groups can keep low power groups low: "control over the instruments of systematic terror and of their use; control over the state which establishes and enforces the laws, rules and procedures which regulate the social institutions of the society; control over the institutions (such as the family, school church, and media) which socialize and indoctrinate people (such as the family, school, church, and the media) to accept the power inequalities; and interactive power in which there are repeated individual behaviors by those who are more powerful which confirm the subordinate status of those in low power. In addition, there are the self-fulfilling prophecies in which the behavior of the oppressed, resulting from their oppression are used by the oppressor to justify the oppression; and the distorted relation between the oppressor and the oppressed."

Such statements or objections are irrelevant to the discussion of this book and would represent a grave miscomprehension of its focus. The point that is highlighted here is not the absence or presence of sameness or equality, but the absence or presence of the vertical scale of human worth and value. Diversity and difference can, without a problem, go together with sameness of value and worth; there is no automatism that necessarily links diversity and difference to rankings. The vertical scale of human worthiness is conceptually independent of hierarchy, inequality or stratification. (I will come back to this point later and explain that there indeed are some links that, after all, may be conceptualized.)

The important point at this stage is that a system that condones the vertical scale of human value *essentializes* hierarchy, inequality, and stratification. In such a social framework, a street sweeper not only does a lowly *job*, the lowliness of the task is essentialized as inner core of his entire being: He or she is a lowly *person*. Something that could very well be peripheral to this person's essence, namely the task of sweeping the street, is turned into her core definition: this person is deemed to be of lower human value and worth. This act of essentialization is what we find in many, if not most, traditional societies.

A street sweeper and a bank director could very well be seen as fellow human beings of equal dignity, albeit with different occupations; what differentiates them could very well be pure neutral difference and diversity. However, in traditional societies, this difference is being ranked and essentialized. Neutral difference is turned into *lesser* and *higher*. *My Fair Lady*, the musical, illustrates beautifully how Professor Higgins regards the poor flower girl Elisa as a *lower human being*, even after she has learned *higher manners*. Her essence, in his view, is fixed in lowliness through her initial poor status in society. For Professor Higgins nothing can turn Elisa into a human being of equal worthiness as compared to him and his higher cast.

Affaire d'honneur! How honor is like pride and dignity, only that it is ranked

The concept of *honor* was, and still is, deeply linked to the vertical scale. The German SS officers under Hitler learned that humiliating "Untermenschen," pushing them down, holding them to the ground, sometimes literally, was an honorable and noble duty. "Meine Ehre heißt Treue" or "my honor is loyalty," was the German motto, loyalty to the "Führer's" vision of a world of Aryan Übermenschen. Honor is the big word in societies that rank human beings vertically. Young German soldiers in Falstad, together with millions of Germans, were impregnated with the ideology that pushing and holding down those who "belonged" below was their honorable obligation.

An officer in this situation, if he disobeyed, would not only risk losing his life, worse for him and his family, he would lose his honor. He learned that obedience to the "Führer's" will was his supreme honorable duty, not merely for the sake of his immediate superordinates or political leaders, much more, for the sake of the entire German people, not enough, for the sake of the global order as a whole. Since the Aryan race was regarded as the savior of the world, young German soldiers learned that it was their utmost honorable duty to safeguard Aryan superiority so as to secure a bright future for the entire globe.

During long stretches of history, humiliation was the reason for honorable gentlemen to risk their lives, for example in duels or duel-like wars. Humiliating insults brought honorable gentlemen to the lawn behind the city walls to defend their very honor with pistols in bloody duels.

Let us go to America, around 1800. Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Aaron Burr entertained virulent animosities against each other. At some point Burr demanded satisfaction for insults he had endured from Hamilton. Hamilton first hesitated, but finally acquiesced to Burr's desire to have a duel. Hamilton wrote to his wife Elisabeth that even though he would have liked to avoid this duel, he could not, because he would be unworthy of her esteem. On July 11, 1804, the duel took place. When Hamilton had his shot, he intentionally missed and thus did not kill Burr. Hamilton may have expected the same kind of gentleman's decency from Burr. Burr however, shot Hamilton into the stomach and Hamilton died painfully next day (Fleming, 1999).

Hamilton's experience shows how a man who wanted to remain in public esteem had to conform to the code of honor, utterly independent of whether he felt passionate about the involved adversary or not. Burr was passionate in his hatred, Hamilton not. Still, Hamilton had no choice as to enter into the duel. And he paid with his life. Not least many wars resembled duels, only that they cost thousands or millions of people their lives.

Honor was not only inescapable, but also ranked. Aristocrats had *more* of it, others *less*, and everybody took care of the honor allotted to him in the appropriate way.

Thomas Scheff, researcher on the sociology of emotions, told a joke that illustrates how the honor of masters was not the same as the honor of underlings (2002 in Oslo). Scheff told the story in Yiddish and English, I only recount my summary of the English version. "Two Jews get into a fight," Tom recounts. "None of them manages to win the quarrel. Finally, they agree to have a duel." This, explains Tom, is already the first joke, because duels were something for aristocrats, and not for such insignificant underlings as Jews. However, the joke continues. "Next morning, before six o'clock at dawn, one of the opponents arrives at the little aperture behind the forest where the duel was to take place. There he waits. He waits. And he waits. His opponent does not come. He merely does not show up! Yet, finally, a messenger arrives. He brings a message from the opponent saying that he is late and that the other should not hesitate to start without him!"

In traditional honor-based societies, each social stratum, be it called cast, class, group, or sub-group, cultivates indigenous idiosyncratic sets of honor definitions that are embedded within the context of the vertical scale. The honor of a slave is different from the honor of a master, yet, both have their honor. Both defend their honor against attempts to humiliate them, to lower them further. The servant or slave who works in the emperor's private suite of rooms attaches his honor to this important rank and resists being degraded to work in the quarries (note the words *servant* and *to serve* stem from the Latin word *servus* that means *slave*). The master, equally, resists being debased into the second rank; he only succumbs if otherwise he would be debased even further.

Honor is a more collective feeling and institution than pristine pride or dignity. Honor is worn like armor; people may defend their group's honor against intruding humiliators, for example in duels, merely as a duty (similar to Hamilton), without feeling much personal hurt. I once counseled an Egyptian lawyer who had studied in Europe and had almost forgotten about his roots in the Egyptian countryside where blood feuds were ripe. One day, to his great surprise and shock, he was visited by his

villagers who told him that he was the next in line to be killed. He neither knew why nor by whom. He had not done anything to elicit other people's hatred. His place in the genealogy of his village was sufficient to give him a place in the honor game.

Honor, furthermore, is linked to gender in particular ways. In an honor society,[43] the man is defined as the principal actor, no matter how functionally important female activities might be. He is the *actor*, she is his *object*. He is the defender of honor against humiliation. He is defined as being responsible, self-reflexive, and rational. He is expected to protect *his* women, at least as long as he values them as a *resource*, for example as prizes and symbols of *his* honor, or as mothers of *his* children.

A woman who lives in an honor society learns that she either is not regarded as a human being at all, or that she is a lowly human being. In the first case, she is perceived as a passive recipient of male actions, as "material" to be used or thrown away by him; she is on the same level as household items or domesticated animals. In the second case, also, she is seen as a passive recipient, but as a human being whose rank is lower than the men's; in this case, she is on the same level as children or slaves. In blood feud societies she can move freely around, only men are "worthy" of being killed "honorably," not women.

Some honor cultures in the Arab world and in Africa regard the woman's hymen as a symbol of the family's honor, and among others for this reason they practice female genital mutilation – on the grounds that in this way the family's honor (in which she shares) is being "protected." In many traditional honor societies, a female is a token, or representative, of the family or group to which she belongs. And daughters or sisters are needed as "gifts" for marriage into those other families *her* males want as allies. And within such a context only "honorable" girls make honorable gifts.

Thus, we may conclude that honor is like pride or dignity, only that it is ranked and that every stratum in a hierarchical society has its own honor. Honor furthermore is often played out as a group phenomenon – mostly heavily gendered – more than an individual feeling. People may even find themselves caught in games of honor beyond their control, caught in affaires d'honneur emanating from their group without themselves identifying with these affaires as individuals.

Don't complain! How pain from humiliation can be prescribed as "honorable prosocial suffering"

In social and societal structures of honor, any pain or suffering that those have to endure who have their place further down, particularly those at the very bottom of a pyramid of power, is deemed to be *necessary pain* or even *prosocial suffering*. Through thousands of years, underlings' sufferings were regarded as "good" for them and "fruitful" for the health of society as a whole. Vaccinations or surgical operation, albeit painful, are accepted as "good" for patients; this is a positive view of pain that even today's human rights activists can sympathize with. Similarly, underlings' pain was seen as "good" for the health of society by those subscribing to the vertical scale of human value, including many of the underlings themselves.

Jeanne D'Haem (1997) wrote a very sensitive book, *The Last Camel. True Stories of Somalia* (D'Haem, 1997), where she describes what I also have found in the course of my fieldwork in Somalia. She was in Somalia in 1968 as a Peace Corps volunteer and narrates the story of a neighbor in the small village where she stayed. Her neighbor

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[43] The following three paragraphs are adapted from Lindner, 2002a, p. 142.

was a woman who, through adverse circumstances, had nobody to stand in for her and her little daughter. She was forced to support herself and the child by prostitution.

However, at the age of about forty, she met a man who fell in love with her and was willing to marry her as his second wife. She, too, was very fond of him and was thrilled by this prospect. She wished to mark this new stage in her life, this step into a better future, by something greater than herself. And she did this by a highly symbolic act. She had herself "closed up" (the vagina sewed up so as to let urine pass only) as if she was a virgin that had not yet met a man. The source of her joy was that her husband had to open her up in the wedding night with the force of his member, like a virgin. For her, the pain of all these procedures, the hurtful sowing up and the agonizing reopening, was no argument to be placed against them. Like in the case of vaccination or surgery, she deemed that short-term pain would serve to safeguard a happy future. And since she sincerely believed in the worldview of her social environment, namely that female genital mutilation is not a mutilation but a symbol of honor, the procedure did, indeed, make her proud and confident. After all, subsequent to a successful, albeit painful, operation, we typically all are happy.

During my fieldwork I met a woman from the Somali diaspora who had stepped out of the worldview that the above described woman held. It was at a conference in Finland in 1998 when she urged me in an interview, "I feel that female circumcision is a humiliation carried out and justified by my culture. Please do not accept that part of my culture – on the contrary, help me change this! Do not cover up for the wrong-doings of my culture just for the sake of wanting to recognize and respect Somali culture!"[44]

Not many months later I was in Somalia, and I met two young women, around twenty years old, who had recently returned to Somalia from England with their parents. Their parents despised the practice of female genital mutilation as archaic and wrong and these girls were therefore not "closed." However, instead of bringing relief to them, their condition was a source of great aggravation to them. Because they were "open," they were treated as if they had leprosy wherever they went, and made to feel as if they were prostitutes. They could not bear this. They were sure to not be presented with any suitable husband as long as they were "open." They were desperate. They vowed to have the operation done by their own funding against the will of their parents. The argument that this operation represented a painful humiliation had no effect on them.

The vaccination and surgery argument, namely that pain may be regarded as necessary *side effect* on the path to higher goals, is not reserved to this example. *Just war* is another, and it still is valid today, even among human rights advocates. The *just war* argument posits that short-term suffering is the price for long-term freedom and justice. The 2003 war in Iraq demonstrated this. All pain that was elicited, on all sides, was deemed as regrettable but prosocial suffering by those who saw this war as just war. What we learn here is that the argument that something is painful is no valid counterargument against action that is regarded as price to be paid for a secure future. Opponents of such practices have to find better arguments. We will discuss them further down.

More even, pain may not only be seen as regrettable yet necessary side effect; however, it may even be sought on *its own account*. Medieval flagellants were happy to whip themselves; they would lower their bodies to the ground and crawl on their

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[44] This paragraph is adapted from Lindner, 2000j, p. 3.

knees for miles; they agreed to even the most severe sufferings, more, they inflicted these painful acts of humiliation on themselves. They did this because they were convinced that it was for their own moral advancement, and for God's honor. By whipping themselves, by having blood streaming from their backs and knees, they wished to demonstrate to God the intense sincerity of their reverence. Through such self-lowering they reckoned they climbed up on the human ranking scale, up, nearer to divinity. They gained worth and value, increased the ranking of their human essence, not through grabbing riches and power, but through closeness to God. Their self-inflicted humiliation thus elevated them on the vertical scale towards the top.

Even today, such practices are still around. This year's Shia celebrations gave evidence to the world of how practices of self-whipping are alive also in our days. Bowing to divinity enhances one's moral standing and reputation, at least as long as a widely accepted divine concept is the object of this worship and not some obscure sectarian guru. (Bowing to a kitchen knife, to make the point clear, would not have the same effect; it would be ridiculous and bring the practitioners of such a cult into madhouse rather than boost their reputation.)

In the case of Christianity, not only believers actively venerate God by humiliation, also God is seen as actor who uses humiliation. The Christian God is seen to have reached out to humans by giving his son through the most humiliating death available at the time, namely by being crucified. The Christian God is thus seen as strengthening the conceptual link connecting the vertical scale of humanity to divinity through the instrument of self-inflicted humiliation. God lowered himself so as to connect to humanity.

Stockholm syndrome! How lowliness can be widely accepted

Throughout human history, many underlings accepted their lowly lot, more so, some even defended it. Women, for example, used to keep their heads down for large parts of human history. For long periods, in Europe, and not only there, women risked to be branded, punished, and even burnt as witches if they dared to arrogate more importance than was "due" to them. A woman had to "know her place" and this place was somewhere down. She was not supposed to define her lowly condition as humiliation in the sense of violation; on the contrary, she was expected to accept it with "due humbleness," "female modesty" and regard it as her "honor" to be at service. Her duty, and this she taught her daughters, was to "respect" this order, not humiliate it. Rebellion against female lowliness was regarded as deeply disrespectful to the overall order.

And, many women did not only obey these rules reluctantly and superficially but internalized them profoundly. It would be a mistake to believe that only men accused women of failing in modesty, women kept each other down as much. Not only men pointed the finger at women for being witches, women accused their sisters, too. In the last years of Queen Elizabeth I up to 53 per cent of all cases fell into this category (Jones, 2000, p. 206). And still today, in large parts of the world, women believe that they are born inferior; and they bow.

Yet, women were not the only ones inhabiting lower ranks throughout human history and actively accepting this. Also the history of former slaves or colonized people, black people and ethnic minorities is full of examples of acceptance of inferiority, even nowadays. A member of a low caste in India might see her fate as God's will that should not be opposed.

Many colonized *subjects* (*jacere* is Latin for *to throw*, and the prefix, *sub* means

under) indeed deemed their colonizers to be more "civilized;" why else did so many yearn to become "more French than the French," or "more British than the British." Frantz Fanon (1986) wrote a book entitled *Black Skin, White Masks*, where he describes how he at some point was very proud of having attained almost being "French." He was proud because he had climbed *up* the vertical scale of human value. What he overlooked, initially, was that he, paradoxically, through his delight, validated his former lowliness. You cannot be proud of being *up* without judging your former status as *down.*

There are many terms describing this *identification with the oppressor*. *Learned helplessness* is "a term coined by Martin Seligman to characterize the generalization that helplessness is a learned state produced by exposure to noxious, unpleasant situations in which there is no possibility of escape or avoidance" (The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology, Reber, 1995). Also the discussion of the *Stockholm syndrome* may have its place here. The *Stockholm syndrome* is "an emotional bond between hostages and their captors which is frequently observed when the hostages are held for long periods of time under emotionally straining circumstances. The name derives from the instance when it was first publicly noted, when a group of hostages was held by robbers in a Stockholm bank for five days" (Reber, 1995).

However, the *identification with the oppressor* is not merely an individual process; it can also be a societal process. As discussed before, many underlings turned their lowliness into "their culture," in other words the concept of *learned helplessness* was turned into long-term cultural beliefs. Johan Galtung's notion of *penetration*, or "implanting the topdog inside the underdog" (Galtung, 1996, p. 199), illustrates the fact that acceptance of subjugation may become a culture of its own. Also Ranajit Guha's understanding of the term *subaltern* points at this process.

However, it may be arrogant to frame underlings as mere passive victims. Voluntary subservience may in many cases have been more than behaviorally *learned helplessness*. Lowliness and helplessness can also be displayed out of conviction. As discussed before, not few underlings accepted their lot as God's will or nature's order. Many underlings were conceivably not only coerced or seduced into believing in their own lowliness; throughout human history many may have genuinely shared their superiors' views on the legitimacy of ranking human essence in a way that turned them into lesser beings.

Break the will of the child! How parents can reproduce underlings
Parents typically were central to reproducing obedient underlings. Alice Miller (1983) spelled out how, in the period that lead up to the two World Wars, leading pedagogues of the time regarded *breaking the will of the child* as essential for childrearing.[45] Lakoff and Johnson (1999) describe the underlying framework with what they call the *Strict Father model* (as opposed to the *Nurturant Parent model*):
> The father has authority to determine the policy that will govern the family. Because of his moral authority, his commands are to be obeyed. He teaches his children right from wrong by setting strict rules for their behavior and by setting a moral example in his own life. He enforces these moral rules by reward and punishment. The father also gains his children's cooperation by showing love and by appreciating them when they obey the rules. But children must not be coddled, lest they become spoiled. A spoiled child lacks the appropriate moral values and

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[45] *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and The Roots of Violence*, by Miller, 1983.

lacks the moral strength and discipline necessary for living independently and meeting life's challenges. The mother has day-to-day responsibility for the care of the household, raising the children; and upholding the father's authority. Children must respect and obey their parents, because of the parents' moral authority. Through their obedience they learn the discipline and self-reliance that is necessary to meet life's challenges. This self-discipline develops in them strong moral character. Love and nurturance are a vital part of family life, but they should never outweigh parental authority, which is itself an expression of love and nurturance – tough love. As children mature, the virtues of respect for moral authority, self-reliance, and self-discipline allow them to incorporate their father's moral values. In this way they incorporate their father's moral authority they become self-governing and self-legislating (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp. 313-314).

The result is the following,

Evidence from three areas of psychological research – attachment theory, socialization theory, and family violence studies – shows that the Strict Father model …tends to produce children who are dependent on the authority of others, cannot chart their own moral course very well, have less of a conscience, are less respectful of others, and have no greater ability to resist temptations (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 327).

Thus, the *Strict Father model* seems to produce what Theodor Adorno called the *authoritarian personality* whose principal characteristic is obedience and preparedness to blindly following orders, irrespective of their moral contents (Adorno et al., 1950).

John came to my clinic because he was desperately lonely. He had recently retired and felt that life had been in vain. He told me the following: "My father has always subdued me. I was never good enough for him. He put me down wherever he could. He said that parental love means 'making the boy tough.' He used to say, 'What will not kill him, will make him strong.' I am surprised that he even gave me food. In hindsight, I would have preferred he had starved me to death.

What I learned from him is either to look up or down on people. In my case I developed a taste for the latter, though. My main concern, throughout my entire life, was to push down those people around me who were better than I. I studied them and at some point I subjugated them. In this way, in the course of about twenty years, I became the president of a large international corporation. I was ruthless. I spotted my 'enemies'' weaknesses – I mean of course my colleagues' weaknesses – almost immediately. Whenever a colleague was better than me, I was consumed by the endeavor to 'kill him.' I made tabula rasa. I was the only one.

In the course of this endeavor I lost my wife and my children. She left me, and my children do not even send me a birthday card. When I was not yet retired, I did not mind. However, now, I suddenly realize all this. What I realize, is that I never learned how to enjoy being equal with somebody. I never learned how to bring about friendship or love. Yes, I love my car, my dog, and my luxurious house. But have I ever loved another human being, apart from idolizing Superman symbols? There is this automatic reflex in me to measure my *opponents* – you see, for me there are no *interlocutors* – for their strengths and weaknesses. May aim is not to enjoy their company but to get on top of them. I am the ultimate humiliator. I am obsessed with dominance. I cannot relax until I am the master.

Yet, what has all that brought me? Loneliness and utter emptiness. I succeeded, I was the boss, but for what? Is this the meaning of life? Shall I write on my grave stone 'Here rests the man who could bite like a dog?' I indeed feel like a dog and not like a human being. I followed some notion of supremacy like a slave. Although I was the boss, I was a slave. I blindly obeyed some kind of cold law of supremacy. All sorts of black thoughts engulf me since I am retired and have time to reflect. I am not anymore proud of my life."

Be "civilized"! How humiliation may elicit shame and humility

What has the millennia-long routine use of humiliation in honor societies brought to humanity? Has it merely brought wretched lowliness to underlings and conceited arrogance to masters? Has it not also brought civilized behavior? Earlier I mentioned humility and humbleness and their place vis-à-vis humiliation in the mental landscape of the vertical scale of human worthiness. And indeed, Norbert Elias (1994) describes this in his seminal book *The Civilizing Process* (Elias, 1994). Durkheim, Marx, Weber and historians such as Marc Bloch presented similar lines of reflection.

Elias explains how a process of subjugation may have had a civilizing effect on formerly rough and haughty knights, lords, and commoners. He studied the French court and how feudal lords were seduced into bowing to the absolute ruler. Unruly, proud local warlords were being "civilized" by being taught the lessons of shame. According to Elias, pacified and civilized people learn to feel embarrassed; they learn "social anxiety."

The resulting *civilized habitus* that Elias describes could also be called the "successfully humiliated habitus"(Smith, 2001). Not only the French court, also the Indian caste system, the Chinese system of kow-towing, and the low Japanese bow all express and reinforce strong hierarchies. These Indian, Chinese and Japanese hierarchies were all constructed, historically, around the practices of ritual humiliation.

Habitus is a Latin word and means *character* or *appearance*. The civilized habitus is a habitus of self-control and detachment that emerges, as Smith (2001) writes, "as a consequence of humiliation mechanisms – ranging from massacres to verbal insults – employed to create and maintain social hierarchies. The humiliated habitus is consistent with intense self-discipline. For example, slaves try to avoid visible behaviour that would prompt masters to punish them" (Smith, 2001, p. 2).

Does this mean that humiliating people is a good thing to do? That is promotes peace? What is the relationship between shame, humiliation and humbling here? Shame is what I agree to; humiliation is what I do not agree to. Shame seems to be humiliation that has been accepted by the receiver and interpreted as due humbling.

I blush when I break wind inadvertently; I am ashamed even if nobody notices it. I am ashamed precisely because I have learned to subscribe to the notion that farting is a transgression of decent behavior that is demarcated by shame. While blushing after such a flatus, I might remember my mother telling me off when I was a child and let wind. Human beings are intersubjective beings, we see ourselves as others see us, and we can either feel pride or shame when we look at us with the other's eyes. When my mother made me understand that I transgressed boundaries of decency, I felt shame. I may even have felt extreme shame. Many people dream horror dreams of strangers standing above them, laughing and ridiculing them, while they lie naked on the floor in their excrements (not surprisingly, this horror dream is a script for torture).

Torture uses feelings of shame so as to humiliate its victims and it uses humiliation

so as to create shame in them. Torture is in a position to use shame for its goals precisely because shame is widely regarded as an asset. A human being that is not capable of shame is seen as a monster. Shame is what keeps us within the limits of the social rules and regulations. We all hope that shame will deter our neighbors from lying to us and steeling from us. More so, I hope that my neighbor will feel guilty and not have an affair with my spouse (guilt may be defined as moral shame, shame over moral shortcomings). With other words, we all hope that our neighbors will bow to the rules and regulations which safeguard that our community can live together in harmony. We hope that shame and guilt will limit social disruption and we therefore deem these forms of shame and guilt as highly valuable.

At this point we see the link between shame, guilt and humility. Not only shame and guilt can be highly prosocial, as mentioned earlier, also humility can be seen as a virtue. As shame and guilt, also humility requires bowing. Arrogant people believe they can take down the sky and do the impossible. Humble people, on the other side, recognize that there may be limits. Shaming is the business of civil society because of its prosocial effect. Corporations and governments are being "shamed" into abiding to the promises of humility they made. They are asked if they are not ashamed of cutting down the trees that are the backbone of a healthy global climate. They are confronted with questions as to whether they are not ashamed of destroying bio-diversity, the very gene pool that may one day be the only savior of humankind when new medical drugs are needed.

In other words, one person may feel ashamed and humbled without feeling humiliated; another person may feel humiliated but not ashamed. Shame could be seen to emanate from two pathways, firstly the path of self-humiliation and self-destructive depression, and secondly the prosocial path of self-humbling and becoming a more mature human being.

What we can conclude here, at the end of this chapter, is that there were times in human history, when it was almost universally accepted as the *normal order of things* that human beings were ranked along a vertical scale and that those of *more* worth were at the *top* and those of *less* value at the *bottom*. In an honor society, each level has its own honor. *To humiliate* means nothing but maintaining this hierarchical order by "reminding" those further down on the scale of their "due" place. Humiliation was a universally accepted and honorable instrument for masters – and still is in many places – to keep *stability, law and order*, which was the order of the vertical scale of human value and essence. And many an underling assisted by voluntary self humiliation, wrapped in various definitions of honor.

Reading related to this chapter
Nisbett and Cohen (1996) examine an *honor-based notion* of *humiliation*.[46] The honor to which Cohen and Nisbett refer is the kind that operates in the more traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in *blood feuds*.[47]

William Ian Miller (1993) wrote a book entitled *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence*, where he links humiliation to honor as understood in *The Iliad* or *Icelandic sagas*, namely humiliation as violation of honor. Miller explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Miller suggests, "that we are more

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[46] Nisbett and Cohen, 1996.

[47] See other evidence relating to blood feuds in Boehm, 1984, Malcolm, 1998, and Rodina, 1999. I owe these references to Adam Jones.

familiar with the culture of honor than we may like to admit. This familiarity partially explains why stories of revenge play so well, whether read as *The Iliad*, an Icelandic saga, *Hamlet*, many novels, or seen as so many gangland, intergalactic, horror, or Clint Eastwood movies. Honor is not our official ideology, but its ethic survives in pockets of most all our lives. In some ethnic (sub)cultures it still is the official ideology, or at least so we are told about the cultures of some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, and so on. And even among the suburban middle class the honor ethic is lived in high school or in the competitive rat race of certain professional cultures" (Miller, 1993, p. 9).

Read in Dennis Smith, 1999, on Bauman's analysis and how it overlaps with the approaches of critical theory (e.g. Adorno and Habermas) and post-structuralism (e.g. Foucault and Lyotard) but cannot be fully aligned with either.

Read furthermore on hunters and gatherers and their rather harmonious societal structures,[48] *circumscription*,[49] on *women* as *objects*,[50] on the practice of *exchanging women* between groups,[51] on *just war*,[52] on *oppression* and the *psychology of oppression*,[53] "*civilized oppression*,"[54] on *learned helplessness*,[55] on subaltern

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[48] See, for example Johansen, 1982, Weatherford, 1988, and Weatherford, 1991, for a discussion of the constructive contributions from Native Indians in North America. I thank Jacqueline Wasilewski for having drawn my attention to this literature.

[49] See, in particular, the work of Carneiro, 1988.

[50] See the classic work of Simone de Beauvoir, 1953, *The Second Sex*. According to Beauvoir, women are "not born, but made."

[51] See Marcel Mauss, 1950, *Sociologie et Anthropologie*; Claude Lévi-Strauss, 1957, "Reciprocity, the essence of social life?"; and Lévi-Strauss, 1968, *Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté*. I was confronted with this practice during my fieldwork in Somalia in 1998, where the exchange of women between clans was widely regarded as the last step on the way to solve the current divisions. See Lindner, 2001c.

[52] There is a sea of literature to be drawn upon that addresses just war. Walzer, 1992 is a classic. See also Norman, 1995.

[53] Morton Deutsch (2002) writes on *oppression* and identifies five types of *injustices* that are involved in oppression (p. 4): *distributive injustice, procedural injustice, retributive injustice, moral exclusion,* and *cultural imperialism. Distributive* injustice addresses four types of capital, *consumption, investment, skill,* and *social* (Perrucci and Wysong, 1999). Deutsch (2002) continues (p. 16), "The oppressors use "history," "the law of nature," "the will of God," "science," "the criteria of art," and "language" as well as the social institutions of society to legitimize their superiority and to ignore or minimize the identity of the oppressed." For the *psychology of oppression*, see Fanon, 1986, and also Bulhan, 1985. Paulo Freire is another important name to be mentioned in this context, see, for example, Freire, 1970. See also Sidanius and Pratto, 1999.

[54] Harvey, 1999, has used the term *civilized oppression* to characterize the everyday processes of oppression in normal life. Civilized oppression "is embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutions and rules, and the collective consequences of following those rules. It refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions which are supported by the media and cultural stereotypes as well as by the structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms" (Young, 1990, p. 41, I quote from Deutsch, 2002).

[55] See Seligman, 1975, Abela and Seligman, 2000, and also Peterson and Maier, 1993, among many others.

studies,[56] on the *authoritarian personality*,[57] on *crimes of obedience*,[58] on Elias and *civilized* people who learn to feel *embarrassed*[59] and acquire *social anxiety*,[60] and read more on *shame*.[61]

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[56] See, for example, Guha and Spivak (Eds.), 1988.

[57] Apart from Adorno et al., 1950, see related literature, for example, in Altemeyer, 1988, Altemeyer, 1981, among many others.

[58] Kelman and Hamilton, 1989. See also Blass, 1991, and Blass (Ed.), 2000.

[59] See Smith, 2000 forthcoming. There is a sea of literature available on Norbert Elias.

[60] See also Braithwaite's work on shame, reintegration, and modernity, Braithwaite, 1989, Braithwaite, 1993. See furthermore Keltner, 1995, and Keltner, Young, and Buswell, 1997.

[61] See, for example, Gilbert and Andrews (Eds.), 1998, Gilbert, 2000, Morrison and Gilbert, 2001, Gilbert and Miles (Eds.), 2002; see also Hartling et al., 2000.

Humiliation as Painful Violation of Dignity: The New Order of Dignity

A slave who is beaten and lives in a world where beating slaves is not only seen as normal but even as divinely ordained rule, in what way does he suffer? A woman, who is beaten and lives in a world where it is codified by law that her husband ought to beat disobedient wives, in what way does she suffer? Today, Norway is the world number one of the Gender-related Development Index, GDI;[62] still, until as recent as 1868, Norwegian law obliged husbands to beat insubordinate wives. Which effect do such *legitimizing myths* (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) have? *Cognitive appraisal theory of emotions* addresses this question.

A disobedient wife was not only regarded as sinning against her husband, but against social order as a whole. Perhaps she endured the pain of the beating acceptingly because she regarded it as justified and prosocial pain? Perhaps she accepted it in the same way people agree to painful surgery, because they tell themselves that medicine only helps when it tastes bad? A surgery patient is glad after the operation; it did hurt, yes, but having endured it feels like a victory. Perhaps a lot of humiliation has been endured in this way in the course of human history?

In long-standing hierarchical societies, the underling and master relationship is static; both believe their power relations to be the natural order of things. Underlings may be happy or unhappy, but they do not include their inferior status as a significant variable within their happiness equation. They accept their lowly position as an externality, in the same way they accept that some people are taller than others, that time proceeds, or that we get old and die. Those aspects of life may make people happy or unhappy, but they are beyond the reach of criticism or complaint.

We may conclude that a person cannot be humiliated in the sense of hurtful violation as long as she agrees to be lowered or lowers herself, even if this is extremely painful. This is particularly true when it happens within a wider social context that acknowledges the meaningfulness of ranking the essence of human beings vertically. Even today, pain is not necessarily rejected. In the context of surgery and vaccination it is accepted. Likewise, the pain of humiliation was widely accepted as "necessary medication."

This discussion does not mean to deny that underlings in the course of human history suffered, and it is certainly not meant to condone suffering. Oppression, such as slavery, was at times excruciatingly cruel. However, the discussion aims at highlighting the different way in which suffering can be processed, as *unavoidable pain similar to natural disaster or even as necessary pain similar to medical treatment*, or as *torment that is unduly inflicted and should discontinue*. The way in which the experience of pain is processed, greatly influences our handling of it.

Many of my female clients, but also many male clients, were caught in a struggle against "prescribed lowliness." Nadia, eighteen years old, was beaten by her mother regularly. The mother would shout: "Why did we send you to school? That you get

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[62] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2002 explains, "The human development index (HDI) is a simple summary measure of three dimensions of the human development concept: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a decent standard of living ... Thus it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income to allow a broader view of a country's development than using income alone, which is too often equated with well-being. Since the creation of the HDI in 1990 three supplementary indices have been developed to highlight particular aspects of human development: the human poverty index (HPI), gender-related development index (GDI) and gender empowerment measure (GEM)."

> haughty ideas? That you forget the due place of a woman? We should never have sent you to school! A woman bears her husband's children and obeys him! That is her role! Stop whining!"

Stop! How humiliation means violation

Up to 1757 the verb *to humiliate* meant nothing worse than *to lower* or *to humble*, or to *show underlings their legitimate lowly place*, without any connotation that this may also signify a violation. This we learn from the *Oxford English Dictionary* with regard to the English language. I quote from Miller (1996),[63] who informs us that "the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757."

In other words, in the English speaking world, humiliation was nothing hurtful until about 250 years ago. And England and English-speaking people were not alone throughout history with the view that *to humiliate* may mean nothing else than *to humble*. For millennia, people around the world believed that it was normal and morally absolutely correct to have masters and underlings, and that masters were entitled to be treated as *higher* beings and underlings deserved to be shown "where they belonged," namely somewhere *down*. Even when underlings rebelled, they attempted to replace the master rather than dismantle hierarchy.

The emergence of the new meaning of the word *humiliation* (1757) coincides, interestingly, with the *invention of the self*. The author of *The Invention of the Self*, John O. Lyons (1978) suggests that the self – as we know it today – also emerged around 1750.[64] In his book, Lyons analyzes the ways travelers describe their experiences and finds that around 1750 these descriptions change insofar as the authors insert themselves as subjects who describe their personal perspective on what they observe.

These changes closely precede the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) and the French Revolution (August 4, 1789), both important starting points for the subsequent rise and canonization of human rights ideals. Undoubtedly, the ideas that feed into today's human rights ideas predate 1757. Not least important religions such as Christianity and Islam entail significant ideals of equality. However, these ideals seem to have gathered pace only about 250 years ago.

Thus, clearly, humankind was "pre-adapted," meaning that it had the ideas of equal dignity in store. However, it pulled its entire ethical and moral sentiment around only circa 250 years ago, or, more precisely, the Western world did this. Yet, I do not believe that human rights are merely a Western vision. I think that certain defining factors have changed – among them the second round of *globalization* that has entered the stage – and that the Western world was affected by this change first. The emergence of human rights ideas, according to my analysis, may be an outfall of humankind interacting with new global realities. We will have a closer look at these reflections further down.

Hence, around 250 years ago the *age of honor and fear* started to give way to the *age of dignity and humiliation*. Before the transition, people were kept in check by infusing them with fear. The new moral sentiment, however, rejects handling fellow

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[63] Miller, 1993, p. 175, italics in original.

[64] See Lyons, 1978. I thank Barnett Pearce for making me aware of Lyons's book. I thank Jon Elster for making me aware that the "birth of the self" began much earlier, with Michel de Montaigne, 1575, in his Essays. See furthermore, Bloom, 1999.

human beings by means of equal dignity. Self-empowered dignified individuals are the ideal of the new human rights paradigm, individuals who stand up in civil disobedience if blackmailed and extorted by applications of fear. This new dignified individual, however, can be humiliated if dignity is violated. Fear was often responded to with submission, also humiliation may elicit submission, however, it may also lead to violent defiance.

Thus, after 10,000 years of hierarchical practice, around three hundred years ago, very *suddenly* for historic processes, a major transition incepted, marked by the 1757 change of the meaning of the word *humiliation*. The *Zeitgeist* urged the application of the vertical scale on human worthiness to be dismantled and abandoned. The gut feeling connected to practices of *putting down* sat out to swing from *hm* to *akh*. Increasingly, what masters and underlings once called *benevolent patronage* is being criticized as *brutal domination* since and practices of humiliation and arrogation rapidly lose legitimacy, even though the dismantling of the vertical gradient on human worth and value is far from complete. Yet, virtually nowhere on nowadays globe is *subjugating* people, *putting/pushing/holding down* people regarded as reason for pride and satisfaction. Increasingly, new framings are being applied.

William Ury (1999) drew up *a simplified depiction of history*, see Table 1. Ury is an anthropologist and director of the *Harvard University Project on Preventing War*. He draws together elements from *anthropology* as well as *game theory* and *conflict studies*. He describes three major types of society, *simple hunter-gatherers*, *complex agriculturists*, and current *knowledge society*.

According to Ury's systematization, simple hunter-gatherers live in a world of coexistence and open networks, within which conflicts are negotiated rather than addressed by coercion. The abundance of wild food represents an expandable pie of resources that does not force opponents into win-lose paradigms.

In contrast to the hunter-gatherer cluster of *logics*, complex agriculturalists, the second type of society, live in a world of coercion. They lead their lives within closed hierarchical pyramids of power on land that represents a fixed pie and pushes antagonists into win-lose situations that typically are addressed by strict orders.

Thirdly, the historically last type, namely present knowledge society, resembles the first type insofar as the pie of resources, in this case knowledge, represents an expandable pie, similar to hunters' and gatherers' wild food that lends itself to win-win conflict solutions, lest antagonists all want to lose. This type of society is again organized as an open network and not anymore as a tightly knit hierarchical body. Negotiation and contract replace command-lines, and coexistence is again the word of the day, leaving behind the old paradigm of coercion.

A Simplified Depiction of History

Type of Society: Conditions:	Simple hunter-gatherers	Complex agriculturists	Knowledge Society
Basic resource	Expandable pie (wild foods)	Fixed pie (land & power)	Expandable pie (knowledge)
Basic logic of conflict	Both-gain or both-lose	Win-lose	Both-gain or both-lose
Basic form of organization	Open network	Closed pyramid	Open network
Basic form of decision making	Negotiation	Orders	Negotiation
	↓ Coexistence	↓ Coercion	↓ Coexistence

Table 1: A simplified depiction of history (Ury, 1999, p. 108)

"Subjugating human beings is illegitimate!" How the sentence of humiliation evolved

Let me build on Ury's table and integrate into it the practice of humiliation. I start by reflecting on the sentence, "Subjugating people is illegitimate" or, in a slightly longer version, "Subjugating, abasing, instrumentalizing, or putting down human beings is illegitimate and called *humiliation*, whereby humiliation means the *illicit violation of equal dignity*." This sentence feels morally "right" for human rights advocates in the twenty first century. By analyzing this sentence more closely, we detect that it contains three parts, (a) "subjugation," (b) "human beings," and (c) "illegitimacy."

Bear with me through the following analysis. I think it unveils a fascinating core discourse of human history, a discourse that underpins all other discourses as, for example, communism, democracy, or capitalism. The three elements of this sentence may be conceptualized as expressing *common sense* categories as discussed in Smedslund's earlier mentioned work on *Psycho-Logic*.

By varying the last element (c), we can build another sentence, namely "subjugating people is legitimate." Does this sentence sound familiar? What we have unearthed, like archaeologists, is a sentence that was accepted as morally "right" through something like the past 10,000 years in most societies. Wherever the sentence "subjugating people is legitimate" reigns, the use of the word humiliation does not entail any connotation of violation; on the contrary, humiliation is venerated as a core practice to maintain hierarchical order and show underlings "their" place. Still today, the sentence "subjugating people is legitimate" is widely in use; however, as discussed above, it rapidly loses legitimacy and is increasingly criticized.

We can also manipulate the second element (b) of the sentence, namely "human beings," and try to replace it, for example, with the word "nature." We arrive at two sentences, namely (1) "subjugating nature is legitimate" and (2) "subjugating nature is illegitimate." Again we have discovered widely-used sentences. The first one, "Subjugation nature is legitimate" has indeed dominated eons of human history. The other version of this sentence is "subjugation nature is illegitimate." This sentence is at the core of modern talk about sustainability that attempts to limit unchecked "subduing." "Subjugating nature is illegitimate" is, so-to-speak, the human rights ideal applied to the biosphere. One may call it the *biosphere rights ideals* by replacing

the word *human* in *human rights ideals*.

Finally, we can also manipulate the first element of the sentence and ask whether the practice of "putting down" and "subjugating" has always been known to humankind. Perhaps language was the first application of the idea that something can be put down; after all, we *subject* nature to our linguistic labels. The Latin root of the word *sub-ject* reveals it: *ject* stems from *jacere*, *to throw*, and *sub* means *under*.

With respect to tools, which are the result of *subduing nature*, already chimpanzees know how to use them; they use twigs to fetch larvae out of tree holes and thus know how to instrumentalize nature for their own advantage. Yet, their skills are extremely restricted in comparison with human expertise. Admittedly, early Homo sapiens was not that proficient either, at least compared to later eras in human history. Modern technology eclipses Stone Age tools. In other words, early attempts to subjugate nature were only tentative applications of the plethora of uses that later became known in the historic course that led up to the twenty first century.

Thus, we can conclude that at the core of the notion of humiliation we find the *theoretical possibility* that something can be put down or pushed down, or held down. As explained earlier, the words used for humiliation, not only in English, reveal this spatial concept. The theoretical possibility that something can be put down and held down could very well have gone *undetected* by humankind. However, Homo sapiens discovered it. Not only that, Homo sapiens also *transformed* it into manifold practices: Initially, only abiotic nature was put and held down and tools were made. Later the idea was *expanded*. Not only the *abiotic nature* was put and held down, also *animals* were subjected to domestication, yet, not enough, even *human beings* were included and held down by other human beings. This was regarded as entirely *legitimate* for 10,000 years, until, very recently, humankind initiated a drastic turn and today widely *condemns* what it regarded as moral duty for 10,000 years. This is nothing less than a revolutionary turn.

If we were to use traffic as a metaphor and map it onto the historic evolvement of the concept and practice of humiliation and human rights, we could conclude that, as long as there is ample space, everybody can pass without taking too much notice of one another. Under conditions of abundance, hunters and gatherers are free to enjoy pristine pride.

In early agricultural empires with denser populations, however, the powerful usurped the right to pass first and instated a hierarchical system of honorable priorities. Honor suggests that big vehicles pass first, while the smaller ones wait in due reverence. A master regards it as utterly legitimate to push out the smaller ones, who, in deference, accept this treatment as divinely ordained order, or the "nature of things." A master has the green light inbuilt in his vehicle so-to-speak. Occasionally somebody who previously owned a small vehicle would attempt to acquire a larger one, and if he succeeded, he would be the new master and venerated accordingly. Thus a revolution would topple the master, but not the system. However, apart from the threat of revolutions that required constant attention from the masters, this system would render a certain extent of public stability, calm and order.

At some point, just prior to the great upheaval of the French Revolution, around the time when the word humiliation acquired its meaning of violation, a discussion arose as to whether traffic could be arranged better, namely through traffic lights. Dignity means that every driver, irrespective of the size of the vehicle, has the same rights in front of traffic lights. The size of the vehicle, its color and prize, are not supposed to affect the driver's status as traffic participant.

In the course of the entire course of humankind's historic development, two major transitions are thus to be observed. The first transition from period I to period II, and the second transition from period II to period III. The first transition occurred roughly 10,000 years ago, when agriculture emerged together with hierarchical societal structures. The second transition is still unfolding subsequent to its onset around 250 years ago. The linguistics of the word humiliation are profoundly important markers of this transition and it is most illuminating how this word changed its meaning around 250 years ago.

Table 2 attempts to integrate my analysis of humiliation into Ury's *simplified depiction of history*.

"A Simplified Depiction of History" with Humiliation Added

	Simple hunter-gatherers I	Complex agriculturists II	Knowledge Society III
Type of society and period in human history	Pride	Honor	Dignity
The application of the idea that something can be put down, instrumentalized, or subjugated	Humankind undertakes its first tentative attempts of applying the idea of subjugation and, by making tools, instrumentalizes nature.	Humankind expands the practice of subjugation on to human beings; some human beings, slaves and underlings, are transformed into "tools" at the hands of others, the masters.	Humankind turns against the practice of ranking human beings into lesser and higher beings, and declares the practices of the past ten thousand years to be illegitimate.
The evolution of the sentence of humiliation	The subjugation (of nature) >	and of human beings (no longer only nature) >	is defined as illegitimate (no longer as legitimate).

Table 2: "A simplified depiction of history" with humiliation added

Let me transpose this analysis of human history onto the figure of the three lines that was presented in Figure 1. We start with sketching a single horizontal line. This is meant to represent the line of equal pristine pride, equal dignity and humility. This line does not signify that all human beings are equal, or should be equal, or ever were or will be equal, or identical, or all the same. However, this horizontal line is to represent a worldview that does not permit the hierarchical ranking of existing differences of human worth and value. This horizontal line depicts the core principle of the egalitarian hunter and gatherer communities that stood for the first ninety percent of human history.

Then we build the gradient between the lines of the master at the top and the line of the underling at the bottom. To finalize, we visualize the human rights revolution as

an attempt to collapse this gradient back to the line of equal pride, or more precisely, now not to pristine virgin pride anymore, but to equal dignity and humility. What was legitimate before is no longer legitimate. The practice of masters arrogating superiority and humiliating underlings is now regarded as illicit and obscene and human rights advocates invite both, masters and underlings, to join in shared humility at the line of equal dignity.

The Historic Transition to Human Rights

Master in the old honor order (arrogation)	Top of the scale
New human rights order of humility	Line of pristine pride and equal dignity
Underling/ in the old honor order (humiliation)	Bottom of the scale

Figure 2: The historic transition to human rights

Don't! How the legitimacy of applying the vertical scale to human worthiness disappears

How come then that humiliation has changed its meaning around 1757 in English language? How come that the *gist of the word humiliation* moved from *prosocial medicine designed to maintain an honorable order* to an *antisocial violation of human dignity?* At the core of the suffering endured by the Falstad prisoners, we do not find physical pain, or bodily hurt. We find that it is humiliation that causes the greatest pain.

Nils Alte, another Falstad prisoner, explained how he was ordered by the SS guards to lie straight on the floor with his arms by his side. Then he was dragged down a flight of concrete stairs in such a way that his head bumped onto the steps and blood poured from his head. He then was commanded to crawl back up the stairs and lick up his own blood from the steps. He said: "It was not so much the physical pain that was excruciating, as bad as it was; it was the humiliation, the degradation, which was the worst."

That it is humiliation that is felt as the most painful suffering, and not physical pain or material destruction, is a recurrent phenomenon. This is what I heard from my clients

as well as during the course of my fieldwork,[65] and you will recognize it when you ask yourself, or people around you.

    An earthquake or a volcanic eruption, for example, is a terrible devastation and causes immense suffering among victims who lose family members, shelter and belongings; however, this tragedy can be overcome with mutual encouragement and solidarity. A much deeper suffering creeps in when some corrupt officials siphon off the resources that were earmarked for rebuilding and these people let the victims linger in the mud of provisory camps for years while enjoying a highflying life in the top slot of society themselves. Then enraging feelings of undue humiliation seep in. The South of Italy comes to mind, however, many will recognize this dynamic from other contexts. The victims' sense of humiliation may become overwhelming in such situations. They feel humiliated by officials who degrade them through their betrayal; and clearly, it is not the earthquake that is at the core of this suffering. Wherever people arrogate privileges and resources this way and perhaps even believe that it is their right as lords, victims may feel violated and humiliated in the very core of their humanity.

    We may wonder and ask why is that? Have we not reflected on the fact that many underlings used to participate in their superiors' views of the world? Is not this what "subjects" learned in the course of the past ten thousand years? How come that humiliation can sometimes be so hurtful, however, at other times voluntarily accepted or even sought and self-inflicted? How is it possible that there are perpetrators who believe that their doing is their right or even their holy duty so as to maintain their honorable superiority, while their behavior is felt as deep violation by the recipients? How come that these recipients define themselves as victims, not only of a violation of superficial rules, but of the core of their membership in humanity? How come that at times we find perpetrators on one side and victims on the other, who live in so diametrically opposed worlds? Why do underlings sometimes bow voluntarily and humbly honor lowliness so as to maintain the world's divine and natural order, and sometimes not?

Knut Gjørtz, another former Falstad prisoner, described yet another story very well. He narrated, how he one early morning stumbled over a young German soldier of about nineteen years, inadvertently, down in the basement of the Falstad building. The young German was crying. He shook his head, while crying, and repeated again and again: "We are all crazy!" "We are all crazy!" When the young German saw the Norwegian prisoner approaching, he put his forefinger on his lips so as to indicate that he should not speak about this openly. The next day, the same young German was beating the prisoners just as much as his comrades did.

This young German soldier clearly was caught in a world in which it was regarded as perfectly legitimate to divide humans in higher and lesser beings. However, he himself was torn as to the question of whether this indeed was legitimate or not. He doubted, in secret, more so, he found this vertical scale *crazy*. However, he was not courageous enough to step out of this worldview entirely and oppose it. He felt bound by this system and obliged to abide by it. During daytime this young man succumbed to the definition that it was his noble duty to humiliate the prisoners and at night he decried his own deeds. He was caught in a deep moral conflict.

    Nazi propaganda was full of paroles that told Germans that they were worth more

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[65] See Lindner, 2001b.

than others and that it was their holy duty to "remind" those "*Unter*menschen" of their place far *down* on the scale of human worth. Not only Jews were viewed as Untermenschen, others as well. Poles, for example, were put into at least three categories. Class I referred to Poles "eminently suitable" for Germanization, Class II to those thought "capable" of Germanization and Class III to "unsuitables." Figure 3 illustrates the two alternative moral landscapes between which the German soldier is caught. At night, in the dark basement of the Falstad prison, he cries for the illegitimacy of the vertical scale, during daytime he enforces its legitimacy.[66]


Figure 3: The legitimacy of the vertical scale of human worthiness

Figure 3 suggests that humiliation entails diametrically opposed meanings in each respective worldview; I call the first one the worldview of honor, or the old order of honor, a rather collective concept, as opposed to the second worldview that is based on the notion of dignity, a concept that rather highlights individualism. Around 250 years ago, the second worldview began to push aside the first one, whereby the second profoundly subverts the first. More precisely though, not the ideas of human rights themselves are new; ideas of equal dignity are indeed already present in Christianity, Islam, and many other worldviews far earlier. It is the wider acknowledgement of these ideas that is new.

   Thus, today, we live in the middle of a for our forefathers almost unfathomable historic transition. Ideas and moral sentiments, which were marginal for millennia gain unprecedented weight. Ideas that previously lingered at the periphery of the human condition currently move onto the center stage and attempt to define the essence of humanity, and they at present do that in an ever increasing number of hearts and minds around the world.

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[66] Cognitive dissonance could be the appropriate term to be applied to the situation of the crying soldier.

Dignity is untouchable! How human rights render humiliation illicit

As stated above, around the year 1757 a new meaning of the word *to humiliate* emerged, namely that humiliation, indeed, does entail a violation, namely the violation of a person's most profound dignity. The main message of modern human rights ideals is that every human being has an inner core of dignity that ought not to be humiliated. Every human being is equal in dignity.

> The first paragraph in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, reads as follows:
>   "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."

Clearly, this Article does not insinuate that there are no differences between people. People may have different skin colors, different biological gender, different religious creeds, and different ethnic backgrounds. However, all human beings, solely by being born as human beings, are defined as possessing the same level of worth and value. *Nobody* is a *lesser* being, *nobody* is a *higher* being. Nobody is allowed to humiliate and degrade others. The young crying German soldier in Falstad was posited in the middle of this transition and torn between the two worldviews. At night he sensed that what he did was *crazy*, during daytime he attempted to regard this *craziness* as *norm*.

   Human rights thus are not only abstract rights, they have emotional effects. They elicit *gut feelings of the undueliness of humiliation* when people are treated as *lesser* beings. Human rights ideals introduce a new form of feelings of humiliation that was not present at any point in human history before. Human rights link dignity and humiliation. They indicate that every human being, by being born as such, possesses an inner core of dignity that ought not be humiliated. Thus, human rights introduce feelings, feelings of humiliation, when dignity is being degraded.

Dignity is humanness! Why humiliation is more hurtful in the context of human rights

In human rights based societies humiliation becomes more hurtful and therefore more important a topic for research than it has been ever before. The reason is that the *four* kinds of humiliation (at least) of honor cultures are conflated into *one* kind of humiliation in human rights contexts, and, not enough, even into the worst kind. Let me explain.

   Humiliation in honor societies – we may call it *honor humiliation* – can be categorized in four variants (see Table 3).[67] A master uses *conquest humiliation* to subjugate formerly equal neighbors into a position of inferiority. As soon as the hierarchy is in place, the master uses *reinforcement humiliation* to keep it in place. The latter may range from seating orders according to honor and rank, to bowing rules for inferiors in front of their superiors, but may also include brutal measures such as customary beatings or even killings to remind underlings of their place. A third form, *relegation humiliation*, is used to push an already low-ranking underling even further down, and, finally, *exclusion humiliation* means excluding victims altogether, in other

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[67] See Smith, 2001, whom I thank for coining the words conquest/relegation/reinforcement/inclusion humiliation.

words, exiling or even killing them.[68]

The first three forms of *honor humiliation* keep human beings within humanity, only the last type excludes them. In other words, the first three forms may, in many cases, are less hurtful than being excluded from humanity entirely. In the beginning of a conquest people may shout, "Rather dead than slave!" yet the large empires of human history would not have existed if people had consistently followed this path. Smaller peoples where swallowed up into larger empires continuously and the conquered did not all commit suicide; most of them adapted to lower ranks.

Cultural traits even flourished on the humus of this adaptation, covert sabotage of the masters was cultivated, special kinds of humor emerged. Czech *good soldier Schweik* (a figure created by Jaroslav Hasek, 1983-1923), epitomizes subtle resistance that, in spite of its deep sincerity, is extremely witty. Marvelous Egyptian humor may stem from tackling millennia of oppression, oppression that incepted after Pharaonic greatness succumbed to Greek, Roman, Arab, French and at last British domination. Their humor gives Egyptians their reputation as the "Czechs" of the Middle East.

What we may conclude is that the first three types of *honor humiliation* may, indeed, have had quite a number of positive and prosocial effects in the course of human history, even though they at times were painful to endure. Even though in many instances underlings have gone too far and have lost their ability and courage for civil disobedience, in other instances they may have gained self-control that may be beneficial and a precondition for peaceful conflict resolution. Thus, the first three types of *honor humiliation* that play within the vertical scale of human value lend themselves to somewhat ambivalent evaluations, some aspects even appear prosocial. However, the fourth type of honor humiliation, namely *exclusion humiliation*, is of an entirely different quality. Being excluded from one's *ingroup*, expelled from humanity itself, exiled, called *vermin* or *pest not meriting being alive*, is of a totally different caliber.

In human rights contexts, the four types available in hierarchical structures collapse into *exclusion humiliation*. The reason is that human rights denounce as deeply illegitimate the application of a vertical scale to human worth and value. Human rights dismantle the gradient and range of levels between the master and the underling. Human rights define one single line of equal dignity, humility and modesty as the only legitimate one. Figure 2 attempted to depict this process.

Human rights advocates explain to underlings around the world that their lowliness is a humiliating violation of their dignity. Human rights promoters invite underlings to rise up to the line of equal dignity. And they teach that tyrants perpetrate something profoundly illegitimate, namely that they arrogate superiority. Human rights promoters urge tyrants, dictators, and brutal rulers to descend from the top seat of the master to the line of equal dignity. A master is seen as arrogant, an underling as humiliated, and both are invited, by human rights advocates, to meet in the middle, at the level of equal dignity, modesty, humility, and humbleness as to our shared humanity.

Human rights advocates may not reflect on the fact that rising awareness of human rights in the world also increases the intensity of the feelings of hurt when they are violated. Human rights violations exclude victims from humanity, a situation that produces intense pain and suffering. This is because losing one's dignity means being

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[68] See Lindner, 2000h, p. 8.

excluded from the family of humankind altogether. Human rights define the parameters of human dignity very narrowly, thus their violation amounts to the single strongest hurt, namely being excluded from humanity entirely. I call this type of humiliation *human rights humiliation* or *dignity humiliation*; it is a deeply destructive and devastating experience that attacks the core of a person's humanity and dignity. Being excluded from humanity is much more hurtful than being debased within humanity.

Table 3 depicts the kinds of humiliation a hierarchical honor society may contain, as opposed to a human rights context that allows for but one kind of humiliation – and in addition the worst type, namely exclusion from humanity.

Four Variants of Humiliation

	Honor humiliation	Human rights dignity humiliation
Conquest humiliation: When a strong power reduces the relative autonomy of rivals, previously regarded as equals, and forces them into a position of long-term subordination. Creation of hierarchy or addition of a new upper tier within a hierarchical order.	X	–
Relegation humiliation: When an individual or group is forcefully pushed downwards within an existing status hierarchy.	X	–
Reinforcement humiliation: Routine abuse of inferiors in order to maintain the perception that they are, indeed, inferior.	X	–
Exclusion humiliation: When an individual or group is forcefully ejected from society, for example through banishment, exile or physical extermination.	X	X

Table 3: Four variants of humiliation (adapted from Smith, 2001, p. 543)

In a human rights context the total expulsion from humankind or *exclusion humiliation* – a fate that is seen as illegitimate and unfathomably painful – is the form in which humiliation expresses itself even if no killing is carried out. This is the reason why humiliation is so much more hurtful in a human rights context than in a traditional honor context. This is the background for why practices of humiliation that before where "normal" and far from traumatic such as beating and "breaking the will," at present acquire medical labels such as that of *victimhood* or *trauma*.[69]

Where are we? How we travel from the old honor order to the new dignity order

We, the people living in the year 2003 in the Western world, you, the reader probably included, are not used to reflect on the transition that started 300 or 250 years ago, and we are certainly not aware of its profound significance. For many of us, human rights are self-evident. They are "old news." The abolition of the legitimacy of humiliation

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[69] See Lindner, 2001b.

in the name of human rights is something historic and far away. Human rights ideals are for many of us in the Western world something that needs attention in Africa, or India, or other far-flung places, and more often than not we are reminded of human rights only when we hear horror stories as to how they are violated somewhere far away. This is, at least for many of us in the Western world our only link with the human rights revolution. We vaguely remember that slavery has been abolished some time ago, we usually know that Apartheid was overthrown more recently, we may even know that bonded labor still is around today – we have heard about carpets made by enslaved children somewhere in poor countries, or shoes, or cloths – and we know about honor killings, too. Yet, we believe that all this does not concern our lives as Western citizens directly.

When we hear about traditional customs such as honor killings, we merely shiver and shake our heads in disbelief, "How archaic and primitive! Don't these people understand that they violate their own dignity through such cruel concepts of honor?" This sentence incidentally unveils to us how concepts of honor and dignity can deeply oppose each other.

We are usually not aware that our Western lives are situated in the midst of this extremely noteworthy historic transition in similar ways as in "backward" places. We are often blind to the fact that changes take place not merely somewhere out there, but in us, in me and you, in our core personalities. This transition permeates our bodies, minds, and hearts, and influences the body, mind, and heart of every single person on this planet. In India this process is merely starker, in the United States and Europe it is played out in more subtle ways. However, in all cases it is deeply significant.

Be honest, is it not the "nature" of women to carry the rubbish down to the garbage container behind the house? Try to reply straightforwardly. You will answer "officially not, of course not, however, in practice, yes!" Or, is it not "dishonoring" for a man to clean up the baby's excrements? Is not the woman's "essential character" to serve in lowly positions? Is not the best proof for her natural lowliness that she so "voluntarily" wipes clean the kitchen after her husband, exceptionally, grilled the meat for the guests? Is it not "normal" for a woman to let her husband sit in the driving seat of the family car? Is it not woman's "nature" to serve with her naked body in publicity, media, and society as a whole? Do you not find it normal that new car models are presented with some female decoration? Are not prostitution and pornography "legitimate" uses of human bodies, particularly when they are female? Is not prostitution the "oldest profession," and therefore "okay"? Is it not the "duty" of a boss to humiliate his employees if this is a way to increase output and shareholder value? Is it not every now and then necessary to remind people of "their place"? Must not sometimes "lessons" be taught? Is not the pain of humiliation "necessary" and "prosocial" in certain cases? Should not underlings occasionally stop lamenting and humbly accept their lowliness?

I will come back to these questions later. Because I believe that it is, indeed, necessary to "humble" dictators and tyrants and teach them "lessons." However, the important new point introduced by human rights ideals is that this should be done without humiliation. Lakoff and Johnson allude to this when they describe the *Nurturant Parent model* of rearing children that combines firmness with respect. They write, "Nurturant Parent morality is not, in itself, overly permissive. Just as letting children do whatever they want is not good for them, so helping other people to do whatever they please is likewise not proper nurturance. There are limits to what other

people should be allowed to do, and genuine nurturance involves setting boundaries and expecting others to act responsibly" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 316). The point of humbling without humiliating will be discussed in more length further down.

To summarize, we all live in the midst of a historic transition from concepts of honor to visions of dignity for all. We all are embedded in some way or another into this transition, either by welcoming it or resisting it, and in all cases by being confused by it. It is a difficult transition even for the most fervent human rights enthusiast because it is easy to lose orientation. Old recipes still sound so "right." For example, is it so bad to sometimes hit a child? And what about the treatment of criminals? And should not women be careful not to lose their "femininity"? What we have not yet developed are new proverbs and sayings that sound equally "right" as the old ones and highlight that "lessons" are to be taught in new ways in human rights based societies and realities framed in new mental pictures. The new world is not yet there while the old world disappears.

Stand up! How humiliation may also elicit defiance

Earlier we discussed how being subjected to humiliation may very well render shame, guilt and humility, all of which can be highly prosocial. The point I will come back to several times further down in the book is that prosocial shame, guilt and humility, though sometimes the result of being subjected to humiliation, are better elicited by careful humbling and without humiliation. The reason is that being humiliated can very well lead to outraged defiance and violent retaliation, rather than shame over lacking humility.

What this discussion brings home to us, again, is that humiliation and shame, though close, ought not be confounded. One can feel humiliated without the slightest shred of shame. One of the best examples is New York and how it stood up after September, 11. The terrorists sent a message of humiliation, and what they reaped was not American shame – but defiance.

I paraphrase what I hear from my American friends: "Why should America be ashamed? Of what? Has not America bailed out the rest of the world in times of need? Where would Europe be today, if not America had rescued it twice, 1944 from Nazi Germany and 1917 in World War I? Are not we the ones who always try to do good and bring freedom to the rest of the world? Where is our track record of having conquered, invaded and enslaved others? Would you rather live in a world that is dominated by China or Saudi Arabia? And why are we the most powerful country on the planet? Is it not because of the unique industriousness of our brave people!? We deserve praise and thankfulness and not scorn! Our forefathers left their homes in the old world because they were ill-treated; they magnificently built a better, a new world in America. Why should we now accept being ill-treated? We see no need to bow, and any attempt at instilling shame in us will fail! Terrorists can send us as many "messages of humiliation" as they want, we will not bow! We will only regain the unique strength and solidarity of our forefathers. If anybody is envious of our power and might, why don't they work harder and get their act together, as our forefathers did? Instead of taking the easy road, pointing their fingers at us and trying to humiliate us, people should sweep in front of their own doors!"

Thus, anybody who believes that humiliating others will humble them needs to be aware that humiliation may elicit stout defiance rather than humility. Defiance may be

the result of humiliation; victims of acts of humiliation may stand up in heroic resistance instead of bowing in shame. Shame and humiliation may differ hotly.

In a world dominated by the old honor code, the difference between humbling and humiliating is rather insignificant because sheer force is the arbiter: the stronger force wins and the weaker one has to bow. And as long as everybody agrees that force is the ultimate authority, and the hierarchical ranking order of the essence of humanity is accepted as legitimate by everybody, there is no moral conflict. In the old honor order it is not important whether underlings are held down by force, or whether they have genuinely internalized shame, humbleness, and humility. Down is down. No difference is made between humiliating people and humbling people. This differentiation, however, forces itself onto center scene as soon as human rights are regarded as leading ideal.

Humbling tyrants and helping underlings to rise – as it was the aim of the *coalition forces* in the 2003 war in Iraq – if done with the help of humiliation, or if perceived as humiliation, risks forging defiance. Within the honor code, this may be acceptable. The winner becomes the master and the loser is expected to eventually accept lowliness as "honorable medicine." Humiliating and humbling are not differentiated and ultimate humiliation may indeed render ultimate underlings. Within traditional mindsets of honor, Iraqis and coalition forces (or, for that matter, the Arab world and the West) could be expected to try putting each other down as efficient as possible, so as to negotiate who will be the master and who the underling in the future.

In a human rights context, however, humbling and humiliating must be differentiated and held apart with great care. The reason is that within a human rights context the aim is not to create underlings. The aim is to arrive at communities of dignified upright citizens in democratic states where everybody is free to have a voice and humbly bows only to law, not to might. It does not correspond to the vision of dignified citizens, to create people who accept superior power as inherent value, or people who turn simmering anger inwards and get depressed, or people who direct rage outwards into violence – from sabotage, guerilla warfare, terrorism, and open revolution.

Be aware of changes! How all aspects of life are affected by the call for equal dignity

The human rights revolution it is embedded in an interwoven manner in its historic time. It is being shaped and molded by its historic and contemporary context and it is at the same time an active force that shapes its historic and contemporary environment. Many conceptual shifts mark this movement. In the following I will touch upon a few, *victimhood, trauma* and *conflict, objectivity*, and *consciousness*.

New definitions crash with old definitions! How conflict, victimhood, and trauma draw on the notion of undue humiliation

Terms such as *victimhood* and *trauma* can only be applied when a process of thinking has been carried out on the part of the victim, a process of reflection that defines a person's state as victimhood and trauma. The victim in many cases has to make a journey from *honor humiliation* to human rights steered *dignity humiliation* in order to define herself as victim.

The typical case of the social worker comes to mind, who wants to save a woman

from being beaten by her husband.[70] The social worker defines the woman as being a victim. However, the woman may claim, "No, beating me is my husband's way of loving me and I am far from being a victim!" Virtually every social worker has been caught in this trap and has tasted the deep frustration flowing from this experience. The third party's definition of victimhood and trauma does not always stick in the victim. As discussed above, there were times in human history when it was seen as highly prosocial that a husband beats his disobedient wife. This was enshrined in law even in a pro-woman country such as Norway until as recently as 1868. The pain that the beaten wife felt was defined as being "good" for her, not only for her, but "good" also for the whole order of society. By accepting the beating she respected the overall order. In such an order a loving husband beats his disobedient wife and she expects herself to love him for that.

In other words, people who are under the control of a dominant group, even if this domination is hurtful, may not see themselves as *traumatized victims*. They may go as far and define themselves as "*protected children*." Not least a Saddam Hussein managed to see himself as a benevolent patron and it is not excluded that some of his followers bought into this. Deutsch (2002) writes:

> The socially privileged, typically, assume that they have the right to control the interactions in their relationship with members of subordinated groups. Challenging this assumption can be risky for a subordinate and, as a consequence, they usually go unchallenged. The repeated, everyday experience of being treated as an inferior produces a public image of being an inferior, which may be internalized as an image of self-inferiority. In the socially privileged, in contrast, such interactions will produce a public image of superiority and a corresponding self-image. Such non-egalitarian everyday interactions between the socially dominant and the oppressed help to keep the system of oppression in place by the public images and self-images they produce and perpetuate (Deutsch, 2002, p.16).[71]

The interesting question is the following: How do underlings move out of "respect" for the supposed benefaction that flows from being part of a system where domination and subjugation are regarded as the norm? Some kind of framing has do be done on the part of a victim in order to actually define herself as a traumatized victim. The beaten woman emerges from respecting pain as "good for me and society as a whole" only when she defines being beaten as illegitimate humiliation. She arrives at defining herself as traumatized victim via embracing the notion of dignity humiliation.

It is only in the context of human rights that humiliation acquires its definition of being an undue violation. As repeatedly stated, in the framework of human rights it is enshrined that every human being has an inner core of dignity that ought not be humiliated. Only when the beaten woman defines being beaten as a violation of her dignity, she defines herself as traumatized victim. In that way *dignity humiliation* is posited at the very core of victimhood and trauma, or more precisely, at the core of victimhood and trauma that is inflicted by fellow human beings.

The situation is profoundly different in the case of natural disasters. In the case of earthquakes and other natural disasters that happen without a perpetrator the notion of

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[70] *Power and control wheel*: Domestic violence consists of physical, sexual, psychological, and/or emotional abuse.

[71] See also Harvey, 1999.

humiliation is missing (unless one believes in God wishing to humiliate his sinful followers) and the result is that victimhood and trauma are less intense than when the same pain is flowing from fellow human beings, particularly when this happens in the framework of human rights. It is much more traumatizing to have ones dignity humiliated than being the victim of a natural disaster. The background for this is that the phenomenon of humiliation is deeply relational.

My husband is snoring terribly. I am astonished that anybody in the house can close an eye at night. However, since I know that he does not intend to hurt anybody, I am not angry with him, even though it sometimes drives me crazy. His snoring is like a natural disaster. It is very bad, but nobody's fault.

However, on the other hand, we have neighbors who sometimes put on music that they know we do not like and they turn it loud. We like the Beatles or so, and despise Bavarian folk music. And it is precisely this music they play loud. These neighbors are a real pain; they take delight in bullying us. We complained about their dog, and this music is their revenge. Even though their noise cannot rival that from my husband's snoring, it infuriates me in a completely different way. Whenever they put on this music, I am consumed by rage against these stupid neighbors (adapted from an account by a client; see for work on the *controllability* dimension, Allred, 1999, Averill, 1982, Averill, 1993).

Or, another example: The first question everybody asked when the 2003 blackout in North America occurred was "Was it a terrorist attack?" Strangely enough, some kind of relief seeped in when it became clear that this was not a terrorist onslaught. The hardship on the ground was identical; however, still, seemingly it was easier to stomach it when it was not meant as a terrorist "message of humiliation."

When people suffer at the hands other human beings, they have in principle four choices. She may define this suffering (1) as a kind of natural disaster (being beaten by a disturbed or drunk person, for example), or (2) she may accept it as "prosocial honorable lesson" or "prosocial humbling" (as discussed earlier, being beaten, in honor contexts, is often seen as equivalent to having surgery or a vaccination that "hurts but must be endured"), or (3) she may not accept it as "prosocial honorable lesson" (being beaten as slight of honor that calls for humiliation-for-humiliation), or (4) she might see it as an illegitimate humiliation of dignity (being beaten as violation of dignity that ought to be opposed in a dignified Mandela-like fashion). Only in the third and fourth case does a person look at herself as traumatized victim.

Thus, *human rights humiliation*, or *dignity humiliation*, is an indispensable concept for defining victimhood as victimhood, and, consequently, the most painful trauma occurs when pain is inflicted by fellow human beings within a framework of human rights ideals.

How does this dynamic play out in the context of conflict? As long as I accept being beaten as prosocial honorable lesson that is "good" for me, I do not frame myself as traumatized victim. In this case there is *concord* between me and my dominators. The word *concord* stems from Latin *cum* which means *with* and *cord* which means *heart*. *Concord* means that our *hearts* are *with* each other.

The word *conflict*, however, has at its end the verb *flectere*, to *bend*, to *curve*. Thus, as soon as I define that being beaten is a violation, I *bend*, or the overall situation becomes *bended*, *curved* and thus *convoluted* instead of *smooth* and *straight*. In conflict, *discord* displaces *concord* and this may lead to *confrontation*. The word *confrontation* entails the Latin word *frons* which means *forehead*. In *confrontation*,

faces are placed *against* each other, in opposition.

Thus, the term *conflict*, similar to the terms *victimhood*, and *trauma*, is dependent on a particular framing of reality forged by the players and the overall society's mindset within which they are embedded. The same event is experienced differently in each context, once as *necessary pain*, once as *trauma*. Deutsch (2002) explains:

> Discontent and the sense of injustice may be latent rather than manifest in a subordinated group. Neither the consciousness of oneself as victimized or disadvantaged nor the consciousness of being a member of a class of disadvantaged may exist psychologically. If this be the case, consciousness-raising tactics are necessary precursors to the developing of group cohesion and social organization. The diversity of consciousness-raising tactics have been illustrated by the variety of techniques employed in recent years by women's liberation groups and black power groups. They range from quasi-therapeutic group discussion meetings through mass meetings and demonstrations to dramatic confrontations of those in high-power groups. It is likely that a positive consciousness of one's disadvantaged identity is most aroused when one sees someone, who is considered to be similar to oneself, explicitly attacked or disadvantaged and sees him resist successfully or overcome the attack; his resistance reveals simultaneously the wound and its cure (Deutsch, 2002, p. 31).

Every psychotherapist has seen divorce cases evolving thus: The woman tries to make her husband understand, for years, that he has to respect her dignity, while he thinks she merely is a little "sensitive" or "hysterical." For long periods she suffers from psychosomatic symptoms and is depressed, seemingly supporting his views. Therefore, when she then files for divorce, he is profoundly surprised and hurt, while she tells him that she has talked to him for years, in vain.

The woman who finally files for divorce does perhaps not call this private "uprising" of hers "conflict." If her husband were to understand her and apologize for being slow in embracing the notion of equal dignity, there would be no conflict. She does not wish for conflict. It is perhaps rather the man who creates the conflict because he remains rooted in the old order where he believes that a quiet woman is a good and happy woman. As long as she was quiet, he did not see any need for change and was reluctant to "bend" so as to fit into new worldviews. Thus it could be said that he created conflict and confrontation. Feelings of humiliation are likely to rage on all sides, however, profoundly irreconcilable types of humiliation: honor humiliation on the part of the husband, and dignity humiliation on the part of his wife.

For a person who actually has arrived at defining herself as a victim at the hand of fellow human beings, in other words, as victim of undue humiliation, there are, again, three outcomes. Firstly (1), the victim of humiliation may turn her rage inwards and become depressed and apathetic (this would be the depressed wife suffering from psychosomatic symptoms). In that case the conflict is almost invisible. However, this person may turn her rage outwards. In case this happens, we have outcome two and three, namely (2) the Hitler and (3) the Mandela outcome.

A Hitler attempted to redress humiliation by inflicting humiliation on the supposed humiliators; he turned another spiral in a cruel cycle of humiliation. A Mandela lifted the overall societal order up, onto a new level, and thus avoided powering a new turn in a cycle of humiliation. He did this by implementing a new social order based on the notion of respect for individual dignity. At the center of his effort was his inclusion of the humiliator, the white upper class, into the definition of human rights. In other

words, Mandela solved the "conflict" by peacefully but firmly making de Clerck and his followers (in the case of the couple this would be the unwilling husband) understand that the old order was outlived and that the only way to "bend" this conflict into *concord* and *convergence* again, was by the representatives of the old order to relinquish their framings of reality. Mandela attempted to attain humility without humiliation.

In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and the Arab World, there is *convergence* of views in case the Arab World frames the situation as *liberation*. *Conflict* ensues as soon as the Arab World frames the military action in Iraq as *humiliating invasion*. In case it is framed as such, conflict may stay invisible and be lived out as depression and apathy on the part of Iraqis, Arab citizens and those who identify with them (1). However, simmering rage may also lead to Hitler-like reactions, such as terrorism against the West (2), or (3) Mandela-like or Gandhi-like outcomes in case such leaders are available. This is what is meant when the question is asked of how not only war, but peace could be won.

Even truth is being humbled! How epistemology is affected by the idea of equal dignity[72]

The human rights revolution aims at dismantling masters together with the gradient that ranks masters as masters and underlings as underlings. Human rights promoters are not supposed to be satisfied by merely replacing the old master with a new one. Yet, in many cases, this was exactly what historically happened in the first round. The old honor order is difficult to overcome. The French Revolution led to new hierarchical structures in spite of its motto of egalité; institutions promoting equal dignity evolved only gradually. And this course of events was not reserved to the French Revolution. In the course of many uprisings the master was replaced by a new one in a first round and only gradually the hierarchical gradient itself was subverted as well. *Epistemology* is only one among many fields that is affected.

Modernist thought has roots in the *enlightenment* (the rise of human thought from the "dark" or "medieval" ages), characterized by new methods of logic (Descartes, Locke, Kant), empiricism (Bacon) and, the emerging scientific method (Newton). The Enlightenment was a revolution, an uprising of individual rationality against "all forms of totalitarianism – royal and religious" (Gergen, 2000a, p. 2). Thus, the old master, *faith in God-chosen sovereign rulers and their opinions*, was replaced by a new master, *faith in experts as guardians of reason*.

Yet, enlightenment soon faced another challenge. Particular subversive is the claim that all human beings are equal in their capacity to engage in rational activity. This claim entails the seeds for a second revolution that undermines the victors of the earlier revolution. The first revolution toppled the absolutist master, the second revolution sets out to topple hierarchy itself – and the roots for this second revolution were planted by the first. The *experts* had to yield to the *common man* (and, soon the common *man* had also to make room on equal terms for his *female* equivalent).

As Serge Moscovici (1997) puts it, "…at the beginning, people took an interest in the biases of social knowledge and compared 'experts' with 'novices,' leaning on the distinction between 'truth' and 'mere opinion.' Now, the notion of collective and social representations presupposes that all people are 'rational,' that they are rational because they are social, and so on" (Moscovici, 1997, p. 2).

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[72] This section is adapted from Lindner, 2000k.

Objectivity is a hotly disputed field within this debate. The ideal of objectivity promises the possibility of a world untouched by human subjectivity. In former times God was expected to talk to kings and priests. Later, in the world of the enlightenment, nature, the *untouched world*, was expected to talk to the *objective* researcher. The latter was supposed to secure this *objectivity* by *listening* to the voice of the *untouched world* with the help of *scientific methods*, and then to describe this untouched world as it *was*, *uncontaminated* by subjectivity.

Yet, there are problems with *scientific methods measuring the untouched world*, and the debate is more than heated. As Max Planck once remarked, "Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of Nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we are trying to solve" (in Kaku, 2005, p. 158). According to Patton,

However, "social scientists are exhorted to eschew subjectivity and make sure that their work is 'objective'" (Patton, 1990, 479). The conventional means for controlling subjectivity and maintaining objectivity are the methods of quantitative social science: distance from the setting and people being studied, formal operationalism and quantitative measurement manipulation of isolated variables, and experimental designs.

Yet, the ways in which measures are constructed in psychological tests, questionnaires, cost-benefit indicators, and routine management information systems are no less open to the intrusion of the evaluator's biases than making observations in the field or asking questions in interviews. Numbers do not protect against bias; they merely disguise it (p. 480). Patton draws on Michael Scriven's[73] discussion of objectivity and subjectivity in educational research, praising it as a major "contribution in the struggle to detach the notions of objectivity and subjectivity from their traditionally narrow associations with quantitative and qualitative methodology, respectively" (p. 480).

The previously mentioned work of Jan Smedslund is relevant to this heated debate. Smedslund was among the first to warn psychologists against trying to appear *scientific* by mistaking *scientifically looking* methods for sound science in places where core rules are blatantly apparent and studying "infinite objects" would be silly.

Also this book is embedded within the hot debate surrounding concepts such as logical positivism, social constructivism, or social constructionism. As briefly discussed in the introduction, the epistemological basis for this book is the *reflective equilibrium*.

Some daring social scientists, at the forefront of development, have taken up the ball from Max Planck. *Quantum social science* is being proposed to solve the mind-body problem that represents a serious difficulty for all branches of social science and their basic ontological and epistemological assumptions. "We know we have experience from, well, experience itself, but there is no apparent way to reconcile this fact with modern science. By rights it seems consciousness should not exist, and as such neither should meaning, which presupposes consciousness (Wendt, 2005, p. 10). Wendt suggests that a quantum connection, justifying a "participatory epistemology" in social inquiry, would give additional force to critiques of the subject-object distinction, such as post-modernists or feminists. "Human beings are in effect 'walking wave particle dualities,' not classical material objects" (Wendt, 2005, p. 7, see also Chalmers, 1996, Jahn and Dunne, 1997).

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[73] See, for example, Scriven, 1967, and Scriven, 1972.

False consciousness! How elites may encourage underlings to rise

Not only *trauma and victimhood* are concepts closely related to feelings of humiliation, the notion of *false consciousness* is as well. The backdrop for the occurrence of this notion, interestingly, is that throughout human history, the victims of what human rights would deem brutal domination were not necessarily the ones to plan for uprising.

A French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), explains how the French revolution came about – precisely not by those lingering at the bottom. New ideas seeped in from somewhere within the elite camp:

> I look back for a moment on the situation of France seven hundred years ago, when the territory was divided among a small number of families, who were the owners of the soil and the rulers of the inhabitants; the right of governing descended with the family inheritance from generation to generation; force was the only means by which man could act on man; and landed property was the sole source of power.
>
> Soon, however, the political power of the clergy was founded and began to increase: the clergy opened their ranks to all classes, to the poor and the rich, the commoner and the noble; through the church, equality penetrated into the government, and he who as a serf must have vegetated in perpetual bondage took his place as a priest in the midst of nobles, and not infrequently above the heads of kings.
>
> The different relations of men with one another became more complicated and numerous as society gradually became more stable and civilized. Hence the want of civil laws was felt; and the ministers of law soon rose from the obscurity of the tribunals and their dusty chambers to appear at the court of the monarch, by the side of the feudal barons clothed in their ermine and their mail (Tocqueville, 2003).

Tocqueville thus identifies the clergy as the "culprit" for revolution, not necessarily the lowest of the lowest. Marx and Engels were no poor workers either. Seen from their social background they were closer to the exploiters they despised then to those humiliated souls they wanted to save. Marx and Engels thus promoted the demise of their own cast's dominance.

Likewise, human rights, today, are often preached by people from the rich West. What they do, knowingly or not, is promote the limiting of their own privileges, since human rights call for enabling living conditions for all and oppose the rich to exploit the planet's resources on their own. Not surprisingly, they are met with the wrath of their own elite group.

May-be, most members of top elites, except the few revolutionaries, are too engaged with their wealth to feel compassion and empathy for those who suffer at the bottom, while those at the bottom may have no energy left for clearly perceiving and analyzing their own wretched situation. Those members of the elite however, who are disenchanted out of whatever reason, and have the resources and the time, may be the first to both perceive dissonances and also devise strategies for remedy. Thus third parties, often stemming from elite segments of society, played and still play a central role in pushing for change.

Marx and Engels created the notion of *false consciousness*, and inserted this concept into the traditionalist Marxist perspective, indicating that workers live in a reality that oppresses them, a reality that ought to make them feel humiliated, a feeling that in turn should make them want to rise. When workers did not rise as prescribed, they were regarded as victims of *false consciousness*. The notion of *false consciousness* signals how change is proceeding incoherently, with some parties far ahead and others far behind. The notion of *false consciousness* indicates how those far ahead and those far behind can slide into loggerhead positions that may transform change into mayhem that forestalls the very aim, namely a hoped-for better future.

Marx and his successors would perhaps agree, in hindsight, that the violent uprising they endorsed, an uprising that entailed the humiliation of the humiliators, was much less effective than the implementation of the Western welfare state that lifted underlings up without putting apparatchiks into the master's seat. Marx's recipe led to sustained hierarchy with the former elites being killed or deeply humiliated and apparatchiks as new masters. Russian Bolsheviks, for example, decided to deny the right to vote to "reactionaries" and "exploiters" – in other words the former masters – in the name of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," who were the new masters.

> To use traffic as metaphor, communism thought to remedy the imbalance between masters and underlings, between large and small vehicles, by suggesting that everybody ought to have exactly the same vehicle. This order was to be supervised by apparatchiks. Unfortunately, these apparatchiks could not resist the temptation to get bigger vehicles for themselves, and push the smaller ones out. Thus, this experiment ended up by falling back into the very power pyramid it originally wished to avoid.

It is the modern, socially responsible, state that seems to enshrine equal dignity best. Democracy is a system that attempts to give a voice to everybody, not merely to selected subgroups of people. Democratic decision making is meant to extend inclusive self determination to *we, all of us*; it is *freedom under the law that protects equal dignity*. Thus, the term *false consciousness*, introduced by third parties, signals *impatience* with change that indeed evolves, but more slowly and more radical, not by replacing the master, but by dismantling the master-slave gradient.

It is Nelson Mandela, who most recently managed such a transition in South Africa. He channeled *false consciousness*, both on the side of humiliators and humiliatees, into a system that aims at *including everybody*.

To conclude this section, while humiliation is "honorable medicine" in the old order, it turns into painful violation in the new order of human rights ideals. The new

mindset deeply contradicts the old one and dangerous frictions and confrontations develop in the course of its emergence. Impatience may intensify such confrontations and bring mayhem. All aspects of life are affected by this transition. Further down, in Part II of the book, it will be discussed in more depth why and how this transition unfolds.

Don't misunderstand! How the different approaches to humiliation are also synchronic

What we can summarize is that there has been a historic evolvement of the practice humiliation, and the ways it is reacted to, in the course of human history as humankind populated the globe and made its way through different sets of limiting factors. Clearly, however, this historic path was not one-directional. Not only in the bygone past, also today communities populate planet Earth that describe themselves as hunters and gatherers, and the traditional honor society is well and alive in many places. In other words, what I recounted as historic development is also synchronic.

I personally know a number of countries quite well that entertain rather egalitarian leanings; Norway, but also Somalia. I furthermore know some countries with more hierarchical societal structures that give me, when I visit, a distinctive feel of being confronted with *higher* and *lower* levels on a vertical scale that are used to organize social relationships. Germany, France, Egypt, Rwanda, or Burundi, are but some examples.

Geert H. Hofstede has developed a classic systematization of culture dimensions that directly relates to the discussion of the vertical scale presented here. Hofstede detected four dimensions of culture (later also a fifth dimension). Hofstede's first dimension is *power distance*. *Power distance* is "the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede and Bond, 1984, p. 419).

Hofstede carried out research on IBM employees around the world and found that there are countries where subordinates follow their superiors' orders rather blindly, where organizations are centralized, with many levels within the hierarchy, and where employees at the lower levels tend to have low levels of professional qualification. These are the countries with a high power distance, a long vertical scale so-to-speak, for example Mexico, South Korea, or India. Countries with low power distance have rather decentralized organizational structures and flat hierarchies, and highly qualified employees are to be found at any level of the hierarchy; examples are USA, or Scandinavia. In other words, *power distance* is the name that Hofstede gave to the vertical scale of which the endpoints are the *master* at the top and the *underling* at the bottom.

When we look at the countries that, according to Hofstede, have a low *power distance*, like the USA and Scandinavia, then we recognize that these countries define themselves as being rooted in the human rights ideals; respect for the dignity of their citizens is enshrined in their legal body. (Yet, there is no reason to believe that these societies are always homogenous. Even within societies that take it for granted that they are based on human rights, considerable remnants of the old honor order linger on. The status of women is but one example. Equally, societies such as Pakistan, Egypt, Mexico, supposedly adhering to the old collective honor code, are far from being homogenous. There is a great deal of *diffusion* going on, meaning that cultural realms are in contact with each other and learn from each other; they are far from as isolated "containers." Again, the historic development is also synchronic, even within

each community.)

Yet, also within the minds and hearts of every single individual currently living on planet Earth, this process is synchronic. The staunchest feminist may give her car key to her husband because she deeply believes that he as the superior being will be able to protect the family better than she can. And when the doorbell rings unexpectedly in the middle of the night, she might send her husband to the door. Many a woman, including in the supposedly enlightened West, does not take her political opinions, or indeed all of her opinions, seriously, precisely because she has learned to believe that women cannot think clearly. At the same time such a Western woman, supposedly so "liberated," may be deeply astonished at her Somali sister, who, newly arrived in the West, displays unprecedented courageous "feminism."

Thus, the historic development that has been described in this historic section is not only diachronic, but also synchronic. Different mindsets exist side by side in the *global village*, in the same society, and even in the same mind.

No rankings! How equal dignity can be ascribed to stages

Scholars who adhere to human rights do not wish to be seen as *looking down* on people.[74] Therefore the historic process described here is unacceptable to some of them. Some scholars, in order to avert being misunderstood as arrogantly humiliating humanity's past and humanity's diversity, deny that any historic evolution ever took place. They reject the very word *evolution* and the notion of *historic stages*. They attempt to describe human history not as development, but as diverse endeavors by human beings of putting in place equally valuable and worthy social and societal systems. These thinkers do not wish to sustain previous scholarship that indeed once provided justifications to colonizers and other humiliators. Western white male supremacy is not what they want to contribute to. They attempt to give equal dignity to all human experiments ever designed on Earth, particularly to those groups that previously were branded as "primitive," "barbaric," or in other ways "aberrant."

I agree with the goal that arrogant humiliation ought to be avoided, not least as to human history and the diversity of human societies that ever lived on the planet. However, I would want to suggest that stages must not automatically be ranked hierarchically. They can be posited on an equal level of worth and value. Hunter and gatherer lifestyles were evolved under circumstances of *abundance*, whereas agriculture was an attempt to expand the pie of resources through *intensification* when abundance was faltering. Modern societies, in turn, are deeply influenced by the coming-into-being of *One single global village*, which posits yet another uniquely novel set of circumstances to humankind.

In each case, humankind coped creatively. There is no need to rank these designs in ascending stages. These stages can safely be regarded as patterns that are equal in worth and value, each coping with another set of limitations, using the toolkit that existed before and expanding on it. The identification of stages, such as hunters and gatherers, agriculturalists, and finally the modern information age, is thus not to be confounded with the identification of an arrogant view that the last stage is the best ever reached in history. However, it may be the best under current circumstances; I, for example, happen to believe that what we call human rights indeed serve the needs of the citizens in *One single global village* best.

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[74] Rostow's linear theory of development is criticized in this line (Rostow, 1960). I thank Roger van Zwanenburg for making me aware of Rostow's work.

The view presented here describes a culturally transmitted physical and mental toolkit that has been developed in the fashion of a slow and long-term historic discourse carried out by humankind. Each stage had the benefit of being familiar with the physical and mental toolkit that had been developed before. Under circumstances of abundance small egalitarian communities could easily roam the planet without excessively putting and holding down neither nature nor fellow human beings. However, as soon as abundance was getting limited, formerly insignificant experiments with the practice of putting down – pre-adaptations – were developed into a wholesale new way of life. This new way of life was agriculture and hierarchical societies, in other words, an attempt to intensify recourses, not only by holding down and domesticating nature and animals, but also fellow human beings. This practice was invented in many parts of the globe, at different stages in human history, the first emerging in what is today Turkey around 10,000 years ago. Around 250 years ago another deep transition incepted, again building on the formerly available physical and mental toolkit, however, this time rejecting the application of certain tools as illicit overuse. Instead, "old" ideas, such as egalitarian ideals, that lay somewhat dormant, are being "dug out." Human rights advocates reject the application of the *tool of putting down* on humans, and they also wish to limit the exploitation of nature. This latest transition has not yet permeated the entire globe, neither as vision nor as practice; however, the new ideals are seeping in everywhere.

Earlier I stated that it is an ideological decision whether or not to apply a vertical scale to human worthiness so as to draw up a hierarchical gradient. The same pertains to human history. Human communities and societies – both present and throughout history – do not need to be ranked hierarchically. I certainly do not intend to rank them. However, the wish to abstain from ranking does not force us to relinquish describing differences, even systematic differences that build on each other. It is not necessary to abandon analysis of stepwise discourses just to avoid rankings. Differences, even differences that can be narrated as steps or stages, may be posited as equal in worth and value.

To conclude and summarize this chapter, an effort has been made to highlight in what way the implementation of rankings of human worth and value evolved throughout human history. Such rankings and the negotiation of their legitimacy or illegitimacy form important parts of the inner skeleton of human worldviews, both diachronically throughout history and synchronically in contemporary times. Present times are characterized by a transition to a new order that squarely contradicts previously existing norms. The phenomenon of humiliation as hurtful act inhabits the center of the new worldview – as violation of equal dignity – and therefore the phenomenon of humiliation calls for exceptional and innovative attention. Part II will give more space to such attention.

Reading related to this chapter

The view that humiliation may be a particularly *forceful phenomenon* is supported by the research of, for example, Suzanne M. Retzinger (1991) and Thomas J. Scheff and Retzinger (1991),[75] who studied shame and humiliation in marital quarrels. They show that the suffering caused by humiliation is highly significant and that the bitterest divisions have their roots in shame and humiliation. Also W. Vogel and Lazare (1990) document *unforgivable humiliation* as a very serious obstacle in

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[75] Suzanne M. Retzinger, 1991, and Thomas J. Scheff and Retzinger, 1991.

couples' treatment.[76] Robert L. Hale (1994) addresses *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder*,[77] and Francisco Gomes de Matos (2002) its role in *communication*.[78] Humiliation has also been studied in such fields as *love*, *sex* and *social attractiveness*,[79] *depression*,[80] *society* and *identity formation*,[81] *sports*,[82] *history*, *literature* and *film*.[83]

Scheff and Retzinger extended their work on *violence* and *Holocaust* and studied the part played by *humiliated fury* (Scheff 1997, p. 11) in escalating conflict between individuals and nations (Scheff, 1988; Scheff, 1990a; Scheff, 1990b; Scheff, 1997a[84]). Also psychiatrist James Gilligan (1996) focuses on *humiliation as a cause for violence*, in his book *Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and How to Treat It*.[85] Vamik D. Volkan[86] and Joseph Montville[87] carry out important work on *psycho-political analysis* of *intergroup conflict* and its *traumatic effects*,[88] as does Blema S. Steinberg (1996).[89] Furthermore, Ervin Staub's work is highly significant; he is a great name in *peace psychology*.[90] The *Journal of Primary Prevention* devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation in 1991,[91] 1992,[92] and 1999,[93] as did the journal *Social Research* in 1997, stimulated by *The Decent Society* by Margalit (1996).[94]

The discussion of *democracy* and *capitalism* cannot be expanded upon here. However, certain recent insights may be mentioned. David Ricardo, 1817, is credited with what is commonly called *comparative advantage*, the idea that two parties can benefit from trade even if one of them is better at producing everything than the other.

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[76] Vogel and Lazare, 1990. See also Anatol Rapoport (1997), who writes that "... the most intense feelings experienced by human beings are probably those engendered by conflict and by love" (Rapoport, 1997, xxi).

[77] Hale, 1994. See also Lehmann, 1995, Schlesinger, 1998.

[78] Gomes de Matos, 2002.

[79] See, for example, Baumeister, Wotman, and Stillwell, 1993, Brossat, 1995, Gilbert, 1997, Proulx et al., 1994.

[80] See, for example, Brown, Harris, and Hepworth, 1995, Miller, 1988. Kendler et al., 2003, document that humiliating events that directly devalue an individual in a core role were strongly linked to risk for depressive episodes. I thank Linda Hartling for this reference.

[81] See, for example, Ignatieff, 1997, Markus, Kitayama, and Heimann, 1996, Silver et al., 1986, Wood et al., 1994.

[82] See, for example, Hardman et al., 1996.

[83] See, for example, Peters, 1993, Stadtwald, 1992, Toles, 1995, Zender, 1994.

[84] See also Masson, 1996, Vachon, 1993, Znakov, 1990.

[85] Gilligan, 1996.

[86] See, for example, Volkan, 1988, Volkan, 1992, Volkan, 1994, Volkan and Harris, 1995, Volkan, 1997.

[87] See, for example, Montville, 1993, Volkan, Demetrios, and Montville (Eds.), 1990, Montville, 1990.

[88] Together with their colleagues at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction of the University of Virginia (Harris, 1993, Harris, 1994, Stein and Apprey, 1990, Stein and Apprey, 1985, Apprey, 1994, and Ross, 1993b, Ross, 1995b).

[89] Steinberg, 1991a, Steinberg, 1991b, Steinberg, 1996.

[90] See Staub, 1989, Staub, 1990, Staub, 1993, and Staub, 1996. See for more literature on psychological approaches to the field of international relations that consider humiliation, for example, Cviic, 1993, Luo, 1993, Midiohouan, 1991, Urban, 1990.

[91] Klein, 1991. See for further work Broom and Klein, 1999, Klein, 1992a.

[92] Barrett and Brooks, 1992, Klein, 1992b, Smith, 1992.

[93] Hartling and Luchetta, 1999.

[94] Margalit, 1996, see also Frankfurt, 1997, Honneth, 1997, Lukes, 1997, Mack, 1997, Margalit, 1997, Pettit, 1997, Quinton, 1997, Ripstein, 1997, Oksenberg Rorty, 1997, Schick, 1997.

Furthermore, it was long discussed that self determination cannot be based on majority voting because this would outlaw the aspirations of the minorities who voted the other way; "mob rule and emasculation of the wise" would reign. Vilfredo Pareto, 1906, resolved this issue by defining as *Pareto efficient* any decision which results in perceived betterment but does not result in anybody else being worse off, in their own estimation; democratic institutions tend to exploit this optimal through decisions which avoid harm to others. Robert M. Solow, 1957, used growth accounting mathematics to analyze historical GDP data and identified the overwhelming importance of total factor *productivity*, namely *technological innovation* or *know how*, in securing growth and not variables such as capital and labor input.

Read furthermore on the *cognitive appraisal theory of emotions*,[95] on *human history*,[96] the *development of self-awareness* in the course of history,[97] on *game theory*,[98] on the *information age*,[99] on *cognitive dissonance*,[100] on the *obsolescence of*

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[95] Co*gnitive appraisal theory of emotions* indicates that victims evaluate and react to harm on the basis of questions such as "Who is responsible?" "Is there a justification for what happened?" "Were norms violated?" (see, for example, Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, and Clore & Ortony, 2000).

[96] Read, among many others, Diamond, 1997, Fromkin, 1999, Kennedy, 1987, McNeill, 1997, McNeill, 1982.

[97] Apart from Lyons, 1978, see also work on the development of self-awareness over longer stretches of history. See classic, albeit controversial work by Julian Jaynes, 1990, and more recent views, such as by Robert Karl Kretz, 2000.

[98] Game theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with strategic problems that relate to politics, commerce, warfare and – more recently – biology and sociology. Game theory is a study of how to mathematically determine the best strategy for given conditions in order to optimize the outcome. "Games" that use these theories are, for example, the Prisoner's Dilemma. Among the most well-known expressions of game theory are terms such as zero sum game. Game theory was formally developed as part of economic theory by Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, in their classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.

[99] See on the information age, the work by Manuel Castells, Castells, 1996, Castells, 1997b, Castells, 1997a.

[100] Festinger, 1957, did path breaking work on dissonance.

honor,[101] on the *cultural shaping of emotions*, [102] on the *science* of *conflict*,[103] on *power and conflict*,[104] on *resistance* and *rebellion*,[105] on *objectivity*, [106] on *false*

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[101] Berger, 1970, wrote an article "On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor." See also Charles Taylor, 1993, and his description of the paradigm shift from honor to dignity and recognition. According to Taylor, social hierarchies are the basis for honor and the collapse of these hierarchies is the precondition of honor's transmutation into dignity and recognition. The Enlightenment emphasizes the equality of every human person and the abolition not just of social hierarchies but of the concept of honor. I thank Eric van Grasdorff for making me aware of Taylor's work.

[102] Markus and Kitayama (1994) describe the cultural shaping of emotions as collective reality or core cultural ideas. They analyze the subjective reality of societies as flowing from their socio-economic environment and institutional structures and examine how aspects of individual emotionality relate to this subjective reality.102 Translated into the terms used in this book, the notion of humiliation is a core cultural idea that is deeply embedded into historic social and societal changes. See furthermore Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997 and Harré (Ed.), 1986. Coleman (2003, p. 25) explains, that "some scholars contend that extreme reactions seen in many conflicts are primarily based in emotional responses (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). However, until recently researchers have paid little attention to the role that emotions play in conflict (Barry and Oliver, 1996)." However, Coleman recognizes that emotions and rationality cannot be divided. He states that "In effect, the overall distinction between emotionality and rationality may be rather dubious when it comes to intractable conflicts, where they are often inseparable. Here, indignation, rage, and righteousness are reasons enough for retributive action. This is the essential dimension of human suffering and pain, of blood and sorrow, which in large part defines the domain of intractable conflict" (Coleman, 2003, p. 25).

[103] Moore, 1996, identifies five *kinds of conflict* (p. 60): *Relationship conflicts* (strong emotions, misperceptions or stereotypes, poor communication or miscommunication, repetitive negative behavior), *data conflicts* (lack of information, misinformation, different views on what is relevant, different interpretations of data, different assessment procedures), *interest conflicts* (perceived or actual competition over substantive [content] interests, procedural interests, psychological interests), *structural conflicts* (destructive patterns of behavior or interaction, unequal control, ownership, or distribution of resources, unequal power and authority, geographical, physical, or environmental factors that hinder cooperation, time constraints), *value conflicts* (different criteria for evaluating ideas or behavior, exclusive intrinsically valuable goals, different ways of life, ideology, or religion). Fry and Björkvist (Eds.), 1997, focus on conflict and violence from a cross-cultural perspective. According to them, conflict is not tantamount with aggression, but can be addressed in different ways: denying its very existence, negotiating a mutually desirable solution, compromising, threatening verbally, attacking physically, and appealing to a third party. Conflict strategies include: contendin*g* (high concern for one's own outcomes and low concern for other's outcomes), problem solving (high concern for both one's own and other's outcomes), yielding (low concern for one's own and high concern for other's outcomes) and avoiding (low concern for one's own and other's outcomes). Fry and Björkvist conclude that some cultures tend to favor one set of strategies, while others prefer another set of strategies. I thank Elizabeth Scheper for making me aware of the work carried out by these Fry and Björkvist. Read furthermore, among others, Schellenberg, 1982, and Fisk and Schellenberg, 2000.

[104] Political scientists P. Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, were among the first to address *power and conflict* in their article "The Two Faces of Power" that is placed within the context of the civil rights movement in the USA of the nineteen sixties. See also Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma, 1973, or Keltner and Robinson, 1996, who tested the hypothesis that within social disputes those partisans representing the status quo perceive their conflict less accurately than those seeking change, and that partisans seeking change typically are stereotyped as extremists.

[105] See Gurr, 1970, Gurr, 1993b, or Wink, 1992.

[106] Egon G. Guba tells the story of the discourse within which objectivity figures centrally: "Objectivity assumes a single reality to which the story or evaluation must be isomorphic; it is in this sense a one-perspective criterion. It assumes that an agent can deal with an objective (or another person) in a non-reactive and non-interactive way. It is an absolute criterion way" (Guba, 1981, p. 76). See also, for example, Guba, 1978, Guba, 1981, Guba and Lincoln, 1981, Guba and Lincoln, 1988, Lincoln and Guba, 1985.

consciousness,[107] on *World Revolutionary Elites*,[108] how *new ideas* (including human rights ideas) are carried forward in an *inhomogeneous* manner,[109] the *acceptance of human rights*,[110] and on *cultural diffusion*.[111]

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[107] Read, among many others, Augoustinos, 1999, or Jost and Banaji, 1994.

[108] Lasswell and Lerner (Eds.), 1965. I thank Dennis Smith for this reference.

[109] Everett Rogers, 1962, describes how new ideas are carried forward by *innovators*, who convince *early adopters*, who in turn influence *early majorities* and may slide into loggerhead positions with *laggards*. I thank Barnett Pearce for making me aware of this literature.

[110] They are therefore met with the wrath of others in their elite group. Jim Lobe (2003), writes about the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think tank close to the Bush administration, targeting NGOs for their alleged "efforts to constrain U.S. freedom of action in international affairs and influence the behaviour of corporations abroad" (Lobe, 2003, p. 1). However, consider Schulz and Robinson, 2001, and their argument that human rights advocacy is in the interest of all Americans.

[111] See, for example, Triandis, 1997, for *Cultural and Social Behavior*.

Globalization and Humiliation[112]

Virtually every news program in the world's television channels starts with a turning globe. People all over the world are constantly kept aware of the fact that we are all inhabitants of planet Earth. None of our ancestors had this view. The astronaut's gaze on the globe is unprecedented in human history and uniquely novel. This perspective seduces, invites and pushes us to become aware of the fact that we live on *One tiny planet* in a vast universe, and, increasingly, are moving into *One single global village*.

If we imagine the world as a three-dimensional place then *globalization* is played out along the horizontal dimension: the human world is pulled together both in reality and in our minds (this *coming-together* is what I define as *globalization*). The awareness of this process pokes holes into the fences and frontiers that previously used to safely separate groups. The *global village* vision is an ultimate saboteur of fault lines and a fervent merger of realities and imageries that formerly pertained to separate units.

Yet, merging is not always blissful. This is because feelings between players who come closer are heated up as soon as misunderstandings arise and expectations are disappointed. Not least feelings of humiliation are more swiftly elicited than ever before.

Admittedly, *globalization* is not the first incidence of *unification* on planet Earth. The creation of larger units is not new, it has happened before. Big empires have formed from smaller units in the course of human history, the Roman Empire, for example, was huge. However, there is one element that is profoundly new at the current historic turning point, an element that causes the presently living generation to experience unprecedented times. It is the fact that humankind is in the process of not only indirectly being affected, but *consciously* understanding that the planet Earth is small, limited, vulnerable, and not expandable.

In the past, empires were held together by strong centers that ruled over their underlings through fear and seduction. They posited themselves in opposition to the rest of the world that was not yet conquered or not worth being conquered. For most of human history, this "rest of the world" had no clear limits in the minds of its inhabitants; the outer boundaries of the human world were fluid. Like early hunters and gatherers who may have thought that there was unlimited "free" space to wander about, early conquerors thought that there potentially were unlimited numbers of underlings to subjugate. They never reached the end of the globe in their raids. Empires did not run out of opportunities to expand, to conquer more; there were no limits in their imagery.

In contrast, nowadays, the *global village* is held together by something profoundly different. It is not held together by the overwhelming iron grip of one power center, but by something much more abstract, subtle and impersonal, namely an *increasing awareness of the minuteness of the globe and its interdependence*. "We may have all come on different ships, but we're in the same boat now," this is a saying by Martin Luther King.

Clearly, the planet was never anything else but precisely this tiny planet in a vast universe. It is not the planet that has changed. What is new is that humankind has understood this or is in the process of understanding it. It understands this by the help of a long tradition of tool-making that ultimately brought us spaceships and astronauts, airplanes and telephone cables. This technology makes entirely new

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[112] Parts of this section are adapted from Lindner, 2002d.

perspectives on the world possible. We are able to take pictures from space, airplanes shrink distances between the continents, and communication technology makes networks such as the Internet possible.

The facts and imageries of the *global village* not only teach us about the minuteness of the globe. They furthermore profoundly affect relations between *us* and *them*. They affect relations between "*us* Americans" and "*you* Europeans," between "*us* Americans" and "*you* Russians," as much as "*us* Americans" and "*you* Chinese." The term *global village* indicates that a unifying process is taking place; *One single* large unit is formed of several smaller, formerly separated units. The rifts that used to separate *us* from *them* are affected by this unifying drive of *globalization*. *Ingroups* and *outgroups* coalesce into *One single ingroup*. There are no longer several *villages*, but *One single global village*.

Clearly, imagery precedes reality; in reality the *global village* is far from there. However, the wide-spread use of the term *global village* betrays that this novel framing of the world's reality is entering the minds and hearts of an ever increasing number of people.

> Several recent debates in anthropology and neighbouring disciplines pull … away from notions of integrated societies or cultures towards a vision of a more fragmented, paradoxical and ambiguous world. The currently bustling academic industry around the notion of globalisation (see Featherstone (Ed.), 1990, for an early, influential contribution) represents an empirically oriented take on these issues, focusing on the largely technology-driven processes that contribute to increasing contact across boundaries and diminished importance of space. This focus on unbounded processes rather than isolated communities has contributed to a reconceptualisation of the social which is radically opposed to that of classic Durkheimian sociology and anthropology; where flux, movement and change become the rule and not the exception in social life (Strathern, 1991, Hannerz, 1992, Lash and Urry, 1994) (Eriksen, 2001).

The view on planet Earth from space is something that is ground-breaking, world-shattering and unsettling; none of our ancestors had this view. It frames our conceptualizations, our feelings, and our reactions towards this globe in a completely new and unmatched way. No history lesson helps us, because the notion of *One global village* turns the whole of humankind into *One single ingroup* on *One single tiny planet*, something that never occurred before. The reverberations are revolutionary, both *benign* and *malign*.

The task for humankind at this crucial historic juncture is to study the potentially *benign* and *malign* outfalls of this new historic reality that we call *globalization* and find ways to strengthen the *benign* tendencies and mitigate and marginalize the *malign* ones. This chapter addresses these queries.

Are you one of us? How globalization can elicit feelings of humiliation that were not there before

Let us look at one issue that is central for *globalization*, namely the fact that human beings have a tendency to differentiate *ingroup*s from *outgroups*, *us* from *them*, and moral *inclusion* from moral *exclusion*. To say it blunt, there are two kinds of morals, an "*inside* moral" and an "*outside* moral." What *my* people deserve is not the same as what *your* people deserve. The reach of morals is also called the *scope of justice*. Coleman (2000) expresses this as follows, "Individuals or groups within our moral

boundaries are seen as deserving of the same fair, moral treatment as we deserve. Individuals or groups outside these boundaries are seen as undeserving of this same treatment" (Coleman, 2000, p. 118).

A whole wealth of social-psychological research relates to the phenomenon of *in-* and *outgroup* categorizations. *Social identity theory*, a hotly discussed field, examines phenomena of *us* versus *them*. The famous Robbers' Cave experiment by Muzafer Sherif[113] involved boys in a summer camp. The boys were split into two groups and asked to engage in competitive activities with conflicting goals (for example, zero sum games such as football). Intergroup hostility evolved astonishingly fast and almost automatically. One may assume that only children due to their relative immaturity react in this way. However, experiments by Tzeng and Jackson (1994) confirm the same dynamics also for adults.[114] Even worse, this splitting tendency is so strong that not even conflicting goals are needed. For example, schoolboys were assigned to two groups, and this was done in an entirely arbitrary fashion. Then they were given money and asked to distribute it to everybody. Astonishingly, they favored their *ingroup* even under such minimal circumstances. This tendency is therefore called the *minimal group paradigm*. You get a blue patch on your shoulder, by mere arbitrary choice of the experiment organizer, without any deeper meaning or rational, and I get a yellow one, and almost automatically you begin favoring all those with blue patches and I do the same with all those with yellow patches.

Why is the *ingroup* favored? Is this virtually automatic and seemingly even involuntary gut-reaction in any way also rational, effective, or instrumental for humans? And if yes, instrumental to whom? Whose interests are expressed? Is it to protect against our awareness that we are mortal, as *terror management theory* indicates? Or has it purely pragmatic reasons?

A Somali nomad would explain to the social psychologists that in a dangerous environment it would be suicidal to not be part of a strong *ingroup* for protection. Many Somalis owe their lives to clan-affiliation; when fleeing, they can count on clan-members they never met before for help wherever they stray. Many of those who live on Somali soil are kept alive by the funds coming in from the Somali diaspora in Canada, USA, Australia, Sweden and all around the globe. Somali clan affiliation is their health insurance, their old age security, and their emergency reserve. Their clan affiliation is their protection; it is like the roof over their heads.

How, under such circumstances, can there ever be *cooperation* across fault lines? Are boundaries, dividing lines, divisions, rifts and gaps bound to stay eternal? What can be done? Does it help to bring people together? Does contact render cooperation? Do exchange programs work? And does the coming-together of humankind into *One village* yield friendship and trust?

The so-called *contact hypothesis* says yes. The *contact hypothesis* represents the "belief that interaction between individuals belonging to different groups will reduce ethnic prejudice and inter-group tension" (Ryan, 1995, p. 131). Interaction, Ryan explains, can come through trade, business, trade unions, professional meetings, sports and the like.

However, we wonder, does mere interaction in actual fact bring harmonious

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[113] Sherif and Sherif, 1966 and Sherif et al., 1988, within the context of *realistic group conflict theory*.

[114] *Effects of Contact, Conflict, and Social Identity on Interethnic Group Hostilities*, by Tzeng and Jackson, 1994.

cooperation? What about Yugoslavia and Rwanda where neighbors and even spouses turned into deadly enemies? Surely, being married does represent "interaction"? Being married and having children together, should not this have impeded hostility? Clearly it did not. Also Ryan agrees that the idea that greater contact alone will build peace is flawed. Research shows that contact only improves attitudes when that contact is intimate, pleasant, between equals, socially supported, and in pursuit of common goals. Absent those conditions, increased contact may lead to increased hostility.[115] Thus, we have to conclude, unfortunately, contact alone does not automatically render cooperation, contact may even lead to the very opposite, namely hostility.

What we learn from research is that the only remedy against the *splitting tendency* that so deeply characterizes human nature are common super-ordinate goals that are reachable and emanate from consent borne by equals. In other words, three conditions must be fulfilled to have the citizens of the global village cooperate across all previous fault lines and not descend in hostility: they must at first identify with *common super-ordinate goals* that secondly are *realistically reachable* and thirdly *social inequality must be avoided* in the process. Let us analyze these three conditions and ask in what way *globalization* entails *benign* or *malign* elements that further or hinder cooperation across fault lines.

First requirement for cooperation: common super-ordinate goals

Under the heading *Creating Super-Ordinate Goals* Michael Harris Bond, cross-cultural psychologist based in Hong Kong writes:

> Social polarizations may be transcended through groups' and their members' uniting successfully around a common purpose or goal (Sherif and Cantril, 1947). This might involve local tasks such as constructing community facilities. Community service projects, especially if involving younger students from various ethnic groups serving members of various other ethnic groups, may be especially effective in building trust and good-will across group lines.... National tasks, such as protecting the shared environment or indeed, fighting off an invader, will accomplish the same unification. Social capital will then develop out of the experience of working together and subsequently out of shared pride in the ongoing benefit from the actual accomplishments themselves (Bond, 1998).

In our quest to investigate benign and malign tendencies entailed in *globalization* we may ask whether *globalization* provides elements that provide common super-ordinate goals. The answer has been discussed above. The increasing understanding of the vulnerability of our planet indeed represents an incentive to *global village* citizens to identify with the common super-ordinate goal of safeguarding this fragile common home. The rising awareness of the planet's tiny size and fragile biosphere brought about by various technological devices that coalesce with processes of *globalization* provides an experience that binds people together and pushes for cooperation. *Globalization*, understood in this way, could thus be said to represent a *benign* trend that furthers global cooperation.

More even, *globalization* may be more *benign* and not only open humankind's eyes to super-ordinate goals but also make people *humble* in front of these newly detected goals. Let me explain. The majority of lay-people, through human history

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[115] Adapted from http://www.intractableconflict.org/docs/appendix_6.jsp.

until only very recently, were certainly not very enlightened as to the nature of the universe. According to our everyday experience, the Earth is flat, with small variations for hills or mountains. Indeed it is difficult to understand that the Earth is spherical. Today's proofs were tricky to obtain in the days of early astronomy; pictures from space were not available, and nobody could take the plane and actually traveling around the Earth and end up in the same spot. It is not until present times, that virtually everybody on the globe is exposed to the pictures from space of a revolving Earth-ball.

When many still thought the earth was a flat disc, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) went already a step further and developed a heliocentric model. He found that the Earth not only fails to be a vast and unlimited flat disc, it even is not at the center of the universe. This humbling view was accepted as scientific standard only in the 1660s and the church rejected it until the 1800s. The church waited for evidence to be produced by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630). Thus, even for rather learned clerics it took 300 years to adapt to a new framing of their worldview.

We could conclude, that *globalization*, or the physical and mental coming together of humankind on the tiny planet Earth, started long before the modern term was coined. And it had and has a subtle humbling effect. It is humbling that humankind inhabits but a tiny marginal spot in a vast universe and is far from being at the center of it.

The revolutionary effect of such insights is described by Charles Kingsley (1819-1875), professor of modern history at Cambridge, "Inductive Physical Science, which helped more than all to break up the superstitions of the Ancien Regime…set man face to face with the facts of the universe" (Kingsley, 2003).

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) later added more humbling lessons. Not only is Homo sapiens just another animal, Homo sapiens is not even in control of himself. Phenomena such as dreams and hypnosis betray that there is life in the midst of our souls that is beyond our conscious control. We may altogether not be as "sapiens" [wise, judicious] and certainly not as mighty as we once thought.

Thus, the human toolkit, meant to heighten human standing, ultimately humbled it. Telescopes dissipate the message that haughtiness on the part of Homo sapiens is misplaced. We are no prominent center players in the universe, we are somewhere at the outskirts. Humility, in this context, could be called an unintended *side effect* of the human toolkit that initially meant to achieve the very opposite. Yet, this unintended side effect seeps through, more or less subtly. It is unsettling for any intelligent being to ponder whether Homo sapiens really is chosen by God, or whether the truth is not rather that we are lost in space. Whoever dares think in such lines, even if she only touches this doubt, is about to lose faith in fixed order. Masters are not sure anymore whether *up* is really their divinely ordained place; underlings, equally, question whether being somewhere *down* indeed is the order of the world.

More recent modern technology adds to these humbling lessons to human species. The fact that we all are dependent on *One single vulnerable biosphere* is a significant humbler, at least for those who hear the message. The thought that planet Earth may be better off without humans, may not only be humbling but even humiliating. Perhaps we will die out like the Dinosaurs, and the world will make a sigh of relief? All aspects of *globalization* that highlight human species' insignificance and

vulnerability, humble us, they make us more cautious and turn *proud subjugation* into *mindless violation*.

A friend, a veterinary who works in Scandinavia, told me the following (in October 2002): "Recently, I heard a talk at a conference. It was about artificial insemination. The American speaker explained that his research had shown that in order to procure semen from male animals – and he spoke about bulls – the quality of the sperm is best when you provide the bull with an artificial vagina. The quality of the sperm will be better than if you use the alternative method, namely electro-ejaculation. Electro-ejaculation means that you give the bull a little electrical shock that triggers ejaculation. The drawback with the artificial vagina is that the bull has to be trained to use it, while electro-ejaculation is swifter.

Subsequent to the talk, the American speaker and his American colleagues explained to my great astonishment that they would continue with electro-ejaculation. I was flabbergasted. First, the speaker explains to us that using an artificial vagina renders better results and then he declares that he still recommends to inferior method. 'Aside from that,' I said to him, 'Did you know that electro-ejaculation is forbidden in Norway and Sweden out of ethical reasons and in order to protect the welfare of the animals?'

What did he and his people reply? They said, 'We are free, you know, we can do what we want!'"

We sat at a table, while my friend told this story. At this point he turned around and almost shouted at me, "Is not this the freedom of the fool who cuts the branch on which he sits? How can foolishness be freedom? These people are so blind in their arrogance in front of nature that they do not recognize that a little humility would serve their interests much better! And, besides, does not also an animal have dignity? These people humiliate their animals and in my eyes also themselves."

Another friend, a United Nations official, when reading this text, commented, "Now you understand why the world is so furious at the United States for their lack of commitment in multilateral agreements. Global climate, it seems, does not interest them, only American climate. Many Americans behave as if God has secretly promised them another planet where they can live when our planet is used up. And it is as if they have already decided that they will not share this divine invitation to a new globe with anybody else on Earth; of course, because they believe they are the only ones chosen by God. The only hopes we have are those Americans who are sensible and see that America needs humility. It is obscene how this country contributes to wasting our biosphere's resources and is even proud of this theft! As if it is virtuous to get rich and powerful by stealing common goods! As if it is virtuous to cut off the branch on which humankind sits! Americans have still to arrive in the *global village*!"

Thus, we may conclude that the process of *globalization*, or better, the increasing awareness in the minds of an increasing number of people of how small and vulnerable the boat is in which we all sit, is not only providing a common super-ordinate goal but is also humbling. This new humility sabotages fixed order and lets haughtiness become out of place. The Scandinavian veterinary has heard the message, his American colleagues not yet. They haughtily believe that "freedom" means power over the limitations of nature. In this sense, new humility, seeping in by means of the myriads of little processes that coalesce to what we call *globalization*, turns acts that are intended as acts of confident subjugation into overconfident violation.

The arrival of new common super-ordinate goals provided by the facts and imageries of the vulnerability of planet Earth thus represent a *benign* tendency in *globalization*. However, there is a problem that can turn *malignant*. The humility that is required to tackle the newly detected super-ordinate goals – though propelled by processes of globalization – does not arrive at the same time in all hearts and minds. The presence or absence of this humility heats up feelings of humiliation on all sides. Isolationistic Americans, accused of haughtiness, may feel insulted, humiliated and enraged when others point their fingers at them, and those who do the finger-pointing feel insulted, humiliated and enraged by the American definition of "freedom. And since feelings of humiliation undermine cooperation, the difficulties entailed in the requirement of new humility could thus be said to introduce *malign* or at least *detrimental* tendencies that have to be mitigated if cooperation is to be attained.

Second requirement for cooperation: common super-ordinate goals must be reachable

As stipulated above, super-ordinate goals alone are not sufficient for successful cooperation. These goals must also be *reachable*. We may ask if *globalization* provides *benign* tendencies at this point.

Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio and others (1993, 1999) stipulate that an environment that is formed as a win-win situation may be expected to lend itself to bringing people together, while zero sum circumstances may increase the likelihood of divisions between people.

So, we may ask, does *globalization* render win-win situations? Yes, is the tentative answer. As discussed earlier, Ury (1999) describes the global information society as a place where the pie of resources is expandable. Knowledge – ideas, new thoughts, and novel inventions – has no limits, unlike land. Agriculturalists depend on land, and this forces them into win-lose games. Modern information bearers, on the other side, find themselves in win-win situations; there is always another innovation out there that has not yet been invented. Thus, innovative ideas that power modern technologies that in turn power *globalization* also render *benign* tendencies towards cooperation. Thus we can mark off that the second requirement for cooperation, namely *reachability* is currently veering to the *benign* pole. It seems thus beneficial to strengthen these *benign* tendencies and open up space for creativity.

Third requirement for cooperation: super-ordinate goals must be combined with conditions of equality

Yet, what about the third condition, equality (I would prefer to be more specific and call it *equal dignity*)? How come that social psychology pinpoints equality as requirement for cooperation? Ill feelings supposedly are brought about by inequality. Wilkinson et al. (1996, 1998) have worked on social inequality and explain that social inequality is detrimental because it deteriorates the quality of social bonds, producing psychosocial stress for all, particularly among those of lower status.

However, we may ask, what are inequalities? How are inequalities detected? And even if inequalities are detected, do they necessarily lead to ill feelings? The obvious answer is that as long as people live far away from each other and have little information about each other, they have no way of knowing about inequalities. Those who have less, are simply not aware that they have less. Under such conditions, *relative deprivation* may go undetected.

The *Dictionary of Geography* (Mayhew, 1997) explains the notion of *deprivation* as "lacking in provision of desired objects or aims," and explains further, "Within the less developed countries deprivation may be acute; the necessities of life such as water, housing, or food may be lacking. Within the developed world basic provisions may be supplied but, in comparison with the better-off, the poor and the old may well feel a sense of deprivation. This introduces the concept of *relative deprivation* which entails comparison, and is usually defined in subjective terms…The idea of a *cycle of deprivation* refers to the transmission of deprivation from one generation to the next through family behaviours, values, and practices. This idea has been extensively debated and discussed."

In order to recognize *relative deprivation*, we may assume, it is necessary for people to somehow move closer to each other. The more opportunities to compare each other, the more existing inequalities will be acknowledged. And indeed, being an oasis dweller in the Egyptian desert, getting access to television and for the first time watching American soap operas, or observing Western tourists passing through, represents a crash course in comparison. What may have been *absolute deprivation* before is turned into *relative deprivation*.

Yet, as discussed before, as long as those who have less believe that inequality is divinely ordained or regard it as a natural phenomenon, they may not develop ill feelings even if they learn about their relative deprivation. People, who experience relative deprivation will ask about its legitimacy, and, if there are satisfactory explanations, may accept it. *Cycles of deprivation*, for example, are kept in motion precisely when those who have less, develop cultures that explain certain aspects of relative deprivation as *honorable assets*.

It is only when justifications are undermined, for example by the human rights message, that people begin to question inequality and may proceed to protect their self-esteem and identity by attributing their lowly circumstances to powerful enemies that unfairly impose such situation on them (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973) Deutsch (2002) summarizes:

> An individual's conception of what is he and others are entitled to is determined by at least five major kinds of influence: (1) the ideologies and myths about justice that are dominant and officially supported in the society, (2) the amount of exposure to ideologies and myths that conflict with those that are officially supported and are supportive of larger claims for the oppressed, (3) experienced changes in satisfactions-dissatisfactions, (4) knowledge of what others who are viewed as comparable are getting, and (5) perceptions of the bargaining power of the oppressed and oppressors (Deutsch, 2002, p. 25).

Mapped onto the process of *globalization* we are bound to conclude that the coming-together of humankind provides new opportunities for comparison and thus turning *absolute* into *relative deprivation*. When I sit in the Egyptian desert in my mud brick house with only one or two dresses to wear and watch American soap operas, it is as if I go to school to learn about inequality. Inequalities that were not seen before become thus apparent.

Not enough that I learn about my relative deprivation, at the same time the message of human rights deems *relative deprivation to be illegitimate*, thus removing possible justifications for inequality and potentially eliciting rage and anger. In the language of *human rights humiliation*, it is felt to be humiliating to be shown the amenities of modern life in Western soap operas on television and be invited into the family of equal human beings by human rights advocacy, while at the same time

being deprived of those very amenities. As a result, ill feelings, including feelings of humiliation, must be expected to increase.

Thus, we may conclude that *globalization* turns humiliation into a topic that is more relevant than before. And since humiliation favors division and not cooperation it must be mitigated for cooperation to succeed. Humankind will want to aim for cooperation between teammates and not humiliation inflicted by masters on underlings.

This section may be summarized by suggesting that from the point of view of social psychology, *globalization*, as soon as it renders super-ordinate goals that are realistically reachable and that at the same time are tackled in a real team spirit may be regarded as *benign*. And indeed, *globalization* may be conceptualized as a process that provides humankind with common super-ordinate goals and thus with a source of hope; with hope that demarcation lines between hostile groups can be transcended. The fact and imagery of the *global village*, the vision of the revolving lonely planet in a vast universe, has *benign* effects, because it brings to awareness a formerly unknown vulnerability and thus the super-ordinate goal that humankind has to take care of this defenseless common home. However, equal dignity must be nurtured in the process; otherwise emerging feelings of humiliation may turn all otherwise *benign* tendencies *sour*.

You are an enemy! How outdated outgroup language can humiliate

In the previous section we concluded that the huddling of humankind on a tiny planet in a vast universe has a humbling effect. However, *globalization* yields more than a general humbling of Homo sapiens. Other revolutionary upheavals are triggered as well. One of the most significant changes brought about by the coming-into-being of *One single global village* is that there is no *outgroup* anymore.

The revolutionary consequence of the demise of any *outgroup* to *One single global village* is that all concepts, ideas, and feelings that are attached to *outgroup* categorizations lose their validity and are increasingly outdated. This is one of the consequences of *globalization,* and it is one that is driven by logic, without any actor having to speak for it. When there is only *One ingroup* left, there is no *outgroup* anymore. Together with the *outgroup*, whatever concepts were previously attached to it, are lost. *Outgroup* notions begin to "hang in thin air" without their former basis in reality. It is like when a tree disappears; its apples disappear. People may need time to grasp this, yet, they cannot escape this new reality.

At present many linguistic transitions illustrate this phenomenon. For example, consider words such as *enemies*, *wars*, and *soldiers*, alongside the already mentioned word *they* as opposed to *us*. These are all words stemming from times when several *villages* inhabited the globe. These words lose their anchoring in reality as soon as people conceive of the globe as *One single village*. Under the new circumstances *we* are in *One* boat and there are no imperial *enemies* anymore threatening from *outside*. This is so, because there is no *outside* anymore. Likewise there is no *they* anymore because there is only one single *us*. That is, the word *enemy* that is defined as *people threatening 'us' from 'outside'*[116] loses its functionality together with the disappearance of the *outside*. Likewise do words such as *wars* and *soldiers*. This is a logical process that is steered by nobody but by the change of determining circumstances.

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[116] See *Faces of the Enemy* by Keen, 1986. I thank Gordon Fellman for this reference.

The only sentence that fits the reality of any village, including the *global village*, is, *"We are all neighbors; some of us are good neighbors, some are bad neighbors, and in order to safeguard social peace we need police [not anymore soldiers to defend against enemies in wars]."*

This sentence is fitting, because a village usually comprises good and bad neighbors, while enemies traditionally have their place outside of the village's boundaries, as have soldiers and wars. And a village enjoys peace when all inhabitants get along without resorting to violence. Polarizations into *friends* on one side and *enemies* on the other are not helpful for long-term peace inside a village because they indicate that *bad neighbors* actually are not only *bad* but *outsiders*. The suggestion that there might be *outsiders* risks splitting a village in two. For a *global village* that strives for unity, this would be a step backwards.

In the course of the past months we witnessed bits and pieces of this slow historic transition, a transition away from the word *enemy*. The word *terrorist* became more prominent than ever at a global level. Language visibly adapts to new realities. *Terrorists* are *inner enemies*, they represent the *very bad neighbor*, the only subgroup within the category labeled *enemy* that can occur *inside*. We witness the disappearance of *enemies* in the sense of people attacking from *outside*, from another imperial sphere, giving prominence to a subtype of the category, the *inner enemy* or better the *terrorist* or *criminal*.

Equally, words such as *war* and *soldier* are anachronistic. The only language that fits the new situation is the language of policing, because to safeguard social peace within a village, *police* is put in place, not *soldiers*. This pertains to every village, including the *global village*. And indeed, we do witness that the traditional notion of the *soldier* slowly changes. Many are now *peace keepers* and *peace enforcers*.[117] What is increasingly obsolete is the traditional *soldier*, for example of the First World War, who left home to reap national and personal glory, fame, and triumph.

When in old times traditional Rwandan aristocratic warriors sat together in the evenings – and I got vivid descriptions of this – they chanted their *names of glory*. Central to a warrior's *glory* is the number of *enemies* he has killed. A modern member of a peace keeping force would be reprimanded if he or she boasted in the same way of having caused the death of so many fellow human beings. Books such as *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics*, are markers of new times (Shriver, 1995).[118]

It is important to learn that the use of outdated language may have humiliating effects.

Friends from different parts of the non-Western world, among them those who supported the American government in its resolve to go to war against Iraq, regularly write to me. I summarize and paraphrase their reactions at the period around April 2003:

"I think that Iraq has to be liberated. But I find it obscene to say that Saddam Hussein has to be removed because he threatens the civilized free world. Does this mean that there is a 'civilized' world and 'uncivilized' world? Who is the 'uncivilized' world? Where is it? Does it mean that an Iraqi person is uncivilized? Or are Indonesians uncivilized? Does it mean that only America is civilized? What an arrogance! America is a baby among the great civilizations! Not least Iraq is the

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[117] See for *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors*, Snyder, 2000.

[118] I thank Morton Deutsch for this reference.

successor of Mesopotamia, home of some of a succession of the greatest civilizations ever! I repeat, what does it mean that Saddam threatens the civilized world? Does it mean if he only threatened the uncivilized world, he could stay in power and freely kill these uncivilized people? And where are these uncivilized people whom we do not have to worry about? Where do they live?

And what about the free world? Who is free today? Everybody is free who has a passport of a rich country. This person is free. She can travel the entire globe. No problems with visa. A person from a rich country, even the most awful sloth and parasite, is free. But, all those poor creatures who are born into a poor country, are not free. They are restricted. They may very well work a hundred times harder than any rich person, still they are not free. When they try to escape, they are called illegal immigrants and sent back, deeply humiliated. What does it mean that the 'free' world is threatened by Saddam? Does it mean that if he threatened the 'un-free' world, there would be no problem? Does it mean that he could kill as many poor un-free souls in poor un-free countries as he wanted, but please, none of us rich ones?

Please, President Bush! If you want to win the hearts and minds of the uncivilized and un-free of this world, never again say that dictators threaten the free civilized world! They threaten the whole world! Period! You destroy your own message, dear President, when you want to protect only one part of humanity and not all! Please don't do that!

And, please Mister President, do not wage *war*! Even not *just war*! It is *policing* what you do! But please, do not police in the interest of the 'civilized' and 'free' world only! Please protect us all and adapt your language!

People tell me that America wages war to teach the Americans geography. People tell me that Americans do not know the world. Please, dear President, if you want to win my heart and my mind, do something about that!

And please, dear President, never again say 'May God continue to bless America!' Always say 'May God continue to bless America and the whole World!' I tell you why. Imagine, what would happen to America if only America was blessed and the rest cursed? America is only blessed if also the rest is blessed! Do not pull God onto your side only!"

This woman asks the US president Bush not to wage *war*, even not if it were *just war*. And, indeed, in a world that comprises nothing but *One village*, there is no place for *war* anymore. What is typical for *villages* is *policing*. *Policing* can be just and unjust, however, it is never *war*. Policing is *just*, at least from the point of view of a human rights framework, when the related institutions are democratically legitimized and do only target criminals. It is *unjust*, when the police force is dominated by an elite who uses it to subjugate competitors.

Much of the currently used Western war-language is anachronistic and thus deeply humiliating for humanity, particularly in the ears of all those among the audience who subscribe to the human rights vision of equal dignity for all. It feels obscene. It violates decency and darkens the courage that indeed is being put into *missions*. The same endeavor, if framed in proper police language, namely that *criminals* are to be *brought to justice* (not *killed* or *flushed out*) and that *hostages* (including *enemy soldiers* who were put at their guns by the highjacker) have to be *freed*, would reap more acceptance.

We may conclude this section by stating that *globalization*, through a basic logic shift from several *villages* to *One village*, makes *outgroup* language obsolete. In cases where such language is still applied, it has the potential to elicit humiliating effects.

The *globalization* process as it is described here proceeds even in the face of resistance. Conservatives around the world, for example, may insist that the word *enemy* is essential to them and that bad people deserve to be called *enemy*. Yet, this word, together with all related words, such as *war* and *soldier,* does not disappear because some soft-hearted dreamers wish for it. These words lose significance because they are based on the image of several *villages* and do not fit into the new world of *One village*. Their basis in reality wanes, and thus they wane. They merely do not fit anymore.

This section thus attempted to show in what way remnants of *outgroup* language represent *malign* influences in a world where the coming-into being of *One single global village* has profoundly *benign* effects through the disappearance of *outside* spheres.

The emergency is over! How globalization brings humiliation to the fore

In Lindner (2001g), I developed Table 4 that entails some elements of Ury's systematization, such as the pie of resources as expandable or fixed. I conceptualize a small number of *logics*, namely four, to be at the core of the human condition: (1) The question of whether and to what extent resources are expandable (*game theory* located in philosophy), (2) whether the *security dilemma* is weaker or stronger (*international relations theory*, located in political science), (3) to what extent long-term or short-term horizons dominate (as described in many academic disciplines, among others *cross-cultural psychology*), and (4) how the human capacity to either deepen or loosen fault lines of identifications is calibrated (*social identity theory*, located in social psychology).

Let me first explain the four *logics*. *Game theory* is widely described and well-known and does not need to be expanded on here. It is almost general knowledge that win-win situations are more benign than win-lose situations, and, as discussed before, global knowledge society indeed offers a win-win environment (Ury, 1999). This state-of-affairs could thus be scored as providing a rather benign base-line. The security dilemma and the time horizon, however, are less frequently used terms and will be explained in the following two subsections. *Social identity theory*, as well, has been touched upon earlier. It will be mentioned briefly in a third subsection.

The security dilemma

As long as humankind lived in times where there were many *villages* around, the danger from *outside* attackers was great. In the course of human history outsiders regularly intruded into *villages*. From Vikings to Huns, raiders caused *villagers* to build walls and fortresses.

The reason for this happening so frequently during the past thousands of years was that not only *intensification* or agriculture are ways to increase resources, raiding neighboring *villages* is another method. Differentiation within societies and warfare between societies (Gil, 1998) are two ways to increase resources when abundance falters. Semi-deserts such as in Somalia, little suitable for agriculture, saw warrior cultures of raiders emerge. Farmers typically are being looked down upon by mobile and "free" Somali warriors. Through centuries farmers who lived in the vicinity of

"noble" warriors were used to being routinely raided.

The term security dilemma has been coined by *international relations theory* that explains it as follows: "I have to amass power, because I am scared. When I amass weapons, you get scared. You amass weapons, I get more scared." [119] Thus an arms race and finally war are likely to be triggered. In such contexts, even the most "benign" sovereigns are compelled to be belligerent because they are victims of the *security dilemma*. So-called *classical* and *structural realism*, two early *international relations theories*, see the *security dilemma* as unavoidable.

The security dilemma forces bloody competition to emerge out of mutual distrust, even as nobody is interested in going to war in the first place. The threat of preemption with preemption is the ultimate and seemingly inevitable outcome of the traditional security dilemma. The term "security dilemma" was coined by John Herz, 1950, to explain why states that have no intention to harm one another may still end up in competition and war. Its very essence is one of tragedy. The security dilemma has been expanded upon by many authors (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985, see also Betts (Ed.), 2005). Jack Snyder's definition of the security dilemma, where one state *requires* the insecurity of another (Snyder, 1985, see also Snyder and Walters (Eds.), 1999) has been labeled by Alan Collins as a *state-induced* security dilemma (Collins, 2004).

What we learn is that there is a *dilemma*, the *security dilemma*, which makes it very dangerous to live in a world of several *villages* that live in *anarchy*. War between *villages* is almost inescapable and calm and quiet will be continuously disturbed.

We may ask to what extent the *security dilemma* indeed is an inescapable logic, or whether it can, logically and practically, be heightened or attenuated. Indeed, a culture of male prowess will tend to be a response to a strong *security dilemma* and make it even stronger. Crawford (1997) explains, "Before World War I there was a 'Cult of the Offensive' in Germany, a 'Cult of Militarism,' a 'cult of having to hit before being attacked;' this increased the problem."

However, the *security dilemma* can also get weaker. This happens, when more actors play a role than only heads of states, as for example, civil society. And it gets more *benign* when *villages* grow interdependent and begin to communicate in ways that make it possible to better discern the motives of the *other*. The *security dilemma* gets weaker when *villages* are being drawn closer together and trust is being built between *villagers*. And its logic disappears when there is only *One village*.

Thus we learn that as long as there is enough abundance around and *villages* are far enough away from each other so as to not be aware of each other, there is no problem. However, as soon as *villages* are geographically close enough to each other to be potential raiders, but psychologically too far away to build good communication and trust, leaders are caught in the *security dilemma* and have no choice but invest in arms which in turn worsen the situation. However, as soon as these *villages* coalesce into *One village*, again, the problem disappears again. The *security dilemma* poses grave problems only as long as *villages* stay in a medium distance, too close for *geopolitical security* and too far for *human security*.

As long as people live so *far away* that I do not know about them, they do not bother me. After all, there may be myriads of extraterrestrial creatures plotting for the Earth's demise. But because humankind does not know about them, fear of this potential

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[119] Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, July, 20-25, 1997.

threat does not consume anybody really.

However, what if people live close enough to me so that I am aware of them, but remain unable to speak their language or understand their motives and have no access to commonly-accepted mechanisms to redress grievances? I may want to get myself a little gun for my bedroom. These people would perhaps find out; after all, they are not out of the world, and they would get afraid. They would then get themselves somewhat larger weapon. And, clearly, I would respond accordingly. At some point our lives would be consumed by fear and preparations for defense, a defense that would be misunderstood as aggressive posturing from the other side. The situation would increasingly get worse and we would be eaten up by mutual fear.

As soon as people live under the roof of *One common super-ordinate structure*, however, there is a chance for trust. Trust is something very strange. How come that I do not expect that my neighbor will get himself a canon and shoot at me from his sleeping room? Why do I believe that I know my neighbor better? Why do I trust that he will not attack me, at least not suddenly? Why am I convinced that we would be able to solve normal neighborhood problems peacefully if they occurred? The reason is that I meet my neighbor often and we exchange words. He seems to be interested in his garden and his children and not at all in attacking me. And even if problems were to occur, I have police, mediators, ombudsmen, and all kinds of alternative ways at hand with which to solve the problem apart from violence.

What we understand, is that attempts to create calm and stability *within* a state or *village* are doomed as long as strongmen from outside can arrive a the blink of the eye and destroy everything. As long as a *village* continuously has to be prepared for sudden attack, the *security dilemma* reigns. A culture of male prowess will try to stand up to it; however, instead of alleviating the problem, it will worsen it. Fortresses will be built, strong *village* walls, weapons will be stored, men will train how to fight, and mothers will teach their sons to suppress their feelings, because otherwise they will be too afraid to die in combat. Men will become fighting machines and will call this condition "honorable." However, the fiercer they become, the more the fear among the other *villagers* increases and those *others* will try to outdo the first. There is no limit to how far this spiral can be turned. Fortifications and male prowess indeed does "defend" security, but only as long as the *enemy* is not provoked into doing the same thing, only better. This is why the *security dilemma* is called a *dilemma*. Nobody can escape it. The only solution is to "take out" the fear that is at the basis of the *security dilemma*, and this can be done by either eradicating all *villages* but one (or at least move them into safe distance), or coalesce *all villages* into *One village*.

Thus, the coming together of the world into *One global village* carries the potential to remove the fear and the *anarchy* that seeps in from *outside* and cannot be controlled by any *inside* government. *Globalization* thus weakens the *security dilemma* and frees citizens from the fear of sudden attack from *outsiders*. This is a profoundly *benign* effect of *globalization*.

The time horizon

Similar to the notion of the *security dilemma*, the notion of the *time horizon* is less frequently discussed. Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961) have developed a six dimensional categorization of cultures. One of their dimensions addresses the *orientation towards the flow of time*, namely the future, the past or the present. In a culture that emphasizes the past,

according to the authors, innovation is more difficult, while societies that look into the future evaluate new plans according to their potential to improve the future. The authors relate the story of an American and a Bahraini coming to a restaurant where they find a sign saying that the kitchen will be closed for the coming six months. The American reacts with anger while the Bahraini says: "We have lived without this kitchen for thousands of years, we will also survive the next six months without it!"

There are many examples to be drawn from daily life. Alabama, previously among the poorest states in the United States, has benefited greatly from the long time horizon put forward by David Bronner. David Bronner manages the Alabama's teacher retirement fund. In the course of the past years he invested the teacher's contributions paid into this fund in ways that were designed to secure long-term revenue and secure pensions for those teachers. In the course of doing so, the economy of Alabama has profited greatly from these investments. In a program on German television (April 2, 2003[120]) that lamented the sad state of German pension security, Bronner explained that politicians, with their short time horizon, have to be kept out of the business of caring for long-term goals such as pensions.

And clearly, Bronner puts his finger on a sore place in the model of democracy. The electorate has an interest to elect politicians who care for the long-term future of society. However, politicians themselves may not wish to put forward difficult long-term plans that risk to be greeted with short-term defeat at the polls. The electorate may thus be exposed to politicians who misinform them as to the electorate's own long-term interest, and politicians would be at the source of this misinformation merely in order to be elected again. Only a strong, educated, and well-informed electorate can withstand this dangerous trap inbuilt in democracy. It is a trap connected to the time horizon.

A long-term future time horizon seems to be more beneficial for human kind than a short one. An entrepreneur who cuts down the trees of the rain forest, the lungs of the globe, has a short-term interest of earning money with these trees; however, he has also the long-term interest that his grand-children should find a world worth living in. Players in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may have a short-term interest in retaliation, whoever they all have a long-term interest in building a world that provides peace and welfare to their children.

Thus, many conflicts merely "dissolve," as soon as people switch to long-term future time horizons. The reason is that there is ample common ground as soon as we enter the floor of long-term interest projected into the future. Divisions dissolve. We all want to give a world to our children that they can enjoy. Therefore, a central element in any conflict resolution effort is to turn the hearts and minds of the players towards long-term time horizons into the future.

> When serious problems or crises arise, constituent groups normally look to their leaders to address them in a timely fashion. However, many of the social, economic, and political problems leaders face today are complex matters where information is scarce or contradictory and require considerable time for effective analysis, planning, and implementation. Furthermore, these problems typically occur in a context where there are multiple problems demanding attention, which may or may not be related. Thus, leaders are often driven (and rewarded) to suggest quick solutions to problems that insufficiently address the roots of the

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[120] ARD, Das Märchen von den sicheren Renten.

problem (Welsh and Coleman, 2002) (Coleman, 2003, p. 16).

We may conclude this subsection by making a note that long-term orientations, projected into the future provide common ground and are more *benign* than short-term orientations or orientations projected into the past, and that *globalization* processes, or more precisely, the technological advances that coalesce with and drive *globalization*, may represent a push towards such *benign* long-term orientations whenever they help bringing long-term processes to public awareness. Research on climate is an example. Democracy, with its inbuilt short-term horizon for politicians, is only *benign* as long as a strong civil society counteracts this short-term outlook and safeguards long-term future orientations.

Social identity

Social identity is defined in Table 4 as entailing the problem of humiliation that becomes the most significant creator of rifts within social relationships at all levels when people get closer and take human rights as relevant framework. Angry outflows of feelings of humiliation can be so devastating that they lead to violence even in cases where the other *logics* would indicate cooperation. Humiliation can introduce devastatingly *malign* elements into otherwise *benign* processes.

Four logics

Table 4 displays the four basic *logics* that may have guided the way in which humankind has developed *cultures* of *pride* (1), *honor* (2), and *dignity* (3), and (4) the particular manner in which each of them deals with humiliation. Table 4 is based on the reflection that, about 10,000 years ago, a humankind of *pristine pride* confronted a dramatic alteration in the core *logics* that define human lives – suddenly abundant pies turned into fixed ones – and humankind responded with developing a completely new moral ethos and emotional coinage, namely the *honor coinage* that legitimizes the vertical scale of human value and worth. Present change corresponds with the development of yet another, completely new and initially extremely disruptive ethos and emotional coinage, namely that of *equal dignity*. Post-modern knowledge society starts to transform the fixed pie of resources into an expandable pie again – the "second round" of *globalization* invites humankind into *One single ingroup*. The *security dilemma* weakens and long-term thinking seeps in. This development de-legitimizes practices of *putting and holding down*.

The Human Condition

		The Time Horizon		Social Identity	
		Short, or long past	**Long future**	**Respect**	**humiliation**
The Pie	**Fixed**	(2)			(2)
	Expandable		(1,3)	(1,3)	
The Security Dilemma	**Strong**	(2)			(2)
	Weak		(1,3)	(1,3)	

Table 4: The Human condition (adapted from Lindner, 2001g, p. 439)

Lindner wrote (2001),

> The most benign scenario is a combination of weak Security Dilemma, expandable pie, long time horizon, and an atmosphere of respect. Conversely, the worst scenario brings together a short time horizon, positioned in an environment that represents a fixed pie of resources, combined with a strong Security Dilemma, within which individuals or groups are exposed to humiliating assaults. As already mentioned, feelings of humiliation and their consequences may be so strong that they override and undermine otherwise 'benign' scenarios, in a downward spiral. This model of the human condition may be instrumental to analysing social change over long time stretches and in different world regions, as well as aid future strategy planning for governments and international organisations. It indicates that the destructive nature of the dynamics of humiliation becomes the more visible the more the other parameters veer to the benign side (Lindner, 2001g, p. 439).

Clashes of humiliations

In what way is *globalization* bringing humiliation to the fore? Will we in the future experience not *clashes of civilizations*,[121] but c*lashes of humiliations*?

The notion of a *clash of civilizations* is founded on a framing of the world that assumes that *villages* develop in considerable distance, each one on its own. Cultural difference is seen as having a firm basis in "real" differences in the shared belief systems of the cultures we look at; one culture is adapted to the mountains, others are fishermen, and again others are traders. "Cultures" are theorized as "containers" with more or less opaque walls, as the result of diverse environments and diverse cultural belief systems in human groups that have developed in isolation.

> We make a small allowance for "diffusion," meaning that cultures usually are in contact with each other and learn from each other, but this allowance does not alter the basic concept of cultures as isolated "containers."[122] Post-modern thought turns this view into its very foundation and assumes that different cultures are fundamentally impenetrable, unknowable, and enigmatic to each other (Lindner, 2000d, p. 12).

As long as we perceive cultural difference as fundamentally impenetrable, unknowable, and enigmatic, there is not much we can do in case cultures clash, except protect ourselves against attacks by building walls, fences, and defense armor. We may seek to respect diversity and respect difference and hope to thus minimize potential hostility from "other" cultures; however respect has its limits when others shoot at us. Then we are back to building fences.

I propose that the picture may be more complex and at the same time more hope-inspiring than that. What if *culture difference* is much more relational than the *diffusion hypothesis*[123] and also *post-modern thought* wants to have it? What if *culture difference* may at times not be an act, but a re-action? What if culture difference often is a *device* brought forward when relations turn sour and one side wants to cash in on respect (either in form of *respect for hierarchy*, or in form of *respect for equality*)?

During my fieldwork in 1998 and 1999 in Somalia and Rwanda I came in close

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[121] Huntington, 1996.

[122] See Triandis, 1997, for *Cultural and Social Behavior*.

[123] meaning that cultural realms are in contact with each other and learn from each other.

contact with these dynamics. When Somalia became independent in 1960 a dream existed, the dream of a united Somalia. The colonial powers had split the Somalian people five ways even though ethnic Somalis are united by language, cultural, and devotion to Islam. "Most other African countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification" (Mazrui, 1986, 71).[124]

Today Somalia is a deeply divided country, war-torn for more than a decade, full of bitterness and suffering. "Somaliland" in the North is self-proclaimed and not recognized by the international community or by other Somali leaders. During my fieldwork in 1998 in Somaliland I was beleaguered by Somalilanders who urged me to promote their dream to become an internationally recognized independent republic. They argue that they had been humiliated to such a degree by former dictator Siad Barre and his allies, Somali clans from the south, that they were no longer able to be part of a united Somalia. They insisted that the "cultural differences" between them and the other Somalis are, after all, too significant.

Thus, feelings of humiliation on the side of the Somalilanders made them create a cultural rift and a new culture, namely the culture of Somalilanders. Where there was a dream of unification before, and the notion that "we all are brothers," suddenly there are no brothers anymore, but the wish to be apart. Culture difference, and deep rifts justified by this difference, can thus be constructed in response to humiliation.

In Rwanda the situation presented itself to me different and similar at the same time. A Tutsi minority ruled both Rwanda and Burundi for centuries. The Hutu majority had been the humiliated victim as long as they could think, incorporated into an intricate hierarchical culture under a Tutsi aristocracy who perceived themselves not as dominating, but as caring patrons of their Hutu underlings. The Hutu majority started moving towards power in 1959, still under Belgian colonial rule. After independence the Hutu majority dominated Rwanda (contrary to the neighbor Burundi, where Tutsi rule stayed on after independence). Under Hutu rule the Tutsi minority in Rwanda, the former ruling elite, suffered constant humiliation, and those who had fled the country and lived as refugees in neighboring states where not much better off.

When I arrived in Rwanda early 1999, I was struck by the fact that the country has no history that is accepted by everyone. People with strong Tutsi background will maintain that their century-old minority rule was very beneficial to the country and still is. After all, they say, the Hutu perpetrated the genocide and tried to eradicate the Tutsi, an atrocity unheard of under centuries of Tutsi rule. People with strong Hutu background, on the contrary, will maintain that Tutsi rule never was that benevolent as Tutsi want to have it today, but that the Tutsi elite tries to imagine that they were good patrons in order to justify their domination of the country.

Thus, feelings of humiliation on the Hutu side made them create a "culture" of their own, including a "history" of their own. They do not want to be part of a culture that is defined by their dominators, the Tutsi. On the other side, the Tutsi, appalled by this defection, insist that there is only one culture, including satisfied Hutu underlings.

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[124] "There was during the colonial period a British Somaliland, an Italian Somaliland, and a French Somaliland. A section of the Somali people was also absorbed separately into Kenya under British colonial rule. The fifth component became the Ogaden, a section of Ethiopia. The dream of independence for the Somali was in part a dream of reunification" (Mazrui, 1986, p. 71).

Hutu attempt to express their opposition to this view by creating their separate culture, which, in turn, can be instrumentalized as validation for why there can be no peace. Wherever there is a clash between both groups, it would more precisely be described as a *clash between humiliations* than a *clash between cultures*.

Not only Somalia and Rwanda, countless other examples show how easily feelings of humiliation can lead to divisions. Apparently, what happens, is that people say, "I do not want to be part of a people and a culture that painfully humiliates me and violates my dignity. I therefore shape a separate identity, be it personal, cultural or national." Liah Greenfeld uses the example of Ethiopia and Eritrea and suggests that ressentiment plays a central role in nation building (Greenfeld, 1992; Greenfeld, 1996).[125] Thus, we may expect that humiliation, as soon as it occurs, helps create and construct rifts and difference, cultural or national, difference that was not there before. As discussed before, the danger for this to occur is perhaps most salient in cases where there is a dream of unity. Somalia had a dream of unity, Rwanda still has. The *global village* has a dream of unity. Protest against humiliation may thus express itself through the formation of separate cultures within the global village. In case those cultures clash, such clashes would best be described as *clashes of humiliations*.

   To round up this section, I suggest that *globalization* entails a *benign* push towards a weaker *security dilemma*, and an expandable size of the pie, and that the "retreat" of these two *logics* into the background, gives social identity a chance to come to the fore. This happens the more the first two *logics* get more *benign*. In an environment where the *security dilemma* is strong, everybody is afraid that outsiders will attack with even more armory, and will therefore expand their defense; and this fear will overrule the rest of possible choices and force people into strong tribal loyalties and deep demarcation lines. When the *security dilemma* weakens in the course of increasing global interdependence, there are less tribal loyalties based on this dilemma, and more tribal loyalties, if they occur, caused by processes of humiliation. Personal, cultural and national identities and hostilities will no longer be constructed out of the fear flowing from the *security dilemma*, but out of humiliation. Thus, the *benign* effect of a weaker security dilemma is prone to be undermined by the *malign* effects flowing from humiliation.

   Current Iraq demonstrates this dynamic. Arab youth may want to watch American films and happily wear Jeans. However, being invaded, and perceiving this as an illegitimate humiliation, may shape an anti-American national identity that never existed before in this acute form. This, in turn, is bound to elicit disappointment on the part of American liberators; they may feel equally humiliated in their noble mission of freeing Iraqis from a despot. They may feel that the ideals underlying Western civilization are being trampled on and that the liberated are not thankful enough. What started as *liberation* may thus end in *clashes of humiliation*.

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[125] Read on the *dynamics of secession*, also Hechter, 1992.

Come in! How globalization can dignify women[126]

"Women should become more active in the public sphere." How did such a demand enter modern Western thought? Just some hundreds of years ago such ideas were unthinkable for the majority of both men and women. What has happened? Was it that men in former times denied women their due participation, women being too weak to defend themselves? Are women stronger today? If yes, then why?

The domestic and the public sphere

I should first describe how I define the traditional roles of men and women. To do this I rename what usually is called the *domestic* sphere in *inside* sphere and *public* sphere in *outside* sphere. Women are traditionally responsible for *inside* maintenance (maintenance of the physical and social inside aspects), while men are traditionally responsible for the *outside* and for guarding the frontier between *inside* and *outside*, thus making the *inside* a safer place.

Women in their traditional role are expected to maintain a household, to wash and clean, to repair what is broken, to plan for long-term maintenance costs, to consider the interdependence of things for keeping a household going – all for the maintenance of a physical *inside* sphere. The same principle applies to the social *inside* sphere; a woman is expected to care for the well-being of the people surrounding her, she is held responsible for the maintenance of emotional and social life, she is the one to create harmony and console the distressed, she is the one to heal and repair social cohesion.

The man is expected to *go out*, to reach for the unknown, to be daring in conquering the unfamiliar; he is traditionally expected to risk his life in defending the *inside* sphere. A German saying asserts: "Der Mann geht hinaus in das feindliche Leben" or "The man is to go out into hostile life." Countless fairy tales tell the story of a hero facing a series of increasingly difficult tasks in far away universes in order to prepare himself for marrying the princess and be the ruler and protector of his people.

Arne came to me because he did not know what to do with his wife. Arne is a Norwegian with American ties who got recently married to a Mexican girl.

"You know, when I met Maria nine months ago she was an energetic young woman, beautiful and radiant. She was working in a shop. We furiously fell in love and quite quickly decided to marry. And we did. It was wonderful. I was more than happy.

But, you don't guess what Maria did! The day we got married she quit her job and started waiting for me at home. She passed her days with making our flat cozy and watching TV. When I came home in the evening, tired and worn out from work, she expected that life should start; after all she had waited for me all day. I, on the other hand, was exhausted.

At some point, I asked her why she had given up her job without discussing it with me first. She was deeply insulted by this question. We hardly speak with each other now. She says she feels unbearably humiliated in her womanhood and whether I do not want to provide for her. She accuses me that all I want is playing around and letting the woman feed both children and men like in the neighboring black communities.

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[126] This section is adapted from Lindner, 1999d.

> I tried to explain to her that the problem is not that I want to exploit her money and be a playboy. I do want to provide for her if necessary. The problem is entirely different. I cannot have a wife at home who has no life on her own except me. I can't. I will have to have a divorce if she does not understand that! What shall I do?"

Maria is firmly anchored in a world where males are sent *out* and females care for home and stay *inside*. Indeed, females in most societies in the course of human history were the ones asked to nurture the next generation, while males were put to the task of protecting the present generation. There are few examples of women soldiers to be found in the course of history. For long stretches of the human past, the script was that males were responsible for short-term emergency and women for long-term maintenance. In Africa, this gendered "division of labor" is in some places to be observed in particularly pure forms. Men proudly hold themselves ready for war in coffee houses, while women humbly care for crops and children.

If we were to look for reasons behind this kind of "division of labor" there is, of course, the undeniable fact that men can beget more children and do this faster than women. A community that in the past would have systematically constructed a culture that sends out women into combat and not men would thus have had good chances to die out. It is more fitting to let males "do the dying;" they are "redundant" so-to-speak at an earlier age than women, seen from the point of population politics.

Emergency trumps maintenance

As soon as a community has decided to use males for defense, male dominance is almost not avertable. Because emergency trumps maintenance. Even our body informs us thus. When in danger, adrenaline is poured into the blood stream and pushes the maintenance tasks of the body into the background. Maintenance is secondary to emergency. Thus, males can soundly claim a superior place in society as long as they are the ones caring for emergency, and women can but agree.

However, there is a price to pay. Continuous stress causes the body to fail; the body breaks down because maintenance is neglected under conditions of constant emergency. Heart attacks are the result – heart attack being the typical emergency trouble shooter disease. Equally, a world under the grip of the necessity of continuous male prowess is bound to live in constant danger of collapse, too. Such a setting is a potentially *malign* setting.

"Male" emergency tasks are traditionally being designed in a less holistic fashion than "female" tasks. Male tasks pride themselves of the sword cutting through, the axe destroying the enemy, even if this means destroying a highly intricate network. Males historically were the ones to cover distances unidirectionally on a horse, on a ship, in an airplane or in a rocket; males were the ones to open new horizons. This male action indeed bore valuable fruit during human history, called modern technology. However, it also created long-term problems, since this mindset tends to overlook the fragile interdependence of physical laws and the need to maintain this balance.

Mapped onto *globalization*, we see a *benign* effect flowing from the coming-into-being of *One global village*. Since emergency, fear, stress, and the need to send out people to defend borders rises and wanes together with the strength of the security dilemma, all this wanes when the *security dilemma* weakens. And indeed it weakens under conditions of only *One single village*, because attacks from *outside* that call for male military action, disappear. The only attacks still to be policed, by women and men together, are those from *inside*. The coming-into-being of *One single village*

takes thus away continuous emergency and stress, and instead gives room to proper maintenance.

Thus *globalization* potentially saves the world from "cardiac failure." It cuts back on the need for a culture of male dominance that characterized humankind almost everywhere on the globe for the past 10,000 years, a culture that neglects proper maintenance. In the *global village*, both, females and males are invited to concentrate on maintenance and cautiously planned exploration of new horizons, rather than emergency. Both, females and males are invited to become mature adults; women are encouraged to discontinue huddling under male protection like children, while males are encouraged to undo overdone self-confidence that they were bound to develop as long as they had to appear as credible protectors.

No bias

Clearly, some delineations presented here are drawn overly stark, in order to make the conceptual categories clearer. Women and men are not irreconcilably different by nature, although, as mentioned, there are undoubtedly hormonal and physical differences between the two sexes. Yet, still, a woman can step into a male role and vice versa. When I talk about female or male roles, I therefore refer to them as a set of culturally determined *recipes* or *prescriptions* or *templates*. I see those roles as sets of *how-to-do* and *how-to-be* rules, which are assimilated from birth by every individual.

Though men usually were the warriors and explorers, and not women, men did not only conquer the unknown as warriors, explorers or discoverers. Men were farmers, too, and cared for the maintenance of cycles and networks as women did. Trade especially combines "male" and "female" role patterns, since it requires going out into the unknown to find new products and clients, but after having established new trade connections it subsequently requires their maintenance.

Thus, I do not wish to condone any bias, not that women are better people, nor men. Positive bias would be as misplaced as negative bias. The two gender role *templates* offer tools for both construction and destruction. We can concede that there nowadays is an urgent need for the more "female" holistic thinking, on the ecological and on the social level. Respecting biological cycles and caring for social peace are notions which are currently gaining ever increasing importance. On the other hand, one should not overlook the fact that unidirectional thinking can be an important tool for, for example, innovation; admittedly it can be destructive, but it can also be constructive.

Furthermore, there is the *cleaning* aspect (see work on *Purity and Danger* by Douglas, 1984a, Douglas, 1984b) entailed in the "female" maintenance tasks. This cleaning aspect can be extremely destructive, especially when it bases itself on the concept of an *outside* sphere around it. Not only at the ecological level, cleaning can go too far, as can be seen, for example, when women wash clothes white with heavily polluting agents. Also on the social level, this cleaning aspect offers the conceptual framework for damage, destruction and even atrocities. One has just to think of ethnic *cleansing*. With the metaphor that something needs to be *thrown out* from *inside* into some kind of *black hole* that is imagined *outside*, environmental and social atrocities can be "justified" and incited.[127]

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[127] Barrington Moore (2000) explains that people persecute those whom they perceive as polluting due to their "impure" religious, political, or economic ideas (Moore, Jr., 2000).

The German army was involved in ethnic cleansing during the Second World War, but tried to deny this involvement since for a soldier this is not a "male" enough task. Soldiers typically are entitled to be proud of a war against an attacking enemy, and wear medals afterwards, but not of ethnic cleansing. Killing defenseless people smacks of "female" cleaning activity and thereby lack of bravery. In an attempted justification, the killing of Jews in concentration camps was equated with having to eradicate "dirt" or "pests" like rats or weeds, something which the SS were persuaded to do as an unavoidable although "mean" and not very honorable duty in order to save the German race (see, for example, Heinrich Himmler's speeches).

Women agreed

Ahmed came to me as a client because it was too much of a burden for him to take care of his sisters. He came from a middle class family in Cairo. He had five sisters, all older than him. Traditionally, it is the task of a son to step into his father's shoes as protector of the family. As a psychologist I witnessed many cases, where this was extremely successful. Foreign wives, married to Egyptians, were at a disadvantage not least because they had no family that was willing to intervene in family disputes. Western parents and siblings would regard such problems as "private problems." Not so in Egypt. A system of family mediation is in place that in many cases very effectively solves family disruptions. However, Ahmed happened to be overburdened by this task because of the mishap of being born subsequent to five sisters. He explained:

"Can you imagine how difficult it is for me to take care of five sisters? One is married in Turkey and another one in the United States. As you know, it is my task to mediate in marriage quarrels. Can you imagine how much time and money I spend on that? And alongside with this burden, I have my own family! I am so worn out that I sometimes do nothing but watch television for hours. I don't know how this can continue!

I think the reason for why I am so exhausted is that I was not nurtured enough when I was a child. When I was small, I was told that I had to be tough because I was a male and had to take care of a large family. I had to be fearless because I needed to die for the family in war if necessary. Apart from that, I had to learn to be tough much earlier than others, because all my sisters are older than me and I had to learn to match them as fast as possible. My mother was extremely hard with me. She always made it clear to me that I had no time for play because of the great responsibilities that were waiting for me.

You know, being the protector of the family means that you are treated with deference. My father wished to eat together with the family, however, my mother insisted that the father has to eat first, together with his son, and only when he has finished, my mother and her daughters would come to the table and eat the rest. It was my mother who wished to mark her husband's primacy, not he himself. I have abolished this practice; I am eating together with my wife and my two little children. What I receive, however, is always the best piece of meat and the best of all."

Ahmed's story illustrates in which way care and protection can be combined in the male role and how male primacy may be linked to his role to stand in for his family in emergencies. Ahmed's story highlights furthermore how this order of things can be enforced by women, not only by men. Ahmed's story underlines that women cannot simply be described as the powerless and thereby inherently "good" creatures and that

"all problems [will] cease when the powerless achieve power" (Ashford, 1994, p. 253).

Ahmed's story shows that male supremacy has an anchoring in reality as long as the *security dilemma* forces emergencies onto humankind for which people are needed who will step in as defenders and protectors. Since males are sent out to die, and since emergency trumps maintenance, as a logical consequence the male sphere trumps the female sphere. An overdose of emergency leads society to neglect "female" maintenance tasks and thus easily leads to social "vascular disease." However, as long as the *security dilemma* is strong, both women and men have no choice but keeping up defenses. Only when the *security dilemma* weakens, this state of affairs can be changed.

We could conclude this subsection by noting that *globalization*, or *the coming-into-being of One single global village*, has a *benign* effect on the human condition insofar as it weakens the danger of *outside* attack. Thus humankind, men and woman in teamwork, can rather set their minds on high-quality *inside* maintenance.

The global village as One single inside sphere

As discussed before, *globalization* shrinks distances and gives us the *global village*. During history, women could usually move relatively freely inside a village; she would not venture out of her village walls, where plunderers and bandits waited. Indeed, *globalization* slowly, in the course of years, dissolves old village walls, and thus increasingly gives *One single inside* sphere to women. There are even female astronauts today. When we accept that women traditionally are responsible for *inside* spheres, then this means that the woman's sphere has grown and is still growing through the coming-into-being of a *global village*.

This development is bound to create an ever-increasing demand for traditional "female" services, and indeed, this is what we observe. Negotiation is called for, instead of military attack, mediation instead of dictatorial order, and social maintenance through an intricate network of courts, lawyers and police, instead of a unidirectional system of sheer military force.

Good maintenance work is currently in the process of acquiring a higher status virtually in all segments of society. Management courses nowadays try to train managers to understand the importance of "soft" human factors such as motivation, job satisfaction, cooperation abilities, and creative problem-solving. Well-balanced "female-type" cooperation is advocated today on all levels, from small companies to the United Nations, while the army-like "male" hierarchical order is considered out-of-date. Wild-West-pioneering-style is appropriate for films, but not anymore for real life. Traditional female role characteristics are gaining ground on a global scale.

However, cultural change is not necessarily quick or homogenous. Since the ranking of the male over the female sphere had been poured into cultural beliefs for centuries, it possesses a tenacity of its own. Even while male supremacy starts losing its anchoring in the logic of reality as the *security dilemma* weakens, practices do not necessarily follow suit at once.

At some point, gaps become apparent. Women no longer cheer at men in uniform; they no longer feel protected by supreme males, but humiliated. They ask fellow men and women to understand that traditional rankings of male over female spheres are no longer practical and legitimate and to be abandoned so as to respect equal human dignity. They feel humiliated by those men and women who still adhere to the old order of male supremacy, by those who do not fast enough understand that change is

unavoidable in a new world of new *logics*.

To conclude this section, *globalization* plays a central role in the gender debate because *globalization* undermines traditional gender roles and the need to prioritize male tasks. *Globalization* widens the traditional female *inside* sphere and narrows the traditional male public sphere, and *globalization* removes the male domain of tackling emergency threats from *outside*. Humankind as a whole benefits, because continuous focusing on emergency tasks leads to neglect of maintenance and risks collapse.

In other words, women and men may not have to always fight for change; change is taking place alongside with *globalization*. *Globalization* entails *benign* pushes for humankind, both for women and men and for gendered role descriptions. Only the sluggishness of change, the slowness of some players grasping new realities, introduces malign influences. Newly empowered women feel humiliated by outdated old-fashioned male dominance. Emerging feelings of humiliation may tempt some women to erect "female culture" as being different from "male culture," thus substituting demarcation lines *born out of the security dilemma* with demarcation lines *born out of humiliation*. *Clashes of female/male humiliation* would be the result, representing a *malign* outfall.

To round up the entire chapter, the attempt has been made to investigate *globalization*, or, more precisely, the *coming-into-being of One single global village*, and identify *benign* and *malign* outfalls. The analysis indicates that *globalization* carries profoundly *benign* pushes. Among them is the disappearance of *outside* spheres with their attached security dilemma. Global society can concentrate on *inside* maintenance tasks and discontinue prioritizing *outside* emergencies and having males sacrifice their lives for it. Furthermore, the *widening* of the *inside* sphere opens up new space for women and invites men and women into coalescing formerly separate gender role descriptions and gender role rankings. And, not last knowledge, as an ever expandable pie of resources and driver of *globalization*, renders rather *benign* win-win contexts.

However, *malign* influences threaten to undermine otherwise *benign* tendencies. *Malign* influences are largely connected with the phenomenon of humiliation. Use of outdated terminologies, for example, may elicit feelings of humiliation on behalf of humanity. And observing lacking ecological humility provides fertile ground for dynamics of humiliation. Feelings of humiliation are furthermore elicited when promises are made that are not kept, or at least not fast enough; human rights advocacy, for example, figures large as promise – yet betrayed.

Feelings of humiliation are triggered when transitions towards new concepts are unstable, slow and inhomogeneous, because they risk putting old and new ideas at loggerhead. Some people are ahead, some people lag behind or are seen as lagging behind, and both may turn against each other. As soon as feelings of humiliation gain ground, they may be used to construct demarcation lines and rifts that were not there before and thus lead to *malign clashes of humiliation* in a *global village* that basically wishes nothing more but unite in peace and provide a sustainable future for *our* children.

The following chapter will discuss in which way humankind may envisage the structure of the future *global village*.

Reading related to this chapter
Relevant for research on humiliation are historical dimensions of psychology and psychological research, as well as its epistemological anchoring. Kurt Danziger (1990) and his classic book *Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of*

Psychological Research[128] may be mentioned, and, for example, Kenneth J. Gergen (1999) with articles such as "Agency – Social Construction and Relational Action."[129] A. P. Craig (1999) in "What Is It That One Knows When One Knows 'Psychology?'"[130] advocates a "continuous interplay between stories and science because, in this way, we are better able to account for and configure who we are and how to live" (Abstract). See also Stam and Egger (1997) "On the Possibilities of a Narrative psychology" in *Paul Ricoeur and Narrative.*[131] Paul Ricoeur is indeed listened to, not least in Rwanda. His article, "Le pardon peut-il guerir? [Can pardon heal?]" (Ricoeur, 1995), has been reprinted in the Rwandan journal *Dialogue, Revue d'information et de réflexion* where his article serves as the opening article in the journal's special issue *Two Years After the Genocide.*

Read furthermore on the *globalization of world politics*,[132] *scope of justice* and *moral exclusion*,[133] on *social identity theory*,[134] on *terror management theory*,[135] on

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[128] Danziger, 1990.

[129] Gergen, 1999.

[130] Craig, 1999.

[131] Stam and Egger, 1997.

[132] Read, for example, Baylis and Smith (Eds.), 1997.

[133] Susan Opotow (1995) defines the *scope of justice* as "a psychological boundary for fairness . . . within which concerns with justice and moral rules govern our conduct" (Opotow, 1995, p. 347). See furthermore, among many others, LeVine and Campbell, 1971. "Moral exclusion refers to: Who is and is not entitled to fair outcomes and fair treatment by inclusion or lack of inclusion in one's moral community? Albert Schweitzer included all living creatures in his moral community, and some Buddhists include all of nature. Most of us define a more limited moral community" (Deutsch, 2002, p. 10).

[134] Tajfel's (1981) *social identity theory* proposes that the social part of our identity derives from the groups to which we belong. He suggests that we, by favoring attributes of our own groups over those of outgroups, acquire a positive sense of who we are and an understanding of how we should act toward ingroup and outgroup members. See Tajfel, 1981, Tajfel, Fraser, and Jaspars, 1984, Tajfel and Turner, 1986. See for more literature, for example, Billig, 1976, Billig, 1987, Billig et al., 1988, Billig, 1991, Billig, 1995, Billig, 1996, Howitt and Billig, 1989, and Tajfel (Ed.), 1978, Tajfel et al., 1971, Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel and Minority Rights Group, 1978, Tajfel, Fraser, and Jaspars, 1984, Turner, 1982.

[135] *Terror Management theory* (TMT, see Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 1991, Greenberg et al., 1995, Arndt et al., 1999, Goldenberg et al., 2001) originates from the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (Becker, 1962, Becker, 1973). Becker describes humans as "unique from other creatures in that through highly developed intellectual abilities, we are cognizant of the inevitability of our demise, yet we maintain an enduring instinct for self-preservation. According to Becker (1973), the result of this conflict is paralyzing terror unless methods are utilized to manage this predicament. TMT contends that our species uses the same advanced cognitive abilities that afford the awareness of unavoidable death to create and participate in culture as a means of managing this existential terror" (quoted from http://web.uccs.edu/gwarnica/tmt_research.htm).

stereotyping,[136] on *outgroup contact*,[137] on *social cohesion*,[138] how to find out that the Earth's surface is *curved*,[139] since when *experts know* that the Earth's surface indeed is curved,[140] on who promoted a *flat-Earth model*,[141] on the ecological dangers

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[136] See, among many others, Campbell, 1967.

[137] "Personal values are related to integrative behavioral orientations. Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995, found that readiness for outgroup social contact was connected positively to his value domains of universalism and self-direction, but negatively to tradition, security, and conformity for the dominant Jewish group, but to the value domain of achievement for the subordinate Arab group in Israel. This finding suggests that the motives regulating outgroup contact differ depending on the group's position in the social hierarchy…Few studies have been done relating personality to integrative orientations across group lines. One suggestive finding comes from the work on attitudes towards global culture done by Fong, 1996. He found that self-ratings on adjectival personality measures of openness and assertiveness positively predicted endorsements of this general constellation of attitudes, including the integrative facets of humanism, global welfare, and gender equality. Again, the important role of openness to experience found in the section on divisive orientations is underscored by its reappearance in this section…People high on concern for others in particular and empathy in general show lower social dominance orientations, as do those high on Katz and Hass, 1988, Humanitarian-Egalitarian scale (Pratto et al., 1994). Lower SDO scores may be taken as a preference for lesser inequality among social groups, a probable unifying social feature in social groups (Wilkinson, 1996)" (Bond, 1998, I quote from a personal message from the author, where he attached the text of this paper). As to the ills flowing from inequality, see also Wilkinson, Kawachi, and Kennedy, 1998. See furthermore Pettigrew, 1998.

[138] Morton Deutsch (2002) stipulates that groups become *cohesive* by formulating and working together on issues that are *specific*, *immediate*, and *realizable* (Deutsch, 2002, see also Deutsch, 1973). See also Hechter, 1990, on the *emergence of cooperative solidarity* and Gaertner et al., 1994, on the *reduction* of *intergroup bias*. Colletta and Cullen, 2000, provide a definition of social cohesion that combines the absence and presence of certain features; the absence of latent conflict (absence of inequalities, tensions, disparities or polarizations), and the presence of redundant relations bridging social divisions and institutions of conflict management (functioning democracy with independent judiciary and media). I thank Elizabeth Scheper for making me aware of this literature.

[139] Not everybody was clever enough to figure out that the Earth's surface is curved from observing a lunar eclipse. A lunar eclipse occurs when, in the course of their regular orbits, the Moon, Earth and Sun happen to line up in a nearly straight line. The Earth casts a shadow on the Moon, which darkens because the Earth blocks the light from the Sun.

[140] Contrary to the lay-person, experts did know that the Earth is a sphere. The sphericity of Earth was known to the Greeks long before 300 B.C. When we read Aristotle's (384-322 B.C.) summary of old knowledge we understand that he was aware that the Earth is round. Not only did ancient and medieval astronomers know the shape of the Earth, they also knew the approximate size of the Earth. Eratosthenes was the head librarian at the famous Library of Alexandria, and his excellent and famous measurement of Earth's circumference dates from 250 B.C. or so, long before Ptolemy's time. Augustine of Hippo (354-430), a famous Christian church father, knew that the Earth is round, not flat, too. And in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the prolific medieval Christian theologian, teaches that the spherical shape of the Earth can be empirically demonstrated.

[141] A flat-Earth model was promoted by personalities such as the African Lactantius (AD 245–325), a professional rhetorician, who converted to Christianity and rejected all Greek philosophy, including the spherical Earth-model. Church fathers condemned this as heresy, yet, in the Renaissance his writings were unearthed again, because of his good Latin, and thus his flat-Earth view was revived. There was also Cosmas Indicopleustes, a sixth century Eastern Greek Christian, who suggested a flat Earth stretched out beneath the heavens that consisted of a rectangular vaulted arch. Also his work was rejected by the church fathers.

threatening planet Earth,[142] on how *win-win situations bring people together*,[143] on *relative deprivation* and *causal attribution*,[144] on *sacrifice* and when it is deemed worth it,[145] on *genocide* and *ethnic cleansing*,[146] on *game theory in relation to political theory*,[147] on the *security dilemma*,[148] on the *diffusion hypothesis*,[149] on *gender and space*,[150] on *division of labor*,[151] on *female revolt*,[152] on the *relationship between social construction and biological facts* as, for example, with regard to *gender differences*,[153] *causes* of *war* and *violence*,[154] on *ethnic conflict*,[155] on

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[142] Read, for example, Mitchell, 1991, *World on Fire*. However, the amount of available literature is overwhelming.

[143] See, for example, Gaertner et al., 1994, Dovidio and Gaertner, 1993, Gaertner and Dovidio, 1999, Gaertner et al., 1999, Gaertner, Sedikides, and Graetz, 1999.

[144] Apart from Heider, 1958, Kelley, 1973, and Walker and Pettigrew, 1984, see also Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan, 1999, Crosby, Muehrer, and Loewenstein, 1986, Fine et al., 2002, or Leach, Snider, and Iyer, 2002, just to name a few out of a large body of literature. Runciman, 1966, differentiates egoistic and fraternal deprivation. Egoistical deprivation arises when an individual feels disadvantaged relative to other individuals; fraternal deprivation occurs when a person feels his group is disadvantaged in relation to another group. Colletta and Cullen, 2000, make the argument that private investment increases social cohesion. However, this claim may be questioned. I thank Elizabeth E. Scheper for making me aware of this literature and the counter-argument. Investment may also lead to the opposite of social cohesion, particularly when investment creates inequalities that are perceived as illegitimate. In that case, investment could even lead to feelings of humiliation and resentment.

[145] See, for example Berger, 1976, *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change.*

[146] The literature on *genocide* and *ethnic cleansing* is vast. See, for example, Alvarez, 2001, Hassner, 1997.

[147] See, for example, Barley, 1991, Bell and Coplans, 1976, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992, Gert (Ed.), 1991, Hampton, 1986, Jehn and Weigelt, 1999, Morrow, 1994, O'Neill, 2001, Ordeshook, 1986, Rapoport (Ed.), 1974, Rapoport, 1960, Rapoport and Chammah, 1970, Ridley, 1996, Schmidtz, 1991, Tsebelis, 1990.

[148] See, among many others, Jervis, 1976, Jervis, 1978, Roe, 1999, Roe, 2000, Posen, 1993.

[149] meaning that cultural realms are in contact with each other and learn from each other.

[150] Read on *gender and space*, for example, Massey, 1994, Rose, 1993, Spain, 1992. I thank Nick Prior for making me aware of this literature.

[151] Read, for example, Durkheim, 1993.

[152] Read, among many others, for example, Chafetz, Dworkin, and Swanson, 1986.

[153] Clearly, the intertwined relationship between social construction and biological facts (and their construction) requires a more thorough discussion. Yet, it would take too much space here. See for masculine domination as patriarchy and male power, for example, *Men in the Public Eye: The Construction and Deconstruction of Public Men and Public Patriarchies* (Hearn, 1992).

[154] Read, among many others, Evera, 1999, Kagan, 1995; read on *scarcity* and violence, Homer-Dixon, 1999, and on *greed* and violence, Collier and Hoeffler, 2001.

[155] See, for example, Chirot and Seligman (Eds.), 2001, Crawford, 1998a, Crawford, 1998b, Esman, 1994, Gurr, 1993a, Kelman, 1997, LeVine and Campbell, 1972, Rotberg, 1996, Williams and Rhenisch, 1977.

masculinity, violence, and *war*,[156] on *genes, hormones* and *violence*,[157] on *citizen-soldiers* versus *manly warriors*,[158] on *militarism from a feminist point of view*,[159] and on *modern management and leadership* that considers "soft factors."[160]

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[156] See, for example, Allen, 1992, Breines, Connell, and Eide (Eds.), 2000, Brittan, 1989, Brod (Ed.), 1987, Connell, 1997, Connell, 1995, Connell, 1996, Goldstein, 2001, Hanmer, Hester, Kelly, and Radford (Eds.), 1996, Hooper, 2001, Kimmel, 1997, Kimmel, 2000, Kimmel, 1996, Messner, 1997, Morgan, 1992, Walby, 1990, Whitehead, 2002, Wrangham and Peterson, 1996, Zalewski and Parpat (Eds.), 1998. See also *The Men's Studies Bibliography* at <http://www.xyonline.net/mensbiblio/>.

[157] See, for example, Bernhardt, 1997, Caspi et al., 2002, Clark and Grunstein, 2000, Fuller and Thompson, 2003, Hamer and Copeland, 2000). The rate of men with two Y chromosomes as compared to one, which is normal, has been found to be nineteen times higher in prison than in the normal population (Hamer and Copeland, 2000). There is furthermore the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene to be considered, located on the X chromosome; genetic deficiencies in MAOA activity have been linked with aggression in mice and in humans. Then there is the gene to compose nitric oxide; when this gene was removed in mice, they became extremely aggressive. In nearly every experiment involving aggression, serotonin, dopamine, or norepinephrine are found to be related to increased aggression; high testosterone levels combined with low serotonin levels seem to be particularly salient.

[158] See, for example, Snyder, 2000.

[159] Militarism has been examined from a feminist point of view in, for example, *Women and War* (Elshtain, 1995). Jean Elshtain examines how the myths of *man* as *just warrior* and *woman* as *beautiful soul* are undermined by the reality of female bellicosity and sacrificial male love, as well as the moral imperatives of just wars. Cynthia Enloe investigates international politics and reveals the crucial role of women in implementing governmental foreign policies (Enloe, 1990, Enloe, 2000). International relations as a mirror to masculinity have been discussed, for example, by J. Ann Tickner. She examines the meaning of global security through a gender-sensitive lens (Tickner, 1992). V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan describe both women's roles in world politics and the impact of world politics on women's roles (Peterson, 1992a, Peterson and Runyan, 1993, Peterson, 1992b).

[160] See, for example, the work by Heifetz and Linsky, 2002. Heifetz distinguishes between *adaptive* and *technical* leadership problems, and cautions that a basic error in leadership is to treat adaptive problems as technical problems. He states that "Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behaviour" (Heifetz, 1994, p. 22). I thank Virginia Swain for making me aware of Heifetz's work.

Part II: How Does Humiliation Operate in the World and in Our Lives?

Egalization and Humiliation[161]

This chapter is intricately linked to the previous chapter that discusses *globalization* and humiliation. This chapter, on *egalization* and humiliation, is placed in Part II of the book and not Part I because *egalization* permeates our daily lives perhaps more than *globalization*. *Globalization* is powered by technology and how we use it, egalization is powered by us and our day-to-day moral sentiments and moral decisions. *Egalization* is about our relations with others and ourselves, it is about whether we deem it appropriate to look *up* or *down* on others and ourselves, or treat all as having equal dignity. *Egalization* is about whether we want to use fear as "glue" for coercive hierarchies, or if we want to live in creative networks that prefer mutual respect for equal dignity as "adhesive."

I would like to open this chapter by asking you what you do about your *nasty neighbor* whose dog shits on your doorstep. Do you call him *enemy*? I assume not. Even if you did, you would do so somewhat jokingly. You would never mean to go to conventional warfare against your neighbor and become a warlord. Or if you did, your neighbors would call the police. What you would do, instead, is try to *speak* to your neighbor, invite a *mediator* in, or go to the *police*. What I allude to here is that you are embedded within a so-called *social contract*.

Global democracy or global dictatorship? How the wrong sheriff can humiliate

The *social contract* has been discussed, for example, by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in *Leviathan* (Hobbes, 1651), or by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762)[162] became a text-book for the French Revolution and influenced the history of the entire Western world. Rousseau writes that all men [sic], though born free and equal, regard the state as a contract in which individuals, rather than surrendering their natural rights, agree to have them protected. He argues that individuals find their true being and freedom only in submission to the *general will* of the community. In *Emile, or on Education* (1762) Rousseau writes, "Since before choosing a king a people is a people, what made it a people, except the social contract? The social contract is therefore the foundation of all civil society, and it is in the nature of this act that we must seek the nature of the society formed by it" (Rousseau, 1762b, paragraph 1647).

The same line of thought is being described in various other terminologies. Political philosophy uses terms such as *collectivism* and *individualism*. Collectivism and individualism are seen as perhaps best balanced in a *social contract* that we call *social democracy*. All discussion on *democracy* and *capitalism* and how they could be calibrated indeed circle around the potential kinds of *social contracts* and which ones may be most beneficial.

But what is the use of a social contract? Why should we need it? We need it because of the *anarchic state of nature*. The collapse of law and order after the 2003 Iraq war shows to which degree *anarchy* can occur. Somalia, after exiling their dictator Siad Barre in 1991 remained lawless for ten years, and in many ways still is. Colombia currently has only one big objective, namely putting in place "Order!

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[161] This section is partly adapted from Lindner, 2002d.

[162] *Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique*, by Rousseau, 1762a.

Order! Order!" and the "Rule of Law!" to stem rampant social *chaos* (says Francisco Santos, Colombian Vice President, on May 12, 2003[163]).

In *Leviathan* (1962), Hobbes describes *life under conditions of anarchy* as "continual fear, and danger of violent death" where "the life of man [sic]" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes, 1651). Hobbes characterizes the *state of nature* as an utterly lawless state of affairs that cannot be remedied by a social contract that is merely agreed upon by its users. In Hobbes's view only unlimited political authority, preferably *absolute monarchy*, is strong enough. Citizens should voluntarily bow to a strong hand.

John Locke (1690), on the other hand, has another solution. He reminds his readers that even absolute monarchs are nothing more than human beings with all their weaknesses. Ultimate political authority, according to Locke, has therefore to be placed in the *will of the majority*. This majority will then entrust political power to governmental officials, under the condition that they work for the common good and can be removed if trust is violated.

To use traffic metaphor, the *anarchy* of the *state of nature* poses a problem. Under conditions of *anarchy*, big vehicles push the small ones out of the way at every cross-road. Small vehicles hardly have a chance and there is much upheaval due to continuous fighting.

Hobbes pledges for an *absolute authority* to decide how traffic should be regulated and to enforce these rules. He believes that only a very strong hand is able to control the emergence of usurpers of power who undermine calm and order.

Locke, on the other hand, thinks that it should be possible to sit together and decide all this collectively. Perhaps the *majority* could decide on a super-ordinate set of rules and have everybody bow in humility in front of it. And an abusive traffic police chief could be replaced by the vote of the majority of traffic participants. This is Locke's approach.

So, how shall law and order in the *global village* be maintained in the future? Apparently, we have two main candidates for solutions, Hobbes' or Locke's proposal. One version is *subjugation through an absolute world ruler*, the other is *global democracy*. Hobbes reflections suggest a global village with a clear top-down pyramid of power, while Locke rather would propose a global village of equal citizens.

Both set-ups may render stability and order. If Hobbes's strongman uses a sufficient amount of force, no underling dares breaking the law or instigating revolution. There will be quiet, either out of fear or out of lazy contentment. Saddam Hussein's draconian rule undoubtedly provided a certain degree of stability and order, even if only borne out of fright. And if Locke's majority vote is carried out sensibly, and the majority is not too unruly, there will be quiet as well. A draconian honor code may render calm and stability as much as a successfully applied dignity code.

Thorvald Stoltenberg, eminent Norwegian politician, explained (2000) the responses he receives, when he asks friends in Eastern Europe, why they voluntarily elect people from the old communist times. They reply with saying that if they have the choice between order and democracy, then they choose order, and if they have the choice between the free market and jobs, then they choose jobs. Stoltenberg pointed out that

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[163] With Mike Embley in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program.

it is "useless" to explicate to them that in the long run it will be better for them to opt for real democracy…" (Stoltenberg, 2000).

So, how will our global village be structured in the future? This master question translates into many sub-questions, such as the following: Will the United Nations be supported by all in common humility? Or will there be *lesser* beings at the bottom of the global village's pyramid of power, and an *elite* ruling from the top? Today, the global champions of the world are the United States; will they and their allies rule, and the rest be second class underlings? Or will the human rights message be heard that calls for *egalization* in combination with *globalization*? Hot feelings are attached to these questions.

If Hobbes could go on all TV channels of the world and promote his ideas of an absolute ruler, perhaps the world would acquiesce to his solution. As mentioned before, an iron grip renders calm, not least because it elicits debilitating fear.

However, clearly, Locke's views have won. Even the United States would not want to fill the role of the absolute world subjugator, at least not as long as they also believe in human rights and equal dignity for all. This means that the only solution is a global village shaped according to Locke's views, a global village of democratically decided upon super-ordinate structures that guarantee equal dignity.

Since such global super-ordinate structures are at least rudimentarily available in the form of the United Nations, any action or language that undermines confidence that indeed all players aim at this goal, elicits deep feelings of betrayal and possibly also humiliation. If the United Nations institutions, for example, are understood to be lackeys of the United States, if Kofi Annan is seen as employee of the United States government, there is a problem.

What we today call democracy and capitalism, is when traffic lights and rules are in place that are voted upon by majority vote. The democratic ideal is that every driver, independent of the size of the vehicle, has the same right to pass at each traffic light. Large and small vehicles (capitalism allows for such differences), all have to wait in front of the red light; both small and large vehicles are allowed to start driving at green light (equal dignity despite of differences). This system is managed by officials who can be replaced with majority vote where every single person, the driver of a Rolls Royce as much as the user of two feet, has a say (democracy).

In a common effort, all drivers elect a police chief and have a say as to how the traffic lights should be positioned. All bow in humility in front of red lights. The owners of the big vehicles give away potential personal ambitions to pass first. They do not use the freedom that they indeed have; with their large vehicles they could push the others aside. However, instead of forcing through their "freedom," they decide for humility in front of commonly created rules.

During the period of transition, when the envisaged super-ordinate roof of rules and institutions is not yet securely in place at a global level, many ask whether those with the large vehicles really and genuinely want to give up their "freedom" and bow to rules that are set by all. Whenever a large vehicle forces others out, everybody starts doubting whether the global village indeed will be one of equal dignity. Worries arise such as: Will the global village be one of ranked dignity or of equal dignity? Will humility reign or arrogance? Will masters humiliate underlings? Or will all be dignified equals?

Not only traffic is suitable as illustrative metaphor; each Western film illustrates the

same process.

This is the story-board of many Western films: Gangsters arrive who terrorize the city; different bands vie for power and control. Raw might, brutality and shooting power, as well as promises for wealth and riches, determine who is at the top at any given moment. There is no peace and quiet for the ordinary citizen. They are all drawn into this cruel power play. Then the sheriff arrives on the scene. He represents the interest of the common citizen against their tormentors. He represents an impartial super-ordinate force that aims at protecting all citizens against brutal power. He is not another warrior who prides himself of his courage and firing power and the good he is doing to all his followers. He is not even a Robin Hood and he does not yearn for personal glory.

Before, each band had a name. There was the band of bloody Jim, dirty Harry, or vicious Jack, each calling the other *enemy,* and terrorizing poor everybody else with promises and threats. Later, subsequent to the sheriff's victory, we are left with only *citizens* and *criminals*. Bloody Jim is a *criminal*, as is dirty Harry. They are no cunning *masters* anymore; they are now wretched creatures sitting in prison, or, after rehabilitation, humbled citizens. The common interest has won.

And the sheriff did this in the name of *law and order*. Law and order is the principle of the state. The state has the monopoly on the use of force. In the past, citizens were forced and humiliated under the roof of the state by state might and brutality. In modern times citizens are expected to voluntarily extend genuine humble humility to such super-ordinate institutions because they understand their benefit and because the state is democratically legitimized.

Law and order do not only protect but also unite the city or the state. Before, we saw *several camps*, the camp of bloody Jim and dirty Harry. Subsequent to the sheriff's victory, there is *One single city*, or *One single state*, huddling under *One single roof* of the law and order that its citizens gave to themselves. Those who have ambitions to become band bosses are asked to abandon their dreams of warlordism and invest in supporting the sheriff. Even the best intentioned liberator of evil is asked to invest in the sheriff's efforts instead of becoming a Robin Hood. Nobody is allowed to *defend* himself alone anymore; everybody has to help the sheriff to defend and secure everybody, the city or the state. Super-ordinate structures and institutions are to be supported and self-defense curtailed.

Likewise, the vision of the *global village* goes. Former *villages*, brutal Iraq and arrogant/benevolent America, coalesce into *One village* under the roof of the super-ordinate structure of international law and United Nations institutions. Saddam Hussein is a *criminal* to be brought in prison together with all other criminals in the *global village*. The world's citizens are protected by "sheriff" Kofi Annan. It is forbidden for any party to defend herself alone. Instead, there is the duty on all sides to help the sheriff. If the super-ordinate institution of the sheriff is too weak to cope, it must be strengthened. This is every citizen's dignified obligation. Nobody is allowed to ridicule and humiliate this institution or point with fingers at its weaknesses; weaknesses must be patched up by all parties in a unified effort. Nobody is allowed to bail out and selfishly only mind their own business. If there is dissent, this has to be solved under the common roof, lest the door is opened to anachronistic warlordism. In such a world, *my* security is *common* security.

This is the backdrop for doubts arising as to their intentions whenever the richest citizens, such as the United States, go their own ways. Do they, after all, intend to implement a draconian world rule à la Hobbes? Why do they not help the sheriff to do

his job satisfactorily but get their own people to implement law? Will the outcome be global humiliation?

To summarize this section, if the United Nations institutions are to walk in Locke's footsteps, they could one day develop into something akin to a democratically legitimated global government. Hobbes, on the other side, would suggest that the United States hold the rest of the world down in an iron grip as an absolute power and that the world voluntarily agrees to this treatment so as to escape anarchy.

At present, Locke seems to have won the competition, in theory, but not always in practice. Worries and uncertainties as to the future structure of the global village represent *malign* elements in a situation where strong political commitments towards global super-ordinate structures anchored in human rights would have *benign* effects.

In the following section I will try to look closer into the worries and uncertainties as to *egalization* that currently trouble virtually everybody in the *global village*. Among the most pressing difficulties at the current stage of transition is uncertainty as to real motives behind rhetoric.

Which global village? Or, is the invitation serious?

As explained before, I use the word *egalization* in order to differentiate it from the word equality, because the main point is not equality.[164] The point is rather equal dignity, even though there is a connection between equality and equal dignity. (The connection is "hidden" in the human rights stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect human dignity. I will come back to that point later.) The term *egalization* is meant to avoid claiming that everybody should become equal and that there should be no differences between people. *Egality* can coexist with functional hierarchy that regards all participants as possessing equal dignity; *egality* cannot coexist, though, with hierarchy that defines some people as *lesser* beings and others as *more valuable*.

A *global village* of topdogs and underdogs, of hierarchies that essentialize ranking orders and brand its participants accordingly, would represent the Hobbsian vision of the future of the *global village*. *Globalization* combined with *egalization*, however, represents the vision of a *global village* of equal dignity for all à la Locke.

At the current historic turning point one single pressing question underlies every human encounter and it concerns egality, dignity and respect. It is the question "Do you believe in a world of ranked human worth and value, a world of topdogs and underdogs, or do you believe in a world of equal dignity?"

This question permeates every single encounter between interlocutors. It simmers in the background not only when a wife asks her husband about his definition of love, but also when you travel as a tourist and meet your host, or when you go on a journey as a politician or business person to meet your counterparts; and it certainly forms the backdrop when heads of governments meet their "friends" and "enemies."

You, and every person who at present inhabits the globe, are categorized according to your power rank within the world order and how you deal with this. You, a traveling American, European, Japanese politician or business man, as well you as a local elite member, are scrutinized and asked, "Are you elites planning on dominating the *global village*, or at least your region, and treat the rest arrogantly as *lesser* beings?" "Are you people taking the human rights ideals you claim you believe in seriously, are you indeed humble?" "Or are you throwing your weight around?" "Do you include us in a common decision making process or are you trying to exploit us for your own gain?" "Do we really get the enabling environment that human rights promise us or are these promises merely hypocritical and cynical talk designed to make the top-dogs think well of themselves and sleep better at night?"

Since both visions are sometimes extremely close to each other, "magnifying glasses" are necessary to find out where a person or group is standing. The pilot of the plane is the boss in the air, and it is difficult to find out whether he thinks that the passengers are *lesser* beings as compared to him, or *equal* in dignity and worth. It is only the *way in which he gives orders* and the *framing of his words* that give away his vision. It is precisely therefore that the actions of the world's top-dogs are currently so closely scrutinized, particularly by those of lesser resources.

What do the two visions for the future of the global village entail? How would they play out if implemented?

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[164] Space does not permit a discussion of the nuances of concepts such as equality, equity, or egalitarianism.

Globalization without egalization

In the Hobbsian vision for the future *global village* frontiers and fault lines would be instated in new ways so as to divide the *global village* into hierarchical layers. Formerly independent juxtaposed cultures would be transformed into a world where one absolute ruler would trump the rest. The West, the Arab World, China, Russia, would not coalesce with equal dignity into one single entity; the West would rather be at the top, attempting to keep the rest as underdogs. The old honor order would serve as blueprint. Subjugation would be promoted as "honorable medicine."

Whoever fancies the vision of a hierarchical the *global village*, may want to try to become a top-dog, either at the very global level, as member of a world superpower elite, or at least at the regional or local level as member of a local hierarchy. Local hierarchies would want to serve as mandarins for the global top-dog, and help keep the global hierarchy in place. This at least was the traditional strategy in empires; rulers associated themselves with intermediary classes of aids who had an own interest in keeping this order in place because they also profited from exploiting underlings. Often these aids were formerly independent local lords who at some point were subjugated by a stronger centralizing force. The *global village* would in this case comprise local tyrants who ally themselves to a global ruler in order to exploit the rest. The global superpower would support those local rulers, and vice versa, and regional conflicts would be manipulated and fanned in this spirit.

Humiliation would run hot everywhere in such a context. Underlings would be systematically humiliated and this would be seen as necessary strategy to maintain the system. Many underlings would feel humiliated, while rulers would emphasize their benevolence and they themselves, in turn, would feel humiliated by lack of reverence from underlings (although some masters would merely laugh at the ignorance of their slaves).

However, perhaps even more importantly, humiliation would be employed for the age-old power-keeping strategy of *divide and rule*. *Divide and rule* is a strategy that works best when the fear of humiliation is used as "active agent." The strategy has been used by a ruling parties since time immemorial, a strategy that pitches two subordinate parties at each others' throats by telling each of them that the other is about to humiliate him. The third party reaps the victory when others are exhausted.

We may conclude that a *global village* built as hierarchical pyramid of power, for example as protectorate of Saudi Arabian traditionalists, would have to endure humiliation in a multitude of ways. Or, if a Zbigniew Brzezinski became president of the United States and were asked to become an absolute world ruler, he would perhaps subjugate the rest of the world in an iron grip and use humiliation both directly and indirectly, not least in order to *split and rule* (he is proud of having brought down the Soviet Union with such a strategy, see Le Nouvel Observateur, 1998).

Yet, all this doesn't have to happen. Many people within the United States are deeply committed to human rights ideals. After all, the American Declaration of Independence is part of the precious legacy of human rights. Even an American Zbigniew Brzezinski voices his commitment to human rights or would face critics within America, if he attempted world dictatorship. There is reason to believe that an American triumph would ultimately entail the triumph of human rights.

Globalization combined with egalization? Or, human rights ideals may intensify feelings of humiliation

If we were to follow the dignity and human rights vision for the future *global village*, frontiers that divided the world in several *villages* before would slowly be removed so as to form *One unified global village* with equal dignity for all citizens. In other words, the West, the Arab World, China, Russia, or whatever labels we use for the world's parts that represent the former *villages* would move together into some kind of federal order, for example built on the principle of subsidiarity and thus retaining local decision making and identities at the maximum. Or they would become even more integrated, something like California, Ohio, and New Hampshire in the US, or Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and the other German Länder, or even begin to resemble different urban quarters in the global village. If following this recipe, humankind would arrive at a global village where formerly separate spheres were to acquire more of a subordinate and folkloric significance. Separate *villages*, albeit still retaining different identities, or even strengthening their local identities, would coalesce under *One single village* institutional umbrella. Following the principle of subsidiarity, global problems would be solved globally and local problems locally. Global identity would embed local identity and diversity in a context of equal dignity.

Indeed, both historically and currently, we observe many of such processes of coalescence. Parts give up sovereignty and participate in a larger unit. The United States of America went through such a historic process, as does Europe at present. EU,[165] ASEAN,[166] MERCOSUR,[167] NAFTA,[168] APEC,[169] these are all examples of processes in which certain elements of sovereignty are placed at a higher level than the local one and are slowly and carefully transferred to commonly accepted super-ordinate structures. The global village, with its United Nations institutions, is the highest level super-ordinate entity ever formed. It is at the highest level because with the global village humankind reaches the limits of the globe.

In a global village of topdogs dominating underdogs, there would be two parties feeling humiliated, those at the bottom who do not accept humiliation as "honorable medicine" and those masters who feel humiliated by the lack of "thankfulness" on the part of their underlings. In contrast, in a global village based on the vision of human rights, many more groups feel humiliated. In a global village based on the vision of human rights, the aim is to empower citizens so as to create a world of equal chances and enabling environments for all. Local and global tyrants are regarded as illegitimate and exposed to attempts to bring them down and thus humble them.

To use traffic as a metaphor, in a global village based on the vision of human rights there should be traffic lights that give the right to pass to large and small vehicles alike. Former underlings with their small vehicles would be encouraged to pass when

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[165] Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom possible new entrants: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia.

[166] Association of South East Asian Nations Brunei Darussalam, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

[167] The Latin American common market.

[168] North American Free Trade Agreement.

[169] Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation - Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong-China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United States, Vietnam.

the light is green, they would not be humiliated by being told that they are not worth being let through. On the other side, masters would be taught to respect red lights and not regard them as humiliating their supremacy. In other words, also those with large vehicles would have to stop when the light turns red, in a new spirit of humility, and wait like everybody else. And those with small vehicles would be encouraged to feel empowered as traffic participants with equal dignity.

What do you mean? The problem with rhetoric

Currently the human rights version of the *global village* is the reigning vision, at least as official point of view of the world's current elites in the West, supported by human rights advocating individuals and organizations around the world. Human rights have gained the status of moral correctness that is expressed in certain "gut feelings" that have emerged worldwide during the past two centuries. These gut feelings indicate that it is wrong when masters treat other humans as lesser beings. Those who openly adhere to the old ranking order, currently diminish in number.

White supremacy, for example, received a stark blow when Apartheid fell. This does not mean that everybody is "converted," however, it means that those among the white who wish the old order back, have to say so in private or even in secret. South Africa commenced the process of transition very recently, and therefore there are still quite a number of white South Africans around who believe in white supremacy. They feel humiliated by accusations that Apartheid rule was a cruel and heartless; they point at the fact that black South Africans had a much better life than their black brothers and sisters in the rest of Africa. Their gut feeling does not link a sense of injustice to white supremacy; on the contrary, they experience themselves as benevolent patrons. However, this line of argument currently goes "underground."

Public official discourse nowadays is not dominated by a vocabulary of supremacy anymore. The language of the old honor code is increasingly regarded as obsolete, and in increasingly wider circles. Honor killings, until not long ago accepted as *cultural trait* currently move into the category of *violation*. The Indian caste system, not so long ago "respected" as cultural idiosyncrasy, is now being condemned as "Indian Apartheid."[170] The Indian government clearly is not "won over" yet and many Indians may agree with white South Africans that the "Apartheid" is acceptable and in addition benevolently supervised by the elites. Yet, the fact that the term "Indian Apartheid" could at all emerge and that this was the topic of a large international conference, betrays a transition. The old terminology loses ground and a new set of concepts arrives on the scene.

And not only global and local elites broadcast the human rights message. I would claim that the broad majority of the non-haves around the world indeed feels attracted by the human rights message. They would like to participate in the quality of life the West offers; the disadvantaged cannot but yearn for it clean water, shelter, food and a future for their children.

The buzzwords that reign today are words such as *sustainability*, *peace*, *security*, *stability*, *freedom*, *empowerment*, and so forth. If we were to believe these words, the *global village* would be safely on the side of human rights. The transition to a world

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[170] "*World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*" in Durban, South Africa, August 31 - September 7, 2001. Read on *intolerance* in Noël, 1994.

anchored in human rights would be complete.

However, clearly there is a problem. The gap between rich and poor widens, and the non-haves have to watch global and local elites overindulge in luxury goods. Does this mean that words such as *sustainability*, *peace*, *security*, *stability*, *freedom*, and *empowerment* are empty rhetoric? Does the use of these words merely cover up for underlying motives that aim at completely different realities? This suspicion highlights that these words do not mark the endpoint of a transition; they rather hide its incompleteness.

The problem with these words is that they have two potential meanings, one meaning within the context of the Hobbsian vision of the *global village*, and another completely different meaning within the concept of the human rights vision. These buzzwords, as nice as they may sound, are open to deep suspicion from all sides. They can be understood by tyrants as calls for securing their grip on their underlings; tyrants may call for "freedom" for *their* interest groups to "secure" a pseudo-"democratic" system so as to provide "stability," "peace," and "empowerment" to precisely *their* constituency.

Human rights advocates, on the other hand, understand the very same buzzwords as calls to extend the promises they entail to *all* humankind, and not only to some elites. In short, these words are treacherous, what counts are deeds; only deeds show the actual *scope of justice* such words are aimed at.

Feelings of humiliation emerge in the hotbed of this struggle between two visions of the *global village* and its sub-units. Underlings feel humiliated by oppressors, yet, even more by people who lie to them and raise hopes that they then do not fulfill. The West is at present in such a position. The West broadcasts the message of human rights while being perceived as maintaining the opposite reality on the ground. Human rights are understood as an invitation to the disadvantaged around the world to join the West – after all, all humans are equal – yet, when the poor suitors from far-flung countries want to move in and get "married" to the rich, they are thrown out. Boats filled with people who seek the promise of equal dignity are turned back, negotiators who try to reach fair global rules and regulations, are blocked.

The gap between human rights rhetoric and human rights reality is thus a source of disappointment, frustration, feelings of betrayal and humiliation. Those who hope for human rights to gain space in real life are frustrated and feel insulted and humiliated by double-standards. On the other hand, those who use human rights vocabulary to hide their desire for supremacy feel also humiliated; they reckon that they do not deserve to be frowned upon because they regard themselves as benevolent patrons.

The problem is aggravated by elite blindness. Elites are often blind to the feelings of humiliation they elicit; Marie Antoinette is a telling example. Coleman (2000) describes the propensity of the powerful to be blind with respect to the feelings of humiliation they cause in underlings and that very well may reach boiling points,

> …high power holders and members of high-power groups (HPGs) often neglect to analyze – as well as underestimate – the power of low power holders and members of low-power groups (LPGs…). Additionally, they usually attempt to dominate the relationship, to use pressure tactics, to offer few concessions, to have high aspirations and to use contentious tactics… In light of their unreflective tendency to dominate, it becomes critical for members of HPGs to be aware of the likelihood that they will elicit resistance and alienation (from members of LPGs with whom they are in conflict) through using illegitimate techniques, inappropriate sanctions, or influence that is considered excessive for the situation (Deutsch, 1973). The cost to the HPG is not only ill will but also the need to be continuously vigilant and

mobilized to prevent retaliation by the LPG (Coleman, 2000, p. 125).

What Coleman pinpoints here is the possibility that *humiliated fury* (Scheff, 1997b, p. 11) may accumulate in those with lesser power, a humiliated fury that very well may explode, especially when there is "nothing to lose" anymore, when a human life may not count much, even not one's own.

Edna Adan is the former wife of late President of "Somaliland," Mohammad Haji Ibrahim Egal,[171] and I interviewed her on December 3, 1998 in Hargeisa, Somaliland. She had the following message to the *global village*: "The international community is usually the one who encourages dictators and the oppressors to progress. Without mentioning any names, you have government dictators who have millions and billions of dollars in banks. Those billions of dollars were not generated through a salary that they earned or a reward that they were given by the people they were heading. Those billions came from the money that belongs to the people that was given by the international community.

   The international community should act intelligently, and fairly and honestly and not feed, not allow oppressors, to accumulate so much of the people's money. They should not give them arms, they should not give them money and they should not help them to remain in the power. Because it is the international world that maintains dictators in power. The bombs that were being thrown on my people in Hargeisa in Somaliland, were not manufactured by Siad Barre. They came from all corners of the world; they were American, Pakistani, Egyptian, Chinese, Russian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav - any body who made arms, who made tanks, who made ammunition sold it or gave it to Siad Barre, to use against his people.

   So, where was the international world when that was being used against the weak? It should have said 'no,' it should have stopped the inflow of arms to Somalia in that time. It should have prevented the slaughter of the civilians."

   Edna Adan concluded that an international community with double standards is humiliating: "I think the international world has different standards. It preaches human rights, and fairness and so on, in literature! In Europe! But then when that humiliation, and that aggression, and that hurt, has taken place in a poor, remote, developing country like Somaliland, no one wants to be bothered, let them stew in their own juice!

   And these are divided standards, and unfair standards ... It is a humiliation! So, the international community is to blame and I hope you have very strong cupboards in which you can lock up your conscience! Because all the civilians who died here died from bombs that were manufactured by people in the developed countries."

Edna Adan gives her voice to the human rights message that the underlings around the world should be lifted up, on one side, and masters learn humility on the other. Her message resembles the following.

I summarize reactions from Iraq: "First you feed Saddam Hussein and then you bomb us to free us from him? What kind of liberation is this? What kind of help is that? First you push us into the ditch and then you try to pull us out? When we were in the ditch, we survived as best as we could. But now, when you pull us out, we drown in

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[171] Egal also served as Somalia's Prime Minister from 1967, during the latter period of Somalia's democratic era.

the ditch! Don't you see the hypocrisy? Don't you see how counterproductive you are? Stop feeding tyrants in the first place! Stop producing and selling these weapons you then want to collect back! Whoever buys weapons from you will later be bombed! What kind of world do you create? You should be ashamed and not proud! You are like a visitor who congratulates himself that he gives the cancer patient pralines and at the same time overlooks that he withholds the real medicine! How humiliating! You should at least apologize that you ever fed Saddam! And promise to never feed dictators again! And keep your word!"

Thus, we can note that there are at least two groups of victims around in a human rights context. There are those who feel that human rights are taught and promised only to be denied. They feel not only betrayed, but their humanity humiliated. And then there are those who feel that benevolent domination, under the banner of "freedom" and "security" is nothing wrong and deserves gratitude, thus turning criticism into undue humiliation of noble goals.

However, there are more people who feel humiliated in a human rights context. There are those helpers who genuinely want to promote human rights in a non-dominating and non-coercive fashion. Many in the rich West are fervently working for human rights and feel deeply humiliated when their high motives are doubted by those they wish to help rise from misery. When this happens, they feel that their efforts are ridiculed, minimized, devalued, humiliated. This compounds their frustration stemming from observing those others who abuse human rights language to hide ulterior goals and thus make any authentic struggle for human rights so much more difficult.

During my fieldwork in Africa I carried out 26 interviews with third party representatives who were working with Somalia, 54 interviews with third party representatives operating on Rwanda and Burundi, and 30 interviews with third party representatives addressing Africa in general. What I subsume under the name of "third party" were in most cases Western representatives in humanitarian organizations. Many had entered into this life with very high ideals and felt deeply hurt, misunderstood and humiliated when being accused, by African critics, that they supposedly merely wanted some fun and excitement and thus abused others' suffering for their own gains. Some had descended into cynicism and disillusionment and seemed to even feel ashamed of ever having had ideals. They felt squeezed between superiors who sometimes did not live up to the ideals they officially stood for and recipients of aid who did not truly appreciate their efforts. Maren (1997) wrote a book that everybody in the field seemed to have read, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity* (Maren, 1997), where such dynamics are described. Genuine ideals of wanting to work for equal dignity crumbled under the weight of suspicion from the side of the recipients of this work and the malpractice on the part of the own super-ordinates.

We may conclude this section with summarizing that there would be two victim categories to be expected in a *global village* that is based on a draconic hierarchical honor order. Such a *global village* would emerge if certain conservative circles would win control over the *global village*, let us say, if the *global village* was run like a protectorate of Saudi Arabian traditionalists. Or if a Saddam Hussein were to take over. In such a *global village* humiliation would be "administered" routinely and recipients would be expected to "swallow" humiliation as "honorable medicine."

Victims of humiliation would be those who would not buy into this world view and feel unduly humiliated by such an order. Secondly, masters expecting thankful underlings would feel humiliated by lack of reverence.

In a *global village* that is on its way to human rights and caught in the midst of this transition, we can expect at least three groups of people feeling victimized by humiliation. There are those tradionalists who feel that their domination is a benefaction and ought to be greeted with gratitude; they feel humiliated by its lack. Then there are those among human rights adherents who feel humiliated when they see human rights terminologies being misused to hide realities that express the opposite. Thirdly, there are those who genuinely fight for human rights and want them to be projected into reality, yet feel humiliated by suspicion emanating from those they want to help as to their benevolent motives.

Keep protesting! How the human rights revolution is continuous

One may discuss the nature of the human rights revolution that currently is in the process of permeating the minds and souls of so many people around the world. Human rights give a voice to those at the bottom of the pyramid of power. This is in principle nothing new. Human history has always seen revolts by underlings who were not satisfied and thought they had a chance to gain a better life by rising up. What is special with human rights is that they do not only preach the *demise of tyrants*, but also the *demise of oppressive systems*.

Formerly, underlings used to topple elites only to replace them and keep hierarchy in place. Rhetoric of equality would be maintained by revolutionaries and by "freedom fighters" only until they had grabbed the rulers' seats. Even the Russian revolution ended this way. When revolutionaries sat in the master's seat, this was the end of equality. This may even be the "natural" course of revolutions if nothing else intervenes.

However, this course is hampered nowadays by *globalization*, or better, by *global technology* that makes such hypocrisy more difficult to carry out. I suggest that the technology (technology of mobility and communication) that brought people closer to each other and shrank distances on the globe is also a vehicle for something else, namely the first continuous revolution in human history, the human rights revolution.

RAWA, www.rawa.org, was founded by Afghan women who went out with cameras hidden under their burkhas; they took pictures and published them on the Internet. American women and human rights advocates became aware of this site, forged a coalition and contributed with their resources.[172]

In 1998, Kofi Annan says, "Information technology has empowered civil society to be the true guardians of democracy and good governance everywhere. Oppressors cannot hide inside their borders any longer. A strong civil society, bound together across all borders with the help of modern communications, will not let them. In a sense, it has been the new superpower – the people determined to promote better standards of life in larger freedom"[173]

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[172] See also MoveOn, www.moveon.org/.

[173] Press Release SG/SM/6638 14 July 1998, retrieved from
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980714.sgsm6638.html, see also
http://www.undp.org/cso/.

The human rights revolution is aided by modern communication technology, but also by increasing global interdependence. The more cross-cutting interest groups emerge, the fewer stark division lines, horizontal and hierarchical, are viable. Cross-cutting interest groups make many different kinds of coalitions come into play on many different issues.

The human rights revolution furthermore is promoted by the idea of humankind merging into *One* family. As discussed before, there exists *inside* and *outside language*. Similarly, there are *inside* and *outside ethics* (see Coleman, 2000, p. 118). Yet, *outside ethics* lose their anchoring in reality when *outside spheres* wane. What is left are concepts of *inside ethics*. Human rights could thus be understood, at least partly, as the global application of *inside ethics* as they are available *inside* all cultural realms. This would mean that human rights ideals would not represent Western imperialism but a side-effect, an outfall, of *globalization* and its framing of the world as *One single inside sphere*. Clearly, *inside ethics* in many cultures traditionally entail justifications for hierarchical societal structures and routine humiliation; however, they usually do this in an attenuated way as compared to *outside ethics*. Thus, the waning of *outside ethics* and lone survival of *inside ethics*, even if condoning vertical rankings of human worth and value, could be regarded as push in favor of the human rights revolution. I will come back to this point further down.

Human rights may never be fully "reachable," they may have to be striven for in a continuous manner; and, indeed, global networks enable people to do this. It would be a revolution that is kept in motion by and only as long as those who find themselves disadvantaged incessantly protest (and have the material and technological means to do so) whenever hierarchies rigidify.

Even in those regions of the world that supposedly have "established" a democratic national culture based on human rights, it was and still is not easy to create and maintain this. It seems to be rather "normal" for elites to keep trying to maintain control and power (via control of media, for example, or coercion). It is not always self-evident for elites and the groups they represent to surrender power even when they lose the political support of the majority. The human rights revolution may thus be unique in human history insofar as it represents the first permanent revolution.

We are being cooked! How the transition proceeds too fast and too slow

Why are feelings of humiliation intensifying when human rights ideals are being listened to? Are not human rights supposed to bring happiness and welfare? The response is perhaps unexpected: The problem with the human rights revolution may be that it is not homogeneous enough. The transition from the old honor order to a new order based on human rights is not proceeding in a consistent way; it is rather too fast and too slow at the same time. Different subsets of the human populace move in different speeds as to developing mindsets that welcome human rights ideals. And in all cases reality lags behind. Those who are far ahead and see that human rights have to be put into reality much faster are in danger of going into a clinch with those far behind who make the process sluggish.

In 1971, the Aswan Dam was completed in the South of Egypt. A huge new lake, Lake Nasser, formed behind the dam over the subsequent years. In 1985, I met an Egyptian anthropologist who did research in the huge sun dried and wind beaten desert around Lake Nasser. She studied the proud Bedouin tribes that roam these vast stretches of land in South Egypt since ages. She told me the following story:

"One day I visited the tribesmen deep in the desert, far away from the world as we know it. I had visited them before. We went through the lengthy greeting rituals that these Bedouins practice since time's dawn. After a while I was told about the hottest news, namely that the Nile was behaving very strangely. The water was not receding anymore; instead it was forming a kind of lake. I said that this was to be expected; it was nothing to be astonished about. It was merely the new Lake Nasser; the Nile would never be back to its former bed again, at least not as long as the dam was there.

Oh, what a thing to say! I should never have said that! The reaction was amazing! Anger and pity! The old wise men of the tribe came to me and told me that I was much too young to be able to judge such phenomena and that I should better curb my tongue. Of course the Nile would go back to its former shape; it was just a matter of time! How could I be so foolish and believe that age-old nature would change just like that! There I was, reprimanded by wise men who knew 'better'!

There I was confronted with age-old wisdom! Yes, I understood that I was young and immature; still, I was sure that I was right and they were wrong. Their judgment was based on a 'database' that was simply too narrow. Their age-old wisdom did not protect them against profound misjudgments. I did not know what to do. I just left. What should I have done?"

After speaking with the Egyptian anthropologist I thought of the widely known story of "how to cook a frog." If Mr. Frog were suddenly dropped in a saucepan of hot water, he would swiftly jump out; the water is hot and he does not want to be cooked. But if Mr. Frog is placed in a saucepan of comfortably warm water that is heated only very slowly, he does not even notice that he is being cooked. In other words, sometimes the moderate speed of change masks its significance. The Bedouins were like frogs; they were being "cooked" without knowing. The process of change (filling up of Lake Nasser) was slow enough to fool them as to how dramatic it was; while at the same time the change was powerful and fast enough to "kill" them.

If change had occurred much faster, in a matter of days or weeks, it would have been so unsettling that the Bedouins perhaps would have sought help and explanations from a wider world. But since the process took months and years, Bedouin thinking remained within their age-old frames of understanding life. And these frames were now so unsuitable that they were more or less "deadly" for these people: waiting for the Nile to go back to its former bed was just not a viable concept. If the change had occurred even more slowly, over many centuries, generations of Bedouins would perhaps have had the chance to adapt without being alarmed at all. Thus the Bedouins were "cooked" by the medium speed of the change they were part of. The process went too slow to be identified as profoundly new, and too fast to being treated with familiar tools.

Why don't you listen? How what was normal before is humiliating now

The problem for people in the twenty first century is that they live in a period of transition that resembles Mr. Frog's experience. In a very slow motion a transition unfolds within which old practices are still kept in place and defended by some, while others put all their forces into uprooting them. This confrontation is bound to increase temperature, yet since the process develops only very slowly, its detrimental effects are easily overlooked until it is too late.

Eleanor had just emerged from a very unhappy marriage when she came to my clinic.

For years, she had tried to explain to her husband that she wished him to respect her dignity. He viewed her as a kind of object to be used, she told me. As if being a wife meant that she had sold her body to him and had to be at his disposal at his whim. She cried a lot. "Again and again, for years, I told Bob that I am a human being and not a doll. If he wants sex 'without problems,' why does he not masturbate? I feel he uses me as a kind of sperm toilet and this humiliates me deeply. Yet, sex is not the only problem. Whenever I say something, I mean, whenever I express my opinion, he just laughs. As if I have no brains. My words do not count. By definition, everything I think or say is a joke to him. I am not a human being in his eyes, I mean, not as worthy as he sees himself."

After years of agonizing, Eleanor decided to file for divorce. She did this after having "tried everything." She had talked to Bob, had bought lots of books that he should read, and even had dragged Bob to a marriage counselor. "He does not understand anything," was her final conclusion when she went for divorce.

Bob, on his part, was shocked and appalled when he fathomed that his wife indeed was about to leave him. At first he thought it was a joke. But slowly it dawned on him that it was not. Okay, he had noticed that she was not always happy; however, in his eyes she was merely a little "hysterical." He came to my clinic, he too, in rage. He shouted, "My wife is nothing but treacherous! Why on earth did she never tell me that she was unhappy? We had such a good life together! There is no need for this upheaval! There is enough conflict in this world, we do not need more! I have learned to put up with her hysteria! But now, this divorce, this goes too far! Is it right that she tries to castrate my honor?"

We may conclude that Bob did not recognize fast enough that his wife embraced a concept of human worthiness that was deeply different from his. And since he did not identify the deep gap between them, he could not adapt to it in any appropriate manner that would have saved the marriage. He was raised in the old order, where indeed a man felt it was his right to use the body of his wife. Bob was proud of never having beaten his wife. In his eyes this was enough of a proof for that he was a modern man. However, still he believed that her body was at his disposal; was it not therefore that she was his wife? Using her body for sex was not a violation in his eyes. He was not aware that in her eyes it indeed was. His blindness seems "banal" rather than "evil" and this "banality" reminds somewhat of Eichmann's blindness that gave rise to Hannah Arendt (1963) giving her book the title *Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report On The Banality Of Evil*.[174]

Bob misattributed Eleanor's deep unease as some kind of insignificant medical or psychological problem of hers. Since he misinterpreted her uprising as her hypochondria that did not concern him, he overlooked relevant alarm signs until it was too late. To allude to the Egyptian story, Bob's wife is like the rising Lake Nasser, while he thought she was like the river Nile and would come back to "where she belonged."

Thus the twenty first century is "overheated" not least by a transition that proceeds too fast and too slowly at the same time; those who are ahead and those who lag behind slide apart and at some point even confront each other. In the course of this process, feelings run hot, not least feelings of humiliation.

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[174] Arendt, 1963.

Mind-boggling! How we are first taught that our condition is humiliating, and then we are humiliated even more, by the same teacher

However, there are more reasons for overheating to be detected. Not only does the inconsistent speed of change cause friction. There is more. You can imagine that temperature rises when you explain to people that their wretched existence is not divine fate, but a violation of their dignity, perpetrated on them by the rich, who, at the same time, hypocritically preach the opposite, namely human rights.

Agnes came to my clinic one lovely spring-morning. She had been raped by her psychiatrist, not only once, but regularly. However, this was not her main problem, her deepest qualms stemmed from the fact that she had acquiesced to this for years.

She recounted her story: "My father abused me for the first time when I was twelve. I remember that it happened on my twelfth birthday. He told me that I now was a lady and that this was part of being a lady. I was not to tell anyone, it was our little secret. In any case, a child had to obey her father, he explained to me. I was torn. Partly I was a dutiful and subservient daughter, partly I was proud and flattered that I was a lady, yet I also felt disgusted. He abused me until I left home when I was eighteen. My mother never interfered, although I think she knew.

When I started my studies at university, for a couple of years I did not recognize that I had been abused. I did not see myself as a victim of abuse. However, then I read this book. It was a book written by a woman who had lived through very similar experiences. She put clear words on what were merely fuzzy feelings, unclear views, obscure inklings, and vague perceptions in me. It was amazing, so many of my problems suddenly had a meaning and the puzzle of my entire existence fell into place. From then on, I knew that I needed therapy.

I decided to see a psychiatrist in the neighborhood where I lived. He indeed confirmed what I had read in the book. I had been abused and my dignity had been violated. The fact that I was told and had internalized to define this abuse as some kind of compliment had covered up for the wounds so that even I myself could not see them. The psychiatrist opened my eyes to the wretchedness of my adolescent years. Yet, while telling me about abuse he had intercourse with me. He had a carpet in a drawer that he would pull out at the end of each session and put on the floor. He explained to me that I had to regain a healthy relationship with my body and that therefore this intercourse was part of the therapy. I believed him.

It took me years, to put question marks on his behavior. Years that passed in agony. My problems never improved. I had problems sleeping, concentrating, and trusting people. I had no friends, no support group. My studies suffered. I needed help and regularly went to my psychiatrist. Only after years I understood that he abused me like my father had done, or worse. My father framed his abuse as compliment, the psychiatrist as treatment. What was worse? I think it was the psychiatrist who violated me more, because he knew that I needed help to grow out of abuse, and still he inflicted it on me.

The realization that the psychiatrist in fact abused me devastated me. When my father did this, I was a child and nobody can expect that a child can stand up against her father, particularly not when her mother is of no help to her either. Therefore I could excuse my victim status as my father's fault and not mine. However, to go to this psychiatrist was my free choice. Nobody ever forced me to consult him. How on earth could I fall for his disgusting explanations for his abuse? My whole me is in tatters now. During the years, I had slowly learned, with the help of this psychiatrist, to be proud of myself. Now I detest myself more than ever before. How could I allow

this filthy man to twist my mind in such a way? Every time I went to him, he taught me all about abuse, and at the end of the session he inflicted it on me in an even more damaging way. It is this mixture of teaching me about abuse, and at the same time perpetrating it on me, which makes me almost lose my mind. Sometimes I cannot stop dreaming about how I cut him into pieces, slowly, so that he feels the pain that he has inflicted on me."

This was the story of Agnes. It resembles the story of present world community. Let us listen in.

Mustafa reflects, "We, the poor around the world hear that poverty is a humiliating violation of our human rights and our dignity. We learn that enabling environments that empower us are what we deserve as human beings. We know how these enabling circumstances should look like. Access to clean water, health care, a flat, work, a refrigerator, a television set, and hopefully, one day, a car, vacation, and university studies for our children. All this is what our local elites indeed boast of and the rich West as well. Western tourists and soap operas are an ample source of information for us.

However, something unbelievable happens at the same time. Our reality, our poverty, does not get better, it gets worse. On one side we are made to understand that our dignity is violated, and then it is violated even more. We are told that our humanity is debased, and then it is debased more. And this is perpetrated by the same people, those from the rich West, who say that they stand for human rights. In our eyes the West is worse than the worst hypocrite. This is the ultimate betrayal and makes us incredibly angry."

Stephan Feuchtwang, who had just began a four-year study into how people grieve, wrote to me on November 13, 2002, "I am intrigued by two of your contentions. One is that breeches of the promise of human rights create severe humiliation. Why not a sense of betrayal and hypocrisy, which is not the same as humiliation?" I replied, "Absolutely, as far as I can judge, there is a deep sense of betrayal and hypocrisy. But then emerges the next question that those who feel thus ask. They ask, 'Why do these people preach empty human rights rhetoric to us? Is it in order to fool us about their wishes to stay at the top and continue exploiting us?' The motive that is sensed behind the betrayal is arrogance and the wish to stay at the top. This then is felt to be humiliating." Feuchtwang responded with a sentence that I find very concise; he writes back "and one further thought of agreement: to recognise humanity hypocritically and betray the promise humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed" (Feuchtwang, November 14, 2002, in a personal note).

Graham Dyson, a professional mediator from South Africa, points out that in South Africa (and elsewhere) it was not simply a matter of human rights denied. "Apartheid and its predecessors were a question of *humanness* denied. This may or may not be the same thing as *human rights*" (personal communication).

Figure 4 illustrates how the curve of feelings humiliation is currently linked to the curve of awareness of human rights ideals. Awareness of human rights rises, however, reality lags behind, and thus feelings of humiliation fill the gap.[175]

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[175] See also Davies famous J-Curve; Davies, 1969, Davies, 1962, see also Boudon, 1986.

**The Curve of Feelings of Humiliation**

Figure 4: The curve of feelings of humiliation

Morton Deutsch writes in 2002 on the problem of *rising expectations*:

> Many social scientists, before and after Tocqueville, have written insightfully about the "revolution of rising expectations" to explain the paradox that social discontent and even revolutionary activity is more likely to occur after social conditions have improved, when there is rising hope, not bleak despair. The explanation generally follows two major lines. First, improvement of social conditions increases aspirations by increasing what is perceived to be possible to attain. Demand may increase at a faster rate than the actual gains received, with a resulting increase in relative deprivation and in the sense of injustice. The increased discontent is most likely to occur if the gains are discontinued or reversed after the initial gains have heightened further expectations.
>
> The second explanation of the effects of gains is that, the increase is not uniform in all areas in which the victimized are disadvantaged. Improvement in one area, such as education, only makes one more sensitive to the injustice one is experiencing in other areas such as employment, police protection, and housing. Many social scientists have advanced the proposition that status-disequilibrium (such that there are differences in one's relative statuses in income, education, social prestige, and the like) is a source of tension and discontent. Thus, a very effective way of enhancing the sense of injustice of the victimized is to increase

their education and little else (Deutsch, 2002, p. 27-28).

I am torn apart! How people can get caught in between

You may remember the story of the crying German soldier, who beats prisoners during the day and laments over his situation at night. This story illustrates one of the most painful effects of the current transition from the old honor code to the new human rights code. People who are caught in between are tortured in the most unfathomable way. The worst fate is to be forced or seduced to become a *hero* in the honor order, only to be branded a *perpetrator* in the order of equal dignity. Thus perpetrators can be victimized in the most extreme way through being caught in the role of perpetrators. I believe that this is perhaps the most difficult humiliation to overcome.

A young Tutsi, I choose to call him Charles, was in Kigali during the genocide in 1994. I talked to him in 1999.[176] He told me how a Hutu friend of his hid him in his house. Whenever Hutu militia came to search the house for Tutsi, Charles got into a hole that was dug into a rubbish heap in the garden. There he stood, only his nose poking out, covered by a plastic sheet, for hours, until the soldiers went away. This went on for weeks and ultimately saved his live.

However, during the same period Charles's Hutu friend had to participate in killing Tutsi outside in the streets, in order not to be killed himself. Thus he participated in the atrocities perpetrated against Tutsi like any other *genocidaire*. Not least Charles's family was killed, not merely killed, but gruesomely brought to death. His grandmother was already old, almost 90, and weak. She was locked into a room with hungry dogs that ate her.

This story entails everything, greatness and horror, wonderful help and terrible atrocity, extended and perpetrated by the same person, namely Charles's friend. Like the crying German soldier in Falstad, Charles's friend was torn. Both were caught in a reality that incarcerated them in a landscape where Tutsi/Jews were not merely to be killed, but "brought down," humiliated to a degree that they should never be able to raise their heads again. At the same time, privately, both adhered to another framing of the social scenery. Both were torn between two opposing drawings of the social landscape. The German soldier merely cried, while the young Hutu was more courageous and hid his Tutsi friend.

I know from several people, both in Germany and in Rwanda, who say that the worst suffering, stemming from the most painful form of humiliation, is when you are forced to become a perpetrator and you are too weak to resist, too much of a coward to say no and face death.

In Kenya I heard stories of Hutu *genocidaires* who were in hiding and needed psychotherapy. They needed treatment because they could not eat anymore without seeing the small fingers of children on their plates (I am not sure whether this detail is true, at least, this is what I was told). Instead of facing punishment, they became "insane," seeing the fingers of their children on the plate when eating.

Many Hutu had been forced to kill their own families, their Tutsi spouses and Tutsi-looking children, in order to show their allegiance with the Hutu-cause. The

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[176] Adapted from Lindner, 2001g.

International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000) confirms, "Hutu women married to Tutsi men were sometimes compelled to murder their Tutsi children to demonstrate their commitment to Hutu Power. The effect on these mothers is also beyond imagining" (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 16, paragraph 4).

At the end, after the genocide was over and the Hutu government ousted from power, these people found themselves in a devastating place: They had lost everything, their families, worse even, their families had died at their own hands, and they had furthermore lost all honor, pride and self-respect. They were humiliated, not only once, but on many levels and continuously. At first, they had been coerced into becoming perpetrators and the fact that they did not prefer death to succumbing to this pressure was deeply humiliating to them. Secondly, after the demise of the Hutu government and the world's moral outcry against the genocide, they were being humiliated almost daily because they were Hutu and thus belonged to the category of *genocidaires*.

Those who had killed their own family members seem to want to cry out, consciously, or through psychotic symptoms, "I did not want to kill my family, I was forced! I was told that it was the right thing to do! But now I learn that it was not only wrong, it was even the most despicable atrocity! How would I wish I were the one dead and not them! I was weak! I deserve to be loathed as a *genocidaire*! The one, who loathes me most, is me, myself! Do I still have a right to live?"

I think most of us can be extremely glad that we are not brought into situations where we are recruited as "hero" into the world of honor and dutiful deliverance of humiliation and killing, only to experience the demise of this framing and end up as "perpetrator." As far as I have observed in clients and other interlocutors, the fact that one has not given one's life and instead harmed others, out of fear and weakness, can be the source of life-long trauma.

To summarize and conclude this section and the entire chapter, we may remind ourselves that the *global village* in principle can be administered in two profoundly different ways. Firstly it could be structured as a strictly hierarchical entity with absolute rulers at the top and underlings at the bottom. In such a case *globalization* would do *without egalization*. Or the *global village* could be administered as a democratic entity where all citizens enjoy equal dignity. In that case *globalization* would be wedded to *egalization*. The latter version is the currently reigning official version.

Egalization is a process that is deeply linked to the human rights revolution that perhaps represents the first continuous revolution in human history. The problem with this revolution is its inhomogeneous advance. Those who are far ahead risk sliding into loggerhead positions against those lagging behind. This causes feelings to run hot, particularly feelings of mutual humiliation. Those who are far ahead feel humiliated by old-fashioned oppression, and those lagging behind feel humiliated when what they deem to be benevolent patronage is condemned as out-of-date subjugation. Furthermore, those caught in the very moment of transition, heroes in the old context and perpetrators in the new, are among the most traumatized.

Conflict may surface because of shifts in the balance (or imbalance) of power between disputants or because of increased ambiguity about relative power brought about by changing circumstances (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). This can trigger a deep sense of uncertainty and confusion over rank and power and can motivate two types of aggressive behavior: actions by those previously low in power to claim

their rights and actions by those previously high in power to protect their status (Coleman, 2003, p. 14).

The most upsetting humiliation occurs when human rights are promised but withheld and human rights advocacy appears to be empty rhetoric. Words such as *sustainability*, *peace*, *security*, *stability*, *freedom*, and *empowerment* are treacherous, because they are usable by all sides and with opposing meanings. They lend themselves equally to the first and to the second vision of a *global village*, and can thus be used to bolster deeply opposing futures for the *global village*. Uncertainty as to what is meant at a given moment by a given person using such terms, unleashes a host of hot feelings that permeate private lives as much as public life, locally and globally. A husband may expect gratitude for benevolent patronage that helps "secure" the situation and deeply resent his wife's framing of the situation as subjugation. In the same vein, aid agencies look forward to appreciation for their benevolent support that helps "secure" the situation and intensely dislike the recipients' framing of the situation as humiliating oppression and exploitation.

The human rights revolution is further hampered by the overall slow speed of the transition. The fact that humankind currently lives in the midst of a revolution is obscured by its slowness. It began several hundreds of years ago and lasts for generations and thus is so slow that its significance is not detected by everybody. The slowness of change encourages those who lag behind to hang on to old paradigms.

When feelings heat up in this way, confrontations arise, cooperation is hampered, and trust is failing. The world turns into a dangerous place. Also the human rights revolution itself is in danger. Thus, we may conclude that the fact that the human rights revolution proceeds over many generations in a fragmented and inhomogeneous way – too fast and too slow at the same time – introduces a *malign* aspect into the project of marrying *globalization* with *egalization*. At the same time, the vision of an *egalized global village*, once the transition is successfully mastered by every party, is a profoundly *benign* vision.

Reading related to this chapter

Read more on *social justice* and the *social contract*,[177] *collectivism*,[178] and *individualism*,[179] on the *anarchy* of the "*state of nature*,"[180] on *restrictive* and *permissive* approaches to moral dilemmas that can get into loggerhead positions,[181] on the *universality of human rights*,[182] on *realizing human rights*,[183] and on a *new gut feeling* and *A New Global Consensus on Helping the Poorest of the Poor*,[184] on *social evolution* and *world systems*,[185] on *subsidiarity*,[186] and *forms of identity*.[187]

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[177] Other relevant political philosophers are William Godwin (1756-1836) with his *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (Godwin, 1793), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) with his text *The Philosophy of Right* [*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*] (Hegel, 1821), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) with his analysis *On Liberty* (Mill, 1859), Thomas Hill Green's (1836-1882) *Lectures On The Principles Of Political Obligation* (Green, 1895), Friedrich August von Hayek's (1899-1992) *Constitution of Liberty* (Hayek, 1960), and John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971), to mention but a representative few of the best known. One of the most recent writings that I referred to several times already is Avishai Margalit (Margalit, 1997, Margalit, 1996, Margalit, 2002), who stipulates that justice is not sufficient. He calls for decency, which means refraining from humiliation.

[178] The subordination of the individual's life under the roof of a common super-ordinate order is called *collectivism* in political philosophy. We read on http://www.britannica.com about *collectivism* that it "has found varying degrees of expression in the 20th century in such movements as socialism, communism, and fascism. The least collectivist of these is social democracy, which seeks to reduce the inequities of unrestrained capitalism by government regulation, redistribution of income, and varying

degrees of planning and public ownership."

[179] *Collectivism* is posited in contrast to *individualism*. Http://www.britannica.com describes that individualism is a "political and social philosophy that places high value on the freedom of the individual and generally stresses the self-directed, self-contained, and comparatively unrestrained individual or ego. The French political commentator Alexis de Tocqueville, who coined the word, described it in terms of a kind of moderate selfishness, disposing human beings to be concerned only with their own small circle of family and friends."

[180] We read about the *anarchy* of the "state of nature" in Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), as well as in the second part of John Locke's (1632-1704) *Two Treatises of Government* (Locke, 1690), and in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762).

[181] See, for example, Marks, 2002.

[182] Read, for example, Tharoor, 2000. Asian values, for example, are often depicted as opposing Western human rights values on the grounds that the latter are nothing more than yet another form of imperial domination, nothing more than a deceitful attempt by the West to usurp the throne. Mohamad Mahathir, the Malaysian Prime Minister, is one of the advocates of this view. One of the most salient arguments in this line is the criticism that human rights conditionality puts poor countries at a disadvantage and is hypocritically meant to protect Western business interests. See for a deeper discussion, for example Donald J. Puchala (1995) on *The Ethics of Globalism*: "A version of the contest between moral relativism and moral universalism is being played out in the human rights forums of the United Nations. It generated great heat at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993, where representatives of a number of African, Asian, and some Middle Eastern governments directly challenged the universality of the tenets of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These dissenters argued that the world organization's human rights regime is not universal because moral universality is impossible in a culturally diverse world. The Declaration, they claimed, is Western in philosophical content, and enforcing it in their countries constitutes outside interference. For their part, Western governments stood steadfastly behind moral universalism. They attributed unsavory political motives to their non-Western detractors and argued that what was true and universal when the Declaration was signed in 1948 remained true and universal in 1993" (Puchala, 1995, p. 8).

[183] Read, among many others, Korey, 1993, and Powers and Allison (Eds.), 2000.

[184] Read Sachs, 2000, Sachs, 2005.

[185] See classics such as Polanyi, 1944, and later Collins, 1999, Collins and Makowsky, 1993, Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997, Friedman, 1982, Wagar, 1992, Taylor, 1996, Hall (Ed.), 2000, Wagar, 1992, Taylor, 1996, Hall (Ed.), 2000. See, among many others, Wendt, 2003. See also Wasilewski, 2002. See furthermore Ray and Anderson, 2000.

[186] The European Union uses the principle of *subsidiarity* as central structuring principle. The principle of subsidiarity could be regarded as the application of short-, medium, and long-range theory within the political arena. The principle of subsidiarity states that problems are best solved in the subsystem where they arise; subsystems resolve their conflicts without involving higher authority. Whatever solution is adopted, the subsystem is responsible for it.

[187] Castells, 1997, Singer, 1987.

Misunderstandings and Humiliation

Many scenarios can be played out with humiliation as the core element. In Lindner (Lindner, 2000m) and Lindner (Lindner, 2000n), 16 scenarios are listed, 8 scenarios pertaining to the person who inflicts humiliation, and 8 to the person who suffers humiliation. The first scenario is entitled "If you humiliate me, I humiliate you!" It is explained with the following vignette:

> "I hate my wife! She treats me so badly and humiliates me every day. Now I want to humiliate her; I want to see her suffer. I thought up a plan of how to proceed, and I carry it out whenever I see a chance."

In this fashion, 8 cases are illustrated that describe how and why somebody may set out and humiliate another person, and another 8 cases that address the situation as seen from the victim's perspective. Each scenario of humiliation is being analyzed by asking certain questions. For example, does the humiliator indeed harbor hot desires to humiliate? Or is the whole story merely a misunderstanding?

Misunderstanding and humiliation is the topic of this chapter.[188] I choose misunderstanding as a topic because it is less easily accessible than more frequently discussed occurrences of humiliation such as in torture, genocide, or oppression. Everybody understands that torturers aim at humiliating their victims and the victims indeed feel humiliated. I could recount innumerable gruesome stories from my investigations in Rwanda, Somalia, and from German history. However, this would not require new thinking. Virtually everybody already agrees, everybody already knows, everybody has been amply horrified by outrageous stories of atrocities and injustices. The only contribution I could make would be to increase the revulsion. This would perhaps be beneficial, yet, increasing the revulsion by telling the smoker how dangerous it is to smoke may not actually have much impact. Perhaps it is more beneficial for the reader to reflect on cases of humiliation that are not as readily accessible and not as frequently focused upon, but surprisingly relevant.

Currently, misunderstandings seem to lead to feelings of humiliation world-wide as unintended side-effects. There are several sets of misunderstandings to be observed at present, the ones addressed in this chapter are those pertaining to the *spirit* of human rights, to the so-called *attribution error*, and at last *cross-cultural* misunderstandings.

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[188] See also Lindner, 2000m, and Lindner, 2000n.

Care, or not? How different interpretations of the spirit of human rights can humiliate

> "When you speak of human rights, you lack passion and care. Human rights in your mouth are dry and abstract. You talk about institutions and theoretical rights. I understand human rights as warm and caring invitation into the family of humanity. Your coldness and aloofness bothers me, and your lack of care humiliates humanity."

This vignette illustrates how the concept of human rights may be interpreted in different ways. Alain Badiou (2001)[189] explains that we have on one side a *Kantian* interpretation of human rights as abstract rights, and on the other side a *Lévinasian* interpretation, which highlights that human rights may also mean care and respect for the other.

I suggest that human rights are often dissipated by human rights *promoters* in the *first* sense, however, understood in the *second* sense by those who *hear* the message. And I furthermore propose that the incompatibility between the message that is sent and the message that is heard entails a potential for creating feelings of humiliation on all sides. A particularly "sore" point, where ambiguity is invited, is the notion of dignity.

Kantian or Lévinasian? Positive or negative rights?

Human rights stipulate that each human being possesses an inner core of dignity that ought not be humiliated. The first sentence in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." This sentence seems to be straightforward; however, the notion of dignity is ambiguous. It opens up to both interpretations, Kantian and Lévinasian. Or, to be more precise, there is a Lévinasian connection to equality hidden in the notion of equal dignity. The notion of equal dignity is a Lévinasian "Trojan horse" that "sneaks" into the Kantian view. The "Trojan" connection is implicated in the human rights stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect human dignity. As soon as human rights are defined in this way, when "equal chances and enabling environments for all" are on the table, Lévinasian "caring for the other" is also on the table.

The Kantian version could be simplified as follows. "Equal dignity means that, although you are poor, you can have full dignity. What is necessary for you in order to have dignity is a societal framework that gives you political rights, such as the right of free speech. In other words, you can be poor and at the same time dignified and happy." The Lévinasian version would go as follows, again, simplified. "You are poor and live under circumstances that violate human dignity. However, dignity can enter your life by embedding you within an enabling environment that gives you the chance to work yourself out of debilitating poverty into more dignified quality of life."

What is relevant here is the discussion of so-called *negative* and *positive* ("welfare") *rights*. *Negative rights* have at their core the right to be free of violence. Negative rights constitute a nonaggression axiom. *Positive rights*, on the other side, are rights to food, clothing, shelter, and meaningful experiences. They entail the Lévinasian caring aspect.

There is a problem with positive rights, however, at least when they are framed as forced egalitarianism. Who shall give all the food, clothing, shelter, and meaningful

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[189] Badiou, 2001. I thank Bjørn Flatås for pointing the work of Badiou out to me.

experiences and how should this be given? Is not a coercive socialist state needed to do that? What about cars, and villas and luxury items that people may wish to own so as to have meaningful experiences? Who is to distribute such luxury and from where should it be taken? And what happens when one person buys a Ferrari? Does not this mean, in a positive rights framework where everybody is entitled to equal conditions, that everybody has a right to own a Ferrari? Would it not be crazy, if one person's luxury would automatically bring about the right of the rest to own the same? And what about charity? Is not the notion of charity destroyed when the poor claim a right to equal conditions? And, let alone poverty, what about inequalities in beauty and intelligence? Should not the beautiful and smart construct a machine that would transfer some of their beauty and intelligence to the less fortunate so as to attain leveled conditions? In other words, positive rights, if framed as forced egalitarianism, are merely unrealistic and unrealizable. They portray a nightmare of indistinguishable, interchangeable human beings. Therefore the argument is often made that only negative rights are legitimate.

Yet, positive rights may be framed differently, not as everybody having the right to own a Ferrari, but as a right to enjoy *enabling circumstances*. Positive rights could be defined not as rights to be overindulged, but as rights to be nurtured to the point that self-help has a chance. We do not usually withhold care from our children out of fear that they will expect being nurtured lifelong. Parents frame their input as enabling their children to stand on their own feet at some point later in their lives. A certain amount of nurturing is necessary so as to give children a chance to protect their dignity. In the same spirit, a certain amount of facilitating seems desirable society-wide. This is because parents wish to release their children into a world that actually gives them a chance to build dignified lives for themselves. Even the best child nurture is useless if adult life only meets closed doors. Mapped onto the international system this means that aid is useful, and must be combined with fair global trade rules and embedded in good local and global governance, all this enabling people to step out of poverty.

As already mentioned, "individuals or groups within our moral boundaries are seen as deserving of the same fair, moral treatment as we deserve. Individuals or groups outside these boundaries are seen as undeserving of this same treatment" (Coleman, 2000, p. 118). Coleman's words indicate that there are different "gut feelings" as to what *we* need to live dignified lives, as opposed to what *they* deserve. Interestingly, often what we conceive to be "necessary for us and our loved ones" indeed entails quite some caring. Ross and Iost (1999) carried out experiments on equity[190] and tested whether people like to share equally or not. They found that the myth is wrong that everybody, if given the chance, would seize as many resources as possible. Ross and Iost found a strong tendency to want to share equally *within ingroups*, however, not *with outgroups.* The Lévinasian view of human rights is thus surprisingly close to norms that preserve the cohesion of the social fabric within any group, indicating that human rights represent inside ethics of the global village.

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[190] *Fairness Norms and the Potential for Mutual Agreements Involving Majority and Minority Groups*, by Ross and Iost, 1999.

Globalization as Lévinasian push

The process of globalization, in moving towards one single in-group, slowly expands the circle of that we feel in our gut is *us* to include all humankind, and even animals and abiotic nature. In the beginning of the human rights era mainly political rights were equated with human rights.[191] An increasing number of aspects of human rights have since been recognized (apart from civil and political rights, also economic, social and cultural rights) and they are applied to ever wider categories of people, as well as to more of biotic and abiotic nature.

As mentioned earlier, it is not long ago that honor killings, for example, were not yet pinpointed as human rights violations but "respected" as cultural idiosyncrasy. The Indian caste system has been taken up and branded as "Indian Apartheid" as freshly as 2001.[192] The most recent "newcomers" are economic rights. Poverty as violation of human rights, this is the most freshly highlighted concept based on a gut feeling that resonates with a more Lévinasian view for the *global village* (Pogge, 2002). Even animals are in the process of being included; whales and dolphins, laboratory animals, only to name a few, are increasingly regarded as part of *us* and deserving of dignity. The Earth with its biosphere is currently being "dignified" as well, even being named as a living being, for example "Gaia."

Sir James George Frazer (1854-1941), Professor of Social Anthropology at Liverpool University, has recorded practices that would hardly be found "amusing" by today's *gut feelings*, one the contrary, they would elicit revulsion and profound wonderment at how they ever could induce joy:

"In the midsummer fires formerly kindled on the Place de Grève at Paris it was the custom to burn a basket, barrel, or sack full of live cats, which was hung from a tall mast in the midst of the bonfire; sometimes a fox was burned. The people collected the embers and ashes of the fire and took them home, believing that they brought good luck. The French kings often witnessed these spectacles and even lit the bonfire with their own hands. In 1648 Louis the Fourteenth, crowned with a wreath of roses and carrying a bunch of roses in his hand, kindled the fire, danced at it and partook of the banquet afterwards in the town hall. But this was the last occasion when a monarch presided at the midsummer bonfire in Paris. At Metz midsummer fires were lighted with great pomp on the esplanade, and a dozen cats, enclosed in wicker cages, were burned alive in them, to the amusement of the people. Similarly at Gap, in the department of the High Alps, cats used to be roasted over the midsummer bonfire. In Russia a white cock was sometimes burned in the midsummer bonfire; in Meissen or Thuringia a horse's head used to be thrown into it. Sometimes animals are burned in the spring bonfires. In the Vosges cats were burned on Shrove Tuesday; in Alsace they were thrown into the Easter bonfire. In the department of the Ardennes cats were flung into the bonfires kindled on the first Sunday in Lent; sometimes, by a refinement of cruelty, they were hung over the fire from the end of a pole and roasted alive. 'The cat, which represented the devil, could never suffer enough.' While the creatures were perishing in the flames, the shepherds guarded their flocks and forced them to leap over the fire, esteeming this an infallible means of preserving them from disease and witchcraft. We have seen that squirrels were sometimes burned in the Easter fire" (Frazer, 1922, Chapter 64).

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[191] See, for example, http://www.hri.ca/.

[192] "World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance" in Durban, South Africa, August 31 - September 7, 2001.

Changing gut feelings indicate that we all are participants in a historic development from several separate *ingroup ethics* that excluded *outgroups*, towards ethical gut feelings that embrace *One single ingroup*. The Lévinasian version of human rights is gaining ground in the hearts and minds of an increasing number of people via the notion of dignity. Lévinasian *global village ingroup ethics* force themselves upon everybody. And, as the vignette about burning cats brings home, even animals are increasingly being embraced by our empathy. Organizations such as *Animals Angels*, just to give one of countless examples, protect and help stranded animals or supervise animal transports to ensure a dignified treatment. The habit of eating animals, as well, is increasingly eschewed; vegetarianism is on the rise. (Spaceship Enterprise and other media products have managed to introduce even extraterrestrials into human hearts, thus showing that we are willing to go as far as welcoming the entire universe.)

As long as people lived for themselves, and the next valley was several days on horse-back away, warm inclusive feelings for all had little chance to develop. The situation changes, however, when people get closer. Then even love stories may emerge. Although we do not literally enter into a love relationship with the rest of the *global village*'s inhabitants (or extraterrestrials for that matter), their coming closer makes them relevant to us as people who we compare us with, as people we would like to get recognition from, and as people who humiliate us when they do not respect us. As discussed earlier, globalization turns *absolute* deprivation into *relative* deprivation and Lévinasian human rights turn *debilitating relative deprivation* into a *violation of human dignity*.

Globalization as love story

My experience from three decades of international life indicates that indeed, the *coming-into-being of the global village* is a *love story*, a love story that carries the risk of all love stories, namely that it can turn into hatred when betrayed, and can be destroyed by hot reactions that may later be regretted.

Elites are typically admired, loved and envied, and the rich West is not excluded from this phenomenon. What the French court was for Europe, is the West for the *global village*. Copies of the castle of Versailles are to be found everywhere in Europe, copies of the Western style of life cover the entire earth's surface. Elites are often quite uninformed about the rest, while the rest is usually much better informed about everything. Elites do not realize to what extent their admirers know them, imitate them, emulate their life styles, and try to participate in it. Americans are not known to travel much, even members of the Congress have no passports, and most Americans are certainly not versed in the globe's geography. However, this is not the case for the rest of the world. A Somali nomad in the desert listens attentively to BBC radio every day, and Afghans in remote valleys know when a plane crashes in Alaska. The yearning for Western quality of life betrays its global admiration. Not to forget, why do so many pay huge amounts of money to actually be smuggled into the "castle," the "court," the rich West? America and the entire West is admired and yearned for; love declarations are submitted to them every day.

In other words, the addressees of this admiration are not necessarily aware of those love declarations sent to them. They tend to believe in a world of independent nation states and assume that everybody is as much consumed by their own inner affairs as they are. They do not understand that this is not the case, on the contrary, that they have a castle and the others not, that there is inequality in the world, and that the rich

are the object of intense desire from the rest. The rich may not know it, but they are at the centre of the world's attention.

Yet, there is more. Not only do the rich dissipate messages of how wealth is like, they currently also broadcast invitations to the poor to come to the castle. The rich West sends out love declarations, namely "all people are equal, nobody ought to be humiliated;" more precisely, the rich promote the human rights message. To put it differently, the rich send Western soap operas around the world so as to show the poor how it looks like inside the palace and how the paradise can be experienced on Earth and not only in afterlife. And then they invite the poor in, as equals, through the message of human rights. And this message is heard. More than the rich realize. The rich do not understand to what degree this message is taken as literal invitation into Western quality of life. To say it succinctly, the West sends out powerful love declarations, without realizing that people will actually happily respond, wish to move in and want to get "married."

Penniless suitors are unwelcome

Confronted with uninvited penniless suitors, such as asylum seekers swimming through the sea or climbing over barbed wires, the West is astounded, sends them back and explains that the love declaration was not meant so literally. If not before, at least at this point hot feelings arise on the invitees side: Love has been betrayed, love declarations have been rejected, people feel treated as lesser beings and far from taken as equals. And as we know, feelings of humiliation may explode in acts of humiliation.

   As soon as the Lévinasian interpretation of human rights as care has found fertile ground, an additional source of misunderstanding arises. Care is defined differently in collectivistic communities as compared to Western individualistic societies. Westerners do not understand to what degree they are taken to be responsible for giving care in the rather collectivistic rest of the world.

Annegret came to me because she could not stand her Egyptian husband "squandering" their hard-earned money on his brother. "You know, I love my husband's family. When I arrived from Europe as his wife, I was welcomed so warmly that I never looked back and never got homesick.

   However, there is a problem. My brother-in-law has financial problems. He often sends his wife and children to stay with us. I am not opposed to helping family, but I think this goes too far. Once, one of his girls liked a picture on our wall and my husband said to her, "It's yours! Take it!" I was shocked and furious, but my husband told me that it was his duty to open his home to his family and to share everything with them. What shall I do? I cannot live like this in the long-term!

   My husband blames me that I have no heart and that I disrespect profound family duties. He explains to me that I am blind to fact that I grew up in a Western welfare state and that in Egypt the family is the only welfare security net. He tells me that the state provides privileges in the West that give their citizens the illusion of self-reliance and that I should shed this illusion of individual independence.

   I hear his words, but, still, I do not understand his concept of care! It goes too far for me! I am extremely irritated by my brother-in-law and feel that he abuses me and my husband. It is me who feels that my dignity is being violated and humiliated by his demands, not he who should feel humiliated by my lack of care! I am afraid that at some point all this will end in divorce!"

The vignette of Annegret shows that the concept of care that is entailed in a Lévinasian view of human rights, carries the seeds to another round of misunderstandings. How far must care go? How much of a right do the poor have to be supported by the rich? What does it entail to declare humankind as *One family*?

   To summarize, increasing global closeness, high mutual expectations of care, reciprocally misunderstood, combined with stress and subsequent lowering of self-control, facilitate violent acting-out as soon as care is perceived as lacking and feelings of humiliation accumulate.

   Yet, these mechanisms are rarely understood in the West. Westerners easily react like Annegret initially did. Instead of extending enabling care, the victims of lack of care are rebuked for seeking help.

Annegret found a way out to save her marriage. She put her European network of relations into swing and found a suitable position for her brother-in-law. He was now able to maintain his family and less dependent on help. There was no economic need anymore on his part to send his family to stay with relatives. Annegret felt greatly relieved. The feelings of anger and frustration that earlier had dominated her marriage waned. Instead, Annegret was filled with feelings of agency and pride and her marriage grew in depth.

Current right-wing political movements in many European countries would like to shut national borders for immigration. Australia recently receives a lot of media attention for tough politics on immigration. Such political processes are indicators of the emotional problems entailed in the shrinking of a planet that suffers from hot feelings triggered by new closeness. Penniless suitors are not welcome, contrary to the Lévinasian interpretation of the human rights broadcast. At the same time enabling care that would prevent these suitors from knocking on others' doors (fair global trade rules for example), is insufficient.

However, even though enabling care is still insufficient, it is on the rise. The notion of sovereignty is currently in the process of being weakened so as to free people from the grip of dictators. What still is missing, however, is efficient prevention of abuse of power, well-organized ways of dismantling tyrants, and equal chances for all on the global market place.

The 2003 Iraq war in many ways illustrates the transition from Kantian to Lévinasian human rights interpretations. During the war and in the course of the discussions preceding it, a constant veering could be observed between different reasons for the war. Was it to be a war to dismantle Saddam Hussein's regime? Or was the aim only the disarmament of the regime without dismantling it? And why was disarmament so important? Was it because the Saddam regime killed and tortured its own people, or because it was about to threaten the West? And what about other dictators? What about feeding dictators and selling them weapons in the first place? What about global justice? And what about sovereignty? Is it not a violation of international law to invade other countries and preemptively "take out" regimes? Is not such behavior equal to disdain for international law and disrespect for national sovereignty?

Different world views drive these questions. In a world of several *villages*, sovereignty is untouchable. The view of untouchable sovereignty corresponds to the old notion of parents being allowed to do what they wanted with their children, or a man beating and raping his wife as he pleased because this occurred within an supposedly "untouchable" *private sphere*. In such a context, this man or parent would face police intervention only if he started beating his neighbors and threaten others than his family. In a world of *One single village*, in contrast, national sovereignties transform into neighborhood relations that are subject to common policing; beating children and wives is not anymore "protected" by private sovereignty.

Some among my American friends adhere to the first stance as follows, "We, America, are rich not because we were given help. We are rich because we are industrious! How come that we are expected to distribute our wealth to people who are lazy or give them a hand? Human rights are to us democratic institutions and free press. These people around the world, who envy our riches, should put in place democratic societies and then be industrious. If they want tyrants to govern them, it is their problem. As long as they do not opt for democracy and freedom, it is their own fault if they lag behind. We find their whining repugnant. They lament that we

humiliate them by being arrogant and imperialistic. No, we reply, on the contrary, their complaints are shameless and humiliating to us! We find that America has no obligation to 'free' Iraqis! The only good reason for us to go to war in Iraq is that Saddam Hussein may be a threat to America. Period. Saddam Hussein may hurl insults at us, it will not help him! We have a right to defend ourselves!"

Other American friends highlighted the second stance, "No, parents are not to mistreat their children, and husbands should not abuse their wives. Society has to step in! Neighbors have to send in police, even if the husband protests and feels insulted and humiliated by the police hindering him, and even if he is no threat to outsiders. In the same line, we have to step in and depose tyrants like Saddam, even if he has no weapons of mass destruction. We owe it to his people to liberate them!"

Indeed, the latter version is the current mainstream interpretation of the 2003 Iraq war in the United States. Thus, gut feelings as to national sovereignty are veering towards the sentiment that indeed tyrants are not to abuse their people. World police is to step in. And, without a doubt, these gut feelings are shared world-wide. The global dissent as to whether the 2003 Iraq war was a "good" or "bad" one, does not concern the notion that tyrants ought to go. The dissent addresses the necessity of *war* to bring tyrants to fall. Questions arise such as, "Could we have brought this tyrant down without bombs? Why could not the international community, the United Nations, police this problem? Why did the richest world player have to do this job almost alone and insist that their way had to be followed? Is not the price too high to be liberated by depleted uranium that brings cancer and malformed babies? Should there not be a democratically legitimized world police? Why are the rich first feeding tyrants and then bombing them? Would it not be better to not feed tyrants so as to make violent interventions redundant? And what about enabling circumstances for the poor of the world? Is it sufficient to give them 'freedom'? Where are decent sustainable global arrangements?"

Thus the current international dissent concerns more the qualia of policing, prevention, and care in a *global village* than the necessity of policing, prevention, and care. The current global discussion does not address so much whether the abusive husband is a threat to others and therefore must be stopped. There is a wide-spread gut feeling that tyrants who abuse their own people have no legitimacy, even if they do not threaten outsiders. What is at the core of global dissent is the way in which world policing ought best be done and whether the problem could not have been prevented. The state of global discussion thus marks the degree to which the global *village* indeed is framed as *global* village by its citizens.

The disappointment

Imagine there are no traffic lights and those with small vehicles are used to wait at cross-roads until the large and powerful vehicles have passed. Then, one day, the owners of the larger vehicles endorse a declaration that all are now *one* family with equal rights, and that traffic lights should be installed at every cross-road; nobody should anymore be treated as lesser being for having a smaller vehicle. There is great joy among those with smaller vehicles. They were used to admire the big vehicles, envy their owners, fix up their small cars so as to make them seem bigger, sometimes even steal big ones, and now they are invited to be equals! They feel lifted up, honored, respected, and loved. Finally, their admiration for the powerful is responded to with recognition: love declaration meets love declaration.

However, soon it becomes clear that most of the big car owners continue their old practice of passing first at cross-roads; they most often than not disregard traffic lights without even noticing their violation. Great disappointment emerges among those with smaller vehicles, hopes had been created and then betrayed, humiliating subjugation first outlawed and practiced anyhow. Some get so aggravated that they set off and destroy traffic lights. The owners of larger vehicles react with dismay when faced with such "vandalism;" after all, they preached love and get hatred. They were not aware to what extent they were at the centre of attention and yearning, to what extent they had raised hopes that they never were prepared to fulfill. Both sides get aggravated and regret it later. What were lovers, call each other "enemies" and it takes generations to cool down and recognize that all have misperceived the situation, reacted too hotly, and should apologize.

The here described dynamics are not only played out on the global arena. Michelle Fine (2002) conducted research with poor and working class youth in California, who are attending schools that suffer from structural disrepair, high rates of uncertified teachers, high teacher turnover rates and inadequate books and instructional materials. Fine argues "that such schools accomplish more than simple 'reproduction' of class and race/ethnic inequities … The evidence suggests that these schools not only systematically under-educate poor and working class youth, and youth of color, but they convert pride into shame, a yearning for quality education into anger, and they channel active civic engagement into social cynicism and alienation (Fine et al., 2002, Abstract).[193]

To summarize this section we can conclude that mutually "misunderstood" definitions of human rights elicit feelings of humiliation that are central to the new grievances of the *global village*, since new closeness helps create them. If it is true that "we always hurt the ones we love," not least because disappointed love creates hot feelings, then the coming-into-being of the *global village* is bound to increase such hot feelings, at least initially, until humankind has learned to cope. Foreigners want to move into our guestroom, worse than that, they are impoverished foreigners who admire our riches and want to participate in them as respected players. They feel humiliated by our contempt for them, and we feel humiliated by their lack of thankfulness and recognition for our helpfulness. We may say, "We invited the oppressed of the world to seek asylum in our walls, we 'loved' them, we were proud of our high ideals; now they misuse us and humiliate us: let us send them back!" They may reply, "You believe that you can hide behind your castle walls, treat us like animals and disengage from our suffering; we will terrorize you and let you feel that

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[193] See also Schwebel, 2003.

humiliating us is not without cost for you! We will pay for humiliation with humiliation!"

My collateral damage is your evil intention! How the attribution error can humiliate

"Whatever goes wrong in *our* camp is reason for you to triumph and call us evil. Whatever goes wrong in *your* camp is merely an error. Whatever damage *you* do, it is never evil. We are no different than you. How come that *we* are so evil in your eyes? Your bias humiliates us."

This vignette suggests that it may be too simple to describe different *camps* as inherently *different*. They may be far from different. Similarities and common ground may be larger than expected. And overlooking existing similarities and common ground may be at humankind's peril.

Currently, the world contains many *camps*; Israelis are pitched against Palestinians in the Middle East, Tamils and Singhalese in Sri Lanka, Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. These are examples of regional conflicts, yet, there are also global "camps." "Western" values are often seen to be irreconcilable with "non-Western" values. Usually such controversies are regarded as head-on oppositions.

However, perhaps this framing could be differentiated? Research in social psychology suggests that many apparent divisions are based on underlying agreements on values, a congruence that is quite surprising for many. Social psychology research indicates that common ground is systematically underestimated. The reason is that human beings suffer from what is called *bias*. *Ingroup* and *outgroup* differentiations lead to serious *biases* in perceptions and judgments; and these tendencies are intensified wherever violent and armed confrontations increase stress. Thus, barriers to conflict resolution may not *be inherently* insurmountable, but only *appear* insurmountable due to psychological limitations suffered by the involved parties.

Ross and Ward (1995) worked intensively on such barriers,[194] for example, on *reactive devaluation*.[195] Reactive devaluation means that any proposition for compromise that is put forward by an *adversary* is rejected, regardless of its contents, while the *own* group's arguments are regarded by its members with sympathy, merely because they come from the *own* group.

Phenomena such as *essentialization* and the so-called *fundamental attribution error* are central as well. The *fundamental attribution error* can cause rifts and create feelings of humiliation in opposing camps that otherwise would not be there.[196] The *attribution error* could be described as humans having the tendency to believe that their successes are theirs, while their failures are due to adverse circumstances. In the spirit of the *attribution error* this evaluation is turned into its opposite when *others* are judged. *Others'* successes are perceived as due to favorable circumstances, while only their failures are *theirs*.

The human tendency to essentialize in fashions governed by the *attribution error* is

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[194] *Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution*, by Ross and Ward, 1995.

[195] *Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution*, by Ross, 1995a.

[196] There are other effects that should be mentioned, such as the false polarization effect, see, for example, Ross and Ward, 1996. This effect makes people systematically underestimate common ground.

a human bias, which is basic to human perceptions and conceptualizations and at the same time central to creating feelings of humiliation. We observe examples everywhere. We see them in the current Middle East conflict, the conflict in Sri Lanka, in the 2003 Iraq war, as well as in the global *war on terrorism*. The attribution error being linked to humiliation occurs as Leitmotiv. We merely have to listen to any spokesperson's statement about the appalling behavior of *others*.

Usually, spokespersons deplore yet another act of violence that the *other* side "cold-bloodedly" perpetrated. *Others* wounded and killed innocent civilians who had done nothing wrong except being Jewish or Palestinian (or Tamil and Singhalese, and so forth). It is inferred that the *other* side's evil aim is to target innocent civilians. It is highlighted to the world how this is humiliating, how this is a transgression of acceptable limits, a transgression that causes the utmost suffering and merits the utmost retaliation.

This is not "merely" a struggle between two "civilized" parties who defend themselves, so goes the central message to the world, it is more, it is a struggle with an opponent who goes too far, who hates *us* to the extent so as to kill innocent group members. It is this transgression that lights the fire of passionate feelings of humiliation. It is the inference that hateful intentions govern the opposing side beyond mere self-defense that could perhaps be "understandable." It is the burning question of why *we* are victims of *unexplainably evil* hatred emanating from *others*, a hatred that goes so far that it transgresses accepted rules of conflict. When civilians are dying, it is felt that the essence of Jewishness, the essence of Palestinian identity is the object of hatred, an unexplainable evil hatred, directed at one's inner core, and therefore deeply humiliating. "Look, how we are victimized by deep humiliation that cannot go unanswered, you must understand that we have to retaliate!" this is the message transmitted to the world by both sides.

At the same time each side confirms that civilian casualties that may have been caused by one's own actions to the other side are unintended and unavoidable "side effects" and *collateral damage*, something the *other* ought to understand and excuse. However, neither side deems this to be credible. What is *collateral damage* for one side is essentialized as *evil intentions* by the other. The Israeli side confirms that they do their utmost to protect civilians, however, that Palestinians use their own compatriots as shields, something that again proves their moral worthlessness and evilness. At the same time the Palestinian side explains that suicide bombers do not target civilians for being civilians, but that as oppressed occupants they do not have other weapons than their own bodies.

The international community, that recently emerged as perhaps the most important player in its capacity as third party, is implored to understand, acknowledge and recognize the degree of victimization and humiliation each side has to suffer. The international community, however, is exhausted. They wish these opponents to make peace instead of trying to implant their hot feelings into the wider world. The international community is bewildered and asks, "Don't these adversaries see that all human beings basically want the same? That all sides want to live in peace and quiet, have some reasonable quality of life and offer their children a future? Don't they see that they have more commonalities among each other than differences? Don't they see that their distorted mutual perceptions are their biggest enemy? Why don't they change their perceptions?"

Thus, we can conclude that *ingroup biases*, while providing ingroups with sweet

cohesion in shared simplistic world views, when "prescribed" to larger audiences that ought to aim at cooperation, may elicit disgust and even feelings of humiliation that are prone to deepen rifts between groups instead of healing them.

"Eastern" versus "Western" values

Following the pattern of regional conflicts, the *global village* is equally being torn apart. The "West" is perceived as ethically wanting, as "decadent" by many in the "non-West." Anybody traveling in what nowadays is subsumed as "non-West" knows that apart from admiration and yearning for Western quality of life, there is also a host of ill-feelings being harbored with respect to the West. The West, in non-Western eyes, does not sufficiently care for the elderly, not for children, displays an appallingly high divorce rate, little genuine compassion and insufficient social cohesion, and so forth. The West in turn targets the non-West in similar ways. In Western eyes, non-Western women are but abused, individual freedom choked, and self-expression curtailed.

In reality, however, both, the West and the non-West, have more in common than is apparent at the first glance. Both value social cohesion highly. My doctoral dissertation in social-psychological medicine (Lindner, 1994) examined these topics. I compared Germany and Egypt and what they regard as core priority for good quality of life. All yearn for social cohesion balanced with individual freedom. In the "West," rifts to social cohesion such as divorce, or lack of compassion, are deeply regretted as unwanted *side effect*s, a price to be paid for the transition towards more personal freedom, authenticity and flexibility. In the same vain, non-Westerners value individual freedom, and regret any need to curtail it as a sad *side effect*, as price to be paid for social cohesion.

Thus the fundamental *attribution error* leads to regretable *side effect*s that are perceived by the *other* side as the *other's* essence, as profoundly *theirs*, while *commonalities*, such as the *universality of the appreciation of social cohesion that has to be balanced with individual freedom*, are underplayed. Lee Ross wrote in a personal message to me on October 8, 2001, "The invidious comparison, of course, involves the perception that while we are sincere and objective in our actions and analyses, and the costs we inflict on others are an undesirable side effect of inevitable, virtuous, or necessary actions, 'they' are either insincere or misguided, and they have no concern (or even rejoice in) such costs to others. I think discussion of this asymmetry is very much worth emphasizing."

One of the frequently highlighted aspects in the "West" versus "non-West" confrontation is the status of women. However, again, is there not a lot of commonality? Are there not similar tendencies to be observed on all sides? Christian fundamentalists, for example, who have patriarchal leanings and wish their women to stay home, resemble Islamic fundamentalists, who see restrictions for women as a price to be paid for social cohesion, rather than as an attack on women. And moderates on all sides try to open up individual space for women. Sayyid, 1997, therefore criticizes the use of the term fundamentalism for Islamism. (I use the term fundamentalist close to the word extremist as someone who essentializes difference – in Western as much as in non-Western contexts – and who opposes moderates who prefer to emphasize common ground.)

And it is mistaken to believe that practices such as veiling in the "non-West" are merely a result of cruel oppression. The picture is more complex. I met numerous women throughout the years who moved towards increased seclusion and restriction,

both in Christian and in Muslim contexts. I know Christian women who converted to Islam and took the veil, because they felt that the veil finally expressed the respect and self-respect they had yearned for all their lives. Often such women were unusual sincere and intelligent, as sincere as their strongest critics, those women who evaluate the situation as lack of respect and self-respect.

Gabriele was a German girl who moved to Cairo and converted to fundamentalist Islam. She took the veil. She rejoiced, "Finally, I feel respected! Finally, I feel I am something else than this female body that is on the front page of all magazines! Finally, I feel I am a person with a mind and not only this decoration doll that half-naked adorns every kiosk in every Western city! How I am disgusted at this sell-out of the female body, this besmirching of female dignity wherever you turn in the "West"! I am so glad that I have the veil with which I can signal to all these people who view women as erotic objects that I have dignity and deserve respect! It is a nuisance with this veil, I know, but how glad I am to pay this price!"

It is the *fundamental attribution error* that turns the limitation of women's freedom either into an *evil essence* or into a *necessary sacrifice*, depending on the standpoint of the person who judges. (This I say, personally belonging to the severest critics of the restriction of women. Yet, I have empathy for the reasons why Christian and Muslim fundamentalists are drawn to such views. However, I personally think that to remedy perceived disrespect for women by restricting them is unsuitable and counterproductive.)

The example of female status can be mapped onto the entire global situation. The West, no doubt, frequently violates human rights insofar as old *Realpolitik* sometimes wins over human rights ideals. This leads to many in the "non-West" asking questions such as, "Why does the West fight for human rights and democracy in this and that country, but refrains from protecting victims of oppression as soon as the perpetrators are governments that are counted as 'allies' or 'friends' by the West?" *Double standards*, or lack of *even-handedness*, this is the impression the West often provides to those who have bought into the ideals of human rights and feel that these ideals are preached but not reached.

Western human rights activists acknowledge such shortcomings when they occur, however, explain them to be *regrettable inadequacies* in a world that has not yet evolved into a context in which old *Realpolitik* can be set aside. They hope that the struggle for more human rights will soon form a world of global justice. Non-Westerners, on the other side, may turn the argumentation around and, in the spirit of the *fundamental attribution error*, deem shortcomings as *essence* and not as *short-term side effects that may be overcome*.

At the same time there is, in reality, ample common ground. Social cohesion is not just a non-Western desire; it is also a core Western value. Western human rights advocates deem Western divorce rates and anomy, or relapses into old *Realpolitik*, as *side effec*ts to be targeted, for example, by personal growth courses. Non-Westerners may judge those Western shortcomings as *core-failings* that prove that the non-Western strategy of paying the price of subjugating personal freedom to group cohesion is preferable. Shortcomings are thus present in both groups, however, evaluated and responded to in opposing terms.

As I will emphasize further down, the significant fault line does not run between the "West" and the "non-West," but between fundamentalists and moderates, in all camps. Fundamentalists have much in common, in all camps, as have moderates.

More so, both, fundamentalists and moderates, typically have in common that they care for the well-being of the individual within a collective; they differ only on the calibrating of space they think collectivistic versus individualistic approaches ought to receive for that purpose.

At what point do feelings of humiliation come in? Humiliation enters the scene through the self-righteousness that results from the *attribution error*. Every party feels that they in fact are entitled to "help" the other party understand what is right and wrong, or what is ethical and non-ethical and this may have, though unintended, humiliating effects, because the other side thinks just as self-righteously. When this kind of humiliation occurs, it flows from misunderstanding – misunderstanding oneself, the other, and reality – rooted in the common human nature to see oneself in a more forgiving light than the other.

Feelings of humiliation stemming from such misunderstanding, wherever they emerge, are typically compounded by the problem that the West preaches human rights, while being blind to the fact that violations of these very rights may create feelings of humiliation in the victims of such violations. This blindness partly stems from another human weakness, namely the belief in a *just world* that tends to *blame the victim*. The belief in a *just world* gives the more privileged in the global community an "alibi" to be blind to the sufferings of the less privileged, because "everybody deserves what he has."

The situation is aggravated when those who are blind to the injustice and obscenity of poverty are also blind to the fact that they themselves may be the ones to contribute to heightening the poors' sufferings through promoting human rights without seeing them through. On the part of the recipients of empty promises, perceiving *double standards* quickly amounts to *double humiliation*.

East German versus West German "culture"

Reducing blindness among the privileged will allow for the recognition of the fact that expressions of discontent are often transparent re-actions to perceived humiliation, and not unfathomable and opaque actions of unexplainable evil. Terrorism, for example, may in many instances be a *response to humiliation* and no *evil essence*. Rifts that may be unfathomable otherwise, may be understood as outflow of feelings of humiliation.

Germany after reunification may serve as an example. The Berlin Wall fell in late 1989. East Germans declared "Wir sind ein Volk! [We are one people!]" and danced together with West Germans in the streets of Berlin. West and East Germans were *One people* again, they were re-united. This should have been the beginning of a blissful intra-cultural communication among this *One people*.

However, things did not develop all that well. "I Want My Wall Back!" This is the message broadcasted on T-shirts only a few years after re-unification. Jandt (1995) writes, "The irony of unification is that it has produced an Eastern identity that decades of Communist propaganda failed to achieve. Products made in the East sector are experiencing a revival as a way to assert a separate identity… The invisible wall that now exists will take generations to fall because the redevelopment of a homogeneous society takes time" (Jandt, 1995, p. 272).

"I Want My Wall Back!" How could such sentiment gain popularity? How could Eastern-made products, so recently despised, become desirable markers for a new

Eastern cultural identity? What had happened? Many people, especially in Eastern Europe, would claim that East Germans have enjoyed a very favorable situation since reunification. Their rich compatriots have helped them, a privilege other East Europeans were denied. Why are East Germans not more satisfied with their current situation?[197] And, on the West German side, should it not be a welcome burden for West Germans to be able to help their fellow Germans, disadvantaged for so many decades? Why are differences now being played *up*, which were played *down* when the Wall came down? Why has cultural separation rather than cultural unity become the key topic of discussion?

It is commonly argued that the reason for the surprisingly large split between East and West Germans is the existence of an unexpected cultural difference, a cultural difference that developed during the years of separation into two blocks. Jandt (1995) reports the words of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, "We have drifted much further apart than we thought" (Jandt, 1995, p. 267).

This is certainly one way of viewing the situation, but not the only possible interpretation. Cultural differences may be of much more recent origin, and humiliation may play a central role. The perceived "arrogance" of "Wessies" may be responsible, at least partly, for *cultural difference*. Humiliation may have the power to create, maintain, and deepen cultural differences, even where there is a strong willingness to be *One* culture. The point is that West German "help" may not necessarily have dignified its recipients but may repeatedly have humiliated them. It was help that demanded from the East German receiver an admission of cultural, moral, and personal bankruptcy, in other words, the abandonment of pride.

The *fundamental attribution error* of which "Wessies" are accused of is that while they excuse their own failures in life by attributing them to unfavorable circumstances instead of lack of ability, they do not make the same allowance in the case of East Germans; instead, they attribute the failure of East Germany to some kind of "stupidity" inherent in East Germans.

To counter the allegation of "stupidity," East Germans explain,[198] almost apologetically, that they have done their best to survive in the former DDR environment and find it humiliating to be expected to confess to "inherent stupidity" in exchange for help, help that the donors know only too well East Germans cannot do without. To be locked helplessly in a situation of degradation, even more, to be pushed to self-degradation in a situation of need, fulfils the definition of humiliation.

One kind of defense available for East Germans seems to be to respond along lines such as "We are worth something, our lives in the former DDR were not altogether useless! We would, in fact, be happy if we could do without your help! And, by the way, your help is not as fantastic as you think after all! Be honest, don't you profit yourself from helping us? Perhaps we would actually prefer to live in a dignified way behind the Wall, than be humiliated without it! And look, we have a valuable and distinct East German culture, which we are proud of! We know, for example, what loyalty is, unlike you!"[199]

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[197] Another "unification," Hong Kong returning to China, has been addressed by Brewer, 1999a, Fu et al., 1999, Hong, Abrams, and Ng, 1999, Hong et al., 1999.

[198] The sources for this statement are provided by the author's network of family relations, but also by close monitoring of the media; for example, in political talk shows this topic "creeps in" and presents itself in its various shades of mutual understanding and misunderstanding that hovers between participants from the former East and West.

[199] This uttering is condensed from accounts from 12 encounters and media coverage. Mummendey describes general expectations towards East Germans also in her research: "In general, East Germans

East German uneasiness has been on the rise during the past few years. This process can even be quantified: The PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) is the successor party of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), the old communist party of the DDR. West Germanys assumed that the PDS (the "red socks" or "roten Socken" as the conservative CDU called them) would just wither away in a rich and unified Germany. But the unexpected happened. In several East German *Länder* the PDS grew instead of waning away.[200] The numbers make clear that the PDS, the savior of East German identity, was five times stronger in Saxony in 1998 than in Germany as a whole and that the *Erststimmen* [direct votes] increased by about ten percent between 1994 and 1998. And many East Germans who vote for the PDS make clear that they not so much want communism back, but their self-respect back.[201]

The West German side reacts to this "rift digging" undertaken by East Germans with a mixture of astonishment and disgust. However, some try to understand. Sociologist Dietmar Wittich (2000)[202] says,

> German unity was enacted as an enforcement of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany] system. The chance to create something common of the two very different societies, to link their special features has been wasted. As the West Germans to this day continue one-sidedly interpreting the history of the GDR [German Democratic Republic, or East Germany] according to their prejudices, redefining biographies, they remain alien in the East and keep reproducing the relative autonomy of the GDR society. This lack of desire to learn on the part of the West German elites is fascinating me because in the competition of the systems the victory of the West, of parliamentary democracy and market economy resulted from the very fact that this system proved to be more capable of learning. Paradoxically, in the moment of victory this society, in particular its elite, lost its ability to learn (Wittich, 2000, p. 1).

Thus, what is *unfathomable" ill-will* on the East German side, viewed from the West German side, is *deeply understandable reaction against humiliation* in the East German camp. Both overlook that they all yearn for the same, namely respect. West Germans gamble away respect with blindness, they do not understand that their *casual display of power* may indeed be offensive, and East Germans misinterpret this rather "accidental" blindness as essentially *evil* intention.

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were expected to consider their status position as inferior compared to West Germans" (Mummendey et al., 1999). See also Billig for "everyday thinking," discourse and society, ideology and opinions Billig, 1995, Billig, 1976, Billig et al., 1988, Billig, 1991, Billig, 1996, Howitt and Billig, 1989.

[200] In Sachsen [Saxony], for example, the PDS collected 14,3 % votes for their candidates (so-called "Erststimmen"), and 16,5 % votes for their party (so-called "Zweitstimmen") in 1994. The elections in 1998 showed a remarkable increase: 24,5 % of the voters gave their Erststimme to PDS candidates, and 22,2 % gave their Zweitstimme to the party. By comparison, the average strength of the PDS in Germany as a whole is minimal. Here the PDS reached a negligible 4,9 % of the Erststimmen, and 5,1% Zweitstimmen in 1998.

[201] See a social identity approach to understanding party identification in Greene, 1999.

[202] See also Reindl and Wittich, 1995, Hinrichs and Wittich, 1994.

Response to humiliation or evil essence?

If we reflect on "Eastern" and especially Islamic values versus "Western" values, we find a very similar dynamic. On the side of the rich West we find blindness as to the fact that their *casual display of power* indeed may have offensive effects, and in the non-Western camp we see an *essentialization*, namely that Western power play is regarded to hide evil intentions. Similar to the West German and East German situation, the West proves its *essential badness* through a deplorably weak moral fabric, seen from the East, and vice versa.

In reality all sides are in astonishing concord, both within Germany and also the Islamic world and the West. People such as bin Laden speak with a soft voice. They present themselves as holy ascetics more than as power-hungry bullies. They provide an image of brave victims who defend themselves in spite of all hardship. Whether they are authentic and believe what they preach, I do not know, however, as far as I can judge, many of their followers are attracted by this display of humbleness. I lived in Egypt for many years and am familiar with the emotional yearnings felt in this region. The impression these leaders give is that they stand for a justice that is higher than the lowly material world. (As made clear earlier, *understanding* is a word that must be differentiated. *Fathoming* terror does not mean *condoning* it. Thus, this paragraph is not to be read as condoning terrorism.)

What human rights advocates and these Islamic fundamentalist followers share, I suggest, is a suffering from a world they perceive as unjust and lowly, combined with a vision of how to remedy this sad state with higher values. Western human rights activists judge the world as being in need of improvement, as do the fundamentalists we discuss here. The difference lies in the evaluation of justice and the choice of remedies. Human rights are to save to world, this is the view in the West, Islamic fundamentalism is to save to world (or at least its Islamic part), this is the view held by some in the Islamic camp. The disquiet about the state of the world unites both. This disquiet is their common ground.

Western human rights promoters define the way out of their disquiet in the form of human rights ideals that they draw from their social and cultural environment. The Osama bin Ladens, on the other side, grew up in another kind of world and were exposed to a different set of solutions. They live in a world, where Islam and Arab history provide scripts for heroic martyrdom (see, for example, Saladin). Not all cultural contexts on the globe have martyrdom on offer. Confucianism in China, for example, does not provide people with a dream of an afterlife that rewards holy warriors for martyrdom. Furthermore, there is a culture of "noble warriors" in the Arab world. Not least Afghans and Yemenites (this is Osama bin Laden's family background), are "noble warriors," as are Somalis. After several years of research on Somalia, I am familiar with people who are proud that they never were subjugated, that they never bow: Somalis tell me that they do not experience humiliation, because a man would rather die than accept humiliation.

Thus, an Osama bin Laden and his followers can rely on several cultural "scripts" for bravery and martyrdom. In addition, there may be a personal history of humiliation to be found in the biography of bin Laden, similar to Hitler or Siad Barre in Somalia, a biography that makes him want to sacrifice lives in order to avenge humiliation. Thus he may have a personal tendency to structure a situation in terms of humiliation. This may have been amplified by those Americans bin Laden was in touch with during the course of his life. He may have had contact with Americans who did fall into the cliché of arrogant Yankees. And since feelings of Arab humiliation at the hands of Western supremacy simmer in the background of the Arab

soul since decades, compounded by frustration caused by economic difficulties, there is ample "fuel" for narratives of humiliation that people like bin Laden can instrumentalize.

However, terrorism, being as condemnable as it is, is not "easy" to carry out. It is not "easy" to give one's life in suicide bombings. It requires a lot of courage, not cowardice. To acknowledge this courage may be crucial for the West. The President of the United States, George W. Bush, was adamant that the "Iraqi enemy" is not "honorable": The "Iraqi enemy" engaged in "false surrenders," their soldiers slipped into civil cloths only to continue fighting as "guerilla" forces, and finally, they planned for "cowardly" suicide attacks.

The attribution of cowardice, in the spirit of the *attribution error*, may have devastating consequences. Even the staunchest Realpolitician must admit that in the asymmetric situation that characterizes current world affairs, guerilla warfare and terrorism are superior forces. Suicide bombers are the ultimate weapon. No army can control the minds of every passer-by. It is inherently impossible to win a *war on terror* with conventional weapons. Missiles send powerful messages, undoubtedly, their senders want to elicit humbleness and humility, yet these messages may be understood as humiliation and responded to with enraged defiance. Using conventional weapons would perhaps mean that humankind had to eradicate itself in the attempt because success would always be wanting. The only way to *win* this *war* is to gain trust and turn enmity into good neighborhood. The hearts and minds of the masses must be won so as to take away the incentive for them to resonate with those few humiliation entrepreneurs who instigate and organize terror. Only when the masses turn away from the few terrorist leaders, those few can safely be policed and will not be replaced.

Thus, in an asymmetric situation, when those who have found the ultimate weapon, namely employing the feelings of humiliated masses, who are willing to support or even become suicide bombers, to label them as "dishonorable," is a sure way of wasting the only chance to *win* this struggle. The only way towards mutual respect is to *acknowledge courage*, on all sides. Acknowledging courage does not mean condoning suicide bombing. On the contrary, it is the first step to halting it. The fundamental attribution error "hides" common ground." In reality, all are "courageous," nobody is a "coward."

To round up this section we may conclude that feelings of humiliation arise when I hear you misattributing my intentions. As long as communities live far away from each other and do not know about other communities misreading them, there is no problem. Everybody feels comfortable with white-washing their *ingroup* and blackening all *outgroups*. However, this becomes problematic when people move closer and actually get to know how biased others' judgments about them indeed are.

Japan currently lends itself to illustrating this point. If Japan were isolated from the world – as it was when its Tokugawa Shoguns closed it to the outside – Japanese current "inner affairs" would not be known to anybody else. However, in an interdependent world, in 2005, modifications in Japanese school textbooks ("in order to make our children proud of Japan") trigger enraged mass demonstrations in China and Korea, who feel that Japan tries to "gloss over its past." Floyd Rudmin explains what happens (personal message, April 11, 2005, quoted with his permission): "It is the humiliation of history. Japan's neighbors are now furious because Japan has again tried to gloss over its history of humiliating its neighbors, but Japan in turns finds it humiliating that it alone is required to continually account for and atone for its historical past."

It is humiliating to learn about evaluations that place me in a less than advantageous light, particularly when I at the same time feel that those who levy such judgments in my view lack any moral authority to do so. Thus, the *attribution error*, or the human tendency to treat *outgroups* less leniently than *ingroups*, lends itself to eliciting feelings of humiliation in those *outgroups* who are on their way to become part of the *ingroup*. The coming-into-being of the *global village*, the merging of *outgroups* into *One ingroup*, thus confronts people around the world with humiliating and unwelcome *outgroup bias*es that they in former times never would have known. Only when the transition towards *One ingroup* has been successfully completed and all of humankind feels part of this *ingroup*, misreadings and confrontations of this kind can be expected to wane.

Sorry! How cross-cultural misunderstandings can humiliate

"I recognize that I inadvertently humiliated you. I did not have the intention to do so, you are my best friend, but obviously I must have done so."

This vignette shows that humiliation can be perpetrated by hazard. This is particularly relevant on the inter-cultural level, because communication between people from different cultural backgrounds is more prone to produce uncertainties than communication between individuals with the same cultural background. And it is absolutely essential to know how to behave in such cases; otherwise unnecessary cycles of humiliation are set in motion. Particularly in times when a *global village* attempts to grow together, the lesson has to be learned of how to deal with unintended humiliation.

Arrogant carelessness can humiliate

A German or French citizen may perceive it as extremely humiliating if s/he is addressed with *Du* or *tu* instead of *Sie* or *vous*. A foreigner with an English background, who is used to a simple "you," will not be able to fathom the humiliation entailed in addressing somebody inappropriately with *you*. A police officer in France or Germany for example, who intends to humiliate a criminal, uses *Du* or *tu* precisely because of its strong humiliating potential. Thus a foreigner may humiliate a German or French citizen inadvertently just by being uninformed.

An anonymous reviewer of this text, from America, reacted with the following remark (2002) to the *Du* and *Sie* problem.[203] He wrote, "I would hope that most French and German individuals who are called *tu* or *Du* by an obvious foreigner would realize that it's an imperfect command of the language and would not feel humiliated."

This reviewer's hope to be pardoned may meet receptive and sympathetic recipients, however, it may not. The reviewer's trust in being excused may indeed be labeled as arrogant and humiliating.

What would this reviewer feel if he were to expect a Germany intellectual as guest and place the American flag proudly in the guest room, as a welcome greeting, only to observe that the visitor, upon arrival, puts the flag into the waste bin? Would the

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[203] I would like to express my thanks for this comment.

reviewer "understand" this? Or would he feel that American national pride is being trampled on?

Especially for German intellectuals, the Hitler legacy has besmirched national symbols and for some it is intolerable to have any of such symbols in a room, from whatever nation. Hitler's use of flags still lets many Germans shiver and refrain from emotional linkages to such symbols altogether.

Even under these circumstances, would not the American host still be justified in being irritated? Would it not be appropriate to ask a German visitor to collect some information about Americans' deepest feelings before traveling? Would it not be fitting for the visitor to show respect for profound American attachments and not humiliate them, not humiliate the American flag? Is it sufficient that the visitor merely states, "Oh, I didn't know how you felt about your flag! Why make such a fuss, I just didn't know! Don't get so hysterical! I am a foreigner!"

Cosmopolitan liberal Americans may perhaps react calmly and explain the situation to the foreigner; however, those who profoundly identify with the American flag may not be so lenient. They may feel deeply humiliated and ridiculed, firstly by the visitor's action of throwing their flag into the dustbin, but even more by the self-righteous and careless reaction displayed by the visitor after being informed of the faux pas.

This vignette illustrates that the potential for humiliation lies in the perception of *arrogant carelessness* that may be concealed in *ignorance*. Ignorance may be excused, yet, it may not. It may have deeply humiliating effects. Ignorance will elicit feelings of humiliation in those cases where it is understood to betray arrogant neglect in the spirit of "your culture is so unimportant to me that I do not need to be informed, you better excuse my ignorance." It is the guest's unwillingness to invest energy into empathizing with the host that gives rise to feelings of humiliation. The guest may be perceived as transmitting the message, "you are too insignificant to me to get out of my way and put myself into your perspective; whatever you feel is trivial and irrelevant to me."

As soon as *ignorance* is perceived as *humiliating negligence* and *haughty easy-going*, a cycle of humiliation is set in motion. It is therefore not sufficient to merely hope that ignorance is excused. Readers are well advised to not reply in the line of the above quoted reviewer. Expecting excuse for ignorance too lightly, after having been informed of a faux pas, may create the very humiliation that the faux pas itself did not yet cause.

Unwarranted confidence can humiliate

A host of seminars and handbooks cover the market of intercultural training. Thousands of business persons prepare for transactions in other countries by trying to learn what they have to do and to avoid. They learn long lists of *shoulds* and *should-nots*: in some places they should not show the underside of their feet, in others not pat children on their heads, in yet others not step on banknotes, and so forth.

These seminars aim at minimizing cross-cultural misunderstandings; however, in many cases they may even create them. Since many people participate in such seminars, you may find a Japanese bank director reaching out with his hand to shake hands with his French counterpart – having learned that this is the French way to behave – while the French bank person only bows and keeps his hands back – because he has learned that this is what the Japanese counterpart expects. Both have learned the *other's* way and have switched the incompatibility. This "accidental misunderstanding" can easily be remedied and both may laugh and feel respected by the other's willingness to adapt to foreign customs. However, not always is the misunderstanding so easily detectable.

During my seven years of practicing in Egypt as a clinical psychologist and counselor with a European background, I worked with countless such cases. Shaking hands or bowing, these are quite obvious acts and it is rather straightforward to rectify the situation. There are many other traps, however, that do not show so clearly.

I strongly caution people against drawing too much confidence from *How-to-Do in X-Land* handbooks or seminars. Many who had relied on such "intercultural training" arrived as clients at my door, shaking with what they called "nervous breakdown" caused by "culture shock." Counterintuitively, particularly those were befallen with this "nervous breakdown," who had felt particularly well-prepared. *How-to-Do in X-Land* handbooks or seminars, if drawn up to teach students how "they" behave as compared to "us," often create but overconfidence and thus damage the cause more than promote it. What such handbooks or seminars should teach, on the contrary, is humility, self-control strategies, and, first of all, the ability to tolerate insecurity and fear.

There are many reasons why this is so, I suggest. Firstly, it is impossible to learn everything about *another culture*. Imagine your own homeland, and how many seminars would have to be drawn up to cover the whole cultural richness: you as an American citizen know compatriots with a background in Quaker culture, others are rather "cowboys," people in the countryside react differently to people in cosmopolitan cities, even one valley may be deeply different to the neighboring valley, and so forth. You agree that it is impossible to learn the cultural codes of all these types and subtypes in your own culture; to be honest you do not even really understand your parents, your spouse, your children, and what about yourself? In short, it is an illusion to believe that you ever could learn enough.

To have the illusion of knowing all is not very damaging as long as one moves in one's own culture, among people who mutually define each other as "us." Under such circumstances, differences are embedded in a deep underlying concept and feeling of being united in a common "us" and a commitment to it. The trust in this commitment is what makes the illusion of complete mutual understanding viable and perhaps even helpful.

However, as soon as you visit "them" the situation is profoundly different. It is not so much *their* cultural codes that you have to learn; after all you do not have to learn all the details of the cultural diversity in your own culture and still do fine. What you have to learn is negotiating the relationship between "us" and "them." And it is here

the potential for mutual humiliation looms largest. What is important, and what *How-to-Do in X-Land* handbooks or seminars usually fail to address, is *why* it is that we live rather well with the illusion of confident "understanding" in *our own* culture and *why* this illusion is *dangerous* when we visit others.

To my decade's long experience, it is vital that we unlearn the illusion of possible control, at least to a certain extent, and learn to live comfortably without it. The first reason for being cautious with the usual *How-to-Do in X-Land* handbooks or seminars is thus the fact that one never can learn everything about a cultural code, not even one's own, and still do fine. The second reason is that it is beneficial to unlearn the illusion of knowing all. As a *side effect*, detaching from this illusion helps us even at home, because even our children may belong to another "culture."

Humble dialogue is the way out

What is of central significance in cross-cultural encounters is *egalization*. Questions concerning *egalization* permeate meetings between "cultures" at any level. As discussed earlier, there is a love story out there, namely that the rest of the world would like to participate in the freedom and quality of life that the West offers. However, there is apprehension as to whether this invitation is serious. As elaborated above, many buzzwords currently pepper books, articles and debates, buzzwords that betray the humiliation that is entailed in *hypocrisy*, *double standards*, *uneven handedness*, or *unilateralism*. As already described above, confronted with such accusations, elites, also, feel as humiliated, in their case by the painful lack of thankfulness and recognition for what they perceive as their benevolent and generous leadership.

In such a context it is not necessary to learn others' cultural codes by heart, what is crucial however, is to learn how to ask questions in a way that signals respect for everybody's dignity, and how to react with respect when informed of a faux pas. Ignorance is no faux pas; however, dealing with it in an arrogant way may cause profound feelings of humiliation. Ignorance can be the starting point for enriching relationships, asking questions can express interest, respect and recognition, and elicit enthusiastic explanations. We may travel through the world and ask questions, respectful questions, humbly admitting our ignorance, and we will experience that we meet people, people who open up, who enjoy our interest. Our blunders and our subsequent apology of "sorry, I did not know that I humiliated you" may deepen our relationships.

However, we may also travel through the world, being comprehensively informed about all cultural codes around, and sour all relationships through our arrogance and cause feelings of humiliation. We may not even notice this dynamic, but be surprised about being sabotaged or even hated. This was typically the case with those Western clients who came to me with "nervous breakdowns" caused by "culture shock."

Here an example from Mexico. It happened around 1950. A Belgian national, let us call him Robert, owned a big farm in Mexico. He was proud of his good relations with the workers who were Mexicans, all of them proud people who held their honor dear.

One day the workers' foreman, Manuel, approached Robert and asked him for a loan. The Belgian felt honored by this otherwise unusual trust and granted the loan. The Mexican foreman promised to pay back in three months time.

Several months passed and the Belgian was approached by another Mexican who warned him, "Be careful, the foreman will kill you!" The Belgian was extremely

astonished and asked, "Why that! We have a very good relation! I even gave him a loan!" Robert received the explanation, "The foreman cannot pay back the loan in time to you. He cannot bear to appear untrustworthy in your eyes. He cannot bear you looking down on him. This would be too humiliating to him. Therefore he has to kill you."

The Belgian burst out in protest, "But why does Manuel not just talk to me? I am no monster!" The reply was, "His honor does not allow him to do that."

The story of the Belgian farm owner was related to me by one of his friends. It unfolds in three phases: The victim of humiliation, the Mexican foreman, knows that he will feel humiliated by not being able to pay back in time. The Belgian, however, does not even know that he is perceived as a yet-to-come humiliator. If killed, he would not even know that he is killed because he is perceived as the perpetrator in a case of humiliation. Without the help of a benevolent "culture translator," the other Mexican who warned him, Robert would not have survived. His aptitude at building constructive relationships with his workers saved his life. Another, more oppressive and arrogant master would perhaps not have received a warning and be dead.

What we learn is that it pays, your life may even depend on it, to be humble when meeting people from other cultures; it pays to not jump to conclusions. It pays to keep a cautious inner distance and tolerate not having ready-made interpretations of what is going on. It is crucial to be able to endure feelings of fear and insecurity that accompany such uncertainty. It is essential to learn to ask questions with respect.

And finally it is important to understand the dynamics of humiliation that are caused by power differences, including the power differences in the *global village*, so as to be sensitive to the worries surrounding processes of *egalization*. If you are a member of the world's elite you have to understand that you are scrutinized carefully because the less privileged are afraid that your superiority may not be benevolent but exploitative, and the suspicion of you having double standards will easily cause feelings of humiliation. If you are a member of the world's less privileged you have to understand that some elites may in fact be benevolent and feel humiliated by your suspicion. Both should be prepared to say "sorry, but I did not know that I humiliated you."

The traffic metaphor can be applied as follows. Feelings of humiliation may arise when people are not being informed about the idiosyncrasies of the way vehicles are built in the neighboring quarters. Green vehicles may represent an insult in one quarter, but not in another. However, this may not be the most significant source for feelings of humiliation.

Imagine cross-roads with traffic lights and police making sure that they are respected. Police vehicles have sirens that allow them to pass first in case of emergency. Yet, people are not sure whether the police are truthfully defending the impartiality of the traffic rules with their equipment, or whether they use their sirens as means for highjacking the system to get on top of it.

People feel humiliated when they suspect the police siren to be used for the police's own advantage, while police feels humiliated by this suspicion. Both are scrutinizing each other's behavior anxiously.

To summarize and conclude this chapter, misunderstandings and miscommunications are fertile breeding grounds for feelings of humiliation. Usually, this problem is not taken very seriously. However, in the current historic transition period it may be

extremely relevant. "Misunderstandings" as to the meaning and spirit of human rights, for example, may lead to deep disappointments and feelings of humiliation on all sides, as do the "misunderstandings" that occur when I realize how deep a bias emanates from other communities against me. Bias against *outgroups* in favor of one's *ingroup* serves the *ingroup* because it increases its cohesion. However, when *outgroups* wish to merge into *one ingroup* and on the way meet remnants of *outgroup bias* against them, this can have profoundly humiliating effects. Thirdly we have the typical cross-cultural misunderstanding. The usual remedy proposed are *How-to-Do in X-Land* handbooks or seminars where knowledge about other cultures is transmitted. However, what is generally overlooked is that knowledge of the other culture may be less important. What is essential, on the contrary, is knowledge of how to use lack of knowledge constructively to build dignified relationships – for example by showing interest and respect for diversity – and how to respectfully maintain relationships that are embedded in worries as to the status of *egalization*.

Reading related to this chapter

In cases where humiliation shall be studied in cross-cultural settings, cross-cultural psychology is to be included,[204] and the anthropological, sociological and philosophical embeddedness of processes of humiliation in different cultural contexts.

   Linda Hartling (1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (*Humiliation Inventory*)[205] where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring *being teased*, *bullied*, *scorned*, *excluded*, *laughed a*t, *put down*, *ridiculed*, *harassed*, *discounted*, *embarrassed*, *cruelly criticized*, *treated as invisible*, *discounted as a person*, *made to feel small or insignificant*, *unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service*, *called names or referred to in derogatory terms*, or viewed by others as *inadequate*, or *incompetent*. The questions probe the extent to which respondents had felt harmed by such incidents throughout life, and how much they feared such incidents.

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[204] See, example the work of Michael Harris Bond that has been already mentioned. I can only present a small selection of important books and some articles, Bond, 1997, Bond, 1998, Bond (Ed.), 1996, Bond (Ed.), 1988, Bond, 1996, Smith and Bond, 1999, Bond, Leung, and Schwartz, 1992, Bond and Chan, 1995. Bond co-authored many publication with Geert Hofstede, see, for example, Hofstede, 1980, Hofstede, 1983, Hofstede and Bond, 1984, Hofstede and Bond, 1988, Hofstede et al., 1989, Hofstede, 1991, Hofstede, Bond, and Luk, 1993, Hofstede, 1993, Hofstede, 1996a, Hofstede, 1996b, Hofstede, 1998. Harry Charalambos Triandis is an important name as well, see, for example, Triandis and Triandis, 1962, Triandis, 1971, Triandis, 1980, Triandis, 1990, Triandis, 1995, Triandis, 1997, Triandis and Singelis, 1998, Schwartz, 1994. Richard W. Brislin is another very relevant name, see, for example Brislin, 1993, Cushner and Brislin, 1996, Brislin and Yoshida, 1994, Brislin and Tomoko Yoshida (Eds.), 2000, Landis and Brislin, 1983.

[205] Hartling and Luchetta, 1999. See also Hartling and Baker Miller, 2004, Hartling et al., 2000.

> Read furthermore on *human rights and poverty*,[206] on *negative and positive rights*,[207] on *dignity of animals*,[208] on *vegetarianism that is on the increase*,[209] on the *fundamental attribution error*,[210] and on the belief in a *just world*,[211] as well as on *intercultural sensitivity*.[212]

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[206] See, for example, Pogge, 2002, or Amartya Kumar Sen's work, such as in Drèze and Sen, 1989, Sen and World Institute for Development Economics Research., 1987. There is a large body of literature. The *Right to Development* as a human right is central. "The United Nations Development Programme is orienting its work on the basis of the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986. In 1998 the UNDP published a policy document on Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Human Development (UNDP 1998). Similarly, the United Nations Population Fund issued a document on UNFPA: A Focus on Population and Human Rights, and the World Bank published Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank. Under the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) launched by Secretary General Kofi Annan, all UN agencies are called upon to adopt the human rights approach. Thus, WANAHR and the other nutrition rights advocacy organizations have benefited from a movement not entirely of their own making" (Kent, 2000, p. 9). See also Collier et al., 2003, Ekins and Max-Neef (Eds.), 1992, Max-Neef, Elizade, and Hopenhayn, 1991, Robinson, 1999, or Sagasti and Alcalde, 1999, Sen, 1999, Stiglitz and Squire, 1998, or Wolfenson, 1999.

[207] See, for example, Block, 1990, pp. 122-126. Again, there is a large body of publications to draw upon.

[208] See numerous organizations, such as http://www.helpinganimals.com/a.html.

[209] "More and more people are switching to a vegetarian diet for a variety of reasons…As vegetarianism rises the change is reflected in the consumer world as well. Both Burger King and McDonalds now offer veggie burgers in addition to their traditional meat fare. Shops specializing in vegetarian-friendly products have sprung up all over. Maryland-based Pangea (http://pangeaveg.com/) offers everything from eco-friendly soaps to official Doc Marten and Birkenstock footwear specially made in 'fake' leather. Internet based shops such as http://shop.opalcat.com/ offer whole sections of vegetarian, animal rights, and anti-fur designs alongside typical humorous shirts and geeky mugs" (Fernie, 2002). See also Barovick, 2000, or Reaves, 2003.

[210] Reber, 1995, "A general theoretical perspective in social psychology concerned with the issue of social perception. The act of attribution is one in which a person ascribes or imputes a characteristic (or trait, emotion or motive, etc.) to oneself or to another person. Thus, the term represents not so much a formal theory but a general approach to social psychology and personality theory in which behavior is analyzed in the light of this concept." See also Heider, 1958, Kelley, 1973, as well as Pettigrew, 1979, or Hewstone, 1990.

[211] The *just world view* is a general belief that assumes that those with unfortunate outcomes deserve what they receive. There is a large body of literature to draw upon, see, for example, Lerner, 1980, Daugherty and Esper, 1998, and Figley, 1998, among many others. Bandura, 1990, works on the mechanism of *blaming the victim*.

[212] According to Milton Bennett's model of *intercultural sensitivity*, people move through six stages of awareness as they experience other cultures: denial, defense, minimization of differences, acceptance, adaptation and, finally, integration (Bennett, 1993). See also Bennett, 1998, and Bennett, 1996. See on *Crosscultural political psychology* furthermore Renshon and Duckitt (Eds.), 2000. See also Wasilewski, 2001, and recent work by Matsumoto, Hee Yoo, and LeRoux, 2005. See, furthermore, the work by Adair Linn Nagata, Nagata, 1998, Nagata, 2005, Nagata, 2004, Nagata, 2003, Nagata, 2000.

Addiction to Humiliation

"My brother is addicted to humiliation; he is a 'professional' victim of humiliation. I was the sweetheart of my mother and my poor brother was systematically degraded and humiliated by her. Now, as an adult, he perpetuates his victim status actively: if he is not humiliated, he imagines it or provokes it. In order to provoke them, he has let down and humiliated his wife, children and friends, they are the real victims today; however, as soon as they protest, he accuses them of being the perpetrators.

Whoever meets him for the first time is taken in by his talent to depict himself as pitiable victim who heroically stands up against all evil in the world. Many make the mistake to trust and love him. They buy into his victim heroism. They all end up doubly hurt and humiliated, first let down by him and then accused of having humiliated him.

He accuses everybody of humiliation by maneuvering him or her into an imagined position of a perpetrator of humiliation. His satisfaction is when he can lament to the world about what pitiable victim of humiliation he is. To get there, he damages and destroys the lives of his family and friends and his own."

There are two processes of humiliation intertwined in this vignette. The man speaking explains how his brother inadvertently provokes and imagines being the victim of humiliation in order to attain recognition for a suffering that mainly took place earlier in his life and, most probably, never was sufficiently acknowledged and healed. Overtly, his brother asks for pity, compassion, support, and admiration for his heroic defiance of evil, covertly, however, he cannot get away from his feelings of being humiliated and constructs pretexts that enable him to continue them. He needs to satisfy his urge of having his suffering acknowledged. In the course of this *addiction to humiliation* a second process of humiliation is set in motion wherein third parties get hurt and doubly humiliated. Family and friends are first let down and treated in a humiliating manner, and then publicized as evil humiliators when they protest. The *addiction to humiliation* that besets one single person causes suffering to many in his entourage.

Reber (1995) informs us in *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology* that "an individual is said to have developed dependence on a drug or other substance when there is a strong, compelling desire to continue taking it." Not only drugs are typically associated with addiction or dependence, non-drugs such as gambling, eating disorders, compulsive shopping, workaholism, and co-dependency are often connected with those two terms as well. In all cases, the core of the addiction is the compelling and intense nature of the condition. Smokers, for example, typically know very well that their habit represents a health hazard to themselves and others, yet they often go to great lengths to "protect" their habit; even otherwise perfectly "rational" people distort facts, deny evidence, and lie to themselves and others. In the same sense, feelings of humiliation may be as significant and consuming as any form of addiction or dependence.

Barbara came into my clinic and presented herself as a "nervous wrack." She had married into a family of aristocrats, albeit she herself was a commoner. Her mother-in-law had not approved of the marriage of her son and did not hesitate to say publicly, in front of the whole family, "And *you* want to be part of our family? Who do you think *you* are?"

Barbara told to me what she felt when she was confronted with this behavior for

the first time: "I was deeply shocked and petrified; I felt cold, could hardly breath, and I was unable to answer."

Barbara came to me because she felt that she was not addicted to alcohol or cigarettes: much worse, she was caught in her own pain. After her husband's death her in-laws tried to trick her out of her inheritance and she was locked in bitter court-cases with them for many years. She repeatedly became so desperate that she did "stupid" things as she called it – for example writing "hysterical" letters, or starting to shout at her adversaries in the court room – behavior that did not earn her the respect she wished to receive from the judge, her lawyer and others involved in the case.

Barbara could not distance herself, could not develop any leisure interests or relaxing hobbies. Her entire life was consumed by her relationship with her in-laws, a relationship that was filled with a continuous flow of incidents of humiliation and counter-humiliation, sometimes minute, sometimes overwhelmingly vicious. Barbara could not stop being obsessed with imagining all kinds of revenge. Suffering humiliation and responding with humiliation had become an all-consuming life-style for Barbara.

This chapter addresses *addiction to humiliation* in the spirit of the previous chapter that focused on misunderstandings and humiliation. Usually the notion of humiliation elicits associations with pitiable victims of humiliation who deserve support and help. I could present innumerable incidents that underpin this notion and indeed fill a chapter with this focus. However, I would not contribute to much new thinking. Virtually everybody is aware that victims of humiliating treatment, survivors of genocide, torture and crime for example, or the disadvantaged around the world, are in dire need of support and that this is most often than not lacking. I could write a chapter calling for more attention to such victims. Yet, I believe, I should contribute with more provocative thoughts that unsettle the usual classification of victim/perpetrator.

Fuck you! How rejection-sensitive men thrive on humiliation

Mischel and De Smet (2000) describe the "automatic reaction of anger and abusiveness readily triggered in rejection-sensitive men who are quick to perceive it [rejection] from a romantic partner even if it has not occurred" (Mischel and De Smet, 2000, p. 259). The authors explain further,

> Their maladaptive reaction pattern of uncontrolled hostility may be essentially reflexive, bypassing conscious control and preventing purposeful self-intervention effort. In such a case, the person applies encodings even if they do not fit and maintains them regardless of contradictory evidence. The ironic and often tragic result is that the outcome the man most fears and expects – rejection by the romantic partner is precipitated by his own behavior in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Mischel & De Smet, 2000, p. 259).

"You always hurt the ones you love" is a saying that Mischel and De Smet remind us of (p. 263), indicating the common wisdom "that the interdependence coming from interpersonal closeness creates the very situation where emotions are strong and the tendency to react impulsively in hurtful, damaging ways is greatest. Although people may attempt to control the hot, emotional responses that intensify conflict and damage relationships, they often find that their good intentions are not enough to refrain from blowing up, making personal attacks, or otherwise doing things they later regret"

(Mischel & DeSmet, 2000, pp. 263-264).

What we learn from Mischel and De Smet is that in the case of the *rejection-sensitive* men the obsessive aspect of addiction is injected into their emotional world. What they are "hooked on" are situations of debasement where they can feel humiliated. We may want to discount this scenario as marginal, since it applies only to some *rejection-sensitive* men who believe that they are neglected, not taken seriously enough, belittled, and humiliated even when they are not, and lash out in retaliation. However, these dynamics may be relevant in all contexts where groups rise from lowliness.

In his book *The Ethics of Memory*, Margalit (2002) suggests that it is not only the experience of moral emotions like humiliation that motivates aggressive behavior, but also the memory of such emotions. He writes that the memory of a humiliating event can be akin to re-living it. "Margalit proposes that, under certain conditions, individuals can become attached, or even addicted, to the emotion, thus serving as a constant source of retaliatory action" (Goldman and Coleman, 2005, p. 15, Margalit, 2002).

Angela told me the following story (August 2002 in New York): "I work in an office where we have Samuel, or Sam. He is an office clerk. He is a black American. I do not know how to handle him. He does not do any useful work. He is hooked on a weird kind of slave identity. He looks at us white colleagues with eyes veering to the side in angry suspicion all the time. Whatever we say to him, he never looks directly at us, but through us with an air of anger that signals 'I know you, you white racist bastards.' Whenever we make the slightest mistake, even mistakes that have nothing to do with him, he feels vindicated and tells us that this proves that we are all racists. Constantly he fabricates and imagines connections that are not there. It is as if he has a magnifying glass and continuously searches for 'evidence' for being the victim of racism. This is his full-time occupation. When we remind him that there is work to be done, of course, we are racists. And, so he adds, he cannot be laid off because then he would let hell loose and accuse the employer of racism!

So, we do his work and try to avoid him as much as possible. What else shall we do? This guy reads all available books about slavery and knows all the big names of protesters against slavery. He dreams himself into a world where he is as big a hero. He 'resists' wherever he sees a chance to 'resist' and does not realize that he makes a fool out of himself. He speaks with his black *brothers* and *sisters* on the phone all the time; with solemn voices they *share* the *shit* and *humiliation* they find they have to endure. (Or, more precisely, he speaks with brothers *about* sisters, who are either 'hotties' or not; in other words, *sisters* are mere sexual prey for him. He and his *brothers* treat their *sisters* perhaps in an even more humiliating way than they themselves are being treated by whites!)

Brothers and *sisters*, I ask myself, and who are the *parents*? I assume the *parents* are the 'evil' whites? Do black Americans have no *adults* among themselves? To me Sam and his friends seem like a bunch of small *children* who do not want to grow up. I am certainly no racist – I am Hispanic myself and know what discrimination means – and I also understand that there still is real racism in America. But this guy turns the maintenance of victimhood into his core identity. His life is like a film. He has the role of the heroic victim and we are the evil humiliators, whether reality agrees with his script or not. He invests all his energy into this, he is hooked, and will never get anywhere in life if he continues like that.

I hope, one day, he will understand and regret. In reality, he turns *us* into victims of

his abuse everyday and it is *he* who should apologize! In reality, it is *he* who humiliates and victimizes *us*! There are surely lots of sensible people among black Americans; I hope they speak out against this humiliation entrepreneurship perpetrated by some of these *brothers*!"

Such dynamics are relevant at the global level as well. One of the reasons being the likelihood of getting hurt increasing in the course of the current coming-into-being of a *global village*. As Mischel and De Smet indicate, increasing closeness is difficult to handle, it can foster friendship and even love, however, it can also foster hatred, and love is not seldom followed by hatred or accompanied with hot ambivalence such as in the case of *rejection-sensitive* males.

Thus, we may conclude this section by suggesting that the coming together of humankind is likely to increase settings that are characterized by those *hot* feelings and *hot* reactions "that are later regretted." The coming together of humankind, by increasing the chances for more people entering into closer relationships across the globe is bound to increase the *hot* and obsessive aspects in the emotional worlds of its participants.

A European businessman laments, "I trusted my Egyptian business partners. However, they betrayed me. *They* say that *I* betrayed them. I don't really know what they mean or who is right. In any case, I am furious. I am consumed by rant and rave. Day and night I am thinking about how I can get back at these people. I wish those times back when each country was more or less autarchic. This new requirement to be 'international' that we seem to be subjected to today is terrible. Everybody tries to go international! I am disgusted by that. Please bring me back the good old world where we could stay among *us*!"

Can one love a spring knife? How the Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder may entail humiliation

The *Passive-Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder (PAPD)* represents another disorder that may have at its core *addiction to humiliation*. A Health Encyclopedia[213] defines PAPD as follows, "Passive resistance to demands for social and occupational performance beginning in early adulthood." And, "The cause of this disorder is unknown. Biological or genetic factors do not appear to play a role." Eckleberry (2000) explains the historical background of the *PAPD* diagnosis,

> The passive-aggressive personality disorder was first introduced in a U.S. War Department technical bulletin in 1945. The term was coined by wartime psychiatrists who found themselves dealing with reluctant and uncooperative soldiers who followed orders with chronic, veiled hostility and smoldering resentment. Their style was a mixture of passive resistance and grumbling compliance (Eckleberry, 2000, p. 5).

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[213] Retrieved from http://www.austin360.com/shared/health/adam/ency/article/000943.html in May 2002.

Eckleberry (2000) describes the way anger is expressed by people with *PAPD*,

> They may have temper tantrums that release pent-up aggression; if their victim is aggressive in response – so much the better. That response is then used to vindicate the initial attack. Anger expressed by commission is usually justified by laudable motives, e.g. concern for the well-being of the victim. The expression of the anger is dictated by the desire to wound while concealing the intention to wound – even the existence of the anger. This is not to spare the feelings of the victim but to wound them more effectively. The intent is to provoke counteranger with such subtlety that the victim blames himself and believes his anger is not justified. That way, people with PAPD can assume the role of innocent victim (Eckleberry, 2000, p. 5).

Eckleberry is a clinical social worker in mental health with a special focus on addiction and personality disorders and explains, "individuals with PAPD do not frequently seek treatment for relationship issues as they consistently blame others for the problems they have. Even if they do come in for treatment for a marital or parent and child problem, they will uniformly demand that the treatment providers 'fix' the other person or persons who are at fault for the problems within the relationship" (p. 7). "They stall, complain, oppose, forget, and feel cheated by life. They experience life as dark and unpleasurable. To these individuals, thwarting the expectations of others is a victory even if they sabotage their own lives. They are difficult, angry and needy. They see compliance as submission, and submission as humiliation" (p. 5).

"The classic passive-aggressive transference pattern is to comply (sort of) with the therapeutic recommendation, and then to declare triumphantly that it was a very poor suggestion and failed miserably. These individuals are programmed to ask for help and then both to defy it and to suffer from it. Clients with PAPD expect to be injured by a negligent and cruel caregiver" (Eckleberry, 2000, p. 7).

Emmanuel came to my clinic because he was deeply disappointed and hurt by his former partner, Clara. He told me the following: "Clara has had a sad childhood. Her parents were missionaries and in order to obey divine call, namely to convert Indians in the Brazilian rain forest to Christianity, they gave Clara into a children's home run their religious organization. Clara was three. Due to several additional circumstances, she got reunited with her parents only five years later. Thus, she waited for them for years, and endured terrible loneliness, even worse, when her parents came back, she felt estranged from them. She never was able to build trust to them again. I believe, she was deeply enraged by her parents abandoning her in the way they did. However, Clara never worked through her feelings; she never went to therapy, for example.

What she does instead, I believe, is re-enacting her early fate. I met her when she was deeply distressed because of her husband. According to her, her husband was aggressive. I listened for hours to her tales. I was very patient. I admired her heroic stance against her abusive husband. At some point she left him, quite abruptly, from one day to another, with two suitcases only, and moved into my flat. We lived together for six years. During these years I waited for her to get her act together. She had big plans. She wanted to become a writer and earn millions with bestsellers. I was her secretary and helped her where I could. My own work suffered and my life increasingly turned around hers. After all, she was the genius, not me!

However, after six years, I became impatient. I felt that my help merely went up in smoke and nothing substantial came out of it. I invested in hot air so-to-speak. In

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addition, gradually, I had come to understand that her genius was not that brilliant after all. She had told me about the grand scope of her life experiences and cultural and linguistic knowledge that she supposedly commanded; however, the more I learned about her, the more I understood that she boasted. Or, more precisely, she did not boast, she believed in her grandness herself. She merely overlooked reality. She saw herself as victim who is too noble for the world but heroically stands up anyway. Initially, when we met, she had been able to impress me with all her talk about languages, science and culture. I was not as versed and educated as she was. But six years were enough for me to catch up. And I slowly understood that she exploited my ignorance.

As I said, I started becoming exhausted. Even though I stayed calm and kind, I did not worship her anymore. I did not abandon to try to help her, but I did not anymore want to support empty dreams. I wished her to see reality. Yet, this was not to her liking. She quickly found herself a new 'Emmanuel.' I mean, she did the same with me that she had done with her former husband. I became the villain who in her eyes victimized and humiliated her, and her new partner patiently listened to her complaints. One afternoon she went out, as if she wanted to buy some small thing and come back later, but she never came back. She left all her things behind and moved into the flat of the new man. All our friends were drawn into this story. According to her framing, I was an aggressive humiliator who belligerently kept her things from her (although it was she who never fetched them) and she allegedly was the poor humiliatee, who heroically withstood my onslaughts.

I must say that I am more than enraged now, but also sad, and shocked, not least profoundly displeased with myself. Because I see a pattern. I never should have been drawn into all this. I was her case number four, I think, when I look back on her life. Four times she has attracted men with her 'heroic helplessness.' The first man listened to her complaints with regard to her parents; the following three were presented with sad stories as to the abuse she supposedly suffered at the hands of her former partners. Every new partner was charmed by her grand personality and her vows to have a great future. Every man was inferior to her as to education and life experience and dedicated his life to her great goals. Yet, after a number of years each of them got exhausted, and she interpreted this as his evilness. Then she left him abruptly for the next round of the same game. Every man's year-long help was not only not appreciated, it was scorned. And she was the heroic victim.

How I now understand the poor husband of hers who was my predecessor. I sometimes want to phone him and apologize that I ever believed in her stories as to him being such a rogue. He, like me, has been pushed into a corner, until he could not take it anymore. His exhaustion and disappointment at her empty dreams was only too understandable, but his helper fatigue was turned against him. And I assisted in this crime! I am disgusted, both at her, but also at myself.

I have thought a lot about her and about me since she left me and made me play the role of the most recent baddie in her life. I feel utterly abused by her. Yet, there is no way to make her understand that. She does not see her role and how she re-enacts her childhood. Each time when she leaves, it is abrupt, from one day to another, with a suitcase or a little bag, exactly like when she was a child and was brought into the children's home by her father. She seems addicted to this script.

I think her ultimate audience are her friends, not her partners. She wants to demonstrate to the world, that she is a legitimate victim. Her parents never had any understanding for their daughter's feelings of abandonment. I met them before they died and I can confirm that. They never acknowledged any guilt or showed any

empathy with her. On the contrary, they humiliated her – and I witnessed that several times – for her 'weakness' and that she was not strong enough to accept God's will. It is as if she wants to nail them, finally, as perpetrators. And since they are unwilling, and now also dead, she takes substitutes, namely partners. She wants to nail them as perpetrators. First she exposes these partners to empty promises, and then, when they get impatient, she has reached her goal: they are perpetrators. Thus, her game is to produce humiliators. Her victory is to be able to point her finger at someone who does evil to her. The fact that she creates this evil, herself, in the first place, with the exception of the initial case of her parents, is concealed to her. She is satisfied in her increasingly enforced victim role. Her reality simply is not what 'normal' people would assume. Her goals are not her and others' welfare, her aim is to suffer at the hands of perpetrators at whom she can then publicly point her finger.

What pains me is that I am blamed as nasty humiliator by her, in front of all friends, while at the same time, I am a victim. I am a victim of her early victimhood in which she is stuck. She recreates her early victimhood over and over again. To produce perpetrators is her life project. All the rest is irrelevant, all her dreams and plans are merely instrumental to this underlying project. And the more I protest, the more fuel I provide for that to her. Whatever I say to defend myself, in her eyes it turns me into an even more evil humiliator and adds to her victory. And many of my friends are deluded by her game. So, she succeeds very well with producing 'perpetrators.'

If I were less enraged, I would be sad on her behalf. She increases negativity in this world; she makes this world a darker place. And this she does only because her parents hurt her, and she, instead of healing her wounds, got addicted to this 'heroic victimhood.' She cannot get her parents' apologies and therefore cannot forgive them and now she punishes the world. People like her are dangerous people. One has to stay away from them, as far as possible. They are destructive without being aware of it. To love such a person is suicidal. It is like loving a spring knife. You just have to wait; first it provokes you, and when you complain, the knife opens and pins you to the wall, turning you into a shooting target for everybody.

If she were to become interested in politics or lead a religious group, she would make fine people follow her into collective suicide. Like Hitler, she would round up supposed humiliators, enlist everybody to heroically stand up against them, and at the end those 'helpers' would be accused of failing. Hitler said at his end of his life that Germany deserved to be destroyed because Germans had not fulfilled his ideals! I wonder how the Germans felt when they learned that!"

Emmanuel's story shows that psychiatric labels may not even be required to understand a dynamic of *addition to humiliation*. It seems that people described with the *PAPD* label are obsessed with provoking others into giving them the opportunity to appear as heroic victims of humiliation. Perhaps *PAPD* is caused by biological parameters that are not yet detected by research, however, perhaps not. Perhaps it is a label for people who tackle early experiences of humiliation in *PAPD* ways. Triumph comes when they can point their finger at perpetrators who make them miserable. They are not interested in changing their predicament; the satisfaction is already entirely theirs.[214]

PAPD personality profiles are relatively harmless if well controlled within a social context that does not let such people rise to power position. However, what happens if

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[214] Read Kelman, 1999a, on the *Role of the Other in Existential Conflicts*.

they indeed enter positions that give them the power and influence to forge entire group fantasies in their vein?

Lindner (among others, in Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000p) analyzed the cases of Hitler, the Somalian dictator Siad Barre, and the Hutu extremist elite that instigated the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Hitler led a whole country into the abyss, as if this was his aim and to his satisfaction. Hitler in Germany, Siad Barre in Somalia, and the Rwandan elite, all ended being ousted or dead and left behind disaster without seeming remorse. Did they at any point in time authentically believe in their own propaganda that killing their "enemies" (Jews, Isaaq, or Tutsi) in genocide was a "rational" plan that would help them stay in power and their country prosperous? Their strategy of genocide turned out to be a rather suicidal path for themselves and their followers. Their *addiction to humiliation* was lethal for millions.

If such individuals gain power, destruction may be unlimited, since these people do not regard suffering as failure. On the contrary, suffering serves as satisfaction; victimhood is sought and not avoided. A central force in this complex psychical setting may be that the perpetrators of such strategies indeed suffered humiliation during childhood, yet were not duly acknowledged as victims. Such individuals set out and seek this recognition during the rest of their lives.

Israel W. Charny, 1997, proposes to include "A Personality Disorder of Excessive Power Strivings" in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV* (*DSM-IV*). Charny pinpoints a shortcoming of the *DSM-IV*, namely that it does not address conditions in which a person harms *others*.

> Charny posits that a political leader can be deemed disturbed when he defines a target population as "undeserving," "inferior,'' or "enemies of the people"; forces a murderous population transfer; calls on followers or coerces them to commit mass murder-suicide; or is prepared to send people who oppose him into psychiatric hospitals, work camps, concentration camps, and killing fields (Siegel, 1997, p. 1).

There are other labels that relate to this cluster of symptoms, namely the *repetition compulsion,* or the concept of the *wounded self* that is linked to *malignant narcissism, narcissistic rage*, and perhaps also to what has been called *sadistic personality disorder.* Jerrold Post, psychiatric expert on Saddam Hussein, suggests that Saddam Hussein suffered from a childhood trauma of rejection by his mother, and that his *wounded self* turned the Iraqi leader into a murderous tyrant. Post identifies *malignant narcissism* as vicious outflow of a *wounded self*. Scheff (2002) stipulates that tyrants such as Hitler, suffer from three symptoms, firstly from *unacknowledged shame*, secondly from a *master obsession* (in the case of Hitler, the belief that Jews planned to conquer the world and that they therefore had to be preemptively eliminated) and thirdly, from being *isolated individuals* from very early age (in the case of Hitler from the age of six).[215]

To summarize this section, psychiatry seems to be a field that addresses *malignant* tendencies that are deeply linked with the phenomenon of humiliation. Victims seem sometimes to attempt attaining acknowledgment for their victimhood by victimizing others through manipulating them into the perpetrator role. In this process, humiliation is played out on numerous levels and is almost obsessively pursued. What usually is regarded as "rational self-interest" is not prevailing. Similar to drug addicts who do not spare others' or their own welfare in their quest for narcotics, those addicted to humiliation do not spare others' or their own welfare. If such processes

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[215] Scheff, 2002, Eilert Sundt Lecture October 24, 2002, University of Oslo.

occur at the leadership level of larger communities, mayhem may see no limits. It is essential for larger communities to be aware of such processes in order to be in a better position to contain them.

I "cleanse" myself from my admiration for you by humiliating and killing you! How genocide can flow out of being caught in admiration/humiliation

Joseph, a young intellectual with Hutu background, told me the following about the backdrop and "meaning" of the unspeakable acts of humiliation perpetrated during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (the interview took place in December 1998 in Africa): "During colonial times Tutsi children were sent to special schools. There they learned how to rule. The colonialists' theory of Tutsi origin indicated that they had longer faces, their women were beautiful ladies with long nails, and that they came from Arab countries. The whites thought that Tutsi were a mixture of Arab and white blood, therefore nearer to the whites – somehow relatives of whites [this view is also called the *Hamitic hypothesis*]. When Tutsi were admitted to college, they were being prepared to be in power, while Hutu entered in catholic seminars to become teachers and fathers. There were also some Hutu intellectuals, but the path to power was blocked for them. In short: rulers = Tutsi, servants = Hutu. The concept of humiliation is therefore related to tradition and culture: Tutsi are convinced that they are "born to rule," they cannot imagine how they can survive without being in power" (adapted from Lindner, 2001g, p. 183).

Later, Rwandan history turned the hierarchy of Tutsi-rulers and Hutu-servants upside down. Hutu were helped into the ruling seats by their Belgian colonizers shortly before independence, July 1, 1962.[216] Many of the deposed Tutsi left for exile, others stayed on within Rwandan borders as routinely humiliated minority. The Tutsi elite-now-minority was customarily humiliated presumably in order to counter something of the past that lived on, at least partly, namely their elite reputation. Even though Tutsi were the despised minority after their fall, Tutsi women, for example, were still sought-after trophies for Hutu men who had acquired some wealth and were on the lookout for suitable brides. I frequently was told (in 1999) that a Hutu man who gets rich "buys a house, gets a Mercedes, and marries a Tutsi woman" (Lindner, 2001g, p. 351). The cultural belief that Tutsi women are more beautiful than Hutu women thus had apparently survived, even though Tutsi superiority had been abolished politically.

We understand that Hutu habitual admiration for Tutsi superiority was clearly living on even though Tutsi had been successfully deposed. Before traveling to Rwanda I was told that I should not ask whether a person was of Hutu or Tutsi origin; I was to proceed indirectly, keeping in mind that ethnic labels such as Hutu and Tutsi are being disputed altogether. However, I was told, notably "unofficially," that hundreds of years of subservience had marked Hutu body language and given people of Hutu background a tendency to bow humbly, whereas Tutsi would stand upright, proudly and sometimes even haughtily.

Thus, despite of their political demise, Tutsi elitism somehow had survived, not only in the former elite's minds, but, and this is more remarkable, even in the minds of the former underlings who now were in power. Hutu rulers, albeit in power, evidently harbored deep fear of Tutsi return from exile; otherwise, there would have

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[216] When the Belgians opened the door, the Hutu intellectuals organized a revolution, November 1, 1959, which was completed with independence.

been no need to design the 1994 genocide to prevent returning Tutsi from ever again humiliating Hutu as prior to 1959. The newly-gained Hutu power must have felt very fragile and not really assuring for their holders. Thus, although Tutsi had lost most of their factual power, the memories of their past domination lived on in the minds of their former underlings/now rulers in such a way that these underlings felt vulnerable and compelled to go as far as humiliate and kill their already deposed and rather powerless former masters.

This leads to the at first glance counterintuitive insight that perpetrators may be *weak*. Lindner (among others, in Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000p) analyzed the experiential worlds of Hitler, Barre and the Rwandan elite, and found that they did not always look *down* on those they later exterminated in genocide or Holocaust. Interestingly, at some point in their biographies, they looked *up* to those they later killed. The Jews, the Isaaq, and the Tutsi were regarded as *elites* – intelligent, diligent, superior – and therefore as potential dangerous humiliators whose plans to humiliate in the future "had" to be averted by killing them; they were not at all regarded as limited minds. In another chapter further down I will come back to the hypothesis that perpetrators may feel inferior to there victims. Instead of *strong* perpetrators and *weak* victims, we may find *weak* perpetrators. In Rwanda I indeed was frequently told that Hutu allegedly harbor an *inferiority complex* towards their former masters, the Tutsi.

Something as unexpected as *admiration* may thus be the backdrop for the "evil" mixture of "cleansing" atrocities. *Admiration* is something underlings may need to "cleanse" themselves of by putting down the targets of this admiration. Being in power technically may not be sufficient when psychology lags behind. Recently risen underlings may grapple with their admiration for their former and now deposed masters and may want to cleanse themselves of both.

For genocide, Figure 1 may thus be adapted so as to arrive at Figure 5. It may not be long-established elites that are the cruelest, but newly risen underlings who attempt to "cleanse" themselves of elite-admiration by killing the former elite, who is now a minority, but feared as former and future elite.

Genocidal "Cleansing"

|	
Newly risen underlings attempt to "cleanse" themselves of elite admiration	Top of the scale
Humility	Line of equal dignity
Former elites, now deposed, are being humiliated even further	Bottom of the scale

Figure 5: Genocidal "cleansing"

The only salvage from leaders with tendencies described here is that society at large, in the case of the *global village* the *international community*, marginalizes them. Even democracy does not protect against them. They may find ways to incite followers within democratic settings, such as Hitler managed to do. People with profiles such as those presented here may lead whole continents into the abyss. It is therefore eminently important that they are prevented from gaining power in the first place. At the same time, care must be taken to dignify the masses that otherwise serve as "fodder" for the *narratives of humiliation* into which they are "invited" by such leaders.

Zimbabwean *Green Bombers* are people trained to attack the opposition in so-called "state-sponsored" violence. Three young lads who escaped to Johannesburg told the sad tale of how they broke into farms, destroyed fences, let the livestock loose, burned down houses, beat people with sticks and axes, and raped young girls. They were promised jobs, money, land and a dignified future, but "instead they were given alcohol, drugs and orders" (April 17, 2003, on BBCWorld news). The commentator called for African neighbors to intervene and criticized that so far the strategy of quiet diplomacy seemingly had not worked.

To conclude this section, the backdrop for genocidal obsessions with "cleansing" may be *admiration* for the very victims of this cleansing. Recently risen underlings may suffer from fragile psychological structures rendered dissonant by remnants of admiration for their former elites.[217] Such dissonance would then be attempted to be "cleansed" away with almost addictive obsession. To humiliate the former elite not merely into powerlessness but into the abyss would thus serve to "free" the perpetrators of their own esteem for this very elite.

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[217] See Festinger, 1957, for work on dissonance.

Bloody shoes! How childhood experiences can addict to humiliation

Suffering from early childhood neglect and humiliation may lead people to perpetrate acts of humiliation even without any elaborate scripts, inadvertently, through mere *affective blindness*. Perry relates a gruesome story that gives evidence to the severity of the potential effects of childhood humiliation. It is the story of *affective blindness*:

> A fifteen year old boy sees some fancy sneakers he wants. Another child is wearing them – so he pulls out a gun and demands them. The younger child, at gunpoint, takes off his shoes and surrenders them. The fifteen year old puts the gun to the child's head, smiles and pulls the trigger. When he is arrested, the officers are chilled by his apparent lack of remorse. Asked later whether, if he could turn back the clock, would he do anything differently, he thinks and replies, "I would have cleaned my shoes." His "bloody shoes" led to his arrest. He exhibits regret for being caught, an intellectual, cognitive response. But remorse – an affect – is absent. He feels no connection to the pain of his victim. Neglected and humiliated by his primary caretakers when he was young, this fifteen-year-old murderer is, literally, emotionally retarded. The part of his brain which would have allowed him to feel connected to other human beings – empathy – simply did not develop. He has affective blindness. Just as the retarded child lacks the capacity to understand abstract cognitive concepts, this young murderer lacks the capacity to be connected to other human beings in a healthy way. Experience, or rather lack of critical experiences, resulted in this affective blindness – this emotional retardation (Perry, 1997, p. 128).

George is the son of a British soldier who fought courageously in World War II and was highly decorated. When his father came back from war, he started drinking and neglecting his family. The son, George was now in his late fifties and came to me because he suffered from panic attacks. George explained: "My mother was alone with the children during the war. I was the smallest. There was no time for friendliness or warmth. And when my father came back there was mostly quarrelling between my parents. I am emotionally undernourished, I think. I learned from my father this tough attitude to weakness. I believe, he could not cope with his war trauma and put on a hard face. I seem to have done the same. I was profoundly alone, lonely, left alone, by my caretakers, and I think I have sustained this loneliness later by myself.

By being tough and cynical towards myself, I withheld any warmth that otherwise perhaps would have reached me. All the women I met, for example, left me after a while because they could not take my constant urge to denigrate them. I am cynical and sarcastic as to every shred of warm feeling.

At the same time I was a sex maniac. As if somebody in me wanted to get via my skin what I could not get via my soul. This mixture of sex addiction to women, whom I at the same time continuously besmirched with my words and actions, drove women away. No wonder.

I feel that I was destroyed as a child. Nobody taught me how to heal my wounds. Worse, I did not even know that I had wounds. Being emotionally neglected was somehow normal for me. I did not know anything else. Only over the past five years I have come to understand that I am a deeply damaged person. Like a baby I have to learn everything about warmth and nurturing and love from scratch. I have no idea of all that. The only thing I know, the only resemblance of love that ever reached me, was sexual addiction. I could masturbate without break for hours while watching porno films showing the rape of women. The more humiliating the rape, the more

satisfactory for me.

I am sorry that I damaged so many women on my way. Some tried to teach me love. However, none of them succeeded. I 'protected' myself against them with my sarcasm. And I destroyed quite a number of them. You could say that indirectly I am a victim of the Second World War and its emotional destruction of my caretakers, and these women are indirectly victims of this war, too."

George's story shows that neglected children, emotionally "undernourished," may suffer from *affective blindness* and later be caught in *addiction to humiliation*. This emotional neglect may occur as an "accident," as in George's case through the harshness of a war context.

Elliott Leyton, anthropologist and author of widely known books on serial murder and genocide, underlines the harsh long-term effects of war (on CBC National, March 25, 2003):

"I've spent years living in war zones – in Northern Ireland, where Protestants and Catholics have been tearing each other apart for decades, and where nasty boys ran at me with Molotov Cocktails; in Rwanda, where a ruthless Hutu regime exterminated the Tutsi minority, and where we stood in churches stacked floor to ceiling with the bodies of women and children hacked to death with machetes through the eyes; and in Israel, where Christians, Jews and Muslims are joined together in an Unholy Trinity of Hatred, Racism and Murder, and where we were bombed in a fruit market by an enterprising Holy Warrior. Unless you've personally experienced such horror, I hope you'll be cautious about urging it on others.

What's this latest adventure in Iraq *about* anyway? We've all heard the usual theories:

Perhaps it's all about controlling the supplies of Iraqi oil and gas; or it's all about some inevitable Christian death struggle with Islam; or it's all about young Bush[1]s Oedipal need to do better than his father; or it's a Jewish plot; or it's evil militant Capitalism out to make some big bucks; or it's about the elimination of an evil dictator; or it's just an elaborate field testing programme for the USA's latest smart-bombing Brit-busting military hardware; or it's about punishing Iraqis for what a handful of Saudis did in 9/11?

Who knows? And are any of these reasons enough to justify the human misery – the personal grief, the economic and social chaos, the traumatization of yet another generation of children – that comes with a war?

We know quite a bit about the suffering war leaves in its wake. Everybody loses in a war. Wars kill tens of thousands, and this mass death in turn kills all happiness and hope for the victims' loved ones.

But those who die in war are only the first victims of a much deeper process. The best modern scholarship makes it clear that a major war desensitizes us all to violence, and in so brutalizing us, raises the postwar murder rates for many years.

Moreover, most wars generate enough suffering, killing, maiming and hatred to keep us killing, maiming, and hating for generations. Again, the fog of lies that surrounds all wars squanders the credibility of even honorable governments and abandons us to a new generation of cynics who will do nothing if a legitimate call to action is sounded.

And finally, such wars legitimize for decades the deep ethnic, religious and political hatreds from which our ancestors fled, and that we Canadians have been lucky enough to avoid" (Elliott Leyton, March, 25, 2003, on CBC National radio).

The 2003 Iraq war was set against the backdrop of decades of cruelty perpetrated by Saddam Hussein on his own people. Many younger Iraqis have never experienced anything but oppression and violence. Iraqi citizens still have to wait for more peaceful and nurturing experiences that may give space to personal dignity and growth.

The backdrop of cruelty that we find in many countries may thus be due to tyrants such as Saddam Hussein, however, through history, also cultures of emotional neglect have existed – particularly in staunch patriarchal honor-based warrior contexts. Alice Miller (1983) made known to a wider audience in what way leading pedagogues in the period that lead up to the two World Wars of the past century taught that a cruel *breaking the will of the child* was supposedly essential for childrearing. Countries such as Somalia provide other examples. Somalia, with its semi-desert, which offers nothing but extremely difficult living circumstances to wandering nomads, developed unforgiving "warriorhood."

In the case of Somalia, a harsh and proud culture of fierce "warriorhood" led to years of civil unrest, hunger, and death. First came decades of brutal dictatorship by Siad Barre, however, even though he fell in 1991, Somalia is not a peaceful place even today.

"Muusa Bihi Cabdi (Somaliland's Interior Minister until 1995) is a man in his fifties, a tough man with a life experience that hardly any Western man or woman would have survived. He explained to me (December 1998 in Hargeisa) how he learned to be 'tough' already as a small child. He is a former nomad who trained to survive in one of the harshest environments of the world, Somali semi-desert.

He recounted how he learned already as a six years old boy to never really sleep, to always be alert to danger, and how he learned to discern the traces of dangerous animals and 'enemy' clans. Later he left the desert and became a MIG airplane bombardier and studied in Russia. In the Ogaden war in 1978 he participated in the bombing of Ethiopia. Russia abandoned Somalia during this war and sided with Ethiopia, inflicting a humiliating defeat on Somalia. Somalia was subsequently supported by the United States and Bihi studied also there at a military academy. When his Isaaq clan was threatened with eradication in the 1980s, he joined the guerrilla forces and became a commander, responsible for the lives and deaths of many. Later he became a minister in the government of 'Somaliland.'

I asked him what he would change if he could live again. He replied that he would change everything, especially his 'training to be tough and always ready to fight': 'I was always in war, tribal war; looting each others' camels; as a kid I was raised in terror; I was six years old when I saw the first person being killed; when I joined the army, there was always fighting, and I saw a lot of my friends being killed. If I could live again: not all these wars!'" (Lindner, 2001g, p. 149).

We may summarize this chapter by noting that there are people around who *thrive on humiliation*. They are addicted to feelings of humiliation, will provoke them systematically and will perpetrate acts of humiliation so as to "avenge" the humiliation they feel they have suffered. War and genocide may be the result in cases where such personalities gain power and find a sufficiently large pool of feelings of frustration and humiliation among potential followers that they can instrumentalize. The genocidal obsession with "cleansing" may represent another facet of *addiction to humiliation*, insofar as unwelcome elite admiration is "cleansed" away into the abyss

together with its targets. Finally, cultures of *affective blindness* may entail practices of humiliation that become self-perpetuating cultural obsessions. In all these cases the wider community, in order to contain such *malign* tendencies, would benefit from increasing awareness of such dynamics.

Reading related to this chapter

As soon as we turn to issues that are related to humiliation then a wide field of research opens up: Research on *mobbing and bullying* touches upon the phenomenon of humiliation and should therefore be included.[218] This research leads over to the field of *prejudice and stigmatization*,[219] which in turn draws on research on *trauma* and *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder PTSD*,[220] *aggression*,[221] *stress*,[222] and last but not least *emotions*.[223]

Read furthermore more on *PAPD*,[224] on the *repetition compulsion*,[225] on *narcissistic rage*,[226] on the *sadistic personality disorder*,[227] on *Hitler's psychology*,[228] on the *neurobiology of emotional development*,[229] on *early neglect of a child and brain dysfunction*,[230] on *psychoneuroimmunology*,[231] and on how *victims* become *perpetrators*.[232]

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[218] See especially Heinz Leymann for work on mobbing, Leymann, 1990, Leymann, 1993, Leymann, 1996, Leymann and Kornbluh, 1989, Leymann and Gustafsson, 1996, as well as Dan Åke Olweus on mobbing and bullying at school, Olweus, 1993, Olweus, 1997. The confusion around the use of the terms mobbing and bullying stems from the fact that these phenomena are addressed differently in different countries. Leymann suggests keeping the word bullying for activities between children and teenagers at school and reserving the word mobbing for adult behavior at workplaces.

[219] Edvard E. Jones, 1984, *Social Stigma - The Psychology of Marked Relationships*, is a central book on stigmatization. See also Brewer, 1999b, and Duckitt, 1992.

[220] There exists a huge body of research and literature, see, for example, Bremner et al., 1992, Eitinger, 1990, Everly, 1993, Figley, 1989, Gerbode, 2000, Havermans, 1998, Horowitz, Weine, and Jekel, 1995, Kardiner, 1941, Lavik et al., 1999, McCann and Pearlman, 1992b, McCann and Pearlman, 1992a, Nadler and Ben Shushan, 1989, Pearlman, 1998, Pearlman, 1994, Perry, 1994, van der Kolk et al., 1984, van der Kolk, 1994, van der Kolk and Fisler, 2000, van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1989, van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1991, van der Kolk and Kadish, 1987.

[221] Berkowitz, the social psychologist who initiated research on the link between *frustration, anger, aggression* and "*cues*," put forward the *Frustration-Aggression hypothesis* (Berkowitz, 1993). See also Berkowitz, 1964, Berkowitz 1964, Berkowitz, 1972, Berkowitz, 1974, Berkowitz, 1978.

[222] Standard reading on stress psychology is Richard S. Lazarus, 1966, *Psychological Stress and the Coping Process* and Lazarus and Folkman, 1984, *Stress, Appraisal and Coping*. Stress is not necessarily negative, it may also be a stimulating challenge – and there are individual differences why some people thrive under stress and others break. See, for example, *Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages* by Carver, 1998; *Embodying Psychological Thriving: Physical Thriving in Response to Stress* by Epel, McEwen, and Ickovics, 1998; Q*uantitative Assessment of Thriving* by Cohen et al., 1998; *Beyond Recovery From Trauma: Implications for Clinical Practice and Research* by Calhoun and Tedeschi, 1998b; *Exploring Thriving in the Context of Clinical Trauma Theory: Constructivist Self Development Theory* by Saakvitne, Tennen, and Affleck, 1998.

[223] Antonio R. Damasio, 1994, with his book *Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, provides a perspective on the important "constructive" role that emotions play for the process of our decision making; it shows how the traditional view of "heart" versus "head" is obsolete. Daniel Goleman, 1996, in his more widely known book *Emotional Intelligence* relies heavily on Damasio. Goleman gives, among others, a description of the brain activities that lead to post-traumatic stress disorder. The *Handbook of Emotion and Memory* by Christianson (Ed.), 1992, addresses the important interplay between emotions and memory. Humiliation is a process that is deeply embedded in the individual's interdependence with her environment, and therefore relational concepts of mind such as Gibson's ecological psychology of "affordance" are relevant. Gibson "includes environmental considerations in psychological taxonomies" writes de Jong, 1997 (Abstract). M. A. Forrester, 1999, presents a related approach, that he defines as "discursive ethnomethodology," that focuses on "narrativization as process bringing together Foucault's (1972) discourse theory, Gibson's (1979) affordance metaphor and conversation analysis. Also the *sociology of emotions* is relevant; see especially the work of Thomas J. Scheff on emotions such as shame and violence, as well as Keltner and Gross, 1999, and Keltner and Haidt, 1999. Read on the *Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility and Violence*, Beck, 1999a.

[224] Two authoritative psychiatric diagnosis manuals exist; one, the *American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, or DSM, is edited by the American Psychiatric

Association. The other, *The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems*, tenth revision (ICD-10), is published by the WHO in Geneva. The American Psychiatric Association, 1994 describes the PAPD essential feature in DSM-IV (p. 733) as a pervasive pattern of negativistic attitudes and passive resistance to demands for adequate performance in social and occupational settings. The World Health Organization, 1994 lists the passive-aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder in Annex 1 of the ICD-10. To be diagnosed with *PAPD* disorder, individuals must meet the general criteria of a personality disorder, at least five of the following: procrastination and delay in completing essential tasks – particularly those that others seek to have completed; unjustified protests that others make unreasonable demands; sulkiness, irritability or argumentativeness when asked to do something that the individual does not want to do; unreasonable criticism or scorn for authority figures; deliberately slow or poor work on unwanted tasks; obstruction of the efforts of others even as these individuals fail to do their share of the work; and avoidance of obligations by claiming to have forgotten them (ICD-10, 1994, pp. 329-330).

[225] *Repetition compulsion*, or the *compulsion to repeat the trauma*, *re-enactment, revictimization*, or *masochism*. Many traumatized people expose themselves, seemingly compulsively, to situations evocative of the original trauma. The link to earlier life experiences is usually not understood. Surprisingly, this *repetition compulsion* has received little systematic exploration since its discovery several decades ago. "Freud thought that the aim of repetition was to gain mastery, but clinical experience has shown that this rarely happens; instead, repetition causes further suffering for the victims or for people in their surroundings" (Kolk, 1989, p. 389).

[226] See for groundwork on narcissism, Kohut, 1976b.

[227] The diagnosis "sadistic personality disorder" has been "quietly" dropped in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) because it was controversial and insufficiently researched. Soraya Seedat, who works with victims in South Africa, explains (in a personal discussion August 11, 1999 at the conference in Hamburg) that she does not think that sadistic personality disorders exists, according to her experience perpetrators may have an "antisocial personality."

[228] See, for example, Erikson, 1963, Gonen, 2000, or Redlich, 1999.

[229] See a classic on *childhood and society*, Erikson, 1950. See furthermore, among others, Schore, 1994, *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: the Neurobiology of Emotional Development.* See also the work by Antonio Damasio and colleagues, Adolphs and Damasio, 2001, Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio, 2000, Damasio, 2000, Damasio, 1994, Damasio, 1999. See also Cacioppo, Berntson, Adolphs, Carter, Davidson, McClintock, McEwen, Meaney, Schacter, Sternberg, Suomi, and Taylor (Eds.), 2002, Davidson, 2000, Panksepp, 1992, Panksepp, 1998, Whalen, 1998.

[230] Perry (1997) explains that early neglect of a child can lead to brain dysfunction, that in turn may cause the neglected individual to commit horrific deeds later in life, such as for example murder, as 'remorseless violent child, "Very narrow windows - critical periods - exist during which specific sensory experience is required for optimal organization and development of any brain area (e.g., Singer, 1995, Thoenen, 1995). Absent such experience and development, dysfunction is inevitable (e.g., Carlson et al., 1989). When critical periods have been examined in great detail in non-human animals for the primary sensory modalities, similar use-dependent differentiation in development of the brain occurs for the rest of the central nervous system (Cragg, 1967, Cragg, 1969, Cummins and Livesey, 1979). Abnormal micro-environmental cues and atypical patterns of neural activity during critical and sensitive periods can result in malorganization and compromised function in other brain-mediated functions such as empathy, attachment and affect regulation (e.g., Green et al., 1981). Some of the most powerful clinical examples of this are related to lack of "attachment" experiences early in life. The child who has been emotionally neglected or abandoned early in life will exhibit attachment problems which are persistently resistant to any "replacement" experiences including therapy (Carlson et al., 1989). Examples of this include feral children, Spitz's orphans (Spitz and Wolf, 1946), the Romanian orphans (Chisholm et al., 1995) and, sadly, the remorseless, violent child (Ressler, Burgess, and Douglas, 1988, Myers et al., 1995, Mones, 1991, Hickey, 1991, Greenberg, Speltz, and DeKlyen, 1993)" (Perry, 1997, 128).

[231] See for *psychoneuroimmunology*, Albers, Huhman, and Meisel, 2002, Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1993, Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1997, Uchino, 2004.

[232] See, among many others, Sue Grand's work (Grand, 2000) on how victims can become perpetrators.

Love, Help, and Humiliation

We are used to thinking that where there is humiliation, there are humiliators. We are accustomed to believing that for humiliation to occur there must be – somewhere – a "bad" person who humiliates others. However, situations of humiliation may also occur when only one party labels it as such. For example, help and love can humiliate. In such cases, we may find entirely benevolent helpers on one side, no evil perpetrators at all; yet, the help and love extended may still result in feelings of humiliation in the recipients. Only *one* participant identifies this event as *humiliation*, the *other* labels it as *help* or *love*. The following vignette may illustrate the case of help and humiliation.

> "I have cancer. But I have no money to pay for medicine. You come to help me. You bring me chocolate. And you are proud of being such a helpful person. You clearly feel good. I appreciate your good intentions. However, don't you see that I need medicine and no chocolate? Don't you see that you serve your own interests more than mine by bringing me chocolate and no medicine? You feel a lot better than before. You have proved to yourself and your friends that you are a helpful human being.
>
> But what about me? What do you think I feel? I feel that you buy yourself a good conscience and I pay the price. I feel painfully humiliated by your blindness and ignorance. I am bitter. I know, you do not know better and you are perfectly naïve and well-intentioned, but to me, you are either stupid or evil. A little more effort in understanding my situation would really suit you! And by the way, did not you earn a lot of money with these pesticides that presumably brought me this cancer? You are not aware of it, I know, but I find you so arrogant in your 'kind' and 'helpful' ignorance!"

This vignette shows to which degree humiliation is a term that carries the relation between at least two parties at its heart. It cannot be described by looking at just one individual or one party. It is not sufficient to state, "I have good intentions and therefore you have to feel respected and be thankful." The question which poses itself explicitly in such cases is: "If I want to help others, but my arrogant way of behaving humiliates those I want to help – without even me being aware – do I then commit a humiliating act? From my point of view, I do not commit a humiliating act; from the perceiver's point of view I do commit such an act."

> Laura came to me to have counseling because she could not stand her mother-in-law any more. She recounted: "You now, my mother-in-law makes me crazy. She says she wants the best for her son and his family. So, she gives us gifts and arranges for a lot of things. Whatever she deems to be lacking in the house, she orders. She has the key to the house and walks in and out at her will. She defines what is good for us and then she does 'good.' My husband is very glad about that. I beg him to take the key away from his mother. Yet, he only gets angry at me. I tell him that I have nothing to say in the house and whether it is really this kind of life he wishes for his wife? Yet, he only rebukes me for not being thankful enough. I tell him that my opinions, my taste, altogether my way of prioritizing things, are made void and irrelevant by his mother-in-law. I am a kind of decorative doll in the house. No, he does not listen. He thinks I am oversensitive and hysterical.
>
> What shall I do? I am desperate! We have children. I cannot just leave the family

behind. But staying chokes me! Her 'gifts' surround me and make me feel alien in my own home because I have another taste! And I do not want my children to grow up being spoiled by this woman! I do not see them develop any healthy relationship with the real world! This woman invades me and annihilates me and my children with her overflowing 'good-will.' I am being profoundly humiliated, everyday, and nobody recognizes it!"

The case of Laura is relevant in many situations of aid such as humanitarian aid, peace keeping, or peace enforcing. The involved helpers struggle with the possibility that their actions may humiliate those who shall be helped. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War* is the telling title of a book that addresses the traps of help (Mary B. Anderson, 1999).

The difficulty entailed in dynamics of humiliation that are set in motion by help and love is that the "perpetrator" is blind to this dynamic. In torture, the perpetrator intends to humiliate the victim. Both, perpetrator and victim, agree that torture is about humiliation. Both are aware of this dynamic and there is no dissonance in perception. The case is totally different for help and love. In case of failing help and love, dissonance is at the core of the feelings of humiliation that are elicited. Help and love are no torture. Helpers and lovers are not supposed to be torturers. Both, helper and helped, lover and loved, agree on this definition and are decided on realizing something else than torture. When the recipient, despite of this framing, experiences help and love as humiliating, there is deep dissonance, deep disagreement, and a profound breakdown of mutual understanding. There is no shared identity, no shared experience, and no consensus.

The alleged "perpetrators" may overlook this rift and live in an illusionary world, The alleged "perpetrators" may overlook this rift and live in an illusionary world, convinced that good intentions are all that is needed to secure real helpfulness in help and real lovingness in love. The "beneficiaries" will feel humiliated by this blind conviction. Some might "overdo it" and mistrust and reject even those helpers who make every effort to adapt their help and support to the recipients' needs. Whatever is the backdrop, "helpers" and "lovers" typically react with surprise and shock over the lack of gratitude and appreciation they encounter. They may develop feelings of humiliation, too, emphasizing their effort and their benign intentions and seeing the lack of recognition as an evil attempt to besmirch and humiliate them. A cycle of humiliation may thus be put in motion by help and love.

Your love does not reach me! How lacking attunement humiliates

What is required to extend help that really helps and provide love that really loves? What are the ingredients of genuinely helpful help and genuinely loving love? Several elements of humanness may be considered, such as the *need to belong*, *intersubjectivity*, *communication*, *friendship*, *community*, *love,* and *social integration*.

The *need to belong* seems to be characteristic of *humanness*. Helping, friendship, community, love, they all are different forms of belonging. Good *communication* is required to make all this work. Successful communication, however, is embedded in *intersubjectivity*, signifying that we live in each others' minds and look at ourselves with the eyes of others. Communication succeeds only when this intersubjectivity is played with sophistication and its potential is realized. Scheff (2003) commends the idea of *pendulation*, where "we swing back and forth between our own point of view, and that of the other" (Levine, 1997, in Scheff, 2003, p. 10). "It is this back and forth

movement between subjective and intersubjective consciousness that allows us the potential for understanding each other" (Scheff, 2003a, p. 10).

If this *pendulation* is carried out successfully, the result is *solidarity* and *social integration*; if not, we have *alienation* and *lack* of social integration. Scheff reminds us that solidarity and alienation are useful concepts for the analysis not only of large groups or whole societies, but also for interpersonal relations.

Successful *pendulation* is crucial also for successful love. Scheff analyzes love. He introduces three elements, *attunement, attachment*, and *attraction* (including *sexual attraction*). While attachment and sexual attraction are mainly physical processes, comparatively uncomplicated, constant and universal both over time and in different cultures, *attunement* is different. Attunement is the cultural, cognitive and emotional basis for love; it entails numerous dimensions, implications, and varies depending on the individuals, social classes, cultures and historical epochs involved. Scheff explains how attunement is a sense of oneness, mutual understanding, empathic resonance, and shared awareness. Attunement means connectedness between people, often "effortless understanding, and understanding that one is understood" (Scheff, 2003a, p. 9). Good attunement is achieved when *pendulation* is successful, when *intersubjectivity* is lived to its full potential.

Scheff acclaims Solomon (1981, 1994) for identifying *shared identity* as the central feature of attunement and love, "…love [is] shared identity, a redefinition of self which no amount of sex or fun or time together will add up to….Two people in a society with an extraordinary sense of individual identity mutually fantasize, verbalize and act their way into a relationship that can no longer be understood as a mere conjunction of the two but only as a complex ONE." (Solomon 1981, p. xxx; 1994, p. 235).

We may conclude that alienation and isolation emerge when pendulation fails; solidarity, attunement, shared identities, and love emerge when pendulation succeeds. In love relationships where pendulation succeeds, the result is a relationship of interdependency; it is neither independency nor dependency. Real loving love is interdependent; it is a secure bond, not dependent and engulfed, and not independent and isolated. Full love cannot occur when pendulation lacks; heartbrokenness after infatuation, for example, is rather self-absorbed and isolated. Engulfed love, equally, is a case of too little pendulation; when I give up my self for the other, there is no secure bond, there is dependency (the latter representing the setting that was expected from a wife in traditional marriage).

Marshall Rosenberg (1999) holds workshops on *non-violent communication*. He suggests that in close relationships, maintaining empathic connectedness is the absolute priority. Scheff reports: "In Rosenberg's workshops, this question often arises in parent-child relationships, when a mother or father complains about a child's behavior. For example, a mother may repeat a dialogue between her and her son about getting his homework done before watching TV or playing electronic games. Rosenberg begins by explaining that the child has a need for autonomy, for being his own person, as well as a need for remaining connected with the parent.

This idea seems to be lost on the parent. She will ask: "So how do I get him to do the homework?" The parent seems to have the idea that what is involved is a test of wills, and that the way to go is to have a stronger will than the child. Rosenberg then goes on to explain that the parent needs to show that empathic connectedness is more important to her than getting the homework done. That is, that she respects the child's need for autonomy" (Scheff, 2003a, p. 13).

We may summarize that lack of *pendulation*, lack of *genuine interest* for the other, results in a lack of mutual understanding. If I genuinely want to help and love, it seems that I have a responsibility to try to realize intersubjectivity's full potential. Otherwise, help is misplaced and love is a farce. The recipients of such "fake" or "false" help and love, even if it is well-intended, may feel humiliated. When the recipients' thoughts and needs are not taken into account, these recipients are put into an inferior position. To be put into an inferior position against one's will is nothing else but humiliating.

Eve recounts, "My first husband used me like a piece of shit. My body was an object to be walked over. Now I have a new husband who puts a lot of effort in making our relationship a success. He prepares candle light dinners, works for hours to give me orgasms and is altogether unstoppable. The problem is that in both cases, these men do not know how to listen to me and build a relationship. Of course, my first husband was not even interested in a real relationship, yet, the second one is. However, he thinks it is sufficient to "invest" certain "efforts" in me, irrespective of me resonating with them or not. Sometimes a little gesture gives me more of an orgasm than several hours of bed gymnastics and a small snack may do as much as a candle light dinner. The problem is that there is no attunement. I tell him that his monologic actions neglect me and humiliate me because they treat me like a product of his imagination and not as an independent human being. But he only gets irritated that I do not recognize his unrelenting loving efforts."

Rosenberg's and also Eve's vignette expose what attentive readers will have recognized long ago, namely that Scheff's definitions of full love are inscribed in a human rights frame. As Scheff himself notes, in the old traditional honor order no husband was required to build a mutually *shared* identity with his wife, on the contrary, she had to buy into *his* identity and live in what Scheff calls engulfed love. And, Rosenberg finds parents still today believing that "what is involved is a test of wills, and that the way to go is to have a stronger will than the child." In the old order, subjugation was the name of the game; help and love were associated rather with the stick than with mutually shared identity or pendulation. *Egalization* ideals are new to many and must be learned from scratch. They represent skills that have not yet been transformed into secure cultural knowledge. On the contrary, old recipes vie with new ones, different definitions of help and love elicit humiliating "misunderstandings" and the confusion is great.

   To conclude this section, helpers and lovers clearly carry responsibilities, namely to design help and love in ways that are not "walking over" recipients and thus humiliating them. As stated before, full love is *interdependent*, and not independent and *isolated*. However, also recipients carry responsibilities. Full love is not dependent and *engulfed* either. Both parties in love or help relationships may go too far, either by "walking over" the other, or by allowing the other to "walk over" me. The first case was addressed in this section; the second case will be addressed in the following section.

You pretend to love me but you rape me! How allowing oneself being seduced into false love humiliates

Alice came to me as a client in 1991 because her marriage had collapsed. Alice was an intelligent well-educated European woman. She told me the following: "I met Robert ten years ago. He is eighteen years older than me. When I met him, I had just come out of a relationship with an abusive man who could not endure an intelligent woman at his side. I was happy to meet somebody who was older and kinder. I yearned for kindness, for being taken care of, for not being hurt several times a day. I was touched and happy when Robert said that he needed me. My former husband had never said that, he only said that I was old and ugly. I was happy about the new compliments in my life. Robert lifted me up! I was ready to give Robert everything, I was happy to have found somebody who finally loved me, and seemingly did not feel threatened by me, my education, and my intelligence.

Robert lived and worked in Indonesia, and I moved to Indonesia to join him. He was separated from his wife who lived back in Europe and he told me that he could not get a divorce because of the laws back home in his country. However, he said, he considered me his wife now. I accepted. I preferred a happy unmarried relationship to a painful marriage. When I arrived in Indonesia I was full of plans, wanted to do research, get another degree, and have a family.

But nothing of that happened. Now I am ten years older and I have nothing. I have wasted all these years on this man. And the worst, I did not even recognize that I wasted my time while I did it! Every time we wanted to realize one of my goals, there was an existential crisis in his life. He had problems with his job, problems with his family; we always lived in emergencies. I hardly ever relaxed. I was all the time busy helping him with his problems, hoping that we would start 'our' life 'then' and that thus also 'my' life would start one day. It never started!"

Alice cried, "How on earth could I have been so stupid and accept all that? Stupid me, I tried terribly hard to be optimistic! Whenever I felt that I was not optimistic enough, I felt guilty of not loving him enough. I told myself: 'How can I be weak in supporting this wonderful man who has so many troubles!' 'How blind, how stupid,' I say today! How could I ever be proud of being intelligent while being so stupid? How could I ever be proud of being a 'good woman'? My mother had taught me what a good woman was; a good woman was a woman who devoted her life to her man. This is what I did, and it made me feel good! Now I get nauseated only by thinking of it! I realize that Robert used all these emergencies to hide behind them, to avoid real commitment to me. He was not really interested in my needs, my dreams, and my happiness. He needed my presence, yes, he enjoyed me being near him, this was what he wanted; I was a nice object in his apartment and objects do not have needs.

Today my loyalty to him, as well as my intelligence, which made me proud once, makes me feel disgusted of myself. I am not only ashamed of myself; I feel that I humiliated myself in front of the Alice who once thought highly of herself. I feel exploited by Robert; he manipulated me into helping him and sacrificing my life for him. And at the end he leaves me with the feeling that it was alone my fault that I exploited myself, and worse even – he is even right! I feel that he raped me, in a slow process, a slow humiliating rape, which I allowed. I could kill Robert. He destroyed me and my inner core of dignity. What he did to me is worse than overt rape. A brute rapist does at least not lie. Robert raped me and made me believe it was love. The resentment, pain and suffering which this brought into my life cannot be measured."

The case of Alice may be placed within the same theoretical framework as the

Hitlerzeit [*Hitler's era*].[233] Many of Germany's *kleine Leute*, the *little people*, were "raped" by Hitler. They were not only seduced, but also "raped" and humiliated.

Germany is currently undergoing a period of "working through" the *Nazizeit* [*Nazi period*]. *Zeitzeugen* [*witnesses of history*] are interviewed "before they die," in documentaries and TV chat shows that fill German TV programs. But not only on television, also in private homes people reflect more openly than ever before and unearth their memories, people who have been almost completely silent for over fifty years. This may indicate that the *Unfähigkeit zu trauern* [*the inability to mourn*],[234] described by Mitscherlich (1982) for fifty years had its origins in an inability to talk. The only ones who always had a voice where those few *Unverbesserliche* [*those who cannot be reformed*], who at the far right of the political spectrum continued to broadcast Nazi ideals ever since World War II, as well as those few critical intellectuals with historical interests who have written books. Now however, more than fifty years after the *Zusammenbruch* [*collapse*] of Hitler's Germany, the *little people* are beginning to reflect. Whoever had thought those times were forgotten, had been misled by a façade of silence.

Hitler held one of his manipulative speeches on the Bückeberg, a hill near Hamelin. Hamelin is the city of the *pied piper*. The most popular versions of this tale derive from the poem by Robert Browning and the fairy tale by the Brothers Grimm. "In pretty much all versions, rats infest Hamelin and the town hires a traveling rat catcher to exterminate them. When he does so, the king, mayor, or whoever decides not to pay him, so he extracts his revenge by spiriting away the town's children."[235]

On July 22, 2003, a German colleague, Friedrich Flachsbart, wrote to me, "In Hamelin the piper was humiliated and thus transformed from a rat catcher to a child catcher. This has always been a prominent imagery in my mind. My grandfather was on the Bückeberg and there he saw the real rat catcher [Hitler]."[236]

During my stays in Germany I immerse myself in the discourse currently permeating Germany, particularly the elder generations. When I began preparing my project on humiliation in 1994 and started my research in 1997, the term humiliation was marginal; later, starting from 2000 and 2001, the whole German nation seems to talk but about humiliation. I heard people speak about World War II who had avoided this subject before, and they said things that shocked, surprised and moved me. The façade of silence had misguided many into believing that those times were forgotten. But, clearly, memories only lingered under a thin cover for decades, waiting for the right time to come out. And astonishingly enough, even small details are still remembered now, both in the conversations I had and in the television documentaries or talks I monitored. Memories are extremely alive, the torment is still fresh and vivid, and details emerge in a multi-facetedness as if the war had ended only yesterday.

My aim is to collect impressions that are apt to illuminate questions pertaining to competing interpretations of German behavior. Such questions could be, for example, "How did Hitler manage to incite a whole population to follow him?" As Alan Jacobs

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[233] The following discussion of Hitler's Germany is adapted from Lindner, 2000p.

[234] Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich, 1982.

[235] Quoted from http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/mpiedpiper.html.

[236] Translated by the author from "In Hameln war der Spielmann gedemütigt worden und so wurde er vom Rattenfänger zum Kinderfänger. Oft habe ich dies Bild vor Augen gehabt. Mein Opa war auf dem Bückeberg und hat dort einmal den richtigen Rattenfänger vor Augen gehabt."

(1995) puts it: "Why do people join political, religious, professional, or social movements, of whatever size, and surrender so completely, giving up, in the extreme, everything; their fortunes, their, critical thinking, their political freedom, their friends, families, even their own lives? What causes people to create a system or perhaps merely follow a system that creates Auschwitz, the Lubianka, the killing fields of Cambodia…?" (Jacobs, 1995, p. 1).

Several rival views have been contrasted in the course of time. One is represented by Goldhagen's view of the Germans as thoroughly complicitous (Goldhagen, 1996). According to Goldhagen, because of their antipathy and cruel indifference to the victims of Nazism, the Germans were willing, even eager, to "do their part." Another analysis is offered by Norbert Elias (1996), who argues that Hitler used his skills as a propagandist to build up the resentment of ordinary Germans and then directed the aggressive energy fermented by humiliation against Germany's neighbors and against the Jews (Elias, 1996). Theodor Adorno (1950)[237] focuses on the authoritarian personality whose principal characteristic is obedience and blindly following orders, irrespective of their moral contents. Alice Miller (1983) highlights yet another facet in her writings on child rearing practices that create personalities who become disposed to develop into perpetrators. Another notion claims that Germans were "ignorant dupes, guilty mainly of shutting their eyes to unpleasant realities that they could readily have discerned if they had been willing to look."[238] Finally, Ervin Staub (1989), in his book *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*, concentrates on group dynamics and highlights the important role of bystanders and the disastrous effect of them failing to stand up.

Among others, in Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000p, I offer a further view,[239] in which *social identity theory* with its emphasis on the group is linked with a more *individual-based* analysis. It suggests that ordinary Germans were ideal targets for seduction by Hitler. They went along with him, enthusiastically, although in many cases with ambivalence, because of his flattering message about themselves and Germany's future.

The *little people* in Germany, previously victims of routine humiliation, were lifted up by Hitler, for the first time in their history. Hitler offered the *little people*, who never before had been taken seriously, an elite identity and a clear sense of direction. Hitler even arranged for symphony orchestra music to be played in factories, thus giving the *little people* a sense of greatness.[240] Hitler furthermore ennobled the *little people* by including them in the elite Germanic Aryan race with an important national mission.

Many among the aristocracy in Germany opposed Hitler and called him "the demon"[241] because of his talent to get the *little people*'s emotions burning for him. For those among the aristocracy who collaborated with Hitler, the need to do so felt to be utter humiliation: they were forced to work with "the demon," because "the demon" had control over the feelings of the nation. The broad masses had paid less attention to details of the national humiliation inflicted by the Versailles Treaty after World War I

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[237] See Adorno et al., 1950.

[238] Lee D. Ross, Stanford University, in a personal message May 6, 2000.

[239] *Were Ordinary Germans Hitler's "Willing Executioners"? Or Were They Victims of Humiliating Seduction and Abandonment? The Case of Germany and Somalia*, by Lindner, 2000p.

[240] I owe this detail to Odd-Bjørn Fure and Jorunn Sem Fure.

[241] According to a testimonial, which I received during fieldwork in Germany from members of the aristocracy on August 3, 1999.

than the aristocracy – being far too busy with daily survival – but Hitler "explained" the situation to them and gave them a leading role to play.

The *little people* were certainly also caught up in other social dynamics Hitler created. It was attractive to share the passions of the group, to be swept up in its enthusiasm. At the same time, it was disagreeable, and increasingly dangerous, to remain isolated from that enthusiasm and group feeling (to say nothing of the dangers of active opposition). Thus, the interpretation proposed here sees the masses not as *willing executioners* but as *willing partners in seduction*. After the seduction, however, they had the experience of being betrayed and abandoned to a terrible fate by a once-beloved parent or lover. There was no alternative to realizing that they had been "raped." However, to overcome this shock and admit "rape" took decades.

To summarize, when *pendulation* is lacking, there is a problem. Alice went for engulfed and dependent love, as did the *little people* in Germany. Both gave up large parts of their independent selves and immersed themselves into the loved person's framings of the world. Robert and Hitler, subjectively, from their points of view, thought they were providers of love and salvation. However, they brought destruction. Alice was caught in the old framing of love that indicates that a woman has to give up herself for her "man." The *little people* in Germany were misled into engulfed love by their lack of experience with being targeted for "seduction" at a national level. The end was harsh, for all.

Alice, as well as the *little people* had given their "souls" for their lovers. Both had to realize, at the end, that their lovers had not extended genuinely caring love, on the contrary. Their lovers were isolated people, living in secluded hallucinatory worlds, within which they defined love and help on their own premises and without much pendulation. Robert and Hitler overlooked that reality did not conform to their hallucinations of how the world should look like and they profoundly ignored and misjudged what it was that would be good for the well-being of those they supposedly loved. At the end all felt humiliated. Alice and the *little people* had reason to feel betrayed by their lovers and ashamed at the "stupidity" with which they allowed themselves to be lured. They had indeed been humiliated by their lovers. Robert and Hitler, on the other side, felt humiliated by the lack of thankfulness they met. As mentioned before, Hitler, before his death, concluded that Germany deserved to be destroyed.

The lesson to learn is that both, providers of love and help, as well as recipients, have a responsibility to engage in active *attunement* and *pendulation*. Providers need to make sure that what they provide is indeed meeting its goals, while recipients, as well, must verify whether providers are willing and at all capable of doing valid pendulation so as to ensure the feasibility of their help and love.

Incidentally, Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami speaks of humiliation and "rape" as felt in the Arab world: "Arabs feel humiliated. Notwithstanding the clear differences between the conditions of the Israeli-Palestinian situation and the Iraqi threat, Arab leaders and the "Arab Street" have always wanted to see the international community, through the UN Security Council, impose tough resolutions on Israel. And now they are being "raped," as the Arab media puts it, by America into acquiescing to precisely such a resolution against an Arab state at a time when Israel is allowed a free hand in suppressing the Palestinian Intifadah" (Ben-Ami, 2003).

Do no harm! How aid can support peace – or war

The Hefter Center at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, calls for participants for the Wisconsin Institute 19th Annual Conference in 2003 with the following text.

"Failed and failing states pose perhaps the most dangerous threat to the security of the U.S. and the world community, as well as the millions of inhabitants of those states. However, the international community has not found a reliable way to build sustainable peace and development in many of the world's neediest areas…"[242]

The keynote speaker is Mary B. Anderson (1999), author of the book *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War.*

When I came to Africa in 1998, my motivation to do research was emphatically doubted, in the spirit of "how research can support peace – or war." I met the following outcry:

"First you colonize us. Then you leave us with a so-called democratic state that is alien to us. After that you watch us getting dictatorial leaders. Then you give them weapons to kill half of us. Finally you come along to 'measure' our suffering and claim that this will help us!? Are you crazy?"

How was I to react? Was I to feel humiliated by such aggressive insults hurled at my perfectly benevolent intentions? Should I merely shrug my shoulders and label these critics as oversensitive people, clinging to old injuries instead of getting their act together and rising from their lamentable condition? Who was to blame? Was I the one to blame or they? What is good help and helpful research? How should research be framed to be of benefit and not contribute to humiliation? I tried to listen more.

"You from the West, you come here to get a kick out of our problems. You pretend to want to help or do science, but you just want to have some fun. You have everything back home, you live in luxury, and you are blind to that. You arrogantly and stupidly believe that you suffer when you cannot take a shower or have to wait for the bus for more than two hours! Look how you cover our people with dust when bumping childishly and arrogantly around in your four-wheel drive cars! Look how you enjoy being a king in our country, while you would be no more than average in your country! All what you want is to have fun, get a good salary, write empty reports to your organization back home or publish some articles, in order to be able to continue this fraud. You pay lip service to human rights and empowerment! You are a hypocrite! And you know that we need help – how glad would we be if we did not need it! And how good would it be if you were really to listen to us for once, not only to the greedy ones among us who exploit your arrogant stupidity for their own good! We feel deeply humiliated by your arrogant and self-congratulating help!" (Taken from an interview with an African intellectual, January 2, 1999, in Kenya; however this view is usually to be expected in encounters with African intellectuals).

Who is "wrong," the donor who gives unsuitable or insufficient aid with good intentions, or the receiver who thinks that donors should have studied the situation in more depth before designing their helping strategy? After many years of failed aid

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[242] Quoted from the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, UWM Peace Studies Program, and UWM Center for International Education, 2003.

programs, many observers may probably agree that it is primarily the donors' responsibility to ensure that their help really meets the needs of the recipients. The recipients would in this case be evaluated as being "right" in feeling humiliated by ill-considered help.

In Africa, I continuously met descriptions of UN or NGO activities that were framed as parody (that contains elements of truth): "You helpers come along, build wells (or some other installations or services liable to be ecologically unsound or unmanageable in the longer run), create a few short-term jobs for some chauffeurs, secretaries and security personnel, and then you disappear again!"

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni chastised the international community's insufficient political and the resulting poor mandate of UN personnel by sarcastically describing as "dangerous tourism" what UN personnel do when driving around, for example in Congo, and watching from their cars – without intervening – how people are being killed fifty meters away.[243]

Thorvald Stoltenberg, eminent Norwegian politician and former UN Special Representative in the former Yugoslavia, expressed how dismayed he was at the recurrent gap between a rhetoric of support and a reality of letting down, and which devastating consequences this gap can have. He explained how he was exposed to this the first time in 1956 in Hungary, when the West encouraged protesters to keep on rising. Stoltenberg knew very well that the West would not risk a world war and would not help these people. The most recent terrible example he experienced was Srebrenica (Stoltenberg, 2000).

Does this mean that helpers always are those responsible when help fails or is insufficient? Are helpers "wrong" when help goes wrong? Surely not. Help may be well-intentioned and well-designed, but meet receivers who show insufficient appreciation for the effort of the helper. In that case the helper's actions would have to be evaluated as "right," while the blame would have to be put on the receiver.

Before starting my field work in Somalia in 1998, I was in touch with NGO personnel who had worked with Somali refugees. They told me that they would not support me in case I wanted to highlight Somali victimhood. "These people are arrogant and unappreciative. You should have seen their behavior in the refugee camps! They regard help as their right and are extremely pushy, unreasonable, and choosy. And they cheat us helpers wherever they can. They have no gratitude for our efforts. We are absolutely tired of them! They accuse us of humiliation, yes. But if you want to speak to people who really are being humiliated, then speak to us, the helpers!"

What are we to do in such a situation? Who is "right"? Those who claim that their help is well-intentioned, well-designed, and well-administered and merely rejected by unthankful and ill-willed recipients who cover up for their own hidden agendas by accusing helpers of humiliation? Or are recipients of help "right," who claim that help is ill-intentioned, ill-designed, and ill-administered and thus represents humiliation instead of help? Who is "right" and who is "wrong"? Or, perhaps this question is unbefitting? Perhaps, for research, it is important to describe the interplay, the complexity of accusations and counter-accusations? What is the role of research and

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[243] Discussed on May 14, 2003, in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program, by the Rwandan Foreign Minister Charles Murigande.

science in this case?

Sam Engelstad, UN's Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, and, on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in Mogadishu in 1994, wrote to me[244]: "During my own time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent."

Engelstad added that "Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us."

The backdrop for Engelstad's remarks is the launching of *Operation Restore Hope* (by the *Unified Task Force, UNITAF*), on December 9, 1992, by the United States, as a response to the failing of the first United Nations operation *UNOSOM*. However, *UNITAF* also came to fail, as did *UNOSOM II*. Especially, the hunt for Somali General Aidid was widely seen as undermining UN impartiality and turning the UN and the US into targets of Somali mistrust and revenge. In 1993 an angry crowd dragged a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia. In other words, the offer of help to an impoverished and ravaged country, Somalia, was greeted by "disrespect" and "lack of thankfulness," more so: it was met with acts of humiliation perpetrated on the helpers.

On New Year's Eve 1998, I interviewed a Somali warlord (Osman Ato, a former ally of General Aidid) who was just one of many Somali voices who insisted that in the eyes of many Somalis (and others) the *UNOSOM* operation was a big humiliation. This was especially true, he maintained, when a house was attacked and bombed where respected elders had a meeting. He felt even more humiliated, he was adamant, by the cynical and humiliating justification that was given for the bombing, namely that this meetinghouse was supposedly a headquarters. He argued strongly that "when the Americans feel humiliated because their soldiers' bodies were shown in the streets, they should ask themselves why this happened. They should be aware of the fact that killing elders, for example, is a deep humiliation in Somali society." The helicopters, the bombing, all this, he maintained, were acts of humiliation that united Somalis against the UN. Osman Ato's views illustrated that he, a warlord, and himself an "organizer of violence," fervently thinks in terms of humiliation and "counter-humiliation," as do wide circles of the Somali people, who united together with him under the banner of "necessary" humiliation-for-humiliation.

A reader of this paragraph, an American reviewer, reacted as follows (2002)[245]: "For a Somali warlord to attribute the killing of US peacekeepers and the desecration of the body of one of them to the humiliation of some Somali elders being killed by American bombing (although there is no reason to think that the Americans knew that the people in the house were "respected elders") is obviously a more moral-sounding explanation than hatred, bloodlust, or a demonstration of power. Here the problem of researcher bias arises: a more neutral interviewer might have asked this man why the attack on the Americans had been preceded by the killing of dozen or so Pakistani

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[244] Personal communication from Sam Engelstad on September 28, 1999, quoted with his permission.
[245] I thank the reviewer for his remark.

peacekeepers, who presumably had nothing to do with those elders, were fellow Moslems, had not in any way been colonial oppressors of Somalia, etc."

This comment leads us into the midst of the hotbed of humiliation and the question of who is "right." Firstly, the American reviewer expects that ignorance ought to protect from being taken as humiliator (*they* should assume that *we* did not know and that it was an embarrassing mistake what *we* did) without realizing that such "misunderstandings" very often lie at the heart of cycles of humiliation. The American reviewer himself, with his remarks, is prone to be party in a potential cycle of humiliation instead of maintaining neutrality. By expecting that ignorance protects against eliciting humiliation, the reviewer clearly is "wrong."

However, the reviewer is also "right." A warlord may indeed cover up power-lust by using *humiliation rhetoric*, this seems self-evident. Perhaps this description indeed portrays the reality of Osman Ato's way of using humiliation. Ato may in effect instrumentalize humiliation as shield for ulterior motives, however, he may not. Or, it could also be a mixture; perhaps sometimes he feels humiliated and sometimes he merely uses the humiliation argument rhetorically. We do not know. What we know, and what a researcher has to report, is that he uses the humiliation argument, genuinely or not. This is what an impartial researcher has to recount, nothing more and nothing less. A researcher cannot just omit a person's claims to feel humiliated because the opposing party discounts these feelings. In this sense, the reviewer is "wrong" in expecting that the Somali view should not be reported just because it does not correspond to American views.

Moreover, self-evidently, the interviewer (in this case it was the author of this book) indeed did ask Osman Ato and others who had expressed that they felt humiliated by American interventions about the killing of Pakistani troops. However, this failed to fulfill the American reviewer's expectation that this question would open up for Somali self-criticism and undo Somali feelings of humiliation, authentic or not. In that case, the reviewer would have "wrong" expectations.

However, all this may not be a problem for research. Both, *authentic feelings of humiliation* and the use of *rhetoric of humiliation* are worth being reported and researched.

Hassan A. Keynan (former UNESCO secretary general in Somalia) explains the difference between *authentic feelings of humiliation* and the use of *rhetoric of humiliation* (in an interview on August 25, 2000, in Oslo), "On a personal level people's experiences are there and they are authentic. But, with regard to all Somali groups, particularly those with their own political agendas, and in any other society similar to Somalis, rhetoric of humiliation and human rights is used to score political points.

People use political rhetoric including humiliation and violation of human rights – particular those aspects that the Western world gives attention to, that attracts the ears of the Western world. And this manipulation will even be greater if the researcher is a novice, and does not know anything about that particular society.

General political rhetoric and political manipulation is used even in the most democratic societies, in the most stable and economically better-off countries, but its use in war-torn societies assumes particular poignancy. And that is when a researcher trying to be objective must try very hard to discriminate what is authentic and what is political rhetoric aimed at achieving a political objective. I think that is the most important point. This is not an easy job. But, I think, if the person is aware of that then he or she will take that into consideration, he or she would factor it into the

methodology of the research."

When I came to the North of Somalia in 1998, the message was clear. Somalis, upon independence in1960, had a dream of unity, of supporting, loving, and helping each other as brothers and sisters. However, the result was destruction. The Somalis of the North were being bombed to rubble by their own brothers from the South; they were being killed and humiliated in a quasi-genocide in 1988. Subsequent to this experience, they did not want to be in one boat with their Southern brothers anymore. They wanted their own independent state, "Somaliland" (Somaliland is not recognized by the international community or by other Somali leaders, who bitterly resent this secession). Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan (this is not his real name, November 19, 1998, in Hargeisa) states: "Independence of Somaliland is the result of humiliation by the South."

I had recorded many of the interviews that I carried out in the North of Somalia on film. Surprisingly (or rather not surprisingly), when I later showed fragments of these interviews to Somalis from the South, they reacted with passionate anger. They disagreed with what my interview partners from the North said. Some Southerners bitterly complained to me, "You know, these people from the North, they were humiliating others before, but this they do not tell you! They behaved arrogantly and humiliated us!" (conversation in December 1999, the interlocutor does not want to be named).

Thus, the Somali dream of mutual support and unity had descended into mayhem. In the South of Somalia the "secession" of the North was seen as an insult, while people in the North felt that they should not have united with the South in the first place after independence, or at least should have better secured their interests in a united Somalia from the very beginning.

So, where is reality, did the Somalis from the North lie when they professed to feeling humiliated by the South? Who had actually humiliated whom? The South the North, or the North the South? And who is "right," the American reviewer, who accuses Somalis of wicked humiliation rhetoric and may claim that he, as an American, is the only one with a "right" to feel humiliated, namely by Somali anti-American rhetoric? And is the American reviewer "right" in saying that Somali rhetoric is not worth being reported by scientists? Or are the Somalis "right," who adamantly claim to authentically feeling humiliated by American "help" and urging this to be publicized?

Who is to decide? Is this book to decide? Obviously all parties felt humiliated and accuse the other of humiliation rhetoric. Clearly, this book is not the place to distribute blame. This book aims at "helping" the world by doing impartial science and unearthing processes of humiliation, in whatever form. Readers' replies, as the one extended by the American reviewer, are as much part of these processes and to be included into research.

Yet, even though this book aims at "helping" the world by doing good science, it may be drawn into cycles of humiliation and, unintentionally and inadvertently, have humiliating effects on some readers, who then may lash out against it. Clearly, the America reviewer not only participates in the cycle of humiliation that surrounds the Somalian-American relationship, through discounting Somali feelings as "wrong" out of his subjective perspective, he also opens a new front in this cycle of humiliation by accusing the researcher of partiality for having reported the Somali view.

The American reviewer draws *science* into this cycle of humiliation by condemning as "unscientific" reports of views that are unwelcome to the American party in the conflict. Thus, one could claim that even science is being "humiliated" in the process of well-intentioned research that aims at being of "help" to humankind. The reviewer asks research to represent only one side, despite the need for impartiality to end cycles of humiliation. Research is being lowered from the bird's eye view of impartiality, down to lowly partiality, by being asked to represent only one side. This is done while only impartiality can be of "help" to end cycles of humiliation. Cycles of humiliation can be discontinued only if data are collected from all sides, without censorship, and initially also without regard to "authenticity." It is only in a second step that authenticity should be discussed. The misuse of humiliation rhetoric is as relevant for research to analyze as are genuine expressions of feelings of humiliation.

Even more, perhaps it is prudent for an accused party, instead of outrightly discounting feelings of humiliation professed by the opponent, to consider that they may be authentic and perhaps even "justified," at least partly. In this sense, the American reviewer would be "wrong" – or at least imprudent – by outrightly renouncing the humiliation hypothesis and instead suggesting "blood-lust."

There are two reasons for why such prudence may be preferential. Firstly, in case professed feelings of humiliation are indeed authentic, even if they are produced by propaganda, flatly discounting them may inflame them unnecessarily. And secondly, in case they are authentic, even if they are not "justified," they may be healed and thus put out of the way by showing understanding and offering apologies. Free-floating self-feeding psychopathic "blood-lust" is much more difficult to tackle than humiliation that after all is relational and can be mitigated within relations. "Blood-lust" should therefore be the last "diagnosis," after having carefully excluded all others potential candidates for explanations.

Earlier, I introduced Laura and the agony caused by her mother-in-law. However, not only Laura came to me, her mother-in-law consulted me, too. She was enraged: "I am doing whatever I can for Laura and the children. I am sacrificing my life for them! My son is very happy with my caring help. But this bitch of his wife is doing nothing but sabotaging me! She asks me to understand her. But what about she trying to understand me for once? Her soul is black and she is evil!"

Laura cried. "Mother, I do appreciate your efforts, I really do! I am not evil! I do try to understand you! Please! If we continue with this war, the children will grow up in hell! Can you not try to see my point of view? What would you have done if you had had a mother-in-law who dominated your life? Please try to see me! Then you would see that I am not evil! I want you and me and the whole family to have good relations! Do not call me evil!"

If we assume that a cycle of humiliation was put in motion in Somalia and Somalis indeed felt humiliated, whether incited by propaganda or authentically, and that they responded by inflicting humiliation upon dead American bodies, then this may be extremely relevant and in need of analysis. It would not only be a scientific mistake to suppress reports of humiliation because they may entail unauthentic propaganda, it would also be a political mistake.

The latter turn of this cycle of humiliation seems eerily relevant today. Anti-Western terrorism in Egypt (for example Luxor, 1997), the 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, have filled the

media. September 11, 2001, or the attack on the discotheque in Bali as symbol of Western "decadence" in 2002, could be seen as further incidents on this list. Fear of terrorist attacks, kidnappings and bombings has limited the freedom of Western travelers to move internationally since some time. Not even humanitarian workers such as Red Cross and Red Crescent staff are safe from kidnap incidents, such as the one that occurred in Somalia in April 1998[246] and the 2003 attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad showed to everybody that nobody is safe from outflows of cycles of humiliation and their instrumentalization by terrorists.

The humiliating ending of the UN operation in Somalia had profound effects at the global multilateral level for which another country in agony, namely Rwanda, paid a high price. When the genocide started in Rwanda in 1994, the international community left Rwandans to slaughter each other, because nobody wanted a "second Somalia."[247] This is the more shocking since as few as 5000 troops could, perhaps, have saved almost a million lives: "A modern force of 5,000 troops... sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war…" (Feil, 1998, 3, quoted from The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 10, paragraph 9).

To summarize this section, help and love clearly can provide ample breeding grounds for hot cycles of humiliation. Who is "right" when high expectations are disappointed and helping and loving turn sour? The helper? The lover? Or the recipient of help and love? Is it the helper who is ill-intentioned and her help ill-designed and ill-administered? Or is it the recipient who is unreasonably unthankful? Or is the recipient wickedly using humiliation rhetoric and propaganda in order to turn a humiliation cycle one more turn? Even science itself, intending to be of "help" to humankind through impartial research may be drawn into such cycles of humiliation. Reporting on claims to feelings of humiliation by one party may be seen as partial by the other party who then may accuse science of being unscientific, thus even degrading and humiliating science.

What is good help? Action research

What we learn is that if we want to help, if we want to give a gift, or love, we have first to ask whether and how this help, or love, is welcome. Helping, loving, caring, liberating, setting free, these are services that, if linked to isolated arrogance, may end up by being perceived as humiliating. Active *pendulation*, sophisticated realization of *intersubjectivity*, successful search for *attunement*, these are activities that are at the core of genuine help and love. Help and love are only successful if carried out in a spirit of humility, from equal to equal, and not in a top-down manner.

Full and mature love between partners means the interweaving of souls of equals. It means including the loved person with all her needs, respecting the loved person's human rights, treating her as an independent human being, as an end, not as means

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[246] Eight Red Cross and Red Crescent staff were kidnapped at the airport in Mogadishu North. See further down my interviews with hostages, among others the head of the group, Ola Skuterud from the Norwegian Red Cross, as well as with the chief negotiator of the Red Cross.

[247] See for example O'Halloran, 1995.

(Kant); in short, it means putting my arms around the loved person, looking into her eyes, instead of pushing her down.

The buzzwords *enabling* and *empowering* have their place here. Would-be helpers have a responsibility to first enable and empower targeted recipients to voice their views. Merely empowering would not be enough. The *little people* in Germany had been empowered only a short while earlier and what they did with their newly won power was to elect a hallucinating seducer, Hitler. Many, especially women with their newly gained suffrage, were perhaps not yet *enabled* to make informed choices.

Gergen advocates *participatory action research*, particularly in cross-cultural setting. He writes in his chapter "Sensitivity to the Influences of Diverse Cultural Traditions" that is part of the book *Toward a Cultural Constructionist Psychology*: "To assist in this effort new methodologies have emerged attempting to dismantle research hierarchies, and replace the traditional autonomy of the researcher (an invitation to cultural blindness) with more collaborative forms of inquiry. Perhaps the most visible form of collaborative research is that of participatory action research" (see for example Reason (Ed.), 1994, in Gergen and Gergen, 2000).

Wherever I went during my fieldwork in Africa (1998 and 1999) the *War-torn Societies Project in Somalia*,[248] received a lot of praise for being different from the common running of aid agencies. The *War-torn Societies Project* concentrated on *action research*[249] and attempted to develop an agenda for development together with the communities concerned; it thus tried to enable and empower people and turn them from *recipients* into *co-actors*. Empowerment means undoing humiliation; and research means careful pendulation – intellectually and psychologically – between, on one side, the *incoming helpers' perceptions or ideologies of what people need as aid*, and the *support that local people really need* on the other side. This tailor-made approach that inserts a period of intense pendulation before aid is extended seems to be successful not least because it is non-humiliating.

To conclude this chapter, what we realize is that the framing of love and care as presented here is deeply inscribed in a human rights based approach to relationships. Respecting equal dignity and avoiding top-down communication is at the core, for example, of Scheff's presentation of "good" love. In traditional honor contexts, this view is not shared and it is not employed. As Scheff remarks himself, the traditional view of love is that the husband dominates and the wife subjects herself. Attunement, pendulation, sophisticated realization of intersubjectivity, all these are very new "methods" of loving, caring and helping. They are therefore not yet widely known and trained. Families, societies and not least the international community are currently struggling with the transition.

To summarize Part II of this book, this part addressed how the phenomenon of humiliation is brought to the fore by *globalization*, how the notion of humiliation is posited at the core of *egalization*, and how *misunderstandings*, *love*, and *help* can provide hot breeding grounds for dynamics of humiliation that furthermore may be pursued in an *addictive* fashion. Dynamics of humiliation, as soon as they become virulent, introduce *malign* elements into otherwise *benign* contexts. Both

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[248] See http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/index.htm.

[249] See literature about Action research in the ejournal Action Research International, http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/gcm/ar/ari/arihome.html, and Atweh, Kemmis, and Weeks, 1998, Boyarsky and Murphy, 1998, Carson and Sumara, 1997, Greenwood and Levin, 1998, Gustavsen, 1998, Kalleberg, 1989, Marrow, 1964, McNiff, 1992, Neal, Watts, and Calhoun 1995, Reason (Ed.), 1994, Reason and Rowan, 1985, Reason, 1988, Srivastva and Cooperrider, 1990, Stringer, 1999, Torbert, 1991, Whyte, 1991, Zuber-Skerritt, 1991.

globalization and *egalization* may be regarded as basically *benign* processes that need protection from international and national communities against being pulled into *malign* cycles of humiliation.

Misunderstandings, *love* and *help* need particular attention insofar as only one side in a given relationship defines an incident as humiliating, while the other is either ignorant (in the case of misunderstandings), or sure of good intentions (in the case of love and help). The one-sided labeling of a situation as humiliating may elicit fierce protests and hot feelings of humiliation on the other party's side, thus setting in motion destructive cycles of humiliation. Not least science and research, hoping to be "helpful" to humankind, may be drawn into the spirals of humiliation that thus emerge. Misunderstandings are avoided, and love and help successful only when a process of mutual *pendulation* is carried out that is inclusive of all parties who furthermore are being *enabled* and *empowered* to do so. Part III of the book will address the ways and strategies with which cycles of humiliation may be prevented or mitigated.

Reading related to this chapter

Read more on how *help can humiliate*,[250] on the *need to belong* as a characteristic of *humanness*,[251] on *attachment*,[252] on the *relational* nature of our social environment,[253] on *empowerment* and *good governance*,[254] on the *suffering* of *humanitarian helpers* out in the field,[255] on *truth* and *method*,[256] and on *action research*.[257]

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[250] Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen write about the humiliating aspect of help-receiving in the mid-1970's, see their current work at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/kgergen1/text7.html. I owe this reference to Michael Bond. See also Rosen, 1983. It would be interesting to examine whether trade advances peace, as opposed to aid, because it does not entail humiliation, see for trade and conflict Oneal and Russett, 1999, Morrow, 1999, and Hegre, 2000.

[251] See, for example, Baumeister and Leary, 2000.

[252] See, for example, Fisher, 1992. There is a vast body of literature to draw upon. See also Bowlby, 1969.

[253] See, among many others, the work being done at the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute, Wellesley College , by Jordan, Walker, and Hartling (Eds.), 2004, Hartling, 2003, Jordan and Hartling, 2002, Hartling and Sparks, 2000, Hartling and Ly, 2000.

[254] See the discussion at organizations as for example the World Bank, where currently become buzzwords after the failure of "helping" developing countries with financial and/or technical assistance. See, for example, Stiglitz, 1998.

[255] See also Maren, 1997.

[256] Gadamer, 1989, discusses *truth and method*. See also Spence's account of *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth* (Spence, 1982).

[257] See literature about action research in the ejournal Action Research International, http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/gcm/ar/ari/arihome.html, and Atweh, Kemmis, and Weeks, 1998, Boyarsky and Murphy, 1998, Carson and Sumara, 1997, Greenwood and Levin, 1998, Gustavsen, 1998, Kalleberg, 1989, Marrow, 1964, McNiff, 1992, Mills, 2000, Reason (Ed.), 1994, Reason and Rowan, 1985, Reason, 1988, Srivastva and Cooperrider, 1990, Stringer, 1999, Torbert, 1991, Whyte, 1991, Zuber-Skerritt, 1991.

Part III: What Can We Do About Humiliation?

What Victims Can Contribute

Usually we believe that victims are *poor* and *pitiable creatures* who need psychological or pharmaceutical "crutches." That is undoubtedly true in many cases. However, in this book another point will be made. This book calls for victims to empower themselves. It suggests that the world needs victims to do their utmost to leave behind self-perpetuating victim identity and instead assume central responsibility for common peace, order and welfare.

Adolf Hitler was in many ways a victim; he identified with Germany being victimized by Germany's neighbors and felt to be a victim of Jewish complots. The consequence was war and Holocaust. Nelson Mandela was in many ways a victim, too, and certainly had innumerable reasons to feel as such. However, he did not bring war and genocide to Africa. On the contrary, he, the victim, took responsibility and was the driving force in inviting the ruling elite to step aside.

Thus, Mandela, although a victim, is *no poor creature* at all. He was and still is the *driving force in constructive change*. In other words, the "fuel" for violence that may flow from victimhood and may pose a grave threat to communities, locally and globally, must be channeled in *prosocial* ways if communities shall be prevented from descending in violence. Warriors-for-change, or warriors-for-peace may be too angry and divisive to be able to promote their very goals; wise tailors-for-change such as Nelson Mandela are needed to reach *integrative solutions*.[258]

Hitler or Mandela? How humiliation can lead to the Mandela path

In Egypt, where I worked as a clinical psychologist and counselor from 1984-1991, I had Palestinian clients, who came to me with depression because they felt they should help their suffering families in Palestine, instead of studying in Cairo and preparing for a happy life. In the wake of September 11, I try to recall some of the cases.[259]

> A young woman, not yet twenty years old, came to me, let me call her Farida. I try to capture the essence of her message, and use, as much as possible, her way of speaking English: "My father wants me to study, get married, and have a life. But I cannot smile and laugh and think of a happy life, when at the same time my aunts and uncles, my nieces and other family members face suffering in Palestine. This suffering is like a heavy burden on me. I cannot smile and laugh. I feel their suffering in my body. Sometimes I cannot sleep.
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> I know some Palestinians of my age who do not care. They go to the discotheque and dance and do all kinds of wrong things; they even drink alcohol. I think this is disgusting. Our people are suffering and we should stand by them. If we cannot help them directly, we should at least not make fun of them by living immoral lives, or be heartless and forget them altogether. I feel that I do not have any right to enjoy life as long as my people suffer.
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> Okay, I obey my father and try to concentrate on my studies. But I do this only because I respect my father. If he were not there, I would go to my homeland, get

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[258] Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994 suggest that *integrative solutions* for problem solving are almost always superior to strategies such as compromise or letting one side win

[259] The following two examples are adapted from Lindner, 2001d.

married and have as many sons as possible, and educate them in the right spirit. I would be overjoyed to have a martyr as a son, a son who sacrifices his life for his people.

I feel that suicide bombers are heroes, because it is hard to give your life. I want to give my life. I want to do something. I cannot just sit here in Cairo and watch my people suffer and be humiliated. I feel humiliated in their place, and feel that I humiliate them more by not helping them. Their suffering eats me up. I feel so powerless, so heavy; sometimes I can hardly walk. The burden crushes me. What shall I do?"[260]

Farida's involvement and sincerity were intense, pure, deep and selfless. I was reminded of the sincere young students who had been my clients in Germany some years earlier. I remember a young German woman – she was nineteen years old and had bulimia – let me call her Rita.[261]

Rita's words were the following, translated from German: "I am appalled by the violence in the world, the destruction of the environment, and the lack of sincerity around me. I am a good student, a very good one. And I cannot live in a world where men play around with the world, with women, and nature, and bring suffering on all of us. Men want to show off their muscles and virility, that is all they want, and the rest of the world is their victim. This world makes me choke.

I am so nauseated that I do not want to eat. And sometimes I do not eat for a long time. As long as I manage to refrain from eating, I feel pure, ascetic, as if I can escape the pollution around me by saying 'no.' But then I get very hungry, and I start eating, and because I eat too much, I have to force myself to vomit. This in turn makes me feel extremely guilty, because I waste valuable resources. Here I am, I say to myself, eating too much and vomiting, while millions of people do not have enough to eat. They live lives of humiliation and I add to it by my waste! I am caught in this cycle. What can I do? I want to do something, but I don't know what! I feel so powerless and heavy!"

These two young women resembled each other. Both were highly intelligent, with an IQ considerably above average, with a bright future ahead, and they did not know how to digest the violence, neglect, thoughtlessness and humiliation they perceived around them. They were strong women, with an acute awareness of justice, whose strength was wasted because they saw no constructive way out. They felt caught in a hopeless situation, where they were straight-jacketed. The Palestinian woman found solace in dreaming about sacrificing her life as the mother of sons who would give their lives to defend their people. The German woman did not have any such vision; however, she thought that asceticism was a solution, an asceticism that went too far for her own abilities.[262]

I had some male Palestinian students as clients in Egypt as well, and they dreamt of

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[260] Farida's predicament resonates with what Toni Morrison describes in her novel *Beloved* (Morrison, 1987), where she describes the killing of a baby so as to protect it from the fate of slavery. I thank Morton Deutsch of making me aware of this novel.

[261] My field of psychological counseling from 1980-1984 was *eating disorders*, and I facilitated therapeutic groups with women with such disorders.

[262] Other young women, as Rita intelligent and promising young pupils and students, may even manage to kill themselves by not eating – the extreme consequence of anorexia nervosa – while others, those who do not induce vomiting, oscillate between asceticism and obesity.

giving their lives in Palestine in violent resistance. They condemned, as Farida did, those among their male friends who chose to "forget" their people's suffering and instead went about their own business, even enjoying life by feasting and drinking. None of these young clients was driven by any "will to power" or inherent "hatred." They were driven by despair about the sufferings they perceived around them. They suffered from empathy, so-to-speak; perhaps to be called a "noble" suffering. However, they suffered also from short-sighted, impatient and counterproductive strategies to provide their empathy with relief, similar to the alcoholic who believes that alcohol solves any problems.

In other words, the starting point, empathy for others' sufferings – a *noble*, *sincere*, and *valuable* suffering – contrasted starkly with *destructive* strategies for action, destructive for the bearers of these strategies as well as for the social fabric of a world of non-violence. Whenever I counseled these young and bright people I was aware that they were vulnerable to being recruited by leaders who could instrumentalize their ability for empathy and use them for acts of destruction.

Two British citizens carried out a suicide attack on April 30, 2003, at the Mike's Place pub on the Tel Aviv promenade. Asif Muhammad Hanif succeeded in blowing himself up, while Omar Khan Sharif had a fault in his explosive device, was unable to do so and fled the scene (reported on http://www.mfa.gov.il/ on April 30, 2003). These two British citizens lived their previous lives far away from the Middle East; still they were drawn in, similar to Farida and her friends. They were drawn in to an extent that made them turn themselves into weapons of atrocious destruction.

What would you, the reader, have advised Farida to do? I tried to give her strength and discussed with her how she could contribute to a more just world after having finished her studies, in a peaceful way, and how this would be more beneficial to her people and the entire world than giving birth to suicide bombers.

She is caught in a complicated conflict that receives its wounds from an incongruous web of sources, namely from the adherence and violation of honor and dignity codes. In an honor context, "doing nothing" is to appear "weak," while showing "strength" and readiness to defend oneself with violence means being "strong." As long as all actors adhere to this code, there is no complication; raw might wins and all agree even though it hurts. Farida's desire to produce sons as "weapons" has its place within such a code, as have Israeli military muscles.

However, the situation grows far more complicated and hurtful when the audience, or parts of the audience, both in the Palestinian and international community, is not anymore unanimously thinking in such terms. Nowadays, for some, violent demonstrations of strength (killings on all sides) violate dignity codes and are not greeted with acceptance. On the contrary, they fly into the face of the new ethical code. Thus, adherence to the old code produces violations of the new one, something which deepens wounds instead of resolving the situation.

This I tried to explain to Farida, however, first I had to be sure that she had worked through her inner urge to produce violence. I had to make sure that she was "free" to become a Mandela, and not caught in *addiction to humiliation* à la Hitler. I will explain this in the following sections.

Up or equal? How rising from lowliness requires special awareness

As discussed earlier, human history is full of evidence that humiliation (from torture,

and beating to demeaning seating orders) has been used systematically as a device to keep oppressive hierarchies in place.

Acceptance

Typically, responses of victims of humiliation vary greatly. As previously discussed, victims of routine humiliation may accept their inferior position, they may interpret it as God's will or nature's order, in the vein of Galtung's (1996) notion of "*penetration*," and Seligman's (1975) idea of *learned helplessness*. Others may use the belief in a *just world*, or the mechanism of *blaming the victim*, and judge that those at the bottom of the hierarchy – they themselves included – deserve their fate because they caused it by their own inborn and/or self-inflicted shortcomings. Others may be forced or bribed into subservience by their humiliators. Those who fill the middle ranks may defend their position with a combination of bowing towards their superiors and humiliating their inferiors, reminiscent of the description of the authoritarian personality described by Adorno et al. (1950).

Admiration

Aside from acceptance, subservience often expresses itself in *elite admiration*. Throughout history, underlings frequently nurtured admiration for elites and tried to "take part" in the lives of elites by *imitation*. Most of the time, elites could not be imitated in a one-to-one fashion, not least because access to castles and mansions was limited. Thus some kind of nebulous image of what was dreamt to be elite life was being imitated. This typically made elites look down on imitators. Elites usually regard underlings' pathetic attempts to climb up the ladder of status with a mild and pitiful smile.

    The world is full of examples, still today. In the USA, the wealthy build villas that represent, according to the French, embarrassingly overdone replicas of houses dating back to glorious French times, when France still was the epitome of culture par excellence. In this case Americans are the underlings who feel at a loss concerning tradition and culture and the master is the former royal court in France. Meanwhile, the French have problems keeping Anglicisms out of their language and "fast food" out of their culture, showing that in this context the master/underling relation goes the other way.

Admiration turns sour

The advent of human rights ideals, however, turns elite admiration sour. In a setting where equal dignity is aimed for, the sight of underlings "licking the feet" of masters becomes an obscene scene. In the process, those who "lick" are sometimes not themselves aware of their dismal situation; sometimes only onlookers feel offended.

Not only in the United States, Germany and the rest of Europe, also in Egypt and the Arab world, a local production of furniture that resembles the French royal palaces is running high. This furniture betrays an Egyptian admiration for the former French colonial master that squarely contradicts the otherwise professed disgust of colonialism. Even centuries after the French masters left, the colonialist's style is still imitated, voluntarily, without anybody putting force. And worse, this imitation is extended to other Western imports as well, that are imitated without regard whether

they are suitable or not.

At the same time local style is despised. In Egypt, architects who promote indigenous techniques, such as late Hassan Fathy, tended to suffer rejection for trying to revive old Egyptian architecture that is both functional for the local climate and aesthetically convincing. Even when rich Americans ordered Fathy's houses for their villas in New Mexico, Egypt rejected their own prophet. He was discarded because he promoted a taste that smacked of "underling" design, namely mud brick and lime stone, while the imitation of European concrete blocks was felt to send the message of "elite participation." Only more recently, perhaps through American influence, a Hassan Fathy is increasingly regarded as the prophet he indeed is.

The underlings' subaltern willingness to suffer for imaginary high status is as known in Europe as in the rest of the world, and lately much half-understood import of so-called "global culture" carries this tradition further. Potential cultural diversity that could enrich the world is often abandoned for less suitable replacements that promise "elite participation."

When respect is failing: Depression, sabotage or atrocity

As soon as egality is the "name of the game," it is humiliating to be an underling, and it is even more humiliating to be caught in subaltern imitation, see Figure 6. As mentioned earlier, in books that are widely read in Africa, Frantz Fanon (1963, 1986) describes his struggle to become a respected part of the colonial master elite; he tried to become "French." Fanon explains how he eventually recognized that the elite he so venerated did not, in fact, accept him in their midst as one of *us*. Imitating the master is not an effective way for underlings to rise up; the result may at best be the master's mildly contemptuous smile. And it is humiliating to be laughed at by elites whose respect one yearns for, and when that happens, one is ashamed of ever having admired these elites. Rejected love and rejected admiration can burn hot. Thus, former admiration, the habit of flatteringly looking up to elites, turns into self-humiliation at the feet of elites.

Elite Admiration Turns into Humiliation

Elite admiration is seen as

respectable (honor context)   humiliating (dignity context)

Elite

Equal dignity

Elite admira-
tion and
imitation

Unease over
elite
admiration

Figure 6: Elite admiration turns into humiliation

Yet, as soon as feelings of humiliation emerge, they have consequences. Feelings of humiliation may elicit depression which could be described as rage turned inwards, or they can lead to rage turned outwards, namely the desire to retaliate with aggressive humiliation-for-humiliation. In cases where victims are in a weak position and do not have sufficient resources, this humiliation-for-humiliation may express itself in subtle ways – in sabotage, for example. However, where victims have more resources at their disposition, retaliation for humiliation may take the form of more overt acts of aggression, from throwing stones to guerrilla activities or open violence and terrorism, and, as in Rwanda, even genocide against the former masters.

These dynamics may unfold in both synchronic and diachronic stages, from underlings' humble subservience to depressed apathy and violent uprising, stages that may co-exist not only in society, but also in the psyche of a single individual. Rising underlings may admire the elite they attack and at the same time feel ashamed of admiring them. How else is to explain that a Hutu man in Rwanda could marry a Tutsi woman first as "trophy" only to kill her as "dirt" in the 1994 genocide?

Thus, we see a sequence of steps unfold when masters and underlings are met with the human rights message. Lowliness is no longer acceptable and elite admiration turns sour. Resulting rage may be held covert, or become overt. If rage is lived out overtly, it may be poured into violence that ranges from acts of sabotage to genocide.

Be aware of the "inferiority complex"! How victims may become extreme perpetrators

The fact that elite admiration may coexist with shame for elite admiration in the same community and even in the same person, is a special feature of underlings who rise. Long-established masters do not carry this psychological dynamic by definition; they *are* the elite. I believe that shame for elite admiration in underlings merits particular attention. I suggest, that it may explain why we find such an extreme extent of cruelty and humiliation inflicted when risen underlings take revenge. I discussed this earlier,

in the chapter on addiction to humiliation.

The term *ethnic cleansing* may refer to more than "cleansing" and eradicating another *ethnic group*, it may also describe the rising underlings' need to cleanse and eradicate their own *elite admiration*. The obsession with eradicating even the babies in the wombs of their mothers, to wipe out every trace of the formerly admired elite, may have to do with shame over this very elite admiration. For long-standing elites, oppression of underlings may be "sufficient," excessively humiliating and killing them "no bother," while former underlings – risen to power – often seem obsessed with "total cleansing" and may perpetrate extreme forms of atrocities, extreme acts of humiliation and genocide on the former elite.

Hitler (1999) in *Mein Kampf*,[263] describes in length which political personalities he found admirable in Austria, and many of them were Jews. By reading his text it becomes obvious that he indeed admired Jews, at least at a very early point in his life, before he focused on the fact that they were Jews. Later, he attempted to wipe out every Jewish trace and thus perhaps also his admiration for them. Knowing their talent and aptitude, he was convinced that they indeed had the capacity to dominate the world, if not prevented. Thus he tried to exterminate a world elite which he feared precisely because he admired their competence.

In Rwanda, the former elite were Tutsi and those who used to bow in deference were Hutu. An unspeakable genocide was perpetrated by the underlings, recently risen to power, on their former masters. Thus, this genocide may have represented more than an attempt to "cleanse" Rwanda from the former Tutsi elite, but also from Hutu elite admiration. Indeed, wherever people talked about the predicament of Hutu *genocidaires*, the term *inferiority complex* was in use. Whenever the genocide was discussed, it was pinpointed that Hutu supposedly suffer from an "inferiority complex" in relation to their former master, the Tutsi.

In the field of psychology the term *inferiority complex* is connected with the name of Alfred Adler (1870-1937), a psychiatrist born in Vienna.[264] What is called "inferiority complex" in Rwanda may indeed come about, when underlings rise to power and are confronted with the effects of their own former acceptance of their lowly state and their admiration for the elites. Scheff (2003) explains that "the concept of an inferiority complex can be seen as a formulation about chronic low self-esteem, i.e., chronic 'embarrassment'" (Scheff, 2003b, p. 17).

Aside from "cleansing" one's own "inferiority complex" with maiming and killing the human targets of this "complex," also valuable objects are frequently destroyed that symbolize, or perhaps even embody the now shameful elite admiration. The French revolution saw valuable furniture, statues, art objects, and entire castles being vandalized. The world over, history tells similar tales (Mayer, 2000). Typically, however, the destruction is regretted years later by the next generation who does not feel this "inferiority complex" any longer. At that point, painstakingly, valuable objects are dug out again from the rubble heaps where they had landed; they are being repaired and put back into the palaces which then are turned into museums. Thus, in such museums, the formerly shameful evidence of elite admiration is freed of its shame and presented to everybody's admiration.

John Ogbu (1978, 1991) found among black Americans a tendency to reject education as way out of poverty, because many black Americans came involuntarily as slaves to America. Excelling in the educationally system, a symbol of white

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[263] Hitler, 1999.

[264] In 1911 he broke with Freud and investigated the psychology of the individual person.

domination, smells too much of "licking the masters' feet." However, as seen in the other examples, this conceptual linkage is a fallacy. Education can very well be conceptualized as having merits that are independent of its original implementers.[265]

It seems crucial for underlings and those who feel their dignity violated to be aware of the traps that are entailed in rising from victimhood. Extreme emotional reactions must be expected. Extreme atrocities may sometimes seem to be the "right answer." If the world is to survive the surge of uprisings that characterizes the globe in the wake of the human rights revolution, these atrocities have to be avoided. Awareness of the underlying dynamics may be helpful. Creating this awareness is what victims can contribute with.

The rise of underlings characterized by the above-described sequence of actions and reactions that negotiate the issue of humiliation is not only relevant for incidents of war and genocide, but also for other contexts within which underlings rise. The diachronic and synchronic transitions from subservience through admiration and ambitious imitation to humiliation and protest, is relevant for

➢ Women as they rise out of humiliating subjugation by males and patriarchal structures
➢ Blacks as they struggle out of a humiliating position in relation to whites
➢ The poor as they try to cope with the increasing gap between themselves and the rich
➢ Promoters of rationality as defined as a long-term holistic approach, as they rise against representatives of rationality defined as short-sighted instrumentalization
➢ Advocates of nature as fundament of human life that calls for protection in their struggle out of short-sighted instrumentalization of nature

In all cases feelings of humiliation may be expressed in terms of violence and destructive confrontation that compound an already difficult transition with avoidable secondary problems of violent cycles of humiliation and humiliation-for-humiliation. Whoever wishes for social peace, locally and globally, is well advised to be aware of the pitfalls of the "inferiority complex" that may sour a transition that otherwise could proceed more smoothly.

Marion, a young feminist, reflected on her love for technology:
"You know, I love everything that is technical, small machines, big machines, gadgets, everything. I love cars, airplanes, rockets. I would like to buy a really fancy car.

But you know what? I could not admit to myself all this until recently. Why? Because all this technology is associated with maleness. I am a feminist and I think that most men need to be reformed. They need to learn how to communicate, they need to learn about their feelings, but first and foremost they need to learn about respect for women as equal human beings. I am disgusted by the current state-of-the-world where all this is still lacking.

For a long time I thought that I should not love technical gadgets because they are somehow symbols of the "enemy camp." Just think of car expositions. I love new car models. But, what do you see? Half-naked girls are paid for throwing their breasts about in front of these cars to attract men! Are these car-producing companies blind? Do they not realize that this is deeply insulting for women who want to buy these cars? First they humiliate women and then they want women to buy their cars! How

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[265] Ogbu, 1978, Gibson and Ogbu (Eds.), 1991.

come?!

    The typical male definition of female beauty is deeply disrespectful and humiliating to women. I recently got an email – I do not know who the author is – which describes female beauty in a way I feel comfortable with:

Beauty of a Woman:
The beauty of a woman is not in the clothes she wears,
The figure she carries, or the way she combs her hair.
The beauty of a woman must be seen from her eyes,
Because that is the doorway to her heart,
The place where love resides.
The beauty of a woman is not in a facial mole,
But true beauty in a woman is reflected in her soul.
It is the caring that she lovingly gives,
The passion that she shows.
The beauty of a woman
With passing years – only grows.

Do you see this definition of female beauty dominate today's world? No. Male denigration of females reigns. Many males see women as essentially being nothing more than decorative objects (mind you I am not against decoration, beautiful cloths or fancy jewelry, but against taking decoration as the essence of femaleness). This humiliation permeates every little detail of our lives and it sours everything that has to do with femaleness and maleness to me. Typical male views deeply disgust me.

    Sometimes I would like to throw stones at these nicely exhibited cars in these flashy expositions! Or I revel in dreams of scratching these symbols of male arrogance with a knife! I dream of crashing the roofs of these fancy exposition halls on the heads of all these men who abuse women as objects and selling-dolls for their cars!

    But, I have decided otherwise. I have decided to make an effort to get out of all these hurt feelings and allow myself to be fascinated by technology. And why should I kill the whole man when I despise the arrogant thoughts and feelings he carries in his head; it is the male mindset I want to see go, and this I do not attain by killing males.

    What I try now, since about a year, is to differentiate between the merits of technology and the fact that men have developed it and try to sell it to men. I have decided that I want to somehow 'conquer' this technology for me, for women. I thank men that they developed it, but now I want to be part of the game, me too. I do not want to stand back, merely because others were first."

What the Marion vignette shows is that victims indeed can contribute to undoing their problems with elite admiration. Victims can learn to differentiate. Admiration for elite excellence – be it in art or technology – can be detached from calls for elites to step down. Elites that are in the process of being deposed do not have to be killed and their art objects do not have to be despised and destroyed. Masters can be invited to descend to the level of equal dignity, and underlings rise to the level of equal dignity, without an excess of mayhem.

    Transitions are difficult enough in themselves; they benefit from being unburdened of psychological problems that can be solved benignly. Underlings, those who feel victimized by dominating masters, are in control of a considerable leverage to limit destruction during such transitions. Nelson Mandela did not unleash unnecessary

violence on the descending white masters and he did not bully them out of the country or destroy their symbols. Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, on the other side, sadly enough, seems to perpetrate transgressions on the former white masters that are more likely to hurt his country's interests than benefit them.

Step outside of the master-slave dyad! How to act autonomously

Underlings on the rise, those who feel victimized by oppressive masters, often are caught in patterns of re-action and fail to focus on action.

James came to me as a client because he was caught in obsessively responding to his boss: "My boss is a bully and exploiter. Humiliating people is his second nature. I wish the economic situation were better and I could easily find a new job. But, unfortunately, I depend on the job I have. What I fear, however, is that my health will not survive this! I cannot stop thinking about my boss, about what he says and does. He dominates my feelings and everything I do. All my life pivots around him. It is terrible: there I despise him and at the same time I allow him to invade my entire life. I am not free, I am his slave. How can I get out? How can I somehow marginalize him in my life? He is but a bad boss, why should I give my life for him? I give him much too much importance! It is enough that I see him during work, why should he sneak into my dreams, too? How can I free myself from my boss without changing the job? Is there a way? I want to marginalize him in my emotional life and liberate the energy that is caught up in this relationship for more constructive activities!"

James did learn how to become an actor and not anymore a re-actor. It took him a long time, though. However, the more he succeeded the less necessary the entire exercise became. At the end his boss turned out to be a fearful and rather shy person who asked James for help. It was James who had blown up the image of his boss and turned him into a somewhat oversized monster. The more James was able to feel, think and act as independently as was feasible under the given circumstances, the more the "monster" shrank, not only in James's head, but also in reality. He never became a nice boss; however, he became a tolerable boss. The most important point was that James had learned to protect his integrity and dignity even under less than perfect circumstances.

One day, James felt he did not need any counseling anymore. "You know what? I told my boss that certain ways of giving orders were counterproductive and that he should learn more about modern management methods. I said it calmly and nicely, without wrath and aggression. He looked at me, in astonishment, and then, you would not believe it, he thanked me for the advice! And I, I felt really strange. There was this old man, lonely and somewhat bitter, much more insecure than I, and for years he had been my monster! I will never like him, yet, somehow, I must have convinced him that it is better to come down from the tyrant's throne!"

What the James vignette illustrates is that victims benefit from leaving the master-slave dyad, from discontinuing re-acting to the master's actions and definitions, and from learning to act autonomously. This is what also characterizes Nelson Mandela. Mandela did not allow his tormentors to take the lead and turn him into a re-actor. The last step that Mandela so successfully performed was to teach his master elite that change was necessary and unavoidable, both normatively and practically, and that a peaceful transition is preferable to violence and war. Deutsch (2002) concludes, "By his persistent public refusal to be humiliated or to feel humiliated, Mandela rejected

the distorted, self-debilitating relationship that the oppressor sought to impose upon him. Doing so, enhanced his leadership among his fellow political prisoners and the respect he was accorded by the less sadistic guards and wardens of the prison" (Deutsch, 2002, p. 39).

Avoid extremism! How moderates have to interfere

Not only physical but also psychological scars characterize Rwanda even years after the 1994 genocide. When I did my fieldwork in Rwanda in 1999, a strange rigid emptiness, a kind of frozen sadness on many faces betrayed that mayhem had ripped the society apart. Even close friends would not talk to each other about their nightmares. Rape, especially, had been employed as part of the genocide, and women told me that they would only realize that their closest friend had been raped, when she asked to be accompanied to take a HIV test.

The scars in Rwanda stem from the fact that extremists had won over moderates. Hutu moderates tried to prevent the genocide, Hutu extremists instigated it. Subsequently, Hutu moderates were being killed together with the Tutsi. Hutu extremists – and this seems to be a characteristic of extremism also in other parts of the world – had a tendency to transgress formerly respected boundaries in their quest for revenge. Underlings who rise to power together with humiliated leaders who get control of a state apparatus may perpetrate atrocities that transgress limits that formerly were respected. Long-established masters, on the other side, may stop short of certain atrocities. This may be caused, as discussed earlier, by rising underlings becoming extremists in their obsession to "cleanse" themselves from their *underling mindset* or "inferiority complex."

Public rape as transgression of traditional limits

One of the most gruesome examples of using humiliation as a weapon is public rape in war, as has been perpetrated in many places, among them Somalia, Rwanda, or South Eastern Europe. Rape in war has acquired a sad reputation as a "weapon" especially when systematically employed and carried out. Its "efficiency" builds on its potential to humiliate thoroughly not only the raped victim, but also the family and the whole group to which the victim belongs. This humiliation is so devastating that it very "efficiently" weakens the enemy.[266] And, interestingly, employing public rape as "weapon" seems to be a new tactic.

Asha Ahmed, Information/Dissemination Officer at Somalia Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, explained to me on January 11, 1999, in Nairobi, how the ICRC invited historians from all Somali clans to do research and

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[266] The following comment was made to this paragraph (I thank the anonymous reviewer for this remark.): "I think that Lindner uses humiliation as an explanatory construct where it is not the only one, and perhaps not the primary one. For instance, rape proves dominance, masculinity, and brings sexual pleasure, as well as humiliating the victim and her group." Though this remark is correct to a certain extent, the example given here refers to systematically designed rape campaigns with the primary aim to humiliate the male honor of the enemy and the moral of its women, and thus enfeeble the opponent, with all other "gratifications" enumerated in the comment being secondary. It is this systematic application of rape that lately has received increased attention. See a report from the office of the UN high commissioner for human rights from September 2, 2001 stating "that during situations of armed conflict, ethnic or race-based violence, systematic rape, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, sexual abuse, sexual slavery and other grave human rights violations against women of a particular racial group are common" (Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2001, p. 1).

come up with what eventually became the *Spared from the Spear* booklet.[267] This booklet shows that women and children traditionally were "spared from the spear" and that Somali war code explicitly protects civilians against warrior onslaughts. Women were not to be touched. It was in this way that women could embody bonds between clans, because they could move freely, even in wartime.

Asha Ahmed pointed out: "When you look at this booklet, the *Geneva Convention* is all in there! At first the *Geneva Convention* was like Latin to the Somalis! But the Geneva rules are theirs already!" She continued, "Usually, women were not touched; consider the ancient practice of blood feud. Rape may have happened in the chaos of war, but not planned in the way it is today. Today it is orchestrated in order to 'send a message to the enemy.'"[268]

Former Somali Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh confirmed the "novelty" of public rape and its reverberations in an interview on January 9, 1999, in Nairobi, see also Lindner (2000i), "There is one thing which never was part of traditional quarrelling between clans, and this is rape, especially mass rape in front of the family. This is new. It happened for the first time when Siad Barre's dictatorial regime sent soldiers to annihilate us. Soldiers would rape our women in front of their husbands and families."

Dualeh continued, "This is the reason why today Somalia is so divided. We Somalis are united through our common ethnic background; we speak one language, and are all Muslims. Why are we divided today? Humiliation through rape and its consequences divides us. The traditional methods of reconciliation are too weak for this. It will take at least one generation to digest these humiliations sufficiently to be able to sit together again."

Dualeh rounded up by saying: "…believe me, humiliation, as I told you before, was not known to the Somali before Siad Barre came to power! It is somehow a 'tradition' that young men of one clan steal camels from another clan, and sometimes a man gets killed. But women were never touched, never. There might have been a rare case when a girl was alone in the semi-desert guarding her animals, and a young man having spent a long time in the desert lost control and tried to rape her. She would resist violently, and at the end the solution would perhaps be that he had to marry her. But mass rape, especially rape in front of the family, this never happened before, this is new!" (Lindner, 2000, p. 343).

Human Rights Watch (1996) confirms the systematic application of rape,

> In attacks on Tutsi before 1994, women and children were generally spared, but during the genocide – particularly in its later stages – all Tutsi were targeted, regardless of sex or age. Especially after mid-May 1994, the leaders of the genocide called on killers not to spare women and children. The widespread incidence of rape accompanied this increase in overall violence against groups previously immune from attack. "Rape was a strategy," said Bernadette Muhimakazi, a Rwandan women's rights activist. "They chose to rape. There were no mistakes. During this genocide, everything was organized. Traditionally it is not

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[267] International Committee of the Red Cross Somalia Delegation, 1997.

[268] Incidentally, in regions that practice blood feud, women are untouched, and have to assume all the duties that their males cannot carry out anymore because they have to stay indoors out of fear to be killed. Albania experienced an upsurge of these practices after the downfall of the communist regime that had outlawed them. Thousands of men are currently confined to their own homes, while their women move freely.

the custom to kill women and children, but this was done everywhere too"… Other Rwandans characterized the choice of violence against women in the following ways: "It was the humiliation of women;" or "It was the disfigurement of women, to make them undesirable;" or, "Women's worth was not respected." (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 41).

We may conclude that new forms of atrocities have been employed in recent ethnic cleansings, genocides and quasi-genocides. Traditional confines have been transgressed. We may hypothesize that this phenomenon may be related to the fact that these atrocities were perpetrated by rising underlings and not by long-established elites. A desire looms large to hurt more – and more deeply – than ever before in history.

Rising underlings would benefit from heightening awareness of these dynamics. Leaders with a biography of personal victimization by humiliation that they feed into narratives of national humiliation may want to show responsibility by stepping back. Third parties, as well, should be aware of the dangers and intervene. A surgeon does not operate on his own child, a police man or a judge goes "off the case" when too involved. Equally, rising underlings, especially those with personal wounds from humiliation and an "inferiority complex," may be too involved, too *hot*, and too prone to transgress boundaries if kept *on the case*. A Hitler, a Milosevic, a Saddam Hussein, to name only a few "heroic victims," should never have been allowed to *get on the job.* In the future, candidates with similar profiles have to be identified much earlier so as to prevent them from highjacking entire countries and continents with their obsessions. And, these leaders are called upon to reflect on themselves and their responsibilities; perhaps they can consider retreat from leadership and learn to work with their obsessions and their victimhood in more constructive ways.

Afterlife as arena

Humiliated underlings may be tempted to flee beyond Earth when they do not get on Earth what they yearn for, namely recognition, dignity, respect, and worthiness. Fleeing beyond Earth, for example into visions of worthiness extended by God after life, is sometimes a way out of humiliation.

During the years that I spent in Egypt, I closely observed how religion gained space. During the past two decades, an increasing number of people turned to Islam and within Islam to more conservative forms. Egypt in its recent history went from colonialism to communism and nationalism and no -ism brought the sought-after respect and welfare. The Pharaonic past of Egyptian grandeur remains eerily far away. Egypt is in a poor shape, both within and outside. It is a beggar on the world stage – it is kept alive by American funding – and most young people do not know whether they ever will have the means to found and maintain a family. Thus, Islam is the latest "candidate" that creates hope for a better life, within Egypt and as means to becoming a more respected international player. It is the lack of answers on Earth that pushes people into looking for answers beyond Earth. Egyptians, especially in the Nile Delta, are particularly pragmatic people who have no "natural" tendency to become zealots. Yet, even among them, hopelessness as to a dignified life on Earth increases afterlife orientations.

In short, what we call "pragmatic values" are perhaps the values of those who feel

respected, while "afterlife values," or "beyond Earth values," are perhaps, at least partly, embraced in a response to frustration, deprivation and humiliation. If this reflection is followed through, then current pragmatic "Western values" would represent the "default," or what people do when they live full dignified lives, while "afterlife values" would represent an *emergency adaptation* when the chances for a full dignified life before death are lacking. An increasing afterlife orientation would thus not be "free" choice, but the result of being pushed into a corner.

Every religion lends itself to being used as refuge beyond Earth and beyond death, both in benign and malign ways – Islam, Christianity, and even Buddhism. Singhalese Buddhists, for example, promote a specific and according to them purer and more authentic version of Buddhism that, according to them, ought to be spread in the world. And long before recent suicide missions were carried out in the Middle East under an Islamic banner, Tamil leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran "designed" innumerable suicide operations.

Since afterlife can be filled with limitless promises, equally limitless atrocities on Earth may be justified with them. Clearly, also altruism, care, and love can be promoted by an afterlife orientation. However, the problem is that afterlife or the world beyond Earth, by definition is withdrawn from direct verification. Does God really appreciate suicide bombings and will He indeed extend the sought-after dignity after death and beyond Earth? Since the answer is always given by mere human beings, it is prone to fall victim to the feelings of these human beings. Promises of a dignified afterlife are only too easily manipulated out of only too earthly motives. Thus, even though to anchor oneself in fundamentalism *beyond* Earth and death may bring great serenity and solace, it may also turn life *on* Earth into something not worth living.

Thus, underlings and those who feel victimized would benefit from some critical thoughts as to their afterworld orientations. Such orientations can be misused and manipulated in ways they may detect but too late. What if you found out after death that dying as a suicide bomber is not necessarily divinely ordained martyrdom? What if you misunderstood God's call? Life on Earth may be soured unnecessarily for the sake of life beyond Earth. Is this really the way to go?

Extremists and moderates

The defining characteristic of moderates is that they are capable of rising above the level of opposing sub-groups and able to perceive all players as fellow participants in One single larger ingroup.

David Kimche, former Deputy Director of Mossad, and Riad Malki, former spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, are two moderates who build linkages that bridge the deep gulf between both parties. "At a time of political stalemate and continued violence, why have two former enemies decided to join forces and fight for peace with words? …Considering that 20 years ago the two were bitter enemies, how can they make peace now when their leaders can't, and do they see any chance for the Middle East roadmap?"[269]

Extremists are those who are most caught in humiliation, both as feelings and

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[269] Quoted from www.BBCWorld.com, Kimche and Malki talked to Tim Sebastian in BBCWorld Hardtalk on May 22, 2003.

retaliating acts, and they deepen the rifts of hatred instead of healing humiliation. Armed conflicts are usually embedded within an angry atmosphere of "*We* have to stand united against the *enemy*, *we* have to protect ourselves, and if you do not agree with *us*, you are our *enemy*." This sentence would be interpreted by extremists as saying, "*We* have to eliminate the *enemy*." In contrast, a moderate would say, "*We* protect ourselves best by working towards a larger *we* in a constructive manner so as to include among *us* those we today call *enemies*." Both interpretations usually compete, whereby the "hotter" interpretation promises fast redemption for painful feelings and therefore has a direct appeal, while moderation is much more difficult to "sell" and therefore needs the support of a larger group of people to gain weight and credibility.

A shining example of a moderate is Nelson Mandela. He succeeded in transforming his feelings of humiliation after 27 years of prison into a constructive contribution to social and societal change. He distanced himself from his own urge for revenge. However, a Mandela is all too often missing. Moderation may then be best provided by third parties who are not involved in the conflict and who are committed to safeguarding social cohesion in a respectful manner and without humiliating any participant. The involved opponents' feelings may often be too hot to be moderate, at least during conflict peaks. Sometimes an overpowering force of moderates may be needed, especially when opponents were allowed to become extremist leaders of political movements.

Mature, moderate, responsible people are called upon to invite young, intelligent people to follow the example of a Nelson Mandela, and not to follow promoters of terror who at some point in their lives have translated empathy with the suffering of the oppressed into an urge to retaliate with violence. Moderates of all camps and third parties are those who carry the responsibility of curbing extremism and invite their representatives back into the camp of moderation, of patient change, and long-term solutions.

Once a situation has been taken over by extremists and their polarizing language, those who wish to promote moderation, face almost insurmountable problems. Moderate Hutu were killed together with Tutsi by extremist Hutu in the 1994 genocide. Extremist tyrants typically eliminate critics from their own camp first.

Moderates who find themselves in such a dilemma, have only one option, namely to gather as many allies as possible from the global third party, the international community, to give weight to moderate positions, to help dampen extremist language and to forge alliances of moderates across all opposing camps.[270] The coming-into-being of the *global village* currently facilitates this process, since it becomes increasingly apparent, particularly these days – terrorism is the keyword – that it is in everybody's interest to extinguish extremist fires wherever they burn: they may otherwise inflame the whole *global village*.

For a third party such as the international community, promoting moderation means furthermore supporting and advocating leaders such as a Mandela. It means also collecting and broadcasting moderate traditions and ancient wisdoms that are provided by opponents' own cultures. And finally, it means continuously emphasizing our children's future, a future that usually none of any warring party wishes to be bloody and violent. These are crucial elements that give weight to moderation and have the potential to outweigh extremist voices.

The protection of *my* people is best secured by working *for* global social

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[270] *Quarantine the Aggressor*, said Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1937.

sustainability, and not *against* any *enemies*. Muriel Lester is quoted to have said "War is as outmoded as cannibalism, chattel slavery, blood feuds, and dueling, an insult to God and humanity..." All third parties who wish for social peace in the *global village* are thus called upon to promote moderation and maturity in the face of hot feelings that tempt people to lash out *against* "enemies" instead of work *for* social cohesion of humankind as a whole.

We may conclude that the important fault lines in conflicts are not those that separate Israelis from Palestinians, Hutu from Tutsi, Singhalese from Tamils, or Americans from the rest of the world. There is only one single important fault line, namely the fault line between extremists and moderates in all camps. If extremists gain access to power, they will polarize and deepen whatever rifts they can feed on. Social peace, locally and globally, is only secured if moderates outweigh extremists.

For rising victims of oppression and humiliation it is important to be aware of the dangers entailed in extremism. Extremist stances do not heal, they exacerbate the problem. For victims, it is therefore essential to avoid being drawn into extremist camps. This is what victims can do for a peaceful world.

Victims are not always humble. Also victims may need to learn humility

Masters, when asked to step down, often portray themselves as victims, as victims of humiliation. However, in human rights contexts they have to learn humility instead of nurturing a victim identity.

Although many Somalis perceive themselves as victims, many among them still have to learn humility. Somalia has never been a proper part of any empire that deserved the name, probably because Somali nomads are known to be proud, stubborn, unruly and fickle. Their pastoral democracy built on equality, as described by Lewis (1961), did not provide a strong hierarchical ranking order that conquerors could easily instrumentalize and dominate.[271]

In other words, Somalis are difficult to humiliate; they are too proud. Somalis are proud – for example, of the fact that they did not bow to colonization in the same way others did in Africa (they kept their Islamic faith, for example, unlike neighboring Kenya).

Yet, there is a dark side to that, namely that some Somalis may not always know enough about the humility that is necessary for effective cooperation. Local warlordism, for example, undermines attempts to build functioning "traffic rules" that protect every citizen.

To use the traffic metaphor, Somali warriors, who follow the proverb "a man deserves to be killed, not humiliated," may have problems with rules such as "traffic lights". They may interpret red lights as an attempt to humiliate them. They may vow to choose victory or death instead of bowing in humility. Every single man may want to fight his way through at every single traffic light. The weakest ones are pushed to the wall and there is no peace and calm for anybody.

Indeed, this is a fair description of Somalia after the demise of Dictator Siad Barre, and to a certain extent also of the equally proud Afghanistan after the Soviet retreat. Many mountainous or scarce regions, difficult to subjugate by former empires, preserve a degree of pristine pride that makes it difficult for them to integrate into a

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[271] *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn Of Africa*, by Lewis, 1961.

new world system where humility is important:
    Resisting humiliation is not everything, learning humility is equally important!

What masters can contribute. How transitions can be smoothed

Not only victims, or those who define themselves as victims, can contribute to a peaceful future for the *global village*, also masters can do their share. Why was the French aristocracy humiliated and killed, not the English? Why was there no guillotine in England, but in France? Those who are elites today and do not want to be victimized, may perhaps learn from the English experience?

    A French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), went to the United States (1831-1832), to study "democracy" from a French point of view. After returning, he wrote his *La Démocratie en Amérique* (volume I in 1835 and volume II in 1840). There, Tocqueville points out that in England the elites made sure that the poor enjoyed the privilege of exemption from taxation, while in France this was the privilege of the rich. Charles Kingsley (1819 – 1875), professor of modern history at Cambridge, confirms how England was the forerunner of the very ideas that later brought French elites to fall:

> England was the mother of every movement which undermined, and at last destroyed, the Ancien Regime. From England went forth those political theories which, transmitted from America to France, became the principles of the French Revolution. From England went forth the philosophy of Locke, with all its immense results. It is noteworthy, that when Voltaire tries to persuade people, in a certain famous passage, that philosophers do not care to trouble the world – of the ten names to whom he does honour, seven names are English. "It is," he says, "neither Montaigne, nor Locke, nor Boyle, nor Spinoza, nor Hobbes, nor Lord Shaftesbury, nor Mr. Collins, nor Mr. Toland, nor Fludd, nor Baker, who have carried the torch of discord into their countries." It is worth notice, that not only are the majority of these names English, but that they belong not to the latter but to the former half of the eighteenth century; and indeed, to the latter half of the seventeenth (Kingsley, 2003).

German history is often used as another example for change without bloodletting. Bismarck is said to have spared Germany a bloody revolution by providing potential revolutionaries with the inceptions of a social welfare state. We may conclude that elites can indeed contribute greatly to constructive social change without bloodletting, violence and aggression. And that they often do. A mindset of humility is what elites may have to adopt in order to bring such change about.

    However, since elites often are blind to the reality surrounding them, they may not be alert enough. Masters routinely subscribe to the notion of a *just world* and are lulled by the veneration they often receive from their underlings. They believe their underlings "love" them and are like children to them. Easily, self-satisfied elites wait until it is too late and simmering rage from discontented underlings overruns them (like the frogs that get cooked in the Mr. Frog story).

    When protest and violence erupt from discontented underlings, masters often are shocked and surprised. Widespread astonishment at recent terrorist attacks illustrates the degree to which global elites were blind to the successful humiliation entrepreneurship brought about by some extremists through which they were able to draw on, create and influence a considerable pool of followers.

    As soon as protest and violence erupts, elites may develop feelings of humiliation

at the aggression pointed at them and at the lack of appreciation for what they deem their benevolent patronage. A cycle of humiliation is thus set in motion; underlings feel humiliated by elite domination and elites feel humiliated by lack of appreciation from the part of underlings.

What both masters and victims have to aim at, instead of cycling through humiliation, is the constructive ascend of underlings towards equal dignity, combined with a constructive descend of masters towards precisely the same equal dignity, without anybody being humiliated in the process.

To summarize this chapter, we see that underlings, who rise and acquire power, in those cases where they become perpetrators may become the most fearsome perpetrators, perhaps even more cruel then long-standing masters. Masters may debase to suppress, former underlings may debase to exterminate.

The fury that is entailed in feelings of humiliation contains an enormous force and energy. This energy can be instrumentalized in constructive or destructive ways. Underlings, those who feel victimized, and those who identify with them, have to take great care when unlocking feelings of humiliation, the "nuclear bomb of emotions." The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where neighbors slaughtered almost one million of their neighbors with machetes in a few weeks, shows how these emotions do fine without fancy weapons and financial funds. As soon as feelings of humiliation burn hot, every single individual in a neighborhood may turn into a weapon of mass destruction.

Moderates like Mandela can curb the hot feelings of extremists and forge alliances of moderates above and over all fault lines. Mandela managed to wake up the white ruling class in South Africa to the fact that they had to step down before it was too late. In the case of South Africa it was thus the victim who was the driving force, and not the master. Since the rage and fury that feelings of humiliation are capable of engendering is felt on the part of the victims and those who identify with them, it is the victims and those who help them who are first and foremost responsible to take care that the process of change is a constructive and not a destructive one. Unleashing Hitler-like responses to humiliation does not serve anybody. Victims may become Mandelas. There is no need to turn into Hitlers.

Reading related to this chapter

Read on *problem solving*,[272] *moderation*,[273] on *Hawks, Doves, and Owls* (Colin Powell as exemplary "owl"),[274] on *religion* and *violence*,[275] or on *non-violence*.[276] See also, approximately 3,500 pages long, and published in six volumes, William T. Vollmann, 2003, and his grand opus *Rising Up and Rising Down*.[277]

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[272] Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994 suggest that *integrative solutions* for problem solving are almost always superior to other strategies, such as compromise or letting one side win.

[273] Read in Feuerverger, 2001, on a Jewish-Palestinian Village in Israel, and read *Reflections of a Radical Moderate* by Richardson, 1996.

[274] Allison, Nye, and Carnesale, 1985, and Nye, 2002.

[275] Read, for example, Appleby, 2000, Juergensmeyer, 1991, Juergensmeyer, 2000.

[276] Read, among many others, Ackerman and Duvall, 2000, Naess, 1958, or King, 1999. 197 methods of nonviolent actions have been differentiated (Sharp, 1971, McCarthy and Sharp, 1997).

[277] I thank Jacqueline Wasilewski for making me aware of Vollmann's opus.

What the United States of America Can Contribute

> I decided long ago
> Never to walk in anyone's shadows
> If I fail, If I succeed
> At least I lived as I believed
> No matter what they take from me
> They can't take away my dignity[278]

This chapter is written because of a very specific historic fact, namely that currently there is only one single superpower left the globe, namely the United States of America. Who are they? What can they do to maintain the *security of our loved ones* and the *future of our children*?

Two vignettes are meant to invite into the mindset that in many ways is characteristic for America.

In 1981, I came to a little place near Minnesota, in the Middle of the United States, where many Norwegians have settled. I accompanied a Norwegian friend, Ragnar. We wanted to pay a visit to Ragnar's family. One of his uncles, Thor, had immigrated to the United States about seventy years earlier. He was now 86 years old. Ragnar had never met his uncle before.

We came to the house and rang the door bell. A woman opened, clearly the wife of the old man. She greeted us very kindly and brought us to the room where her husband was lying in his bed. He clearly was very frail and near death. He was lying in a hospital bed that was the only furniture in the somber room. Oxygen bottles, cables and tubes where to be seen everywhere around his bed.

We carefully approached the bed, afraid to awake the old man or disturb him in any way. We did not know how to talk to him and looked at his wife for help. However, suddenly, there was a deep voice coming out of the bed: "You didn't want me!" This was all. There was no more talk. "You didn't want me!" was all he said to us. No "hello" and no "good bye."

We went out of his room, almost in shock. We needed his wife to explain to us what had happened. She clarified. Thor had left Norway together with one of his elder brothers when he was sixteen. In Norway the eldest son inherits the farm, alone. Before finding oil, Norway was a very poor country and those without a farm had little prospects. This made feel Thor very unwelcome and he was bitter all his life. She, his wife, was the only one to keep in touch with his family back in Norway; he would not send a single post card, never. She was the one who had invited us to visit him before he was to die. However, clearly, his bitterness lay too deep. There was no closure for him.

Many American clients came to me when I worked as a clinical psychologist and counselor in Egypt (1984-1991). I was stricken by the frequency of sad family biographies that in some way or another resembled Thor's. Without a doubt, those who had left their homes to immigrate to America were not always the happiest people. Many fled; they fled from intolerance, from suppression, from ill-treatment, from humiliation. They were unwelcome at home and they felt unwelcome. Thus the backdrop for people born as American citizens is, in many cases, the suffering of their

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[278] *The Greatest Love of All*, song popularized by Whitney Houston.

forefathers. Like adopted children, who often grapple with the question of why their biological parents had rejected them, American identity seems to grapple with rejection.

In Egypt, I had an American colleague, a psychologist. He had Egyptian students as clients. I remember two young women around twenty years old and from wealthy family backgrounds consulting him. They had problems with their parents. In one case it was the mother who was too strict, in another it was the father. My colleague advised these girls to move out of their parents' homes and get themselves their own apartments. They had to "cut the umbilical cord" and "get on their own feet" he told them. If they were not willing to do that, they were "wasting" his and their time.

I was astonished. In Egypt, a girl cannot just move out and live alone. This would in many cases be regarded as dishonoring both the girl and her family. What she could do, was move to her grandmother or a sympathetic aunt. And since families are large, there would always be a place to go. In case of a family member being unhappy, in Egypt, family alliances can be drawn upon to solve the problem. Thus, the counselor, as advisor, could encourage his clients to make use of this widely known traditional conflict resolution system that almost all Egyptian families are acquainted with.

However, he was adamant that the girls had to get their own apartments. He said, "These poor things here in Egypt have not yet had the chance to learn the American way of life. We have to teach them independence. They have to become strong individuals. How can they get strong when they accept to be pampered? We in America have paid a heavy price for freedom. And it is worth it. These girls have to learn it, too!"

What these two vignettes are intended to convey is an idea of the suffering that may have accumulated in the collective historic memory of the people of the United States, together with a legacy of heroic prevailing. The United States are not just "another country;" they are a country with a specific history and a particular ethos.[279] And since the United States is the remaining super power on planet Earth, it is important to understand their cognitive and emotional mindsets and invite them as key players into the task of building a sustainable *global village*, sustainable both socially and economically.

Prevent misreadings! The United States and surgical strikes

The aftermath of September 11, including the 2003 war in Iraq and its repercussions, overshadows the lives of virtually everybody on the globe. The "fall-out" is global and local, public and private. It ranges from shaky oil prices and an anxious international business community to children fearfully asking about war.

However, the world, instead of standing together, is split as to how to solve such crises. There seem to be two basic strategies on the table – as to the Iraq war and other similar problems – let me label them somewhat starkly: firstly there are *decisive strikes* (strategy favored by America and their allies) and secondly there is *cautious containment* (strategy favored by much of the rest of the world).

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[279] See, for example, Lutz and Collins, 1993, and their book *Reading National Geographic*. Lutz and Collins show how the view on other cultures is colored by a wish to validate middle-class American values. I thank Michelle Fine for this reference. See also Stewart and Bennett (Eds.), 1991. See furthermore Katznelson, Kesselman, and Draper, 2002.

Interestingly, we find both strategies not only in politics but also in medicine. Both fields lend imagery and metaphors to each other. The term *surgical strike* is only one among many examples. Health is the super-ordinate goal that connects both fields, namely to have healthy people and healthy societies.

Supreme courage

Lynn Payer (1988) wrote a book entitled *Medicine and Culture: Varieties of Treatment in the United States, England, West Germany, and France*.[280] The interesting point is that in the US the dose of medication would usually be higher than in Europe, often considerably higher. Also surgical interventions would tend to be more forceful in the United States. It seems that American citizens expect themselves to be tougher, more courageous and decisive in fighting disease than the rest of the world's population.

> I recently saw the film "The Lost Battalion," a film produced in 2001, depicting extraordinary courage shown by an American battalion towards the end of World War I, in 1918. The film's message is that the American courage displayed by this battalion was something unparalleled; no other nation was capable of it, neither the German "bastards," nor the French allies. This film hails American defiance in the face of almost impossible difficulty and highlights the ethos of extraordinary American solidarity bound together by this courage. German evilness and French weakness serve as a backdrop against which American heroism shines. Thus, this film illustrates the above described cultural differences, not in the field of medicine, but in this case in the field of war.

Other cultures may value wisdom, or long-term planning; America's prides itself of its "ingenuity" and "sheer will."

> Let us listen to actor Sam Elliott narrating with his majestic voice the story of Union Pacific. Sam Elliott hails America's "sheer will" as follows: "A great land, destined to become a great nation, built on ingenuity and sheer will, strengthened by new ideas and new technologies, and powered by the 48,000 men and women of Union Pacific, providing the building blocks of our nation..."[281]

Clearly, Americans have touched base with their sense of extraordinary courage, sheer will, and heroism after September 11, 2001. Many Americans are deeply moved by the vision of standing together in defiance of evil adversity, as heroic as the legacy their forefathers left them.

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[280] Payer, 1988.

[281] On the UP internet site we read, "For the last 140 years, Union Pacific has contributed to the building of a nation. Abraham Lincoln envisioned a transcontinental railroad that would connect America, east to west, contributing to the economic development, stability and security of the nation. And along with the development of a country, came the growth of one of America's most important companies." http://www.uprr.com/newsinfo/ads/.

I try to paraphrase and summarize what I heard from my clients as to their legacy: "Our forefathers have migrated to the United States not merely because they liked a casual summer outing; on the contrary, they have escaped from being unwelcome, misunderstood or even humiliated in their previous homes. By extraordinary bravery and perseverance our forefathers built a better world. And this better world nowadays has become the target of global envy; envy entailing both negative and positive connotations. Anti-Americanism is the negative fall-out of this envy, while imitating America is its positive aspect. Both reactions confirm American pre-eminence. Our forefathers were once humiliated, victimized and they prevailed. When we are being humiliated now, and victimized, we will prevail as well. We regard those around the world who are able to appreciate our achievements as our friends, while those who don't are either weak souls or enemies."

Strikes or preventive strengthening

Undoubtedly, courage and heroism are wonderful human achievements, yet, only as long as they are invested in action that is not counterproductive. This may be the problem that lies at the very core of the recent international rift over Iraq, a rift, as it may characterize also future fall-outs, merits closer attention. Let me first go down the medical line of thought.

We see two basic strategies in the field of health. We have firstly classical school medicine that often places the emphasis on *fighting the enemy of cancer or microbes by surgical or pharmaceutical strikes*. On the other side, we have rather alternative schools of medicine, which often highlight a more preventive approach of *strengthening the entire body system so as to make disease less likely to find fertile ground*.

If we were to compare these differences in approach to the 2002/3 Iraq crisis that led up to the 2003 Iraq war, we could make some interesting observations. *Fighting the enemy with courageous strikes (including preemptive strikes)* and *standing together courageously in front of the enemy* would be the American ethos and gut feeling of the "right approach." This resembles the classical school medicine approach. *Cautious containment combined with balancing and strengthening sustainable global interdependence* is what rather feels "right" in "old" Europe (and other regions). The latter approach is more in the line of alternative and preventive health mindsets.

It is necessary to insert a small disclaimer here. Many Americans stand on the European side of the divide so-to-speak. When the term "America" is used in this text, it is meant to point at a certain tendency among some, not all Americans. The same is valid for the use of the term "Europe."

The attribution error

When I move through Europe, as I did during the Iraq crisis, being in touch with people in different European regions, while monitoring the emotional climate in the United States, it is remarkable to observe how the same problem cluster (Saddam Hussein, dictatorial regime, weapons, UN resolutions, time that has elapsed, and so forth) can lead to so stark differences and deeply divergent *visceral reactions* as to what is needed as redress. Everybody agrees that a dictatorial regime such as the one of Saddam Hussein is "bad," however, the *gut feelings* as to the appropriate redress

are profoundly different. What was seen as *war of necessity* in the United States was seen as *war of choice* in Europe.

In the spirit of the attribution error, many Europeans deny Americans altruistic feelings and ideals; Americans are regarded as having nothing but arrogant and selfish economic oil interests in Iraq. The same bias is to be found vice versa. The American narration is that France, Germany, and Russia have had strong economic ties with Iraq and that they therefore, out of arrogant and selfish economic interests, wanted to close the door for Iraqis getting the chance to be liberated from an evil dictator. All sides are convinced that altruism is all theirs, while selfish egocentrism is to be found exclusively on the other side.

Newt Gingrich, Republican and Former Speaker House of Representatives, explained in an interview[282] how amazed he was that some people preferred to do nothing about proven dictators such as Saddam Hussein who had been a threat to America and the world for the past decade or more. He described how flabbergasted he was that some people, instead of uniting forces behind America and respecting America's sense of vulnerability and need for defensive action, would stall. Clearly, crowds get it wrong sometimes, he stated, indicating that the European public got it wrong. Those who appeased Hitler, he clarified, albeit this stance was hugely popular, were wrong. America, with a track record of liberating and not conquering, is a trustworthy partner after all, he stated; therefore it was doubly hurtful to meet such a lack of understanding among allies. France, he suggested, did nothing but hideously try to grab the historic opportunity that presented itself to them in order to build a position of counter-power to the United States.

"Here we Americans are," we could paraphrase Gingrich. "First our forefathers had to run from adverse circumstances and with their diligence built the best country on Earth. And now, again we are victimized like our forefathers. And even when we want to defend ourselves, we are misunderstood and wronged. Here is a dictator, Saddam Hussein, who wishes us death, and you want us to do nothing. More so, you stab us in the back when we build up to defend the free world, which even includes you. And, as if this is not enough, you dare lecture us on imperialism and arrogance while you have a track record that is perhaps worse. Does France have a UN mandate for being in Ivory Coast? And don't you know that Frenchmen are not particularly welcome in today's Rwanda because France is suspected of having trained some of the genocidaires who perpetrated the 1994 genocide? Do not throw stones at us while sitting in a glass house!"

The French reply may go as follows, "How dare you accuse us of wanting to do nothing! This is grossly insulting! Of course, we agree that something should be done about cruel dictators. However, we do not agree with the methods. We believe that what you do and the way you do it is counterproductive to your own goals, which we share. Jacques Chirac is seen as a power player à la de Gaulle by you; however, perhaps French people merely have learned the lesson of human rights and equal dignity? We believe that your actions, though you pledge to protect rights and dignity, in fact violate them. And how come you believe you have a better track record than us? Remember all the dictators around the world you have supported! Do you really think your past performance makes you trustworthy? In any case, your behavior

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[282] With Tim Sebastian in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program, March 3, 2003.

should stand on its own feet – your record does not get better by pointing out that others behave worse!"

We may conclude that America stands for *decisive strikes* and France for *cautious containment*, and both suspect the other of wanting to employ their respective strategy out of selfish power goals. And indeed, both strategies do mean different things in different contexts. Both strategies can be inscribed in a human rights set of mind or in a world seen as a brutal Hobbsian jungle. Even though virtually every player in the world currently speaks of protecting humanity and human rights, many suspect the *other* player to be following a hidden Hobbsian agenda, namely engaging in old-fashioned power-play of muscles and threats. And indeed, *decisive strikes* may be employed to save human rights in a policing fashion, however, *decisive strikes* can also serve to gain and maintain superiority above law. Equally, *cautious containment* can be applied to safeguard human rights; yet, *cautious containment* can also be part of a cynical power game. There is a tendency, in the current world, to see *oneself* securely placed in the field of human rights, dignity and welfare, and judge *others* as indulging in evil power games. Being thus "misunderstood" by the other, creates deep feelings of hurt, bitterness and humiliation on all sides.

Not all strikes strike well

Perhaps the following analysis pinpoints the core of the disagreement. I think, all players concur in principle that a good balance between *strikes against disease* and *strengthening the system so as to enable it to withstand disease* is what is to be achieved for social peace. Both strategies should support each other and not be seen as mutually exclusive. When I studied medicine in the nineteen eighties, hot debates and enmities were going on between representatives of both approaches, adversaries pouring gall over each other. However, this proved little helpful. Both strategies seem to benefit from buttressing each other. Equally, building a sustainable world based on human rights would be equivalent to the preventive *strengthening* approach, which is as important as dissuading, isolating and marginalizing extremists, such as terrorists, which would correspond to *strikes*.

The current disagreement seems to arise as to the calibrating of both strategies. Let me use the case of gastric ulcer. Until recently it was unknown that a microbe, helicobacter pylori, contributes to the development of gastric ulcers. Many people, still nowadays, believe that gastritis and gastric ulcers have an entirely psychosomatic genesis and are basically caused by stress. Traditionally, apart from psychotherapy, all kinds of treatments were on offer. However, none really helped; some of these old-fashioned "strikes" may even have worsened the condition.

Three paths could be described: Path 1a would be the path of delivering old-fashioned "strikes" against gastritis, which may sometimes have worsened the symptoms. Path 1b would be the modern strategy of "striking" with a high dose of a suitable antibiotic mix; this, we know today, has good chances to heal the condition. Path 2 would be the approach of strengthening the body so as to enable it to better withstand gastric ulcers. In other words, there are two kinds of "strikes," those that are beneficial (1b) and those that may even be counterproductive (1a). Even though all strikes may be courageous, not all strikes are protective. When striking, one should make sure to strike the right target with the right tool or bullet. In case of uncertainty as to which strike is appropriate, it is wise to limit one's focus to the strengthening approach (2), while planning for (1b).

From the American point of view, current European hesitation confirms American

suspicion that Europeans are not capable of being decisive and courageous and that Americans stand out in the world as the most visionary and strong-minded leaders. Americans are good surgeons so-to-speak, and Europeans are weaklings who cannot see blood. From the European point of view, American strategies risk being counterproductive; they are widely seen as being the wrong strikes at the wrong moment that exacerbate the disease instead of healing it. American courage is regarded to be ill-invested and misguided, ultimately damaging American interests (and the interests of the rest of the world) rather then defending or protecting healthy freedom and security. In short, Americans see their strategy for strikes as described by path (1b) while "old" Europeans categorize American strategy as representing path (1a).

How the bullet is administered

However, there is more. There is not only the need to find the right bullet or the appropriate strike; there is also the need to administer it in the appropriate way. Here medicine and politics differ to a certain degree. Bacteria cannot feel humiliated and take revenge, but people can. It may be the same bullet; however, there is a difference as to whether it is in the hands of a policeman or a self-appointed body guard. In other words, not only the strength of the strike and quality of the bullet, also the way of administering it is crucial. Even medicine is not completely free from this dynamic. Given the same medical treatment, administered by a patronizing bully of a doctor it may be rejected by the patient, whereas it may do good if offered by a wise and dignifying healer.

Humiliating arrogance

From the European point of view, a view shared in the Arab world, the American administration, particularly their hawks, too often than not appear arrogant more than benevolent, even though they themselves clearly are deeply certain of the opposite. American hawks and many average Americans are indeed profoundly permeated by the previously described identity of heroism, based on their background as offspring of *victims of the old world*, who courageously left and *built a better new world*.

In the same vein, particularly France is perceived as arrogant in the United States, deserving of being put down in response. And indeed, Thomas Donnelly, from the *American Enterprise Institute* stated that the quick American-British victory in Iraq effectively "humiliated" arrogant French President Jacques Chirac (April 11, 2003[283]).

The question arises of who is right. Are American hawks arrogant or benevolent? Who has to do more explaining and understanding? Do Europeans and Arabs have to better fathom that American motives are benevolent and forget about their allegations of arrogance? Or do Americans have to understand that they appear to be arrogant and should explain themselves and prove that they indeed are not arrogant?

Equally, has France to go to the Americans and explain that France in fact is far from arrogant, but deeply worried? Or do the French have a right to receive better explanations from the American side?

What perhaps can be agreed upon, on all sides, is that all have a problem of miscommunication. The attribution error runs hot. Perhaps, in a first step, all sides could accept that their inner conviction of having high ideals is not automatically

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[283] In BBCWorld Hardtalk with Tim Sebastian.

transmitted to the world. Even if such an inner conviction is self-evident from *inside*, if read as arrogance from *outside*, there is a problem. Such misreadings, when they happen, easily acquire the epistemological status of hard facts; people start believing in them. Europeans start believing in American arrogance and vice versa, even if this is a misreading. And the more people believe in such framings, the more these framings fuel the very antagonism – including terrorism – that all involved actors so courageously aim to protect against. Under circumstances of mutual misreadings, any *bravery* and *courage* invested in *strikes* as well as *containment* is easily counterproductive and wasted. The very strategy that otherwise would perhaps be beneficial, will be rejected under conditions of misunderstandings and misreadings.

To conclude this section, it is not sufficient to merely discount misreadings of arrogance as ill-willed misconstructions by the other side. Such misreadings have to be addressed in an attentive manner, avoided and prevented, so as "to make the peace worth the war" as British Prime Minister Blair phrased it. All parties would want to do more explaining.

This chapter is entitled with "What the United States of America can contribute." This section suggests that the United States could contribute with reflecting on their specific cultural background and how this is being evoked by September 11, 2001. Many Americans are proud of being different, of being more courageous and decisive than others. American history taught harsh lessons. There is thus a specific American tendency to link courage with decisive *strikes* and regard strikes as appropriate to defend high ideals such as freedom and human rights. However, such linkages are not a priori benign. *Prevention* and *containment* may be as courageous and equally appropriate or inappropriate as *strikes* for addressing high ideals.

Most probably, everybody will agree that the appropriate approach is to tailor-make strategies to situations and make sure that the suitable strategy is implemented for the intended goal. Sometimes, courage is better invested in prevention and containment, and sometimes better in strikes. Sometimes strikes are necessary to defend high ideals and sometimes prevention and containment are preferable. It is not beneficial for global peace when international disagreement over appropriate strategies is automatically misread as proof of lacking courage or ideals. Such misreadings may unnecessarily stir up feelings of humiliation on a global scale. Clearly, this is true not only for the United States. However, this chapter addresses the United States and what they can contribute to global peace. This section thus suggests that the United States could contribute with more in-depth explaining and more in-depth understanding.

Children, madmen, criminals, enemies, or subhumans? Which framing fits terrorists best?

The Twin Towers of the World Trade Center collapsed in September 2001. They were hit by two planes. These planes were piloted by a few men. These few men shook the world. They sent America into mourning and outrage, and war planes into Afghanistan and Iraq. They created new laws that are designed to capture terrorists, because nobody wants terrorists. Nobody wants mad people flying into their neighborhoods and crashing into their homes.

Here comes the big question: Are such terrorists in fact *mad*? To answer this question we have to ask: What is madness? Is it about some hormones that get out of control? Are terrorists psychiatric patients? Should they be locked up in psychiatric wards?

No, it seems. Although we sometimes call people who go on suicide attacks *mad*, we do not really seem to mean that. Otherwise we would not need new laws and criminal courts. Such institutions are not provided for mad people, but for *criminals*. And, clearly, a criminal is not mad. A criminal breaks the law, supposedly out of contempt for law and order. For criminals we need prisons, not psychiatric hospitals.

Let us deepen this analysis. Is it not the case that the world today wages war on terrorists? And is not usually *war* waged on *enemies*? Enemies usually are neither seen as mad nor as criminals who disrespect law and order. Enemies are yet another category as compared to mad people or criminal lawbreakers. What enemies do, is opposing *us*, clearheadedly. They oppose *us* together with *our* laws, and they mean it, cold-bloodedly! Their minds are not clouded, neither by hormonal nor by moral dysfunction. They want to force another moral on *us*; this is what enemies typically are seen to be about. Enemies are arrogant opponents who come to win the battle if we do not stand up and respond in kind by waging war back on them.

So, what have we learned from this analysis? We have learned that we have three stories to fall back on, the one of the *mad* terrorist, the one of the *criminal* terrorist, and the one of the *enemy* terrorist. Which story shall we use? Which is correct? Or useful?

We have to be careful, because we cannot apply all of them at the same time. A mad person cannot be a criminal or an enemy, because mad people are not in control of their own actions; it is precisely therefore that we usually put them into hospital and not prison and wish for their recovery. A criminal on the other side is not mad, because criminals indeed are in control of their actions; therefore we put them into prison and not hospital and wish for their moral restitution. And, thirdly, an enemy is neither mad nor criminal, because enemies are very much in control and clearheadedly object to our laws. Enemies attempt to put themselves above our laws and substitute ours with theirs. Enemies try to put us down, our system, our beliefs, our entire being. Therefore we have to stand up against them and respond in kind, which is war, because otherwise they will eradicate our very existence. This is how we usually define enemies and appropriate responses.

These are the three main "stories" or "framings" we normally use for explaining the world's dysfunctions. However, September 11 forces us to question the world further and perhaps even our very framings of it.

Madmen or misguided children

If we use the *mad person framing*, the men who flew the planes that destroyed the Twin Towers were *poor disturbed souls*. Whoever chooses to perceive these men as *mad* can look down upon them with pity and go about daily duties quite undisturbed. Poor souls deserve that we shake our heads and sigh in wonder about nature's strange ways of disturbing the brain's physiology. We may want to give some funding to research of psychiatric conditions and certainly pay for the better protection of potential targets. If we had to make a drawing of *us* and *them*, then *they* would be pitiable individuals somewhere far below us, similar to *children*. In other words, the category of *mad* people would be somewhat linked to the category of *children*, or those who are *not yet mature*, but may evolve if aided. We could glance down on these *mad* people or *immature children* with a mixture of mercy and horror, as we would when our children ruined the neighbor's car or worse, got the neighbor's family members hurt, and brought expensive lawsuits on us.

Misguided children typically can pull off quite a lot of trouble before we would

question our worldviews. This is because children are supposed to learn, and learning is an inherently unstable process. We are all aware of the pitfalls this fragile process may have in store, and therefore we keep quite calm, even if confronted with sad stories of misbehaving children. We are furthermore aware that every generation in some ways is shocked about the next one. There is something normal about "mad" children. Both madness and "mad" children do not shake our world; we know that this will be with us until the end of our days.

Criminals

Does this framing satisfy us? Are the suicide attackers of the twin towers *misguided children* or *mad* or both? Even if it were true, our rage and degree of unsettledness would ask for more. After all, these suicide attackers were adults with a certain degree of education, able to be clear about their actions and motives. So, are they then criminals? The fact that *we* indeed respond with changing laws seems to indicate that *they* in fact are *criminals*. Yet, why do we then wage *war*? Is it because destroying the Twin Towers is an attack on *our* essence, because it is more than merely the breaking of laws?

If we were to make a drawing of *us* in comparison with criminals, we would perhaps draw the super-ordinate structures of state institutions as an umbrella of law covering *us* as well as *them*. Then we would place us as exemplary law-abiding individuals directly under this umbrella, and those we deem to be criminals somewhere further down beneath us for not having reached our level of moral integrity.

This design would put us in a position to look down upon them, in mainly two fashions: *Conservatives* (more precisely, those who are called *conservative* in the United States of America) would look down with moral disgust, while *liberals* (those who are called *liberal* in the United States of America) would look down rather with mercy.

That is, conservatives narrate the following story, "*We*, the conservatives, look down and draw a stark line separating us from those criminals beneath *us* and call them *them* in repugnance, because we believe that *they* are of a fundamentally different essence to *us*, namely of an evil essence." Liberals recount the story as follows, "*We*, the liberals, would draw a more permeable line between *us* and *them*, since we perceive *them* as misguided children who could be lifted up to our level of integrity if therapeutic efforts were exerted on them."

In the latter case, the category of *criminals* is connected with the category of *madness* by using the category of *children* who still can learn. Conservatives oppose this "mercy" and deem that criminals have forfeited such "excuses." However, in both cases *we* stand high *up* and place ourselves at some kind of moral heights and gaze *down* on what we call *criminals*.

Lakoff explains that mainstream conservatism is grounded on a Strict Father model, whereas mainstream liberalism is based on a Nurturant Parent model.

Since each family model includes its own morality, political liberalism and conservatism express different views of morality. Each family model organizes the culturally shared metaphors for morality in different ways, giving priority to certain metaphors and downplaying others. Moreover, each particular metaphor for morality (e.g., Moral Strength or Moral Nurturance) gets a more unique interpretation depending on which family model it is identified with (Lakoff, 1996, p. 312).

Enemies

What about enemies? Are *they higher* than *us*, or are *we above them*? Where is the super-ordinate umbrella of law? Are enemies a different story as compared to criminals? Yes. Enemies try to put themselves *above our* norms and wish to replace them with their own ones. They try to install themselves *above us*, and we have to fight in order to *put them down*. It is a struggle for survival, spiritual, existential, all-encompassing. It is either *them* or *us*. This mapping of the world is usually shared by liberals and conservatives.

However, we see conservatives habitually tending to feed *criminals* into the category of *enemies*; criminals from the conservative viewpoint attack the commonly agreed upon structure of law and order. Liberals, on the other side, prefer to categorize *criminals* closer to the camp of *children* or those who can be taught and reformed. Liberals believe that *criminals* suffer from some kind of inhibition, not a chemical aberration in the brain that causes "madness," but a social disadvantage that, if remedied, would turn criminals into at least supportable neighbors, perhaps even into good neighbors. Conservatives do not like to make such "allowances" and focus on the existing order that has to be protected against criminals who are *enemies* and therefore have to be cordoned off, irrespective of the cause of their criminal aberrance.

When we review our analysis of social categories and possible paradigms for terrorists then we can conclude that there are not three, the *madman*, the *criminal* and the *enemy,* but rather only two, the *child*, and the *enemy*. The category of the child is rooted in the view of the human being as inherently willing to home in under a super-ordinate structure of law and order and live peacefully with one's neighbors. *Liberals* typically have this view, which basically means to apply the *child* category. Criminals in their view resemble misguided children who were inhibited by some kind of environmental shortcoming, a shortcoming, and this is important, that is open to betterment. Liberals tend to define social responsibility as the community's task to shape an environment that does not damage individuals to the extent that they become criminals. *Conservatives*, on the other hand, tend to expand the category of the *enemy*. They see it as their responsibility to "clean" the social fabric from destructive "elements," to "flush them out." They feel that people who have reached a certain age are no children anymore and ought not be "excused" by treating them softly, but that they ought to stand up for their misdeeds as grown-ups.

Subhumans

There is yet another framing available to humankind; however, I believe it is not helpful to include it here in more length. It is the historically infamous alternative of viewing other human beings as *offal* or *subhuman*. Humans, in the course of history, have been viewed as "pests," "cockroaches," or "aberrations not worth living." These were the labels given to the victims of genocides and the Holocaust, in Hitler's Germany as much as in Rwanda and other places. Such labels have not been discussed in this section as to not give them a status of "possible choices." Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus in most parts of the world as to not use strategies of dehumanization, not on anybody. Yet, we have to acknowledge that history confronts us with such categorizations, and if we are to avoid them, we have to understand their inner workings.

Offal has to be *cleaned* away. This has indeed been used as a conceptualization in relation to people; terms such as "ethnic cleansing" expose this. The *offal* label connects to the other categories discussed above with respect to our wish to have these people far *away*. *Mad* people have often been locked up as to be away and removed from our sight. The same can be said about *criminals*. In former times, when there still was ample empty space on the planet, criminals were even sent into exile, to Australia for example, thus creating a geographical distance that satisfied the psychological need for distance. Distant, far removed, this is also the space we associate with *enemies*; those we wish would stay where they are, namely far away.

To dehumanize and kill people as offal is to introduce a very particular distance, not a geographical distance, but a conceptual distance. Whereas the word *enemy* still allows for respect – we know stories of enemies even admiring each other – this is excluded when dehumanization is applied. Yet, the abysmal conceptual divide that is created by dehumanization is not something Western civilization is willing to allow for. Opinions are divided on capital punishment for criminals, exactly because we perceive that there is a sensitive line where humans should perhaps not decide whether other humans are to be considered worth being part of humanity or not.

The child paradigm fits best

What do the two paradigms, the *enemy* paradigm, and the *child* paradigm represent? I claim they represent the vision of *old* and *new* times. I define old times as the world *before* the occurrence of the notion of the *global village for all*, and new times as the reality and vision of the *emerging global village* within which all citizens enjoy human rights and respect for their inalienable inner core of dignity.

When we look around and try to link these reflections with existing theories then we find, for example, *Realism* and *Idealism* in *International Relations Theory*. Marshall (1999) writes: "The Realist assumption of man as a self-serving, power-maximizing, calculating actor operating in an anarchical environment of potentially violent aggression stands in stark contrast to Idealist visions of an altruistic, reasoning, and cooperative humankind striving diligently to progress beyond the confines of their own ignorance and parochialism" (Marshall, 1999, p. 62). We could thus link the *Realist* vision to the *enemy* paradigm and the *Idealist* conceptualization to the *child* framing of basic human nature.

Why do I link the *child* paradigm with new times and the *enemy* paradigm with old times? Because the *child* paradigm implies closeness and relation in most societies and cultural subgroups. The *child* paradigm is inherently relational, even if children are misguided and have to be bettered; our children are part of *us*. *Enemies* on the other hand are always distant. They come from *outside*, they approach from somewhere outside of the social network and outside of the cultural consensus that surrounds what we feel is *us*. Children are part of *us*, even misguided children, while enemies are *them*.

The notion of the *global village*, however, is a vision of the whole of humankind being *us*, including misguided people, thus lending itself to the *child* paradigm, while the old world of *many villages* rather reflects a world of independent and unrelated players that may turn out to be enemies, thus correctly captured by the *enemy* paradigm. In other words, conservatives who champion the *enemy* paradigm believe that they live in a world of *many villages* of *us*-versus-*them*, while liberals rather place themselves in a world of *One village* of *us*.

Us, or we against them? What kind of global village do we want?

Who is right? Conservatives or liberals? Or, more precisely, which world do we want to create for the future?

Why is it essential to rephrase these queries in such ways? Because the question "who is right?" indicates that there is some kind of neutral "truth" out there and we have to behave according to it. Yet, we all know that we are not just *observers*, but also *creators*, we shape the truth by the way we interact with our environment.

Imagine you see your new love in the street warmly hugging somebody else. You walk towards them and stage a big scene of jealousy and disappointment about the lack of loyalty on the part of your new love, and how you are being betrayed. Your love now turns around and asks you, full of disgust: "Why do you condemn me before having asked me who I hug? This here is my dear cousin! Your reaction shows to me that you do not love me! I call off our love!" This little example illustrates how you can destroy a perfectly acceptable situation by perceiving it as unacceptable. It is you, the perceiver, who destroys a social fabric by your way of perceiving it. In the same way we can create a world of *enemies*, where there are *none*, just by expecting them to be there.

We all have heard about *Rosenthal's expectation effect* that can make positive as well as negative expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies. *Rosenthal's expectation effect* is the phenomenon in which a researcher's tacit hypothesis or expectancy can become a self-fulfilling prophecy of the responses they get. Teachers' expectations can improve the factual academic performance of their students; where they expect success, they create and find it and where they expect failure, they also create and find it.

There is much research to be found in this field, for example the illuminating work by Lee D. Ross at Stanford about the role of the *situation* and of *framing*. When you tell students that a task they are asked to carry out is difficult, they may not solve it; however, when you explain to them that the same task usually is being solved quite easily, they will solve it. When you ask students to play a game where they have the choice to cooperate or to cheat on one another (*Prisoner's Dilemma* game) and you tell them that this is a *community game*, they will cooperate; however, they will cheat on each other when you tell them that the same game is a *Wallstreet game*.

Deutsch (1973) lays out what he calls *Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations*. This law says that "characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship." In short, "cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition" (Deutsch, 1973, p. 367).

In other words, reality is being shaped according to what kind of truth you believe in. If you believe that criminals are enemies of social order, they may become enemies. If you believe that they are more like misguided children who need betterment, they may become misguided children who need betterment. Not totally, clearly, yet, to a certain degree, we lock reality with our expectations and framings.

Maria came to me as a client because she felt utterly worthless. She recounted, "I come from a family, who has a fundamentalist Christian orientation. When I was a small child, I tried everything to be part of this. I remember when I was five, six, and seven years old and prayed for more than an hour a day. When I was nine, I started to study the Bible intensely.

Unfortunately, this was the beginning of the end. I developed what is called 'religious doubts.' I asked questions such as, 'Why do all those people in the world who by mere chance have not heard about Jesus have to go to hell? It is after all not their fault, when they have not heard about Him? This is unfair!'

Furthermore, I did not want to be part of what I felt were degrading ways of dealing with God. In my social environment, God was seen as somebody who can be bribed, who needs to be given attention otherwise He gets angry like a jealous lover. God could be asked the most stupid questions in prayers, such as 'give me this and give me that.' For me this behavior resembled the Pharisees from the Bible more than anything else. I wanted a much more ennobled and meaningful religion, not just a cover for human stupidities and projections. In a way I was much more religious and more sincere than my entire family.

My family, however, was deeply shocked at my doubts. Yet, they knew what to do. I had to pray more. God would send me answers, if He deemed me worth His attention. I prayed and prayed. Everyday. Until I was about twelve years old. The tragedy was that my doubts only grew. Somehow, I was not exposed to good answers. I could not help it. And I did not want to pretend. After all, what is religion about? It is about sincerity, isn't it? After many years of strife, at the age of about twelve or thirteen, still lacking answers that could include me into my family's religious world, I had to conclude that God clearly did not deem me worthy of His attention.

My family did not understand that I tried my very best, that I prayed for hours, that I was more sincere than they were, rather than less. They thought I was evil. They decided that I, out of some kind of malevolent deliberation, had determined to reject God. And this they decided while I felt rejected by Him! They could have helped me, supported me, and consoled me in my growing loneliness. Instead they deepened the rift. For me, the new situation meant that I was not part of God's world, and, since my family was part of God's world, I was also excluded from my family. They could have included me, but they alienated me even more.

The result is that what I have learned about myself is that I am condemned by God, not worth His attention, an evil enemy of religion, and not part of my family. Everyday I try to reject this death sentence, but it continuously seeps into my soul. My self-esteem is rock bottom. According to the 'true' teachings of my family, not even after death there is hope; God has condemned me even after death. How come, that I, thoroughly well-intentioned, have ended up in such misery? My parents see the devil in me. Why did my parents not include me? If they only had had more strength! By naming me *evil enemy*, they turned me into an *enemy*, while in reality I yearned for nothing but being *part of my family*!

For years I did not talk to my family and when I did, I was aggressive. I was too disappointed with them. So, they undeniably got their *enemy*. They felt vindicated in their judgment when I was rough. But it was *them* who had turned me into an *enemy*. *They* had done it to me and themselves! All I yearned for was being united with them!"

Earlier we asked: Who is right, the conservatives, or the liberals? We could now conclude that in a world in which humankind is *One family* or *One village*, liberals are more "right," and in a world of *many villages* conservatives are more "right." Both are "right," yet in different contexts. However, if we wish to bring about a world of *One village*, framing it in the liberal way would help bring it about, because, as discussed earlier, expectancy helps bring about reality.

Here, we face the basic question: Do we want the planet to continue becoming *One*

single village? Do conservatives want *One single village*? If they were to wish for that, they would better become more liberal. Because by framing the world in conservative terms, the world's reality is stuck there. Marshall writes about the *Realist's* and *Idealist's* images of human nature: "The Realists see no way out of the present mess except to keep the wolves at bay with sticks and fences; the Idealists see a light at the end of the tunnel but have no clear vision of how to get there from here" (Marshall, 1999, p. 62). Also Marshall's words indicate that we should perhaps all become *Idealists* and then search for good ways to "get there"?

Or, perhaps, the question has to be rephrased. What *kind* of *One village* do we want? A village with a big gap between *haves* and *have-nots*, or a village with a more equal distribution of opportunities? We may expect that liberals would opt for the latter version and conservatives rather for the first.

A stern conservative who is afraid to lose privileges would perhaps paint the following picture, "Whoever aims at taking anything away from me is an enemy and terrorist. Terrorists are enemies who question my values, and my values state that I deserve my privileges and ought not allow anybody to take them away from me. *We* who have are rightly defending our freedom and waging war on *them*, who do not accept this arrangement. *They* place themselves outside of law and order. *They* want to replace *our* norms with *their* norms, and thus they are *enemies*."

Liberals on the other side may say, "What if *they*, the terrorists, are nothing more than *disappointed children*? What if they have bought into our values and do not oppose them in any way? What if they want to join us in our privileges and feel respected and dignified? What if we invited them into our ideals of human rights and equal dignity, but only half-heartedly, and now they protest against our double standards? Then they would be neither enemies, nor criminals, mad people, nor children, but more similar to adolescents who wish to be part of the adult world as full members and use short-sighted violence to give voice to their frustration."

The conservative position is strengthened by *just world* thinking, at least under circumstances of inequality. As reported earlier, Lee Ross and his colleagues carried out interesting experiments.[284] Contrary to the assumption that it is the "nature" of human beings to want to grab as many resources as possible if given the chance, these experiments show that people are very much willing to share resources equally. However, those who have acquired more in the past, tend to justify this inequality once it is there. In other words, human beings seem to wish for a fair world, however, fairness in the future is judged differently from fairness in the past. We define fairness as equal sharing as long as the sharing will be carried out in the future; however, once we have accumulated more than others, we tend to believe that we deserve it.

The famous *loss aversion* plays into these psychological preferences as well. Loss aversion means that people dislike losses significantly more than they like gains. This means that we would want to share equally in the future, but as soon as we have accumulated more than others – and others would perhaps say that we have unfairly much – we would not like to lose what we have, and would even tend to believe that we merit to have that much.

Such deep psychological phenomena as *just world thinking* and *loss aversion* strengthen conservative stances because they lead people to evaluate those who aim at another distribution of resources as aggressors; even poor American citizens who have not much more than the American passport and the *American Dream* to lose are thus pushed into the conservative camp. Being attacked from outside strengthens a

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[284] See Iost and Ross, 1999.

conservative mindset even further. The pilots who flew into the twin towers indeed managed to unite an overwhelming majority of American citizens in the camp of conservative love for God's own nation, against *them.*

At this point of analysis we could sum up and predict that there will be no way out for the *global village* other than become a pyramid with those with privileges at the top, even if the only privilege were the inclusion into the *American Dream*, and those with shattered dreams at the bottom, firing snipers at the top: *us* against *them.* And since we know that our perception creates what we perceive, this perception of the world would also help create it: a world of fear, of insecurity, and mistrust, a world, where the citizens of the *global village*, instead of being brought closer together, would be divided into new *separate villages.*

Yet, do we want that? Would it not be much better if *we conservatives* were to expand our love for America from *our country* to the *whole of God's own planet?* And at the same time expand the pie of resources so that all can *have* without getting at each other's throats? If we were to achieve that, conservatism would in many instances collapse with liberalism; we would not need the division anymore.

This section is thus a message to American conservatives. It invites American conservatives to become true citizens of *God's own planet Earth* and not merely of *God's own America*. Becoming true citizens of *God's own planet Earth* means abandoning certain conservative fortresses. This section invites American conservatives to participate in building a *global village* where all can live together in dignity. "United we stand for *God's own planet Earth*," this is a *benign* message. "United we stand against the world," easily has a divisive and counterproductive effect, as much as this may be unintended.

Why do they hate us? The role of humiliation

Many Americans ask: "Why do they hate us?" And many reply: "*They* are cold-blooded *enemies* who want to destroy our values, our freedom, and our wealth! *We* are a nation at *war*!"

"America exports its fear and meets the humiliation of the Arab world. The historic memory of America is perhaps too short, in the Arab world perhaps too long, particularly in Iraq," says Dominique Moisi, Deputy Director of the *Institut Francais des Relations Internationales*.[285]

Moisi's words describe the world after September 11, 2001, when the United States began feeling more vulnerable than ever before. In 2000, Kenneth Waltz still had another view of the situation. He ridiculed the idea that the United States has substantial enemies. "Never in modern history has a country been as secure as we are now," he said. "We have to invent threats. We have to dramatize them just to justify spending on defense." Waltz claimed that the American media exaggerated the strength of China and other supposed adversaries. "Who's threatening us?" he asked. "North Korea? Iraq? They're not threatening us. The Chinese know they cannot invade Taiwan." He explained why the media perpetuate such ideas by saying, "The American media report whatever American policy officials tell them" (March 28, 2000[286]).

So, where is the truth? Are the United States threatened or not? I propose that the

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[285] In a program called *Guerre en Irak*, March 30, 2003, on the French television channel France 2 (translated by the author).
[286] Retrieved from http://www.columbia.edu/cu/pr/00/03/kennethWaltz.html

United States, including the rest of the West, are much more threatened and since a much longer time span than they usually think, however, that they at the same time are much less threatened. Let me explain.

Resentment of power that is too casually displayed

In 2000, in Lindner (2000s), I warned that a new Hitler could threaten the globe. My decades-old international experience and subsequent research on humiliation had unearthed widespread simmering rage that clearly was only waiting to be instrumentalized by Hitler-like figures. However, I hoped that the Mandela path would outweigh emerging Hitler-like tendencies.

In 2000, in the article *What Every Negotiator Ought To Know: Understanding Humiliation*, I wrote, "Fortunately for the West, human rights-humiliation in the Third World has not yet found its Hitler. It would be disastrous if such a leader created a global following among the humiliated by arguing, for example, that the West's human rights' rhetoric was merely a hypocritical device to divert attention from the fact that the divide between rich and poor is greater than before. In view of the danger that a new Hitler would present, the West is fortunate that the influence and prestige of Nelson Mandela are so great" (Lindner, 2000r, p. 19).

The punctuation of history that is suggested by September 11, 2001, may thus be misleading. There were clear signs of imminent threat previously to 2001. The 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, as well as the attack on a US battle ship in Yemen are but a few examples. The attacks of September 11 did not suddenly fall out of the sky. They could be regarded as the peek of the iceberg, the result of years of covert rage. The threat existed long before September 11, 2001.

As cause we may pinpoint *resentment of power that was too casually displayed*, not only on the part of the United States, but of the entire West. In the United States, accusations that they engage in double standards, uneven-handedness, and arrogance have been rejected as "wrong" for years, as unfounded, as ill-willed propaganda. All this might be true. The United States can indeed be proud of achievements that outdo the rest of the world. And without a doubt, US power elicits envy that may turn sour. However, it is not sufficient to merely shrug these accusations off. Even if feelings are based on misunderstandings, they are there, and they lead to consequences that are extremely real. Even if the bin Ladens of this world misunderstand America profoundly, their hatred still is a fact.

In other words, if nothing else, the United States have an *image problem.* This problem briefly diminished after September 11, when a wave of sympathy and compassion was extended to the United States. However, subsequent American attempts to make the world a safer place, seem to have had counterproductive effects on the hearts and minds of the rest of the world.

In the second part of 2003, the BBC asked 11,000 people in the UK, France, Russia, Indonesia, South Korea, Jordan, Australia, Canada, Israel, Brazil and the US in a poll about their views and opinions on America. The poll posed a range of questions, about general attitudes towards America and US President George Bush, and about America's foreign policy, military power, cultural influences and economic might.

The results do not look encouraging for America, even after most critical appraisals of the statistics. America and the "rest of the world" seem deeply divided.

Much of the "rest of the world" believes the square opposite of what Americans hope and trust. The "rest" feels that American economy makes their country poorer, that American economic policies should not be copied, that America is a greater threat than Iran, China, or Russia (only Al Qaeda is recognized as being more dangerous than the United States), and the "rest" believes that American military might turns the world into an unsafer place.[287]

Yet, the United States had an *image problem* also before September 11 and before the 2003 Iraq war. And indeed this image problem was being recognized. "The White House announced it would create a permanent Office of Global Communications to enhance America's image around the world. At the same time, the House of Representatives approved spending $225 million on cultural and information programs abroad, mostly targeting Muslim countries, to correct what Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill., called a 'cacophony of hate and misinformation' about the United States" (Hale, 2002, p. 2).

Thus, we could conclude that the threat to United States security does not incept with September 11, but started earlier, and secondly, that the danger is much more significant than people ever thought. The images of the falling Twin Towers visualized this. However, they did not yet embody the mayhem we may expect in the future. Millions could die. A few planes, crashed on nuclear plants, would surely have much more devastating results. Thus, attacking the Twin Towers, going for humiliating symbols, fell short of what could have happened and may happen in the future. Millions could be killed and vast landscapes turned into deserts.

Every single human being on the planet is capable of turning into a weapon of mass destruction if only he or she sets her mind on it. No weapons are needed. Even nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are not required. As we have seen, kidnapping planes is enough. Being creative suffices. Trojan horse strategies are cheap and can at the same time be extremely effective. September 11 may only be a faint hint of what history could still hold in store.

Global admiration. America has already won the war

How can I then suggest that the danger is at the same time much less? Because there is also a great admiration for America and the West to be found around the world. There is a great yearning among the less privileged to become members of *One single family* of humankind. Many among the poor and marginalized ache to be invited into dignified lives. America and the West have *won the war long ago*. Why else are so many people trying to leave their homes and enter the paradise of America or Europe? Why else do so many endure the most unspeakable hardships to penetrate the walls of the palaces of the globe to get in?

America and the entire West are widely seen as shining examples of how a *good life* should look like. A good life includes a job, a home preferably made of stone, a television set, a refrigerator, perhaps even a car, old age security, a health insurance, and good education for the children, in sum, a dignified life. All this appears to be rather "normal" in the West; however, it is far from normal for the majority of the world's population. In overlooking this fact, the West is blind to the current state-of-affairs.

Western tourists travel to exotic and mysterious places to enjoy the kindness and

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[287] See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/programmes/wtwta/poll/html/default.stm.

services of the local poor. Just world; are not poor people happier than rich people? Most tourists do not reflect on the feelings these poor may develop when they see tourists dangling their cameras in front of large stomachs that the servants themselves will never be able to afford, let alone the camera. This is not some kind of superficial envy that can be casually discounted. It is not some egocentric material desire to steal from the rich. This it is a deep yearning for a life of dignity.

Thus, the human rights message of equal dignity for all has won the hearts and minds of most of the people around the world since a long time. As explained before, to many, human rights represent an invitation into the palace. And this invitation is happily accepted. As discussed before, there is not only hatred; there is a love story out there, a disappointed love story.

Fear of humiliation. How the victory can be gambled away

Two human tendencies currently threaten to gamble away the successful underlying love story between the West and the rest. The two human tendencies are *blindness* and *fear of further humiliation.*

Blindness is what typically characterizes master elites. And it is thoroughly understandable. There we, from the West, travel the world and meet the poor as servants in our hotel or sellers of cultural artifacts. They smile at us. They treat us well. They do not tell us what they feel inside. If they were to tell us, it would sound as such, "How come that you can pay an air ticket and a hotel room in this hotel? For this money I could maintain my family for a whole year! How come that your children go to school and university, while my children toil? You bring us human rights, but at the same time protect your markets against our products! What do you expect us to feel towards you? Don't you see that your wealth forces us to smile because we depend on you? Don't you see how we humiliate ourselves by smiling at you as if everything is fine? Don't you see that we are not on equal footing and that our smiles cannot possibly be born out of 'free' choice?"

From the American point of view it is a noble deed to bring civil and political human rights, and Americans expect citizens around the world to be industrious and create wealth as soon as they enjoy this freedom. However, there are also cultural, social and economic human rights that stipulate that more has to be done. The World Trade Organization is called upon by experts such as Philippe Legrain (2002) to broker the insertion of other aspects of human rights than only political ones into the global context. The term *enabling environment* means more than freedom from political oppression; it means also fair global rules. The lack of Western enthusiasm for fair global rules disappoints those who listen to the human rights message. One of the buzzwords is *agrarian subsidies* both in the US and in the EU: The amount of subsidy a cow in Europe and America receives per day – US $ 2.5 per cow – is more than twice the average daily income of a small farmer in the rest of the world, or more than the average earnings of half of the population of the world. The result of such obscene statistics may be that the "ugly American" and "ugly European" is pinpointed as perpetrator of humiliating double standards. Blindness on the American and European side both sets in motion and exacerbates this problem.

Yet, blindness can be remedied. And there are many American citizens who are not at all blind. However, there is a second element that recently was added to the blend of emotions felt in America, namely fear of yet another humiliation. The need to defend *our loved ones* against *evil* that threatens from some dangerous rest of the world easily counteracts attempts to be less blind. The haste of emergency, the need to

immediately stand up together against *them*, takes away attention from the more basic task, namely long-term building of global trust among all of *us*. Thus, the love-story may be soured by blindness and fear of humiliation.

This situation is aggravated when leaders are anchored in an old honor order of *several villages*. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) examine an honor-based notion of humiliation as it is lived in the South of the United States, see their book *Culture Of Honor: The Psychology Of Violence In The South*. George W. Bush has his home in Texas. In Texas, he is widely respected because he is seen to "have character." This "character" has a lot to do with the southern concept of honor and the "right" way of remedying humiliation. In frontier times this concept certainly was appropriate and perhaps even utterly laudable. However, in a *global village*, it may not always be beneficial. What is "character" in Texan eyes may be misunderstood as arrogance in other regions of the world, and even though this may be a misunderstanding, it still has negative reverberations.

Pride for having "character," laudable as it may be, may thus interfere negatively with the underlying love story of the *global village*. Talent for strong leadership is a wonderful gift. However, leaders can err as much as electorates. Even the most convincing amount of strength and conviction invested in leadership does not automatically make it right. The British electorate initially failed to recognize the danger flowing from Hitler; it was a leader, Churchill, who proved them wrong. However, also a Churchill could have erred. And in today's interconnected world it is more dangerous than ever to use "Southern-character" labels such as *enemies* and "honorable" "Southern" resistance, where there are *disenchanted neighbors*, as terrible as they behave. As discussed before, too strong labels and framings can even create *enemies*.

Sir Andrew Green, Former British Ambassador to Syria, explained that Syria currently is the target for humiliation by America, however, that "Syria is not in the business of being humiliated by America."[288]

From the American point of view, speaking to Syria about weapons of mass destruction and criticizing Syria for supporting terrorism and lacking cooperation with the United States is meant as nothing else but "candid" language. Humbling is intended, humbling so as to pacify a player who seems too unruly. However, as discussed earlier, humbling does not always render humility, particularly not when perceived as humiliation, it may elicit defiance. Humiliating Syria may further inflame feelings of humiliation in the Arab world and create the very threat that it aims to protect against. "An overconfident America could push too far, with potentially catastrophic consequences," said another commentator.

We could round up this section by saying that there is a *love story* out there, indicating that the *war on terror* in many ways has been won long ago. Virtually every citizen on planet Earth wishes to enjoy Western amenities. Yet, this love story is being disappointed in various ways. Many of such disappointments may be based on misunderstandings, still they are influential. Blindness on the part of the rich West, combined with fear of further attacks, puts friction into this basically *benign* situation. Thus, the United States (Europe as well) may be able to contribute to a better world by acknowledging to what degree they already have won the *war on terror* and that there is ample mileage available to them for good "image" work with which

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[288] BBCWorld Hardtalk program with Tim Sebastian, April 16, 2003.

disappointments that turn the love story sour can be undone.

Read about Benjamin Franklin and humility. Walter Isaacson, author of *Benjamin Franklin: An American Life* (Isaacson, 2003a), explains in an interview: "Well, you know, Franklin once did his list of virtues – the virtues that a good tradesman, a diplomat was supposed to have. He was so proud of them, he showed them around to a friend. And the friend was a Quaker, and said 'You missed one.' And he said, 'What's that?' ... 'Humility. You're a little bit too proud. You need to put humility on your list.' And Franklin said, 'I was never perfect at acquiring the virtue of humility, but I was good at acquiring the pretense of it. I could fake it very well.' And that's what it really took, because if you acquire the pretense of humility, it's almost like having a real humility, because you scale yourself back. I think that he felt very strongly in foreign policy in this world, that you needed to at least show some humility, especially when you were strong. And I know that President Bush said that over and over again during his campaign. I think now that, after the war in Iraq, and the problems we've had with France, what Franklin would do now is show a little bit more humility and help repair the breach" (Isaacson, 2003b).

One global us! How American security hinges on global security

What is the most significant lesson of September 11? It is the lesson of interdependence. In an interdependent world, freedom and security for every single nation, including the United States, hinge on global security and freedom. *Under circumstances of interdependence, self-interest in many ways is equal to common interest.*

The Commission on Human Security was established in 2001 and is co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. It aims at developing the concept of human security and proposing a concrete program of action for the international community. The *Concept of Human Security* is explained as follows:[289] "In parallel with rapid globalization, trans-national issues such as infectious diseases and environmental problems have spread all over the world and frequent regional conflicts and economic factors have given rise to a serious issue of involuntary movement of people such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

It is therefore necessary, in addition to the concept of traditional national security, to strengthen a framework in order to protect and empower individuals and their communities and to protect the potential of each individual, focusing on viewpoints of individuals, to overcome serious and wide-ranged direct threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity."

Under circumstances of interdependence, it is more important than ever before to avoid humiliating others. Humiliation is counterproductive in an interdependent world because everybody sits in a glass house. On today's global interdependent planet it is a deadly luxury to divide the world in *enemies* and *friends*. The way to go is to make *good or at least supportable neighbors* of all. Rifts have to be mitigated as much as possible and not under any circumstances deepened further.

In order to not deepen rifts further, hot feelings have to *cool down*. People who feel humiliated are under stress. Stress is a stimulating force as long as it does not

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[289] See http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2003/2/0214.html.

transcend a certain level. An overdose of stress, however, is damaging. It is damaging for the person who is stressed – heart attacks tell the tale of stress – but it can also be detrimental to the social environment of the stressed person. Stress leads to what is often called *tunnel vision* and diminishes the ability to act as a good advocate of one's own and others' interests. Any good policeperson, judge or physician hands over the task at hand to colleagues as soon as he or she is emotionally too involved and "over-motivated." A good surgeon prefers to not operate on his own child.

The United States have been deeply shocked by September 11, 2001. And this shock is not over. Everyday, fear of future mayhem and humiliation knocks at the door. There is no escape from the trauma. In many parts of the world people are used to this situation, not so in the United States who long were well "protected" by two oceans. For people in the United States global threat is new and extremely stressful.

It would perhaps be wise to take a deep breath, to take time out, or to meditate, so as to cool down. Others, colleagues and supporters, have to step in and help "operate on the child." Clearly, nobody who is "over-motivated" likes to wait in the background while others do the job – surely, they fear, others will not take proper care – however, it may still be for the best of all. In other words, perhaps the international community, represented by the United Nations, is the address to turn to so as to unburden the United States of too emotive tasks.

Obviously, stepping back and waiting, while being inundated by stress hormones, is difficult. Immediate action might seem necessary and colleagues and supporters may appear to be much too sluggish. Time is running out. The United States, victimized by the September 11 ultra-humiliation, thus understandably are prone to lose patience with their colleagues. From the American point of view, inspections did not work in Iraq, sanctions had not worked for more than a decade; clearly, the international community was failing to live up to its tasks. The United States had to step in and rescue the weak United Nations from themselves.

However, is it really in US interest to have to rush about the globe and take on all rogues and terrorists? Would the world not be a much better place if it had a *global village police*? After all, every nation and every city invests in a police force. Clearly, victims of crimes are often unsatisfied with the police service they receive; however, nations and cities do not abandon the institution of police because they sometimes fail. Every single citizen who wishes for an effective police force is called upon to strengthen it and not replace it by self-defense.

It is an achievement of humankind to have pacified increasingly large areas. First cities had protective walls; defensive fortresses dot the whole of Europe. Travelers had to expect marauding bandit bands right behind the city wall. However, later, fortresses turned into pleasure palaces because the walls had been moved so as to protect entire nations. NATO, parallel to equivalent organizations around the world, has moved the "city walls" even further away. Why should we go back? Would it not be preferable to include the entire globe under the roof of *One single police force*? It seems that strengthening the existing multilateral institutions so that they one day indeed can go out and *arrest tyrants* for *crimes against humanity* serves everybody's interests.

In case of danger, when police forces are overwhelmed, there are two choices. Either each citizen takes up arms, in self-defense, or each citizen helps strengthen the police force. The first seems to be a historic step backwards, the latter a historic step forward, both locally and globally. When police forces are undermanned and not capable of doing their job, the individual citizen cannot say, "The police fails." This citizen has to say, "We as a community have failed to give the police sufficient

resources." Equally, the United States cannot say, "The UN failed." What they have to say is, "We all have failed to give the UN the necessary support and resources." The United States are part of the United Nations, there is only *One single we*, no *us* as opposed to *them*. Whenever the United Nations fail, their members fail them, nobody can step out of this responsibility, including the United States. United Nations resolutions are not "self-executing;" they require the political will of their members to be carried through, said Shashi Tharoor, UN Undersecretary of State, on April 15, 2003.[290]

The richest merchant in the city may be tempted to first undermine the police forces and then hang them out for failing so as to take control of the state apparatus and become an absolute ruler. This would be like taking away food from a worker and then criticizing him for not being strong enough for work. However, is this the way we want the *global village* to work? The current United Nations institutions certainly fall short of perfection. Churchill is quoted as having said "Democracy is the worst system devised by the wit of man, except for all the others." The same may well apply to current United Nations institutions that could be seen as forerunners for democratic institutions for the *global village*.

The United States, having experienced rejection and criticism from around the world, may not wish to bow under the roof of jointly decided upon super-ordinate institutions. Norway did not want to join the European *Union*, among others because they had experienced that *union* meant *domination*; the Norwegian *union* with Sweden that was dissolved in 1905 was perceived as national humiliation. However, Norway may one day indeed become a member of the European Union, and Norway is a fervent member of the *global village*.

The United States are thus invited into the *global village* and into the United Nations institutions that they once helped put in place. The rest of the world needs America. The rest of the world, on their part, has accepted the American ideal of happiness for everybody already long ago. Everybody wishes for a life of dignity, nobody wants to be humiliated.

In order to achieve a sustainable and decent global order, action is necessary. Prevention, containment, investment into sustainability, all these activities represent action; action does not only concern post-hoc damage control. Trust has to be built, global trust, and this requires perhaps the most arduous action. The United States are thus invited to invest their great abilities for courageous action into a special kind of internationalism of mutual trust and equal dignity.

Charles Kupchan (2002) wrote a book entitled *The End of the American Era.* He predicts[291] that the United States will one day become tired of hearing "Yankee go home" after having done "good" to the world, and that they will retreat in isolationism. He suggests that the United States are well advised to give others more political space, move aside a bit, so-to-speak.

We may conclude this section by encouraging a new and beneficial kind of internationalism for the United States, namely internationalism married to multilateralism, rather than internationalism combined with unilateralism. *Global* security has to be maintained, not only *American* security, more importantly, *American security hinges on global security*. There is no exclusive American security without inclusive global security. The United States are invited to abandon *American war on terror*, and join a *global policing endeavor against terrorists*. The way out is

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[290] In BBCWorld Hardtalk with Tim Sebastian.

[291] In a BBCWorld Hardtalk interview with Tim Sebastian, March 18, 2003.

to do more than fighting *against*, namely fighting *for* a sustainable future for all *loved ones* on the *entire planet*.

Apologies from the world! What the world can do for America

Anti-Americanism and "Yankee go home" language are humiliating for United States citizens. Such language throws all American citizens into one single category, namely "ugly American," and thus alienates them. This cannot be the aim if an inclusive *global village* is to be achieved. Whoever feels that "America" behaves arrogantly, ought to remember that humbling may elicit defiance rather than humility if done in humiliating ways.

Reconciliation between America and the rest of the world is crucial if the *global village* is to enjoy peace and welfare. What the rest of the world can do for America, is inclusion, recognition and apology.

It seems that feelings of fear and bitterness are being accumulated in the hearts and minds of many American citizens. Americans I have spoken to feel humiliated by the world. And these feelings of humiliation as to the outer world are being supplemented and nurtured by a pool of feelings that simmer since America's founders immigrated to the United States (clearly, the indigenous Indian population as well as black Americans find themselves in additional cycles of humiliation that are played out within the United States).

As discussed before, American pride of being able to *prevail against adversity* has its roots in their forefathers having fled difficult circumstances. The American ideal of *courage in the face of rejection* is forged out of past experiences of suffering. Clearly, it is not possible for the world to go to each single American citizen, unearth his or her forefathers' pain and then apologize for it. It is difficult to apologize to people for the suffering their forefathers endured at the hands of my forefathers. But still. Some kind of apology and recognition could perhaps indeed be conveyed. How else is American identity to be freed from the constant doubt of "why are we hated?" that has the potential to make them defensive?

This doubt of "why are we hated?" was a sad and only too real motto for many American immigrants. Jewish immigrants, for example, had to flee under this very banner. Many of those who came to the United States fled religious persecution. Others were unwelcome mouths that could not be fed. In all cases, it was not easy to leave home for an uncertain future in far away United States of America. It is not easy to be unwelcome back home.

It is the world's responsibility to heal the doubt of "why are we hated" in the American soul. It could perhaps be appropriate to send a passionate and powerful message to United States citizens, *a love message that counterweighs the hate message of September 11, 2001*:

"We, the non-American world, apologize to you Americans for whatever hardship and rejection your forefathers suffered. We see that you are still afraid of us today. You huddle in your country and praise it as the best, because the rest of the world seems so alien and hostile to you. You feel that you must either retreat from the rest or dominate it. Looking at us as equals seems scary.

We would like to apologize for every little incident that contributed to alienating you so painfully. And we would like to invite you to become part of this world like everybody else.

We observe how you easily reject what the rest of the world reflects and agrees upon. You do not sign on to important moratoriums and protocols that are designed to protect the globe. It is as if you tend to discount ideas that are not yours because of a history of suffering at our hands. Please, we do wish to see you in our midst! Please take our apologies to heart and step out of fearful isolationism/domination. We love you!

We thank you for having bailed out Europe during the First and Second World War. We are sorry that we so often are like unthankful children. Sometimes children focus too much on what their parents fail to give them and forget to recognize how much their parents indeed do provide. Are you familiar with this human weakness? We would like to say sorry for that. When you act, we accuse you of acting, and when you do not act, we accused of not acting. You can never do it right. We are sorry for our hurtful inconsistency!

We are sorry also for our envy. Of course it is not easy to acknowledge that we are rather powerless in front of you. We may sometimes envy you and lash out at you, even though you deserve admiration for your achievements. Let us apologize for our weaknesses!

We applaud your statements that express your wish to bring a better life to the rest of the world. You have a big heart. We recognize this and wish to give you our most sincere appreciation for this.

And furthermore, you like to act; you do not like to wring hands. We admire you for this trait of yours. We agree. We need to act. There are huge problems to be solved, from global terrorism to global poverty to a biosphere that is overloaded. We need you in our midst and in action. Action is not only to 'strike,' action is also to prevent and strengthen. Sometimes you seem to define action as something short, and swift. However, long-term prevention is also action, often much harder to do than short strikes. Action can be productive or counterproductive; it is no virtue in itself. As you well know, an operation may be successful even though the patient is dead. Please join us in good and appropriate long-term action!

We have a huge task in front of us as humankind. We have to build a *decent global village*. Please be with us! We understand that there are two oceans surrounding you and that they protected you from the rest until recently. And furthermore clearly you are the most powerful player around; so you might feel that there is no need to listen to us in any case. But please, let September 11 be a good lesson. Let it be the lesson of global interdependence that even you cannot escape. The lesson of interdependence teaches that helping others humbly without humiliation is more important than ever before. Let us together evoke the spirit of the Marshall plan and the Mandela path.

Please consider yourselves as citizens of the *globe* more than as citizens of *America*. We promise to try to do the same with our national identities. Please learn to *love planet Earth* as much as you *love America*. Do not divide the world in friends and evil enemies. Please treat us as sympathetic neighbors. Some of us are disappointed neighbors. Nobody is an evil enemy. We do love you and want you! Please love us!

Please accept our apologies and let them sink deep into your souls. Perhaps then you will be able to adopt the entire planet Earth as your home. Then you would not anymore be drawn into the attribution error that makes you reject whatever we say or do. Then you would be able to appreciate that perhaps we have good ideas, too, at least sometimes.

Let us help you in your most bitter hour, September 11. You are afraid, vulnerable and enraged. Somebody cruelly humiliated and debased you in the midst of your own

country. We understand how deeply hurting this is. People in trauma need recovery. They need support and care. Let us give you this care. People under stress are not always the best representatives of their own interests. Remember the cop who gets off the job when he is too involved in the case. Let us help you. You are not alone! We love you! *Welcome in the global village*!"

Reading related to this chapter

Read more on *America and its legacy*,[292] the *Rosenthal's expectation effect*,[293] on the role of the *situation* and *framing*,[294] on *loss aversion*,[295] on *preventing deadly conflict, avoiding war* and *the cost of conflict*,[296] *human rights* and *conflict prevention*,[297] on *conflict transformation*,[298] on *global human security*,[299] on *negative* versus *positive peace*,[300] on *American vulnerability*,[301] on the *Internationalization of Human*

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[292] See, for example, Campbell and Fluornoy, 2001, Degler, 1984, Ruggie, 2003.

[293] Mike Bellah writes in http://www.bestyears.com/expectations.html: "During the 1964-1965 school year, Harvard's Robert Rosenthal conducted an experiment in an elementary school to see whether teacher expectations influenced their students' performances. Teachers were told the names of children in their classes who were 'late bloomers,' about to dramatically spurt in their academic learning. In fact, these 'special' children were randomly selected and no smarter than their classmates. At the end of the term, all the students were tested, and the results made an important point. The 'special' children not only performed better in the eyes of their teachers (an expected outcome, the so-called 'halo effect'), but they also scored significantly higher on standardized IQ tests. In other words, teachers' expectations had improved the academic performance of their students. Where they expected success, they found it.

[294] See Ross and Nisbett, 1991, and Ross and Samuels, 1993.

[295] See, among others, Rabin, 1998.

[296] Read, for example, Allison and Owada, 1999, Annan, 1999, Boutros-Ghali et al., 1998, Brown and Rosecrance (Eds.), 1999, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, Carter and Perry, 1999, Feil, 1998, George, 1991b, George, 1991a, Goodpaster, 1996, Greenberg, Barton, and McGuiness, 2000, Hamburg, George, and Ballentine, 1999, Hamburg et al., 1996, Hamburg, 2000, Lund, 1996, Peck, 1998, Stremlau and Sagasti, 1998, Vance and Hamburg, 1997.

[297] Robinson, 2003.

[298] The literature on *conflict transformation* is vast. Read, for example, Hamburg, 1999, Kelman, 1990, Kelman, 1999b, Stern and Druckman (Eds.), 2000. Read on *mindful mediation*, McConnell, 1995.

[299] See, for example, Axworthy, 2001, or Steinbruner, 2000.

[300] *Negative peace* is the absence of direct violence (physical, verbal, and psychological) between individuals, groups, and governments. *Positive peace* is more than the absence of violence; it is the presence of social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of law (see, for example, Smoker, Davies, and Munske (Eds.), 1990, or Barash (Ed.), 1999).

[301] Read, for example, Drell, Sofaer, and Wilson (Eds.), 1999, Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, 1998, Talbott and Chanda (Eds.), 2001. Read on *deterrence failure*, Morgan, 1977, Morgan, 2003.

Rights,[302] the *Commission on Human Security,*[303] on *illiberal democracy*,[304] on what the *World Trade Organization* can do for *globalization*,[305] on the *United Nations* and *the United States*,[306] and on the *Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* .[307]

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[302] Read, for example, Forsythe, 2003.

[303] The *Commission on Human Security* was established after a meeting between Mr. Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, and Mrs. Sadako Ogata, former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, in Tokyo in January 2001 in response to Japan's call at the U.N. Millennium Summit in September 2000. The Commission, co-chaired by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, Special Representative of the Prime Minister for Afghanistan Assistance, and Professor Amartya Sen, Master, Trinity College, Cambridge University, and consisted of 10 other world-renowned experts, aims at developing the concept of human security and proposing a concrete program of action for the international community.

[304] See Zakaria, 2003.

[305] *Open World: The Truth About Globalisation*, by Legrain, 2002. See also Hernando de Soto's work, such as in Soto, 2000, Soto, 1989.

[306] See, for example, Ostrower, 1998.

[307] *The End of the American Era. US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, by Kupchan, 2002.

What the United Nations Can Contribute

This chapter could also be entitled "what the international community can contribute." Or, "what bystanders can contribute." Third parties are called *bystanders* by Staub (1989). Staub argues that the significant element in the atrocities perpetrated by Hitler's Germany was that bystanders stood idly *by* instead of standing *up* and getting *involved*.

What can the *international community* contribute? What can *bystanders* bring to the world peace? The reply may go as follows, "The international community who is standing *by* can instead stand *up* and forge a relevant *global civil society* and at the same time help build *sound global institutions* that pacify the globe. Since the United Nations are the body for global institutions that are available, it seems sensible to not oppose the United Nations but reform and strengthen them. The United Nations are certainly not in perfect shape; however, we do not cut a tree whose shade we desire just because it is still small. We water it and care for it. Or, a roof that has holes has to be built stronger, not taken down."

How can the international community go about? What are points to be aware of?

Calm down, no stress! How bystanders can stand up

Christianson (1984) describes how, when people feel threatened, they experience a *significant narrowing of consciousness*, and remain focused on the central perceptual details only. Read also van der Kolk (1987) on *speechless terror*, and how *explicit memory* may fail,

> As people are being traumatized, this narrowing of consciousness sometimes evolves into amnesia for parts of the event, or for the entire experience. Students of traumatized individuals have repeatedly noted that during conditions of high arousal "explicit memory" may fail. The individual is left in a state of "speechless terror" in which the person lacks words to describe what has happened (van der Kolk and Kadish, 1987, p. 6).

Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) research the processes of willpower and how people are enabled to execute their intentions; they describe two closely interacting systems, namely a *hot* system and a *cool* one. Mischel and De Smet (2000) explain this as follows,

> The cool system is a "know" system: it is cognitive, complex, contemplative, slow, rational, strategic, integrated, coherent, and emotionally neutral. It is the basis of self-regulation and self-control. In contrast, the hot one is a "go" system: emotional, simple, reflexive, fast. The hot system develops early in life and is dominant in the first few years. It is accentuated by stress, whether in the immediate situation or from chronic stress. It is tuned biologically to be responsive to innate releasing stimuli, both negative and positive, that elicit automatic, aversive, fear-and-flight reactions, or appetitive and sexual approach reactions. Impulsive and reflexive, the hot system is the basis of emotionality, fears as well as passions; it undermines rational attempts at self-control (Mischel and De Smet, 2000, p. 261).

Peter Coleman elaborates on the point how our *hot short-term coping system* may be detrimental to our long-term self-interest:

> Many of the coping mechanisms that act to protect and insulate individuals and

communities from the psychological damage and stress of protracted trauma (such as denial, suppression, projection, justification, etc.) impair their capacity to process information and function effectively (Lazarus, 1985). Thus, the ability to make sound, rational decisions regarding a conflict (such as cost/benefit assessments and a thorough consideration of alternatives and consequences) is adversely affected by the need to cope with the perceived threats associated with the conflict (through a denial of costs, glorification of violent strategies, and dehumanization of the other) (Coleman, 2003, p. 17).

What we learn is that people exposed to traumatic stress are not necessarily at their best with regard to balanced thinking and rational protection of their own interest. They are beset with a narrowing of consciousness, speechless terror and failing memory. What we learn is that stress, fatigue, and overstrain are factors that have the potential to undermine people's self-control and lower the threshold for lashing out in anger in less than constructive ways. However, all these factors can be counterbalanced with the help of sufficient personal *maturity*. Mature individuals are able to recognize their own limitations under stress and engage in and train *cooling*.

   Parents know this from their children. Children may appear to be quite calm and grown up at times, however, under pressure – in a fight, for example – they may regress and act suddenly very "immature." Apt parents recognize this and "help" their children out without belittling them. *Cooling* strategies will restore a more adult posture in children. Mischel and De Smet (2000) write on *cooling*,

   Between six and eighteen months of age, infants begin to learn to regulate their emotions. Six-month-olds approached by a stranger tend to cope with their fear and anxiety by averting their eyes and "fussing." Twelve- and eighteen-month-olds, on the other hand, use other strategies, such as self-distraction and self-soothing, to deal with an anxiety-producing stranger. These more sophisticated cooling strategies allow children to effectively cope with their hot fear and anxiety reactions. Because conflict elicits similar fight-or-flight emotional responses, self-distraction, self-calming, and other cooling strategies are equally important skills for adults (Mischel and De Smet, 2000, p. 268).

This is what I hear from American Muslims (in summer 2003), I paraphrase and summarize: "American feelings after 9/11 run hot. In some people this malignly combines with their training in 'assertiveness' and a lawyer's style of debate. Lawyers learn to win debates; they become indignation entrepreneurs, trained to score points at the other party's expense. Many Americans seem to have become indignation entrepreneurs since 9/11!

   When combative conversational styles are used in the absence of arbiters, the effects can be devastating, rendering the social atmosphere aggressive and unsafe. Common ground is not sought; indignation is the goal. If confrontational kinds of discourse are carried out in the presence of judges and arbiters, or as rituals, they may be harmless and even fascinating. There are television programs, for example the BBCWorld Hardtalk program, in which confrontational discourse styles are central, yet, this is done in a way, which clearly is not meant to crush the opponent. The set-up resembles a game.

   The rifts that are caused by unabated indignation entrepreneurship are deep, both within American society, but also within the *global village*. Whoever is deemed to be an *outgroup* member by such indignations entrepreneurs, is abused so as to score points. The victims of such abuse feel insulted and humiliated to the point that

growing together into *One global ingroup* is hampered and not aided. Thus, current American nervousness, particularly when combined with lawyer-type 'assertiveness,' has the potential to make the world an unsafer place, both national and international."

Not only children may need help with *cooling down*. Also adults may benefit from it at times. And this is where third parties, parents, therapists, or the wider community, including the international community and the United Nations, have to step in. The first task for third parties is to extend empathy, compassion and understanding to all members of all sub-groups in hotly erupting conflicts in an uncensored way so as to "calm them down." It is a sign of strength and maturity to keep a "cool" head under conditions of stress. This strength and maturity has to be promoted and furthered in victims by third parties, lest uncontrolled cycles of violence may emerge.

Mischel and De Smet (2000) propose as *cooling* strategies taking time-out, better self-regulatory strategies, improved stress management, reframing goals, and third party intervention. This book is written in this spirit. It views current world politics as *hot* reactions that would very much benefit from *cooling down*. The participants themselves may be too involved to do that, therefore third parties have the profound responsibility to speak up. And third parties comprise all those who have *matured* as did Nelson Mandela, those who have renounced extremism and embraced moderation.

Robin is a police man. He came to a colleague of mine, because his wife had been raped, clearly in an act of vengeance against him. He was so enraged that he literally was "out of his mind." He shouted and screamed:

"They do not let me be on this case! I cannot understand that! They say I am not calm enough! They say I cannot handle this case! It is my wife who was assaulted, you know! My wife!!! Can you imagine? And they take the case away from me? What shall I do? Shall I wait that this guy comes again? How shall I protect my wife? My colleagues are good guys; really, we are a top bunch of folks! But how can I trust them to protect my wife? Can you imagine how humiliating it is not to be able to protect one's own wife against rape? I am only a man, you know! Now they send me to you, a psychologist, and tell me that you have to calm me down!?"

Robin is not "on the case," because he can not be trusted to be in control of himself. He is so "hot" that he is ready to find any culprit and "beat the shit out of him." He has no sufficient inner distance. Inner distancing from the debilitating turmoil of trauma and the resulting urge for revenge, however, is necessary for effective reflection and action. Inner distance is either an effect of great personal strength and immense maturity, or it is the result of *self-cooling* training, or of third party *cooling* strategies.

Robin is helped by short-term counseling. Then he is back to "normal." This cannot be as easily achieved, however, for those who live in regions of protracted conflict and who are caught in continuous cycles of violence, unremitting stress and chronic trauma. They hardly ever have any chance to live emotional and mental lives that others would call "normal." Their predicament is even harsher than for those for whom trauma is an exception and who can go *back* to *normality*. People under conditions of continuous trauma need more comprehensive support than one-time interventions. Applying the term "emergency help" when emergency is the default, and preparing people for a normality that is nowhere to be found can – apart from being felt as an insult – be called inappropriate. The Middle East, vast stretches of Africa, as well as several countries in Asia and South America, all suffer from

continuous stress and strain; help from outside is urgently needed.

People like Nelson Mandela have the inner maturity to maintain measured distance under continuous emergency and traumatic humiliation without assistance from outside. In order to help the *global village* become a place with an intact social fabric, it may be beneficial if bystanders were to attend to *maturation* in people who are caught in feelings of humiliation and drawn towards self-destructive depression or other-destructive violent retaliation, both at the micro and macro level. Effective *cooling* is a precondition. At present, such *cooling* is happening "by chance," unsystematically. Perhaps this process can be hastened by systematic attention from the international community.

Yet, sometimes *cooling* may not be enough. People, who are *too hot* need to take themselves *off the case* or be taken *off the case* by their peer group. People, who are "too hot," are not to be put into leading positions. Hitler was "too hot," and he led his people into the abyss. Bystanders have to protect the world against "hot" leaders bringing mayhem. United Nations institutions such as the *International Criminal Court* are instruments that have become available recently. Thus, to summarize this section, third parties, bystanders, the international community and the United Nations have the responsibility to *cool people down*, or, if this does not work, to take them *off the job*.

Narcissistic rage! How bystanders can take despots *off the job*

Leaders who are *too hot* have to be taken *off the case*. Stress and trauma can diminish people's ability to process information and act sensibly. There are leaders, however, who are worse off than that. They may be caught in cycles of humiliation from childhood on. They may be obsessed with humiliation. They should never be *on the case*, not in their lifetime. As discussed earlier, Jerrold Post worked on the profile of Saddam Hussein and identifies *malignant narcissism* as destructive outflow of a *wounded self*.

Sigmund Karterud, a Norwegian psychiatrist is a specialist on *malignant narcissism* and the *urge for revenge* emanating from people suffering from this condition. He suggests that those areas of the self that regulate self esteem are damaged in such patients, rendering a *vulnerable* and at the same time *grandiose self*. Karterud describes the *grandiose self* as being full of ambitions, grandiosity, uniqueness, assertiveness, perfection, and "mirror-hunger."

According to Karterud, humiliation leads to a partial fragmentation of the self and activates precisely the *grandiose self* in people so disposed. The grandiose self, once activated, reacts with *narcissistic rage* and perpetrates revenge in order to restore itself. Karterud reports a higher propensity for narcissistic rage among individuals with personality structures of paranoid, antisocial, borderline and narcissistic type.

Malignant narcissism personality traits are, according to Karterud (2001):
➢ Grandiose sense of self-importance
➢ Preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, etc.
➢ Sense of entitlement
➢ Interpersonally exploitative
➢ Unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation
➢ Lack of empathy
➢ Lack of remorse
➢ Failure to conform to social norms

- ➢ Deceitfulness
- ➢ Reckless disregard for safety of self and others
- ➢ Distrustful and reluctant to confide in others
- ➢ Unforgiving of insults, injuries, or slights
- ➢ Inappropriate intense anger and is quick to counterattack (Karterud, 2001).

Karterud recommends a process of psychotherapy for such patients, a process that ultimately leads to the mourning of bygone hurt. This psychotherapy should include empathy so as to show patients that they are being understood, it should also entail authentic concern so that patients feel cared for. Furthermore, he suggests, the idealizing self-needs have to be activated so as to enable the patient to experience trust, confidence, and the possibility to lean on someone greater than self. Finally, repressed emotions have to be liberated, and a process of mourning incepted.

Figure 7 depicts how the three-line graphic can be adapted from a historical, social, cultural and collective process to an individual process. In order to promote healing, the therapist helps the client's grandiose self to descend from arrogating superiority and the wounded self to rise and acquire human dignity. As soon as the fragments of the self are integrated at the line of humility, the client can become a full human being with maturity and patience, accompanied by love warmth, and generosity.

The Healing of the Wounded/Grandiose Self

|		
Grandiose self *Self that arrogates* *superiority*	———	Top of the scale
Humility	▬▬▬	Line of equal dignity
Wounded and *humiliated self*	———	Bottom of the scale

Figure 7: The healing of the wounded/grandiose self

The international community, the United Nations, and bystanders in general will not be able to carry out therapy on tyrants such as Saddam Hussein. However, what they can contribute with is strengthening international institutions, such as the *International Criminal Court*, which then could persecute tyrants around the world for crimes against humanity. As soon as such despots are in custody, they can be treated within the realm of international law like any national prisoner who receives psychiatric help if needed.

Furthermore, global and local bystanders can *recognize* malignant narcissism personality traits and *prevent* such individuals from entering into leadership positions,

both globally and locally. People with these traits require therapy, not leadership tasks. Bystanders who are aware of this phenomenon can contribute with campaigning for more public awareness and for mitigating the malign influences emanating from people with these traits.

The German electorate was not enlightened enough when it allowed Adolf Hitler into power, a man that was called "the demon"[308] by people who knew him. Especially German women were electrified by Hitler's seduction. German women, only just empowered to vote, immediately abandoned their power to Hitler. Worse even, German women supported the Nazis despite backward Nazi views on women. Mere six weeks after Hitler took power, in a speech entitled *German Women* (March 18, 1933[309]), Joseph Goebbels laid out rather clearly what his party intended to do to change the role of women in society, namely go backwards.

Thus, German women gave sad testimony to the miserable fate of people who could have been potential players but turned themselves into idle bystanders and subservient underlings. Instead of using the power they had received, German women gambled it away and transformed themselves into voiceless underlings of a "demon." This is a path the international community, the United Nations, and bystanders should avoid.

Twenty-to-two, women and men! How coercion and respect can be combined

Preventing mayhem by keeping unsuitable leaders *off the job* is one task for the international community, containing hot conflicts that already exist is another. Yet, how can cycles of humiliation among conflict partners be contained by third parties without inflicting even more humiliation on them?

Colin Powell, present United States Secretary of State, is known to recommend a *power strategy* in military conflict. He wishes to have something like five times as many forces on his side than in the opponent's camp. Donald Rumsfeld, currently United States Defense Secretary, is regarded to be a representative of a more mobile, flexible and less costly approach. The fast course of the 2003 Iraq war seems to have vindicated Rumsfeld's approach. However, both strategies are perhaps not so different. They have an element of overpowering in common; in the case of Powell it is *overpowering in number*, in the case of Rumsfeld *overpowering by speed and through the element of surprise*. I believe that, indeed, an element of coercion and overpowering is necessary for the policing of peace, globally and locally – however, under the condition that this *overpowering coercion is wedded to respect*.

> During my time in Egypt, I was amazed at the low rate of crime and unrest in Cairo, a huge metropolis of at that time ten to fifteen million people. I soon understood that a high amount of *social control* is part of Egyptian culture. I frequently witnessed incidents that gave testimony to this social control, among them the following scene that I observed numerous times:
>
> An accident happens in the street in the middle of overcrowded Cairo. The two involved drivers get out of their cars and look angrily at the damage. They build up anger and subsequently shout and jump at each others necks: they scream, they pull each other at their cloths, they even hit each other.
>
> Around this scene, in the street, in coffee houses, in shops, people's attention is

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[308] Reported to me by members of the German aristocracy on August 3, 1999.
[309] Goebbels, 1934.

caught. The expressions on people's faces change and very fast reach a common expression of seriousness, of urgency, and of respect and involvement. About ten to twenty men, usually young and strong ones, slowly leave whatever they just did and come to the place of the scene. They separate in two groups of about five to ten men each. Each group of ten men assumes responsibility for one of the opponents. Each opponent is held back and talked to by his "party."

He is held back sufficiently so that he cannot really hit and hurt his opponent any more, but he is on the other hand not held back too much, so that he still can shout and scream and make brief attack leaps (therefore it needs strong men as actors, since a person in rage can be quite overwhelming).

At the same time each opponent is talked to in a very special manner. His "facilitators" speak calmly and with a high degree of respect to him. They show him that they are fully aware of the urgency of any situation which forces a man to go out of his way in such a dramatic manner (a person being *outside* of him/herself is almost seen as holy in Egypt, as if an important spirit were to try to speak via this person).

The "facilitators" try to understand the nature of the conflict and propose various compromises designed to resolve the conflict. They do not focus unduly on the rational side of the conflict, they rather constantly grant respect to the fact that the opponents are psychologically overburdened by the conflict and that the rupture of social peace has to be healed by psychological efforts of the whole group.

After about ten to fifteen minutes the opponents' rage loses thrust; they agree on a compromise in case this is appropriate – if necessary some facilitators promise to act as witnesses and/or enforcers of the compromises – the opponents can finally be pulled apart by their respective "facilitators." The conflict is over. The opponents leave. The facilitators go back to their previous occupations and as much as they stayed calm during the conflict, they do not find it necessary to be exited over it afterwards; patching up conflicts is but routine.

When we analyze this conflict resolution and containment scene in the streets of Cairo, then we observe a twenty-to-two ratio, or at least a ten-to-two ratio. We note that as many as ten or up to twenty physically powerful men may be required to *cool* and *pacify* two clashing opponents. If this scenario is taken as a blueprint for conflict resolution, then resources for the prevention, containment, and resolution of conflicts around the world are to be increased. *Overpowering* numbers of blue helmets/global policepersons with a credible *overpowering* mandate and well-devised *overpowering* strategies are required. The Powell and Rumsfeld approaches need to be intelligently combined.

Thus, it seems that conflicts cannot be prevented, contained, and solved *light*. In many world regions, in so-called *failing states*, it is rather the absence of policing than its overdose that has to be remedied. These regions need support. In other regions it is the highjacking of police forces by elite interests that has to be addressed. Resources invested in prevention and containment are well spent; they prevent the much higher investments that are necessary post-mayhem.

The international community can develop wells of creative ideas based on the twenty-to-two ratio blueprint. Why is it that hundreds of thousands of soldiers are available, but not hundreds of thousands of inspectors? Or, what about human shields preventing atrocities? What if hundreds of thousands of people from all over the world insisted to come to Burma or to Zimbabwe, just to visit? Many doctors give their vacations to work in destitute world regions, why should not more people give their vacations and use them for global social control? Social control, if carried out in

the spirit of human rights, works through a combination of outnumbering and respect. Global bystanders still face a sea of yet undeveloped ideas. In the final part of his book on *Getting to Peace*, William Ury (1999) suggests ten roles to Homo negotiator: the provider, the teacher, the bridge-builder, the mediator, the arbiter, the equalizer, the healer, the witness, the referee and the peacekeeper.

It is interesting to observe, how the Egyptian approach to hotly erupting conflict combines elements of coercion and respect that also could be mapped onto traditional male and female role descriptions. What is combined in the described scene is "female" talking, understanding, empathy, perspective-taking and healing on one side, and a "male" potential for overpowering, coercion, force, violence and aggression on the other. "Male" strength and well-dosed counter-aggression are required to hold the fighters. "Female" awareness of the cohesion of the social fabric is needed to take the fighters seriously. To combine the "male" aspect of force with "female" empathy could be described as the modern recipe of conflict resolution. The old "male" strategy of hitting, of destructive force, is no longer appropriate in an interdependent modern *global village*, while the "male" ability to use restraining force continues to be an important tool, though in a more steady and long-standing application and combined with empathy and respect.

This means that today men and women are invited into each others' role descriptions; men to use more of the traditional "female" role characteristics and women to become more "visible." In former times, visibility was connected to the man guarding the frontiers of the *outside*, just as clothes protect and hide the *inside* from *outside* viewers. There is an Egyptian saying, "The woman is the neck and the man the head; the woman turns the neck wherever she wants." In other words, Egyptian women feel that they create relevant content *inside* the home and that this is then presented to the *outside* by their men. With the disappearance of an *outside* sphere in a *global village*, this "division of labor" loses its significance, giving the opportunity to women and men alike to dwell both *inside*, in intimate privacy, and appear visibly *outside*.

UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme urges precisely the strengthening of the "female" aspect in conflict resolution efforts. The list is a long one (adapted from Lindner, 1999): using multi-track, "track II" and citizen-based diplomacy; installing early warning institutions; rethinking the notion of state sovereignty; setting up projects to better study and understand the history of potential conflict areas, collect this information and make it available to decision makers; using psychology not only on a micro-level, but also on a macro-level, taking identity as a bridge; keeping communication going with warring parties; talking behind the scenes; including more than just the warlords in peace negotiations; developing conflict-resolution teams with less hierarchy and more creativity; setting up mediation teams; installing "truth commissions;" allowing warring parties to feel the world community's care, respect and concern; taking opponents in a conflict out of their usual environment; taking the adversaries' personal feelings and emotions seriously; recognizing the importance of human dignity; introducing sustainable long-term approaches on the social and ecological level; progressing from spending aid-money after a disaster to allocating resources to prevent it; and so on.

According to *UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme* and conflict resolution experts around the world, these rather "female" efforts must be combined with a certain amount of "male" coercion to achieve peace. The term *social control* precisely expresses the combination of both aspects. On the national level, police and prisons represent some of the coercive aspects (incidentally more effective if the average

citizen does not carry weapons), while institutions like lawyers, courts and rehabilitation programs have the potential to fulfill the role of social caring and healing. Such a *culture of peace*, merging formerly separate "male" and "female" role descriptions, is the way to contain cycles of humiliation among conflict parties without humiliating them.

To summarize, the *global village* embodies *One single inside* sphere. The traditional "male" role description of *going out*, fighting the enemy and conquering the unknown – being unidimensional, unilateral and more short-sighted – loses significance since it was only appropriate *outside* the *village* or around its borders. The world as a single *global village* no longer provides an *outside*. Men themselves, as travelers and explorers, were responsible for this development which now makes their traditional strategies in many ways inappropriate and dysfunctional.

Maintaining social cohesion in an *inside* sphere means complex, relational, multilateral, foresighted, integrative and holistic strategies such as mediation, alternative dispute resolution and police deployment (for example peacekeeping forces) instead of traditional military combat. *Subsidiarity*, *quality* (and not quantity) of life, *culture of peace* – all these are keywords and concepts which stem from traditional "female" role descriptions, showing how much the new strategies are, conceptually, "female" approaches. Thus, *globalization* opens space for women and "female" strategies, inviting both women and men into embracing and combining them with the traditional "male" strategy of coercive containment.

Twenty-to-two or at least ten-to-two is the ratio needed to contain hot feelings according to age-old Egyptian experience. The young men in the Cairo scene do not need to exert brute force precisely because they outnumber the two quarrelers. Their overpowering count enables them to combine coercion and respect. Respect alone would not suffice, and coercion through outnumbering alone neither. It is a combination of both that has to be striven for by the international community, the United Nations, and bystanders in general.

Kofi Annan, on April 17, 2003, explains that he does not wish for a subordinate role in post-war Iraq for the United Nations, but that he on the other hand equally rejects for the UN to take on a task they cannot fulfill. In other words, Annan asks for resources and a strong mandate. He wants to avoid UN "failing" that is brought about by member states withholding support and then decrying the lack of UN success. What he says, in short, is that you should not send out a boy to kill a lion with a stick and then lament the boy's inaptitude when he does not succeed. Maybe, a stronger UN, and a stronger UN mandate would have prevented the attack on the UN in Baghdad on August 19, 2003.[310]

Respect the individual! How recognition has to be placed carefully[311]

When we speak about intercultural communication we assume that there are *different cultures* or that there is primary *culture difference*, and that culture difference ought to be respected. But where does *culture difference* come from?

I do not wish to dispute that cultural differences ought to be respected. I share the stance that ethnocentrism and lack of respect for cultural diversity have to be overcome. Yet, how are we to judge a situation where tyrants say to the victims of

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[310] Edward Mortimer, Adviser to the UN Secretary General, emphasizes the necessity of a stronger mandate in BBCWorld Hardtalk with Tim Sebastian, August 28. 2003.

[311] This section is adapted from Lindner, 2000j.

their oppression: "*Our* culture is to punish disobedient underlings, and you better accept being treated thus, because you are part of *our* culture! *Our* culture is hierarchical, and your place is somewhere down within this hierarchy." Usually masters add, "We are benevolent masters and believe that all our underlings love us and thank us for our efforts to care for them."

Some underlings may actually agree with their masters and enjoy their patronage. Others will protest vehemently: "We do not want to be part of a culture where we are oppressed!" They may continue: "*Our* culture is in fact quite different; we are not part of our oppressors' culture!" These underlings will then turn to the international community and ask for *respect and protection of their culture* under the banner of human rights. Their masters will turn to the international community as well and also call for *respect for their culture*, in their case meaning that they wish to force their underlings back under the umbrella of oppression

This means that oppressed *minorities* fighting for *their* culture typically are former *underlings*. As long as underlings are utterly powerless, they are also voiceless. It requires a certain amount of resources and ideological support to acquire the label of *minority* and call for *respect for our culture*.

Thus, intricate configurations of oppressors and victims unfold in front of the eyes of third party observers: Women may be victims of oppression perpetrated by their families who are victims of oppression perpetrated by their national rulers who are victims of oppression perpetrated by other states. The victims will claim to have *different cultures* as compared to the cultures of their oppressors, and ask observing third parties to recognize and respect this, while the oppressors will vehemently urge third parties to keep quiet and not interfere in what they regard as *their culture*.

In Gellner's work on *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), the central argument is that culture can become a tactic, an instrument, not a primary cause of conflict itself. According to Gellner, the social chasms of early industrialism made national cultures and nationalism come to the fore. The way to address such conflicts, says Gellner, is not to focus on the culture, but the socioeconomic circumstances that gave rise to such culture.

We round up this section with the following question, "In the case of conflicts between members of different cultures, what has to be recognized and respected, the other culture, or the other person?" The answer may go as follows: For third parties who adhere to human rights values, what has to be recognized, acknowledged and respected is the other person and not her membership in another culture. This is because each individual has her own personal dignity. The other *culture* may be a reason of *pride*, but may also be a *cause* or a *product of humiliation*. Intercultural communication must include an analysis of power relations and probe whether past incidents of humiliation may be at the source of supposed *culture difference*. If this is so, respect and recognition entail an obligation to heal this humiliation. *Respecting culture difference* for its own sake may compound past humiliations by adding further humiliation.

Stop voluntary self-humiliation! How bystanders can help preserve cultural diversity

There are innumerable stories to be told of what I call *voluntary self-humiliation*. Walk into any international hotel in the poorer parts of the world and you will find that indigenous dishes and drinks are hardly available, or if yes, then in some kind of weak imitation, supposedly adapted to the "Western" taste.

Ask in Cairo, in international hotels, whether you can get the drinks that are sold just outside of the window in the street. You will earn a smile of embarrassment and be told that you can only have international drinks. Ask for traditional food in Sri Lanka, people will be as ashamed of their delicious heritage and believe that Western visitors cannot be served poor-mans' products in an expensive international hotel.

A British friend who was born in Sri Lanka more than fifty years ago told me, "Last time I went to Sri Lanka, I saw how the hotel's employees prepared this delicious coco nut dish I love from the times of my childhood in the kitchen, for themselves, but not for the guests! I made a deal with them, and they brought me their food to my table somehow in secret, as if it was a crime! Can you imagine the degree of voluntary self-humiliation these people perpetrate on themselves? How can I encourage them to be proud of what they regard their poor-mans' products? They are about to lose their indigenous cuisine out of self-inflicted humiliation!"

Or, travel to the Azores, those nine islands in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Still, wonderful old houses can be observed, hand laid from the local volcanic stones, and some even decorated with the wood from stranded ships. Yet, the richer the island, the fewer of these houses you will find. Concrete slabs are viewed to have higher status. Western technology has a quasi religious rank. I remember, I once visited a house on one of these lush islands, it was in 1991. A microwave oven was placed in the middle of the sitting room and decorated like an altar with porcelain figures inside. The microwave oven was not in use; it was a shrine. The owners of the house were in the process of saving money to tear down their wonderful stone house and replace it with a concrete "box."

Or, visit other parts of the world where you see old-style houses, well adapted to local conditions, being taken down and concrete "containers" put in their place. I recall the story of a good Egyptian friend. He filled this container with pitiful imitations of Western furniture, Louis XIV or XV style. He and his family were used to squat all their lives. But now he packed the new houses with chairs and fauteuils only to sit in front of them on the carpet. The only purpose of this furniture was to cater for and impress the Western guest. At the same time his family had no way to go. In the new house, the family had no courtyard anymore to prepare food in the midst of the extended family on a gas stove because a "modern" kitchen – useless to them – was in place. And there was no space to sit on carpets on the floor as the family was used to do, except squeezed between the monsters of the new fauteuils. The family would thus huddle in the small, window-less and dark corridor on their carpets so as to try to rescue some of the life they were used to live before. Thus, the owner's family basically was misplaced in their own new house. The house was not built for the family but for the Western visitor. To witness this "voluntary self-humiliation" literally broke my heart. What could I say? My friend was so extremely proud of his new, expensive, and supposedly brilliantly Western house!

Incidentally, squatting is a very beneficial exercise, seen from the anatomical point of view. Only in recent years have gynecologists had to admit that giving birth in bed is convenient for the attending doctor, but perhaps not the best position for the woman. Defecating and giving birth are activities that are aided by squatting. The body's anatomy is built thus and gravity cooperates. However, squatting is not only good for defecation and delivering babies. Flexibility, moving about, squatting in different

positions, is good for everybody. Chairs are not made to promote human health, on the contrary. They produce stiff people with back problems. Squatting, sitting on platforms (the traditional Japanese house, for example, provides platforms to sit on), like the majority of human kind is used since millennia, is preferable. Many children still have an inborn knowledge about this; they roll about on the floor or on their beds when doing their homework. However, since some Westerners some time ago found out that squatting is "not the way to behave," stiffened Westerners invade the rest of the world with their rigidity, chronically sore backs and nobody stops them. Admittedly, stiffened Westerners after a certain age cannot enjoy squatting anymore, yet, why should coming generations be forced into the same straight-jacket? Here, Western "civilization" does a disservice to itself in a self-humiliatory way, without being aware of it. Chairs are like thrones, they give status, the *chair*-man is not without reason the one to lead a meeting. However, in a world where everybody sits on a chair, the status-giving function is void. What we are left with is the fact that chairs are not very functional with respect to human health.

In 1999, I participated in several fieldtrips in Rwanda, both with the UNDP and with international and national NGOs. These trips came to represent a chain of informal focus groups since I discussed the topic of humiliation whenever it was possible. Particularly during these fieldtrips I did not only monitor other people's feelings of humiliation, but also mine. With many people I shared my deep shock, and feelings of humiliation, that developed in me, about the way for example shelter programs were being built. Not so much that water had to be fetched from sources that were too far away, and that the distance to the fields was too great in many cases, as is the case of many such "villages" in Rwanda. To me, these "villages" represented more; they are part of a general problem, namely the flagrant humiliation of humanity through an uninformed admiration of outdated concepts of "modernity." The design of these artificial "villages," that invade for example Rwandan landscape, corrugated iron sheets on huts set in a military camp layout, remind me of the same anti-human philosophy that stood behind the *Plattenbauten* (ugly tower blocks) architecture in the socialist East, but also in the West, that today are regarded as a shame by almost everyone in the very same West or East.

Obsession with rectangularity and military uniformity is widely seen as an obsolete concept of modernity and few in the West today are proud of having admired it once. The socialist belief that uniformity (from clothing style to architectural design) would heal wounds of bygone humiliation inflicted by past oppressive hierarchies obviously commits the same mess-up of categories that it aims to remedy.

Clearly, difference is first of all a term that describes diversity; it can perfectly well exist independently of ranking and untouched by humiliating pecking hierarchies. Uniformity, meant to introduce equality, destroys this diversity, and thus, as I see it, introduces a new kind of humiliation, because the loss of diversity is not a small loss. Human beings are diverse, at least to a certain extent, and human identity seems, at least partly, to depend on diversity markers. And uniformity neglects precisely this basic human reality and need; instead, uniformity relegates and humiliates the human being down to the status of robots, of machines, or at best animals. This is endured by those who are forced to live in uniform rectangular blocks or "rabbit boxes," they feel indeed humiliated and abased to the level of rabbits, a reaction involuntarily "proven" by the architects who would never live in the very blocks they design.

To round up this section, I find myself hoping that international organizations, used

to care for emergencies and development, will plan better for the emergencies that are to be expected in the future. Arguments that only rectangular military uniformity is efficient and practicable, and that poor refugees or returnees should be happy with what they get, are not good enough arguments to me. How is a helpless person, struggling to heal and build a new life, to be expected to become better if her basic individual particularity is removed and humiliated into even more helpless uniformity? Is not this humiliation of the essence of humanity itself?

Subaltern elite admiration – the slavish copying of elite lifestyles (or worse, bygone concepts of elite lifestyles) – turns into what I call *voluntary self-humiliation* when a world of equal dignity is what we aim at. Yet, as discussed earlier, the opposite extreme, namely the blind rejection of whatever elites do, the obsessive humiliation and killing of elites or former elites, and the destruction of elite lifestyle symbols, is as mistaken as a strategy. Stepping outside of the master-slave dyad means that elite lifestyles are evaluated calmly: if found to be functional and constructive, elite products and habits may be adopted, if not, not.

Help the United Nations! How the international community can build a global roof

The tasks waiting for the international community are daunting and require the world to stand together and build sound global institutions that secure sustainability, both social and ecological. Ten million children under the age of five die each year, the majority from preventable diseases and malnutrition (this we read on the website of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2001). An estimated 1.2 billion people worldwide survive on less than $1 per day. Half of them are children. Around 40 million children each year are not registered at birth, depriving them of a nationality and a legal name. Children in 87 countries live among 60 million land mines. As many as 10,000 per year continue to become victims of mines. More than 300,000 youths and girls currently are serving as child soldiers around the world. Many are less than 10 years old. Many girl soldiers are forced into different forms of sexual slavery.

UNHCR reports (2001) that between 1994 and 1999, the United Nations requested $13.5 billion in emergency relief funding, much of it for children. It received less than $9 billion. It reports that AIDS has killed more than 3.8 million children and orphaned another 13 million. In 1998 donor countries allocated $300 million to combat AIDS, though an estimated $3 billion was needed. If developed countries were to meet an agreed aid target of 0.7 percent of their gross national product, an extra $100 billion would be available to help the world's poorest nations (see for a recent publication *The End of Poverty* by Jeffrey Sachs, 2005).

However, there is also a lot to celebrate. During the 1990s, United Nations global conferences[312] have emphasized the relationship between the three main goals of the UN Charter: *peace, development* and *human rights*. The force of the global human rights movement is growing. *Apartheid* has been toppled and topics such as *personal landmines* or *debt relief* are being addressed. Dictators from around the world are bound to observe with special attention how Chile's General Augusto Pinochet was

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[312] The 1990s have witnessed a remarkable cycle of world conferences convened by the United Nations. These conferences enabled member states to address some of the major developmental, economic, social and environmental problems of our times. Taken together, the results of these conferences form the UN's Global Agenda.

apprehended in London and Slobodan Milosevic brought to The Hague (even though not yet joined by likes, such as Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic). And, in July 1, 2002, in The Hague, the *International Criminal Court* started its work. Tyrants who abuse human rights, those who fancy being above the law, currently learn that they in the long run cannot anymore trust that national sovereignty will prevent interference from these newly emerging super-ordinate institutional structures at the highest global level.

To conclude, the glass is only half full. And many people, on all sides of the political spectrum, wring their hands and decry that the glass is half empty. Which is true. Yet, what do we attain by wringing hands in pessimism? Humankind has engaged in *nation building* for ages and still is, and *global village building* is still very much wanting. Yet, the fact that even at the national level states are failing does not mean that the cause is lost. Historically, socioeconomic needs have been met at village, tribe, or clan levels before central state authority was even known as a word. Building sensible state institutions is a tedious process that can stagnate in what John Stewart Mill in the nineteenth century called *ramshackle states*, or what Robert Jackson (1990) describes as *quasi-states* (Jackson, 1990). Applied to the *global village*, we currently live in a *ramshackle global village*. Even worse, in many ways we indeed do face the anarchic world that Robert Kaplan (1994) describes in *The Coming Anarchy* (Kaplan, 1994), where he pinpoints overpopulation, resource scarcity, crime, and disease as compounding cultural and ethnic identities in creating a chaotic, anarchic world. Yet, all these conditions are no reason to abandon attempts to build *more sturdy local and global institutional structures* built on the *subsidiarity* principle that gives room to *celebrate diversity*. *Good governance* and *transparency* are only two of many buzzwords that illuminate what has to be achieved.

On February 14, 2002, I wrote in an email, "I advocate the view that the glass is half full and that there is no way but optimism. I personally do not deal with optimism or pessimism really. Or, perhaps, if I am honest, I am more pessimistic than anybody else I know.

My view is the following: Optimism, patience and long-term thinking is the only choice we have, even when feeling deep pessimism. Like with a patient, optimistic patients get well quicker and die in fewer numbers. Optimism is a method to save what can be saved. Pessimism is a method to lose what could perhaps be saved. It is not a good strategy for a doctor to display overt pessimism; the patient might die, while optimism would have kept him alive. Pessimism drains energy and takes away the gram of force that perhaps would have saved the situation. This is my approach.

I put myself in front of the world and say: okay, what do we have. Where are the elements that could bolster optimism? We have to grasp these elements and take them very seriously. Clearly, we should not be naïve and overlook all those elements that could bolster pessimism. However, the very act of giving negative facts overly much public attention and allow those elements the sole power to define our view of the future would perhaps give them the gram of weight that indeed would tip the balance from staying alive to dying.

Thus I see the responsibility of scientists. Perhaps there is something like 100% neutrality, somewhere, theoretically, but in real life scientists have leeway where they can highlight certain aspects more and others less. And here I see that we scientists have a voice that may be extremely important for the world. We do not only describe the world, our descriptions also shape the world. And we should be aware of that. Any personal psychological leanings towards wanting to share gloom and depression

should be secondary, and the strategy of constructive optimism primary."

Some daring social scientists, at the forefront of development, have taken up the ball from quantum mechanics and try to develop a *quantum social science* that builds on a participatory epistemology. Alexander Wendt highlights that everybody, scholars included, must become aware of their ethical responsibilities as soon as they see themselves as irreducible participants in the super-organism that is world politics. Only in the classical Newtonian worldview can scholars place themselves *outside* and pretend not to influence the world with their measurements and descriptions. "But with those responsibilities comes a capacity for collective self-consciousness that is otherwise largely missing in day-today international life, and as such is a basis for reflexivity and progressive change" (Wendt, 2005, p. 59).

The conservative Lord Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary 1989-1995, was in office during the first Gulf War. On April 28, 2003,[313] he spoke about the state of the world after the 2003 Iraq war. Hurd had just returned from a tour through the Arab world and reports that the populations there are in a state of *sullen humiliation*. Not the governments – they are rather US friendly – but the people in the streets. Hurd refers to the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak saying that US policy is stimulating the bin Laden phenomenon rather than counteracting it. There is the *wounded giant* on one side, Hurd explains, erupting in energy since September 11, not anymore isolationist but rather imperialist, and on the other side Arab populations are enwrapped in gloomy humiliation opposed to America roaming their region. Arab citizens want to travel and study in US universities, but not have Americans act like masters. Before the war erupted, Hurd thought and publicly said that it was "wrong and unwise" to start it, because, even though the war might be won in six days, the peace may perhaps not be secured in six months.

Hurd's observations are confirmed by others. Shibley Telhami (2002) writes, "Today militancy in the Middle East is fueled …by a pervasive sense of humiliation and helplessness in the region. This collective feeling is driven by a sense that people remain helpless in affecting the most vital aspects of their lives, and it is exacerbated by pictures of Palestinian humiliation. There is much disgust with states and with international organizations" (Telhami, 2003a, p. 1[314]).

When asked about the role of the United Nations, Hurd makes the point that military might is good in destroying, however, not well adapted to constructing. And, he adds, America is a country that wants to construct, and it will therefore recognize that it needs the United Nations.[315]

Perhaps Hurd's message could be projected into the future as follows. *Global village building*, in the spirit of by now well-known *nation building* requires support from all world states and citizens for a new internationalist world order, enacted through the United Nations. Perhaps one day we will have a global passport and a global welfare net. Perhaps one day tribal and national identities will be secondary to the core identity of global citizenship everywhere on the globe. The principle of *subsidiarity* will perhaps be the blueprint for organizing global power structures, and for building personal identities of shared humanity at the core, and cultural diversity at the periphery. There will be no need for *enemies*; all will be *neighbors*, "good" as

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[313] On BBCWorld in BBC Hardtalk with Jon Sopel.

[314] See also Telhami, 2003b, Zakaria, 2001.

[315] According to Hurd, the significant problem was not so much that the UN did not endorse the war in a new resolution, however, that the strike on Iraq was preemptive.

well as "bad" neighbors. And democratically legitimated police aided by a global culture of responsible social control and respect will keep "bad neighbors" in check. A "roof" of super-ordinate global institutions, democratically legitimated, will protect global citizens in the same way democratically legitimated nation states at present attempt to guard the interests of their national citizenry. Thus a *decent global village* could be built, following Margalit's call (1996) for a decent society.

Perhaps part of the explanation for why "old Europe" seems to harbour dissenting basic moral gut feelings may be found in deep differences in juridical culture. The English influenced sphere of the world (England, USA, Canada, Australia, etc.) adheres to an *adversarial* style, while in other parts of the world an *inquisitory* style is applied.

Sir Ludovic Kennedy has devoted his life to fighting for the release of innocent convicts. Kennedy wants the current *adversarial* court system in England replaced. "Current practice, he says, creates a 'pseudo-dramatic atmosphere' and is an 'invitation to corruption … because it's a battle between two sides and each wants to win, it's not a search for the truth. The counsel always feel they have to score points over their opponents whether it's relevant to the issue or not'" (Kennedy, 2003).[316]

The *search for truth* instead of the *attempt to win* may provide a more appropriate strategy for shaping the future world, at least when we aim at long-term sustainability: Winning in disputes is not sufficient – verdicts and solutions must also be "true" in a wider context and contribute to a more sustainable world, both socially and ecologically. A beneficial approach is "constructive controversy" or what Aristotle called "deliberate discourse," meaning discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of proposed actions aiming at synthesizing novel solutions embedded in creative problem solving. Combative styles such as "concurrence seeking," or "debate" are less helpful (Johnson, Johnson, and Tjosvold, 2000, p. 66).

To conclude this chapter, around the year 1757, a new meaning of the word *humiliation* emerged, together with a new vision of a *social contract*, based on human rights and the idea of equal dignity. This created and still creates what political science language calls *expectation gaps* and lets *grievances* emerge. The situation is made worse through widespread *state failure*, and the preeminence of *short-term interest* that highjacks institutional structures that are meant to protect the common good for all. In this book's language this would be translated into saying that newly learned feelings of humiliation lead to anomie, depression, and simmering rage. Rising underlings may become humiliation entrepreneurs and use feelings of sullen humiliation brewing in broad masses to mobilize collective violent action such as terror or even genocide on elites. Elites in turn react with oppression. Cycles of humiliation are thus destroying the social fabric of communities around the world.

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[316] Many countries operate on the basis of the adversarial system. This system is based on argument and is therefore built upon the antagonistic principle. The judge is passive, a kind of referee who adjudicates on motions and objections, while the jury observes and reaches its verdict. The quest for truth depends upon the outcome of the battle between the two parties involved, one of whom is the State. The public prosecutor is plaintiff for the State and therefore represents one side of the argument. Of course, it is only logical that this structure also influences the phase prior to the trial itself. The preparations for the case are also characterized by the battle between opposing sides, with the emphasis very much on winning the case. Other countries, including the Netherlands, have a less dualistic system. These nations have adopted the so-called 'inquisitory' style of hearing, also known as the continental system. The most important characteristic of this approach is that the judge is active and embarks upon his own independent search for the truth (De Lange and Wabeke, 2003, pp. 383-384).

The international community, the global bystander, carries the responsibility of counteracting that. They have to build a global *culture of peace* and enshrine it in global institutional structures (UN) that ensure a *decent* and *dignified* life for all citizens of the *global village*.

Reading related to this chapter

Mass violence[317] and *deadly conflict* are topics that have been widely studied; thousands of publications are to be found that cover a wide range of conflicts, from *interpersonal* to *intergroup* and *international conflict*.[318] The search word *terrorism* renders thousands of hits in databases.[319] Instead of presenting large lists of publications at this point I would like to mention some of those that had particular significance for this research project on humiliation. A pioneer of conflict studies in social psychology was Morton Deutsch,[320] the founder of the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) at Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.[321] Also Herbert C. Kelman was among the first to work in this field.[322] Note that Ervin Staub, the author of the *Roots of Evil* (1989), at the Psychology Department at the University of Massachusetts, is starting a new Ph.D. concentration in *The Psychology Of Peace And The Prevention Of Violence*.

Lee D. Ross, principal investigator and co-founder of the *Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN)*, addresses psychological barriers to conflict resolution.[323] William Ury, Director of the *Project on Preventing War at Harvard University*, and co-author of *Getting to Yes*,[324] and author of *Getting to Peace*[325]

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[317] Numerous theories address the *causation of deadly conflict and mass violence*. Gustave Le Bon (1895) stipulates that individuals turn into "primitive beings" in crowds, and that *crowd behavior* is intellectually inferior and basically lacking civilized reason (Le Bon, 1976, Le Bon, 1896). Later, the twentieth century evolution of sociological theories led to theories such as *breakdown theory*, *resource mobilization theory*, *prospect theory*, and *cultural theory*. *Resource mobilization theory* suggests that violence occurs when groups draw upon their resources and solidarity to pursue their interests (explaining routine collective action such as strikes, yet lacking explanation power for non-routine collective action such as mass violence, see, for example Gamson, 1968, Gamson, 1975 and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001, Tilly, 1978. David A. Snow and colleagues (see McAdam and Snow (Eds.), 1997) have updated *breakdown theory* by integrating *prospect theory*, which claims that individuals make decisions based on rational choice, and *cultural theory*, which introduces the concept of the "quotidian," meaning everyday life that we all take for granted. Social breakdown (a) creates losses which are experienced as deprivations (prospect theory), and (b) diminishes actors' confidence that their accustomed practices will grant a satisfactory future (cultural theory). This overview is adapted from Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002, and Useem, 1998. See, furthermore, the work by Michael Harris Bond and colleagues, such as in Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond, 2005. See, also, Leyton, 1983, Leyton, 1997, Leyton, 1975, Leyton, 2000, Leyton, O'Grady, and Overton, 1992.

[318] See among many other, for example, Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003, Hardin, 1995a, Hardin, 1995b, Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, and Hewstone (Eds.), 1988.

[319] Just to give a few examples, Falk, 1988, Gilbert, 1994, Hoge and Rose, 2001, Kruglanski and Golec, 2005, Reich (Ed.), 1990, and Ross, 1993a. In Stern, 2003, you find a chapter on humiliation.

[320] See, for example, Deutsch and Krauss, 1965, Deutsch, 1973, Deutsch and Hornstein, 1975, Deutsch, 1976, Deutsch, 1994, Deutsch and Coleman (Eds.), 2000.

[321] For an overview over social psychology of conflict see also Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, and Hewstone (Eds.), 1988, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict*.

[322] See, for example, Kelman and Hamilton, 1989, Kelman, 1992, Kelman and Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1965, Kelman, 1997, Kelman, 1999b.

[323] See, for example, Ross and Ward, 1996, Ross and Ward, 1995, Ross, 1995a, Ross and Nisbett, 1991, Ross and Samuels, 1993.

[324] Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991.

[325] Ury, 1999.

focuses in his anthropological work on conflict. Monty Marshall, founding director of the *Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR)* program at the *Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM),* University of Maryland, wrote a seminal book on protracted conflict and the hypothesis of *diffusion of insecurity* (Marshall, 1999). Bar-On and Nadler (1999) call for more attention to be given to conflicts in contexts of power asymmetry.[326]

In the past years innumerable university departments and institutes have been created that carry in their names terms that address conflict and peace. I was in touch with many institutions, centers, departments, and programs, among others with UNESCO's *Culture of Peace* Programme (www.unesco.org/cpp/),[327] as well as with the Eastern Mennonite University, EMU, Harrisonburg, with Howard Zehr,[328] Hizkias Assefa,[329] and Ronald S. Kraybill,[330] and the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, in Sweden. In Norway the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO, the first peace research institute ever founded), the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), as well as the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, are central to the international discourse on conflict and peace. See also Amitai Etzioni's *Communitarian Network* with its *responsive communitarian* philosophy articulated as "a middle way between the politics of radical individualism and excessive statism."[331]

Read more about *arousal* and *amnesia*,[332] about *implicit memory*,[333] on *calming down* and *anger management*,[334] on *post-traumatic growth*,[335] on *leadership*,[336] on

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[326] Bar-On and Nadler, 1999.

[327] I thank particularly Ingeborg Breines, Director of "Women and a Culture of Peace," for her encouraging support, as well as David Adams whom I met already in 1994, as well as Timothée Ngakoutou, John Aglo, Jacqueline Nzoyihera, and Alpha Oumar Diallo.

[328] See, for example, Zehr, 1990, and Zehr, 2002.

[329] See, for example, Assefa, 1987.

[330] See, for example, Kraybill, 1996.

[331] Quoted from http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/about_us.html, retrieved July 13, 2003. See furthermore, for example, Etzioni, 1991, Etzioni, 1993, or Lukes, 1998, and the quarterly journal *The Responsive Community*.

[332] See, for example, the *Relationship Between Induced Emotional Arousal and Amnesia,* by Christianson, 1984.

[333] While traumatized individuals may be unable to give a coherent narrative of the incident, there may be no interference with implicit memory: "they may 'know' the emotional valence of a stimulus and be aware of associated perceptions, without being able to articulate the reasons for feeling or behaving in a particular way" (van der Kolk and Fisler, 2000, p. 6).

[334] On the American Psychological Association's website we read, "Anger is a completely normal, usually healthy, human emotion. But when it gets out of control and turns destructive, it can lead to problems—problems at work, in your personal relationships, and in the overall quality of your life. And it can make you feel as though you're at the mercy of an unpredictable and powerful emotion. This brochure is meant to help you understand and control anger" (http://www.apa.org/pubinfo/anger.html). There is a vast literature to draw upon for anger management, as well as numerous self-help programs.

[335] See work on *post-traumatic growth* by Calhoun and Tedeschi, 1998a, Tedeschi, 1999.

[336] Read, among many others, Gardner, 1993, and Hogg, 2001.

whether Hitler indeed was *democratically elected* or not,[337] on *multi-track diplomacy*,[338] on *uprooted people*,[339] on the *Middle East, democracy* and *Islam*,[340] on how to *aid democracies*,[341] on *International Law of Human Dignity*,[342] on *United Nations reform* and *World Federalism*,[343] on *We the Peoples*,[344] on how *bystanders* can stop standing *by* and stand *up*,[345] and on *learned optimism*.[346]

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[337] It is disputed that Hitler was actually democratically elected. "Critics of democracy often claim that Hitler was democratically elected to power. This is untrue. … Hitler never had more than 37 percent of the popular vote in the honest elections that occurred before he became Chancellor. And the opposition among the 63 percent against him was generally quite strong. Hitler therefore would have never seen the light of day had the German Republic been truly democratic. Unfortunately, its otherwise sound constitution contained a few fatal flaws. The German leaders also had a weak devotion to democracy, and some were actively plotting to overthrow it. Hitler furthermore enjoyed an almost unbroken string of luck in coming to power. He benefited greatly from the Great Depression, the half-senility of the president, the incompetence of his opposition, and the appearance of an unnecessary backroom deal just as the Nazis were starting to lose popular appeal and votes" (Retrieved from http://www.korpios.org/resurgent/L-hitlerdemo.htm in April 2003).

[338] Read on the website of the *Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy*, http://www.imtd.org/about-theory.htm (2002), the following, "The term multi-track diplomacy is based on the original distinction made by Joseph Montville in 1981 between official, governmental actions to resolve conflicts (track one) and unofficial efforts by non- governmental professionals to resolve conflicts within and between states (track two). Later, Louise Diamond coined the phrase "multi-track diplomacy," recognizing that to lump all track two activities under one label did not capture the complexity or breadth of unofficial diplomacy. Ambassador John McDonald then wrote an article expanding track two into four separate tracks: conflict resolution professionals, business, private citizens, and the media. This framework, however, still had the four unofficial tracks operating with the exclusive purpose to affect or change the direction of track one. In 1991, Diamond and McDonald expanded the number of tracks to nine. They added four new tracks: religion, activism, research, training, and education, and philanthropy, or the funding community. More importantly, however, they reorganized the relationship between the various tracks. Instead of putting track one at the top of the hierarchy, with all the "unofficial" tracks poised to change the direction of track one, Diamond and McDonald redesigned the diagram and placed the tracks with each connected to each other in a circle. No one track is more important than the other, and no one track is independent from the others. They operate together as a system. Each track has its own resources, values, and approach, but since they are all linked, they can operate more powerfully when they are coordinated." See Diamond and McDonald, 1996, or Lederach, 1997.

[339] "There are approximately 50 million uprooted people around the world— refugees who have sought safety in another country, and people displaced within their own country. Around half of this displaced population are children. The majority of people flee their homes because of war. In recent decades the proportion of war victims who are civilians rather than combatants has leaped from five percent to more than 90 percent" United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2001.

[340] See, among many, Crossette, 2001, Lewis, 2001, and Takeyh, 2001

[341] See, for example, Carothers, 1999, Linz and Stephan, 1996.

[342] See for example, McDougal, Lasswell, and Cheng, 1980.

[343] See, for example, work carried out by Joseph Preston Baratta, 1995 or Baratta, 1987, see also Annan, 1997, or Zolo, 1997, as well as Saul H. Mendlovitz, director of the *World Order Models Project*, Mendlovitz (Ed.), 1975. A large body of literature can be drawn upon.

[344] Read Annan, 2000, on *We the Peoples*. See also Rosecrance (Ed.), 2001.

[345] See, for example, Sen and Klein, 2003. I thank Morton Deutsch for making me aware of this publication.

[346] Seligman, 1991.

What You Can Contribute

In former times the *little people* had not much to say. The *mob*, the *masses*, or the *crowds* were not worth anything. Today's situation is profoundly different. Today, *global public opinion* counts. When reading history books, the players typically are *rulers*. *Rebels* and *revolutionaries* are lucky to be named. The *media* or *public opinion* are absent. This has changed dramatically in recent times. Among the most influential forces within the *global village* are *you*. The voice of every single individual has a greater potential impact today than ever before. Everybody can, if properly making up her mind, develop into a Mandela or a Hitler. Individuals can contribute to *peace*, like Mandela, or transform themselves into *weapons of mass destruction*, like Hitler.

For thirty years most people expected a bloodbath in South Africa. Why did it not happen? Mandela initially engaged in violent resistance against Apartheid. However, history books will not remember him for instigating violence. They will remember him for teaching his followers how to overcome the pain and anger caused by humiliation under the system of Apartheid. In South Africa the humiliators and the humiliated sat down together and planned for a society in which "both black and white" could be "assured of their inalienable right to human dignity."[347]

By contrast, the humiliation imposed upon the German nation by the victorious powers after World War I sowed the seeds for an even more disastrous global conflict two decades later. Unlike Mandela, Adolf Hitler taught his followers to strike back violently; instead of reconciliation he promised the Germans bloody revenge.

Mandela and Hitler both understood the strength of the feelings stirred up by humiliation and they both appealed to the deepest wishes of their audiences. However, they used their understanding in different ways. The German nation felt "soiled" by the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler gave the Germans a strategy, a disastrous one, for restoring their national honor. The black population of South Africa felt cheated and deprived by Apartheid. Mandela gave the people of South African a strategy, an ambitious one, for gaining their human rights.

There are several differences between Hitler and Mandela. Firstly, they were responding to different kinds of humiliation. In Germany, as Norbert Elias (1996) has argued, what hurt most after 1918 was the damage done by military defeat to the sense of nationhood. It was a matter of collective honor, felt most keenly by the old political class but permeating throughout the society.[348] In response, Hitler led a huge effort to put the German nation in a position where it could, in turn, deliver thunderbolts from on high against enemies, rivals and scapegoats.

In South Africa, by contrast, humiliation was a matter of human rights denied. As Mandela put it, the solution was for "ordinary South Africans …[to] produce an actual South African reality that will reinforce humanity's belief in justice."[349] To summarize: in Germany, national honor was felt to be at stake while in South Africa the issue was human rights.

A further difference is that Mandela's approach resonated with the spirit of *ubuntu*, a traditional philosophy, a way of life and state of "being," a code of principles for

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[347] The quotation is taken from President Mandela's inaugural address, May 10, 1994.

[348] It is important to make distinctions between different elements in the German population. The sense of national dishonor was more acutely felt in 1918 by the aristocracy and military hierarchy. Some of them used their residual power to undermine the Weimar government as far as possible, thus preparing the ground for Hitler, unwittingly.

[349] This quotation is taken from President Mandela's inaugural address, May 10, 1994.

living together and a strategy for conflict resolution. *Ubuntu* is a way to togetherness and community in the atmosphere of shared humility. Desmond Tutu's (1999) work of the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* drew on *ubuntu*. Hitler, on the other side, did not fall back on Christian equivalents to *ubuntu*. On the contrary, he based his approach on a philosophy of honor and idolization of strength and potency. Hitler's message to Germany was "either you are strong – and since the strong deserve to win and rule, you will rule the world – or you are weak, and then you deserve to be crushed."

The most disastrous difference is that Hitler's road led to war, Mandela's to peace. For Hitler, the intense anguish of German humiliation was a source of destructive energy to be *directed against* targets chosen by the Führer. For Mandela, the task was to *dissipate* the destructive energy engendered by bitterness, to concentrate on implementing human rights rather than victimizing enemies.

As the examples of Hitler and Mandela show, when dealing with humiliation the stakes are high. The twentieth century was fundamentally influenced by Hitler. If the twenty-first century is to be shaped by the example of Mandela, the part played in human relations by humiliation must be better understood and avoided.[350]

The question poses itself as to how *you* can strive for a Mandela mindset. What does the Mandela mindset entail? What can we learn from Mandela? How do we attain his maturity, balanced calm and measured sense of direction, even in the face of grave adversity? Why did he not become a Hitler-like figure?

Detach! How weak ties can further social peace

The exemplary behavior of people such as Nelson Mandela seems almost unreachable. Yet, it may be worth trying. The way to go, for personal maturity and social peace, is to foster people's ability to form *weaker ties* as opposed to too *close* and too *hot* ties, both within oneself, with others, and with the world in general.

> The Taliban's war on Afghan art got world attention when Taliban soldiers blew up two enormous Buddhist statues sculpted from a cliff overlooking Bamian, which dated back to the third or early fourth century. Their aim was to have a "superior Islam" in Afghanistan.[351]

The sad tale of the Bamian Buddhas illustrates the futility of linking representations too tightly to what one believes them to represent. What did the Bamian Buddha statues represent? Did they represent insults to pure Islam? Or, did they not rather represent precious human cultural heritage? The Taliban were intensely attached to the first interpretation; they were unable to differentiate contents from representation and loosen their version of the linkage between both. They were unable to allow complexity and uncertainty.

The word *representation* combines the Latin *prae* and *esse* with the prefix *re*. *Praeesse* means *to be*. The word *praesens* is the present participle of *praeesse* and means *to be present*. The prefix *re* means *back*. The term *representation* thus signifies a marker that points back at something which is present. Or, short, *representations* and *representatives* are markers for something else.

Clearly, destroying markers does not lead to the destruction of the entities they

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[350] The previous paragraphs on Nelson Mandela and Adolf Hitler are adapted from Lindner, 2000r.
[351] *War on Art: Taliban Took Ax to Culture*, by Watson, 2001.

point at. It is ridiculous to destroy markers if one wishes to destroy contents. Hitler's delight in burning books appears to be absurd, because ideas cannot be destroyed in this way. Equally, criminality is not eradicated by merely killing criminals. Or, victory is not necessarily achieved by killing adversaries. It is not required to kill the managers of companies, for example, or the financial ministers of nations in trade wars.

Imagining too tight links between a representation and the real thing are silly; they show a lack of differentiation and understanding of the fact that, in the language of linguists, *signifier*s are not fixed, but *sliding*. In other words, Bamian statues can signify many things, extraordinary handicraft skills, precious cultural heritage, or controversial religious statements; there is no fixed connection between the *signifier* and the *signified*. It seems beneficial for people who want to promote social peace to collect the courage to understand that it is an ideological decision to loosen or tighten links between the representative and the represented or between the signifier and the signified. It might be beneficial for social peace to be aware of the underlying complexity of such linkages.

> Robin Cook disagreed with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the necessity of the 2003 Iraq war. However, he did not want Blair to step down, and he did neither plan for an assassination. Thus, disagreement can be carried out on the peripheries of identities and identifications and must not be essentialized. As for the Bamian statues, there was no need to destroy Tony Blair politically and/or physically in order to "send a message."
>
> Incidentally, war is a minefield for "messages." The incursion of American tanks into Baghdad was designed to be a "show of force to send a powerful message to the Iraqi people and their leaders." The aim for the future must be to learn how to send "powerful messages of courage and resolve" without destruction.

Also in other realms of life it is beneficial to loosen ties, for example in the realm of emotions. Bond (2002), cross-cultural psychologist at Chinese University of Hong Kong, did research on how long emotions are being felt by people in different cultures and how this correlates with the level of homicide in that culture. He writes, "… countries populated by persons who experience emotions for greater lengths of time would, on average, commit more homicide" (Bond, 2002, p. 5). Bond's findings indicate that it seems preferable for social peace to forge cultures that promote *shorter* and thus *weaker ties* to emotions. Such weaker ties to emotions, more supple and flexible than rigid and obsessive, may enable people, among others, to *cool down* faster, to perform calmer evaluations of situations, and to refrain from uncontrolled eruptions into *hot* aggression.

Following this line of reflection, it is perhaps sometimes more important to learn how to forget than to remember. Mandela once told the story of how he approached the gate to freedom after 27 years of prison. While walking towards the gate he said to himself that he had to leave behind both prison and hatred beyond the gate, because otherwise prison would have him for lifetime. Hatred binds. And Mandela freed himself. Miroslav Volf,[352] an academician, theologian and native Croatian, who writes from his experience of teaching in Croatia during the war in former Yugoslavia, suggests that forgetting is an active act of *nonremembering* (Volf, 1996). It means remembering the past, its grievances and humiliations, choosing to forgive and

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[352] I thank Amy Williams for making me aware of this author.

purposively embracing the other in an act of preservation and transformation.

Thus, searching for "roots" may sometimes attach people to the past too tightly. If stronger ties at all, then what is needed, are stronger ties to a future for all. It seems preferential to strengthen attachments to constructive visions of the future and to weaken ties to destructive visions of the past, particularly to pasts that call for revenge for bygone humiliations. Layers of identity would be beneficial, where differences range lower than commonalities. Universality can contain diversity, while diversity cannot always contain commonality. In other words, the world would be a more peaceful place if not differences were given priority, but common ground.

More even, placing commonalities at the core of identity and differences at the periphery may furthermore also be the most important precondition for diversity to flourish. As long as I believe that my culture is so different from yours that it separates us by an unbridgeable gulf, there is a problem. Only when I make clear that *my* being different does not threaten *us* being human beings of equal dignity, I can invite *you* into celebrating diversity together with *me*. Only under circumstances of common ground is diversity not divisive but inclusive. Since perception always also entails construction, the suggestion to construct identities in the here described way could mitigate post-modernist fears that allegations of common ground could be used as cover up for the colonization and humiliation of weaker parties.

For peaceful social relations, ties should therefore be rather weak and flexible with regard to memories, roots, the past, and cultural differences, while somewhat stronger ties are at their best when linked to constructive and common visions of the future. Yet, too strong attachment to specific visions, to the past or the future, would make people inflexible in all cases. Earth citizens would benefit from constructing identities that resemble sunflowers; in the middle a large common ground of shared humanity and of all of *us* being citizens of the *global village* and at the periphery numerous flower petals signifying the diversity of idiosyncratic personal attachments and identifications: I may love Buddhism, and cherish this attachment on an equal level with my love for Christianity, or I may hold dear my love for Asia side by side with my attachments to America. When asked, "Who are you?" or "Where are you from?" I could reply, "I am a human being from planet Earth and have a great number of emotional ties to different geographical regions on this planet, to different people from everywhere, and to different occupational, intellectual and spiritual realms."

Having a lot of *weak ties*, instead of only a few strong ones, seems to be preferential in social relationships as well. Granovetter (1973) did research on how people find jobs, through strong social ties or weak social ties. Surprisingly, and counterintuitively, people found jobs rather through their weaker social ties than their closer ones. Granovetter forged a *theory of the strength of weak ties*. Granovetter builds on the German differentiation of *Gemeinschaft* versus Tönnies's *Gesellschaft*, and explains that in a *Gemeinschaft* people have strong ties and share norms so thoroughly that little effort is needed to gauge intentions of others. Yet, such a setting does not allow for much individual autonomy and is easily disrupted by even minimal dissent. Granovetter suggests that it is preferable to have many weak ties to a number of other people – Tönnies' *Gesellschaft* – because this provides more individual autonomy. People with many weaker ties can live up to the expectations of several others in different places and at different times and at the same time preserve an inner core of self and withhold certain inner attitudes.[353]

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[353] See, for example, http://www.analytictech.com/networks/weakties.htm.

Robert came to me as a client because he was extremely unhappy in his work. He had sacrificed 25 years of his life for his company and had always been extremely loyal. Now, elder employees like him were being bullied out so as to minimize cost.

"Here I have put my soul into the company, I *was* the company, and how does the company thank me? My loyalty is trampled on! My whole life's sacrifice is denigrated! I am so enraged that I could set the entire factory on fire! Or kill the new directors with some bombs! There is no limit to the fantasies of revenge that I have!

The more I think about it, the more I get aggravated. The only solace is my brother-in-law. He has an acquaintance who has another acquaintance, and they just opened a new enterprise and might want to have me as a consultant. When I concentrate on imagining an interesting future in a new company, I am able to put aside my grievances with the old one. However, I burn hot when I concentrate on what my company does to me!"

Humiliation in the past captures Robert's attention obsessively and only attention to a better future releases him. And weak ties in his social environment indeed open the door to possible better futures. Likewise, on the global level, knowledge, as expandable resource, and weak international ties may help protect people from clinging in malign ways to local narratives of humiliation of the past.

Christoph came to me because he felt that the obligations his parents put on his shoulders weighed too heavy: "My family comes originally from Silesia. After World War II, Silesia (together with other areas, such as Pomerania and East Prussia) was lost to Poland. Germans had lived there for more than 1,000 years; however, they were thrown out of their houses from one day to the other. Millions of Germans lost their homes and their land. More than 10 million people were displaced after World War II. Among them my parents.

The suffering that these people had to endure has never really been acknowledged; it was somehow taboo to cry. Presumably, because Germany deserved punishment for Hitler. Only very recently the tragedy became a voice, through a novel written by Günter Grass (2002).[354] However, still, all this agony is a footnote in history books, no more.

My parents live this agony everyday, even now, more than half a century after their expulsion. They are depressed and furious, sometimes more depressed, sometimes more furious. My mother was fifteen years old when the Second World War was over and she was thrown out of her home. She was told that she could take what she could carry; the poor thing tried to carry her bed. She had nothing to do with Hitler. Why should she lose her home and not even be allowed to cry? Not only my parents are deeply enraged. After all, millions were uprooted, and they have children. Many grew up like me, as a so-called 'refugee-children,' both in West Germany and what once was the DDR. We grew up immersed in this history that often was hidden as if it was a great shame. My parents even suppressed their Silesian dialect.

One of the saddest moments for my parents was the 1989 reunification of Germany. It represented the most unbelievable humiliation to my parents. German Chancellor Kohl used the historic upheaval of the reunification as an opening to "sell out" my parents' home. Until 1989, there was no official agreement that Silesia should go to Poland. My parents hoped it would come back to Germany in their lifetime. However, now this is even further away. Chancellor Kohl gave their home as

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[354] *Im Krebsgang: eine Novelle*, by Grass, 2002.

bait to get the DDR.

The most grotesque humiliation for my parents is that the former DDR is now called 'East Germany.' It is forgotten that Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia still should be East Germany, according to them. Silesia was once East Germany, now the ex-DDR took over this label. For my parents the ex-DDR is in the middle of Germany and not the east! *They* are the East!

My parents expect that I do something about it. If I lived some hundreds of years ago, I would perhaps gather soldiers and try to re-conquer Silesia from the Poles and bring it back into Germany. However, shall I really do that? I continuously disappoint my parents by telling them that I see no need in military action to get back their farm. I do not want to be a farmer! My resource is knowledge and I am a global citizen. I am living in a completely different world; my world is not their world!

And, does not the European Union make borders more permeable and increasingly less important, I tell them? Poland is now part of the European Union. And one day there will even be a world passport, perhaps, I hope; then national borders will be as insignificant as the borders between California and their neighboring states. I love my parents, and I love many aspects of the culture they taught me. I am sad that the Silesian dialect and traditions die out with my parents and their generation. But I see no need to spill blood for national borders! I merely do not identify with these borders strongly enough! My home is planet Earth!"

To summarize, flexible and weak ties to one's own emotions, weak ties to ones own identifications with the past, as well as flexible ties to a great number of fellow beings seem to be advantageous for social peace. Robert Jay Lifton calls this kind of personality the flexible *protean self* (Lifton, 1999). Conversely, being tightly integrated into few and homogenous social bonds, being at the same time rigidly attached to identities of difference that foreclose common ground, this appears to be less advantageous for the peaceful maintenance of social cohesion. It is the task of all players in the *global village*, from media, to politics and down to families to forge somewhat stronger ties to common ground and a constructive future and weaken and marginalize those ties that obsessively link up with painful pasts.

Social identity that furthers social peace could be envisaged as being layered like a sunflower. At the core a person would feel to belong to humankind, at the periphery, in a somewhat loser fashion, multiple diverse cultural identities could be placed. Thus, in the same individual or group, a strong identity of global human unity could be combined with comparably weaker ties to local cultural diversity. This would enable diversity to flourish in an inclusive way.

Grow up! How to develop maturity, wisdom and humility

How does *maturity* and *wisdom* come about? How did Mandela acquire his unique mixture of *humility* and *pride*? Perhaps there is no recipe. However, perhaps we may learn from other's experience.

Alistair Little explained his *maturation process* extremely well.[355] Alistair Little is a former Ulster Loyalist terrorist who was seventeen when he murdered a catholic man on behalf of the Ulster Volunteer force in Northern Ireland. Since then he has served twelve years in prison and renounced violence.

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[355] On May 23, 2002, he was interviewed by Tim Sebastian in BBCWorld Hardtalk.

He describes the first significant turning point in his life when he was fourteen and attended a funeral, the first funeral in his young life. A friend of his father's had been killed by the *enemy*. He heard people saying "and where are *our* boys?" or "where are *our* men when we need them?" He made a vow to himself that he would volunteer as soon as he was old enough. When he subsequently was sent out to kill an *enemy*, he felt a strong sense of belonging, comradeship, and that he did the right and necessary thing to protect his loved ones.

Alistair Little describes impressively how he responded with his emotions to the fear he sensed in his community, and how it touched him that his people felt that protection was lacking. The *enemy* was not a human being to him, he explains, therefore it was easy to kill. During the first six months in prison he felt good, because he was among comrades, and he was proud to have stood up against the IRA.

However, there came another turning point, and this occurred when Bobby Sands died. (One of the most traumatic episodes in the history of Northern Ireland was the 1981 hunger strike when jailed members of the outlawed Irish Republican Army began the protest after they were stripped of their special status as political prisoners. It soon turned into a battle of wills with the new British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. When the leader of the hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, died, it brought Northern Ireland to the brink of civil war.)

Alistair Little describes how he sat in a prison car and others were laughing about the death of Bobby Sands. He got very angry at them and was astounded by his reaction. There he defended his *enemy* who would have shot him if he had had the chance.

This was the moment, he explains, when he recognized that after having demonized the *enemy,* he now had re-humanized him. He had developed empathy for the other side. Later, he explains, he became disillusioned even with some of his own people. He describes how he realized that there was hypocrisy even in his own community; people had been calling for sons to volunteer, however, always for sons of others. The same people who called upon others would not want to sacrifice their own offspring. And subsequently the same people would even distance themselves from those who had volunteered, those who had done the "dirty" job they had encouraged them to do, and that had helped their political ends.

He describes how he at a young age did not see further than the accomplishment of his deep-felt duty of killing, how he thought he would indeed contribute to the goal of protecting *his* people, however, how he slowly, in the course of years, understood, that he may even have contributed to aggravating the problem.

He concludes that he does not feel entitled to forgiveness. In any case, he adds, nobody could offer forgiveness, except the murdered person himself. He describes vividly how any peace process is bound to "fracture" communities, families, brothers, sons and fathers, along a fault line that separates those who support the peace process and those who do not, a phenomenon that makes the peace process more dangerous than the campaign before.

What Alistair Little explicates is how he at first intensely and spontaneously felt compelled to devote his life to the plight of his people and how his aim was to "teach" the *enemy* that he could not perpetrate humiliation and murder without cost. However, later on, he disengaged from this *hot* attachment, acquired a larger horizon, and *cooled down*. He regrets what he has done.

Alistair Little maintains that his degree of maturity, he calls it *tolerance*, is now higher than among many of his friends, for example his tolerance for the

shortcomings of the peace process. He knows from own experience what the alternative would be, he explains. Many of his friends get enraged by details of the peace process that they perceive as unacceptably humiliating and "compelling" them to want to call the peace process off, he reports. They do not yet possess his degree of maturity, this could be the conclusion.

Alistair Little evidently has understood, over years, that he was born into a situation that had pitched two groups against each other and that he should perhaps contribute to *cooling* the situation, not heating it further up. His forefathers from England had arrived in Ireland, and, instead of submission had faced resistance. The "love relationship" that they had planned for when settling on the island and the "deference" that they expected from local people was perceived as humiliation by the addressees and responded to as such. Alistair Little has now disengaged from "automatic" identification with history's fault lines and can now help build a new contract for a new "love relationship" instead of the old misunderstood and soured one.

Alistair Little has learned to undo mechanisms that facilitate the occurrence of atrocities. Albert Bandura is an important name regarding work on how aggression may be learned (or unlearned), as well as on *moral disengagement*. He addresses this issue in his recent article *Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities* (Bandura, 1999), and earlier in his chapter on *Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement* (Bandura, 1990), where he highlights all mechanisms that make it "easier" to perpetrate atrocities or accept their occurrence, such as *obscuring causal agency*, *blaming and devaluating the targets*, *moral justification of counterterrorist measures*, *public intimidation and judgments of retaliatory violence*, *euphemistic labeling*, *disregard for, or distortion of, consequences*.

Together with Staub (1989), who calls for bystanders to stop standing *by* and instead getting *involved*, Bandura calls for every individual in the global community to avoid all those mechanisms that make it "easier" to perpetrate atrocities or watch them with indifference.

To conclude this section, you, as an individual, can contribute to peace by being aware of *mechanisms of moral disengagement* and by undoing such disengagement. You, as bystander, can stand *up* and not *by*, and you can *engage*. And you can engage in ways that do not deepen fault lines and do not intensify hot feelings, but attenuate them.

Take humble control! How it needs a bird's eye perspective to live sensibly and calmly

What is the core of *maturity*, *wisdom* and *humility*? Is there a way to describe this state of mind? How can an individual go about who is willing to try? I developed the following approach during my years as a clinical psychologist and counselor in Egypt.

Bird's eye perspective on me

1.
I, the one who governs

3.
I, the one
who acts

2.
I, who
does
research

Figure 8: Birds' eye perspective on me

Figure 8 entails three entities of the self. When I am placed in a new situation, the first move that I typically make is to design a strategy of how to accomplish the task at hand. In other words, the part of me that is equivalent to the government of a country or the administration of a city makes a plan. This is (1) the *I, who governs*. The strategy that I develop entails a phase of research: *I, the one who governs*, sends out another part of me, namely (2) the *I, who does research*. When this research is carried out satisfactorily, (1) devises a sound strategy for action and sends (3) the *I, who acts* into the skirmish. Of course, this illustration is extremely simplified and the process never that linear, however, as a model it may be useful.

Elvira was newly married to an Egyptian man. She came to me as a client because she could not understand how it was possible that her husband accused her of being "unclean." She was furious at his accusations since she indeed washed herself thoroughly every day and took great pride in her self-care. The marriage was almost finished before it had begun because she felt so mistreated, indeed unduly humiliated. She was about to run away from her husband and Egypt.

However, there was a way out. After calming down, Elvira got used to the thought that she might not have enough elements in her possession that would enable her to understand what really was going on. She agreed to put her rage on halt until she had found out more. She went about and carefully asked around what exactly her husband meant with the word *unclean*. She learned that removing body hair from the entire body, face, arms, legs, pubic area, was to be *clean*. Washing was not enough. Traditionally, an Egyptian husband, at least in certain segments of Egyptian society, may feel justified to leave his wife if she were not to remove her body hair. Elvira was astounded. All this was completely new to her. Now she understood her husband's reactions much better.

But what to do about it? It took Elvira several weeks to devise a strategy that pleased her. She decided to wait for a holiday that she would spend together with her husband and then explain to him that there was a cultural difference getting in the way of their relationship. She described to him her concept of cleanliness and clarify that she did not want to hurt or otherwise disrespect him by not following his concept of cleanliness, more, that she even had had no previous knowledge of his concept altogether. She then made a proposal. She would make a trial period of three months, during which she would let her hair be removed and see how she liked it. If she were not to like it, he could perhaps make an attempt of another three months to live with

her body hair.

So she proceeded, and the marriage was saved. The problem of body hair proved to be secondary. What was important was to take care of the communication channel between the two. Warmth, respect and love could flow again.

What we learn from Elvira's experience is that it is beneficial to increase the "distance" between (1), (2), and (3) and strengthen the bird's eye capabilities of (1). The first thing Elvira did was to calm down and thus interrupt the short-circuiting that went on between (3) and (2) before. Then she learned to wait and bear uncertainty while collecting more information. She was able to gather valid information that gave the situation an entirely new coloring.

Subsequently, she did not rush to action but planned it carefully. The way she devised it included respect and warmth. She did not shout and scream and accuse her husband, but talked calmly and lovingly with him. And she differentiated. She stopped equating his cultural bias with lack of love. Thus, she saved her marriage, increased the respect she enjoyed in her social environment and gained great confidence as to her conflict resolution capabilities. Next time she visited her family back in Europe, she applied the same method to her own family, as if her family was another culture. Not surprisingly, her relationship with her family improved as well. Earlier, we discussed the phenomenon of *pendulation*. Elvira turned careful pendulation into her main activity; pendulation between the different agencies within her self and pendulation between these agencies and her social environment. Figure 9 illustrates her case.


Bird's eye perspective on me and you

1.
I, the one who governs

2. + 3.
I, the one who does research and acts

4.
You, the Other

Figure 9: Birds' eye perspective on me and you

What Elvira had learned was how to introduce a *transcending element* or a *personal manager,* a *self-government,* or an *inner super-parent figure* (1) who overlooks the situation from an elevated point and builds bridges both within herself and to other people. These bridges enabled her to do successful pendulation. She asked her husband, "What do you mean?" in a way that showed respect and warmth; not in an abrupt and offensive manner. In a next step she differentiated carefully between what her husband may have wanted to say and what she understood him to say. And she proposed solutions, again with a respectful and warm attitude.

What Elvira had managed to do was forge dialogue where there were several almost autistic monologues missing each other before. Steinar Kvale (1996) writes, "The conversation…involves a basic mode of constituting knowledge; and the human

world is a conversational reality" (Kvale, 1996, p. 37).

When arriving in Somalia for fieldwork, I found that the standard Western interview style would not render valid results (Lindner, 2001a). Coming to Africa as a Western researcher and abruptly wanting to apply Western "science" resembled yet another act of colonial domination and elicited defiance instead of truthful data. If anything at all, I was told what my interview partners thought I wanted to hear. I became more aware than ever to what extent discourse is shaped by and shapes power relations.

I knew that I had to find a way along the lines of humility and humbleness as Robert Merton (1949) described particularly in his chapter on *Science and Democratic Social Structure*. I had to exercise humility not only towards the topic and research carried out so far by other researchers, but, and this was the point here, towards those who knew more about the topic than me (also called *informants*).

Gergen (1997) addresses similar processes, "My commitment to social psychological inquiry has now exceeded three decades; the commitment has been a passionate one throughout. However, the nature of this passion – the sense of the inquiry and its significance – has changed substantially over this period. The 'message' of the discipline, as it initially kindled my excitement, now seems deeply mistaken – in certain respects even injurious to the society" (Gergen, 1997b, p. 1).

After two weeks of "classical" interviewing in Somaliland, I changed my methodology and decided that I had to enter into dialogue with these people who knew much more about the subject I was to examine than me, namely about feelings emerging in the context of genocide, and particularly about feelings of humiliation. I had to consider them as the *experts*. I had to become more aware of the social relations I actually formed by entering the scene as a researcher. And in order to enter into dialogue, I had to be authentic. Taylor (1990) writes about *The Ethics of Authenticity*. Thus, I had to restructure relations both within myself and with my interlocutors and embed them into a more authentic, egalitarian and respectful frame.

Elvira, even though she profoundly changed her way of behaving, did not lose her spontaneity or authenticity. She merely elevated her entire demeanor onto a higher level of control through implementing a *personal manager* (1) and by learning to wait and bear uncertainty while circling between (1), (2), and (3). She was no longer thrown here and there like a little child who can but scream (3).

Thus Elvira remedied her former lack of self-control and self-empowerment. However, she did not overdo it either. Elvira did not implement the *personal manager* as a tyrannical dictator. (1), (2), and (3) formed a team of caring team members in her self, not (1) acting as a cruel tyrant coldly subduing the rest. The entire process could be described as giving life to the *reflective equilibrium* or *hermeneutic circle* that was discussed earlier, rendering ever richer grounds for sound action. The fact that the process at the same time entailed warmth, care, and respect between (1), (2), and (3), subsequently also helped create warmth, care, and respect in Elvira's social environment.

What I call the *personal manager* is in certain ways akin to the *third factor* proposed by Eileen Borris (2000). She describes a *third factor* as an element of strength and faith that can be labeled in a variety of ways, such as closeness to divinity, appreciation of compassion, or faith in shared humanity. *Mindfulness*, a Buddhist concept, carries similar connotations. Victor Frankl's concept of *self-observation* in the framework of *logotherapy* is related as well. *Self-remembering*, as advocated by Gurdjieff, is a similar concept, as is *being awake*, a notion in

transpersonal psychology that has related implications. In a more general way, Erving Goffman, an "ethnographer of the self," has described how people negotiate and validate identities in face-to-face meetings and establish "frames" within which they evaluate the meaning of their encounters.

It needs courage to do what Elvira did. It is much easier to stick to fixed ideas than to jump into a sea of uncertainty. It would have been simpler for Elvira to place her husband into some kind of preconceived ideas of hers. Yet, she developed the courage to let herself float. This floating opened up for new perspectives and made her creative.

To summarize, Elvira has grown up, transformed into a courageous adult person who takes charge and steps out of victimhood as a forceful agent. Her new approach entails humility, warmth, and respect, all of which she uses to form links to herself and fellow human beings and which also enables her to sustain these relationships in spite of conflicts, misunderstandings and differing views. Being an adult person means having a *self-government* that treats both self and others with calm respect and warmth.

Learn how to communicate! How to function in a global community of equal dignity

The coming-into-being of *One large family* of humankind under the roof of *global village institutions* introduces new challenges to every individual's abilities to function. Or, to be more precise, those challenges are amplified that are brought about by the coming-into-being of nations under the roof of father- or motherland institutions. The *size of the family*, so-to-speak, increases ever further; from the extended family of hunters and gatherers to the tribe, then to the nation, and finally to the global community. In a hunter gatherer band, everybody knows everybody quite well; however, a state is quite ignorant as to the "children" to which it delivers its services. Cities, urban centers, nations, the *global village*: all these family-like entities are so large and impersonal that they easily introduce anomy, loneliness and depression.

Therefore, under conditions of *globalization*, every individual needs to acquire even more communication skills than are required inside a nation or city. Everybody has to turn into a diplomat, mediator, messenger, envoy, and conflict solver on the national and international parquet. A lot of learning has to be done so as to enable the global community with all its cultural diversity to live in dialogue and not be stuck in estranging monologues.

Andrew came to me because he was lonely. "You know, I grew up in a huge traditional family. You were never alone. You were included whether you wanted it or not. It was difficult to be on your own. You were known to everybody as son of x and grandson of y. You had your place. But now I live alone, in a flat of my own, in an urban center. Suddenly, social life is not automatically coming to me anymore. I have to make an effort. I have to talk to people and somehow attract them to me when I wish to have company. Yet, I never learned how to do that.

Even during my professional life I did not have to learn that. I had a very stable job where everything was formalized. I was the boss of x and the subordinate of y. But now I am retired. I am suddenly thrown into a completely unstructured and lonesome life. It depends entirely on my initiative whether I wither of loneliness or not.

But how do I get friends? I have never had friends, I mean people who just enjoyed

my company. Yes, I had friends, but they were somehow attached to my job or to my late wife. I myself have no skills that enable me to make friends on my own. I am completely lost. I am used to structured hierarchical relationships with duties and rights. But I know that real friendship should be equal. Yet, I have never lived in an equal relationship. I am either too arrogant or too subservient. Nobody likes to be with me.

  Before, inside the family, everybody knew everybody, now, in this city, community structures have taken over many of the services and caring tasks that were formerly carried out within families, and mother city, or father state, has now so many "children" that nobody knows the other anymore. I get my pension from a state organization and not from my son. Everything is more anonymous and when you are such a social illiterate as I am, you are lost. I feel like a child that never grew up, I still need father and mother to give me structure. However, they are gone and my family is dispersed. What can I do?"

Andrew was aware of the need to learn new communication skills. However, many people merely descend in depression and anomy, without reflecting on the fact that they may lack knowledge in communication. They may misinterpret their condition as a psychological problem, while it in reality it is much simpler, it is a lack of expertise in communication in a changing world. Old communication styles are not sufficient anymore. They are based on each individual *having her place* and being included more or less automatically.

  In the new world, *belonging* has to be brought about more pro-actively, and it is every individual who has to learn how to do that. Reaching out to the neighbor and creating a relationship that provides the feeling of belonging requires skills that our forefathers rarely needed.

  The new skills require an attitude of humility as a precondition. Nobody likes to be bullied. Arrogance makes no friends. And slavish subservience neither. Since real friendship is a voluntary relationship, force is of no use. Warmth, loyalty, solidarity, mutual recognition, dialogue, humble acknowledgement of equal dignity, this is friendship. People who can provide all this will have friends and feel that they *belong* on this planet; otherwise they are alone. Again, we may conclude that these new skills are embedded within the processes of *globalization* and *egalization*.

Stand upright! How you can prevent feelings of humiliation from seeping in

Nelson Mandela evidently withstood being invaded by feelings of humiliation, in spite of manifold attempts to humiliate and break him. And as a result he is admired and revered as a great wise man and hero. In the following illustrative quote, Mandela describes his arrival as a political prisoner on Robben Island. In the process, he "demonstrated a rare talent for conflict management. Meeting the raw brutality of the guards with human dignity, he built a relation of respect" (Heffermehl in Mandela, 2001, p. 35).

Mandela (2001) recounts the following (p. 35): "Two officers entered the room. The less senior of the two was a captain whose name was Gericke. From the start, we could see that he was intent on manhandling us. The captain pointed to Aaron Molete, the youngest of the four of us and a very mild and gentle person, and said, 'Why is your hair so long?' Aaron said nothing. The captain shouted, 'I am talking to you! Why is your hair so long? It is against regulations. Your hair should have been cut.

Why is it long ...' and then he paused and turned to look at me, and said, '... like this boy's?' pointing at me.

I began to speak: 'Now look here, the length of our hair is determined by the regulations...' Before I could finish he shouted in disbelief: 'Never talk to me that way, boy!' and began to advance. I was frightened; it is not a pleasant sensation to know that someone is about to hit you and you are unable to defend yourself.

When he was just a few feet from me, I said, as firmly as I could, 'If you so much as lay a hand on me, I will take you to the highest court in the land and when I finish with you, you will be as poor as a church mouse.' The moment I began speaking, he paused, and by the end of my speech he was staring at me with astonishment. I was a bit surprised myself. I had been afraid, and spoke not from courage but out of a kind of bravado. At such times, one must put up a bold front despite what one feels inside.

'Where's your ticket?' he asked and I handed it to him. I could see he was nervous. 'What's your name?' he said. I nodded my head towards the ticket and said, 'It is written there.' He said, 'How long are you in for?' I said again, gesturing towards the ticket, 'It is written there.' He looked down and said, 'Five years! You are in for five years and you are so arrogant! Do you know what it means to serve five years?' I said, 'That is my business. I am ready to serve five years but I am not prepared to be bullied. You must act within the law.'

No one had informed him who we were, or that we were political prisoners, or that I was a lawyer. I had not noticed it myself, but the other officer, a tall, quiet man, had vanished during our confrontation; I later discovered that he was Colonel Steyn, the commanding officer of Robben Island. The captain then left, much quieter than he had entered."

Nelson Mandela apparently applied some kind of "minimal justice" approach. He did not endlessly lament over Apartheid and that it should be dismantled, but demanded justice in a respectful minimal way. Mandela retained his style of careful measured moderation also after ascending to power. He did not bow when he was a disempowered victim, and in the same spirit he did not humiliate his former masters when in power.

In Senegal, the *Tostan-UNICEF program* employs a participatory approach based on dialogue in order to help end female genital cutting. *Participatory approach* means that those who support the practice of FGC are not confronted in an alienating way, but respectfully invited into a dialogue on new awareness.

The Imam of Salémata congratulated the participatory approach used by Tostan and UNICEF, "The Tostan approach is the best way to proceed, contrary to the approach of the Government which almost created a reaction of resistance and defiance. Dialogue is more effective than force" (Dia, 2003, p. 1). Prior to the implementation of the Tostan-Unicef program, people who practiced FGC were being imprisoned. However, prisons filled up quickly without changing the practice.

To summarize this section, it may be beneficial, in situations of humiliation, to withstand being invaded by hot feelings of humiliation and wild urges for violent reactions. It seems beneficial to rather confront humiliating situations with measured calls for justice that are combined with dignifying and respectful behavior displayed towards the humiliators. Humiliators, or those perceived as such, will find it easier to step down when feeling respected and dignified. As in the case of Mandela, his prison guards became his friends.

Start with cooperation! How to extend your hand in reciprocal altruism

Matt Ridley (1996) asks the following question: Is Homo sapiens instinctively an *antisocial* or a *prosocial* animal? Game theorists, who have embraced biology and sociology, indeed have an answer: Populations of people who help others – but refuse to help people who cheat – prove to be more stable than populations where kindness is unconditional or cheating is the norm. Cooperating is the most intelligently selfish strategy people can employ (under the condition that they are embedded in long-term relationships with others, meet repeatedly, and know that they may depend on each other in the future).

Game theorists have shown that the most evolutionarily stable strategy over the long run is a version of *tit-for-tat*, or as in the German proverb "Wie du mir, so ich dir" ["as you to me, so I to you"]. The rule is simple: Do not help unconditionally, do not cheat either, but help those who reciprocate.

Robert Axelrod (1981/1984) explored computer models of the iterated *Prisoner's Dilemma* game and formalized the *evolutionary tit-for-tat* strategy (the *Prisoner's Dilemma* game is a game that gives two players the chance to either cooperate or betray one another). Axelrod's key finding is that the *evolutionary tit-for-tat* strategy is remarkably successful and defeats all other strategies. In the language of evolutionary biology, this strategy is called *reciprocal altruism*. It grows the benefits of cooperation over time and protects them from predators. Morton Deutsch (1973) called this *Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations* that stipulates that "cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition" (Deutsch, 1973, p. 367).

The important point is that the *Prisoner's Dilemma* game renders prosocial results only when being repeated and not just when played once. This is because people are more tempted to cheat when they know they will never see each other again and may cooperate only when cheating is costly. Peter Singer (1999), who describes himself as a "Darwinian Left," suggests that we therefore, in order to arrive at a more peaceful world, need to try to set up situations in which people experience long-term relationships with others and will therefore do better by cooperating rather than by trying to exploit the other. Singer calls for a world of long-term relationships, because this represents a world where the *Prisoner's Dilemma* game is played repeatedly and renders prosocial results. We may suggest that *globalization*, or the coming-into-being of the *global village* does exactly that. It transfers formerly *separate* entities into *One single unit of interdependent relationships*. Thus the *global village* represents a push towards the *iterated Prisoner's Dilemma* game.

Tit-for-tat means that it is not useful to hide behind thick emotional walls and remain as isolated individuals out of fear to be cheated. Extending your hand and entering into relationships of altruism is the best strategy, even though you sometimes may meet predators. The way to go is to continue extending your hand to people, even though cheaters may cross your way. The first move should be cooperation, building bridges to fellow human beings and not isolation (and not cheating either).

Clara came to me because she felt inner emptiness. She had had a very destructive relationship with her father and later with a number of other men. Furthermore, her initial attempts to become an academic were met with rejection from the academic milieu she had targeted. She felt that humiliation was the game of these men and these academicians. She recounted:

"I was so hurt and humiliated by men and by the academic world that I retreated

from both. As a response, I created my own business, where I was totally in control. Not only that, instead of a husband, I found myself foreign men, who had no legal papers, and I used them as some kind of house slaves. Again, I was totally in control. I did the same as all these men who marry younger women, less educated women, or women from poor countries so as to preemptively safeguard their superiority. In this way, I protected myself against even the slightest possibility of being rejected or humiliated. I built my tiny little world, where I was in control and had put down everybody around me preemptively. From this little tiny spot I could safely rage against the rest of the world. Like this I lived for the past twenty years.

However, now I feel that I choke. I feel like an alcoholic who at first is pleased that all worries are successfully being subdued by alcohol, but then detects that there are grave side effects. Or like people who retreat into sects after being traumatized by life, sects that indeed do protect in many ways, but ultimately suck up all life energy.

I need to get out of this trap now. I need to do something else with my rage than barking at the world from a safe distance. I am not alive anymore. I am dried out. My controlled life has made me crumple like a dry apple.

However, what shall I do? Whenever I meet men who are my peers or whenever I meet academics, I behave like a dog. I want their attention, yet I am afraid of their rejection and humiliation, and I am angry at them for their past negative responses. I oscillate between yearning for their recognition, fearing them, and peeing against their legs. Understandably, they do not like being aggressed and give me exactly what I fear, namely rejection. In that way I never get out of my closed mindset. What should I do?"

Clara indeed learned to recognize that she had lived through bad experiences with certain men and with certain academics, and that it was not very helpful to stereotype the entire group of men and academicians in the same way. She recognized that her angry stereotyping foreclosed good relationships with anybody from these groups. She learned to put her bad experiences aside and unearth what she called her innocence, her desire to share humanity on an equal footing with others. She learned to leave behind her urge to control others. She started to cope with rejection in other ways than retreating into her small controlled world and shouting about in generalized rage. She began to offer to others her deep desire to share humanity with them irrespective of the danger of rejection. From a cynic, from somebody who was continuously ready to lash out and humiliate others preemptively, she transformed into a loving person.

And, to her absolute surprise, the bad world around her changed. The world became a much nicer place. Her relationships with other people turned around. The responses she received became much warmer and started to nourish her emotional hunger. She learned that openness to humble cooperation and sharing breeds openness to cooperation and sharing, while arrogant stingy cynicism breeds stingy cynicism. She learned to opt for the first and leave behind the second.

Helfferich (1993) writes,

For bats, baboons, or barons, cooperating is the most intelligently selfish thing you can do when cheating has swift and obvious costs. From this, Ridley and Low conclude that environmentalism needs healthy cynicism about human motivation. Provide some adequate incentive for cooperating in the work of saving the world, and people will cooperate to save it. Tit-for-tat on a grand scale could mean taxing gas-guzzling cars or boycotting tropical forest wood products. It could mean government preference in selecting contractors that use recycled materials or low-

pollution vehicles. It certainly would mean accepting some very natural aspects of human nature (Helfferich, 1993, p. 1).

Evolutionary biology has been criticized for *fundamentalist arrogance* and for believing to have a "hotline" to what human evolved nature is. However, the findings from evolutionary biology do indeed resonate with stances taken in other fields as well. Even business relations are discussed in this light. Nelder (1996) explains,

When we find business viewing its activities in a purely materialistic fashion, and exploiting the environment, bear in mind that we are part of that environment. The successful business of the future will reverse that relationship, moving away from what Jewish theologian Martin Buber calls the "I-It" relationship to an "I-Thou" relationship based on mutual respect. Businesses who value their relationships with their customers will be able to hang onto them, and those who don't, won't. The smart company will hear negative feedback from its environment (including its customers) and respond to it symbiotically (Nelder, 1996, p. 10).

Nelder draws on *phenomenology* that has a strong tradition of conceptualizing the relationship between human beings and how real dialogue is brought about. Martin Buber (1944) developed a *philosophy of dialogue* that views the human existence in relations, namely in two fundamentally different kinds of relations, *I-It* and *I-Thou* relations. An *I-It* relation is the normal everyday relation of a human being towards the things surrounding her. Also fellow human beings may be considered as Its, from a distance, like things, as parts of the environment. Fundamentally different is the *I-Thou* relation. This is a relation into which a human being enters with her innermost and whole being. An *I-Thou* relation represents a genuine meeting and genuine dialogue. For Martin Buber, this engagement in the other represents *making the other present*, or *inclusion* and such *I-Thou* meetings are in Buber's eyes reflections of the human meeting with God.

As discussed earlier, also Emmanuel Lévinas has worked on dialogue and caring. Lévinas's first magnum opus, *Totality and Infinity* (Lévinas, 1961), influenced in part by the dialogical philosophies of, among others, Martin Buber, analyzes the *face-to-face* relation with *the other*, the fellow human being. It seems that *starting with cooperation* is a good strategy for arriving at genuine dialogue within full *I-Thou* relations *face-to-face* in a sustainable society. Buber's concept that the human meeting is an encounter with God may furthermore introduce a spiritual meaning embeds human existence within a more comprehensive context. Earlier, *terror management theory* was discussed. It stipulates that our awareness of our mortality instills dread in us that we try to counteract by various means. Viewing human relations as mutually validating and spiritually fulfilling may render these very means.

In modern individualistic societies, family bonds are no longer as strong as before. Individuals are more like lonely bubbles that hover about society. They easily lack meaning and see no reason for why they should be on this planet. Is the meaning of life to go to work and then have vacation? Or is it to earn money and have no time for enjoyment? Or, worse, what to do if time indeed is available – what is then enjoyment? I had a number of clients who were acclaimed personalities. They cried about their empty lives. Applause, even when coming from hundreds of people, did not fill their lives with meaning. In other words, the meaning that in many ways was implicit in traditional societal structures can in modern society only be created by learning the art of mutual validation, recognition and appreciation.

Anne came to me because she had no friends. "I am not sure whether it is a problem that I have no friends. Perhaps it is not. But I must admit, it is as if something is missing. I have never experienced friendship, even not as a child. I was always a loner. Can I change this?"

Anne indeed changed her behavior and years later reported as follows, "I don't know why we do not learn at school that you do not get anywhere by being emotionally stingy and tight. I learned as a child that one had to protect oneself against exploitation and should approach other people with the initial suspicion that they might be cheaters. I always withheld myself and waited for people to prove themselves. I waited and waited, and most people just disappeared from my life. I literally spent my life waiting that other people should prove themselves.

Now I have changed my ways radically and you would not recognize me. I approach people with a very open mind. I give them all the attention and warmth I feel in me. When somebody disappoints me, I do not make a fuss, I just retreat. Yet, there are very few people who cheat on me. The majority of those I meet become good acquaintances or even friends. I have learned to appreciate and enjoy contact, dialogue, conversation, sharing, and being together with others. I enjoy giving my friends support, recognition, and appreciation.

I am no longer like an accountant who constantly makes emotional calculations and weighs how much others owe me. I am no longer going around like a greedy person who has as her highest priority to cash in on what others should repay. Not that I have turned into a selfless idiot, far from it, but I am more like a generous source of warmth that warms and gets warmed in return. You would not believe the results! The world has changed. Suddenly it is full of nice people who take pleasure in my company. Before the world was cold, now it is warm! I warmed it, and people around me responded in kind. It is marvelous!

It is not that I rationally calculated that I would get an advantage from being more forthcoming, no. I somehow found out by trial and error and was surprised by the effect. However, I believe, children should learn at school that they have to actively contribute with warmth and care if they want a warm world. Waiting for others to come forward is simply not good enough.

We all need to hear that the world needs us, that our contribution is worthwhile, that our lives have a purpose. It is not enough to merely function; merely being like robots is not what we human beings yearn for. Even the greatest riches can not fill an empty life. I give purpose and meaning to those around me by telling them how much I appreciate them. By expressing my appreciation I provide them with meaning. I am so amazed at this priceless resource that everybody owns, namely to be able to give meaning, life, and purpose to others, to validate and anchor others in this life. In return, others validate and anchor me.

In my former life I thought that everybody somehow lived his or her life independently of me, now I know that I am part of others' lives and that I am needed to validate them, and that I need them to validate me. I now live in a network of mutual validations, full of warmth and respect, not to forget constructive criticism, all of which gives me the feeling of being at home on this planet. Before, I was like an alien!

I would tell today's children, 'Immerse yourselves in the pleasures of being part of a larger thing, namely the being together with others, the sharing, and the mutual support. Let go of your little self, you are not the center of the world. Step down from egocentric arrogance and join the world of human beings with all their faults, weaknesses, strengths, and desires for warmth, recognition and acknowledgement.

There are people out there, who protect themselves to death – so, if you keep your hands to yourself, you will never shake hands!'"

To conclude this section, the preferential strategy for you, if you are willing to contribute to long-term social justice and peace, can be described as follows: Let your very first approach to other people be cooperation. Be nice, do not try to win at the expense of others, and avoid unnecessary conflict. The best way to do this is to learn to enjoy human contact for its own sake. For Martin Buber, meeting a fellow human being in a real dialogue is a reflection of the human meeting with God. Even if you are an atheist, you can subscribe to this view and make the world a better place by taking pleasure in relations with fellow humans in a quasi-divine fashion. Cherishing human mutuality can very well be your religion. Why not call your religion *philia*, which means "love between friends" in Greek. When you detect that somebody cheats, merely stop cooperating, however, do that in a measured way, do not overreact. Discourage predators. Be prepared to forgive, so as to restore cooperation. Be clear, simple and emphatic to avoid misunderstandings. Always clarify that cooperation is your rule but that you will defend yourself proportionately against cheaters. Show humility, no haughty arrogance, but no submissive subservience either. Meet other human beings in their capacity as beings who share fundamental existential similarities with you, among them the need for validation and recognition. Extend your hand.

Creativity! How creativity can be a Trojan horse for equal dignity

As mentioned earlier, Robert M. Solow (1957) used *growth accounting* mathematics to analyze historical GDP data and identified the overwhelming importance of *technological innovation* and *know-how* in securing growth and *not* variables such as capital and labor input.

Thus, we learn that creativity, innovation, and new ideas for novel technological solutions are central for economic growth. And, incidentally, new are ideas are urgently needed – not only for growth – but not least for finding novel solutions for the long-term sustainability of planet Earth. Creativity has thus to be promoted and nurtured by societies who are interested in having a growing economy, as much as by those in the *global village* who wish for a healthy future for their children.

However, creativity is an extremely tricky phenomenon. It cannot be forced. It has to be elicited with care. It often is spontaneous and cannot easily be planned. The best ideas may come at night or on a plane or during a walk in the woods. You can force yourself as hard as you want; the ideas most probably come when you relax in the bathtub. Creativity is like an orgasm. Hard work is needed to build viability into a love relationship, but hard work does not help to get an orgasm. It cannot be ordered. It cannot be increased by oppressing people. Or, to me more precise, through oppression, underlings may very well develop a creativity of their own, however, not necessarily for the benefit of the oppressor, but rather in order to sabotage the oppressor's aims.

A manager in a company or a mother who wants her children to succeed in life – and wishes to nurture creativity that is not merely invested in sabotaging oppression – needs to extend respect to employees/children and open up spaces of relaxation and freedom.

Creativity and creative self-realization, if looked at in this way, prove to represent another Trojan horse that translates *normative* calls for equal dignity into *pragmatic*

calls for equal dignity (the other Trojan horse discussed above was the link between human dignity and enabling environments). Being treated as somebody of equal dignity, as somebody whose views have weight, as somebody who can feel empowered, opens up space for creativity. Underlings can provide creativity when elevated, much better than when kept in humiliating lowliness. And elites, as well, profit from joining the ranks of equal dignity.

The old times of ranking human worthiness in many ways resemble Chinese foot binding. Feet binding incapacitates, at least partly. Women with bound feet were reduced to rather dependent and helpless toys. Likewise, underlings in coercive hierarchies are typically forced into artificial incapacitation. Underlings, especially females, but also males, have their right arm bound behind their backs so-to-speak – the right arm being the sword arm. Only master elites, particularly their males, are the ones allowed to use a sword; more so, they are compelled to do so. They are not meant to be vulnerable or dependent; therefore they have their left arm bound behind their back, to use the same metaphor. The problem is that both, elites and underlings, function with only one arm. Masters – since they have to disconnect from their vulnerability – easily develop a false sense of control and a distorted view on reality, while underlings – through being barred from developing a comprehensive sense of control – are caught in helplessness and dependency.

Deutsch (2002), points out the advantages of leaving behind distorted selves, not only for humiliatees, but also for humiliators; he calls them the advantages of *self-realization*. He first describes in which ways oppressors and oppressed depend on each other:

> If we were to examine the oppressors psychologically – the child abusers, the husbands who batter their wives, brutal bosses, and political tyrants – I believe that we would find that the oppressors need the oppressed. Their need to control and dominate the other, their intolerance of the autonomy of the other, makes them dependent upon having vulnerable, weaker others for the definition of their own power. Their own deep sense of vulnerability (anxieties about helplessness and impotence, guilt about forbidden desires and rage, self-hatred for vulnerability) leads to strong needs both to deny one's vulnerability (by projection of one's anxieties, guilt and contempt onto others who are more vulnerable) and to have the power to control those who are vulnerable or can be made to be more vulnerable. The oppressor needs to be able to make demands, which are arbitrary and unreasonable so that the obedience of the oppressed is due to the oppressor's power and not to the agreement of the oppressed (Deutsch, 2002, p. 20).

Deutsch quotes Lichtenberg, 1990, who suggests that dominators must withdraw from processes of domination and must re-own and resolve their feelings of vulnerability, guilt and self-hatred, rage and terror, and undo the projection of these feelings onto the oppressed. Deutsch writes, "Psychologists, in their roles as psychotherapists, marriage counselors, organizational consultants, and educators have a role to play in demystifying the psychological processes involved in the dominators. So too, I believe do the oppressed, by not accepting their distorted roles in the distorted relationship of the oppressor and the oppressed" (Deutsch, 2002, p. 35-36). The call for creativity and self-realization could thus, incidentally, be conceptualized as a down-to-earth and very pragmatic push towards *egalization*.

Indeed, in the early twenty-first century the world finds itself in transition from a *culture of coercion*, which is many centuries old, to a *culture of creativity*, which is still in its infancy. In a culture of coercion, underlings are punished simply for being

underlings. In contrast, the culture of creativity regards everybody as being fundamentally equal, interdependent, and a potential resource. The key to releasing that resource is persuasion and the basis for persuasion is respect for equal dignity.[356]

Culture today indeed seems to have less of a preserving function than in former times. It rather acquires a propelling role. Everywhere there is movement towards innovation, towards the creation of new ideas, new theories, new products, and new life styles. Change which occurred in the past, occurred in spite of the efforts of the established societal power elites to stop it, while today the established elites seem to thrive on a culture of change. While established elites in former times tried to preserve their power by preserving the status quo, it is now innovation which is expected to preserve power.

The effects of the current transition towards a *culture of creativity* are visible everywhere and permeate all our daily lives, locally and globally. Old people of today are "younger" than old people one generation ago, and even today's young people do not resemble their age groups of one century ago. Creativity, ideas, innovation, curiosity, flexibility, adaptability – all terms that in many ways describe children – are promoted as indispensable tools for adults in a rapidly changing world. Swift adaptation is in demand when global mobility increases intercultural contacts, and rapid technological development requires continuous mastering of new challenges.

Innovation requires creativity, and creativity requires other skills in a human being than are necessary for the preservation of the status quo. A person or a group of people who want to be innovative and creative need to be curious, searching, questioning, playing, and prepared to make errors. Terms such as *growing young* in the service of better *custom-tailoring* are entry points to describe the new world. Both terms capture different aspects of a constantly repeated *pendulation* movement of checking the situation, adapting perceptions, deciding what to do, acting, and going back to checking and exploring the situation.

The term *custom-tailoring* could be used to describe the undertaking of interlinking abstract concepts (theories, world-views) with "reality" in ever more dynamic, flexible and differentiated ways than has been tried in former times. *Custom-tailoring* would be another word for the epistemological term of the earlier mentioned *reflective equilibrium*, which means going in circles, again and again, to arrive at ever thicker descriptions.

The term *growing young* or *childlikeness* could subsume skills of curiosity and playfulness that promote improved custom-tailoring. Curiosity and playfulness are usually skills which children have and adults tend to lose. Ashley Montagu thematized similar processes in his book *Growing Young* (Montagu, 1981).

Childlike curiosity and creativity – the playing in the forest, the turning around of the stones, and the creative building of huts from twigs and leaves – all this helps to arrive at differentiated *custom-tailoring*. In order to build a theory or a mechanical tool, to adapt an instrument to its task, one needs to study the situation very carefully and generate as many creative potential solutions as possible. *Childlike* playing is a suitable way to bring about the highest quality of data collection and idea generation. Perhaps, what we currently observe is therefore nothing but another leap towards a new level of the *growing young* tendency that characterizes Homo sapiens from the outset of the species.

In the corporate sector, openness to change, flexibility, and creativity, or *growing young* so as to arrive at more *custom-tailored* solutions, could be said to be elevated to

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[356] I thank Dennis Smith for these formulations.

an "official" program today: Training, learning, openness, flexibility, malleability, asking questions: All these terms describe a child, and they are at the same time terms used in today's training seminars preparing modern managers for globalizing world. Terms like rigid system, secure knowledge, fixed identity, are old-fashioned. Adaptability is important, not rigidity, when the environment changes quickly.

In today's competitive world market it is crucial for a company to look carefully at the market and then *custom-tailor* the response. Small units are more effective in doing that than huge inflexible organizations; therefore building small units is a current occupation of managers. Or, put into the language of economists: Profit in a market economy is secured only if the clients' needs and wishes are taken seriously and satisfied, when the right niches for products are found (or created). And since the world is globalizing, this extends to the global market place.

Capitalism, understood like this, could thus be said to be the "winner" over *socialism*, because and only as long as it offers "reality" better chances to be noticed, felt and recognized. Clinging to rigid planning strategies in socialist systems meant denying "reality's" responses in favor for wishful thinking. Or, in the language of *humiliation* and *putting down*, rigid planning hoped to *humble* "reality" and make it malleable to one's wishes through *humiliating* it. Yet, the results show that too rigid planning is equal to fighting an impossible fight against the "empirical world," a fight bound to be lost at the cost of long-lasting damage. Capitalism in this sense would mean to understand that no theory or plan can "tie down" "reality," that only constant "running up and down" the slope between practice and theory (from clients' needs to the drawing board of products) can, crudely said, bring profit. Again, the term *reflective equilibrium* would cover this circular movement.

Childlikeness does not mean that one should abandon adulthood. On the contrary. It means that the self's *personal manager* sends the self climbing up to theoretical and abstract heights while emphasizing the necessity to also make the effort of going down into the valleys, and even play there, in order to get new input. This new input can then be taken up again, not up to badly constructed towers of rigid theory, but to theories which have stronger ties with empirical data. And not necessarily up to the lofty heights of one single *grand theory*, but perhaps only as far up as the situation requires, for example up to *short-range* or *medium-range theories*. All this because the *Ding an sich* seems to punish those who do not "listen" to its "utterances." Gorbachev is said to have told the East German head of state Erich Honnecker, when Honnecker refused to open DDR to reform and Glasnost at the end of the 1980s: "Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben" ["Life punishes those who come too late"].

In a personal conversation a citizen of the former DDR told me (1995 in Leipzig): "In the DDR everything was decided for us. We did not have to think much for ourselves. After the *Wende* [literally *turn*, meaning the reunification of Germany in 1989], suddenly we were our own masters and organizers, not anymore the disempowered subjects of the state. This was difficult for many and still is. Freedom requires great courage. You easily freeze in fear and cling to the next-best preconceived ideas without properly investigating the ground. What you need is courage, and a good self-management to be at times playful and collect information and develop ideas and at other times decisive in implementing them."

If we search in the political sphere for terms that introduce and secure flexibility, *democracy* might be the term. Democracy as an institution is an arrangement with in-built mechanisms designed to secure that the overall system stays flexible. One of its

primary aims is to *custom-tailor* its mechanics to its "users," its citizens. *Sustainability* is another term that emphasizes *custom-tailored* long-term linkages between theory and practice.

To summarize this chapter, there is a lot with which you can contribute. You can identify stressful situations and take care to avoid tunnel vision by keeping your mind cool so as to be able to act sensibly. You can avoid too intense and rigid attachments to both your own emotions and to fellow people and you can strive to transform into a person that is as mature and wise as Nelson Mandela. You can develop a strong *personal manager agency* in your self that introduces a higher amount of control into your life. With this control you can improve your communication skills, you can withstand being humiliated, you can learn how to turn enjoying human contact into a valuable asset, and you can promote your and others' creativity.

To round up Part III of this book, we may conclude that all peoples and citizens populating the globe can contribute to local and global ecological and social sustainability. Although it would be nice, we do not need to love everybody else or distribute Ferraris to all. However, what we have to avoid is pushing the planet over the edge. Everybody can contribute to at least this minimum requirement.

The first step is to cool down and help others cool down in order to achieve measured and mature calmness. Especially those who feel victimized are called upon to do that. Victims carry an enormous responsibility since their anger can make the *global village* explode – potentially every individual can turn into a weapon of mass destruction if only enraged enough and organized enough. To avoid mayhem, this has to be prevented.

Since it is inherently impossible to succeed in tackling terrorism with conventional weapons or building walls – worse, missiles and bombs meant to send messages of humbling may be understood as messages of humiliation and responded to with violent defiance rather than humility – there is only one way out: building a *global village* of at least *supportable* neighborhoods, if not *good* neighborhoods.

The United States as only superpower left, together with the rest of the world's nations, carry the responsibility to build a *decent global village* with *decent* United Nations institutions. In an interdependent world it is wishful thinking – even though it is fathomable that some people wish for that – to hope that there is such thing as security or welfare for *me* alone *against you*. In an interdependent world, *my security and welfare by definition always depends on everybody's security and welfare*.

Reading related to this chapter
Read more about *ubuntu*,[357] on the *dynamics of willpower*,[358] on *resilience in the face*

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[357] The term *ubuntu* is used in parts of Central, Eastern and Southern Africa, yet, similar concepts are found under different names in many other African countries. The philosophy of *ubuntu* can be compared with *Ahimsa* (non-violence) promoted by Gandhi, the Greek doctrine of Agape, and the Christian principle of "do unto others as you would wish them to do unto you". *Ubuntu* has been transmitted orally in innumerable dialects, throughout the continent, through folklore, stories, proverbs and songs. For a discussion of the *Ubuntu* approach implicit in the philosophy of reconciliation, see Tutu, 1999, Battle, 1997. See also Lieberfeld, 1999, Minow, 1998.

[358] *A Hot/Cool System Analysis of Delay of Gratification: Dynamics of Willpower*, by Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999.

of humiliation,[359] on *sliding signifiers,*[360] on *necessary losses* and how to *forget,*[361] on the *theory of the strength of weak ties,*[362] on *tolerance,*[363] on *new forms of identity* such as the *protean self,*[364] on *multiple identities,*[365] on *dialogue,*[366] on *discourse* and how it is shaped by and shapes *power relations,*[367] on *humility* as to *Science and Democratic Social Structure,*[368] on how interview partners can be considered as *experts,*[369] on *the ethics of authenticity,*[370] on the *third factor,*[371] on the Buddhist concept of *mindfulness,*[372] on Victor Frankl's concept of *self-observation* in the

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[359] Read the autobiography by Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, 1996, or books by Holocaust survivors such as Ruth Minsky Sender, 1996. I thank Ramona Eileen Cuevas for making me aware of Sender's book.

[360] The Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, noted in his *Course in General Linguistics* (1911) that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary (see the parallel French and English text in Saussure, 1993). For example the relationship between the word "tree" and the idea of a tree is arbitrary, because the idea of tree can be signified by other sounds, such as "arbre." Saussure's key contribution was the shift in focus from objects to relations, from object to structure, a shift that defines modernism in a wide range of disciplines. For the French thinker Jacques Lacan, language is what we use to construct the world and ourselves and it is completely inadequate for both those tasks. Nothing is real. Nothing is solid. You are not real. This, according to Lacan, is unbearable and therefore we reject and repress it; we do not dare to understand it. Yet, and this is my point, it might be beneficial for social peace for people to refrain from clinging to visions of certainty that might not only be imaginary but also at times misleading and dangerous.

[361] Judith Viorst wrote a warm and insightful book on *Necessary Losses. The Loves, Illusions, Dependencies and Impossible Expectations That All of Us Have to Give Up in Order to Grow* (Viorst, 1987). I thank Catherine Peppers for making me aware of this book.

[362] See Granovetter, 1973, and more recent publications such as Granovetter, 2002. Granovetter builds on Coser, 1991 and her theory of autonomy, which in turn is based on the sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel (1858-1918).

[363] See, for example, Walzer, 1997.

[364] Also Giddens (1991) describes the occurrence of and the need for *new personal identities* in the new global context, in *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Giddens, 1991). See also Sennett, 1996, or Millon and Davis, 2000. See furthermore Bauman, 1998, who wrote *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. However, there is a vast amount literature to draw upon. See for classic analyses in *urban sociology* Georg Simmel and his views on metropolitan life and its effects on the psyche. See, furthermore, Singer, 1987, and the work on identity by Castells, 1997.

[365] See, for example, Brewer, 1999a.

[366] See for literature on *dialogue*, for example, Bakhtin, 1981, Buber, 1944, Wold (Ed.), 1992, Billig, 1998, Campos, 1998, Josephs and Rommetveit, 1998, Hermans, 1999, Prosser, 1978.

[367] Foucault, 1980, Bourdieu, 1977, and Burke, 1998. See for discourse and power in cross-cultural contexts, for example, Bandlamudi, 1999, Bremer, 1996, Clyne, 1994, Crawford, 1999, Gumperz, 1982, MacMartin, 1999, Morgan, 1998a, Morgan, 1998b, Scollon and Scollon, 1981, Sitaram and Prosser, 1998, Valsiner, 1999, Wetherell and Potter, 1998, Wetherell and Potter, 1992, Williams and Chrisman (Eds.), 1994.

[368] Merton, 1949. I owe this reference to Ragnvald Kalleberg, sociologist at Oslo University, and see also chapter 3.3 in Engelstad et al., 1996; see also Engelstad and Kalleberg (Eds.), 1999, Kalleberg, 1989, Kalleberg, 1994.

[369] Beynon, 1984 defines the Ford workers in this way. I owe this reference to Ragnvald Kalleberg.

[370] Taylor, 1990.

[371] Eileen Borris (2000) describes a *third factor* as an element of strength and faith that can be labeled in a variety of ways, such as closeness to divinity, appreciation of compassion, or faith in shared humanity (Borris, 2000).

[372] See, for example Kabat-Zin, 1994. I thank Suee-Chieh Tan for making me aware of this literature.

framework of *logotherapy*,[373] on *self-remembering*,[374] on *being awake*,[375] on Erving Goffman's *frames*,[376] on the *origin of virtue*,[377] on *game theory* that has *expanded into biology and sociology*,[378] on *evolutionary tit-for-tat strategy*,[379] on "*Darwinian Lefts*,"[380] on *arguments against evolutionary psychology*,[381] on *I-It* and *I-Thou* relations,[382] on the *aggregate production function*,[383] on *creativity*,[384] and on *growing young*.[385]

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[373] See Frankl, 1973, Frankl, 1972, Frankl, 1963.

[374] *Self-remembering*, as advocated by Gurdjieff, is a similar concept, see Speeth and Friedlander, 1980.

[375] *Being awake*, a notion in transpersonal psychology has related implications (Tart, 1994). I thank Suee-Chieh Tan for making me aware of the literature with respect to Gurdjieff and Tart.

[376] Erving Goffman, an "ethnographer of the self," has described how people negotiate and validate identities in face-to-face meetings and establish "frames" within which they evaluate the meaning of their encounters. See, for example, Goffman, 1953, Goffman, 1959, Goffman, 1974.

[377] *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation*, Matt Ridley, 1996.

[378] The extension of game theory into biology and sociology is generally attributed to John Maynard-Smith, 1976 (and his concept of the *Evolutionarily Stable Strategy*, or *ESS*) and further expanded by Richard Dawkins, 1976, in *The Selfish Gene,* and Matt Ridley, 1996, in *The Origins Of Virtue*. See also Wright, 1994, and Waal, 1996.

[379] Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, published the article "*The Evolution of Co-operation*," Axelrod, 1984, a book on *The Evolution of Cooperation*.

[380] *A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution and Cooperation,* by Singer, 1999.

[381] Rose and Rose (Eds.), 2000, edited the book *Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments against Evolutionary Psychology.* They are very critical as to what they perceive as fundamentalist arrogance among biologists who believe to have a "hotline" to what human evolved nature is. Even though, of course we actually have to respect what our biology is, what all living systems biology is, they remind us that there is a richness of experience about how we should live in the world, and that biologists don't have the only route to it. Philosophers, sociologists, economists, novelists and painters are valid sources as well.

[382] *I and Thou*, by Buber, 1944.

[383] *Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function*, by Solow, 1957.

[384] Donald C. Klein, who also writes about humiliation, recently also worked on creativity, see Klein and Morrow, 2001. Clearly, the literature on creativity is vast.

[385] See Montagu, 1981. Already around 1900 scientists pointed at the fact that the human being occupies a special place among animals. The zoologist Otto Storch was probably one of the first to focus on the fact that animals have quite rigid programs of behavior, while human beings use *learning programs*. The Dutch anatomist Louis Bolk (1866-1930) pointed at the fact that the human child is born prematurely and helpless and needs many years of training, while other new-born animals are independent quite fast. Even more, the lack of hair, the nakedness of the adult human being give rise to the thought that the human being always stays at the level of a child, that he never reaches the kind of adulthood a chimpanzee reaches. Louis Bolk proposed the theory that human beings are metamorphically prolonged as a result of a changed hormonal balance. Bolk described several characteristics of the human species influenced by this form of metabolic revision. He called this cluster of characteristics in humans, *neoteny* (a word coined by Kollmann in 1885).

Concluding Remarks

Give us meaning! How we crave great narratives

We human beings seem to crave narratives that anchor us in the world. Religion often provides such narratives as do family legends, clan mythologies, or national myths. From such narratives we learn where we come from and where we go to. We learn in which way we are significant and in which way not. Such narratives seem to be more important to humans than being alive. They are so important that people are willing to die for them. Serbs risked their lives and waged war from within a narrative that circles around hot feelings attached to a battle about 700 years ago. In the Arab world, history that reaches hundreds of years back is as close as daily events and can define life and death decisions. Not least, suicide bombers give their lives for acquiring a meaning that reaches beyond their existence on Earth.

Modern secular Western science does usually not provide us with equivalent long-term narratives and explanations as to what our lives may "mean." Concepts such as *democracy, communism, capitalism, modernity, post-modernity* or *modern information age*, do not really tell us where we come from and where we go to and what significance we have or could have. *Religion* still fills more gaps than perhaps necessary.

Christian religion teaches that the world will collapse in a series of apocalyptic disasters, only to be saved at the end in an afterworld. What does Western science have to say to that? What are the long-term *logics* that steer the planet and humankind according to natural and social science? Natural scientists such as physicists have much to say about the planet. However, where is social science?

Physicists currently have several narratives on offer, all a mixture of rather "sure" knowledge and so-called "educated hunches." What they still are looking for is a grand unifying narrative (great unifying theory) that links the sub-narratives (theories of subsets of forces). What about humankind and social sciences? Which narratives created from sure knowledge and educated hunches are offered by social science? Is "man" "aggressive" by nature? Or not? Is there hope that humankind can manage its home planet in a constructive way? Or not? Is humankind innately unable to guard its own interests? Or not? And what are humankind's interests?

In this book, concepts such *democracy, communism, capitalism, modernism, post-modernism, modern information age*, are treated as *epiphenomena*. They are regarded as *side effect*s of, or *negotiations* of deeper *logics*, which are inscribed in a timeframe that reaches back more than 10,000 years. Psychological mindsets and emotions, such as *pride, honor, dignity, humiliation, and humility*, are regarded as dependent on and intertwined with these *logics*. Emotions are not viewed as timeless or history-independent. On the contrary, the way emotions are felt by each individual is regarded as deeply interdependent with the overall worldview of the community within which this individual is embedded. People may react with *humiliated fury* when put down, but not always. They may also accept subjugation as "honorable medicine" in communities where this is seen as opportune. Underlings may even create *cultures of subservience* that they transmit to their children. And humiliation may furthermore – as a kind of side-effect as long as humbling and humiliating are not differentiated – elicit genuine humility and be a source of *civilized* behavior (Norbert Elias). In social contexts, in which humbling and humiliating are treated as distinct, humiliation may, however, rather reap angry defiance and only humbling lends itself to bring about humility.

What about four logics? How we may narrate the story of the human condition

What are these deeper *logics* that figure in the background? Four *logics* are stipulated in this book, and have been discussed earlier, see Table 4. They are partly building on Ury (1999) and entail (1) the nature of the pie of resources, and whether it is expandable or not (win-win, win-lose); (2) the security dilemma that makes us amass weapons out of fear of others attacking, and whether this dilemma is strong or weak; (4) the time-horizon, and whether we think far ahead or not; and (4) social identity, and whether we live in a world of equal dignity or not. If we introduce Homo sapiens into these four *logics*, do we arrive at a model of the human condition that is made of scientific proof and educated hunches? At least I believe so.

First, who is this Homo sapiens who meets these *logics*? Homo sapiens is a "hostage" on Earth, a passive victim, however, Homo sapiens is also an actor and shaper of the world. Homo sapiens wants to eat and drink and Homo sapiens is a social animal. Yet, as alluded to before, the urge for meaning seems to have the capacity to overrule the rest, hence Homo sapiens' willingness to die for higher goals. Furthermore, Homo sapiens is extremely curious and very good at making tools and finding solutions. Perhaps our curiosity will find solutions to save the planet Earth and humankind from war, violence and environmental disaster? Or not? How are the odds?

Let us try to put Homo sapiens into the four *logics* and make the narrative work. Homo sapiens apparently has populated planet Earth starting from Africa. Some 30,000 years ago, anatomically modern humans started colonizing Africa and the rest of the world (except for the Americas). Population geneticists believe that the ancestral human population was very small – a mere 2,000 breeding individuals. If we were asked if this is rather "sure" knowledge or a so-called "educated hunch," we can respond by saying that this narrative seems to be true with some certainty – archaeological and genetic research underpins it and it seems to be more than merely an educated hunch.

If we put ourselves into the shoes of these early people, it seems plausible to imagine that the planet presented itself to them as unlimited; this is but logic. Early hunters and gatherers for 90% of human history were never disappointed by mother Earth. New valleys of abundance could be found by simply wandering a bit further. The game was thus one of gracious win-win, because the cake of resources could always be expanded. The *security dilemma* was insignificant, because there was enough of yet "untouched" abundance, and conquering and raiding others made little sense. To narrate the story thus, is an educated hunch. Indeed, the archaeological record shows few crushed skulls and thus few signs of organized homicide from that period. Under circumstances of abundance, cultures and psychologies of pristine pride are feasible; this is at least plausible. Pristine pride is when I trust that nature will provide for me, when I even "expect" to be provided for, and when I have not yet experienced subjugation at the hand of other human beings.

However, the "party" had an end. Asia, Europe, and later also America and Australia could only be populated once. This is but logic and does not need much empirical research to be proven. At some point, there were no more "empty" valleys to populate. The Earth has limits. This is a fact. It is a fact that nowadays is not doubted by anybody anymore.

The area that was populated was thus getting crowded. Albeit early Homo sapiens was most probably not aware that the Earth is of limited space, indirectly, the

consequences of this fact made themselves felt to a growing humankind. The anthropological term for this is *circumscription*, meaning that abundance was faltering. More and more people, more and more often, met circumstances that were not characterized by abundance anymore. We could call this juncture in human history the first "round of *globalization*": by merely wandering about, Homo sapiens had managed to populate the entire planet, or at least its habitable areas.

When the first "party" ended and scarcity and much grimmer win-lose games entered the scene, humankind, however, stood up to the challenge. Somehow, some people found methods to increase faltering resources in novel and alternative ways. They took ideas and skills they were already familiar with, namely tool-making, and put them to new uses. This happened in several places around the globe, at first in what is today Turkey about 10,000 years ago. Archeology proves this. *Intensification* was the name of the new game, or agriculture.

Nature, animals, and fellow human beings were being instrumentalized and exploited. Hierarchical honor societies were built, with masters routinely humiliating underlings, a practice which at that time was seen as absolutely legitimate and as sign of *civilization*. Underlings were advised to accept their lowliness as "honorable medicine." Putting down and humiliating fellow human beings thus entered humankind's "toolkit" in the form of legitimate "honorable medicine." Honor could be described as resembling pristine pride, only that it is inscribed in a ranked order of human worth and value. There is abundant archeological proof of this historic development. Anybody can see it. Not only the pyramids of Gizeh are powerful messages from this past.

When resources are limited, cruel win-lose is the name of the game. Under win-lose conditions, not only *intensification*, but also raiding neighboring *villages* is a method for increasing resources. Thus the *security dilemma* and with it a culture of *male dominance* arrived on the scene. *Dominance* was *male* because mothers sent out their sons to die, while their daughters were to take care of the next generation, and it was *dominance* because short-term *emergency* trumps *maintenance*.

In other words, the new set of rules made Homo sapiens more "aggressive." Wars were fought, by empires, and raids became ingrained as continuous activities in the cultures and identities of mobile people in areas of semi-desert unsuitable for agriculture. Somali warriors are feared. Furthermore, raiding introduced short time horizons. All these reflections build on more than educated hunches; archaeological evidence shows abundant signs of organized homicide during the past 10,000 years.

Today, we find ourselves at the end of the second "party" that lasted for the past 10,000 years. The second "round of *globalization*," so-to-speak, enters the theatre. At some point there were no new "empty" continents left anymore whose populations could be conquered and exploited. This time, humankind is not only indirectly affected by the limitedness of our planet, this time people are consciously aware of it. Pictures from space of planet Earth can not be dis-imagined. Modern technology – from telephone cables to space ships – power the current round of *globalization* that pushes global interdependence into *One single global village* and elicits a vision of a future *global village* of equal dignity.

Since the *security dilemma* characterizes a world of several *villages*, its basis in reality disappears when there is only *One village*. This is but logic. So, humankind can relax in the hope that *One village* will render a more *benign* reality than *many villages*. Male courage is no longer needed to defend the village's walls; together with the fading of continuous threats and emergencies powered by the *security dilemma*, traditional male *wars* and *soldiers* lose their anchoring in reality. Again, humankind

can relax and hope for a more *benign* future. And since knowledge is a more *expandable* resource than the geographical surface of the Earth, the pie of resources increasingly regains the friendly win-win character that it had among hunters and gatherers. Again, humankind can relax. What is left to do is *maintaining* and *policing* the *global village*. Thus, while the past 10,000 years were ferocious, we may be sailing into more *benign* times.

Yet there is a problem to heed and mitigate, which, if not attended to, may turn those otherwise *benign* tendencies *sour*. Not only are the limits of Earth being reached at present. During the past three centuries, keeping underlings down became increasingly difficult. The French revolution saw the heads of the aristocracy be cut off for Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternité. The push for *egalization* joined *globalization*. Thus, not only is there a thrust towards *One global village* to be observed today, but a big question mark is hovering over the world as to what *kind* of *global village* this will be. Will it be a village where every citizen has equal dignity? Or will it be a pyramid of power with small elites exploiting the rest? Dignity is like pride and honor, only that it knows how humiliating subjugation feels; however, instead of haughty resistance, dignity includes humility.

What about two transitions? How we may narrate the current historic juncture

Today, humankind finds itself at a historic juncture that marks the end of the past 10,000 years that were characterized by the *four logics* having their switches set on *malignancy*. For the future, we may hypothesize that the switches are thrown to more *benign* positions. However, this *benign* course is complicated by the fact that the current transition towards a *single global village* is split into two transitions which proceed at different speeds, see Table 5. Modern technology powers *globalization* while *egalization* lags behind. Through new awareness of the limits to the planet's biosphere, humility and thus *egalization* seeps in. However, still, it is not sure whether the *global village* will develop into one of equal dignity; it may not. Humankind may make hierarchical rankings of human dignity legitimate. The question mark over which will be the course of the future *global village* deeply troubles our historic juncture.

Transitions Pertaining to Globalization and Egalization

	Past		**Future**
Globalization	*Many* villages	⇨	*One* village
Egalization	Hierarchical rankings of human worth and value (honor)	⇨ ⇨	Equal dignity or Hierarchical rankings

Table 5: Transitions pertaining to globalization and egalization

Globalization and *egalization* are two words that are used in this book to label the two transitions that currently proceed out of tact. *Globalization* is understood as the coming-together of humankind, and *egalization* as the negotiation of hierarchical rankings of human worth and value. If we imagine the world as a container with a height and a width, *globalization* addresses the horizontal dimension, the shrinking width. *Globalization* is when humankind huddles together on a planet that is viewed as a tiny human homestead lost in a vast universe, as opposed to a large Earth taking

the prominent seat in the middle of the universe. *Egalization*, on the other side, concerns the vertical dimension, reminiscent of Hofstede's power distance. *Egalization* signifies that there is not anymore a very high container, with masters at the top and underlings at the bottom, but a very flat container with everybody at about the same height of equal dignity.

Globalization and *egalization*, if linked together, thus describe a shrinking of our container "world," both horizontally and vertically. *Globalization*, if wedded to *egalization*, sees humankind as being huddled on tiny planet earth, aware of its limitedness, and at the same time eager to flatten hierarchical rankings and treat everybody as equal in dignity.

Globalization is a process that is driven by modern technology, telescopes, space ships, airplanes, internet, and this represents a push towards closer global social relations and more interdependence than ever before. *Egalization* on the other side is driven by an increasing moral gut feeling that everybody ought to be treated as equal in dignity. *Globalization* occurs "automatically," propelled by technology, whereas *egalization* is an ideological decision. *Globalization* can very well be managed without *egalization*. *Globalization* could stand alone and exist without *egalization* and currently this is precisely what happens when we consider that the gap between the rich at the top and the poor at the bottom is growing, both locally and globally. *Globalization* without *egalization* is a story of the container getting narrower and higher. *Globalization*, if married with *egalization*, however, is a story of social distances shrinking, the container getting narrower, and at the same time also flatter.

Currently, humankind finds itself in the middle of these two transitions. The first one, *globalization*, proceeds from the "arrogant" belief that planet Earth potentially has an infinite biosphere to be exploited if only tough enough subjugation of nature is applied, and that there are many more *villages* to conquer and subjugate, to the humble realization that Homo sapiens inhabits but *One single global village* on a tiny planet. The second transition, *egalization*, puts at loggerhead those who believe that humiliation is an "honorable duty" on one side, against those who deem humiliation to be a violation of dignity. Both transitions push towards more humility and less arrogance – something we may hold as great source of hope. However, wherever the transition does not occur smoothly, it places humankind under great stress, particularly in situations where it puts opposing worldviews into stark opposition.

We, the people of the twenty first century sweat in the middle of these transitions. They heat up feelings in ways that particularly elites typically overlook for too long, only to react with panic and too late. The transition is too slow to put us on guard, and too fast to be without danger. And it concerns everybody. It permeates international relations as much as my relationship with my family and with my own self.

Hitlers, Bin Ladens and Saddam Husseins? Who are they?

The two transitions towards the coming together of humankind in *One village* of *unlimited knowledg*e and *equal dignity* entail great hope for a bright future. A world of infinite resources (knowledge) is more *benign* than a world that is dominated by win-lose games. A world where there is only *One village* is more *benign* than a world with many *villages* threatening each other and increasing the *security dilemma*. A world of long-time horizons that include the fate of our children is more *benign* than a world that is caught in short-time horizons.

However, there are great dangers, among them humiliation. Feelings of humiliation with their potentially violent outflows can overrun all *benign* tendencies. As soon as people feel victimized by undue humiliation, they may create rifts in the *global village* where there were none before. And when they see no way to remedy humiliation in this life, people may look for gratification through martyrdom in an afterlife. This turns the *global village* into a dangerous place. Cycles of humiliation can tear it apart.

Osama bin Laden was a dramatic humiliator. The downing of the Twin Towers broadcasted a message of devastating humiliation that made the world turn around. During the past months, bin Laden's name has been supplemented with the name of Saddam Hussein. He was another rogue, who, it was feared, was planning on humiliating the Western world with as much cruelty as bin Laden did, or worse. *War on terror* was therefore expanded to include *war in Iraq*. In other words, the humiliated, the victims of September 11, were sending a message back to the perpetrators, namely the message that they did not intend to succumb to this humiliation, on the contrary, that they were (and are) set on resisting it. In this situation of heroism meant to protect peace and security, many ask, "How come that we find ourselves enveloped in violence, war, and terror, or at least in apprehension and fear of it, even though the only thing we yearn for is peace?"

Yes, how come? What drove the suicide terrorists to attack innocent people? As pointed out earlier, some scholars and experts identify deprivation, such as poverty, as the main cause of such violent reactions. The argument goes as follows: Deprivation represents a *grievance* that leads to *resentment* and *embitterment*, and finally to a *backlash*.

However, deprivation, such as poverty, low status, or marginalization, does not automatically elicit feelings of suffering and yearnings for retaliation. A religious person may join a monastery and be proud of poverty. Low status may be explained as God's will or a just punishment for sins perpetrated in an earlier life. Also marginalization may be the basis for pride; not all minorities feel oppressed. Furthermore, poverty may motivate a person to work hard in order to get out of it, parents may sacrifice to enable their children to have an education and a better life, and every small incremental step towards a better quality of life may be celebrated. Not least their allegiance to the *American Dream* surely keeps many of the poor within the United States from rebelling.

The question then is: Is it pure unexplainable pathological evilness that drives terrorists? In that case there is hardly any hope for humankind since terrorism inherently can never be controlled by traditional means, not to 100% and not even to 90%. Drying out financial resources and access to weapons may help. However, terrorists do not really need weapons, as we have seen, highjacking planes is sufficient, and if anything, at least their minds cannot be controlled by any military or police defense. Worse, sending military "messages" to them may lead to furious defiance, instead of eliciting peace-loving humility.

So, are there no effective remedies around? Perhaps we could ask what it is that transforms deprivation into unbearable suffering of a kind that triggers the urge to retaliate with violence. Yet, as we know, even where grievances lead to suffering, the probability is high that depression and apathy are bred, rather than highly organized terror. Thus the question becomes more complicated: Firstly, what kind of deprivation is required for an urge for violent retaliation to develop, and secondly, under which conditions is this retaliation carried out in an organized way?

There is more than frustration! How feelings of humiliation may form the missing link

Feelings of humiliation, is my answer to the first part of the question. As already stated earlier, feelings of humiliation may lead to acts of humiliation perpetrated on the perceived humiliator, setting off cycles of humiliation in which everybody who is involved feels humiliated, and is convinced that humiliating the humiliator is a just and almost holy duty.

As to the second part of the question I would suggest that the presence of leaders is significant, who channel the sufferings of masses into one single joint project of retaliation. Hitler is not the only master narrator of stories of humiliation that – as he argued in the 1930s – had to be resisted and prevented in a highly organized joint effort. Hitler incited the entire German population to undo the humiliation that Germany had suffered after World War I through the Treaties of Versailles. Not enough, he also engaged Germany in "preventive" extermination of the World-Jewry that he feared was set to dominate and humiliate the globe in the future if not stopped. Undoing past humiliation and preventing future humiliation, these were his justifications for unspeakable atrocities. Hutus in Rwanda, likewise, were geared to undo past humiliation and prevent future humiliation, when they perpetrated the 1994 genocide on their alleged humiliators, the Tutsis. International terrorism is swimming in similar waters. Thus, victims of humiliation, or those who perceive themselves as such, seem to be among the most vulnerable to become perpetrators of humiliation and feed evil leaders with support that otherwise would be lacking.

Humiliation seems to be the mediating link that turns grievances, such as poverty or abuse, into *nuclear bombs of emotions*. As noted before, poverty or any abuse, do not unavoidably trigger violence, on the contrary, living under harsh circumstances may lead to apathy, depression, or exhausted submission. Even heroism may emanate; a Nelson Mandela gives unsurpassed guidance on the latter. Yet, as soon as sufferings are translated into overarching narratives of illegitimate lowering and humiliation that must be responded to by humiliation-for-humiliation (something Mandela avoided), the desire for retaliation is on the table. Victims may yearn for and plan acts of humiliation against perceived humiliators (real or imagined) and thus victims may become ruthless perpetrators. If this happens at the group level, such planning may be channeled into group violence, as has happened in Rwanda and other places. A Mandela could have become a Hitler. And a Osama bin Laden, Slobodan Milosevic, or Saddam Hussein may not be the last aspirants for the role of humiliation entrepreneurs.

I feel humiliated and get angry! How feelings of humiliation come about and which consequences flow from them

How do feelings of humiliation come about? Based on many years of research on this phenomenon I would suggest the following explanation: Feelings of humiliation come about when deprivation is perceived as an illegitimate imposition of lowering or degradation, a deprivation that cannot be explained in constructive terms. According to my analysis all human beings basically yearn for recognition and respect. I believe that it is when people perceive that recognition and respect are withdrawn or denied that they may feel humiliated, and that this is the strongest force that creates rifts between people and breaks down relationships. Whether this withdrawal of recognition is real or the result of a misunderstanding, still the perceiver is prone to feel humiliated, whether he or she is rich or poor, marginalized or not.

Thus, I suggest that the desire for recognition unites us human beings, that it is universal and can serve as a platform for contact and cooperation. Consequently, many of the rifts that we can observe stem from an equally universal phenomenon, namely the humiliation that is felt when recognition and respect is perceived as lacking.

I do not therefore believe that ethnic, religious, cultural differences or conflicts of interests create rifts by themselves; on the contrary, conflicts of interests can best be solved through cooperation and often indeed are being solved thus, and diversity can be a source of mutual enrichment. However, cooperation and diversity are possible and enriching only as long as they are embedded within relationships that are characterized by respect. It is when respect and recognition are failing, that those who feel victimized are prone to highlight differences in order to "justify" rifts that were caused, not by primary differences, but by something else, namely by humiliation. Not *clashes of civilizations* are the result, but *clashes of humiliations*.[386]

The current state-of-affairs humiliates me! How we live in a world that elicits feelings of humiliation

Do we – members of communities around the world today – live in contexts that make people accept explanations for inequality and deprivation such as those mentioned above, explanations alluding to God's will, or to nature's order, or to punishment for past failings? The answer is: No.

At present we live in a world that invites humankind into embracing the human rights message that every human being, by virtue of being born as a human being, possesses an inner core of dignity that ought not to be humiliated. This is understood as an invitation into dignifying quality of life for all. Poverty, under this new paradigm, is no longer fate or bad luck or "my own fault only;" poverty acquires the status of a violation of human rights, perpetrated by the rich on the poor. Environments that are disabling are no longer accepted, they are seen as massive acts

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[386] Until the 1960s, *culture and ethnicity* or even *culture and nationhood*, were seen to be almost synonymous. Fredrik Barth (Ed.), 1969, was among the first to make the point that there is no one-to-one relationship between culture and ethnicity; cultural differences are not "real," but socially sanctioned. The controversy between *primordialism* and *instrumentalism* characterized the field for many years, as did the debate over *essentialism* and *constructivism*. As to the first controversy, *instrumentalism* became the dominant one, see Guibernau and Rex (Eds.), 1995. *Primordialism* in essence regards ethnic identity to be primary and not secondary, with Clifford Geertz, 1973, being one of its representatives. Gellner, 1997, stands for *constructivism*, with Smith, 1991, being placed in between *essentialism* and *constructivism*. This overview has been adapted from Eriksen, 2001.

of humiliation. Thus, human rights ideals introduce a link between poverty and humiliation that previously was not existent.

The disadvantaged of the world feel indeed invited; however, they fear that the invitation is not serious. And they feel humiliated by what they worry to be hypocrisy, double standards, uneven handedness, or unilateralism emanating from the world's elites. Confronted with such accusations, elites, on the other side, feel as humiliated, in their case by the thankfulness and recognition they perceive lacking for the benevolent and generous leadership they either indeed provide, or see themselves as providing.

The terror attacks of the September 11, 2001, in the United States, that shocked the world, show – at least to my understanding – that the entire world community is caught in cycles of humiliation. Men such as Osama bin Laden would never have any followers, if there were not a pool of feelings of humiliation somewhere, feelings that are so intense that young intelligent men, who could found families and have satisfying careers, are willing to follow such leaders and lose their lives in suicide attacks. The rich and powerful West has long been blind to the fact that its superiority may have humiliating effects on those who are less privileged, even if unintended, and that neglecting this phenomenon may be dangerous, especially during times when the West simultaneously teaches the world the ideals of human rights, ideals that heighten feelings of humiliation.

The tasks to be brought about in the coming years

What are the challenges for the *global village*, apart from containing tyrants and terror?

The *United Nations Millennium Declaration* of September 2000 calls to
➢ eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
➢ improve maternal health
➢ achieve universal primary education
➢ combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
➢ promote gender equality and empower women
➢ ensure environmental sustainability
➢ reduce child mortality
➢ develop a global partnership for development

The *World Summit on Sustainable Development* (also known as the *WSSD*, *Earth Summit III* or *Rio +10*) that took place from August 26 – September 4, 2002, in Johannesburg, South Africa, lists the following *successes*: By 2015, agreements are set to
➢ halve the number of people living without clean water and sanitation
➢ reduce the loss of biodiversity
➢ restore depleted fish stocks
➢ reduce infant mortality rate and the prevalence of HIV

No concrete targets or tangible goals, however, were set for numerous other issues. The Summit *disappointments* concern:
➢ renewable energy
➢ phasing out agricultural subsidies
➢ good governance
➢ corporate responsibility

Fair global trade is being called for by many voices, academic as well as political. Sergio Cobo is quoted as saying, "People who live in rich countries count for only 20 per cent of the world's population, yet they get most of the fruits from globalisation. The world's poor, who count for 80 per cent, receive nothing. Is this really the type of globalisation we want? Let's globalise the struggle; let's globalise hope. We want to make trade work for all."[387]

Fairtrade Foundation, Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Oxfam's fair trade site, these are just a few links.[388] Philippe Legrain (2002), in his book *Open World: The Truth About Globalisation* (Legrain, 2002) delineates the responsibility that has to be shouldered by the *World Trade Organization* on the way to fairer global trade and Juliette Bennett, 2001, writes on the role of multinationals in conflict zones and how they can promote regional stability. Jeffrey Sachs explains, how world poverty can be ended (Sachs, 2005).

We live in a *World Risk Society* (Beck, 2000)[389] that we have to tackle in constructive ways. Fortunately, we live in an *Information Age*,[390] where knowledge and creativity may be drawn upon to save us.[391] With this creativity we may manage to build a *global village* with fair rules (Legrain, 2002) and *good* and *transparent governance*.

What can be done? How the roadmap to the new world order could look like

What can be done? What are the methods for building a sustainable *global village* for all?

Is there another planet to move to after divorce?

The first step to a sustainable *global village* is the acknowledgement of new realities. Global interdependence is the inescapable new reality for humankind. Global terror, new computer viruses, new biological viruses, global climate change, all of this brings this fact home to humankind acutely. These are *problems without passports* as Kofi Annan is reported to have said.

Old concepts of *Realpolitik* are therefore no longer appropriate. They are being undermined by current change. Whoever holds on to Old *Realpolitik* philosophies will

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[387] Retrieved from http://www.foe.co.uk/pubsinfo/infoteam/pressrel/2001/20011102112007.html, which informs of a *Trade Justice Parade* in central London on November 3, 2001, as world governments prepared to travel to Doha, Qatar, for *World Trade Organization* talks.

[388] To be found, for example, on http://www.tve.org/earthreport/archive/doc.cfm?aid=904.

[389] See also Beck, 1999b, Hartling, 2003.

[390] See for work on the information age Castells, 1996, Castells, 1997b, Castells, 1997a. See the following sites for more information on the sociology of cyberspace and issues relating to technoculture, social relations and the internet:
http://www.dc.peachnet.edu/~mnunes/moo.html
http://www.pscw.uva.nl/SOCIOSITE/TOPICS/WebSoc.html
http://eng.hss.cmu.edu/internet/articles.html
http://otal.umd.edu/~rccs/
http://www.unn.ac.uk/corporate/cybersociety/
http://cec.wustl.edu/~cs142/articles.html
http://www.plannet.co.uk/olp/vcity.htm
I thank Nick Prior for these links.

[391] See also Luke and Toulouse (Eds.), 1998, Luke, 1997, Luke, 1989, Luke, 1992, Luke, 1990.

benefit from adapting to new realities fast. The new situation is that everybody on the globe is "getting married" to everybody else *without a chance to move out of the neighborhood in case of divorce*. I will explain.

When people marry and fall out with each other, in many societies they can get a divorce. And in case they by that time hate each other's guts, after many rounds of humiliation and humiliation-for-humiliation, they can move into different neighborhoods and never see each other again. However, this is not possible for humankind in a *global village*. The maximum distance people can create between each other under such circumstances is that of *neighbors*. The United States cannot move to another planet when they have enough of China, and vice versa. Nor have people who fear terror or climate collapse an alternative galaxy to travel to. And since *bad neighborhood* is not desirable, the only solution to strive for is some kind of *good neighborhood* – or at least *supportable neighborhood* – a neighborhood that remains livable even under conditions of "divorce."

The obligatory aim for humankind is thus to prepare for minimum damage in worst cases such as "divorce." The world will presumably never be a place where everybody loves and forgives everybody. And there is no need to distribute Ferraris to all. We certainly all hope for a world that takes maximal strides towards constructive social and ecological futures, yet, humankind may not manage to reach the optimum of its dreams and may still survive. However, what we better avoid is pushing the planet over the edge, both socially and ecologically. This is the mandatory minimum requirement.

In many countries parents increasingly receive joint custody for their children after divorce.[392] Humankind has *joint custody for the planet* – irrespective of any inter-personal or inter-national fall-out. For divorcing parents joint custody is only one among alternative options – a family judge may decide for it or against it. However for humankind this arrangement is compulsory. Humankind is forced into the same neighborhood through the limits of the globe. The challenges of the globe, from fair trade to pollution control and disease containment, have to be tackled even in the face of mutual antipathy.

A society that is aware that couples in love will have to continue living as good neighbors and parents after divorce will have to prepare their citizens in profoundly new ways for marriage and cohabitation. Under such conditions, society cannot merely hope for the best and allow lovers to blindly throw themselves into hot passion and high mutual expectations. The downturn can very well be as hot and passionate. Society has to be more *proactive* and insert some *sensible security valves*.[393]

These security valves are new cultures and skills of human interaction that humankind must forge and develop; new cultures and skills of calm maturity that enable people to enjoy the richness of human contact in a the-glass-is-half-full fashion, rather than immaturely smashing the glass whenever it appears to be half

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[392] "Joint custody – this can refer to joint legal custody and/or to joint physical custody. Generally, however, people mean joint physical custody when they talk about joint custody. Joint physical custody does not have to mean that the children spend exactly fifty percent of their time with each parent, but it does mean that the children are with each parent for significant amounts of time" (retrieved from http://www.jhlaw.org/faq.html in April 2003).

[393] Relatively low expectations may be the secret of the success of so many *arranged marriages* in non-Western cultural contexts where the extended family is primary and the couple secondary. Egyptian grandparents warn against marrying a person one is in love with (personal conversations, Cairo, Egypt, 1984-1991). The chances are great that this marriage will be unhappy, they say. Expectations are too high and it requires an enormous amount of maturity to tackle the down-turn constructively.

empty. Many in the corporate sector have understood that. Some companies offer family courses to their employees, courses that are designed to teach communication skills and prevent the breakdown of families. This is because the corporate sector is aware of the negative effects private problems can have on company interests.

In the same vein, it is in the interest of humankind, for the sake of a sustainable future of the *global village*, to be better prepared for the maintenance of good international neighborhood relations. The call for the promotion of a *culture of peace* (UNESCO) is no rosy idea, it is no dream; it is the only *Realpolitik* for the future. If humankind fails this new *Realpolitik*, unprecedented mayhem may befall it. The downing of the Twin Towers could very well be the first taste of kinds of disasters that were unimaginable before. On April 1, 2003, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said in a speech that he fears that 100 Osama bin Ladens will emerge as a result of the Iraq war. And subsequent attacks in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the Middle East, and threats in Kenya rather confirm than discount his words. Especially after the attack on the UN in Baghdad, August 19, 2003, Harlan Ullman's fear may come true that Iraq will become a "surrogate battlefield" for Islamic Jihad-entrepreneurs against the West and, furthermore, that the bin Ladens and their successors may succeed in building a theocracy in the region, based on Saudi oil and Pakistani nuclear power.[394]

In other words, it is not sufficient to round up some evil terrorists, and treat the terrorist problem as a problem of a few individuals. What is needed is to diminish widespread feelings of humiliation that provide the backdrop for terrorist action.

Many clients come to psychotherapists with the desire to "get rid of a problem," let us say, of smoking, alcohol, or some other obsession. The therapist is supposed to "cut out" this problem like a surgeon. However, in many cases the entire personality has to be considered and restructured since the superficial "problem" is but the expression of an underlying imbalance. The real problem may not the apparent obsession, but blindness as to the need for much more comprehensive personal growth and change.

Likewise, it is not sufficient to merely "catch" some terrorists and hope that surgically "cutting" them out of the flesh of humankind will save the world. The real problem may be blindness as to the need for much more comprehensive change that includes all walks of life and all segments of local and glocal society.

The globe cannot afford to put fuel into the fire of local and global family fall-outs and "divorce cases." Hot urges for revenge in case of "divorce" have no place in such a limited space as the *global village*.[395] As said before, the compelling reason is that there is no other planet to move to when relations turn sour in too hot a manner. Constructive neighborhood relations must remain possible however deep the rifts; the limits of the globe make constructive neighborhood relations compulsory.

Psychologists, sociologists, teachers, and all those who know about relationships, are to be enlisted by global society to bring about better *communication skills*, not least with regard to cross-cultural relations. Good communication skills can be learned. Learning and teaching them is a new local and global task.[396] The global

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[394] Ullman in an interview on August 20, 2003, in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program with Tim Sebastian.

[395] See books such as Hamburg, 2002 and Mitchell, 1999.

[396] See the sea of literature that promotes skills conducive to a more peaceful world. I could recommend hundreds of publications, and just pick some, for example, Hamburg, 1992, as well as Takanishi and Hamburg, 1997, who write on preparing *adolescents* for a peaceful world, or Schwebel, Maher, and Fagley (Eds.), 1990 who address *cognitive growth over a life span*, or Hendrix, 2001,

community of scientists altogether has a central responsibility.[397]

Thus, at first the world has to *calm down*. Every individual has to strive for a degree of detachment that makes sensible reflection and action possible. Taking time-out, improving self-regulatory strategies and stress management, as well as reframing goals are essential skills (Mischel and De Smet, 2000). And global society is bound to provide for efficient third party intervention to promote calm composure wherever there are too hot feelings around.

The introduction of a *personal manager* into the self is essential for every individual so as to learn to sustain uncertainty and avert urges for jumping to premature conclusions or rigid attachments, while at the same time learning to maintain respectful and warm relationships with self and others (and being able to sustain uncertainty incidentally also opens up for creativity). Based on such calm composure, learning *new communication skills* can be mastered, *communication skills* that embrace the Buberian dialogical *I-Thou* relationship and the Lévinasian care for *the other* at least in a minimal way.

What is needed is good attunement (see Scheff, 2003a). The way to do this is to learn effective *pendulation* between different agencies within oneself, with others, and the world in general. Keeping a cool mind, maintaining flexibility in attachments to one's own mental representations and emotions, as well as to one's environment, is essential. Furthermore, it is beneficial to hear the *tit-for-tat* message and learn how to start with *cooperation* and not with withholding it. Or, in other words, it is preferable to start new relationships with newly arriving neighbors, locally and globally, by cooperating with them and not fearfully holding back (or cheating on them). Beginning new relationships with cooperation encourages and spreads cooperation.

To avert the Earth's tipping over the edge, *inflicting new damage in order to redress old damage* is to be avoided. Humiliation, for example, is a phenomenon that is capable of heating up feelings and eliciting urges for humiliation-for-humiliation that undermine considerations for calmly informed self-interest or the common good. When such mechanisms have found their way into cultural rules, there is hardly any hope. Blood-feud societies, for example, strangle their future in their quest for justice for the past. The globe better steers clear of that.

Mandela's approach to justice is the only path adapted to a viable future for the *global village*. Mandela focuses on constructive solutions for the future instead of being caught in the bitterness over bygone humiliation.[398] Glass-half-full thinking, decency over justice, staying away from humiliation both as act and as feeling; these are all aspects of the novel need to be proactive and train for constructive "divorce" in case love fails.

Hendrix and Hunt, 1997 with their very down to earth guidelines for couples and parents. See also the work done by peace psychology. Note that Ervin Staub, the author of the *Roots of Evil* (1989), at the Psychology Department at the University of Massachusetts, is starting a new Ph.D. concentration in *The Psychology Of Peace And The Prevention Of Violence*. See furthermore the work by a great old lady, Elise Boulding, former secretary general of the *International Peace Research Association*, who says "There are no safe places except as we make them." See her work in Boulding, 1999, Boulding, 1990, Boulding, 2000, Boulding and Brock-Utne, 1989. Or see work by Richard Wagner Christie, Wagner, and Winter (Eds.), 2001, Deutsch, 1993, and Hinde and Parry, 1989. Read on *critical reflection* that has been stipulated as central objective of adult education in the work of Mezirow (Mezirow, 1990, Mezirow, 1991, Mezirow, 2000). Mezirow's work is part of a critical tradition in adult education associated also with Collins and Brookfield as well as Freire, owing its roots to Dewey, and its theoretical base to Habermas on the other.

[397] Read, for example, De Gerrano and Keynan, 1998.

[398] See, for example, Minow, 1998.

Particular attention has to be extended to the traps of misunderstandings and help. Both can lead to feelings of humiliation even in the absence of any actors having the intention to humiliate. Benevolent helpers and humiliated recipients may put in motion bitter cycles of humiliation. Benevolent helpers feel humiliated when they are accused of humiliating rather than helping recipients and they may retaliate by humiliation-for-humiliation. It is therefore essential for helpers to factor in that even the most well-intentioned display of help may elicit feelings of humiliation. Equally, misunderstandings are a hot breeding ground for feelings of humiliation, particularly when well-intentioned actors feel unduly accused of evil intentions. Instead of jumping to conclusions as to the other's evil intentions, calm investigation has to be inserted.

Currently, we observe an upsurge of literature on forgiveness and reconciliation. However, forgiveness is complex and reconciliation may sometimes be too much to ask. And, though highly desirable, perhaps it is not even always necessary, at least when we consider the minimum requirement of not pushing global community over the edge. A Tutsi genocide survivor told me (1999 in Kigali), "I cannot forgive the killers of my mother on her behalf. I would arrogate a right that only she has. What I can do, however, is curbing my urge for revenge and contributing with my share so as to make sure that my children will live in a friendlier world."[399]

The Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture was set up by Helen Bamber to help torture victims. It deals with 5,500 new cases every year in Britain. "One man, whose story Helen Bamber described movingly, had been forced to witness his own son's execution, and to applaud. He had also been badly tortured himself. He did not talk of forgiveness, but neither did he seek revenge. He felt anger, extreme grief and a lack of purpose in his life. 'The battle he had been prepared for had been lost. How do you help a man who has suffered this kind of loss and abuse, to grieve appropriately?' What he needed was validation and recognition. He was able to talk about his son, to re-live his relationship with his son and to make him present enough that he was finally able to release him and symbolically bury him" (Simon Bowen, 1999, *The Forgiveness Conference*, October 18, 1999, The Findhorn Foundation[400]).

Third party intervention

We, the people of the twenty first century, sweat in the middle of *egalization*, or, as it

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[399] In his last book *The Ethics of Memory* (Margalit, 2002) Margalit, indicates that forgiveness does not require forgetting the wrong done, but that it requires getting beyond certain moral emotions, like humiliation and resentment. Howard Zehr, known worldwide for his pioneering work in transforming our understandings of justice, proposes workable principles and practices for making restorative justice both possible and useful (Zehr, 1990, Zehr, 2002). Miroslav Volf (1996) proposes that the act of forgiveness is active suffering because it means foregoing full retributive justice. We may choose to forgive and embrace, but 'the other' may not. Despite this paradox, we must give ourselves to *the other* and receive *the other* into ourselves. "I must keep the boundaries of my own self firm, offer resistance; otherwise I will be engaged in a self-destructive act of abnegation. At no point in the process may the self deny either the other or itself. The embrace itself depends on success in resisting the vortex of de-differentiation through active or passive assimilation, yet without retreating into self-insulation. In an embrace the identity of the self is both preserved and transformed, and the alterity of the other is both affirmed as alterity and partly received into the ever changing identity of the self" (Volf, p. 143).

[400] Retrieved from http://www.findhorn.org/events/conferences/archives/forgive/bamber.html in April 2003.

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also could be called, the *first continuous revolution in humankind*, the *human rights revolution* that leads us from *coercive hierarchies built on fear* to *creative networks depending on respect for equal dignity*. The *human rights revolution* can be called *continuous*, because new underlings are constantly on the rise. Masters (such as dictators and other supremacists) are demanded to step down from superiority that they have arrogated, and underlings (such as the poor, low casts, and underlings in general) are encouraged to view themselves as illegitimately humiliated and entitled to rise. Both, former masters and former underlings are being invited – by never tiring human rights advocates – to meet at the line of equal dignity and humility.

Feelings of humiliation are the "fuel" that drives this continuous revolution. Feelings of humiliation can be conceptualized as the "red thread" that binds all *rising underlings* together, be they *the colonized, people of color, women, advocates on behalf of nature, feelings, creativity,* or *individual freedom* as opposed to the *master category* entailing *the colonizers, the white man, men, humankind's control over nature, ratio, intellect,* and *normative control*. Movements of underlings often are fragmented; they would benefit from becoming more aware of what they share and what binds them together: the experience of humiliation.[401]

Human rights promoters encourage the celebration of diversity – without ranking diversity vertically – and the creation of practices and institutions that ensure equal dignity. Diversity is welcomed, such as diversity in ethnic, religious, cultural, gender, or skin color variations. Even hierarchy is possible, but only functional hierarchy (the pilot of a plane is the boss; he is not the "same" as a passenger; still he can be equal in dignity). The *human rights revolution* is proceeding continuously, sometimes fading, sometimes mounting, already for the last three centuries.

As hope-inducing as the *continuous human rights revolution* may be, minefields loom large on the way. Masters who believe that humiliation is their "honorable duty" will not appreciate when underlings frame this treatment as violation of their dignity. Deutsch (2002) writes:

> … any attempt to end long-enduring oppressive relations will have to address the psychodynamic issues which lead people to resist changing unhappy but familiar relationships. Some of the anxieties and fears that have to be addressed for the oppressed and oppressor are listed below:
> 1. Both feel anxious in the face of the unknown. They believe that they will be foolish, humiliated, or helpless, in a new unclear relationship;
> 2. Both fear the guilt and self-contempt for their roles in maintaining the oppressive relationship;
> 3. The oppressed fears that their rage will be unleashed; the oppressor is in terror of this rage;
> 4. Both fear punishment, if they change; the oppressed from the oppressor, the oppressor from the oppressed and other oppressors; and,
> 5. Both anticipate loss from the change: the oppressed will lose their sense of moral superiority and the excuses of victimhood; the oppressor will lose the respect and material benefits associated with being more powerful (Deutsch, 2002, p. 21-22).

Underlings, rising towards equal dignity, similarly, may not understand that humiliating their former masters is as much a violation as when masters humiliate

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[401] I thank Morton Deutsch for this thought, which he communicated to me in a personal conversation in July 2003.

underlings. During the process of change, care is to be taken to discourage rising underlings from surpassing the line of humility. They are not to arrogate the master's place, because then they would merely replace the master and keep hierarchy intact. In the same spirit, former masters are not to be humiliated as far down as to the level of underlings. All, former masters and former underlings, are to be encouraged to meet at the line of humility, in the middle. Whereas in former times masters were replaced by revolting underlings and hierarchy was kept unchanged, the new strategy is to dismantle tyranny together with its societal structure, namely oppressive hierarchy itself.

Feelings of humiliation that emerge around the world can, ironical as it may sound, be interpreted as a success of human rights teachings. This is because feelings of humiliation are sharpened in contexts where ideals are created that do not correspond to reality. In short, when ideals arrive and reality does not follow, there is a *problem*. However, the occurrence of the *problem* also proves that the ideals, indeed, have arrived.

It is important to realize, however, that these heightened feelings of humiliation, though a "success" of human rights advocacy, have profound effects on people, as I was able to observe in my clients and during my social psychological research. Those who advocate human rights ought perhaps to become more aware what it means to intensify feelings of humiliation – what I would call the *nuclear bomb of feelings* – when they neglect that reality does not follow ideals and do not show dignified ways out of humiliation.

The *human rights revolution* heats up feelings in ways that especially established elites have hard times to grasp fast enough. The transition is too slow to alarm everybody and at the same time too fast to be risk-free. The international community's aim must be to prevent dynamics of humiliation from occurring and contain those that are in motion. Humiliating people has to be avoided, at all levels, at the family, organizational, national and international level. At the national and global level it is particularly essential to "dry out" the waters in which despotic humiliation entrepreneurs swim who spread global terror. As an Arab friend told me (May 1, 2003), "Why do you first feed dictators, sell them arms,[402] and then you bomb us to liberate us? Stop feeding dictators in the first place! Why is global trade still not fair and poverty abject in so many world regions? Invest in a fairer world and not in dictators that you first nurture in and then bomb out!"

Global village building

Global village building is not an affair to be left to laissez faire strategies or appeasement. It requires firm and courageous resolve. The question, however, is which kind of firm and courageous resolve is necessary. Courageous action can be invested into global institution building, containment and policing, or it can be invested into self-appointed law enforcement aiming to protect ones own family and interests only. The first application of courage is the one fitting in a global interdependent world, the second one is appropriate in an unsafe frontier region at pre-global times.

Wars that employ surgical strikes to liberate peoples from tyrants certainly have laudable advantages. *Surgical strikes* surely are preferable to *carpet bombing* because they attend to the problem in a more tailor-made fashion. Yet, even in surgery,

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[402] See, for example, Hartung, 1994.

surgeons who strike risk failure. Human encounter with the world has to become even more tailor-made than that. Prevention, for example, is preferable to post-hoc intervention. Prevention of disease can make surgery superfluous. However, even when prevention fails, instead of striking, surgeons often go about with painstaking meticulousness. Surgery is most of the time not the hit and run remedy as which it sometimes is portrayed. Even *surgical strikes* can go wrong, to minimize damage, better than on *surgical strikes* we may want to bet on *surgical art*.

Building sustainable *global village* institutions is tedious. It is a long haul operation that requires meticulous *surgical art*. For a constructive future for the *global village* it is not anymore practical to round up *friends* and *enemies* for short-term operations. It is not useful to ask "are you with us or against us" because this insinuates that there is space for *enemies* or those against *us* in *our* neighborhood. Humankind huddling on a tiny planet does not have this option, as difficult as it may be to let go of familiar *friends/enemy* notions. What is needed, are super-ordinate global institutional structures that include all.

There will always be unpleasant people around on the globe, and dangerously disturbed or psychotic individuals will never go away. Yet, the maximal negative label we may apply to such people is *bad neighbors* and not *enemies*. *Bad neighbors* have to be attended to by police, courts, or psychiatry. Only in this way the damage done by such individuals can be limited. The majority of the global community has to be protected from being drawn into stand-offs steered by antisocial personalities.

Courageous fighting and decisive resolve – these virtues have to be invested in fighting *for* global social and ecological sustainability and not *against* enemies. There is a right of self-defense; however, self-defense by merely *striking back* is counterproductive. As long as self-defense is not inclusive of all opponents and satisfies all sides, it represents not self-*defense*, but self-*damage*. This is inescapable reality on a limited, interdependent globe, at least for those who listen to the human rights message and wish for a pacified *global village*.

Security, stability, freedom, peace, these words have an old and a new meaning. The old meaning advocates the infliction of humiliation, the new meaning the abstaining from humiliation. Only the new meaning is adapted to new realities of *globalization* embracing *egalization*. Furthermore, for global *security, stability, freedom,* and *peace* it is not sufficient anymore to wait for the possible *arrival* of problems, it is mandatory to envisage and work for *preventing*[403] their arrival. It is, for example, not enough to foresee that China may become a graver threat to United States interests in the coming years than Russia and prepare for defense *against* this threat. It is not sufficient to ally with Russia and overlook its human rights violations in Chechnya so as to counterbalance the Chinese menace. This is just not good enough. It was – perhaps – good enough in the old world, yet, if it ever was, it is no longer.

In the new world of global interdependence, it is indispensable to include everybody into a neighborhood – nobody can escape from it in any case – in at least a minimal constructive way. Old *enmity* is no longer an option. Protecting *against* is no longer on the table. Fighting *for* inclusive neighborhood is the only choice there is. *Everybody's security hinges on everybody else's security. Global* terror has brought this home to everybody.

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[403] There exists a wide spectrum of literature on early warning. For efforts to collect societal indicators that can serve as alarm signals, see, for example, the *Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR)* program at the *Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM),* University of Maryland

The core approach to a new *inclusive world order* is to implement the rule of law – that is familiar at the national level – also to the global level. Present United Nations institutions are inceptions of such super-ordinate roofs of law for the entire global village.[404] *Might-is-right* muscle power loses significance when interdependence increasingly dictates the terms. Interdependence introduces vulnerability that replaces the necessity for force to interfere with the necessity for legitimacy to be attained.

One of Tony Blair's closest foreign political allies has warned Britain and America that they may live to regret unleashing the "law of the jungle" in international relations when China becomes the dominant world power later this century.

The Labour prime minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark, told the Guardian that Washington and its allies had created a dangerous precedent by going to war without a UN resolution.

"This is a century which is going to see China emerge as the largest economy, and usually with economic power comes military clout," she said.

"In the world we are constructing, we want to know [that the system] will work whoever is the biggest and the most powerful."

She understood why Britain had stood beside the US, its closest ally. But New Zealand had taken a different view, because of the danger of setting a precedent for ignoring the UN.

"It would be very easy for a country like New Zealand to make excuses and think of justifications for what its friends were doing, but we would have to be mindful that we were creating precedents for others also to exit from multilateral decision making," she said.

"I don't want precedents set, regardless of who is seen as the biggest kid on the block."

Ms Clark said the damage to the UN had to be re paired to prevent the world returning to 19th century style anarchy in international relations, which could leave countries like New Zealand at the mercy of the great powers.

"New Zealand has always argued for the rights of small states," she said – one of her predecessors, the wartime Labour prime minister Peter Fraser, helped to write the UN's founding charter.

"We saw the UN as a fresh start for a world trying to work out its problems together rather than a return to a 19th world where the great powers carved it up ... Who wants to go back to the jungle?"

The multilateral system had been damaged by the rifts over Iraq, but countries were now redoubling their efforts to cooperate in the Doha round of global trade talks (Denny and Freedland, 2003).

As important as global rule of law may be, humankind's efforts must reach beyond it. Mere *justice* is inadequate, *decency* has to be achieved (Margalit, 1996). Avishai Margalit (1996) wrote the book *The Decent Society*, in which he calls for institutions that do not anymore humiliate citizens. He states that it is not sufficient to merely aspire to building *just* societies, *decent* societies should be implemented that do not entail humiliation. Humiliating living conditions are not only unjust; they are also *obscene*. *Decency* reigns when humiliation is being minimized, humiliation in

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[404] This book is not the place to discuss how exactly such institutions should or could look like and how current national sovereignty may be reconciled with democratically anchored global institutions. These are tasks that will take decades to bring about. This book merely wishes to delineate the path.

relationships, but particularly humiliation inflicted by institutions. *Decency* reigns when dignity for all is made possible. *Decency* calls for a joint effort to attain the goals of the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* of September 2000.

Calling for *decency* is not merely a rose-colored naïve wish; it is the only way out. Margalit's notion of *decency* is the bedrock notion for preventing avoidable deteriorations of neighborhoods and preventing the globe from slipping over the edge. *Decency* does not mean that everybody should love everybody, or that all should receive a Mercedes. *Decency* is the minimum that is necessary to keep a neighborhood functioning – coexisting without mayhem – even when the neighbors are not at all in love with each other.

Roadmap of Transition from the Old to the New World Order

	Old Honor Order	**New Dignity Order**
Archi-tecture	➢ We observe many *villages* (not *One single global village*) based on a hierarchical honor code that legitimizes humiliation as a strategy (ranking of human worthiness). ➢ Feelings of humiliation are "locked" by the honor code (ranking human worthiness is legitimate) ➢ We see the world as divided into *friends* and *enemies*, *in-* and *outgroups* (because there are many *villages*), *higher* and *lesser* beings (because ranking human worthiness is legitimate).	➢ We observe *One single global village* (*globalization*) based on a code of equal dignity that de-legitimizes humiliation (*egalization* of human worthiness) ➢ Feelings of humiliation are being "unlocked" by the human rights message (stratification of human worthiness is illegitimate). ➢ We see *One single* global family, *One single ingroup* (*globalization*), within which feelings get hotter, especially when equal dignity (*egalization*) is seen to be violated.
Toolbox for strategy	➢ Humiliating others may at times protect my self-interest, both *inside* and *outside* my group. ➢ Protecting freedom and security *against* adversaries is feasible, since walls, bulwarks and war indeed may protect me. Furthermore, "empty" regions such as Australia still are available to send enemies into exile; moreover, global environmental interconnectedness is still limited.	➢ Humbling tyrants serves my self-interest only if it is done without humiliation. Bullies are not to be met by *war*, but by *policing*, and they are not *enemies*, but *misguided family members* or *bad neighbors*. Words such as *enemy* and *war* are obsolete in the new order. Defending the old honor order is increasingly self-defeating. In the corporate world, humiliation as tool to increase effectiveness of team work is increasingly counterproductive. ➢ Freedom and security are only feasible *together with* everybody else because even my next-door neighbor may turn his body into a missile or environmental hazard if I do not secure our relationship by ways of mutual trust. Freedom and security furthermore hinge on the achievement of global dignity through attaining the goals of the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* of September 2000.

Table 6: Roadmap of transition from the old to the new world order

This book proposes to learn the German/European lesson with a more long-term

punctuation of historic time. The lesson does not start with Hitler. It starts with the Treaties of Versailles. And, it is not a lesson about evil but about humiliation.

As stipulated in the Prologue, this book can be criticized for too stark language and lack of anchoring in established research on the notion of humiliation. Both criticisms are well-placed – or not. This book presents a novel perspective on the human condition and novelty by definition is not established – and new perspectives are perhaps sometimes best been broadcast with starkness. This book represents an invitation to the reader to join in with own research.

This book attempts to adhere to its own preaching by not overly clinging to the past in I-was-right-and-you-were-wrong fashions, but look at the future and ask "what can we learn from *our common* experiences? Which of *our common* reflections and strategies will promote social and ecological sustainability for *our* global village? The questions asked thus are not "who is right or who is wrong?" but "what is beneficial?" or, "in what way would humankind want to tailor-make solutions for new circumstances?" or, "which tendencies would benefit from being strengthened?"

The central question of our times is the following: Is the current deplorable state of the *global village* an expression of the *essence* of *globalization*? Or is it a *side effect* that can be remedied? In this book the position is put forward that the condition of the *global village*, obscene as it currently is, is a *side effect* that is not essentially connected to *globalization*. The problem may rather be that *unifying tendencies* at present transgress *national borders in a way* that hampers *egalization*. Global institution building that could curb global Hobbesian anarchy is lagging behind.

I believe that the framing of the human condition that is suggested in this book is thus not only interesting, but also extremely hope-inducing. It stipulates that there may be a *benign future* in store for the *global village* in the long term, if only we manage to *steer clear* of the *malignancies* threatening from the mine fields that loom on the way in the short term. *Globalization* and *egalization* are thus regarded as entailing grounds for high hopes, however, also for grave fears. The hopes are linked to a *global village* of social and ecological sustainability. The fears are linked – not alone but pivotally – to the phenomenon of humiliation. Dynamics of humiliation are brought to the fore by both, *globalization* and *egalization*. If not curbed, they risk undermining in *malignant* ways the *benign* tendencies otherwise to be observed.

However, there is hope. After all, at the national level Hobbesian anarchy has been tamed, thus, why should not the same success be possible at the global level? The incentive should be that the idea and reality of *One single interdependent ingroup* is more *benign* than the idea and reality of *many ingroups that consider each other as outgroups*. Hence, in this book, the *unifying tendencies* of *globalization* are differentiated from *egalization* tendencies, that are equally *benign* even though we currently experience an obscene lack of *egalization*, a lack that profoundly humiliates humanity in every single world citizen. Lack of *egalization* humiliates humanity because whenever equal dignity is violated, humanity is humiliated. This book therefore calls for counteracting these *malignant* tendencies and strengthening the *benign* tendencies of *globalization* and *egalization* by implementing a *Moratorium on Humiliation*.[405]

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[405] Similar to the *Moratorium On Trade In Small Arms*, or the *Moratorium On Commercial Whaling*. Read, for example, Patten and Lindh, 2001.

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