

Towards a Theory of Humiliation:

Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany

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My funds for fieldwork were limited and did not allow for stays in hotels, meals in Western style restaurants, or use of expensive transport such as taxis too much. Both in

¹ Titles such as Dr. or Professor will not be used in this book. The only exception will be made for physicians.

Europe and in Africa I depended on finding people who would house me, and help me with transportation in regions where public means such as buses would not suffice or be safe. In Africa I travelled for months, often on overcrowded rusty buses under breathtaking circumstances, with a backpack containing only my computer, and my digital audio and video equipment; there was no room in my bag for clothes or other personal things. Wherever I was welcomed into a house I received help with basic personal needs. Furthermore, I had no office facilities, and could not afford expensive hotel business centres for communication or for making interview appointments. In many cases, if available, I was generously offered some communication facilities by my hosts, such as use of telephone, or sometimes even Internet access. Thus I moved from home to home, on the average every week to a new place, for almost a year in Africa (also in Europe, only there for longer periods of several weeks or even months in one place), always looking for new hosts who would kindly house me and give me the invaluable opportunity to get involved in their lives and acquire an understanding of their perspective on life, an opportunity that hotel rooms would have foreclosed.

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² See for his publications for example Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996; Ross & Ward, 1995; Ross, in Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Ross & Samuels, 1993.

³ See for his publications for example Bond, 1986; Bond & Venus, 1991.

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⁴ See for his publications for example Smith, 2000a; Smith, 2000c; Smith, 2000b; Smith, 1999; Smith, 1997a; Smith, 1997b; Smith, 1991; Smith, 1984a; Smith, 1984b; Smith, 1983; Smith, 1981.

⁵ Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Ury, 1999.

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I built a network of altogether more than 500 interdisciplinary academic contacts, a network of conversation on the topic of humiliation. To date, autumn 2000, the actively

maintained academic network has grown to 532 researchers from all over the world, and the network of individual informants and/or representatives of organisations to 537. However, the numbers increase continuously, because almost daily I receive messages from researchers and practitioners who have heard about the humiliation project. It is impossible to name everybody. I beg anybody who does not find his or her name in this list to be assured that I highly appreciate every contribution that was given to me. But space does not permit to give due respect to all people who generously gave their time and reflections to this project.

Finally I would like to thank my parents. I have 'non-roots,' in other words, I am born into a family that is known in Germany as a 'refugee family' (correctly 'Vertriebene,' or 'internally displaced persons') from a region in Central Europe that does not 'exist' anymore, meaning that refugees such as my family cannot return 'home.' My family originates from Schlesien, Silesia, which became part of Poland after the Second World War. I have a father whose kind nature, more concerned with respecting human rights than waging war, corresponded badly with World War II requirements. Although I was born long after the World War II in West Germany, I grew up with the debate around the atrocities of the two World Wars, and my father's courageous and bitter struggle has given direction to my interests, and, very early in my life guided me towards wanting to learn from Germany's gruesome past and help others avoid a similar journey into horror.

Introduction⁶

On the 1st September 1999 a Burundian who lives in Europe and whose name I do not want to disclose wrote this intensely-felt message to me: ‘Sometimes, when I see how Europe avoids examining its own responsibility in the tragedy [of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda] and obsessively tries to attach criminal culpability to one ethnic group [the Hutu] and not to the real political authors of this Hecatomb, I ask myself whether the Rwandese drama is not being lived in the West as ‘therapy’ for the Jewish Shoah: the transfer of humiliation to another far-away, unknown, non-historical culprit. Il y a tellement à décrire, à écrire, à rire et à ire. Surtout à crier: There is so much to describe, to write about, to laugh about and get angry about (so much ire). But most of all, so much to cry about.’⁷

This quote shall serve as the opening statement for this manuscript.

After about twenty five years of international experience, having worked and studied in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the United States, in the fields of both psychology and medicine, - after learning many languages and having lived among people of many cultures, I developed a ‘gut feeling’ that the dynamics of humiliation may be more relevant to understanding the human condition than has hitherto been acknowledged. Clearly, ‘gut feelings’ are not, in themselves, ‘scientific’ - but they may serve as a valuable entry points into innovative and creative new research.⁸

An important entry point for my interest in the dynamics of humiliation was the widely accepted argument that Germany welcomed Hitler because Germany felt humiliated

⁶ This introduction is adapted from the doctoral dissertation *The Psychology of Humiliation: Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany* (Lindner, 2000b) in which the fieldwork that was carried out in Africa by the author is described in detail.

⁷ Translated by the author from French: ‘Des fois, quand je vois comment en Europe on ne veut pas examiner sa propre responsabilité dans la tragédie et que l’on veut absolument coller l’imputabilité criminelle à une ethnie et non aux vrais auteurs politiques de cet hécatombe, je me demande même si le drame rwandais n’est pas vécu en Occident en thérapeutique de la Shoah juive: le transfert de l’humiliation vers un autre, éloigné, inconnu, non historique. Il y a tellement à décrire, à écrire, à rire et à ire. Surtout à crier.’

⁸ ‘In qualitative inquiry the researcher is the instrument. Validity in qualitative methods, therefore, hinges to a great extent on the skill, competence, and rigor of the person doing fieldwork’ (Patton, 1990, 14, italics in original). Patton continues on the same page and quotes Guba and Lincoln: the naturalistic ‘inquirer is himself the instrument, changes resulting from fatigue, shift in knowledge, and cooptation, as well as variations resulting from differences in training, skill, and experience among different “instruments,” easily occur. But this loss in rigor is more than offset by the flexibility, insight, and ability to build on tacit knowledge that is the peculiar province of the human instrument’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 113)

after World War I by the Treaty of Versailles (28th June 1919).⁹ After World War II the victorious allies took care to not humiliate Germany again, so as to avoid World War III, so-to-speak. Instead, Germany received Marshall Aid and was integrated into Western alliances. High politics thus demonstrate the influence and applicability of psychological reflections: humiliation has, indeed, been identified as a cause of world wars. I wondered why humiliation was not more widely researched in psychology. Supposing that humiliation really does have the potential to trigger world wars? I set out to have a closer look at its role.

The Innovative Approaches Adopted Within This Text

This text will provide the reader with insights flowing from a number of innovative approaches; one is the point just mentioned which is that, as a psychologist, I take lay assumptions concerning the importance of the psychological causes of war – pertaining to the notion of humiliation – more seriously than psychology has done so far, since, if their existence is substantiated, such causes may be very significant.

The next innovation, a creative challenge for both the reader and the author, is the broad interdisciplinary approach envisaged here for understanding the issue of humiliation, branching out from a secure base in psychology. The topic of massacres¹⁰ and mass killings – ranging from the Holocaust and other forms of genocide and ethnic cleansing to terrorism and war - requires an interdisciplinary analysis. Psychology cannot make its full contribution except in this broader context that recognises the embeddedness of inter-personal humiliation processes within specific types of social hierarchy and a broader context of socio-political structures with distinctive patterns of historical development. I believe that this text, though thoroughly rooted in social psychology, will be relevant also for a wide range of other academic fields, including political science, sociology, conflict resolution studies and peace studies.

⁹ This treaty included the now infamous war-guilt clause imposing complete responsibility for the war on the Germans and demanding that they 'make complete reparation for all... loss and damage' caused: 'The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies' (Versailles Treaty 1919, part VIII, section I, article 231). See also Sebastian Haffner & Bateson, 1978, and Norbert Elias, 1996.

¹⁰ Robert B. Zajonc uses the word 'massacre' to subsume for example Holocaust, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, see Robert B. Zajonc's forthcoming book, Zajonc, 1999.

Several implications make such interdisciplinary work challenging. For example, language has to be kept as neutral as possible in the face of disciplinary identities that all have their own rules, ideologies, and ‘initiation rites’ regarding language and method. I will deliberately avoid over-use of ‘insider’ terminology and will heed Gergen’s reflections: ‘...we can speak with some confidence about the emotions of fear, anger, and sadness, because these terms are constituents of a widely shared vocabulary (of approximately a dozen “emotion” terms) employed with a high degree of frequency within the culture. To admit ignorance of such feelings or to declare them to be absent from one’s makeup – would be to render doubt about one’s membership in the human species. Would a person be altogether human if he/she could feel no anger or sadness? Other psychological predicates, shared by smaller and sometimes more marginal groups within the culture, fail to command such credibility. Terms like existential anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, spiritual awareness, flow, and channelling command respect in various pockets of the culture, but for vast numbers may be discounted as jargon or cult language. More extremely, to claim oneself to be overwhelmed with *acidia*, a term popular in medieval monasteries; suffering from a strong bout of melancholy (a term of great interest to 19th century poets and novelists); or seized by *mal de siècle* (a term that moved many to suicide less than a century ago) would probably raise queried looks among one’s companions’ (Gergen, in Grodin & Lindlof, 1996, 3).

The reader will be invited to share the insights flowing from yet another innovation. Through my background as a physician and a clinical psychologist I am accustomed to using the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy, and this will be the overarching approach in this text.¹¹ I will expand this three-step pattern to include also prevention so that it figures as diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention. Prevention is the best therapy for the future,

¹¹ I received support for this approach in 1998 from Magdy A. Hefny, Egyptian diplomat and expert on the ‘OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’ in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Furthermore, Johan Galtung, at the conference Higher Education for Peace, 4th – 6th May in Tromsø, North Norway, reported that his family is a family of doctors, and that he was supposed to become one himself, which he fulfilled, so-to-speak, by advocating the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy for the field of peace studies. Johan Galtung states furthermore that according to his experience diplomats are not very well prepared to become good mediators, while psychotherapists are often better suited, because, he explains, ‘problems at the geopolitical level resemble family problems; micro, meso and macro levels are connected; compassion and perseverance are important!’ Also Paul Ricoeur, renowned French philosopher, recommends this approach, and this is taken very seriously in Rwanda; his article ‘Le pardon peut-il guerir? [Can pardon heal?]’ (Ricoeur, 1995) has been reprinted in the Rwandese journal *Dialogue, Revue d’information et de réflexion* which is currently published from Belgium. Ricoeur’s article is the opening article in the journal’s special issue ‘Two Years After the Genocide,’ ‘Le Génocide Rwandais: Deux Ans Après.’ Last but not least Jürgen Habermas can be drawn upon; Anthony Giddens refers to him when he advocates the therapy approach in *New Rules of Sociological Method* (Giddens, 1976, see further down for more details).

based on diagnosis of the past, and the prognosis drawn from it. My past experience has taught me to envisage the diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention paradigm at the micro and meso level, and now I am extending this approach to encompass the macro level. During my training as a physician I learned about the micro level, the human body in its physical and social environment, and through my education as a Western clinical psychologist in the Rogerian tradition I learned much about relationships between individuals. Later, during my medical work in different cultures, but especially during my seven years (1984-1991) of work as a clinical psychologist in Cairo, Egypt, - a rather collectivistic society, - my attention turned to family relations and how they may contribute to constructive diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention sequences. In this research I approach even larger groups, ranging from clans to nations and ultimately to the so-called international community.¹²

At this point both author and reader face up to new challenges, namely the need to avoid the potential danger of patronising or even unsolicited therapy and, in intercultural settings, the additional problem of overcoming ethno-centrism. When I finished my education as a physician I decided not to work in this field, because medicine in Western contexts – perhaps less so in a number of non-Western contexts – has long been a stronghold of conservative hierarchical approaches to the world in general and patients in particular. In other words, in my research I had to be aware of the danger that a self-appointed therapist like myself may be unwelcome, or that therapy may be perceived as nothing else but intrusion, or as a badly disguised attempt to exercise power.

Furthermore, in Egypt I understood from ‘first hand’ experience that what is called ‘psychology’ or ‘therapy’ is a Western product and thus ethno-centric.¹³ Over the years, through my work with people of the many nationalities that live in Cairo, I developed a cognitive approach to therapy and conflict resolution in which I tried to model the process of finding diagnosis - prognosis - therapy as a dialogue between equal partners. In other words, I avoided having ‘clients,’ or ‘patients’ who would encounter me as the therapist and supposed ‘possessor of all wisdom.’ ‘Therapy’ would, instead, become a shared common journey into knowledge of Western culture with its specific ideals of health, quality of life, and happiness,

¹² Thomas J. Scheff supports this endeavour: ‘In claiming an isomorphism between interpersonal and international relations I realize I challenge an article of faith of modern social science: that structure and process at the societal level are fundamentally different from those at the level of persons... I show parallels between the communication tactics and emotion that occur in families and in relations between nations’ (Scheff, 1997a, 75). Also Johan Galtung confirms (May 2000 in Tromsø) that micro, meso and macro levels can be viewed together.

¹³ See Harry Charalambos Triandis chapter on ‘Theoretical Concepts That Are Applicable to the Analysis of Ethnocentrism’ (Triandis, in Brislin, 1990).

combined with a similar journey into the non-Western culture of my respective dialogue partner, a journey in the course of which we detected different, and analogous ideals of health, quality of life, and happiness.

My encounters with ‘clients’ thus turned into shared ‘archaeological projects’¹⁴ combined with ‘architectural projects.’¹⁵ The archaeological approach attempted to unearth underlying structures of their individual and family situations and placed them in their historical and cultural context by drawing upon various disciplines, not only psychology but also anthropology, sociology, philosophy, history, and political science. Openings for healing, or the construction of new social realities, often emerged when synergies between the different cultural perspectives reinforced each other in novel ways, and innovative perspectives shed new light on old problems. The aim of this book is to move this ‘archaeological/architectural project’ approach from the micro and meso level to a macro level and find similar synergies for larger groups.

What I struggled with in Egypt was the complicated three-sided relationship between the ‘problem’ or ‘case’ (disease, symptom), the client who ‘has’ the problem, and, finally, the therapist. Does the therapist treat the problem? Does the therapist treat the client? Or, do therapist and client attend to the problem together, as ‘co-subjects’? ‘Deltakar og tilskodar’ [‘Participant and Observer’] is a classic text of unique clarity in which Hans Skjervheim (drawn upon and highly regarded by Jürgen Habermas¹⁶) gets to the very heart of the problem by suggesting that the ‘ego-alter relation’ has to be divided into two components, ‘at first the ego and alter (i.e. I and the other) are together on some third thing, we have the same problem, ego and alter are co-subjects who together confront the same case. In the second case the alter and what the alter does is a fact in the world of the ego. There is no longer a shared participation in the same case. Each lives in his/her own world where the alter has facticity for the ego in the world of the ego. There is, however, a further alternative. The ego may, instead of listening to what the alter says, listen to the sounds which the alter produces, and thereby turn the alter into a pure physical object in its world. This is the programme of behaviourism, one which that school, understandably enough, has not followed through. In daily life it is not a question of one or the other or the third, but about all the three attitudes at

¹⁴ Claude Lévi-Strauss uses the image of archaeology for his work in anthropology; he superimposes different stratae and searches for structures that would not be discernible from only one strata.

¹⁵ See Steinar Kvale’s discussion of the researcher as a ‘miner’ or a ‘traveller’ further down.

¹⁶ I am very grateful to Jon Hellesnes for introducing me to Hans Skjervheim and his work (personal conversation on 28th October 2000), as well as to Habermas, 1996, *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*.

the same time. Therefore the situation of the fellow human being is, in principle, not unambiguous, but “ambiguous.” It is this ambiguous situation within which the human sciences are embedded, and it is here that the roots of the complicated fundamental problems of these sciences are to be found.¹⁷

Research on humiliation, genocide and war, is, unavoidably, a journey into the abyss of this ‘ambiguous’ human condition, and such a journey cannot be confronted from within an academic field or discipline, it has to begin with a distancing step away from well-established paths, with an acceptance of Heidegger’s notion that all human beings – be they therapist, scholar, client or patient – are ‘thrown into the world.’ In *Sein und Zeit* [*Being and Time*], Heidegger’s purpose is to bring to light how it is to ‘be,’ and what it means to ask, ‘What is the meaning of Being?’ According to Heidegger these questions lie behind the obviousness of everyday life and, therefore, also behind the empirical questions of natural science.

Paul Stenner discusses Heidegger’s contributions to phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism in terms of distinctions between truth and correctness, the ontological and the ontic, and Being and beings, and uses Heidegger to offer ‘deep reflexivity’ to psychology. ‘Heidegger’s arguments concerning ontology before the subject/object distinction, his discussion of enframing, his concern with the understanding of being, and his distinction between modes of being are all important for a rethinking of psychological practice’ (Stenner, 1998, Abstract).¹⁸

¹⁷ Translated by the author from Nynorsk, a Norwegian language of particular historic standing, richness and clarity: ‘Vi har således løyst ego-alter relasjonen opp i to komponentar, først der ego og alter (d.e. eg og den andre) er saman om noko tridje, vi har eit sams problem, ego og alter er medsubjekt i høve til det sams sakstilhøvet. I det andre tilfelle er alter og det alter gjer, eit faktum i ego sin verden. Ein deler ikkje same sakstilhøvet lenger. Ein lever i kvar sin verden, der alter er eit faktum for ego i ego sin verden. Det finnes rett nok endå eit alternativ. Ego kan, i staden for å høyra etter kva alter seier, lytta til dei lydane som alter produserar, og med det gjera alter til eit reint fysikalsk objekt i sin verden. Dette er behaviorismen sitt program, men som rimeleg er har dei late vera å fylgja det. I dagleglivet er det ikkje tale om det eine eller det andre eller det tridje, men om alle tre holdningane på same tid. Difor er den mellommenneskelege situasjon prinsipielt ikkje eintydig, men ”tvetydig”. I denne tvetydige situasjonen er vitenskapane om mennesket opphengde, og der er rota til dei kompliserte grunnlagsproblema når det gjeld desse vitenskapane’ (Skjervheim, in Slagstad, 1976, 205).

¹⁸ Hermeneutics ask, ‘What are the conditions under which a human act took place or a product was produced that makes it possible to interpret its meanings?’ (Patton, 1990, 84). Hermeneutic philosophy, as developed by Wilhelm Dilthey and other German philosophers, is the study of interpretive understanding, or meaning, of *verstehen*, with special attention to context and original purpose. Patton writes: ‘The term *hermeneutics* refers to a Greek technique for interpreting legends, stories, and other texts. To make sense of and interpret a text, it is important to know what the author wanted to communicate, to understand intended meanings, and to place documents in a historical and cultural context’ (Patton, 1990, 84, italicisation in original).

Questions to Be Asked

The sequence of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention evidently has to start out with the therapist who, together with the patient, is ‘thrown into the world,’ and asks questions concerning diagnosis that, as in the case of this project, address the role of humiliation.

Questions such as the following may be formulated:

Is the lay-hypothesis introduced above – the one so often repeated with reference to the Versailles Accords – that humiliation may lead to war, correct? Among all the reasons that have been discussed as causes of violence and war, is it possible that *humiliation* plays a role? And, does *humiliation* contribute – not only to war – but also to Holocaust, genocide and ethnic cleansing? Could also terrorism and suicide bombings have roots in *humiliation*? Could, furthermore, even benevolent acts have *humiliating* effects? Could it be possible, for example, that organisations such as the United Nations or international humanitarian organisations might at times *humiliate* those they want to help, even without noticing it? Could thus *humiliation* be a virulent agent involved in starting and maintaining conflicts, conflicts concerning not just the initial opponents, but also third parties attempting to mediate? And might it not be the case that unless *humiliation* is addressed and healed no reconciliation or peace can be lasting?

These questions are not meant to imply that objective factors of *Realpolitik* such as competition for scarce resources do not play a role in violent conflicts. Nor do they claim that conflict in itself is negative since, for example, power imbalances might need conflict to be adjusted, and conflict may also, at times, facilitate creativity.¹⁹ They suggest that struggles around objective factors or power imbalances do not necessarily generate violence, on the contrary, conflicts around objective factors and power imbalances may also lead to non-violent confrontations, and eventually to compromise and co-operation. Behind the questions enumerated above lies the suggestion that it might often be the other way round, namely that feelings of humiliation may feed on objective factors and then create violent conflict. Hitler’s Germany may serve as an awful example: economic hardship and unemployment combined with feelings of humiliation after World War I are widely believed to have made the German population susceptible to Hitler’s demagoguery.²⁰

¹⁹ ‘Modern researchers argue that conflict is a necessity if cognitive change is to occur. The problem is, as stated before, that the utility of a conflict lies in its management. Under good conflict management, conflict can be a necessary precondition for creativity’ (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000e, 3).

²⁰ This paragraph is adapted from Lindner, 1996, the project description that formed the basis for the research project on humiliation that will be explained in the following.

The Research Project

The research project that is the basis for this text has been designed to explore these questions, not only with respect to Hitler's Germany, but also in the context of more recent incidents of war and genocide, and it is being conducted at the University of Oslo (1997-2001).²¹ It is entitled *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*.²² 216 qualitative interviews have been carried out by the present author, from 1998 to 1999 in Africa (in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland, in Kigali and other places in Rwanda, in Bujumbura, capital of Burundi, in Nairobi in Kenya, and in Cairo in Egypt), and from 1997 to 2001 in Europe (in Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and in Belgium).

As the title of the project indicates, three groups had to be interviewed, namely both the conflict parties in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, and representatives of third parties who intervene. These three groups stand in a set of triangular relationships, at least this is the minimum version, - where there are more than two opponents, as is the case in most conflicts, the pattern, obviously, has more than three corners. Both in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, representatives of the 'opponents' and the 'third party' were approached, as were witnesses of Hitler's reign in Germany. Some of the interview conversations were filmed (altogether 10 hours of film were produced by the author, comprising many interviews, but also images of Somaliland and Rwanda), other interviews were taped on mini discs (altogether more than 100 hours of audio tape), and in situations where this seemed inappropriate notes were taken. The following people were included in the 'network of conversations' that was created in the course of the research:

- Survivors of genocides were interviewed, that is people belonging to the groups that were targeted for genocidal killing. In Somalia this included, among others, the Isaaq tribe, in Rwanda the Tutsi, in Burundi Hutu and Tutsi. The group of survivors is typically divided into two parts, namely those who survived because they were not in the country when the genocide happened, - some of them returned after the genocide, - and those who survived

²¹ See project description on www.uio.no/~evelinl.

²² For articles written so long, see Lindner, 1999a; Lindner, 2000g; Lindner, 2000h; Lindner, 2000c; Lindner, 2000i; Lindner, 2000e; Lindner, 2000j; Lindner, 2000a; Lindner, 1999b; Lindner, 2000k; Lindner, 2000l.

the onslaught inside the country. The German background of this fieldwork consists of the network of contacts that I have established, over some decades, with survivors from the Holocaust and, especially, their children.

- Freedom fighters were included into the ‘network of conversation.’ In Somalia, interviews were conducted with SNM (Somali National Movement) fighters in the North of Somalia, who fought the troops sent by the central government in Mogadishu in the South; in Rwanda the interviewees were the former Tutsi refugees who formed an army, the RFP (Rwandese Patriotic Front), and attacked Rwanda from the North in order to oust the extremist Hutu government which carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; in Burundi there were also Hutu rebels. In Germany, the equivalent of these contacts were my exchanges with those aristocratic circles in Germany that fed opposition against Hitler, but also with those, especially from my family, who advocated human rights in the middle of World War II and paid a high price for their human compassion. Furthermore, my contacts with people from the occupied countries who tried to sabotage German oppression, for example the Norwegian resistance movement, belong into this group, as well as representatives of the allies who finally put an end to German atrocities.
- Some Somali warlords who have their places of retreat in Kenya were interviewed.
- Politicians were included, among them people who were in power before the genocide and whom survivors secretly suspected of having been collaborators or at least silent supporters of those who perpetrated the genocide. The equivalent in Germany is the atmosphere of underlying suspicion in which I grew up, generally a mistrust towards everybody of a certain age, but in particular suspicion towards the past of those people in power, a suspicion that only diminishes as the years pass and people die.
- Somali and Rwandan/Burundian academicians who study the situation of their countries were interviewed. For Germany the last striking manifestation in this field, and a focal point for discussions, has been Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s book on *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*.
- Representatives of national non-governmental organisations who work locally for development, peace and reconciliation were included. In Germany, the response to the atrocities of World War II permeates everybody’s life – even the generation born after the war – and my intimate knowledge of a culture of German self-criticism may stand as an equivalent to the pre-occupation with past, present, and future anticipated bloodshed that characterises people’s lives in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi.

- Third parties were interviewed, namely representatives of United Nations organisations and international non-governmental organisations who work on emergency relief, long-term development, peace, and reconciliation in all parts of the world.
- Egyptian diplomats in the foreign ministry in Egypt who deal with Somalia were visited; Egypt is a heavyweight in the OAU.
- African psychiatrists in Kenya who deal with trauma and forensic psychiatry were asked about their experience with victims and perpetrators from Rwanda/Burundi and Somalia. In Kenya many nationals from Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi have sought refuge, some in refugee camps, others through various private arrangements. Some, both victims and perpetrators, seek psychiatric help. The equivalent in Germany are those researchers who focus on the effects of the German Holocaust and other World War II atrocities.
- Those who have not yet been interviewed are the masterminds of genocide in Rwanda, those who have planned the genocide, and organised it meticulously. Some of them are said to be in hiding in Kenya and other parts of Africa, or in French-speaking parts of Europe, or in the United States and Canada. Some are in prisons in Rwanda and in Arusha, Tanzania. However, accounts of people who were close to Somali dictator Siad Barre have successfully been collected. In the case of Hitler and those who supported him, a culture of openness and frank discussion is currently unfolding in Germany – the whole country has entered into a phase of ‘working through’ these past experiences, and people who never talked before, do so now, more than 50 years after World War II.
- As mentioned above, the topic has also been discussed with more than 500 researchers working in related fields. The current state-of-the-art has been mapped, showing that few researchers have turned their attention to this field. A Theory of Humiliation is currently being developed by the author, and a larger book project is envisaged.²³

The empirical work will be explained further down in more detail and will not be expanded further in this introductory section. At this point the reader will be presented with an initial impression of how the dynamics of humiliation may be seen at work at micro, meso, and macro levels. The already mentioned case of Hitler’s Germany will be the first example.

²³ In partnership with Dennis Smith, Loughborough University, UK. Smith is professor of sociology at Loughborough University (UK), see his publications in the reference list.

Introductory Examples of the Dynamics of Humiliation

After Germany's defeat in 1945, care was taken not to repeat the humiliation of 1918. Instead of facing draconian demands for reparations, Germany was given help to rebuild its industrial economy and was brought into NATO and the European Community (now the European Union). The clear intention was to avoid a third world war against Germany with all the horrible costs that would entail' (Lindner, 2000a, 2).

The Marshall Plan was central to preventing a renewed humiliation. Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirmed this when he spoke at Harvard University 5th June 1972 at the commemoration of George Marshall's speech 25 years earlier (Brandt, 1999). Brandt's speech was entitled: '1945 Different Than 1918.'

Willy Brandt, with his own talent for making historic speeches, declared: '...Victories, too, can be bitter, especially if they carry the seed for future conflicts as in 1918, when the war was won, and peace was lost for want of reason on the part of the winners and the losers, through stubborn mistrust on the one side, through resentment of the humiliated on the other... George Marshall and others agreed that victory did not relieve his country of its responsibility. The United States did not for a moment claim that responsibility for itself, it shared it with its allies...With his plan George Marshall roused Europe's stifled self-confidence. He gave many citizens of the old continent a concrete stimulus to bring down from the stars the vision of a Europe united in lasting peace... the Marshall Plan was productive proof that America needs a self-confident Europe capable of forming a common political will... it waits for Europe to grow into an equal partner with whom it can share the burden of responsibility for world affairs...1947 marked the beginning of the Cold War, not because of, but in spite of the Marshall Plan.'

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	The Treaty of Versailles humiliated a defeated Germany and – together with economic hardship – prepared Germany for Hitler.
Consequences of humiliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World War and Holocaust. • As a consequence, all Germans acquired the reputation of being ‘willing executioners’ who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	The Marshall Plan provided Germany with new dignity, and instead of an excluded pariah, Germany is a member of NATO and EU.

Table 1: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the international level

The two world wars thus seem to support the proposition that humiliation may lead to war, Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism. At the turn of the millennium those very issues are still all very high on the world’s political agenda. In recent years, genocide has occurred in Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia, atrocities have been committed in East-Timor and many other places.

To take Rwanda, Jason Clark writes about the genocide in 1994: ‘The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was the execution of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu by Hutu-supremacists in the name of Hutu superiority. It took place at a pace three times that of the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews. This genocide I find to be, with no hyperbole, perhaps the single worst, most immoral, tragic, and horrific event of human history; for a few reasons. First, the genocide was committed not by a military elite but by the populace at large, using crude weapons (mostly machetes). Second, the international community (read: the United States and Western Europe) did almost nothing to stop it, despite repeated warnings. Third, the size and rapidity of the genocide was astounding. Fourth, it was the archetype of genocide, nothing motivated the killers besides a hate that had accumulated over the centuries’ (Clark, 2000, 1).

Rwanda could be added to the list of sad examples illustrating the dynamics of humiliation. Table 2 proposes a possible version of these dynamics, this time not between states, as in the case of Germany, but within a single state.

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	Extremist members of the Hutu ruling class – Hutu being the former ‘underlings’ in the traditional Tutsi kingdom of Rwanda – feared the return of past humiliation if their former Tutsi masters were to regain influence.
Consequences of humiliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Genocide. • As a consequence, all Hutu acquired the reputation of ‘genocidaires’ who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 2: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the national level

Examples are not restricted to the national or international level; the global multilateral level is equally affected. In 1993 an angry crowd dragged a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia.²⁴ On New Year’s Eve 1998 I interviewed a Somali warlord (Osman Ato, a former ally of General Aidid) who was just one of many Somali voices who insisted that in the eyes of many Somalis (and others) the UNOSOM operation was a big humiliation. This was especially true, he maintained, when a house was attacked and bombed where respected elders had a meeting. He felt even more humiliated, he was adamant, by the cynical and humiliating justification that was given for the bombing, namely that this meetinghouse was supposedly a headquarters. He argued strongly that ‘when the Americans feel humiliated because their soldiers’ bodies were shown in the streets, they should ask themselves why this happened. They should be aware of the fact that killing elders, for example, is a deep humiliation in Somali society.’ The helicopters, the bombing, all this, he maintained, were acts of humiliation that united Somalis against the UN. Osman Ato’s views illustrated that he, a warlord, and himself an ‘organiser of violence,’ fervently thinks in terms of humiliation and ‘counter-humiliation,’ as do wide circles of the Somali people, who united together with him under the banner of ‘necessary’ counter-humiliation.

But not only Osman Ato saw humiliation at work. Even some of the most earnest, humane and well willing helpers on the American side felt uneasy. Sam Engelstad, UN’s Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, and, on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in

²⁴ On 9th December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), or Operation Restore Hope, was launched in Somalia by the United States, as a response to the failing of the first United Nations operation UNOSOM. However, UNITAF also came to fail, as did UNOSOM II. Especially, the hunt for Somali General Aidid undermined UN impartiality and turned the UN and the US into targets of Somali mistrust and revenge.

Mogadishu in 1994, wrote²⁵: ‘During my own time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent.’ Engelstad adds that ‘Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us.’

A cycle of humiliation was put in motion in Somalia, see Table 3: First the Somalis felt humiliated, and then they responded by inflicting humiliation upon dead American bodies. The latter phase of this cycle is still relevant today to any traveller, especially from the rich world, as incidents of kidnappings and bombings show, which limit the freedom to move internationally because of fear of terrorist attacks. Not even humanitarian workers such as Red Cross and Red Crescent staff are safe from kidnap incidents, such as the one that occurred in Somalia in April 1998.²⁶ Anti-Western terrorism in Egypt (for example Luxor, 1997), or the 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, are further examples that have filled the media. The recent kidnap drama on the Philippines may also serve as an instance; an American hostage was ‘worth’ much more than hostages with other passports, namely claims of ten million dollars and the release of prisoners in the United States (1st September 2000, ARD ‘Tagesschau,’ Germany).

The humiliating ending of the UN operation in Somalia had profound effects at the global multilateral level, as this quote illustrates: ‘The international community’s intervention in Somalia has become synonymous with the prevailing mood in many quarters against international intervention in far-flung civil conflicts, against the broadening of peacekeeping into “nation-building” operations, and against the United Nations in general’ (Jan, 1996, 1).

Rwanda paid a high price for this ‘mood against international intervention’: When the genocide started in Rwanda in 1994 the international community left Rwandans to slaughter each other, because nobody wanted a ‘second Somalia.’²⁷ This is the more shocking since as few as 5000 troops could have saved almost a million lives: ‘A modern force of 5,000

²⁵ Personal communication from Sam Engelstad (28th September 1999), quoted with his permission.

²⁶ Eight Red Cross and Red Crescent staff were kidnapped at the airport in Mogadishu North. On 4th January 1999, in Nairobi, the present author interviewed the head of the group, Ola Skuterud from the Norwegian Red Cross, later also two other hostages as well as the chief negotiator of the Red Cross who brokered their release.

²⁷ See for example O’Halloran, 1995.

troops... sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war...’ (Feil, 1998, 3, quoted from The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 10, paragraph 9).

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE GLOBAL, MULTILATERAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	Somalis felt humiliated by certain operations that were part of an international intervention that was intended to help Somalis.
Consequences of humiliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Somalis killed UN peacekeepers, and publicly humiliated the dead bodies of U.S. pilots. Also today, especially Western tourists are at risk of being kidnapped or even killed in some world regions. • As a consequence, people in need in some world regions have acquired the reputation of being unthankful recipients who do not deserve sympathy or help. The international community, for example, hesitated to protect Rwandans against genocide.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 3: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the global, multilateral level

Similar dynamics of humiliation may be diagnosed at the intercultural level. As discussed above, Western psychology is ethno-centric. I will relate a story that reinforced my interest in studying this topic; it also connects to the first part of Sam Engelstad’s quote. I learned to understand how Western psychology may be inadequate within the framework of other cultures, and may have a humiliating effect, though unintended, upon these other cultures.

I would like to recount one exemplary story, representative for a larger number of examples, in order to illustrate how the situation became obvious to me: I remember how disturbing it was to see how some of my Western colleagues ‘humiliated’ their Egyptian clients without noticing it, even believing that their actions were for their clients’ ‘best.’ A Western colleague, for example, advised young Egyptian girls who sought her advice because they suffered from problematic family situations, to get their own apartment in order to ‘cut the umbilical cord’ and, ‘by God, get on their own feet!’ My Western therapist-colleague was

unwilling to understand, when I explained, that in most Egyptian contexts it would be quite harmful for a young girl to move into her own flat, that she rather should move to her grandmother, aunt, or some other relative. My colleague defended her approach and explained to me that she felt that the Egyptian population was disadvantaged because they ‘had not yet had the chance’ to learn enough about the Western way of life, and were ‘deprived’ of relevant Western knowledge about how healthy people should behave. When the girls in question did not actually move to a flat of their own, the therapist drew the conclusion that the girls ‘did not wish to get better.’ The therapist told the girls that they were ‘wasting the therapist’s time,’ and should ‘come back when they were serious.’

This example may tentatively be systematised in Table 4 and thus provide an example for the dynamics of humiliation at the intercultural level:

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE INTERCULTURAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	Some instances of ‘helpful’ intervention by Western counsellors were not well enough adapted to Egyptian culture. What was intended as help proved to be humiliating in its effects.
Consequences of humiliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some Egyptian clients stopped accepting ‘help’ from their Western helpers. • As a consequence, these Egyptian clients acquired the reputation of being unthankful recipients who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 4: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the intercultural level

Finally, the interpersonal level shall be briefly touched upon in this enumeration of illustrative examples of the dynamics of humiliation. On the basis of many years of international experience, I suggest that it is a universal human experience to feel terrible if put down and humiliated. I believe that humiliation is especially salient if your love is being rejected in the very act of humiliation; even worse, if the wish to be loved back is being denied at the same time.

I had a client whose mother-in-law enjoyed saying, in front of the whole family, with disgust in her voice: ‘And you want to be part of our family? Who do you think you are?’ My client reported to me what she felt when confronted with this behaviour for the first time: ‘I was deeply shocked and petrified; I felt cold, could hardly breath, and I was unable to

answer.’ She came to me because she felt that she was not addicted to alcohol or cigarettes: much worse, she was caught in her own pain. She could not distance herself, could not develop any leisure interests or relaxing hobbies. Her entire life was consumed by her relationship with her in-laws, a relationship that was filled with a continuous flow of incidents of humiliation and counter-humiliation, sometimes minute, sometimes overwhelmingly vicious; she could not stop being obsessed with imagining all kinds of revenge. After her husband’s death her in-laws tried to trick her out of her inheritance and she was locked in bitter court-cases with them for many years. She repeatedly became so desperate that she did ‘stupid’ things as she called it – for example writing ‘hysterical’ letters, or starting to shout at her adversaries in the court room – behaviour that did not earn her the respect she wished to receive from the judge, her lawyer and others involved in the case.

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE FAMILY LEVEL	
Humiliation	My client is being humiliated by her in-laws.
Consequences of humiliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • My client is obsessed by dreams of revenge. She occasionally gets ‘crazy,’ writes ‘hysterical’ letters, or shouts at her adversaries. • As a consequence, she acquired the reputation of not deserving sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 5: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the intercultural level

These exemplary snapshots indicating the relevance of the dynamics of humiliation are intended to give the reader a taste of what humiliation may entail, and where to find it. Further down in the text some of these examples, especially those at the macro-level, will be examined in more detail.

Tentatively, one may conclude, from the list of examples presented, that the war-torn first half of the twentieth century in Europe suggests that humiliation can lead to war, to Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, while the second half of the century indicates that the same proposition may be true in other parts of the world as well. Furthermore, the examples presented give a taste of the wide range of consequences flowing from humiliation. Incidents of humiliation may lead to extreme reactions such as massacres, but may also be relevant in the more subtle undermining of, for example, intercultural

relations. Moreover, these examples make it, perhaps, clearer how humiliation may be played out at all levels, affecting relations between individuals as well as groups.

In other words, these introductory remarks highlight incidents and processes that invite the hypothesis that deeply damaging experiences of humiliation may be a major cause of the widespread occurrence of the break-down of relations around the world, leading to outcomes ranging from hidden animosity to open violence such as war, genocide, terrorism and kidnapping. The characteristics of humiliation merit detailed investigation. If people feel humiliated, they may strike back when they can, and this may lead not only to extreme outcomes such as war and violence, but also to more muted consequences, such as the hampering of constructive relations, strategies and conflict solutions that otherwise would be attainable.

What Is Humiliation?

The reader who has followed this argument will now ask: But what is humiliation and what makes humiliation so special that it can be hypothesised to lead to all kinds of rifts between people, even to massacres and unspeakable atrocities?

The very word ‘humiliation’ gradually altered its meaning as the idea of universal human dignity slowly percolated through Western societies and then became global. For example, ‘According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757. Its usual sense prior to the mid-eighteenth century is more closely related to the physical act of bowing, or prostrating oneself ... The metaphoric underpinning of *humiliate* connected it more to humility and making humble than to what we now think of as humiliation’ (Miller, 1993, 175, italics in original).

The word ‘humble’ with its meaning ‘having a low estimate of oneself’ is first recorded in English in the 13th century (see *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* by Hoad, 1986, 222). In the 14th century ‘humble’ means ‘of lowly condition.’ The Middle English word ‘(h)umble’ stems from Old French ‘umble’ and (also modern) ‘humble,’ which is formed on the Latin word ‘humilis’ which means ‘low,’ ‘lowly,’ ‘mean.’ ‘Humilis’ in turn is formed on the substantive ‘humus,’ ‘earth,’ and is also relative to ‘homo,’ ‘man.’ The verb ‘humiliate’ was first used in English in the 14th century. The verb ‘to humiliate’ meant ‘to humble’ in the 16th century, but this use is indicated as ‘obsolete’ for today’s use in the dictionary. In the 18th century the verb ‘to humiliate’ means ‘reduce the dignity of.’ It

stems from the Late Latin verb ‘humiliare,’ which in turn is formed on ‘humilis.’ The substantives ‘humiliation’ and ‘humility’ are first used in English from the 14th century.

Apart from etymology – that indicates a downward movement, being put with your face into earth – what is humiliation? Somalia expert Aisha Ahmed (11th January 1999 in Nairobi) explained to me that humiliation can happen at many different fault lines – cultural, religious, political, nation, clan, and individual. Edna Adan, former wife of today’s President of Somaliland, Mohammad Haji Ibrahim Egal,²⁸ defines humiliation in the following way (3rd December 1998 in Hargeisa, Somaliland): ‘Humiliation is when someone tries to bring someone down to their level. They think that you are above them and they want to hurt you, humiliate you, bring you down to their level, so that you have no more self-respect, so that you lose the respect you have for yourself and others lose the respect they have for you.’ Avishai Margalit defines humiliation as the ‘rejection of persons of the Family of Man,’ as injury of self-respect, or, more specific, as failure of respect, combined with loss of control (Margalit, 1996).²⁹

The preliminary, tentative answer that so far has been developed in the course of the research is the following³⁰: Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will (or in some cases also with your consent³¹) and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless. However, the role of the victim is not necessarily always unambiguous – a victim may feel humiliated in the absence of any deliberately humiliating act – as a result of misunderstandings, or as a result of personal and cultural differences concerning norms about what respectful treatment ought to entail – or the ‘victim’ may even invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of a loathsome perpetrator.

²⁸ Egal also served as Somalia’s Prime Minister from 1967, during the latter period of Somalia’s democratic era.

²⁹ His position is disputed, however, for example by Quinton, who argues that self-respect ‘has nothing much to do with humiliation’ (Quinton, 1997, 87).

³⁰ Revised from Lindner, 2000g.

³¹ See Stoller’s work on sado-masochism (Stoller, 1991).

People react in different ways to being treated in humiliating ways: some just become depressed, others get openly angry, and others again hide their anger and plan revenge. The person who plans for revenge may become the leader of a movement. Hitler, for example, began his adult life as a humiliated underdog who badly wanted recognition and acknowledgement but failed to achieve these things. He later identified with German humiliation and put the whole German population to the task of ‘remedying’ it.

In short, the issue is complicated. One might, for example, find a case where the ‘humiliator’ deliberately sets out to humiliate somebody, but the targeted person simply does not feel humiliated, and just laughs; or, at the other extreme, imagine you want to be helpful, and unexpectedly, your help is interpreted as being humiliating; or, to take a third case, you might observe a couple and see that the husband continually treats his submissive wife in such a way that you think that she must surely feel humiliated and protest, and yet she does not; not to forget cases where people in fact enjoy being humiliated in sado-masochistic sex-practices or religious self-humiliation.

These examples suggest that a perpetrator might want to commit humiliation but not succeed, that a ‘benefactor’ might humiliate while trying to do good, that a third party might observe ‘victims’ who do not see themselves as such (or fail to see victims in cases where they do exist), or that humiliation is sought instead of despised.

Furthermore, the word humiliation has an extremely complicated semantic field, because the word humiliation indicates both an act and a feeling. Humiliation is an act that is perpetrated by an actor, intentionally or not, as a brief event or a long-term oppressive infliction – and, as described above, it entails a painful downward push at its core, namely looking down, putting down, lowering, degrading, debasing, abasing, demeaning, belittling, subjugating, oppressing, tainting, besmirching, tarnishing, treating with contempt or disgust, bullying, mobbing, abusing, dishonouring, or disgracing. On the victims’ side humiliation is a feeling. The victim may fight off a humiliating assault immediately, by aggressive retaliation and counter-humiliation. Feelings of humiliation, however, may also be long-term; in this case they may well be characterised by feelings of entrapment and depression, embarrassment or shame, and in their extreme form may be so traumatic that they lead to processes such as mental dissociation.³² However, neither aggressive counter-humiliation nor depression usually

³² Research on trauma describes the phenomenon of dissociation, ‘Dissociation, a splitting in awareness, is not mentioned by either the DSM III or IV as a symptom of PTSD, but there is growing debate in the professional literature as to whether PTSD is a Dissociative Disorder’ (Rothschild, 1998, 4).

solve the problem, cycles of depression, aggression and counter-humiliation do not stop unless underlying feelings of humiliation are healed.

In this thesis the word humiliation will be used both for the act and the feeling, because language becomes too complicated otherwise; hopefully the reader will understand from the context in which the word appears which kind of humiliation is meant.

Research became even more complicated when the researcher discovered that two very different definitions of humiliation seem to exist in today's world: one form of humiliation is connected with equality, while another is connected with the negation of equality. The more recent version of humiliation (indicated by the above mentioned recent etymological transformation of the words 'humble,' 'humiliate' and 'humiliation'), the one connected with equality, relates to the deeply wounding violation of my dignity as a human being, where my dignity draws its justification from the Human Rights notion that 'all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' (U.S. Declaration of Independence). By contrast, there is an older view of humiliation illustrated by the case of aristocrats who oppose each other in a duel, each one seeking to defend his 'honour.'

A further complication, already mentioned before, is introduced by the fact that the humiliation felt by an individual might not be the same as the humiliation felt by a group or a nation. One might ask: Is it really possible for a country, a clan or an ethnic group to 'feel humiliated'? What about the case of humiliated leaders who generalise their own personal feelings and incite their followers to believe in some more or less fabricated version of history that contains supposed humiliations that 'must be avenged' with the leader's help? Would the followers of such leaders have actually undergone humiliating experiences themselves? Or would they only have the illusion of feeling humiliated, by being coerced into it by propaganda? Or, perhaps, do some of them just 'pretend' to feel humiliated in order to please their leaders?

On this point Michael Bond, Professor at the Department of Psychology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, wrote to me (1999): 'I believe that you must draw a fundamental distinction between individual humiliation [you humiliated me] versus group [or national] humiliation [you or your group humiliated my group]. This personal/group distinction is important since people may act to avenge different sorts of affront [and create different sorts of affront for others]!'

Another difficulty forced itself into the process of the research, also this issue already touched upon earlier in the context of psychological therapy in Egypt: As soon as I started to

collect data, I found that research on humiliation in itself might humiliate those who are the object of the research. I found that it is paramount to address the question of research methodology and how it may contribute to deepening rifts instead of healing them. In the course of my research I discovered that the methodology initially attempted was itself humiliating to the people being questioned. This discovery gave rise to deep feelings of embarrassment and shame in me – shame about conducting unethical research. But worse, methods that have humiliating effects are bound to deeply threaten the validity of any research that involves relations between human beings. ‘Informants’ who feel humiliated will, at best, give irrelevant answers or tell what they believe the researcher wants to hear, or they will say nothing, or react with aggression. It was deeply humiliating and humbling for me, the researcher, to discover this; I was so-to-speak ‘forced down’ from the pretentious ‘heights’ of ‘science’ and my face was – metaphorically – thrown down into earth. As a consequence of these experiences and discoveries, I subsequently underwent a very rapid learning process guided by a commitment to achieving a dialogue about experiences and feelings that was as authentic and open as possible. A critical discourse analysis of the interviews led to the conclusion that the method chosen was in fact patronising and humiliating for the interview partners and that certain social psychological methods may have a humiliating effect, especially in cross-cultural contexts with a colonial backdrop and within populations that have suffered greatly from war and genocide.

Gary Boelhower applies the notion of deep listening and transformative dialogue to the field of leadership (Boelhower, 1999, in the editor’s introduction for the 1998-1999 Annual Edition of the *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict*). I found that this notion may be applied to other fields as well, as for example, to methods of research. Boelhower writes ‘there is a growing recognition that authentic leadership must be defined as the coordination and affirmation of partners rather than the management and persuasion of subordinates. There is a growing body of literature that reimages the posture of authentic leadership as one of attentive listening and open dialogue rather than one of proclamation and defense.’ Boelhower calls for ‘each of us to take that posture of deep listening and transformative dialogue, to recognize again the need to expand our vision but also our reach.’

In the course of my fieldwork I attempted to put into practice, in the field of research, what Boelhower calls for in the realm of leadership. Boelhower’s plea also links up to my above-described experience with Western clinical psychology in Egypt, and my uneasiness with certain patronising traits of healing professions such as medicine and clinical psychology. As explained above, during my work as a clinical psychologist I tried to develop

different, more respectful ways of dealing with ‘clients;’ the same learning process seemed to be necessary concerning research methodology. I will expand on this topic further down.

At this point in the introductory chapter the reader has been presented with an overview regarding the innovative approaches to be expected from this manuscript, has received some brief exemplary flashlights on the dynamics of humiliation at different societal levels, and has been tentatively introduced to the field of humiliation itself. This short introduction will now be rounded up by looking back to the initial project description from 1996 that served as a platform for the subsequent empirical and theoretical work.

The Original Project Description

The project started out with a project description that included a number of hypotheses, such as the following: ‘I hypothesise that the significance of feelings of humiliation is universal or culture-independent, and that these feelings carry the potential to hamper conflict solutions described by rational choice theory. What is rather culture-dependent is according to my experience the way humiliation is perceived and responded to. If this double-layer hypothesis is correct then third parties intervening in a violent conflict could develop and use a two-mode strategy which contains one basic module which deals with universally present fundamental questions of humiliation, and one rather culture-dependent module which addresses the specific ways of dealing with humiliation in the cultural domain in which the third party is operating at present (note: culture or cultural domain is here not understood as closed, self-contained entity).’

The project description continues: ‘I hypothesise that it could be in many cases more effective to address and attend to feelings of humiliation, than neglecting these feelings and facing their violent effects. This requires a widening of the time perspective, placing an acute conflict into a discourse before and also after the acute conflict phase. I take it that the new notions of Common Security, and also Human Security, are open to this view, as are programmes as UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Programme.

Hypothesis Ia:

In most cultures feelings of humiliation are a central determinant in violent conflicts, hampering conflict solutions described by rational choice theory.

Hypothesis Ib:

What is perceived as humiliation and how it is responded to, varies across cultures.

Hypothesis II:

Feelings of humiliation can be attended to, its violent effects can be defused.’

The project description then specifies questions that have to be addressed and asked in order to illuminate humiliation: ‘What is experienced as humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? When is humiliation established as a feeling? What does humiliation lead to? Which experiences of justice, honour, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? How is humiliation perceived and responded to in different cultures? What role does humiliation play for aggression? What can be done to overcome violent effects of humiliation?’

What to Expect

This manuscript is part of current and envisaged future work attempting to integrate the above-stated hypotheses into a wider model in which humiliation has its place. The concept of humiliation has, according to the view presented here, the unique potential to connect basic research in psychology, as for example research on emotions, with large macro-political analyses that include anthropology, sociology, philosophy and political science. However, one thesis cannot cover the whole range. This thesis will be addressing the intersection of anthropology, sociology, political science and social psychology. The psychological anchoring in research on emotion, stress, trauma, mobbing/bullying and psychological abuse will be touched upon, as will be the integration of the concept of humiliation into a macro analysis of globalisation. This manuscript is, so-to-speak, placed in the middle of the spectrum that is marked by basic research on the neuro-psychology of emotions at one extreme pole and theories of globalisation at the other pole, see Table 6:

THE NOTION OF HUMILIATION CONNECTS MACRO, MESO AND MICRO LEVELS		
the neuro-psychology of emotions	← →	theories of globalisation
↖ ↑ ↗ focus of this manuscript		

Table 6: The notion of humiliation connects macro, meso and micro levels

As explained above, this thesis follows a model that has a pattern of three elements, namely diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention, as has the empirical part of the study that features

the triad of Germany, Somalia, and Rwanda / Burundi. To reflect these triadic patterns the book will be organised in three main parts that are preceded by a short presentation of the state-of-the-art of research, a short overview over the methodology that has been applied and the preparations being made, including an introduction into the historical background of the three cases.

The manuscript is designated to constitute part of a therapeutic dialogue with all interlocutors in Germany, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi who have been involved in the fieldwork, as well as an academic dialogue with the network of researchers that study related fields. It focuses on the three cases of the research project, namely Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and Hitler's Germany and it builds up the sequence of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention in a stepwise manner. After this introduction the current state-of-the-art will be presented, and the preparations and methodology envisaged for the fieldwork are highlighted. Part I will then begin with the groundwork for diagnosis and address the conceptual background of the notion of humiliation. Part I entails two chapters, the first one addressing humiliation in its relation to trauma, and the second one humiliation as 'Body, Metaphor and Cycle.' Part II is entitled 'Humiliation as Socio-Historical Process' and will place the process of diagnosis within a historical context. Part II entails as first chapter one that describes the historical transition from pride to honour and to dignity as defined by human rights and as second chapter one that attends to the transition from hierarchical societal structures to egalitarian structures that characterises current social change. Part II does not only discuss historic change in the past, but attends to prognosis as well insofar as it draws the line into the future. Part III takes up 'Humiliation in Vivo' and presents in its first chapter an analysis of the Holocaust seen in relation to recent genocides in Africa, particularly the reign of the Somali dictator Siad Barre as compared to Adolf Hitler. The second chapter of Part III addresses therapy and is entitled 'Healing Humiliation.' The chapter on healing humiliation also covers prevention of humiliation, or at least, prevention of violent expressions of feelings of humiliation.

In other words, the architecture of this book represents not only a three-layered paradigm applied on three cases, but also a three-fold 'hermeneutic circle'³³ that mirrors the

³³ The idea of the 'hermeneutic circle' was introduced by Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911), a philosopher and literary historian who is generally recognised as the 'father' of the modern hermeneutic enterprise in the social and human sciences. 'Dilthey argued that the human world was sufficiently different from the natural world that special methods were required for its study. Hermeneutics, the deliberate and systematic methodology of interpretation, was the approach Dilthey proposed for studying and understanding the human world' (Tappan, 2000, Abstract). Dilthey's intellectual biographer H. P.

many hermeneutic circles that the researcher, ‘travelled through’ every day during the fieldwork: often I began in the morning by co-authoring ‘data’ together with my interlocutors, analysing them together with my interviewees, and building theory in the evening, only to be back, next morning, to co-authoring new data, and – through this shared experience – constructing new social realities in co-operation with my conversation partners; even more, not only the course of a day, every minute entailed numerous journeys from ‘data’ to ‘theory.’ In this way, I followed my own version of the famous hermeneutic circle whereby the analyst journeys back and forward between the particular and the general, producing generalisations in which the subtleties of particular cases are embodied.³⁴

The form of presentation in this manuscript is organised such that the circular character of arriving at ‘justification’ is made visible by ‘excavating’ the material three times, each time deepening understanding and discovering new meanings in the evidence. Firstly, the conceptual anchoring of the notion of humiliation is established, secondly the macro-historical landscape in which humiliation takes place is described, thirdly, the therapist, or the author, encounters two cases, namely Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Siad Barre’s Somalia, and proposes ways to heal and prevent humiliation.

Another quote from the letter from the Burundian colleague that was cited in the very beginning shall round up this introductory chapter: ‘...your research is very interesting. It concerns scientific work that touches upon sociology and war studies. I do not know how you are going to interpret humiliation, a sentiment that is psychological and individual par excellence as a social fact. It is exactly here your originality will lie! I encourage you intensely to pursue your research and I am willing to humbly contribute and shed light on the multiple zones of shadow and oversimplification that dominate and surround the humanitarian crisis of Rwanda.’³⁵

Rickman explains, ‘We cannot pinpoint the precise meaning of a word unless we read it in its context, i.e. the sentence or paragraph in which it occurs. But how can we know what the sentence means unless we have first understood the individual words? Logically there is no escape from this absence of priority; in practice we solve the problem by a kind of mental shuttlecock movement’ (Rickman, 1979, 130).

³⁴ See further down for the related concept of the ‘reflective equilibrium.’

³⁵ ‘... votre recherche est très intéressante. Simplement, s’agissant d’un travail scientifique touchant à la sociologie et à la polémologie, je ne sais pas comment vous aller interpréter l’humiliation, sentiment psychologique et individuel par excellence en un fait social. C’est cela peut-être aussi votre originalité! Je vous encourage vivement à poursuivre votre recherche et pourrais humblement contribuer à éclairer les multiples zones d’ombre et le simplisme dominant qui entourent la crise humanitaire rwandaise.’

The Current State-of-the-Art

If we approach the topic of humiliation from the point of view of psychological research, then studies on mobbing and bullying touch upon the phenomenon of humiliation and should therefore be looked at. Research on mobbing and bullying leads over to the field of prejudice and stigmatisation, which in turn draws on research on trauma, aggression, power and conflict, stress, and last but not least emotions. In cases where humiliation shall be studied in cross-cultural settings, cross-cultural psychology has to be included, and the anthropological, sociological and philosophical embeddedness of processes of humiliation in different cultural contexts has to be addressed. If humiliation between groups or even nations is to be studied then history and political science play a central role, too.

Emotions

Emotion is located at the very heart of basic research in psychology. If we want to study humiliation, emotions and their neurological foundations are at the core.³⁶ Antonio R. Damasio, 1994, with his book *Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, provides a perspective on the important ‘constructive’ role that emotions play for the process of our decision-making; it shows how the traditional view of ‘heart’ versus ‘head’ is obsolete. Daniel Goleman, 1996, in his more widely known book *Emotional Intelligence* relies heavily on Damasio.³⁷ Goleman gives, among others, a description of the brain activities that lead to post-traumatic stress disorder. *The Handbook of Emotion and Memory* (Christianson, 1992a)³⁸ addresses the important interplay between emotions and memory.

Humiliation is a process that is deeply embedded in the individual’s interdependence with her environment, and therefore relational concepts of mind such as Gibson’s ecological psychology of ‘affordance’ are relevant. Gibson ‘includes environmental considerations in

³⁶ This I think goes to the heart of the question how emotions (with their accompanying physiological reactions) are related to experience. Does it really have to be some conscious experience of humiliation? In the October issue of the APA Monitor (31) recent, a very interesting research on “The Emotional Brain” is described. By this I do not mean that you should dig deep into neuro-psychology, but in the final end I think that a theory of humiliations must include other levels than the cultural and, psychological (Reidar Ommundsen on 11th November 1997).

³⁷ I thank Finn Tschudi for his excellent guidance in this field.

³⁸ With chapters (Bower, in Christianson, 1992; Heuer & Rausberg, in Christianson, 1992; LeDoux, in Christianson, 1992; Leichtman, Ceci, & Ornstein, in Christianson, 1992; McGaugh, in Christianson, 1992; Nilsson & Archer, in Christianson, 1992).

psychological taxonomies' (de Jong, 1997a, Abstract).³⁹ M. A. Forrester, 1999, presents an related approach, that he defines as 'discursive ethnomethodology,' that focuses on 'narrativization as process bringing together Foucault's (1972) discourse theory, Gibson's (1979) affordance metaphor and conversation analysis. He writes that he conceptualises 'theorized subject positioning as participant-oriented social practices, arguably understood as social affordances produced and recognized dynamically in context' (Abstract).

Silvan S. Tomkins, 1962, developed one of the most interesting theories of the human being and emotions (see his four volumes of *Affect Imagery and Consciousness*; see also Virginia Demos, 1995, editor of *Exploring Affect*, a book that eases the otherwise difficult access to Tomkins' thinking).⁴⁰ Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on script, shame, and pride.⁴¹ Scripts are 'the structures within which we store scenes;' they are 'sets of rules for the ordering of information about SARS' (Stimulus-Affect-Response Sequences) (Nathanson, 1996).

Ekelund & Tschudi, 1994, employ Tomkins' Script Theory as an interpretative framework for a phenomenological understanding of abusive men, an understanding that they find is lacking in the literature, especially a perspective focusing on emotional factors. They find two contrasting script structures: 'A hypermasculine Macho script where violence is an instrumental and more or less effective means to dominate women, and a Nuclear script where violence by definition is an ineffective strategy which is related to deep and unresolved problems not necessarily connected to a need to control and dominate women. The authors conclude 'that the results conform best with a Nuclear script interpretation, where the man's relationship to his father seems to be an unresolved and deeply problematic theme' (Abstract).

See for work on scripts also Eric Berne, 1972, with his book *What Do You Say After You Say Hello?* that illuminates Script Theory from the clinical perspective, while Abelson, in Carroll & Payne, 1976 (see also Schank & Abelson, 1977) addresses the issue from the cognitive perspective, and Tomkins from the personality-psychological perspective.⁴² Also the

³⁹ Gibson's work is hotly debated. W. Sharrock & Coulter, 1998, acknowledge that the work of James J. Gibson is widely acclaimed to be among the most important contributions to the critique of cognitivist approaches to the study of human visual perception, but question his assessments (Abstract). 'Some Remarks on a Relational Concept of Mind' (de Jong, 1997a), is replied to by Meyering, 1997, and again responded to by de Jong, 1997b.

⁴⁰ I thank Reidar Ommundsen and Finn Tschudi for their extremely helpful guidance in this field.

⁴¹ Nathanson, 1987; Nathanson, 1992; Nathanson, 1996.

⁴² I thank Finn Tschudi for his excellent introduction into these issues.

sociology of emotions is relevant; see especially the work of Thomas J. Scheff on violence and emotions such as shame.⁴³

Stress

As soon as we conceptualise humiliation as trauma, we have to study PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) that has at its core the understanding of stress and the consequences of stress. Standard reading on stress psychology is Richard S. Lazarus, 1966, *Psychological Stress and the Coping Process* and Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, *Stress, Appraisal and Coping*. Stress is not necessarily negative, it may also be a stimulating challenge, - and there are individual differences why some people thrive under stress and others break.⁴⁴

Stress has been the object of research in many walks of life, however, lately particularly in the context of work life. Robert Karasek & Theorell, 1990, in *Healthy Work: Stress, Productivity and the Reconstruction of Working Life*, makes the point that stress, if taken too far, hampers people's ability to lead an effective life, and that particularly entrepreneurs who wish to have a profitable enterprise are well advised to understand this. Leymann writes on Karasek's work: 'In my view, this is also still the best scientific overview of the research on work and health. It presents psychological, social and medical research on stress that shows, that management should recognize the biological and mental limits of the human being, when organizing production and administration. It also shows, that humans have potential, that is - on the other hand - rarely used in the Western industrial world. The problem today is personnel management and leadership that too often treats the human being with disrespect and as being merely a production factor, thereby completely failing to stimulate creativity, motivation and learning skills' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000a). John Toohey, 1991, in *Occupational Stress. Managing a Metaphor* addresses the same issue in the Australian setting and calls for diligence when the medical diagnosis of 'stress' merely 'disguises' poor organisation of production and administration in an enterprise, and detrimental treatment of employees. In the same line lies McCarthy, 1995, with his book

⁴³ Scheff, 1988; Scheff, 1990; Scheff, in Kemper, 1990; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, Retzinger, & Gordon, 1992; Scheff, 1997a; Scheff, 1997b.

⁴⁴ See for example Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages Carver, 1998; Embodying Psychological Thriving: Physical Thriving in Response to Stress Epel, McEwen, & Ickovics, 1998; Quantitative Assessment of Thriving Cohen et al., 1998; Beyond Recovery From Trauma: Implications for Clinical Practice and Research Calhoun & Tedeschi, 1998; Exploring Thriving in the Context of Clinical Trauma Theory: Constructivist Self Development Theory Saakvitne, Tennen, & Affleck, 1998.

Managerial Styles and Their Effects on Employees Health and Well-Being, an Australian study of the connection between leadership styles in organisations and the health of employees in these organisations.

Heinz Leymann is co-author of the book *Socialization and Learning at Work. A New Approach to the Learning Process in the Workplace and Society* (Leymann & Kornbluh Hy, 1989) and explains that learning may not always be beneficial, but, on the contrary, may lead to adverse results if not guided carefully. Leymann notes that stress and sub-optimal learning are contingent on the use of oppressive power in the larger macro-sociological structures that form the wider anchoring of a particular societal setting. Political scientists P. Bachrach & Baratz.M., 1962, were among the first to address this in their article ‘The Two Faces of Power’ that is placed within the context of the civil rights movement in the USA of the nineteen sixties.

We could interpret Leymann’s contribution in the field of stress at the workplace as introducing academia as back-up for ‘third party’ involvement in interpersonal ‘peacemaking.’ Richard E. Walton, 1969, based in family therapy, was among the first to promote third party involvement in his book *Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontations and Third Party Consultation*.

Aggression

Stress, conflict and peacemaking are issues that lead over to the topic of aggression. There are many theories in social psychology that address aggression: aggression as hostile instinct or death instinct; aggression as a ‘steam boiler;’ frustration and aggression; aggression as learned behaviour. Variables that mediate aggression are described as arousal, norms, and the social construction of aggression. ‘In the psychological research on aggression, there are two basic and influential positions: one sees aggression as a form of behaviour which is governed by innate instincts or drives; the other sees aggression as a form of behaviour which like other behaviour is acquired through individual experience. There is also a third, intermediate position which integrates the concepts of drive and learning – the frustration-aggression hypothesis’ (Mummendey, in Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1994, 265).

‘Frustration does not immediately evoke aggression, but generates in the individual a state of emotional arousal, namely *anger*. This aroused anger generates an inner readiness for aggressive behaviour. But this behaviour will only occur if there are stimulus cues in the situation [for example weapons] which have an aggressive meaning: that is, cues which are

associated with anger-releasing conditions, or simply with anger itself' (269, italicisation in original, see Berkowitz, 1974 and Berkowitz, 1993 for his Cue-arousal Theory that is the revised version of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis).

Aggression may also be learned. Albert Bandura, 1973, proposes 'that the first step towards acquiring a new form of aggressive behaviour was the process of modelling: individuals acquire new and more complex forms of behaviour by observing this behaviour and its consequences on other people – or models' (Mummendey, in Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1994, 272). Mummendey describes one of the classic experiments that were carried out by Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961, and Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963, where a man kicks a Bobo doll 'with a rubber hammer, and then kicked and yelled at it' (272). The results showed that the children who had watched this 'imitated the model's behaviour when they had seen it rewarded' (272).

Amélie Mummendey addresses 'coercive power' and refers to Tedeschi, Lindskold, & Rosenfeld, 1985, and their seven factors that increase the probability of threats and punishments in the course of a social interactions: 'These factors are: (1) norms of self-defence, reciprocity and distributive justice; (2) challenges to authority; (3) intense conflict over resources; (4) self-presentation and face-saving; (5) need for attention; (6) desire to control immediate behaviour of others; (7) failure to consider future consequences' (282).

Kaj Björkqvist,⁴⁵ Åbo Akademi in Finland, internationally renowned for his research on aggression, looks at aggression and mobbing behaviour and finds interesting differences between women and men. He points out that women choose other techniques for violence than men.

Social Identity Theory

Both for understanding aggression and humiliation, Social Categorisation and Social Identity Theory are central. The most important theorist in the Social Identity approach is Henri Tajfel,⁴⁶ together with John C. Turner,⁴⁷ and Michael G. Billig,⁴⁸ who emphasise the group's

⁴⁵ Björkqvist & et al., 1992.

⁴⁶ See for example Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel, 1978b; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, Fraser, & Jaspars, 1984; Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986; Tajfel & Minority Rights Group, 1978; Turner, in Tajfel, 1982; Israel & Tajfel, 1972.

⁴⁷ See for example Brown & Turner, 1979; Brown & Turner, in Turner & Giles, 1999; Haslam & Turner, 1998; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986; Turner, in Tajfel, 1982.

influence on the individual as opposed to the American highlighting of the single person's social categorisations (see current American theorists in the field of categorisation and identity such as Mackie, Hamilton, Fiske, Dovidio⁴⁹). According to Social Identity Theory, every individual divides his/her social world into distinct classes or social categories. Within this system of social categorisation, individuals locate themselves and others. The sum total of where they are located with respect to each category and classification constitutes their social identity. In other words, one's social identity consists of how one defines oneself in each social category (gender, geographic location, class, profession, and so forth).

Prejudice and Stigmatisation

Stress, caused by violence and conflict, is intimately connected with topics such as prejudice and stigmatisation. Edvard E. Jones, 1984, *Social Stigma - The Psychology of Marked Relationships*, is a central book on stigmatisation.

Stigmatisation often has traumatic consequences, and trauma, aside from stress, is the other aspect of PTSD. Posttraumatic stress represents the most severe and incapacitating form of human stress. Trauma has been widely studied. Books abound. *Too Scared to Cry* (Terr, 1990) is a strong title that describes the pain entailed in trauma.⁵⁰ Reactions to trauma are broadly described⁵¹ (I will expand on this further down), reactions may lead to the PTSD

⁴⁸ See for example Billig, 1976; Billig, 1987; Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1991; Billig, 1995; Billig, in Robinson, 1996; Billig, 1998; Billig, 1999; Howitt & Billig, 1989; Tajfel et al., 1971.

⁴⁹ See Mackie & Hamilton, 1993, with chapters by Dovidio & Gaertner, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Fiske & Ruscher, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Smith, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993.

⁵⁰ See basic literature: Trauma and Recovery (Herman, 1992), Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body and Society (van der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weisæth, 1996), Dibs in Search of Self (Axline, 1965), Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers (Sapolsky, 1994), The Growth of the Mind (Greenspan & Benderly, 1997), Attachment and Loss (Bowlby, 1969), Trauma and Its Wake (Figley, 1985), Compassion Fatigue: Coping With Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder in Those Who Treat the Traumatized (Figley, 1995), Helping Traumatized Families (Figley, 1989), Death and Trauma (Figley, Bride, & Mazza, 1996), Children and Grief (Worden, 1996), The Return of Trauma Theory: Implications for Hermeneutic Psychotherapy Barclay, 1991).

⁵¹ See for example Cognitive Psychodynamics: From Conflict to Character (Horowitz, 1998); Alexithymia in Victims of Sexual Assault - An Effect of Repeated Traumatization Zeitlin, McNally, & Cassidy, 1993; Degree of Somatoform and Psychological Dissociation in Dissociative Disorder is Correlated with Reported Trauma Nijenhuis et al., 1998; Daily Reports of Posttraumatic Nightmares and Anxiety Dreams in Dutch War Victims Schreuder et al., 1998; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Survivors of the Brooklyn Bridge Shooting Trappler & Friedman, 1996; Nightmares of a Hospitalized Rape Victim Lansky, 1995; Lisak, 1994.

diagnosis.⁵² D. D. Blake, A. M. Albano, and T. M. Keane carried out a systematic, manual search of Psychological Abstracts from 1970 to 1990 in order to identify literature on trauma-related topics. They identified 1596 citations, with an increasing tendency over time. This increase was most apparent in literature involving war- and sexual abuse-related traumatisation, but not in publications about natural and technological disaster' (Blake, Albano, & Keane, 1992, Abstract).

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD

'Posttraumatic stress is directly associated with three DSM-III-R, Axis I disorders: i) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), ii) Multiple Personality Disorder, and iii) Brief Reactive Psychosis (APA, 1987). It is similarly associated with the Axis II personality disorder Borderline Personality Disorder (Herman and van der Kolk, 1987). Posttraumatic stress may be indirectly related to various forms of mood disorders, substance abuse syndromes, and phobic disorders. Regarding the prevalence of posttraumatic stress, Helzer et al. (1987) found the lifetime prevalence of PTSD at around 1% in the general population. Breslau et al. (1991) found the prevalence of PTSD to be 9% in a cohort of young adults in an urban setting. They further found a prevalence of 24% in young adults who had been exposed to traumatic events. Norman and Getek (1988) have estimated that nearly one-half of all patients admitted to urban trauma centers are likely to suffer from PTSD in addition to their physical traumatization, while another 31% may suffer from a milder variant of posttraumatic stress. These data argue compellingly for the potential severity of the threat that posttraumatic stress poses to society. Yet, no one clear-cut therapy for posttraumatic stress has emerged, nor has a generally agreed-upon phenomenology emerged upon which to base such a therapy' (Everly, 1993, Abstract).

Refugees who suffered persecution and torture are primary victims of PTSD,⁵³ as is documented by, among others, the Psychosocial Centre for Refugees at the University of Oslo.⁵⁴ Paul Chodoff, 1997, gives an overview over 'The Holocaust and Its Effects on Survivors (Abstract): 'The Nazi Holocaust has had continuing and widely reverberating

⁵² See for example The Development of Posttraumatic-Stress-Disorder Following 4 Different Types of Traumatization (Saigh, 1991); Posttraumatic Stress Disorder - Additional perspectives (Lipton, 1994); Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: A Clinician's Guide (Peterson, Prout, & Schwarz, 1991).

⁵³ Lavik, 1998; Lavik et al., 1999; Vietnam refugees Hauff & Vaglum, 1993; Cunningham & Cunningham, 1997; Watson et al., 1998; Agger, 1994.

⁵⁴ See for example Lavik, 1998; Lavik et al., 1999.

consequences not only for the Jewish survivors but for the world at large. These consequences are detailed, first through a personal account of an Auschwitz survivor, and then through a discussion of the adaptive measures of concentration camp inmates and the long-term psychiatric and psychological effects on survivors and their families. The Survivor or Concentration Camp Syndrome and its relationship to the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is described. Indirect effects of the Holocaust have been manifested in various ways, particularly through various levels of psychologic denial displayed by Holocaust criminals and (at least during the early postwar period) by the German public. The Holocaust has had profound effects on the ways the Jewish people regard themselves and are seen by others. Finally, the Holocaust can be seen as offering a kind of paradigmatic signature to the worldview of the end of the 20th century, emphasizing the persistence of evil and the limitations of the idea of progress.’

Trauma

The intersection of developmental psychology, trauma and spirituality has been reviewed, among others by Garbarino, 1993. ‘The central hypothesis is that the experience of childhood traumatization functions as a kind of “reverse religious experience”, a process combining overwhelming arousal and overwhelming cognitions that threatens core “meaningfulness” for the child... Research implications include the need to study the life path of violent youth as a strategy for understanding the role of spirituality in preventing social problems among high risk children. The discussion is based upon the authors’ formal and informal fieldwork and research with children in war zones, violent youth and street children in several regions of the world over the last 10 years, in which trauma and spiritual development have been a major focus’ (Abstract)Garbarino & Bedard, 1996.⁵⁵

Trauma has been studied in a multitude of contexts, trauma in war,⁵⁶ trauma in political situations,⁵⁷ trauma as cause for becoming a perpetrator,⁵⁸ trauma long time after the

⁵⁵ See also Garbarino, 1993;

⁵⁶ See Shay, 1995; Znakov, 1990; Znakov, 1989; Moses, in Volkan, Demetrios, & Montville, 1999; Volkan, 1997. See also Rethinking the Trauma of War where Bracken & Petty, 1998, criticise the way of Westerners exploit war trauma, by, as I would call it, ‘flying into a disaster zone, letting children draw some pictures, and fly out again.’

⁵⁷ Chile Becker et al., 1989; raped Bosnian and Croatian women Kozarickovic et al., 1995; Dybdahl, 1996.

⁵⁸ Pathological Narcissism and Serial Homicide: Review and Case Study Schlesinger, 1998.

traumatic incident,⁵⁹ and secondary traumatisation (of others), for example wives of traumatised men, and parents of traumatised children.⁶⁰ It has been found that preparedness for torture diminishes traumatic effects.⁶¹

Abuse of children is a significant field for research on trauma. ‘There are three primary themes that have been observed in abusive and neglectful families. The most common effect is that maltreated children are, essentially, rejected. Children that are rejected by their parents will have a host of problems... including difficulty developing emotional intimacy. In abusive families, it is common for this rejection and abuse to be transgenerational. The neglectful parent was neglected as a child. Another theme is “parentification” of the child. This takes many forms. One common form is when a young immature girl becomes a single parent.’ (Perry, Runyan, & Sturges, 1998, 5).

Allan Schore works on the neurobiology of emotional development and describes links between early child experience and brain development (Schore, 1994); he found that a large proportion of prisoners shows specific neuro-endocrinological patterns, not for genetic reasons, but because of inadequate parental responses in early childhood.

301 undergraduates were examined as to whether the experience of maltreatment in childhood is significantly related to the development of depression, dissociation, and negative life outcomes (Becker-Lausen, Sanders, & Chinsky, 1995). The authors tested a causal model that proposes that dissociation and depression act as mediator variables that develop from child abuse and lead to various negative outcomes. The authors report that, as predicted, child maltreatment was related to negative life experiences, with depression and dissociation differentially mediating the various outcomes.

Therapy of Trauma

Therapy of trauma is a wide field.⁶² (See work on Rwanda in James, 1997, ‘Groupe De Patients Rwandais Traumatisés Après Le Génocide: Réflexions Suite à Une Expérience

⁵⁹ See Eitinger, 1990; Nadler & Ben Shushan, 1989; Nadler, Kav Venaki, & Gleitman, 1985; Bar-On, 1996b; Bar-On, 1997a; Bar-On, 1989; Volkan, 1988; Bar-On, 1997b; Staub, 1993; Bar-On, 1992; Nadler, 1987; Staub, 1989.

⁶⁰ See Manion et al., 1996; McIntyre et al., 1994; Mikulincer, Florian, & Solomon, 1995; Solomon et al., 1992; Baker & Kevorkian, 1995; Dane, 2000; Motta et al., 1997; Nelson & Wright, 1996; Westerink & Giarratano, 1999; Westerink & Giarratano, 1999.

⁶¹ See Basoglu et al., 1997; Withuis, 1998.

⁶² See (Coffey, 1998); Balcom, 1996; Coffey, 1998; Gabriel, 1994; Henry, 1997; Miltenburg & Singer, 1997; van der Hart & Steele, 1999.

Thérapeutique.’) In the case of neglect and abuse of children, Perry points at ‘Public Policy Implications’: ‘Ultimate solution to the problems of violence – whether from the remorseless predator or the reactive, impulsive youth -- is primary prevention. Our society is creating violent children and youth at a rate far faster than we could ever treat, rehabilitate or even lock away (Groves et al., 1993; Garbarino, 1993; Sturrock, Smart, & Tricklebank, 1983; Richters, 1993). No single intervention strategy will solve these heterogeneous problems. No set of intervention strategies will solve these transgenerational problems. In order to solve the problems of violence, we need to transform our culture’ (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 12).

However results of intervention techniques seem to be more promising in cases where trauma affects healthy adults. Charles Figley and Joyce Carbonell at Florida State University have recently studied TIR,⁶³ Francine Shapiro’s Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR),⁶⁴ Neuro-Linguistic Programming’s (NLP) Visual / Kinesthetic Disassociation (VKD), and Roger Callahan’s Thought Field Therapy (TFT)⁶⁵ to determine what the active ingredient was. Their study suggests that all four techniques can be effective.⁶⁶

After the December 1988 earthquake in Armenia, Dr. Rusanna Ohanianian, who had lost close family members herself, wrote: ‘We used many tools, the most effective of which in

⁶³ In Traumatic Incident Reduction (TIR) the client repeatedly reviews a traumatic incident, first going through it silently from beginning to end, then reporting what happened, until a point of resolution or “end point” for that incident is achieved (see Friedman, 2000). TIR has been developed by Frank A. Gerbode, M.D., of the Institute for Research in Metapsychology in Menlo Park, California. Gerbode writes: ‘Traumatic Incident Reduction (TIR) operates on the principle that a permanent resolution of a case requires anamnesis (recovery of repressed memories), rather than mere catharsis or coping. To understand why clients have to achieve an anamnesis in order to resolve past trauma, we must take a person-centered viewpoint, i.e., the client's viewpoint and, from that viewpoint, explain what makes trauma traumatic’ (Gerbode, 2000).

⁶⁴ Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) combines imaginal exposure, cognitive restructuring and self-control techniques into specific structured protocols that are modified to meet the unique needs of each client. EMDR treatment also involves having the client focus on an external stimulus such as a) frequent back and forth finger movements b) alternating sound or c) handtapping, while the client is focused on the source of some emotional distress (see Friedman, 2000).

⁶⁵ Thought Field Therapy (TFT) is a systematic method of treating psychological distress using the energy meridians of the body. The client is asked to think about the problem (for example anxiety, anger, guilt, phobia, trauma, depression, panic, etc.) and then tap several times in a precise sequence on specific acupuncture points at various places on the body. Usually the client is also asked to hum a tune, count out loud, move their eyes in various directions and repeat certain affirmations while tapping and thinking about the distressing emotion (see Friedman, 2000). See also Tapas Acupressure Technique (TAT) that is a systematic technique for reducing traumatic/emotional distress and allergies. In TAT the client puts their attention on the emotional distress/trauma. Then using 3 fingers with one hand the client applies very gentle pressure to 3 acupressure points near the eyes and the forehead while placing the other hand on the back of the head (acupressure "pose") Subsequent steps include making a positive statement about the problem, asking about the origins of the problem and asking about where the problem is stored in one's body or life (see Friedman, 2000).

⁶⁶ See for example Carbonell & Figley, 1996.

the first weeks were deep relaxation, NLP (Neuro-Linguistic Programming), and hypnotic suggestion. Often I'd be told, "Oh, doctor, you can't understand... you can't imagine the pain... how it is to lose the dearest people, to lose your home and everything you've worked for all your life, to feel so alone and hopeless." I did understand, and came to understand as well that it was right and good that I should be there, using such skills and knowledge as I possessed to help them to experience relief, however slight. During the first month after the quake, there were so many patients that we needed to stay at the Center from 8:30 in the morning until 11:00 at night every day. As therapists, even those among us who had not suffered personal bereavement were traumatized simply by the constant exposure to the trauma of others, and so the last two hours of each day consisted of workshops and group therapy for the therapists' (Ohanjanian, 2000, 4).

The International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF), co-founded by Jeffrey Mitchell and his colleague, George Everly, is one of the fastest growing professional associations in the world. The primary aim of the organisation is to promote a better understanding of modern crisis intervention methods for emergency service providers and to train and certify teams to design and provide a program of critical incident stress management. 'As an organization, ICISF is a membership of professional fire fighters, law enforcement, paramedics, clergy, and a minority of mental health professionals. Collectively they feel deeply that peer support is a vital to avoiding compassion fatigue... vicarious trauma... and other problems associated with working with the suffering' (see Figley, 1998, 3).

Recently attention to the traumatisation of the therapist himself or herself, such as compassion fatigue or vicarious traumatisation has been growing: 'Vicarious traumatization refers to the transformation of the therapist's inner experience through empathic exposure to clients' trauma material. This paper defines the construct and describes the etiology and manifestations of vicarious traumatization in psychotherapists who treat survivors of traumatic life events. Further, the authors specify and elaborate strategies for the therapist to use to address vicarious traumatization, with the goal of minimizing the negative and maximizing the positive impact of the work of trauma therapy on both therapist and clients' (Pearlman & Saakvitne, in Figley, 1995).⁶⁷

⁶⁷ See also Astin, 1997; Diminic et al., 1994; Figley, 1995; Johnson & Hunter, 1997; Havermans, 1998; Neumann & Gamble, 1995; Pearlman & Macian, 1995; Pearlman & Saakvitne, in Figley, 1995; Sexton, 1999; Valent, 1997.

Group psychological debriefing seems to alleviate vicarious traumatization. 'Using adequately controlled, peer-reviewed journal articles and clinical proceedings as the database, 698 subjects from 10 investigations were submitted to a meta-analysis. The results support the effectiveness of group psychological debriefings in alleviating the effects of vicarious psychological distress in emergency care providers' (Everly, Boyle, & Lating, 1999).

Bullying and Mobbing

Finally, a field of research that touches very closely on humiliation is the field of mobbing and bullying. The confusion around the use of the terms mobbing and bullying stems from the fact that these phenomena are addressed differently in different countries.⁶⁸ Also research on the relationship between mobbing and stress has slightly varying orientations in different countries.⁶⁹ (Leymann suggests keeping the word bullying for activities between children and teenagers at school and reserving the word mobbing for adult behaviour at workplaces.)

The leading world expert on children's bullying at school is Dan Åke Olweus, 1993, see for example *Bullying at School. What We Know and What We Can Do*; Olweus holds a professorship in Norway.

The first book to deal with mobbing/harassment in the workplace was C. M. Brodsky, 1976, in *The Harassed Worker*, however, mobbing, bullying and other sources of stress are not yet differentiated in this book. Bullying and other topics, such as industrial accidents, stress due to heavy workloads, chemical pollution in the workplace and so forth are confounded with stress stemming from bullying and mobbing. 'The author looked at the stressed worker as being a victim of his own powerlessness. Because of poor discrimination

⁶⁸ 'Different research groups have chosen - in the English language - different terminology regarding destructive activities at workplaces, in schools among schoolchildren or in military organizations regarding drafted young people. In England and Australia the word "bullying" is preferred for this kind of behavior in all three of these societal settings. In the USA and Europe "bullying" is used regarding school situations and "mobbing" regarding the workplace. Beside of this, certain other terminology exists: Harassment, psychological terrorization, horizontal violence or just conflict' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000f, 1).

⁶⁹ 'In regard to psychologically oriented stress research in Germany in particular, it may be argued that mobbing can be seen as a certain extensive and dangerous kind of social stress... The different use of terminology in different countries is a theoretical problem. Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian research has focused more intensively on the biological character of the stress phenomenon... due to the fact that this research was mainly carried out in the field of stress medicine in the USA and Sweden. Stress research in Germany was often carried out by focusing on, in part, different stress items. Still another direction in the use of the term "stress" can be observed in Australia, where the term is influenced by its clinical usage as a medical diagnosis... These circumstances cause some confusion when comparing the results from stress research within the different research areas. Thus, discussions can arise concerning the difference between stress and mobbing...' (Leymann, 2000, 1).

between workplace problems of various sorts, this book never made any impression. Nevertheless, this is the first time that some mobbing cases were published' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000a).

Heinz Leymann reports that he wrote the first article in the USA on mobbing, 'Mobbing and Psychological Terror at Workplaces' (Leymann, 1990), and the leading article in the first English book on mobbing and European mobbing research 'The Content and Development of Mobbing at Work' (Leymann, in Zapf & Leymann, 1996). Stale Einarsen & Skogstad, in Zapf & Leymann, 1996, give an overview over the Norwegian mobbing research; Marit Vartia, in Zapf & Leymann, 1996, presents Finnish research, and György Kaucsek & Simon, 1995, give the first report on mobbing at workplaces in Hungary. In *The Silencing of a Skilled Technician* (Leymann, 1993) presents a Swedish case, and in 'How Ill Does One Become of Victimization at Work?' (Leymann & Gustafsson, in Zapf & Leymann, 1996) Leymann introduces statistics on mobbing victims who are in-patients in Sweden. Dieter Groeblichhoff & Becker, in Zapf & Leymann, 1996, Germany, address the treatment of mobbing victims. McCarthy, Sheehan, & Wilkie, 1996, in *Bullying - From Backyard to Boardroom* present Australian work on mobbing/bullying and whistleblowing processes. Klaus Niedl, 1996, in his dissertation (English version), *Mobbing and Well-Being: Economic and Personnel Development Implications*, points at the detrimental effects of mobbing. In the same line lies Zapf, Knorz, & Kulla, 1996 'On the Relationship Between Mobbing Factors and Job Content, Social Work Environment and Health Outcomes' and Zapf & Leymann, 1996 'Mobbing and Victimization at Work,' or Noa Davenport, Distler Schwartz, & Elliot Pursell, 1999 with their view on America and *Mobbing: Emotional Abuse in the American Workplace*.

Conflict

According to William Ury,⁷⁰ pyramids of hierarchical power are currently being replaced by horizontal networks that are becoming global in their extent: 'Humanity is weaving a boundaryless web' (Ury, 1999, 99). This web of interdependence requires continuing co-operation between individuals, groups, organisations and states. However, 'Increasing interdependence means more conflict, not less' (99).

⁷⁰ See his bestselling book, *Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991), and *Getting to Peace. Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the World* (Ury, 1999).

Competition and conflict that require the attention of negotiators are permanent features of group life⁷¹ that may even promote creativity.⁷² However, conflict also may intensify to inter-ethnic and inter-nation violence that is still common in, for example, Ireland, the former Soviet Union, Africa, or the Middle East. Violence may also occur within societies; xenophobic attacks are frequent.⁷³

Conflict is a topic that has been widely studied; thousands of publications are to be found that cover a wide range of conflicts, from inter-personal to inter-group and international conflict. For a social psychology of conflict see, for example, Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, & Hewstone, 1988, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict*. Instead of presenting large lists of publications at this point I would like to mention only those that had particular significance for this research project on humiliation. Lee D. Ross, principal investigator and co-founder of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN), addresses psychological barriers to conflict resolution,⁷⁴ and William Ury, Director of the Project on Preventing War at Harvard University, and author of *Getting to Yes*, and *Getting to Peace* (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Ury, 1999), focuses in his anthropological work on conflict. In the past years innumerable university departments and institutes have been created that carry in their names terms that address conflict and peace. I was especially in touch with the Eastern Mennonite University, EMU, Harrisonburg, with Howard Zehr,⁷⁵ Hizkias Assefa,⁷⁶ and Ronald S. Kraybill.⁷⁷ as well as the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, in Sweden. In Norway the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO, the first peace research institute ever founded), the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), as well as the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, are central to the international discourse on conflict and peace, and many of the researchers working at these institutions gave invaluable advice to the humiliation project. Norway has also produced one of the most renowned peace

⁷¹ See, for example, Elias, 1991; Fiske & Ruscher, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986.

⁷² 'Modern researchers argue that conflict is a necessity if cognitive change is to occur. The problem is, as stated before, that the utility of a conflict lies in its management. Under good conflict management, conflict can be a necessary precondition for creativity' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000e, 3).

⁷³ See, for example, Campani, 1993; Jasser, 1999; Triandafyllidou, 1999.

⁷⁴ See for example Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996; Ross & Ward, 1995; Ross, in Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Ross & Samuels, 1993.

⁷⁵ See for example Zehr, 1990.

⁷⁶ See for example Assefa, 1987.

⁷⁷ See for example Kraybill, 1996.

researchers, Johan Galtung, whose broad peace activities now cover the globe and have grown far beyond his beginnings in Norway.

Rational Choice⁷⁸

Related to the study of conflict is the question of rationality. Questions are relevant such as the following: Are humans rational profit-maximising beings? Related questions are: Are phenomena such as dictatorship, war, genocide, or terrorism rational or irrational? Is, for example, the exploitation of the poor ‘rational,’ and are attempts to alleviate poverty irrational? Are they ‘stupid charity’? Or is it the other way round? Is the exploitation of the poor ‘stupid short-sightedness,’ and the alleviation of poverty a ‘rational’ protection of resources? And if humans are profit-maximising beings, what kind of profit are we talking about? Profit for whom and for how long? Is it ‘long-term profit for all’? Or is it ‘short-term profit for all’? Or is it ‘short-term profit for a few only’? Or ‘long-term profit for a few only’? All these questions centre upon one issue: ‘Who is the actor concerned, and to what extent does this actor take into account her own social, environmental and time embeddedness?’

It is the field of economics, in particular, that bases itself on the set of assumptions about the psychology of actors that is advocated in Rational Actor Theory. This is the psychology of rational choice, utilitarianism and profit maximisation. The theory of rational action originates in its purest form ‘in the classical economics of Adam Smith, and claims that human behaviour can best be understood by assuming *individuals pursue their self-interest, subject to information and opportunity costs*’ (Monroe, 1991, preface x, italics added).

Rational Choice and Rational Actor Theory are hotly contested fields. In 1998, the Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam, in collaboration with the Department of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University, started a research program that aims to evaluate Rational Choice Theory⁷⁹ ‘The dominant conception of rational choice in the social sciences, especially within the discipline of economics, is that of instrumental rationality. Rationality, on this view, is an instrumental, individualist, subjective, forward looking (or consequentialist) and maximizing notion. Rationality, in this view, is not about ends, but only about means; it is purely instrumental. A choice is rational to the extent it

⁷⁸ This section is adapted from Lindner, 2000m.

⁷⁹ <http://www.hum.uva.nl/~racoco/index.html>, retrieved 20th May 2000.

serves to satisfy one's preferences. One cannot criticize the content of one's preferences for being irrational; only choices can be rational or irrational.'⁸⁰

Rational Actor Theory as developed by Anthony Downs in his classical publication *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Downs, 1957) is critically discussed in *The Economic Approach to Politics*, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe (Monroe, 1991). Questions that are examined there are: 'How appropriate is the market metaphor for politics?'⁸¹ Do people actually pursue goals?⁸² Does collective political welfare emerge from the individual pursuit of self-interest?⁸³ Is political behaviour best understood by assuming political agents act primarily in the pursuit of individual self-interest?⁸⁴ Is self-interest the same as utility maximization?⁸⁵ Do real people make decisions the way the theory postulates?⁸⁶ Do political acts and decisions emanate from a conscious calculus?⁸⁷ What is the importance of choice and identity for political behaviour?⁸⁸ Can political calculus be put into cost/benefit terms?⁸⁹ Does use of the Rational Actor Theory limit our understanding of political action by ignoring the political role of values and institutions?'⁹⁰

The psychological research on humiliation presented here, addresses the interplay between rationality and feelings of humiliation that are typically followed by resentment. Young Palestinians or Indians, for example, who carry out suicide bomb attacks in order to defend their cause seem to cast aside 'profit maximising behaviour' together with their own lives. Is this behaviour explicable in terms of rationality?

Robert Wicklund, social psychologist, reflects on such questions in a personal letter to the present author (15th May 1997) about the over-sensitivity of people (and/or groups) who lack, at least momentarily, a basis of security, 'I am thinking of various heterogeneous

⁸⁰ Quoted from chapter 1 of the project description: 'Assumptions of a theory,' 1. See also Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Boer, 1997; Kielmansegg, 1999; Cohn, 1987; Weede & Muller, 1998; Suzumura, 1983; Alexander, 1942; Bazerman & Neale, 1993; Lindner, 1995; Lehmann, 1995.

⁸¹ Almond, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991; Margolis, in Monroe, 1991.

⁸² Eckstein, in Monroe, 1991; Larana, Johnston, & Gusfield, 1994.

⁸³ Whitehead, in Monroe, 1991; Scalia, in Monroe, 1991.

⁸⁴ Downs, in Monroe, 1991; Petracca, in Monroe, 2000; Margolis, in Monroe, 1991.

⁸⁵ Whitehead, in Monroe, 1991; Noll & Weingast, in Monroe, 1991; Kavka, in Monroe, 1991.

⁸⁶ Kavka, in Monroe, 1991; Rosenberg, in Monroe, 1991; Wittman, in Monroe, 1991.

⁸⁷ Johnston, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991.

⁸⁸ Johnston, in Monroe, 1991; Crozier, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991.

⁸⁹ Petracca, in Monroe, 2000; Scalia, in Monroe, 1991.

⁹⁰ Johnston, in Monroe, 1991; Downs, in Monroe, 1991; Noll & Weingast, in Monroe, 1991; Grafstein, in Monroe, 1991; Ferejohn, in Monroe, 1991; Margolis, in Monroe, 1991.

sources who point to people whose sense of identity, pride, etc. has recently or chronically been injured. Such insecurity then produces a sensitivity to criticism, or to further assaults on pride or identity, and depending on which source you read, the effect can be the person's (group's) becoming self-aggrandizing, proselytizing, arrogant and strident, non-apologetic, and transparently self-esteem-building (see for example Fulbright, 1966; Geyer, 1997; Gollwitzer, Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982; Ranaulf, 1964). One thesis, pertinent to the above literature, is that a body of people that needs and flaunts a national identity is doing so out of weakness. This implies that countries that are not so ostentatious with their identities would also be less likely to respond to external sources of Humiliation conversations in terms of aggression.'

Conflict Transformation⁹¹

According to William Ury, 'negotiation courses are ubiquitous...The hunger for knowledge about this subject has been overwhelming' (Ury, 1999, 104).⁹² In the final part of his book, Ury presents a methodology, honed through practice, for preventing, resolving or containing conflict. He distinguishes between ten roles that Homo Negotiator may adopt: the provider, the teacher, the bridge-builder, the mediator, the arbiter, the equalizer, the healer, the witness, the referee and the peacekeeper. The destructive consequences of conflict getting out of hand in the contemporary world are so great that a central figure in this networked world, according to Ury, has to be 'Homo Negotiator' (103).

The *International Negotiation Journal* introduces its scope with the following text:⁹³ 'International negotiation and mediation have become a prevalent form of international activity. They are the principal non-violent means by which both official and unofficial actors resolve or manage international disputes and search for mutually acceptable agreements that satisfy joint goals. *International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice* seeks to examine this activity from many perspectives, to enhance its theoretical foundations and advance its practical application.'

⁹¹ The use of the term conflict resolution has been countered by the development of alternative terms, such as conflict transformation, see Bush & Folger, 1994a. The section on conflict transformation has been adapted from Lindner, 2001c.

⁹² For a valuable overview of negotiation theory and practice, see Breslin & Rubin, 1991.

⁹³ Retrieved in January 1999 from <http://interneg.carleton.ca/interneg/reference/journals/in/scope.html>.

Conflict and its resolution and transformation are addressed in many different disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities.⁹⁴ Conflict resolution/transformation has long historic roots. Among others, there is the organisational development school that has its beginnings in the human training movement and in the social psychology of Kurt Lewin and his followers.⁹⁵ Then there is the problem solving workshops school that creates academic settings with influential personalities using as theoretical frame a basic human needs approach in the tradition of John Burton (London),⁹⁶ Leonard Doob⁹⁷ and Herbert C. Kelman.⁹⁸ Its field of activity has been conflict areas such as Israel, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and Southern Africa. Furthermore, there is a religious approach by Quakers, Mennonites and peace churches that uses mediation and good offices, reconciliation and healing; key terms are non-violence and civil obedience as it was lived by Mahatma Gandhi.⁹⁹ The classic mediation school, the ADR movement (alternative dispute resolution), is active in divorce mediation, environmental dispute resolution, labour-management, and community dispute resolution. This school focuses on power, law and, particularly, interests. In the *Mediation Quarterly* researchers and practitioners explore the role of mediation in resolving all types of disputes: family, commercial, community, educational, labour, business, medical, and environment.

Furthermore, the Chilean economist Manfred Max-Neef is often drawn upon for conflict transformation. His work on what he calls Human Scale Development¹⁰⁰ acknowledges the fundamentals of basic human needs such as subsistence, identity,

⁹⁴ See, for example, Barley, in Bazerman, Lewicki, & Sheppard, 1991; Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997; Ross & Ward, 1995; Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996; Ross, 1993a; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994; Sherif, 1966; Volkan, 1988. Johan Galtung's work on peace and conflict encompasses many schools and disciplines, his publications are innumerable, see here Galtung, 1996 and Galtung & Tschudi, 1999.

⁹⁵ See Lewin & De Rivera, 1976; Lewin & Lewin, 1948, furthermore Marrow, 1964; Marrow, 1969. The *Journal of Social Issues* characterises itself as being governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that 'there is nothing so practical as a good theory.'

⁹⁶ See, for example, Banks & Burton, 1984; Burton, 1979.

⁹⁷ See, for example, Dollard et al., 1939; Doob, 1935; Doob, 1952; Doob, 1965; Doob, 1968.

⁹⁸ See, for example, Kelman & Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues., 1965; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kelman, in Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992; Kelman, 1997; Kelman, in Rothstein, 1999.

⁹⁹ See, for example, Gandhi, 1940; Gandhi, Kelekar, 1961; Gandhi, Rao, 1963. See also, Dalai Lama & Lokesh Chandra, 1981; Dalai Lama, 1999.

¹⁰⁰ 'Conventional western ideas of development and progress are seen by many as a root cause of rainforest destruction and other aspects of the global ecological crisis, but what are the alternatives? Development as it is usually conceived is based on a particular view of human nature. This view, which is taken for granted by economic rationalists, assumes that human beings are driven by a limitless craving for material possessions. Max-Neef's conception of what human beings need, and what motivates them, is fundamentally different. If decision-makers operated according to his assumptions rather than those of most economists, then the choices they made would change radically.' Retrieved from <http://forests.lic.wisc.edu/ric/Background/maxneef.htm> on 5th January 2000, *Max-Neef on Human Needs and Human-Scale Development*.

participation, freedom, understanding (to understand and be understood), security, creativity, rest, and affection. ‘When we design conflict interventions, we try to bear all of these in mind, so that our intervention pays attention to the degree to which these needs are recognised and satisfied.... including the need to have an identity which we are comfortable with and which we has been construed in a sustainable, legitimate way.’¹⁰¹

The term and approach of transformative mediation, though its roots stretch back into the 1970s, was brought to a wider fore by the publication of Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger’s book *The Promise of Mediation* in 1994 (Bush & Folger, 1994a).¹⁰² This book describes two different approaches to mediation: problem-solving and transformative mediation. ‘The goal of problem solving mediation is generating a mutually acceptable settlement of the immediate dispute. Problem solving mediators are often highly directive in their attempts to reach this goal – they control not only the process, but also the substance of the discussion, focusing on areas of consensus and “resolvable” issues, while avoiding areas of disagreement where consensus is less likely’ (Burgess & Burgess, 1997, 1). The transformative approach to mediation, however, aims at the empowerment and mutual recognition of the parties involved. ‘Empowerment, according to Bush and Folger, means enabling the parties to define their own issues and to seek solutions on their own. Recognition means enabling the parties to see and understand the other person’s point of view – to understand how they define the problem and why they seek the solution that they do. (Seeing and understanding, it should be noted, do not constitute agreement with those views.) Often, empowerment and recognition pave the way for a mutually agreeable settlement, but that is only a secondary effect. The primary goal of transformative mediation is to foster the parties’ empowerment and recognition, thereby enabling them to approach their current problem, as well as later problems, with a stronger, yet more open view. This approach, according to Bush and Folger, avoids the problem of mediator directiveness which so often occurs in problem-solving mediation, putting responsibility for all outcomes squarely on the disputants’ (1).

Daniel Bar-On and Arie Nadler criticise, similar to Bush and Folger, that the efforts extended to conflict resolution/transformation often are too limited. They propose research that appreciates that ‘the shift from a conflictual social reality to a more reasonable one is a long and complex process rather than a singular event epitomized in the signing of a peace

¹⁰¹ Graham Dyson, Director Centre for Conflict Management, Norway, in a personal message on 5th January 2000.

¹⁰² See also, Bush & Folger, 1994b.

treaty (peace making)¹⁰³ (Bar-On & Nadler, 1999, 3). They call for the study of long-term processes of post-conflict including ‘conciliation between former enemies, settling past accounts and peace building through forging a new reality of inter-group cooperation and interdependence’ (3), and they criticise insufficient research issues such as forgiveness. Furthermore, they deplore that past research in the area of conflict resolution has been dominated by a rational approach that viewed conflicts and their resolution through the prism of the ‘calculus of competing interests’ (4). They highlight the need for research on psychological processes (for example, the desire for revenge in contrast to willingness to forgive) and sociological processes (for example, power asymmetry between disputants and equity considerations), together with an emphasis on the role of cultural and historical factors in the move from ending conflicts towards the achievement of peaceful reality (4).

Also Bowling & Hoffman, 2000, point out that many aspects of mediation have been discussed, among others the training and development of mediators and their technical skills, however, that few studies address psychological dimensions such as the personality of the mediator. They contend, for example, that a mediator’s ‘presence’ – more a function of who the mediator is than what he or she does — has a profound impact on the mediation process (abstract).

Since many conflicts are fraught with past experiences of death, bereavement and trauma, conflict resolution has to address these emotional dimensions. Teresa Descilo, in Figley, 2000 works on death and describes how bereavement creates symptoms that would be classified as traumatic stress symptoms.¹⁰⁴ Descilo links the experience of bereavement with trauma as follows, ‘trauma occurs when an actual or perceived threat of danger or loss overwhelms a person’s usual coping ability.’ This quote links back to the above presented overview over therapy of trauma, and indicates that elements of such approaches may have to be included when conflicts are to be transformed.

Culture Dimension

As soon as one sets out to conduct research that includes people with different cultural backgrounds, a host of problems arises: words, terms, and concepts cannot be translated, what means one thing in one culture, means something else in another cultural context, - even

¹⁰³ Bar-On, 1997a; Rothstein, in Rothstein, 1999.

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Prigerson et al., 1997; Figley, Bride, & Mazza, 1996; or Raphael & Martinek, in Wilson & Keane, 1997).

worse, particularly problematic is the situation when researcher and informant speak together in a language that is a second language to them both, and both believe that they understand each other, not noticing that they are duped into the illusion of mutual understanding by the superficial use of identical words.

Geert Hofstede has developed a classic systematisation of culture dimensions; initially he detected four dimensions of culture. The first dimension is '*power distance*.' Power distance is 'the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations accept that power is distributed unequally' (Hofstede & Bond, 1984, 419). Hofstede had carried out research on IBM employees around the world and had found that there are countries where subordinates follow their superiors' orders rather blindly, where organisations are centralised, with many levels within the hierarchy, and where employees on the lower levels tend to have low levels of professional qualification, - these are the countries with a high power distance, for example Mexico, South Korea, or India. Countries with low power distance have rather decentralised organisational structures and flat hierarchies, and highly qualified employees are to be found at any level of the hierarchy (for example USA, or Scandinavia).

The second dimension is '*uncertainty avoidance*,' which is the extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous situations, and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these (Hofstede, 1980). People in countries with high uncertainty avoidance have a great need for security and a rather big trust in the opinion of experts (Germany, Japan, Spain). Cultures with low uncertainty avoidance are readier to accept risks, they have fewer written laws, individual initiative within organisations is furthered more, and it is presumed that people are responsible for their acts (for example Denmark and Great Britain).

Individualism (versus *collectivism*), the third dimension, is described by Hofstede as tendency to rather care for oneself and one's own core family; collectivism is the tendency to keep groups and collectives together, as compensation for loyalty. According to Hofstede, rich countries have higher levels of individualism, poorer countries are rather collectivist. USA, Canada, Australia, Sweden and Germany for example exhibit individualism (combined with a high gross national product); in such countries performance is prioritised and is more important than being part of a group. On the other hand, countries such as Pakistan, Peru and other South American countries, also South Korea, are characterised by high levels of collectivism (and at the same time lower gross national product); those societies are rather built on the principle of group affiliation.

The fourth dimension, *masculinity* (versus *femininity*) 'is a situation in which the dominant values in society are success, money and things.' Femininity 'is a situation in which

the dominant values in society are caring for others and quality of life' (Hofstede, 1980, 419-420). In countries with high scores of masculinity, as in the USA or also in Germany, income, recognition, upward social mobility and challenge are of particular importance. Individuals are being encouraged to take independent decisions, as expressed in the German proverb 'Jeder ist seines eigenen Glückes Schmied' ['Everybody is master of his own luck']. Economic growth is valued higher than the protection of the environment, the school system is built on the principle of performance and competition, and there are few women in higher positions. Countries with stronger femininity on the other hand rather emphasise co-operation, a friendly atmosphere, and a secured working place. Individuals are being encouraged to work in teams, success is rather being measured in terms of human contact and quality of life, and the working place is characterised by less stress and by a participative managerial style. There are more women in leading positions, and they are not obliged to mark their stance by appearing overly self-confident.

It is to be expected that in countries with high individualism and low power distance individuals attend more to their own preferences and less to hierarchical structures. In countries such as the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Great Britain and Holland, people learn that all people are equal and they are less impressed by titles and positions. Less developed countries or recently industrialised countries, however, such as Columbia, Mexico, China, Portugal, Singapore are rather characterised by higher power distance and lower individualism. Hierarchical structures count more and titles are important. The Anglo-Saxon countries are characterised by lower power distance and weaker uncertainty avoidance; there is less emphasis on hierarchy and risks are being taken. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Latin-American countries, as well as countries in the Far East, such as Japan and Korea, exhibit rather high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance. Most of the other Asiatic countries show relatively high power distance and weak uncertainty avoidance. High uncertainty avoidance and high masculinity is to be expected from countries such as Japan, Germanic and Latin countries.

Later Hofstede developed his system further and included a fifth dimension, namely *orientation in time*, either long-term or short-term. '...we believe that cultural systems vary in the extent to which they encourage various forms of relationship and are characterized by such different types of relationships. Although no direct evidence exists to support this belief, Hofstede's (1991)¹⁰⁵ five dimensions of cultural variation suggest some testable conjectures.

¹⁰⁵ Hofstede, 1991.

We hypothesize that cultural uncertainty avoidance is related to greater formality in relationship, masculinity to greater task-orientation, power distance to greater hierarchy, individualism to greater superficiality, and long-term orientation to greater competitiveness' (Smith & Bond, 1999, 18).

Clearly, Somalia may be expected to fit into Hofstede's system where power distance and uncertainty avoidance are low, time horizon short, masculinity high, and, where, paradoxically, strong individualism combines with strong collectivism. Rwanda and Burundi would figure as places where power distance and collectivism are high, perhaps also uncertainty avoidance, and compared to Somalia, also feminism would perhaps measure higher, and be combined with a somewhat longer time horizon than in Somalia.

Kluckhohn und de Strodtbeck (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) have developed a six dimensional categorisation of cultures. They believe that cultures can firstly be divided according to their beliefs concerning the *nature of the human being*, in other words, according to their answer to the question, 'Is the human being inherently "good" or "bad"?' The authors argue that important consequences follow from this answer: A person for example, who is convinced that people are 'bad' by nature, will tend to be more suspicious and afraid when she has to deal with people she did not know before. The second category is a culture's *relationship to nature*. The Inuit say '*Ayorama*,' meaning 'There is nothing to be done,' signifying subjugation under nature. The Arabic '*inshallah*,' meaning 'as God wishes,' signifies harmony with nature and subjugation under God, an attitude that is contrasted by the American '*can do*,' that means 'I will manage,' 'I will prevail,' or dominance over nature. The authors relate the story that when Sir Edmund Hillary reached the top of Mount Everest this was hailed as 'subjugation of the mountain' by Western media, whereas Chinese media wrote that he had established 'friendship' with the mountain. The third cultural dimension addresses interpersonal relations similar to Hofstede, namely individualism versus collectivism.

The fourth dimension relates to '*being versus acting*;' cultures are differentiated according to their evaluation of time. Work and recognition has much more significance in cultures that emphasise action as compared to cultures where work is regarded as mere means for survival, the United States being the epitome of the country of action. A further dimension addresses the *orientation towards the flow of time*, namely the future, the past or the present. In a culture that emphasises the past innovation is more difficult, while societies that look into the future evaluate new plans according to their potential to improve the future. The authors relate the story of an American and a Bahraini coming to a restaurant where they find a sign

saying that the kitchen will be closed for the coming six months. The American reacts with anger while the Bahraini says: 'We have lived without this kitchen for thousands of years, we will also survive the next six months without it!' The last dimension addresses the use of space as *public or private space*. In the United States people prefer to work in separate rooms and have important negotiations with a few people in closed rooms. In other parts of the world, as for example in Japan, important conversations are being held in the presence of many people.

Humiliation

If we now turn to the notion of humiliation in particular, we find that it has not been studied as explicitly as, for example, such fields as 'trauma.' In many cases the term humiliation is not differentiated from other concepts; the present author often met the assumption, for example in discussions with colleagues, that humiliation is just a more intense reaction than shame. Humiliation and shame are, indeed, often used exchangeably, among others by Silvan S. Tomkins (1962–1992), whose work is carried further, as mentioned above, by Donald L. Nathanson. Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of altogether nine affects, namely as a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, 1st October 1999; see also Nathanson, 1992; Nathanson, 1987).

However, the point of the research project on humiliation is precisely that humiliation, though in many respects related to shame, deserves to be treated separately, and requires future research and theoretical conceptualisation that differentiates it from other notions.¹⁰⁶ The notion of shame, for example, lacks an element that is essential to humiliation, namely the 'downward push' that is already indicated in the etymology of the word 'humiliation,' or 'de-gradation.'

The list of publications that use the term humiliation explicitly is comparably short, and in addition spread in very disparate thematic fields. The Journal of Primary Prevention pioneered this work in 1991 (Klein, 1991), and 1992 (Barrett & Brooks, 1992; Smith, 1992). In 1997 the journal Social Research devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation, stimulated by Margalit's *The Decent Society* (Margalit, 1996). Margalit's work pertains to the significant literature in philosophy on 'the politics of recognition,' claiming that people who are not recognized suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence (see also Honneth, 1997

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, the chapter entitled 'Shame and Humiliation' Smith 2001, 148-66.

on related themes). Max Scheler set out these issues in his classic book *Ressentiment* (Scheler, 1961). In his first period of work, for example his *The Nature of Sympathy* Scheler focuses on human feelings, love, and the nature of the person. He states that the human person is at bottom a loving being, *ens amans* (Scheler, 1954) who may feel *ressentiment*.¹⁰⁷ Also Liah Greenfeld, writing in the field of political science, focuses on resentment and sees its dynamics at the heart of nationalism (Greenfeld, 1992; Greenfeld, 1996).

In the field of psychology, Linda Hartling (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (Humiliation Inventory) where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring 'being teased,' 'bullied,' 'scorned,' 'excluded,' 'laughed at,' 'put down,' 'ridiculed,' 'harassed,' 'discounted,' 'embarrassed,' 'cruelly criticized,' 'treated as invisible,' 'discounted as a person,' 'made to feel small or insignificant,' 'unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service,' 'called names or referred to in derogatory terms,' or viewed by others as 'inadequate,' or 'incompetent.' The questions probe the extent to which respondents had felt harmed by such incidents throughout life, and how much they feared such incidents.

W. Vogel documents 'unforgivable humiliation' as core obstacle in couples' treatment (Vogel & Lazare, 1990). Robert L. Hale addresses *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder* (Hale, 1994).¹⁰⁸ James Gilligan, a psychiatrist, suggests that humiliation creates violence (Gilligan, 1996), while Scheff and Retzinger extended their work from shame and rage to violence and Holocaust, and studied the part played by 'humiliated fury' (Scheff 1997, 11) in escalating conflict between individuals and nations (Scheff, 1988; Scheff, 1990; Scheff, in Kemper, 1990; Scheff, 1997a¹⁰⁹). John Braithwaite focuses on *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* (Braithwaite, 1989).¹¹⁰

William Ian Miller wrote a book entitled *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence*,¹¹¹ where he links humiliation to honour as understood in the

¹⁰⁷ It was Dagfinn Føllesdal and later Thomas Cushman, editor of Human Rights Review, who drew my attention to Scheler and Honneth.

¹⁰⁸ See also Lehmann, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998.

¹⁰⁹ See also Masson, 1996; Vachon, 1993; Znakov, 1990.

¹¹⁰ See also Braithwaite, 1993. I owe these references to Howard Zehr.

¹¹¹ The theme of this book is 'that we are more familiar with the culture of honor than we may like to admit. This familiarity partially explains why stories of revenge play so well, whether read as the Iliad, an Icelandic saga, Hamlet, many novels, or seen as so many gangland, intergalactic, horror, or Clint Eastwood movies. Honor is not our official ideology, but its ethic survives in pockets of most all our lives. In some ethnic (sub)cultures it still is the official ideology, or at least so we are told about the cultures of some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, and so on. And even among the

Iliad or Icelandic sagas and explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Cohen and Nisbett also examine an honour-based notion of humiliation (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The honour to which Cohen and Nisbett refer is the kind that operates in the more traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds, a scenario with which I was already familiar as a result of working for seven years as a psychological counsellor in Egypt. Within a blood feud culture it is honourable and perfectly legitimate to ‘heal’ humiliation by killing a targeted person. The opposite is true in a society where universal human rights are recognised; ‘healing’ humiliation means restoring the victim’s dignity by empathic dialogue, sincere apology, and finally reconciliation.

Humiliation has furthermore been addressed in such fields as love, sex and social attractiveness,¹¹² depression,¹¹³ society and identity formation,¹¹⁴ sports,¹¹⁵ and serial murder.¹¹⁶ A few examples from history, literature and film illustrate humiliation.¹¹⁷

Roots of Evil

Relevant for the analysis of humiliation at the macro level is work on international relations,¹¹⁸ as well as war and violence.¹¹⁹ *Bloody Revenge* by Scheff,¹²⁰ and *Roots of Evil* by Staub,¹²¹ are grand works that analyse emotions within their sociological environment in an integrative way, thus addressing also humiliation, though not as only variable.¹²²

suburban middle class the honor ethic is lived in high school or in the competitive rat race of certain professional cultures’ (Miller, 1993, 9).

¹¹² see for example Baumeister et al. 1993, Baumeister 1997, Brossat 1995, Gilbert 1997, Proulx et al. 1994, Vogel et al. 1990.

¹¹³ see for example Brown et al. 1995, Miller 1988.

¹¹⁴ see for example Ignatieff 1997, Markus et al. 1996, Silver 1986, Wood et al. 1994.

¹¹⁵ see for example Hardman et al. 1996.

¹¹⁶ see for example Hale 1994, Lehmann 1995, Schlesinger 1998.

¹¹⁷ see for example Peters 1993, Stadtwald 1992, Toles 1995, Zender 1994.

¹¹⁸ see for example Cviic 1993, Luo 1993, Midiohouan 1991, Steinberg 1991, 1996, Urban et al. (Eds.)1990.

¹¹⁹ see for example Masson 1996, Vachon 1993, Znakov 1989, 1990.

¹²⁰ Scheff, 1990; see also Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 1988; Scheff, in Kemper, 1990; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 1997b.

¹²¹ Staub, 1989, see also Staub, 1996; Staub, 1988; Staub, 1990; Staub, 1993.

¹²² In many cases the terms humiliation and shame are used exchangeably, for example by Silvan S. Tomkins (1962–1992) whose work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson. He describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of nine, namely as a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson told me that in a personal conversation, 1.10.1999. See Nathanson, 1992; Nathanson, 1987).

The most important representatives of the psychoanalytic approach to intergroup conflict and its traumatic effects are Vamik Volkan¹²³ and his colleagues at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction of the University of Virginia (Max Harris,¹²⁴ and Maurice Apprey¹²⁵), Marc H. Ross,¹²⁶ and Joseph Montville.¹²⁷

‘Stories of humiliation’ may be core elements of identity, individual identity, but also identity of groups: Yagcioglu, 1998, summarises that, in addition to cultural symbols and rituals, ethnic identity, in order to be defined, needs enemies (who help the group members define who they are not), chosen glories (usually mythologized and idealized achievements that took place in the past, in line with Galtung’s concept of ‘Victor Glory’), chosen traumas (losses, defeats, humiliations – often mythologized as well – that are difficult to mourn, similar to Galtung’s ‘Loser Trauma’), and borders (physical and/or mental) that simplify the difficult task of differentiating in-group from out-group, or “we” from “them.”

Forgiveness

Lately the concept of forgiveness has received increasing attention.¹²⁸ Websites such as www.forgiveness.org propose research on ‘Forgiveness Among Nations’ among others ‘Is There a Role for Forgiveness & Spirituality in Coping with Combat Trauma?’ (Ming Tsuang, Harvard Institute for Psychiatric Epidemiology and Genetics), ‘The Role of Humanitarian Relief in Fostering Reconciliation & Forgiveness in Divided Societies’ (Raimo Vayrynen, Director of Kroc Peace Institute at the University of Notre Dame), ‘Truth & Forgiveness in South Africa: A Multidisciplinary Approach’ Audrey Chapman, representative of the American Association for the Advancement of Science), ‘Forgiveness & the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict’ (Ed Cairns, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, in the Centre for the Study of Conflict), ‘Forgiveness & the Truth & Reconciliation Commission in South Africa’ (Jeffrey Sonis, Department of Family Medicine at the University of Michigan), ‘Healing, Forgiveness, & Reconciliation in Rwanda’ (Ervin Staub, Department of Psychology at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst), ‘Forgiveness from Evolutionary & Cross-cultural

¹²³ See for example Volkan, 1988; Volkan, 1992; Volkan, 1994; Volkan & Harris, in Ettin, Fidler, & Cohen, 1995; Volkan, 1997.

¹²⁴ See for example Harris, 1993; Harris, 1994.

¹²⁵ See for example Stein & Apprey, 1990; Stein & Apprey, 1985; Apprey, 1994.

¹²⁶ See for example Ross, 1993b; Ross, 1995.

¹²⁷ See for example Montville, in Sandole & van der Merwe, 1993; Volkan, Demetrios, & Montville, 1990; Montville, in Volkan, Julius, & Montville, 1990.

¹²⁸ See, among many others, Enright & North, 1998; Henderson, 1996; Minow, 1998; Moore, 1993.

Perspective' (David Sloan Wilson, Department of Biological Sciences at Binghamton University).

This overview over the current state-of-the-art of research as it pertains to the topic of humiliation does not exhaust the contributions to be found in the literature. In the course of this manuscript other authors will also be introduced and cited.

Preparation and Method¹²⁹

As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the research on humiliation presented in this book draws not only on fieldwork in Germany, Somalia, and Rwanda / Burundi, but furthermore on the authors experience as a psychology student in Germany, Israel and West Africa (1974-1978), and as medical student in the Germany, Norway, the U.S., Malaysia, Thailand, China, and New Zealand (1978-1984). Thereafter, from 1985 to 1988 the author worked as a psychological counsellor at the 'American University of Cairo' in Egypt.¹³⁰ From 1984 to 1991 she had her private psychological practice in Cairo, Egypt, in collaboration with the German Embassy physician. Clients came from Europe, the Middle East and Africa, languages ranged from English, French, German, and Norwegian to Egyptian Arabic.¹³¹ Members of the corporate sector represented a prominent group among those who sought advice. What could be called 'cross-cultural translation' was one of the primary tasks.

The author wrote her doctoral thesis in medical psychology about the definition of quality of life in Egypt as compared to Germany (Lindner, 1994). Certain results of this research pertain to the topic of humiliation insofar as a relative lack of national resources has a humiliating and weakening effect on its citizens (Inkeles & Diamond, in Szalai & Andrews, 1980). The general economic situation in Egypt is very difficult. Such national contexts seem to significantly impinge on individual life satisfaction.

The original project description of 1996 that provided the starting point for the research on humiliation, entailed the following plan of action (Lindner, 1996, 3): 'The empirical part of the project will include several methodological strategies: 1) Existing literature and statistics will be used as basis. 2) Qualitative data will be collected in interviews with (a) the involved population in the conflict region, (b) with key opinion leaders in the region (see Schou, 1996 for selection criteria) and (c) with international bodies involved as

¹²⁹ This chapter draws on Lindner, 2001b.

¹³⁰ Clients were students and teaching staff from many nations. The author was presented with the challenge to understand that in Egypt Western psychological concepts may not hold, that for example the image of the self may be different as compared to what is taught and internalised in the West, and that Western 'prescriptions' about what makes a human being healthy may not fit. The author attempted to develop new strategies of counselling bridging Western and Egyptian cultural views.

¹³¹ Both Western oriented as well as more traditional oriented Egyptians came as clients, and non-Egyptians of all nations, such as members of Western embassies, institutes and schools, managers of Western companies, partners in mixed marriages and their children. Especially working with Western companies in Egypt, or with partners in mixed marriages, often meant primarily mediating and translating cultural differences. I found that feelings of humiliation were permeating cross-cultural relations almost everywhere, a fact usually invisible to even the most well-intentioned Western person, but intensely felt by non-Western counterparts.

third parties. 3) Quantitative data will be collected via Cantril's well-established Self-Anchoring Scale (Cantril, 1965, 22), which will be adapted to the notion of humiliation.'

The question to be asked at the outset of the project was: Is this plan of action really valid? As mentioned above, Hartling was working on a pioneering quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (Humiliation Inventory), and the issue was whether this could also be used.

The research started in 1997, and until 1998 the researcher concentrated on collecting literature and getting in touch with knowledgeable people in Norway and around the world, with experts researching on Africa, particularly Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, on international organisations, on Holocaust and genocide, and on social psychology. A network of more than 400 interdisciplinary academic contacts was built, a network of conversation on the topic of humiliation; some of them are named in the acknowledgements at the beginning of this book. To date, 18th January 2001, the actively maintained academic network has grown to 537 researchers from all over the world, and the network of individual informants and/or representatives of organisations to 537.

In an initial pilot study from 1997 to 1998 it was attempted to grasp the concept of humiliation with the aim to construct an interview guideline for the fieldwork in Africa. In a paper submitted to the annual seminar of the Research Programme of the Multilateral Development Assistance Programme at Soria Moria, 19th – 20th February 1998, entitled *Humiliation As Psychological Variable in Armed Conflict: What Is Our Common Sense Definition of Humiliation?* fifteen scenarios of humiliation were differentiated, each starting with an 'utterance.' These 'utterances' stemmed from 52 texts, which were collected during the period of March 1997 to December 1997 from people chosen from colleagues. Everybody was asked about his/her understanding of the term humiliation. Some interviews were taped, some lasted for 10 minutes, others for two hours, some text fragments stem from letters or e-mails which were received long time after having opened the subject with a person, indicating that people were thinking about it for a long time, keeping the subject back in their heads and wrestling with it.¹³²

These interviews opened up more questions than they indicated answers. The concept of humiliation appeared to be extremely complicated and multi-layered. It became increasingly evident that it would be premature to rely heavily upon a quantitative method for the topic of humiliation in its connection with genocide in Africa. Hartling's work seemed to be adequate in the cultural setting, within which it was being developed, but it was too early

¹³² This paragraph is adapted from adapted from Lindner, 1998, 3.

to know to what extent it could capture the notion of humiliation in other cultures, and also to what extent such extreme situations as genocide could be described by it.

A useful strategic overview discussing the relationship between quantitative and qualitative research approaches is available from Scheff (1997) who recommends proceeding from 'the ground,' comparing data from different locations in a 'part/whole analysis,' and, finally, developing hypotheses that can be tested quantitatively: 'Quantitative analysis leads to verification or disconfirmation of a hypothesis. But verification is the third step in part/whole morphology. Before taking the last step, it is usually necessary to take at least one of the earlier steps: exploration (conventional eyewitness field work using qualitative methods), and/or microanalysis of single specimens and comparisons of specimens' (Scheff, 1997a, 9).

Scheff describes his part/whole analysis as follows (Scheff, 1997a, 9): 'The approach ... is one that attempts to generate increasingly accurate and general hypotheses by close examination of the actual reality of social life. By grounding investigation in examination of the "minute particulars" as Blake said, the least parts of single cases, and later in the comparison of these cases with one another in the context of larger wholes. One may generate hypotheses that are general and important.'

What Scheff calls 'investigation' seemed especially necessary in the case of humiliation in genocide, since humiliation in such a context is clearly more dramatic and painful than the terms in the above-introduced questionnaire by Hartling suggested. How would one for example approach questions such as whether such practices as rape in war are humiliation turned into a weapon? And how should culture difference be reckoned with? Somalian, Rwandan and Burundian culture could be expected to have different concepts of humiliation as compared to the questionnaire.

Moreover, since the aim of the project was to link micro, meso and macro levels a questionnaire addressing individuals would not suffice. The explorative and qualitative approach, including quantitative elements from Cantril's Self-Anchoring Scale, seemed to be the correct way for a start.¹³³ This would slightly modify Scheff's approach and combine

¹³³ Cantril's original version was adapted to the research of humiliation in Africa by introducing 'respect' and individual and group level. The question went as follows: There is a ladder from 0 to 10 (IMAGE OF LADDER). Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the highest amount of respect for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible humiliation for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Where would you put (name of group, for example Tutsi or Hutu) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) at the present time? Where did (name of group) stand five

qualitative and quantitative methods from the first stage of the research. Colin Robson defends this position: ‘There are strongly held views that the divide between qualitative and quantitative represents an ideological divide and that that particular twain should never meet. Following Bryman (1988a), my view is that many of these differences are more apparent than real and that there is in practice a considerable underlying unity of purpose’ (Robson, 1993, 6, see Bryman, 1988).

Furthermore, Bannister persuasively argues that ‘Qualitative research is part of a debate, not fixed truth. Qualitative research is: a) an attempt to capture the sense that lies within, and that structures what we say about what we do; b) an exploration, elaboration and systematization of the significance of an identified phenomenon; c) the illuminative representation of the meaning of a delimited issue or problem’ (Banister et al., 1994, 3).¹³⁴

How were qualitative data to be collected? This was the ensuing question. In an interview? In an open interview, a semi-structured, or a structured one? Through focus groups?¹³⁵ By the use of experimental methods?¹³⁶ By asking people to comment on scenarios?¹³⁷

years ago? Just as your best guess, where do you think (name of group) will be on the ladder five years from now?

¹³⁴ In this spirit, the research drew inspiration also from Grounded Theory, as first developed and presented by Glaser & Strauss, 1967. Using Grounded Theory means trying to avoid simply applying existing theories to data (usually interviews, taped and written down), or merely accepting conventional explanations, but instead being as open as possible, developing arguments and categories out of the data, as they emerge.

¹³⁵ Reidar Ommundsen suggested the ‘focus group method’ as used in marketing. He had employed this method successfully in connection with the issue of contraception methods. Four students discussed the topic under the guidance of two moderators, setting in motion thoughts and reflections which otherwise would have stayed opaque, unreflected or not conscious. Validity was addressed by asking the participants individually after the discussion whether they actually said what they meant. The resulting opinions could then be analysed in terms of whether they agreed or contradicted each other. See for further literature for example Barbour & Kitzinger, 1998; Greenbaum, 1988; Greenbaum, 1998; Morgan, 1988; Morgan, 1993; Morgan, 2000.

¹³⁶ Nisbett and Cohen do research on cultures of honour, as can be found for example in Texas, where also the rate of violence is high (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Nisbett and Cohen use experimental methods. For example, they place people in a room, let a co-worker bump into a person and then examine whether this person becomes angry. Levels of testosterone were measured and showed that they were higher in Texas in such situations than elsewhere.

¹³⁷ Lee D. Ross recommended the use of scenarios instead of experiments in the special case of research in genocide contexts, a scenario as a kind of simulated experiment, the experiment happening so-to-speak in the interviewee’s head (Lee D. Ross at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th-25th July 1997). Ross proposed to develop scenarios or stories entailing i) incidents of humiliation, ii) stories without such incidents, and iii) stories with some ambiguous though ‘bad’ situations but not necessarily humiliating ones. Subsequently people could be asked questions such as, ‘what do you think about this scenario?’ or, ‘look at this response to this situation, how do you feel, how do you think others feel, what would a woman feel, your mother, father, brother, and so on.’ The material used in such scenarios would have to be cultural specific (in

Survey and archive research were other alternatives to be thought of to examine humiliation in armed conflict. However, it was clear that the notion of humiliation had to be better explored and defined before venturing into survey research. The project's resources would not make a large survey possible. In contrast, archive research was to be included wherever possible. However, archive research would be difficult, especially in Somalia where the state collapsed in 1991 with all its institutions, and security is very fragile.

A further consideration was the question of whether humiliation was a universal to which cultural differences were 'irrelevant.' Jan Smedslund, for example, argues that 'even though ordinary words have very variable meanings, they also have a stable core meaning, and many partly overlapping words may also refer to the same core meaning. In summary, it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language... A formulation of such a system can only approximate some of the psychologically relevant features of ordinary language and must necessarily ignore others. However, one may envisage successively more complex scientific language, including an ever higher number of psychologically important distinctions' (Smedslund 1988, 5).¹³⁸

Adopting a 'Psycho-Logic' approach to the word 'humiliation,' one observes that it has its roots in the Latin word 'humus,' 'earth' (Hoad, 1986, 222), suggesting that to be humiliated means to be made small, reduced to ground level, perhaps even to have your face forced into the earth. This entails a spatial orientation, a downward orientation, 'being put down to earth,' literally a 'de-gradation.' 'ned-verdigelse' (Norwegian), 'Er-niedrig-ung' (German), 'a-baisse-ment' (French), all mean 'de-gradation.' All these words are built on the

some cultures for example to spit on a grave would be very humiliating, more than in another culture). Ross is a professor of psychology at Stanford University and is a principal investigator (and co-founder) of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN). The author or co-author of four books and scores of chapter and journal articles, he was elected in 1993 to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Ross' seminal research on attributional biases and other shortcomings in human inference exerted a major impact not only within social psychology but also in the emerging field of judgment and decision-making. In the event it proved difficult to construct scenarios with culture sensitive material before having studied the cultures involved.

¹³⁸ Smedslund asserts that human beings create 'meta-myths' that are explicable in terms of common-sense psychology or 'Psycho-Logic' (Smedslund, 1988). 'The key concepts in this system are given definitions, and the basic assumptions are presented in the form of axioms. A number of corollaries and theorems are formally proved. The text also contains numerous notes in which the formal propositions and their broader implications are discussed. It is assumed that the relationship between psycho-logic and empirical psychology is analogous to that existing between geometry and geography. Psycho-logic and geometry both provide a formal system in terms of which one may describe and analyze respectively psychological phenomena and geographical terrains' (Book-cover text of Psycho-logic, Smedslund, 1988). See also Smedslund, 1978; Smedslund, 1988; Smedslund, 1991; Smedslund, 1993; Smedslund, 1997; Smedslund, 1998.

same spatial, orientational metaphor.¹³⁹ This point will be expanded further down. Smedslund's argument implies that the research necessary is the analysis of these metaphors.¹⁴⁰

However, while the core of the notion of humiliation may be universal, there may be individual and cultural differences in its expressions. For example, Lee D. Ross disputes Smedslund's position and argues that psychology is not about asking whether phenomena exist or not, but about the question how they exist, to what extent and in which way.¹⁴¹ Perhaps a balance can be reached between the stances of Smedslund and Ross by ascribing different degrees of 'depth of intention' to each approach. Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess¹⁴² has developed the notion of the 'depth of intention,' or the 'depth of questioning,' or 'deepness of answers.' Naess writes, 'our depth of intention improves only slowly over years of study. There is an abyss of depth in everything fundamental' (Naess, in Wetlesen, 1978, 143). In his book *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology* (chapters 4 and 5, Fox, 1990) Fox discusses how important the concept of depth was for Naess, and that greater depth means asking why and how to a point where others stop asking.¹⁴³

In 'The Concept of Humiliation: Its Universal Core and Culture-Dependent Periphery' (Lindner, 2001a) the present author argues that seven layers of depth could be differentiated for the concept of humiliation, ranging from a core, namely the act of 'putting down' a thing or a person and Jan Smedslund's Psycho-Logic approach as suitable philosophical framework, and various peripheral layers that are open to other kinds of questioning that

¹³⁹ Lakoff and Johnson (1988) describe orientational metaphors as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. Humiliation clearly is 'down.'

¹⁴⁰ Smedslund's 'Concept of Anger' is related to humiliation as it builds on lack of respect (Smedslund, 1993, 13, italics in original): 'The feeling of anger consists in awareness of the relationship between the belief that someone one cares for has been treated wrongly and the want to correct or undo this. Everyone has a right to, and wants to, be treated courteously and justly, that is, respectfully, and when this right is violated, there is anger. What exactly constitutes courtesy and justice for a given person in a given context varies both with the culture and the person involved.' Smedslund formalises the definition within the system of Psychologic as follows (page 14): 'P in C at t is angry at Q' = df 'P in C at t believes that at least one person whom P in C at t cares for has, intentionally or through neglect, been treated without respect by Q, and P has not forgiven Q.' Also Lakoff examines the notion of anger (Lakoff, 1987, 408): Anger is 'structured in terms of an elaborate cognitive model that is implicit in the semantics of the language. This indicates that anger is not just an amorphous feeling, but rather that it has an elaborate cognitive structure.'

¹⁴¹ Personal communication with Ross January 2000, quoted with his permission.

¹⁴² See, for example, Naess, in Linsky, 1952; Naess, 1953; Naess, 1958; Naess, in Wetlesen, 1978.

¹⁴³ Warwick Fox, in his paper 'Intellectual Origins of the "Depth" Theme in the Philosophy of Arne Naess' explains, 'The extent to which a person discriminates along a chain of precizations (and, therefore, in a particular direction of interpretation) is a measure of their depth of intention, that is, the depth to which that person can claim to have understood the intended meaning of the expression' (Fox, 1992, 5).

address, for example, cultural and personal variations in perpetrating and experiencing humiliation.

The approach envisaged before leaving for Africa was multi-layered, combining Psycho-Logic reasoning, Grounded Theory, and Part/Whole analysis. Against this background, a semi-structured interview guideline (see Appendix) was developed addressing questions such as: Can humiliation lead to war, to Holocaust, genocide and ethnic cleansing? Can humiliation lead to international terrorism? And also the more fundamental questions such as: What is humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated?

However, as soon as the researcher arrived in Somalia, this approach proved unusable, unethical, and invalid. Discourse analysis¹⁴⁴ of the encounters during the first two weeks in Somalia led to the following questions, 'How can a researcher call it 'fieldwork' when she drops in from the rich West to study the sufferings and pride of the poor? How can she 'steal' their feelings in order to write a scientific report so that she may 'earn' her scholarship? Is not this obscene, immoral, and unethical? The result were feelings of humbleness; and a sense that it was a necessary humbling. To start with, the present author even felt humiliated; it was a kind of self-humiliation caused by her own initial acceptance of a version of 'scientific' method that appeared to be inhuman later.

Detached neutrality seems very necessary for any scientific endeavour, however, at times as unethical as a journalist's filming of a dying person instead of giving her a helping hand. What, for example, about those the researcher spoke to who were digging out graves from the quasi-genocidal onslaught in Somaliland, and who searched for support for documenting it? They invited the author, offered their tea that they could hardly afford, and hoped that this person from abroad could help them bring funds to study the mass-graves and document the killings that had happened. What about this situation? Or, what about the appeal to the author on behalf of all those people, who were traumatised by the brutalities of the war, who would need psychological or psychiatric help, and, because this is lacking, are chained like animals in their houses since their families are afraid that they may wander off into the desert and not find their way back again? Is not the neutral attitude of a 'scientific observer' at

¹⁴⁴ For discourse analysis and how discourse is shaped by and shapes power relations, for example by 'turn taking,' etc., see, for example, Bourdieu, 1977; Burke, 1998; Foucault, 1980. See for discourse and power in cross-cultural contexts Bandlamudi, 1999; Bremer, 1996; Clyne, 1994; Crawford, 1999; Gumperz, 1982; Henwood, 1998; MacMartin, 1999; Morgan, 1998a; Morgan, 1998b; Scollon & Scollon, 1981; Sitaram & Prosser, 1998; Valsiner, 1999; Wetherell & Potter, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Williams & Chrisman, 1994.

times as immoral as the ‘hands-off’ strategy of the international community in genocidal Rwanda?

The following quote from Kenneth Gergen became important for the ensuing period of the research in Somalia, and thereafter in Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Egypt, and various places in Europe. ‘... constructionist psychologists have also pursued alternative forms of methodology, reasoning as they do that research methods also convey values and ideologies. Feeling that experimental technologies place a divide between the scientist and subject, privilege the scientist’s voice over the subject’s, and invite manipulation, they seek means of broadening the range of research methods. Qualitative methodologies (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) are one significant step toward an enriched social psychology, as are discourse analytic procedures. Further, we are invited to experiment with our very forms of scientific expression. Professional writings in social psychology inherit stale traditions of rhetoric; they are intelligible to but a minute community of scholars, and even within this community they are overly formal, monologic, defensive, and dry. The nature of the social world scarcely demands such an archaic form of expression. Constructionism invites the scholar to expand the repertoire of expression, to explore ways of speaking and writing to a broader audience, perhaps with multiple voices, and a richer range of rhetoric’ (Gergen, in McGarty & Haslam, 1997, 17).¹⁴⁵

The answer to this struggle for method was dialogue.¹⁴⁶ Steinar Kvale writes, ‘The conversation ... is not only a specific empirical method: it also involves a basic mode of constituting knowledge; and the human world is a conversational reality’ (Kvale, 1996, 37). The conclusion was that the researcher had to enter into dialogue with people who know much more about the subject to be examined than the author, namely about feelings in war and genocide, especially feelings of humiliation. The conclusion was that they had to be

¹⁴⁵ See related texts Burr, 1995; Danziger, 1997a; Danziger, 1997b; Danziger, 1990; Danziger, 1997c; Danziger, 1997d; Danziger, 1997e; Danziger, 1997f; Danziger, 1997g; Danziger, 1997h; Edwards, 1998; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1999; Campos, Ramos, & Bernal, 1999; Billig et al., 1988; Edwards, 1988; Gee, 1999; Shotter & Gergen, 1989; Gergen, 1965; Gergen, 1973; Gergen, 1982; Gergen & Gergen, 1986; Gergen & Gergen, in Berkowitz, 1988; Gergen, 1994; Gergen, 1997; Gergen, 1999; Gergen, 2000; Ibanez, 1991; Mead, 1934; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Moscovici, 1998; van Rappard, 1997; Potter & Edwards, 1999; Rorty, 1991; Sampson, 1978; Sampson, 1991; Shotter, 1993; Spence, 1982; Vygotsky, 1978; Wetherell & Potter, 1998; Woofitt, 1992; and see for emotions in this context: Lutz, 1988; Tavis, 1989.

¹⁴⁶ See on dialogue, among many, Bakhtin, 1981; Buber, 1944; Wold, 1992; Billig, 1998; Campos, 1998; Josephs & Rommetveit, 1998; Hermans, 1999a; Hermans, 1999b; Prosser, 1978; Tappan, 1998.

considered as the experts.¹⁴⁷ The researcher had to become more aware of the social relations she actually formed by entering the scene.¹⁴⁸

However, in order to enter into dialogue, the researcher had to be authentic; Taylor writes about *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Taylor, 1990). Being authentic meant to disclose the author's biography. This entailed to explain to the 'informants' why she was in Africa and how the project idea had developed. This meant revealing that the author had been deeply formed by the aftermath of World War I and II in Europe. She had to tell the story of her father who lost an arm, part of his body, because he, being a young adolescent and at the same time soldier, did not want to be an oppressor but a friend of those his country had conquered, and how he was severely punished. She had to recount how she grew up in my father's head, in his imagination of the farm he was due to inherit, but lost when the part of his country where this farm was located was handed over to another country, and he had no more home, no place to go back to. She had to describe how this fate deeply wounded him, how he never really smiled for 50 years. She had to share, furthermore, how she grew up in a so-called 'refugee-family,' always feeling like a guest in my environment, feeling foreign, never being at home. She had to explain how she later tried to live and work in as many cultures as possible in order to acquire a gut feeling for how human beings in different cultures define and handle, life and death, love and hatred, peace and war. She had to conclude this account to interlocutors by explaining how all this led up to the research project.

Disclosing this account, being authentic, entering into dialogue, was to dramatically change the relations she hitherto had in Africa. Before she opened up in the way described, she met polite faces, telling her, if they gave me their time at all, what they thought I wanted to hear, but deep down not believing for a minute that I could understand even one tiny percentage of their reality. This I was told later.

After opening up, she learned many new things. She learned that the average African view of the European visitor could be described as follows: 'You from the West, you come here to get a kick out of our problems. You pretend to want to help, but you just want to have some fun. You have everything back home, you live in luxury, and you are blind to that. You arrogantly and stupidly believe that you suffer when you cannot take a shower or have to wait for the bus for more than two hours! Look how you cover our people with dust when bumping

¹⁴⁷ Beynon, 1984 defines the Ford workers in this way, - I owe this reference to Ragnvald Kalleberg.

¹⁴⁸ Argyle writes extensively about social relations, see Argyle & Henderson, 1990; Argyle & Cook, 1976; Argyle, 1994; Furnham & Argyle, 1981; Argyle & Colman, 1995; Argyle, Collett, & Furnham, 1995; Argyle, 1992; Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Argyle, 1974; Humphrey & Argyle, 1962; Argyle, Furnham, & Graham, 1981. I thank Ragnvald Kalleberg for introducing me to this literature.

childishly and proudly around in your four-wheel drive cars! Look how you enjoy being a king here, while you would be a slave back home in your country! All what you want is having fun, getting a good salary, writing empty reports to your organisation back home, in order to be able to continue this fraud. You pay lip service to human rights and empowerment, but you are a hypocrite! And you know that we need help – how glad would we be if we did not need it! And how good would it be if you were really to listen to us once, not only to the greedy among us who exploit your arrogant stupidity for their own good!’ (this is a condensation from statements that were repeated in Somalia and Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya).¹⁴⁹

Not only did the researcher learn more after my opening up, she felt that also many of my African interlocutors learned. Many have little knowledge of the fact that Europe had not always been rich and peaceful. For many of them World War I and II are irrelevant images from history. Through the author’s account it became palpable to them how terrible the suffering was that people in Europe had endured. This surprised many and it humbled them. Many stopped being arrogant towards the researcher. They hesitated pushing her into the category of those Westerners who do not even have the guts to admit that they want to have fun when they set out to ‘help,’ and who deceive themselves and others when professing to high ideals. The researcher observed how automatic this line of thought was, and how eyes and mouths stood still for fractions of seconds in astonishment when she talked about her background. She observed how she escaped the contempt felt on the African side for Westerners who expect to be thanked for being altruistic while being hypocrites.

And the author felt that Africans learned even more, namely that there is hope. The extent of division and violence in the 20th century in Europe is breathtaking, and still there is peace today (except the Balkans). Thus the example of Europe embodied in the researcher and in the painful past of her family, had the potential to create hope. More, she was considered by many as ‘one of us,’ as somebody who could, perhaps, fathom the extent of suffering they go through. She approached everybody as a fellow victim, a co-researcher on the way out of violence and war. And she felt that, though it is difficult to get through the wall of disgust towards ‘Western hypocrites’ she managed in many cases to get on board those who really struggle for peaceful change.

Authentic dialogue meant also that the researcher could not pretend. She had to approach people around her in the state she was in at the given moment. She continuously

¹⁴⁹ See also Maren, 1997 and Hancock, 1989.

struggled with the topic of humiliation in her head, almost never thinking about anything else. She pursued a multitude of hypotheses and lines of thought and drew every interlocutor into this process. Thus the fieldwork became one large dialogue, an inner dialogue and an external one. From the long list of questions from the interview guideline, only a few central questions ‘survived’: *Who are you? Tell me about you and your life! What do you think humiliation is? Does it play a role? If yes, how and where?*

Many of the people who became part of the ‘network of conversation’ that formed the context for the research became friends and will also be part of the author’s future network. Thus the initial question of structured versus non-structured interview was being transformed into an existential undertaking where the author went in with her whole being. The research thus began to resemble, at least partly, her past experience as a clinical psychologist, for example in Egypt, where she did the first step in this direction by adapting Western methods of therapy to her non-Western context by revising rigid Western ideologies of therapy and mental health.

In *The Psychology of Humiliation: Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler’s Germany* (Lindner, 2000b) the author describes in detail the relationships she as a person with a specific background (it is a myth that therapists are neutral and all-knowing) was able to build with Somalis, Rwandans, Burundians, as well as with expatriates working in the region and scientists studying it, and with contacts in Germany that related to the Nazi past of Germany.

As explained above, during the fieldwork in Africa from 1998 to 1999, the researcher moved from home to home, on the average every week or ten days to a new place, for almost a year, always looking for new hosts who would kindly house her and give her the precious opportunity to participate in their lives and learn about their views, views that she would not have understood from a hotel room, or hotel bar, where she would have encountered what the Panel describes as ‘the routine rarely varies anywhere in the world... Most reporters naturally gravitate to the same bars, where they repeat to each other the latest gossip and rumours, which then become the headline of the day’ (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 19, paragraph 12).

Thus the fieldwork resembled anthropological and sociological participatory fieldwork to some extent, and it is difficult to count the major interviews that were carried out. As already discussed, in the beginning in Somalia a number of quite formal interviews were carried out, later the author had rather ‘relationships,’ or a ‘network of communication.’ These relationships were embedded into a broader social context of reciprocity; the researcher

thanked all those who hosted her – for example, by buying food and contributing to other daily expenses, purchasing pieces of furniture where they lacked, participating in the costs of weddings or educational courses, sending emails and faxes to inquire about scholarships all over the world, or trying to find used computers – this list can be extended with further examples. Thus the researcher felt that she was not exploitative, and, in addition, applied money in a way that often seemed more constructive than spending it on Western style hotels.

When the researcher sat with people, she made notes, or taped the conversations on audio- or videotape. All audio or video tapings were preceded by preparatory visits or meetings, altogether by an effort to build a relationship of mutual understanding and trust, a relationship that would make it possible for both sides to be open, and not just deliver propaganda statements. Apart from incessant encounters with people, each mapping out another fragment of African predicament, altogether 216 full interviews can be counted, as specified in Table 7. Interviews lasted from one hour to several hours, in one piece, or on several occasions. Altogether 100 hours of audio taped interviews and 10 hours of digital video were collected.

The interviews relating to Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi were carried out on the background on a network of relationships in Germany and a knowledge base on German history that the researcher, born in West Germany after World War II as child of a so-called ‘refugee-family,’ acquired through several decades. This knowledge base was expanded between 1997 and 2001 by monitoring the current German ‘awakening’ with respect to painful memories stemming from the time of Hitler’s rule. During the past few years, diverse media programmes began documenting how Germans, who did not talk for decades about their experiences during Hitler’s reign, start talking at present.

The researcher sought also contact with aristocratic circles in Germany who were involved in resistance against Hitler and interviews were carried out (1999) that were embedded in these relationships. Furthermore, the researcher spoke to Holocaust survivors, among others the founder and organiser of an academic education programme on the Holocaust (1999, John Steiner, Sonoma University, USA).

Distribution of interviews addressing Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi	
30 interviews	with third party representatives in general in Africa
26 interviews	with third party representatives working with Somalia
54 interviews	with third party representatives working with Rwanda and Burundi
58 interviews	with Somalis in Africa and Europe
45 interviews	with Rwandans and Burundians in Africa and Europe
3 interviews	with Kenyans

Table 7: Distribution of interviews addressing Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi

In publications connected with this research the identity of many interlocutors is not exposed in order to protect their safety or political survival. Great care has to be taken in this respect since all publications are intended to be read not only by Western academics, but also by the contact network in Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi who kindly provided the researcher with all the insights she is now able to present, as well as politicians who hopefully will be able to draw lessons from this text that helps them to build more peace and not more violence. Especially in Rwanda and Burundi people have not stopped to be afraid, and ‘to-kill’ lists are not just a problem of yesterday, and Hutu forces are still poised to re-conquer Rwanda. I hope that I will show enough sensitivity and not quote utterances that would hurt the person who confided in me.

The interviews were conducted in different languages; most of them in English, some in German, some in Norwegian, and in the Great Lakes region most in French. In the following I will present only English translations, all translated by the author, without always indicating in which language they were conducted.

In the following, it will be attempted to familiarise the reader with the three cases of this research, namely Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler Germany.

Historical Background¹⁵⁰

This section aims at making the reader familiar with the three cases that are at the basis of this research on humiliation, namely Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany. This introduction into the historical background will serve as an overture to the field, - it represents the first 'leg' in the three-fold hermeneutic circle of this book, a circle that is envisaged to lead to a comprehensive diagnosis that extends beyond superficial labels.

Diagnosis, the first part in the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy, typically begins with the collection of biographical data about the patient or the client. Often preliminary diagnostic labels are already attached to clients. '...Most reporters naturally gravitate to the same bars, where they repeat to each other the latest gossip and rumours, which then become the headline of the day. In Rwanda, an implicit, matter-of-fact racism soon took hold, as reporters quickly instructed each other and their audiences back home that the entire crisis was little more than the resurgence of ancient ethnic hatreds among Africans... Here was yet another example of African "tribes" slaughtering each other, a simplistic notion good for an effective 10-second sound bite. As it happens, that Rwanda was nothing more serious than a case of Africans killing other Africans was precisely the line being spun by the genocidaires in a systematic and sophisticated campaign of disinformation shrewdly designed to disguise the reality of the genocide' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 19, paragraph 12).

In the case of wars and genocides first-hand diagnoses usually relegate perpetrators to the level of animals or devils: 'People who commit such horrifying atrocities and hack each other to death, like in Rwanda, are no human beings, they are worse than animals!' Or perpetrators are diagnosed as victims of psychiatric disorders: 'They surely are crazy!' This is a common commentary I am typically presented with when I report on my work to people who normally do not reflect on such topics, a commentary that I do not perceive as ill-intentioned, but as an expression of helplessness and fear in front of unfathomable atrocities.

In the face of 'animals,' 'devils,' and 'lunatics,' a therapist is well advised to try to get access to information about them from a multitude of sources. The first round in a hermeneutic circle is the first attempt to approach a subject, and it will therefore be carried out by selecting the voices of many scholars and leave interpretations by the author out, to give an

¹⁵⁰ This section on the historical background is adapted from Lindner, 2000b.

as complete and balanced picture as possible of the historical background of the cases presented here.

A historical overview will now be presented of the three cases of this research, Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany. Germany will only figure in the background, since its history is more widely known. Somalia will serve as main entry point, followed by Rwanda / Burundi.

Hitler's Germany

The pattern of German history is more widely known than Somali or Great Lakes history. There is a sea of literature available, which will not be discussed at any significant length here; only some perhaps less well-known aspects of its history will be highlighted. Germany is a latecomer within European countries. France, England, Spain, Portugal, each already looked back on a long national history when Germany was created as a state in 1871. As a newcomer, Germany began to compare itself with the rest, and became aware of the fact that the others were far ahead, for example in acquiring colonies. However, the young national enthusiasm that existed at the outset of World War I was thoroughly destroyed by the defeat and the ensuing humiliating Versailles Accords. Germany was now a pariah in Europe, and not what it had wished, an important and respected player.

After World War I the Germans were thoroughly and deliberately humiliated. It is now widely recognised that this had disastrous results. As suggested by many¹⁵¹ the hurt of humiliation created a hunger for retaliation. Hitler promised to do the job. He claimed that he could restore Germany's power and pride, putting it beyond the reach of enemies who wished to impose further humiliations upon it.

Hitler grew up in Austria, with a harsh father on one side and a loving supportive mother on the other (Bullock, 1991). In his book *Mein Kampf* (Hitler, 1999), the blueprint of immense suffering-to-come, Hitler elaborates on his father's authoritarian behaviour and how he, as a young boy resisted humiliation and instead stubbornly insisted on carrying out his dreams of becoming a painter. He writes about his father: '...the old man began the relentless enforcement of his authority' (Hitler, 1999, 9). Hitler, perhaps, displays already here his tendency to transform deep anger, in this case towards his father, into patronising 'understanding' of the weaknesses of the object of his anger, a psychological mechanism we will see him use later in his life as well, with disastrous consequences.

Hitler devotes another part of *Mein Kampf* to less well-known historical facts, namely the humiliating position Germans suffered from in Austria. Hitler describes how the Czechs tried to 'eradicate' German influence, and how enraged he was that only a handful of Germans in the Reich had any idea of the 'eternal and merciless struggle' under way 'for the German language, German schools, and a German way of life' (10). This piece of evidence illustrates that Hitler started his career in a very complicated situation, - not as a subject of the

¹⁵¹ See for example Sebastian Haffner & Bateson, 1978, or Norbert Elias, 1996.

powerful and prestigious German Empire, but as a member of the German population in Austria who felt increasingly excluded and humiliated by Czech influence, and, even worse, who felt thoroughly neglected and betrayed by their own kin, namely the Germans in the Reich, who did not take their brothers' sufferings in Austria seriously at all.

Hitler's relationship with 'Germanness' thus was intriguingly problematic. Hitler's German 'family' neglected him, - him, their German brother in Austria. What options does one have when let down by one's own family? Hitler, instead of getting mad at them, was to clemently translate their unfaithfulness into what he interpreted as their lack of awareness of the necessity to be better Germans. Hitler swallowed his disappointment and chose to teach the Germans in the Reich to improve, how to be 'real' Germans. His anger would not disappear though, it reappeared when they failed him at the end; it was as if he was pleased about the destruction of Germany just before everything collapsed (and he took his life).

Humiliation did not end for Hitler in Austria; he participated in World War I on the German side and experienced its humiliating defeat. He finds that German strategy was lousy. *Mein Kampf* is a training manual for students who want to learn about good propaganda (the allies in World War I), and how to mess it up (German propaganda in World War I). Again and again, it is the Germans themselves who were the ones to disappoint Hitler. Instead of abandoning them in anger, he again set out to 'develop' them and started this endeavour by writing *Mein Kampf*, a title that could properly be understood as '*My struggle to be loved by my German kin who deserves punishment for neglecting and humiliating me instead of loving me, or who is, at best, too naïve to understand what is good for them.*'

It was perhaps more difficult for Hitler to swallow his anger than he wants the reader to believe. While still in Austria, he developed an additional strategy for dealing with his disappointment about his unfaithful German 'clan.' He started to divert his bitter feelings, at least partly, to another humiliator, a 'super-humiliator,' as was in his eyes the 'Weltjudentum.' He suspected Jews of planning to dominate the world and relegate Germany, together with all other nations, to a humiliating slave role. 'Providence,' as he liked to call it, gave him the task of protecting not only his unfaithful Germany, but the entire world against this evil. I discussed these points with Holocaust survivor John Steiner, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the Holocaust Studies Center at Sonoma State University in California, whom I met on 18th July 1999 in Baden-Baden.

During his last weeks, Hitler stated that he had planted a good seed: 'he had been the first to tackle the Jewish question realistically, that was the merit of National Socialism and therefore - in Hitler's last words during his last conversation on April 2, 1945 - "the world

will be eternally grateful to National Socialism that I have extinguished the Jews in Germany and Central Europe.” (Jäckel, 1991, 64).

When Germany was about to be utterly destroyed at the end of World War II, Hitler had, so-to-speak, the proof that ‘his’ Germans, repeatedly letting him down and ultimately disappointing him, had not really deserved him. They had not lived up to the ideal of ‘meine Ehre heißt Treue’ [‘my honour is called loyalty’]. But at the end, unlike before, there was no mercy to be had. They had brought upon themselves their ‘just’ punishment, namely total destruction, a punishment that Hitler might well have wished upon for them during his younger years when they neglected him, when he was suffering as a German outcast among the Czechs and Jews in Austria.



Somalia¹⁵²

The Somalia of today is unique in its apparent failings and its apparent failure. The South has oscillated between high and low intensity civil war for about a decade. Never-ending infighting and violence inflict unceasing sufferings on all inhabitants. There has been no government since 1991; no ministries; no systematic maintenance of infrastructure; Somalia cannot ratify any international convention since it 'does not exist;' a Somali, whose passport has expired, cannot renew it anywhere since there is no functioning bureaucracy inside the country and no Somali embassy abroad (this was the state-of-affairs at the beginning of 2000, later developments are reported at the end of this section on Somalia).

As almost every Somali I spoke to during my fieldwork confirms, it is immensely humiliating to be virtually 'non-existent' as a citizen of this world, to be a suspect 'nobody' at every passport control (therefore many do not venture out anymore, in order to avoid exactly this humiliation), or to be a refugee from a country that has 'messed it up totally,' begging for benevolence in such far-away places as Norway or Canada.

'My emotions for Somalia are used up!' says a widely respected Somali professor, Ahmed I. Samatar, James Wallace Professor and Dean of International Studies and Programming, at Macalester College, in Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA, in a personal conversation.¹⁵³

He writes: 'Somalia has a new global reputation - the world's stereotype of abject, total and violent failure. This image is the consequence of the implosions of early 1991, subsequent events of mutual predation and mass starvation, failed international intervention, and a continuing absence of even the rudiments of viable national institutions. Given up on as an unsalvageable people and place, popular as well as official interest in Somalia has all but evaporated. What references to Somalia that are made, they are usually uttered with a sense of combined foreboding and despair. Hence, a once proud people, grudgingly admired for their dignity and self respect, are now reduced to either exist in the foul debris of their

¹⁵² There exists a confusing plethora of ways in which Somali words and names are written. Somalia is an oral society; it was only in 1972 that an official script was introduced. The major clan of the North of Somalia, for example, is called Isaak, Issaq, Ishak, etc. Or, the name Mohamed Abdille Hassan is written Maxamed Cabdille Xasan in Somali, the 'x' indicating, for example, that the 'h' is strongly emphasised. Almost every author who writes about Somalia uses a different spelling, especially those publishing before 1972. I will not attempt to unify other people's writing, and Somali words and names will therefore appear in different versions in the subsequent text.

¹⁵³ Conversation at the International Congress of Somali Studies, 6th -9th August 1998 in Turku.

socioeconomic and cultural ruin, or for those who can flee, condemned to the status of scruffy refugees in almost every corner of the world' (Samatar, 1998, 11).¹⁵⁴

How did Somalia end up in this abyss of civil war and self-destruction? Lately, the term 'ethnicity' has acquired a certain status in media coverage and academic writing whenever a civil war erupts in some remote corner of the world and nobody knows why. Then the mere utterance of the word 'ethnic conflict' makes everybody nod with 'understanding.' - Ethnicity is accepted as an ultimate explanation now that imperial warfare has faded away. Many analysts may, therefore, be tempted to hypothesise that Somalia is yet another case where people are at each others' throats because of 'age-old ethnic hatred.'

However, research on Somalia (and also on Rwanda and Burundi) soon indicates that 'ethnic division' as an explanation is too simplistic or even wrong. Anybody who studies Somalia is quickly informed that hardly any people in this world are as united as Somalis. Somalis are united ethnically, by language, by culture, religion, and by social institutions.¹⁵⁵ They belong to one single family of African peoples inhabiting the Horn of Africa, known to linguists as Cushitic (Hamitic).¹⁵⁶ Some Somalis argue that they are descendants of old Egyptian tribes who migrated to their present region.¹⁵⁷ Not only their linguistic belonging, but also their traditional lifestyle unites Somalis, 'nomadism is the basic economy with the camel as burden animal'¹⁵⁸ (Lewis, 1998, 11). Seventy five percent of the Somali population are traditionally pastoral nomadic clans (Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye) in the vast arid savannah grasslands of Eastern Africa¹⁵⁹ (the state of Somalia covers an area of almost double the size of Germany, or Norway, or Malaysia, and is about 25 times larger than Rwanda). Somali pastoral nomadic clans are united by their pristine pride, their interdependence in

¹⁵⁴ See also Bradbury, 1993; Farah & Lewis, 1993; Ghalib, 1995; Ihonvbere, 1996; Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Mazrui, in Adam & Ford, 1997; Sahnoun, 1994; Samatar, 1988; Samatar, 1995; Simons, 1995; The Africa Watch Committee, 1990.

¹⁵⁵ See for further reading on Somalia the work of THE great Somali expert, anthropologist Ioan M. Lewis, Lewis, 1957; Lewis, 1961; Lewis, 1980; Lewis, 1994b; Lewis, 1994a; Lewis & Mayall, 1995; or Farah & Lewis, 1993; Farah & Lewis, 1997.

¹⁵⁶ 'Major Cushitic representatives include the Oromo (known in earlier texts by the pejorative name of Galla) who number an estimated 18 million, the 'Afar (Danakil) who straddle the Rift Valley between Ethiopia and tiny Djibouti, the Reendiile, and Boni (Aweera) peoples of Kenya, and the Beja and Saho tribes in eastern Sudan' (Samatar, 1995, 10).

¹⁵⁷ Interview with former Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh, 9th January 1999 in Nairobi.

¹⁵⁸ 'though among the Saho and in some parts of southern Somalia, camels are few and oxen replace them as beasts of burden' (Lewis, 1998, 11).

¹⁵⁹ except the agricultural Digil and Reewin (often pronounced and ascribed mistakenly as Rahanweyn or Rahanwein, says Ahmed, 1995, 24) who constitute about 20 percent of the population in the South of Somalia, and a minority of occupationally specialised caste-like groups that is not included in the major clan-families and lives dispersed among them.

rather egalitarian, horizontal societal relations of alliances and conflicts with great autonomy for each grouping; in other words they live in almost ‘unconnected coexistences’ (Max Weber’s terminology¹⁶⁰), as opposed to societies with strictly hierarchical vertical societal structures. Moreover, Somalis are united by their devotion to Islam (Sunni, of the Sha’afi-ite, Lewis, 1994a, 9); Somali clans even claim to be the descendants of Arab ancestors, ‘Many Somali nomads felt the need for the prestige that comes from an identification with Arab ancestry. They absorbed individual Arabs who provided them with new tribal lineages whose names were adopted as the tribal eponyms’¹⁶¹ (Ahmed, 1995, 7).

Ali Mazrui puts into words how unique Somali ‘oneness’ is compared to the rest of Africa: ‘Most other African countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification’ (Mazrui, 1986, 71).

Do Mazrui’s words indicate that colonialism is at the core of all current Somali ills? Many of my interlocutors in Somalia indeed pointed at colonialism as the main culprit, others opposed this view as too easy a way out. In order to analyse this position, Somali colonialism has to be examined in more detail. Sir Richard Francis Burton was one of the earliest Europeans who made the journey to Somalia, and called this experience *First Footsteps in East Africa* (Burton, 1987). As elsewhere, those who were visited upon and ‘discovered’ by romantic Western travellers were soon colonised. Anna Simons (1995) describes how the Horn of Africa became the field for European ‘chess games’ and Somalis were reduced to playing pieces: ‘The European scramble for control over eastern trade (with the ultimate prize being India) led to protectionist and counter-protectionist seizures across the globe. If Britain acquired Aden to protect its Suez routes to the subcontinent, then France had to acquire something nearby as counterweight (hence, Djibouti)’ (Simons, 1995, 34).

The crucial point during the colonisation process was that the Somali nation was divided into five parts. The first one, Djibouti, was under French rule and included ethnically related Afar tribesmen. ‘Next came the British Somaliland Protectorate which had Hargeisa as its main town, and its neighbour Italian Somalia, with Mogadishu as its capital. Other Somalis eventually came under the British flag in Northern Kenya. Finally, the fifth division consisted

¹⁶⁰ See Gerth & Mills, 1958, 189.

¹⁶¹ ‘However, it is hard to find evidence to support any Arabic or Islamic legacies’ (Ahmed, 1995, 16).

of that large area known after its main Somali residents as the Ogaden, and the Somali territory round Dire Dawa (Dire Dabbe in Somali). This was the Ethiopian portion... These five divisions of the nation are represented in the five-pointed Somali star, the national emblem adopted by the Somali Republic at the time of independence in 1960' (Lewis, 1994a, 26, 27).

After independence in 1960, the North of Somalia, former 'British Protectorate of Somaliland,' and the South, emerging from the 'Italian Trust Territory of Somalia' united, formed the Republic of Somalia and lived through a few years of political democracy (1960 - 1969), during which the hope of incorporating the missing three parts of the nation never ceased to figure prominently. But 'neither Kenya nor Ethiopia were prepared to relinquish those areas of their colonial boundaries which were inhabited by ethnic Somali. As for French Somaliland, this became the separate independent Republic of Djibouti' (Mazrui, 1986, 71).

'*Assabiya* (or '*asabia*) is a concept that may be well suited to capture the Somali dream of unity. It was introduced by Ibn Khaldun, the great 14th century North African philosopher (and, in today's nomenclature, also social psychologist). 'Ibn Khaldun attributed the origins of states, including large and powerful ones, to a key factor he called '*asabia* which may be roughly slated into "social solidarity," "group feeling," or "group consciousness." A primary source of social solidarity is the group to which an individual feels most closely attached, namely his clan or tribe, people with whom he shares a common descent' (Adam, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 113, italicisation in the original).¹⁶²

However, Somali democracy, jubilantly welcomed on the date of independence from colonial rule in 1960, lost credibility very fast; it was increasingly perceived as anarchic and corrupt. 'The Somali nationalist '*asabia* believed in a centralized state. It sought to unite all Somalis including those in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti into one unitary state. Failure to achieve maximum objectives resulted in electoral chaos, corruption and elites living in luxury' (Adam, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 115, italicisation in the original).

The March 1969 presidential elections, the last democratic elections in Somalia so far, saw 62 parties being created at the national level, and 1002 candidates standing for 123 seats. 'In national politics, the most abiding interest of each major local voting block is to place a kinsman in a "chair" (as they expressively put it) in the national assembly. Under what

¹⁶² Said S. Samatar informs us (Samatar, 1995, 25) that modern study of this principle in social relations has been largely the achievement of British social anthropologists; he names Bronislaw Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, and Ioan M. Lewis. Samatar emphasises especially Lewis' work on A Pastoral Democracy (Lewis, 1961).

political party banner this is achieved is of secondary importance, for even if it turns out that a member is returned on a minority party ticket, he can always change his party allegiance once he is home and dry' (Lewis, in Gulliver, 1969, 353).

The fact that democracy did not deliver unification, but instead exhibited corruption and chaos, allowed a dictatorial 'saviour' to seize power. A Somali refugee, an engineer, gave this summary to me (16th May 1997 in Oslo): 'Before 1969 Somalia had a parliamentary system, democratic, peaceful, but with a lot of corruption, especially among members of parliament. Elections were held in quite a disgusting and illegal way. In October 1969 the newly elected President Shermarke was killed (apparently in some kind of personal dispute) and next morning a general, Siad Barre, seized power. He built a socialist system with one single socialist party, and attracted the Soviet Union as 'eternal friend,' advisor and financier.'

President Mohammed Siad Barre from the Marehan sub-clan in the South of Somalia initially gave people new hope. He condemned tribalism and clanism. He seemed to stand for a government that wished to care for all Somalis and not just for one clan, - at least this was his rhetoric, perhaps in the beginning also his conviction. He lifted up the economy by shrewdly capitalising on the Cold War and the support of the Soviet Union.

The first years of Barre's rule were perhaps the only years of relative peace and almost inclusive national development Somalis experienced in the whole of the twentieth century. Times were so peaceful that even a census could be carried out (though the numbers should only be regarded as an estimation; Mohamed Abdulgader (I do not want to disclose his real name) took part in this census and reported to me in an interview on the 24th December 1998 in Mombassa that it was impossible to get exact figures from anybody, - colonial times had taught mistrust of authorities, - that only tribal chiefs would have exact knowledge¹⁶³). The total population according to the 1975 census was 3.3 million (the United Nations estimated Somalia's population in mid-1991 at nearly 7.7 million) with the most lightly populated zones (fewer than six persons per square kilometre) in northeastern and central Somalia (compare for example Norway with 13 persons per square kilometre, but Rwanda with 300 persons).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ I will quote more from my conversations with Mohamed Abdulgader further down.

¹⁶⁴ Retrieved from [http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+so0047\)](http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0047)) in May 1997, titled Somalia: Population and Settlement Patterns. Ioan M. Lewis believes that there are some 5 million Somalis living in Somalia (Lewis, 1994a, 9); Said S. Samatar underlines that figures on Somalia represent guesswork rather than reliable census data, which do not exist for this part of Africa: 'Occupying nearly 1,036,000 sq. kms. (400,000 sq. miles) of an arid savanna grassland in eastern Africa, the Somalis are estimated to number some six to seven million. Two-thirds of these approximately four million live within the boundaries of the modern Somali state 637,600 sq. kms. (260,000 sq. miles), two million in Ethiopia's Ogaadeen (Ogaden) region, 240,000 in northern Kenya

Most significantly (and perhaps also disastrously), Barre built the largest army of the entire region. Somalia had something like 4000 men after independence in 1960 and about 30 000 soldiers in the seventies (Hansen, 2000). Riding on the public wave of national 'Assabiya' enthusiasm Barre set out to fulfil Somalia's great dream of unification: Counting on his 'friend,' the Soviet Union, Somalia attempted to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia, and invaded Ethiopia in 1978.

Stig Jarle Hansen calls this war the 'Armageddon' of East Africa and writes: 'The Ogadeen war saw the largest tank battle south of Sahara, it saw one of the few Soviet led air assaults and one of the largest strategical airlift operations during the cold war. The conflict between Somalia, Ethiopia and the pre-independent Eritrea involved over 300.000 Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis, Soviets, Cubans and Yemenites' (Hansen, 2000, 1).

Said S. Samatar bitterly reflects on an unprecedented historic twist that subsequently turned a near Somali victory into a devastating defeat: 'The resourceful Ethiopians, as usual, bushwhacked the Somalis through international diplomacy. They declared themselves socialist and appealed for help from their "fraternal Soviet Socialist" people. The Soviets were only too happy to oblige. Switching support from the Somalis, they shipped into Ethiopia in February and March 1978 some \$US 1.5 billion in military hardware, together with two leading Soviet generals and 1500 advisers. The majority of the advisers went straight from their advisory positions in the Somali army and, in a tragicomic turn of events in keeping with Somali history, took with them practically all of the Somali maps of the region, showing to the enemy the troop movements and disposition of the Somali army. For good measure, the Soviets directed Fidel Castro, wagger of Soviet proxy wars in Africa, to pitch in with 11,000 Cuban troops. Ethiopia, by the region's standard, had now an awesome force. Within weeks they had the Somalis ejected from the Ogaadeen' (Samatar, 1995, 18).

Somalia's defeat was a devastating humiliation. Samatar continues on the same page: 'Defeat in the battlefield often deals a disastrous setback to military regimes...Incredibly, Mr. Barre's power survived the humiliating trouncing in the Ogaadeen.'

Barre survived national humiliation and secured his own power position because he was alert enough to stifle coup attempts, but mainly by means of an age-old strategy: finding scapegoats. In particular, he put the blame upon the Somalis from the Northern parts of his country, formerly under British tutelage. At first he targeted the Majerteen, destroyed their

(in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) of the British administrative period, an estimated 100,000 in the republic of Djibouti where a Somali ethnic majority, the 'Iise clan-family, has held the lion's share of that tiny republic's resources' (Samatar, 1995, 6).

villages and wells, and later the Isaaq people. ‘You Isaaq, you are so arrogant,’ were Barre’s words to a Somali woman (who wants to stay anonymous) as reported to me during my fieldwork on 30th November 1998; she met the dictator when she pleaded for her imprisoned family members. She confirmed that she believes that the dictator, - himself without formal education, but gifted with a sharp mind, - must have suffered personal humiliation at the hands of Isaaq colleagues who were more educated than him.

The ‘Morgan Report,’ an official top secret report on ‘implemented and recommended measures’ for a ‘final solution’ to Somalia’s ‘Isaaq problem’ was written by General Mohammed Sidi Hersi ‘Morgan,’ Siad Barre’s Majerteen son-in-law, on 23rd January 1987. Morgan writes that the Isaaq and their supporters must be ‘subjected to a campaign of obliteration,’ in order to prevent that they ‘raise their heads again.’ He continues: ‘today, we possess the right remedy for the virus in the [body of the] Somali State.’ Among other ‘remedies’ he proposes: ‘Rendering uninhabitable the territory between the army and the enemy, which can be done by destroying the water tanks and the villages lying across the territory used by them for infiltration,’ and ‘Removing from the membership of the armed forces and the civil service all those who are open to suspicion of aiding the enemy - especially those holding sensitive posts.’¹⁶⁵

Members of the Isaaq clan became potential suspects everywhere, in the South they lost their jobs, they were detained, some executed. Abdulqadir H. Ismail Jirdeh (Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Somaliland in Hargeisa), and Ahmed El Kahin, (legal advisor of the parliament, both interviewed on 19th November 1998 in Hargeisa) are witnesses.¹⁶⁶ ‘After 1981, and the failed coup attempt against Barre, the North did not receive anything anymore. Even the hospital equipment was dismantled and shipped to the South. The Northerners suffered discrimination in many ways: they did not get licences or letters of credit (LCs) anymore, meaning that a Southerner had to be found to provide a facade, while the actual importer was an Isaaq; the MOD faction (Majerteen, Ogaden, Darood) took advantage of that. In short, the South robbed the North. Curfew was at five pm, people were counted in the houses, one had to report even when a brother came and visited, *khat* [a mild stimulant that was illegal] was put into a car as a pretext to frame the owner and confiscate the car; Hargeisa was a big military garrison. The elders always said that this had to stop, they never stopped protesting, but to no avail!’

¹⁶⁵ A worn-out copy of this report was shown to me in Hargeisa, November 1998.

¹⁶⁶ Further down more quotes from this interview will follow.

Also the ‘Hargeisa group’ tried to do something.¹⁶⁷ They were a group of young Somali intellectuals who tried to rehabilitate their neglected city. They started with the dilapidated hospital and persuaded, among others, the German Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) to help them improve its standards. Siad Barre regarded this with great suspicion, and the group was imprisoned in 1981. Fourteen of its members lingered in solitary confinement in one of the worst jails of the country for eight years. They were released on 16th March 1989 following international pressure on Barre.

Perhaps only a Somali, tough and unbreakable, could survive such an experience. An ‘average’ Westerner cannot fathom the accounts I was presented with. Many listeners’ minds tend to close down in horror when hearing about cruel physical torture, because a person who has never experienced torture has no frame of reference within which to grasp such cruelties, - average Westerners take their insights into violence from films in which brutality disappears at the end of the film. Therefore enumerating physical brutalities here would perhaps not promote empathy and real understanding. But almost everybody has been lonely at some point in life and can ask herself ‘How would I cope with being alone, never seeing another human being for eight years, while at the same time never knowing whether I may be executed tomorrow, or even the next minute?’ Or, ‘How would I tackle the challenge and compete with the cockroaches that throw themselves from all four walls of my tiny hot and insect-infested cell-hole, onto the little food I get, at night during Ramadan (where you do not get food during the day), in absolute, total darkness?’

The prisoners did not see each other, but they detected that it was possible to communicate with the cell-neighbours, without the guards hearing it, by knocking on the thick walls and listening with the ear pressed to the wall. One of them invented a knocking language, similar to the Morse code, with two sounds representing the whole alphabet. He taught his neighbour, who taught his neighbour, and so on, - it took several years until the last cell was reached... One prisoner had managed to hold on to a book, it was Tolstoy’s ‘Anna Karenina,’ a thick book, which he ‘read’ to his cell-neighbour through the wall...

Subsequently the dictator ordered the military to run riot against the Isaaq population with quasi-genocidal results.¹⁶⁸ The biggest blow hit Hargeisa, the capital of the North, when

¹⁶⁷ Hargeisa is the capital of the North. Members of the Hargeisa group later founded the SORRA group (Somali Relief and Rehabilitation Association) in 1990.

¹⁶⁸ These atrocities are being labelled ‘quasi-genocide,’ since Isaaq were not systematically exterminated, different to Rwanda, where even ‘half-blood’ were potential targets for extermination, and because until the end there were Isaaq ministers, something that would not have been thinkable in

it was bombed and reduced to rubble in 1988. Edna Adan, lived through hell, she says: ‘The regime began to try to impose its authority by force. You have the airport here, just 5 km from us where we sit now. The airport where you just landed, Hargeisa airport. Russian MIG airplanes, fighter planes, would take off from that airport to come and bomb the city here, where we are. Bomb civilians, women and children, and homes. And do a 4 km circle and just go and land again at the airport, just 5 km away’ (interview in Hargeisa, 3rd December 1998¹⁶⁹).

The Africa Watch Committee reports on *Somalia: A Government at War With Its Own People* (The Africa Watch Committee, 1990) and gives documentary evidence of torture, killings, and suppression of opposition on a massive scale.¹⁷⁰ Government forces were ‘determined to suppress grass roots rebellion among the northern clans. As many as 100,000 people are thought to have died as a result of the attacks. Some 250,000 sought refuge in border camps in Ethiopia, or fled to the countryside for safe haven. Thousands more citizens in the eastern and middle regions of the country had, over the years, their villages burned, livestock looted, and their families made destitute or killed by the soldiers of a government which would not tolerate criticism - a government which was at war with its own people. Because of the atrocities which were being committed against them, many people fled their homeland and became exiled abroad, or became refugees in camps across the borders in neighbouring countries. The Somali people have suffered a diaspora, and can be found in exile today in all countries of Europe, the Middle East, and North America. There are more than 50,000 Somali refugees in Britain today, and an estimated 65,000 in Canada’ (Anita Suleiman, 1997, *Somali Study Materials*).

I do not want to expand on the description of atrocities here; this has been very thoroughly documented in the Africa Watch Committee report and in other places.. To illustrate their severity, the reader might imagine what it would be like if the American President ordered the American army to reduce San Francisco to rubble, or if the British Prime Minister sent military planes to destroy Scotland, promising its territory, once its inhabitants had been destroyed, to other groups. (Siad Barre promised Isaaq land to Ogadenis). I received many accounts of the horrors that the targeted people were subjected to. From several sources I got reports of the endured by those who fled; women and children hid

Rwanda (report by a United Nations employee who does not wish to be named, December 1998, Hargeisa).

¹⁶⁹ Edna Adan will be quoted further down again, from the same interview.

¹⁷⁰ See also the Amnesty International Publication *Somalia: A Long-Term Human Rights Crisis*, London 1988 (Amnesty International, 1988).

under trees on their way to safety in Ethiopia, they were followed by planes who bombed them; suddenly the family under the neighbouring tree was killed...

The Barre regime collapsed in 1991 and the dictator was forced into exile. He was brought down by military factions who fought him.¹⁷¹ In the aftermath Somalia lost all its public and governmental institutions, and is still without any such services. Instead of rebuilding the state, the Somali clans went back to their traditional, pre-colonial tribal independence.¹⁷² Bitter faction fighting ensued¹⁷³ and resulted in bloodshed and endless sufferings for the civilian population during the entire decade of the 1990s, atrocities being carried out on all sides.

However, the Isaaq in the North stood out as an exception. They held a successful peace conference and managed to pacify their region. They went as far as to proclaim their own state, 'Somaliland' (Somaliland is not recognised by the international community or by other Somali leaders, who bitterly resent this secession.¹⁷⁴) Samatar understands that this deep rift between the North and the South may be the result of what may be called 'humiliation that went too far': 'Somaliland's decision to declare independence in May 1991 was a result of massive popular opposition to further rule from Mogadishu. This hostility resulted from the suffering inflicted on the north by the Barre regime' (Samatar, 1995, update).¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Stig Jarle Hansen (1998) summarises not only the downfall of Siad Barre, but gives also a feel for the constantly changing alliances of armed factions, so characteristic for the Somali way of handling war and peace: The Somali Patriotic movement (SPM, evil tongues say that this organisation was formed by Barre supporters that found his cause lost) was based on 3000 Ogadenis that deserted from Siad Barre's army in 1989. Colonel Omar Jess was its commander. Colonel Omar Jess was soon joined by former Defence Minister Adan Abdullahi Nur 'Gabeeyow,' a long-time Siad Barre stalwart who had been dismissed by the dictator. SPM and USC were the two organisations that ousted Barre from Mogadishu in January 1991. After January 1991, the two men radically diverged, Colonel Jess joined forces with General Aydeed while 'Gabeeyow' allied himself with his former colleague and rival in the Siad Barre entourage, General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan,' the SNF leader. Omar Jesse switched sides again after massacres against Ogadenis initiated by SNA, but later again came back in Aidede's alliance. SPM was a major and important force when it was united' (unpublished text leading up to a research report).

¹⁷² See also Ken Menkhaus, 1995 on The Radical Localization of Somali Politics.

¹⁷³ See A. A. Mohamoud, 2000, on 'Somalia: a Political Circus.'

¹⁷⁴ It is a political statement to write Somaliland with inverted commas as in 'Somaliland' since this highlights the fact that it is not recognised, - or writing it without inverted commas because this indicates that the author actually recognises it. As a neutral observer I do not want to be caught up in this discussion. I deeply respect the efforts of the people in the North of Somalia to pacify their region, and I was also touched by the intensity of the wish related to me to be recognised. I will write Somaliland without inverted commas in this manuscript.

¹⁷⁵ The North was not without violence though: 'The stability experienced in the north after the Borama conference was shattered by eruption of violence, over control of Hargeisa Airport...' However, 'the government came out stronger...' (Farah, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 35).

Practically everybody I talked to during my fieldwork spoke with some awe about this legendary Isaaq peace conference. However, Somalis from the still war-torn South, and international advisers would only reluctantly acknowledge its success, since this conference brought relative peace to the North without depending on expensive conference arrangements provided by the United Nations or neighbouring countries, like those that have till now characterised the numerous – and usually unsuccessful – peace conferences and meetings addressing the troubled rest of Somalia.

The legendary Borama National Reconciliation Conference started in January 1993 and lasted for four months. It ‘was attended by 150 voting delegates, comprising elders from all clans in Somaliland, accompanied by a further 150 observers and advisers. An estimated 2,000 people participated in the meeting at different stages. A National Peace Charter was formulated including details on registration and storage of weapons, demobilization of militias, disarming of bandits, and the formation of local police forces and judicial institutions. In addition, the Charter defined the role of elders and communities and a code of conduct. Further, it set out the transitional government structure and emphasized the principle of decentralization and the creation of regional and district councils. The government was to draft a full national constitution within two years. On 5 May 1993 the Borama Conference elected Mohammed H. Ibrahim Igaal as the new President of Somaliland. The election of Igaal was met with general approval. The Borama Conference was politically the most telling achievement of northern local level clan democracy’ (Samatar, 1995, update). (Later the Majerteen clan followed the Isaaq example and created ‘Puntland’ in the Northeast, with Abdullahi Yusuf as President of the self-proclaimed state of Puntland.¹⁷⁶)

Down from high politics to the grassroots, the following account of one of the above-introduced Hargeisa group members who spent eight years in solitary confinement is presented at this point to provide a more personal insight into how the struggle, disruption and hope for reconstruction in Somaliland are being played out in daily family life (interview 9th December 1998 in Hargeisa):

E. (Lindner): In 1981, you got married, and you got your job.

B. (from the Hargeisa group): Exactly.

E: And you came to Hargeisa. And already one year later... it was finished.

¹⁷⁶ Puntland is not claiming independence as Somaliland does, but has set up a regional administration, for example to collect taxes and get some development projects off the ground.

B: It was finished, yes. I was only married for six months. Five months, in fact, when I was arrested.

E: And your wife was... I read that many women were forced to divorce...

B: Forced to divorce, yes.

E: And how did this go with your wife?

B: She was working at the bank here. And she was really harassed for quite a while; she was transferred to very old facilities, away from her family and all. She was asked to... almost every night asked to come and... women were being taken from their homes... because Somalia at that time was supposed to be a socialist country. And she was very tough, really, but they harassed her, and her family as well. That's why she left in 1985. She left to Germany.

E. To Germany?

B: Yes. She stayed in Germany for quite a number of years. But later she moved to Holland. There were some bombings and stuff like that in Germany for hostels or something like that. So she stayed in... in fact, when I came out of prison, and I went to America, I came back through Germany, and they were still in Germany. Near Bonn. That's where they were staying.

E: So you did not meet your wife immediately after being released?

B: No, she was away. She was in Germany when I was released.

E: So after being released, you went to the United States?

B: Yes, and stayed there for six months, to get a residence. And I was only on a visit to Germany.

E: And this was the first time you saw your wife again after so many years?

B: The first time. No letters, no communication, because it was impossible.

E: How was it to meet her again, she was another person and you were another person...

B: Of course. We were strangers for the first... absolutely, for the first few months we were really strangers, because so much had happened to her and to us, it was very difficult to... It's only recently that we are becoming more... accustomed to each other. After three kids. We have three sons now. She's still in Holland now. But she's supposed to move if everything stays like calm here. I hope they'll move to Hargeisa.

E: So the sons get education in Holland?

B: They get education in Holland. They were here recently, for three months. They learned Somali.

E: They speak Dutch?

B: They speak Dutch (laughter).

E: So your wife has Dutch citizenship, and you have American citizenship? (laughter)

B: Yes, and the eldest can get German papers when he's 18. But he can also apply for Dutch.

E: He has a big choice.

B: Yes, a big choice. And they can become American as well.

E: Amazing!

Also the South of Somalia saw a series of peace conferences, with the aim of rebuilding Somalia. The conference of 1991 in Djibouti led to the establishment of an interim government, with Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the United Somali Congress (USC) faction as President. 'This arrangement was, however, soon challenged by the chairman of the USC, General Mohamed Farah 'Aidid,' who had led the final military offensive that drove the Barre regime out of the capital, Mogadishu. Intense fighting between Ali Mahdi and Aidid broke out in November 1991, resulting in widespread loss of life and destruction of physical infrastructure in the capital. Fighting soon spread into the southern regions of Somalia and, combined with the "scorched earth" practices of the retreating Barre forces earlier that year, resulted in an inability of the local population to farm the land or graze livestock. Increasing malnutrition in these areas rapidly led to the onset of a famine by early 1992' (Jan, 1996, 3).¹⁷⁷

Ameen Jan summarises the situation that subsequently lead up to the involvement of the United Nations and the United States: 'The delivery of humanitarian relief by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), various international NGOs, and UN agencies was made exceedingly difficult by the prevailing general insecurity, the increased incidence of banditry and theft, and the extortionist practices of the faction militias whose support was required to guarantee safe access by the humanitarian community to the suffering populations. As a result, several UN agencies withdrew altogether from Somalia during 1991, including UNDP which functioned as Resident Coordinator of all UN agencies in the country' (3).

Jan continues: 'The UN established its first operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in May 1992. It was a traditional observer mission of fifty (later increased to 500) unarmed military observers in Mogadishu who were assigned to observe a UN-brokered cease-fire in the

¹⁷⁷ Ameen Jan's briefing (1996) *Peacebuilding in Somalia* (<http://www.ipacademy.inter.net/somalia2.htm>) was initiated by the International Peace Academy in New York. This briefing was based on a field visit to Nairobi and Mogadishu from 11th to 25th March 1996, an IPA Policy Forum entitled 'Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Legacies of the International Intervention' held in New York on 23rd April 1996, and on over 60 interviews conducted in the U.S., Kenya and Somalia between November 1995 and April 1996.

capital.’ Jan recalls that the mission failed and the humanitarian and security situation worsened. On 9th December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), or Operation Restore Hope, was launched by the U.S. Its mandate was simply to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. In Jan’s view, ‘UNITAF’s impact was immediate and positive. High expectations among the Somali population of what the U.S. would be able to do to quell the fighting, including disarmament of the factional militias, resulted in the faction leaders hunkering down. Delivery of humanitarian assistance was thereby eased, and UNITAF succeeded in saving thousands of human lives in the areas most affected by the famine.’ However, Jan points out that the failure to actively disarm the factions of their heavy weapons encouraged the faction leaders all over again.

The humanitarian emergency wound down and the United States prepared to hand over its functions under UNITAF to the UN. UNOSOM II was established to undertake the task of peacebuilding. As Jan puts it, ‘This task failed. Especially the military objective to marginalize and eliminate General Aidid after the attack on Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993 stripped the UN of the impartiality that it required to perform a useful role in civilian peacebuilding efforts. By the time these military objectives changed in October 1993, UNOSOM II had become too discredited to be seen as an honest broker in the political process (Jan, 1996, 3).¹⁷⁸

Today Somalia is so deeply divided, so war-torn after almost a decade of conflict, so full of bitterness and torment that aid organisations are reluctant to come to Somalia; most organisations ‘retreated’ to Nairobi or other nearby places, and representatives I spoke to could count the number of Westerners they knew who were holding out in Somalia with one hand. Understandably enough: for example, in April 1998 Ola Skuterud, head of the Somalia Delegation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Resident Representative Norwegian Red Cross, who regularly ventured into Somalia with his helpers, was kidnapped in a dramatic incident directly upon arrival at the airport near Mogadishu together with about ten other people. He related the details of this incident to me, explaining how he experienced it from the ‘inside’ (4th January 1999, later I also talked to two other hostages), while the main negotiator (the Somali Secretary General Somali Red Crescent) who worked through long sleepless nights to get the hostages free (9th January

¹⁷⁸ See also: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia: At the Strategic and Operational Levels 19-20 June 1995 by The Lessons-Learned Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations & The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs UN Programme, 1995. See also Clarke & Herbst, 1997.

1999) provided me with the view from ‘outside.’ Their accounts throw into sharp relief all aspects of Somali volatility of alliances: kidnappers are not necessarily in total control of the situation; they face those among them who want a bigger share, and others who do not approve at all...

Sam Engelstad supplements: ‘If three clans are prominent in one town, an international NGO working in the community must generally negotiate with representatives loyal to all three. Each group will expect to be provided with resources commensurate with their clan’s perceived strength. And when things go wrong, as they always do – when “promised” resources don’t materialize – death threats and kidnappings often follow’ (Engelstad, in Haakonsen & Keynan, 1995, 62).

Not everybody comes back alive from kidnapping incidents. On 23rd April 1999 IRIN (The English service of the UN’s IRIN humanitarian information unit, <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN>) reports: ‘The international humanitarian community on Thursday “condemned in the strongest possible terms” the abduction of an Italian aid worker in the Lower Juba Region of southern Somalia, and recommended the suspension of aid activities in the region. The man, a veterinarian working with the Italian NGO, Terra Nuova, was kidnapped on Friday in the town of Hagar by an armed militia whose identity is as yet unknown. In January another Terra Nuova veterinarian, Dr. Manmohan Bhogal, who was working on the same animal vaccination programme in the Gedo Region of southern Somalia, was murdered. Nobody has yet been held to account for that killing.’

Together with a colleague of late Dr. Manmohan Bhogal I went through all possible theories of what exactly might have got Dr. Manmohan Bhogal killed (beginning of 1999, Terre Nuova in Nairobi).

Though Somaliland is relatively peaceful today, and Puntland is following suit, the rest of Somalia is still war-torn and instable; everybody living there is forced to subsist in a state of constant alertness and anxiety to fall victim to violence at almost any time. The South is less homogenous than the North, has stronger warlords, less respect for elders, and less control over youths who have got accustomed to war, to enumerate just a few reasons why the South seems to fall victim to violence more than the North (summarised from Samatar, 1995, update).

The last point is especially interesting; it addresses the phenomenon of the *Mooryaan* (*Mooryaan* in Mogadishu, *Jirri* among the Majerteen, or, *day-day* among the Isaaq). They are

young men, usually heavy drug users (including the ubiquitous *khat*¹⁷⁹), living in houses that they (in some cases together with almost equally ‘courageous’ and tough girls) seized with their weapons. ‘The term “Mooryaan” designates the looter and is, in fact, applied today to those young boys, chewing qaat and carrying weapons as tall as themselves, who indulge regularly in “delinquent” activities’ (Marchal, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 196). When I asked about those young bandits in Somaliland and about why banditry seems to be such a minor problem in the North as compared to the South, I got the answer that some of these ‘boys’ gave up their banditry under pressure of the elders, while some others, those who were less open to prosocial change, were killed, even by their own families.

Incidentally, the case of these young men epitomises how volatile clan fault lines can prove to be: ‘In September, 1991, some Abgal Mooryaan were intent on pillaging a repair station in Shibis; the inhabitants tell them to go away, since the owner of the station and those of most of the cars belong to the same clan. Alas! our young warriors made them into Habar Gedir to gain clan justification. In one word, if the clan did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it’ (Marchal, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 207).

An article in *The Economist* may serve as a conclusion to this short walk through Somali history; it also highlights the global repercussions of the international community’s ‘humiliating failure’ to ‘rescue’ Somalia: ‘In March 995, the last United Nations troops packed their kit and fled from Somalia. It was not just the country that was left in ruins. Their departure was also a turning-point in the UN’s post-cold-war role. The organisation’s humiliating failure to pacify Somalia killed the hope, probably always unrealistic, that it could become the world’s police force. The United States, which lost 18 of its soldiers in one bloody night in October 1993, was, from then on, opposed to almost any forcible UN intervention. It has not, since then, sent its troops to keep peace in Africa’ (The Economist, 1999, 31).

However, *The Economist* comes to a surprising conclusion, ‘Without a government for almost ten years and with little outside assistance, Somalis have not exterminated each other. In various ways, many have been doing quite well, a lot better than might have been expected

¹⁷⁹ Or qaat, or qaad, or miraa. ‘One of the contexts in which men, particularly, are most relaxed is when they meet socially to chew the leaves of the stimulant plant qat. Whereas qat-chewing sessions were once special and occasional pastimes, in the 1980s and 1990s the consumption of qat, during the day as well as in the evening and individually, became pervasive in urban centres such as Mogadishu. The young militia figures tended to chew it regularly and were provided with supplies by their leaders. Marketing qat became in the 1990s big business and played an important role in the political economy of the “warlords”’ (Lewis, 1994a, 19, 20, italicisation in original).

and better than some Africans whose governments are under the tutelage of western donors, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The average Somali, self reliant and tough, is probably no worse off than the average Tanzanian or Zambian' (31).

The article concludes with hope for the future: 'the UN would be ill-advised to try to reconstitute Somalia as a centralised state. Instead, it should encourage its dismembered parts to form reasonably democratic administrations and secure nationwide agreement on common issues such as a central bank, roads, schools and health programmes. Can these be achieved without a central power? Maybe. But the six or seven entities that make up Somalia now should be left autonomous and the boundaries between them as flexible as possible. In time, with good fortune, they may come together in a loose confederation which would suit Somali social structure' (33).

Peace efforts to pacify Somalia have been made all along since the failed UN intervention, - by the UN, and by neighbouring states, - but they regularly ended in disaster. However, there seems to be hope now. IRIN reports on the latest attempt that is currently under way and is welcomed with cautious optimism by observers, even sceptical ones: 'The Somali peace conference held in Djibouti is coming to the end of its consultative phase, after composition of the predominantly clan delegations was slowed down by disagreement, diplomatic sources told IRIN on Friday. Debate focused particularly on numbers regarding sub-clans, women and minorities. The final composition of the delegations is likely to be four groups of 160 representatives, with smaller groups representing minorities' (IRIN, 9th June 2000). Many obstacles have been overcome since June, and on 21st August 2000 a big step ahead was taken when Abdillahi Deroow Issack, the newly-elected speaker of Somalia's Transitional National Assembly (for a transitional period of three years) was officially sworn in, and on 27th August 2000 a new president, Abdulqasim Salad Hasan, was elected.

Somalis in Norway follow the conference proceedings via their Satellite dishes with which they capture Djibouti television programmes that have been set up especially for this conference; otherwise it is difficult to be informed about the progress of this conference. Hassan A. Keynan (former UNESCO secretary general in Somalia) reports to me on the 25th of August 2000 in Oslo: 'In this conference representatives from all clans participate, even from Somaliland and Puntland, although both refuse to take part in the conference and have given orders to arrest these representatives upon arrival in Somaliland and Puntland. Also the warlords, except for one, refuse to take part; but their clans are represented. The conference is hosted by Djibouti and, although it is sympathetically viewed by the United Nations, care has been taken to keep distance from outside control such as from the UN, because that would

create suspicion that hidden agendas are being pushed through.' Keynan is one of the above mentioned Somalia experts who is cautiously optimistic and believes that Somalia, as soon as its problems are settled, has the potential to become a very special and interesting place, even a success in Africa.

Further down I will try to show why I agree with Keynan. I will round up the account of Somalia's history here. Evidently, Somalia's predicament is much more complicated than this brief overview indicates. Anybody who delves into Somali clan relations, for example, can write several books only on clan alliances and breaches of alliances. But, hopefully the aim of this section has been achieved, namely to introduce a reader to Somalia who previously was not familiar with it.



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Rwanda / Burundi¹⁸⁰

As indicated at the beginning of this manuscript, the entry point into this research was the humiliation thesis explaining Germany's lust to go to World War II, namely the thesis that Germany felt humiliated after World War I by the Versailles Accords. Interestingly, part of the Versailles humiliation was that Germany not only lost German East Africa, but that this was also not subtracted from the claim for damages. Øyvind Østerud¹⁸¹ made me aware of this intriguing link between Germany, Rwanda / Burundi, and deliberate humiliation. The League of Nations gave Belgium colonial tutelage over Rwanda, 'as a device for depriving Germany of its colonies without subtraction from the claim for damages,' and this 'added to the humiliation of the peace accord' (Øyvind Østerud).¹⁸²

Anybody who is searching for more common points linking the cases of this book, will be disappointed and find that they are worlds apart: Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi are extreme opposites, at least at the first glance. Somalia is an immensely large and scarce country at the margins of Africa towards the sea, with proud, aggressively honest (in expressing dislike), egalitarian, and mobile inhabitants, while Rwanda and Burundi are tiny fertile hilly countries, landlocked in the heart of Africa, with people who are bound to their farming land, locked into rigid social hierarchies, and who have the reputation of hardly ever saying directly what they think.

Pre-Hitler's Germany, with its strict Prussian militaristic hierarchy and culture of obedience and orderliness clearly falls into the category of the Great Lakes, and not of Somalia. With its hills and neatness, The Great Lakes were known as the Switzerland of Africa.

However, there are also 'connections' between Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi, - apart from the fact that they all are African countries. One peculiar connection is provided by a Burundian Prime Minister, Michel Micômbero, from a lowly Tutsi lineage, who was deposed in 1976 and exiled to Mogadishu, Somalia, where he placed himself under Siad Barre's protecting hand, and died, under suspect circumstances, in 1983. Micômbero also links up to

¹⁸⁰ In the Kinyarwanda language, Ba- is a noun prefix that signifies 'people,' as in Ba-twa, Batutsi, Bahutu. The singular form is Mu-, as in Mu-twa. I will use the plural forms Tutsi and Hutu.

¹⁸¹ In a personal message on 8th November 1999.

¹⁸² Dorsey, in his *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda* reports: 'On May 6, 1919, members of the council - Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy - decided that the German colonies would be administered as mandates by the "Great Powers," which meant that Great Britain received the lion's share - German East Africa and the eastern part of Rwanda' (Dorsey, 1994, 214).

Hitler's Germany, since many Hutu describe him as a Hitler figure who forced the population, including his Hutu victims, to use an equivalent to the 'Heil Hitler' salutation.

Another 'connection' between Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi is the 'Hamitic hypothesis' which argues that the Tutsi of the Great Lakes invaded the Great Lakes region from somewhere between Egypt and the Horn of Africa; Tutsi bodies, slain in the 1994 genocide, were thrown into rivers by their Hutu killers to be 'shipped back' to their 'nilo-hamitic origins,' – a cruel 'go home' message so-to-speak.

A further linkage is the 'Somalia Syndrome' that prevented the international community from becoming more active in Rwanda, precisely at the moment when Rwanda needed an alert and strong-willed international community to protect it from the 1994 genocide.

Another link between Somalia and Rwanda / Burundi is Somali expertise on genocidal killings, an expertise that was needed in Rwanda; the 1994 genocide in Rwanda became the field of examination for a Somali expert, Rakiya Omar, who has co-directed the African Rights report on *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance* (1995).¹⁸³

The international community provides a further commonality: expatriates share a common feel towards both regions, namely that they feel unwelcome; many expatriates would like to leave if their work did not keep them. If I were to create a sentence that summarises the numerous opinions related to me during my fieldwork, then this sentence should perhaps go as follows: 'In Somalia people are unfriendly, overly suspicious and brutally direct, in Rwanda they are unfriendly, overly suspicious and unbearably secretive, - people are much more friendly in West Africa.' Admittedly, for many expatriates these 'unpleasant places' are highlights in their careers nevertheless, but only because they are the hardest posts to be found and thus represent something like a hard-to-pass examination, that gives, if successfully mastered, higher marks, and the well-earned right to relax in more hospitable regions of the world.

Perhaps linked to this extreme picture that most expatriates have of both Somalia and the Great Lakes region, is the fact that both regions at times were 'the best' and also see themselves as 'the best.' For many years Somalia and Rwanda were exemplary and respected nations, under Siad Barre Somalia was a proud member of the Arab League and several

¹⁸³ See also Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1993. See other reports, for example Amnesty International & Amnesty International, 1997, Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, and The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000.

relevant African groupings, and Rwanda was equally respected by neighbours and aid donors. One expert on the Great Lakes (we had several meetings in the French speaking part of Europe during 2000, I do not want to disclose his name), told me ‘off the record’ that the Great Lakes region is peculiar insofar as ‘people there believe that they are ‘the best,’ and, conversely, whatever ills befall them, they see them as ‘the worst’ of what humankind ever had to endure.

The last common point is Nairobi, where both Somalis and Rwandans / Burundians flee from the terror of their countries; Nairobi is the first point of escape for people from the Great Lakes as well as from Somalia.

At this point, I believe, I have exhausted my current knowledge of similarities and differences between Somalia and the Great Lakes (and pre-Hitler’s Germany) and can proceed. I will now look at the Great Lakes region’s past and put forward the first question a therapist asks when a new patient comes: ‘Who is this patient?’

The first white man to set foot in the enigmatic mountain region of the Great Lakes in the heart of Africa was the German Count von Goetzen. He was born in Schloss Scharfeneck, Silesia,¹⁸⁴ on May 12, 1860. The *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda* reports: ‘On his first voyage to Africa in 1891, he was a lieutenant of the Imperial Guard at Uhlans. He also accompanied von Prittwitz and Kersting on their transafrican expedition in 1893 and 1894. The first Europeans to enter Rwanda, they explored Nyragongo and Lake Kivu on an essentially scientific and military expedition that stretched from India to East Africa and the Atlantic Ocean. The explorers remained in Rwanda for several weeks’ (Dorsey, 1994, 242).

What did von Goetzen and his successors see? What did the colonial powers find when they first ‘discovered’ their future underlings? What is the pre-colonial history of this region? They found ‘a thousand hills,’ the legendary *mille collines*, figuring in many names,¹⁸⁵ in an area that is, as mentioned above, a fraction the size of Somalia, but the more fertile (before the events of 1994, Rwanda was the most densely populated country of the African continent, 7.1 million inhabitants for 26,338 square kilometres. Ninety per cent of the population live on agriculture).

This is the only part of the region’s history that is completely undisputed. Almost everything else that the reader might expect to find in a short overview of history is

¹⁸⁴ Also my family originates from Silesia. I found German literature about von Goetzen in the bookshelves of Médecins sans Frontières in Kigali. See *Durch Afrika, von Ost nach West* (Götzen, 1899).

¹⁸⁵ Hotel des Mille Collines is one of the central meeting places in Kigali.

passionately debated: Different parties involved in the current conflict paint it in different ways and ‘imagine’ different kinds of communities (Anderson, 1991). As Lemarchand formulates it, ‘the historical message is radically different among Hutu and Tutsi. For the Hutu, resurrecting a fictitious past gives their collective self-awareness as an oppressed majority a powerful primordial appeal; for the Tutsi, on the other hand, investing the past with an assumption of unadulterated harmony and equality between groups allows them to claim that Burundi is a basically healthy society, only periodically perturbed by malcontents and “selfish” politicians’ (Lemarchand, 1994a, xiv, xv).

I will, in the following, attempt to let different voices speak, in order to give the reader the opportunity to develop a personal ‘feel’ for the delicacy of the situation. The *Encarta Concise Encyclopedia*¹⁸⁶ presents the ‘primordialist’ ‘three-wave’ version of Rwandan history that is also the most widely used in the typical international media coverage on the Great Lakes: ‘The original inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa people. The Hutu were also established by the 15th century, when the Tutsi conquered the area and made the Hutu a caste of serfs.’

Or, in a little more detail, starting with the first wave: ‘Between 2000 BC and 1000 AD, people migrated in successive waves into the area between the Rift Valley lakes of Central Africa. These pygmoid people lived by hunting and gathering in the forests. Their descendants, who are still hunter-gatherers, are known as Batwa’ (Waller & Oxfam, 1996, 4). (The Twa now form less than one per cent of the total population of Rwanda.)

Waller continues with the second wave: ‘For the next 500 years new people migrated into the area. They concentrated on clearing the land for cultivation. Their society was organised in small monarchies, based on clans of related families. Their social and cultural life was geared to preserving and promoting the interests of these clans and their alliances. This population of cultivators is often presumed to be Bahutu’ (4). (They now form almost ninety per cent of the population.)

In his account on the third wave, Waller uses the word ‘emerged,’ instead of ‘conquered,’ or ‘invaded,’ perhaps as an indication that he does not want to commit himself to just one version of history: ‘Then, between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries AD, a taller group of people known as the Batutsi emerged as the dominant military and economic force. It was they who introduced the lyre-horned Ankole cattle into Rwanda. They reinforced their military strength by developing an oral mythology which taught that the Batutsi’ dominance

¹⁸⁶ See <http://links.expedia.com/am/>.

over the Bahutu and Batwa was ordained by God, and that the Batutsi and their Mwami (king) were omnipotent in all walks of life. Even though they were a minority in society, the Batutsi controlled all areas of the country, except the north and west, by means of a complicated administrative system. Bahutu were tied to their Batutsi chiefs by a system of 'clientage' in which the Mututsi patron could deny his Muhutu client access to pasture, or to cattle, or to military protection, if the client did not provide free labour and a proportion of his crops to the patron. The Batutsi Mwamis also manipulated a complex web of spies, and thus not only maintained their power, but developed a capacity for political intrigue and paranoia that remains to this day throughout Rwandan society' (4).

René Lemarchand found a caricature of this 'primordialist argument' in *The Economist*: 'The Hutu are small, thick-set, deep-brown farmers. The Tutsi minority are tall, slim, very dark cattle drivers whose forefathers conquered the Hutu some four centuries ago. The two people have lived as nobles and serfs ever since.... The Tutsi have always disdained foreigners and preferred their cattle to a European idea of God. While the Hutu ran the civil service, the Tutsi manned the army, and kept the upper hand by shooting complainers' (*The Economist*, 1988, quoted in Lemarchand, 1994a, 7). *The Economist* continues, 'The Tutsi stratagems... are said to include offerings of cattle and gifts of "beautiful women," both designed to hoodwink the unsuspecting Hutu agriculturalists. The Tutsi's occupational status as pastoralists and the proverbial beauty of their women (tall and thin) were supposedly key ingredients in the historical process of feudal domination of Tutsi over Hutu' (6).

From this extreme caricature of the 'primordialist argument' we may now turn to the opposite extreme. Pierre Erny (Erny, 1995, 29) reminds us of Anicet Kashamura, who puts forward a contesting 'neo-Tutsi' version of history, for example in his *Essai sur les mœurs sexuelles et les cultures de peuples des Grands Lacs africains* (Kashamura, 1973). This version accuses Western ethnology of having invented the thesis of the existence of different ethnic groups that invaded the region in waves. The neo-Tutsi version states, that, on the contrary, Twa, Tutsi and Hutu belong to one single ethnic group within which a differentiation 'emerged.' Indeed, when I was in the region, I was intensely urged never to use categories such as Tutsi and Hutu in order to not contribute to this rift, and never to ask a person of her origin. I followed this advice, and would not touch upon this delicate subject unless my interlocutors did it themselves, in the same way that I would not ask Somalis for their clan affiliation.

Every researcher or visitor of the region faces this dilemma; namely that nobody advocates partiality openly, - neutrality is the official ideology in most discourses, - while at

the same time reality seems to be dominated by exactly this rift. Whatever publication one consults on this subject, the struggle for truth and objectivity is intertwined with sympathies for one or the other conflict party, and for a novice it is extremely difficult to get an idea of where reality stops and ideology begins. Academic scholar Filip Reyntjens, based in Antwerp in the Flemish part of Belgium, for example, is known to be Hutu-oriented, - many characterised him to me as 'extremely knowledgeable but biased,' and a UNHCR employee in Burundi reported to me that his books are banned in Burundi.¹⁸⁷ Jean-Pierre Chrétien, based in Paris, is reported by many not to be Hutu-oriented.¹⁸⁸ Some recommended to me René Lemarchand for his balanced account,;they found his book *Rwanda and Burundi* the best in this field (Lemarchand, 1970¹⁸⁹). Others related to me that they learned most from Gérard Prunier's book *History of a Genocide* (Prunier, 1995a¹⁹⁰). However, Prunier is not uncontested either, and many criticise him for 'never having lived in the region he writes about.' This list of scholars hopefully will be supplemented by more local expertise, as there is André Guichaoua from Burundi, based in France.¹⁹¹

Where are the facts, and where is ideology? The novice is lost. As soon as I thought that one version was perhaps more likely, I was presented with evidence that supported the other. Lemarchand, for example, points at the puzzling piece of evidence that the same person (in Burundi) 'might assume a double identity and be identified as both Hutu and Tutsi' (Lemarchand, 1994a, 9). He explains: 'The key to the puzzle lies in the different semantic fields associated with the term *Hutu*. In Kirundi, the term has two separate meanings: one refers to its cultural or ethnic underpinnings, the other to its social connotations. In the latter sense, Hutu refers to a "social subordinate" in relation to somebody higher up in the pecking order. The definition given by Father E. Rodegem - fils social, or "social son" - is perhaps even more accurate, since it denotes not just social inferiority but a measure of affectivity (Rodegem, personal communication, 1991). Thus a Tutsi cast in the role of client vis-à-vis a wealthier patron would be referred to as "Hutu," even though his cultural identity remained Tutsi. Similarly, a prince was a Hutu in relation to the king, and a high-ranking Tutsi was a Hutu in relation to a prince' (9, 10).

¹⁸⁷ See, for example, Reyntjens, 1993; Reyntjens, 1994; Reyntjens & Minority Rights Group, 1995; Reyntjens, 1995; and Marysse & Reyntjens, 1997.

¹⁸⁸ See for a selection of his work, Chrétien, 1976; Chrétien, 1991a; Chrétien, 1991b; Chrétien, 1992; Chrétien, 1993; Chrétien, 1996; Chrétien, 1997.

¹⁸⁹ See, for example, Lemarchand, 1970; Lemarchand, 1994b; Lemarchand, 1994a; Lemarchand, 1996, and Kay & Lemarchand, 1987.

¹⁹⁰ See also Prunier, 1995b.

¹⁹¹ See, for example, Guichaoua, 1994; Chrétien, Guichaoua, & Le Jeune, 1989.

‘Does this mean that the neo-Tutsi version is correct?’ asks the novice with some hope of finally reaching the bottom of it, only to be reminded by Erny that nobody in Rwanda and Burundi can stay neutral in these matters (he himself included).¹⁹² He takes a stance and proposes that the neo-Tutsi version of a common origin of Hutu and Tutsi may be Machiavellian ideology, that it may be nothing but a Tutsi attempt to cover up for Tutsi oppression, and more importantly, to confuse the international community.¹⁹³ One has to admit that Erny has psychological likelihood on his side, such a version may be expected from masters who wish to camouflage their domination, perhaps even in front of themselves, by pretending that their slaves in fact are perfectly happy ‘children,’ who, in addition, all are members of the same family, and that outsiders are the ones guilty of disturbing this happy idyll, - a tactic of denial, combined with the strategy of accusing the messenger.

If I put this, crudely and impolitely, into words taken from social work, then Erny’s view would fit with the experience social work professionals have with husbands who beat their wives, and who, to the social worker’s disgust, remain convinced that their battered wives are perfectly happy. Since the social workers are appalled and convinced they know better, they ‘rescue’ the wife. However, and here social workers share the struggle of the historian in the Great Lakes, repeatedly and painfully they have to discover that black-and-white views are too simplistic: even badly beaten wives often appear to ‘love’ their husbands and frequently return to them, in spite of the fact that they had just been ‘heroically rescued’ from their plight by the social worker who, disappointed and exhausted, asks whether, perhaps, the husband (master/Tutsi) was right after all...?

Waller addresses this problem as follows: ‘There are differences of perception [of Rwandese history], and the most important relates to the question of who exactly the Batutsi are, and the precise nature of their relationship to the Bahutu’ (Waller & Oxfam, 1996, 5). Waller then asks the important questions: ‘Did they dominate them in a semi-feudal hierarchy of master and serf, or was their relationship mutually beneficial?’

As indicated above, the delicate topic is difficult to talk about. Waller, in his Oxfam publication, - and Oxfam surely does not wish to be declared non-grata in the region, -

¹⁹² ‘Il existe sur le Rwanda une littérature scientifique considérable, mais je crois pouvoir dire qu’aucun écrit n’est totalement exempt de parti pris: comme l’opposition viscéralement passionnelle entre Tutsi et Hutu conditionne tout le reste, on est toujours, d’une manière ou d’une autre, à des degrés certes très divers, favorable à l’un ou l’autre camp. Je ne prétends nullement échapper à la règle’ (Erny, 1995, 25).

¹⁹³ ‘J’ai d’ailleurs le sentiment que le discours anthropologico-historique véhiculé par le mouvement neo-tutsi est destiné essentiellement aux gens du dehors, à l’opinion internationale, à la galerie’ Erny, 1995, 35).

formulates it with care and tact: 'Ever since aristocratic German explorers first pronounced the Batutsi to be an elite of nilo-hamitic origins, the Bahutu and the Batutsi have been regarded as separate ethnic groups. But some authorities now suggest that the differences between all three 'ethnic' groups result from social differentiation within the clan system, and not from the successive waves of immigration of different groups. The evidence from archaeological, linguistic, and comparative sources is inconclusive, and each group tends to believe the theory that suits its interests best. Although it will be hard to establish an objective version of history, endorsed by all ethnic groups, in the end it will be essential to work out a truly national and non-sectarian interpretation of Rwanda's past, if the current wounds of ethnic conflict are to be healed' (5).

Should one be so impartial in the face of a history that led to genocide, and resolve to 'let them find out by themselves'? Does not such a 'neutral' stance resemble the infamous 'hands-off' attitude that made the international community become guilty of not intervening when the genocide started? Erny proposes that the 1994 genocide especially the ease with which Hutu could be convinced of its necessity, the passion with which they engaged in it, and the vividness with which historic horrors could be invoked and 'heated up' in the face of a Tutsi attempt to 're-conquer' them - could be regarded as a kind of proof for the version that Hutu in fact were cruelly oppressed, and perhaps at some time in history brutally conquered by Tutsi.¹⁹⁴ And just before independence the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), a royalist Tutsi party, could be said to deliver the proof herself, when it clearly states that the 'vulgar thoughts of ordinary persons' [Hutu] could not be valorised in the same way as the 'sharp judgement of a capable man' [Tutsi], and that democratic elections regrettably put a literate minority at the mercy of a majority without culture.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Une chose est apparue clairement au moment des troubles au Rwanda: ce qui a compté de fait, ce n'était pas une quelconque vérité historique, mais la représentation que l'on avait du Tutsi dans l'imaginaire du peuple. Si les propagandes ont eu un tel effet, si l'on a massacré avec une telle facilité, si les gens ont fui aussi massivement devant le FPR, c'est que tout le monde vivait plus ou moins intensément sur l'image ("d'Épinal") d'un Tutsi qui est l'ennemi séculaire, l'opresseur, le tueur, telle que la véhicule, vraie ou fausse, la culture populaire. Et à force d'être enfermé dans une image on finit par s'y conformer et à répondre à l'attente générale... Le stéréotype s'était sans doute estompé dans la fraction instruite de la population qui ne ressentait plus le Tutsi comme une menace directe, et il fallait hautement se réjouir de cette évolution positive des mentalités. Mais après l'attaque de 1990 et surtout l'invasion de 1994, tout un passé resurgissait, fait de peur, de rancœur et de haine: le Tutsi redevenait l'envahisseur d'autrefois revenu asservir un peuple qui avait réussi à s'en libérer. C'est là qu'il faut chercher les causes profondes du massacre. Quand l'émotion prend le dessus, la rationalité s'effondre' (Erny, 1995, 34, 35).

¹⁹⁵ 'Bien que la société rwandaise soit composée d'individus de valeur très inégale et qu'il n'est pas équitable d'accorder la même valeur à la pensée vulgaire de l'homme ordinaire qu'au jugement

What cannot be denied, in any case and independently of any discussion on roots, is that 'Rwanda was a complex and an advanced monarchy. The monarch ruled the country through his official representatives drawn from the Tutsi nobility. Thus, there emerged a highly sophisticated political culture which enabled the king to communicate with the people. Rwanda then, admittedly, had some eighteen clans defined primarily along lines of kinship. The terms Hutu and Tutsi were already in use but referred to individuals rather than to groups. In those days, the distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi was based on lineage rather than ethnicity. Indeed, the demarcation line was blurred: one could move from one status to another, as one became rich or poor, or even through marriage.' This is the way the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda describes the historic state of Rwanda in *The Jean Paul Akayesu Judgement* (<http://www.un.org/ictt/english/judgements/akayesu.html>).¹⁹⁶

The International Tribunal, in its attempt to understand the background on which perpetrators of the genocide, such as Jean Paul Akayesu, committed their deeds, invited also scholars, for example Alison Des Forges,¹⁹⁷ a highly respected expert on Rwanda (see her very well researched Human Rights Watch report *Leave None to Tell the Story*, Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999). The International Tribunal writes in *The Jean Paul Akayesu Judgement*: 'Both German and Belgian colonial authorities, if only at the outset as far as the latter are concerned, relied on an elite essentially composed of people who referred to themselves as Tutsi, a choice which, according to Dr. Alison Desforges, was born of racial or even racist considerations. In the minds of the colonizers, the Tutsi looked more like them, because of their height and colour, and were, therefore, more intelligent and better equipped to govern.'

Des Forges thus suggests that the 'Hamitic hypothesis' - meaning that the Tutsi were a superior, 'Caucasoid' race from North-Eastern Africa responsible for all signs of true civilisation in 'black' Africa¹⁹⁸ - was, partly at least, a mapping of racial or racist colonial views onto an essentially unknown African reality. And, certainly, there are facts that support

perspicace de l'homme capable..., bien que le suffrage universel aboutira infailliblement à l'asservissement de la minorité lettrée par la majorité inculte' (quoted in Erny, 1995, 54).

¹⁹⁶ 'On September 2, 1998, the tribunal found Jean-Paul Akayesu, former burgomaster of Taba, guilty of nine of fifteen charges, including genocide, inciting to genocide, and rape. He was the first person to be convicted of genocide after trial by an international court. The verdict was also the first to recognize rape as a form of genocide' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, conclusion).

¹⁹⁷ I find this name being spelled in various ways, namely Des Forges, or Desforges. I will use Des Forges in my text, but leave Desforges in quotes.

¹⁹⁸ 'Tutsi have longer faces, their ladies are beautiful, they have long nails, they come from Arab countries, they are a mixture of Arab and white blood, therefore nearer to the whites than other Africans, they are almost relatives of the whites.'

her view. For a long period the colonialists favoured the Tutsi, and educated them to be leaders, even more, they fixed a reality that was much more fluid into 'hard' categories: 'In the early 1930s, Belgian authorities introduced a permanent distinction by dividing the population into three groups which they called ethnic groups, with the Hutu representing about 84% of the population, while the Tutsi (about 15%) and Twa (about 1%) accounted for the rest. In line with this division, it became mandatory for every Rwandan to carry an identity card mentioning his or her ethnicity. The Chamber notes that the reference to ethnic background on identity cards was maintained, even after Rwanda's independence and was, at last, abolished only after the tragic events the country experienced in 1994' (*The Jean Paul Akayesu Judgement*).

Perhaps the discussion concerning historical facts will be decided some day in the future. What is clear is that 'In the late 1800s Europeans arrived, and Roman Catholic clergy established missions. Rwanda and Burundi (known as Urundi) were incorporated into German East Africa. Belgium occupied the country during World War I (1914-1918), and after the war the area became known as the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. After World War II (1939-1945), the Hutu began protesting the political and social inequalities in Rwanda. Antagonism between the Tutsi and Hutu erupted into violence, and in 1960 the Tutsi king fled the country, along with 200,000 of his people' (*Encarta Concise Encyclopedia*).

The encyclopaedia misses an interesting historic detail in its short ride through history: The Hutu were not alone in their uprising; they had part of the Belgian colonial powers behind them. 'The early leaders of the Catholic church in Rwanda such as Mgr Hirth or Mgr Classe had been upper-class men with rather conservative political ideas which were followed by the rest of the white clergy' (Prunier, 1995a, 44).

In parenthesis, let me make the suggestion that the *Bible*¹⁹⁹ might have helped these conservative colonial masters find an explanation from the Christian creed. The *Bible* recounts a story that could have been written by aristocratic masters who want to explain to their lowly farmers why they have to obey and not become 'arrogant': God (the aristocratic master) was furious with Adam, Eve and the serpent, - three offenders against his will and command, - and God humiliated them all. The serpent was made the most cursed of all beasts and forced to go about on its belly: 'dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life' (*Genesis 3, 14*).

¹⁹⁹ I thank Howard Adelman for pointing out to me how important a source the Bible may be for the subject of humiliation. He recommends, on 13th January 1997 in a personal message: 'Read Genesis 33:18-34:31, the story of the Simeon and Levi revenge for the rape of Dinah, to see how a cycle of humiliation is set off, beginning with desire and love, not hate.'

Eve was forced to accept the obedience of her husband: ‘and he shall rule over thee’ (*Genesis* 3, 16). She went with Adam as he was ejected from Paradise. By this act, humankind was removed permanently to a lower plane. Adam had enjoyed an easy hunter-gatherer existence in God’s well-stocked heavenly fields. After expulsion he was forced to accept the back-breaking toil of the farmer’s life. Along with Eve, he was ‘sent...forth from the Garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken’ (*Genesis* 3, 23). The *Bible* story has other implications also: What about Cain, the farmer, who kills Abel, the pastoralist and was punished terribly by God for that, condemned to become a fugitive and a vagabond, to be killed by anybody who could find him?²⁰⁰

Prunier continues his account of Belgian rule: ‘But in the late 1930s and increasingly after the war, these men were replaced by clerics of humbler social origins, from the lower middle class or even the working class and increasingly Flemish rather than Walloon. They had no sympathy for the aristocratic Tutsi and identified more readily with the downtrodden Hutu. The combination of changes in white clerical sympathies, struggle for the control of the Rwandese church and increasing challenge of the colonial order by the Tutsi élite, all these combined to bring about a slow but momentous switch in the church’s attitudes, from supporting the Tutsi élite to helping the Hutu rise from their subservient position towards a new aspiring middle-class situation’ (Prunier, 1995a, 44).

The *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda* explains under the keyword ‘Flemish’: ‘A language and group of people from Flanders, often discriminated against by the French-speaking Walloons of Belgium. Those who were members of the colonial service tended to be relegated to Rwanda, especially after 1940. Flemish administrators and young Catholic missionaries tended to have much more in common with and sympathy for the Hutu intellectuals and peasantry. Together, according to one well-placed source, they “took to their protégés, the Hutu leaders, more readily than to the Tutsi,” and therefore may have been biased in their favour during the push for independence’ (229).

Humiliated Flemish colonialists identify with humiliated Hutu. Many of my Tutsi interlocutors accuse Belgium of having sown the seeds for genocidal thinking at exactly this historic juncture. They accuse Belgians to have created conditions under which the latent resentment of the humiliated Hutu ‘underdog’ - or, as many Tutsi would claim, the non-existent Hutu resentment - could find expression in acts of counter-humiliation against the old ruling group, the Tutsi.

²⁰⁰ R. M. Schwartz, 1997, wrote a book about The Curse of Cain: the Violent Legacy of Monotheism.

One man in particular, Guy Logiest, born in Gent (a Flemish region, his family was equally French and Flemish-speaking), and sent to Rwanda as a colonial officer to restore calm and order, brought about a turn-over, single-handedly, in one day. On the 17th November 1959, judging that Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were oppressors, he replaced them with Hutu.²⁰¹ In other words, one could correctly recount Great Lakes' sufferings from colonialism as colonialists initially enforcing a rigid hierarchy of 'worthy' Tutsi as opposed to 'unworthy' Hutu, only to reverse this situation later, after mysteriously having 'discovered' pity and mercy with the underdog.

Field Code Changed

Was this colonial 'pity and mercy with the underdog' authentic? Colonial sympathy for Hutu may have had more causes than just Flemish underdogs sympathising with Hutu underdogs. Also, the mapping of the master-slave cleavage among colonial masters onto the master-slave cleavage among their subordinates may include more shades. The Rwandan Embassy in Washington (Rwanda has been ruled by a Tutsi based government since the 1994 genocide) sees this sequence of Rwandan history more as a Belgian preference for malleable Hutu followers instead of proud and strong-willed Tutsi²⁰²: 'In 1935 the Belgian colonial administration introduced a discriminatory national identification on the basis of ethnicity. Banyarwanda who possessed ten or more cows were registered as Batutsi whereas those with less were registered as Bahutu. At first, the Belgian authorities, for political and practical reasons, favoured the king and his chiefs, who were mostly a Batutsi ruling elite.' Now comes the significant point: 'When the demand for independence began, mainly by a political party - Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) - formed by people from the mentioned ruling elite, the Belgian authorities hastily nurtured another party called PARMEHUTU that was founded on a sectarian ethnic ideology. Under the Belgian supervision, the first massacres of Batutsi at the hands of PARMEHUTU occurred in 1959. With Belgian connivance, PARMEHUTU abolished the monarchy amidst widespread violence.'

This account leads the reader staunchly to agree that Tutsi have a right to accuse Belgians of having supervised Tutsi humiliation and extermination already during colonial times, because Belgians found Hutu, already used to subjugation, more subservient to Belgian domination than Tutsi; in other words: Belgian masters tried to kill their rival Tutsi masters

201 'Et dès le 17 novembre, ce pur néophyte en politique rwandaise, réunissant les administrateurs de territoire, décide d'assurer l'avenir en renversant d'un seul coup, brutalement, la politique traditionnelle menée par la Tutelle belge depuis les origines: à la place des chefs et des sous-chefs tutsi, il décide de nommer systématiquement, en masse, des Hutu' (Logiest, 1982, I, in the 'Préface du Professeur Stengers').

²⁰² <http://www.rwandemb.org/info/geninfo.htm>, retrieved 1998.

and benefited from the fact that the Tutsi had done the 'job' for them to 'teach' the Hutu how to obey.

However, again, is this the whole truth? Perhaps some Belgians felt authentic sympathy with downtrodden Hutu? And perhaps the Hutu really did suffer? In March 1957 a group of nine Hutu intellectuals (containing two future Rwandese Presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda, and Juvenal Habyarimana) published a text called *Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda*, better known by the name *Bahutu Manifesto*: 'The problem is basically that of the political monopoly of one race [sic], the Mututsi. In the present circumstances, this political monopoly is turned into an economic and social monopoly...' (quoted in Prunier, 1995a, 45). Gérard Prunier writes (45): '...the reality they [the Hutu intellectuals] referred to, namely the humiliation and socio-economic inferiority of the Hutu community, could not be doubted.' At this point it becomes palpable that Hutu actually did feel humiliated.

In the preface to Logiest's book the reader feels that this is an account of Logiest's authentically felt deep repulsion against what he perceives as cruelty and perfidy on the part of many Tutsi chiefs, and especially of the king, who 'perpetrates torture in his own palace.' The preface explains how Logiest was upset by the intolerable oppression under which Hutu masses suffered, and how he won the friendship of intellectual Grégoire Kayibanda,²⁰³ the Hutu leader.²⁰⁴ Later in his book Logiest shares with the reader his joy in having fulfilled a historic mission in helping the downtrodden Hutu people. Kayibanda, the Hutu leader, thanks him 1963 in a farewell letter (Logiest is to leave for Congo):

'Dear Monsieur Logiest,

As your friend, my wishes accompany you, not only to Congo, but wherever duty may send you.

²⁰³ 'Born in 1924, Kayibanda had been a seminarist at Nyakibanda, the main gateway to social improvement for the nascent Hutu counter-élite. After being a primary school teacher from 1948 till 1952, he became secretary of the Amitiés Belgo-Congolaises and chief editor of the Catholic periodical *L'Ami* (1952-6). When the agricultural cooperative TRAFIPRO was created in 1956, he was made its first chairman while at the same time becoming chief editor of *Kinyamateka*. Soon after he became the private secretary to Mgr Perraudin, the Swiss vicar apostolic of Rwanda' (Prunier, 1995a, 45).

²⁰⁴ The preface explains that the reader will understand 'la répulsion qu'inspirent au Colonel Logiest la cruauté et la perfidie de nombre de chefs tutsi, et du Mwami en premier lieu, qui torture dans son propre palais, le sursaut qu'il a devant l'oppression que les Tutsi font peser sur la masse hutu, et dont il apprend les aspects intolérables, la sympathie que lui inspire la cause d'une masse écrasée et qui cherche à secouer le joug, la sympathie personnelle aussi qu'il éprouve pour le leader hutu Grégoire Kayibanda, qui deviendra son ami' (Logiest, 1982, III, in the 'Préface du Professeur Stengers').

It is my conviction that God's providence has utilised you to save our country. Your arrival in Rwanda in November 1959 has marked the hour of the final liberation of the Rwandese masses.

You have contributed, fundamentally, to the success of the Hutu movement of which I was the leader. You will always be "The Friend of the Rwandese People."

However, your action carries further: it has proven, in a concrete way, that idealism is not just vain smoke, but an efficient force provided by God in the course of the world's history.

Could other people follow your example, not only in Africa, but also in those countries where riches are equalled by savagery, where technological progress is equalled by fundamental errors, because a number of their leaders have not understood the primordial significance of Love.

Your righteous conduct will serve as an example for generations to come.

Your friend,

(signed) Gr. Kayibanda.²⁰⁵

This is the riddle of Rwanda: Here are those who are educated at colonial catholic seminars, those who rise from oppression and speak about love, Love with a capital L, and about God; some of them will later become 'genocidaires,' those who perpetrate genocide.

On 1st July 1962 Belgium granted formal political independence to Rwanda. The Rwandese Embassy, part of today's government since 1994 that is largely perceived as Tutsi-directed, fails to notice any 'Love' originating from Kayibanda, and does not share Logiest's empathy for Hutu sufferings. It pinpoints the opposite, namely Tutsi torment at Hutu hands

²⁰⁵ Translated by the author from Logiest, 1982, 210, 211:

'Cher Monsieur Logiest,

En tant qu'ami, mes vœux vous accompagnent, non seulement au Congo, mais là aussi où le devoir vous enverra.

Ma conviction est que la Providence de Dieu a utilisé votre caractère pour sauver notre pays.

Votre arrivée au Rwanda en novembre 1959 a sonné l'heure de la libération définitive des masses rwandaises.

Vous avez contribué essentiellement à la réussite du Mouvement hutu dont j'étais le leader. Vous restez « l'Ami du Peuple Rwandais ».

Mais votre action porte plus loin: elle a prouvé concrètement que l'idéalisme n'est pas une vaine fumée mais une force efficace prévue par Dieu dans la marche de l'Histoire du monde.

Puissiez-vous avoir des imitateurs non seulement en Afrique, mais aussi dans ces pays dont la richesse égale la sauvagerie, dont les progrès techniques égalent les erreurs fondamentales, parce que bon nombre de leurs leaders n'ont pas vu la primauté de l'Amour.

Votre conduite droite servira d'exemple aux générations qui nous suivent.

Votre ami,

(signé) Gr. Kayibanda.'

when it describes Rwandese history as it unfolded from independence onwards²⁰⁶: ‘The first republic under President Grégoire Kayibanda institutionalised discrimination against Batutsi and periodically used massacres against this targeted population as a means of maintaining the status quo. Some Rwandese groups in the diaspora attempted, without success, to stage a comeback through armed means. In 1965 Rwanda was declared a one-party state under MDR/PARMEHUTU, which is the architect of the racist ideology which was to be consolidated in the second republic under President Major General Juvenal Habyarimana. In 1973 the late President Kayibanda was deposed in a coup d’etat that brought Major General Habyarimana to power. Subsequently, the first President and many prominent politicians of the first republic were killed. More Batutsi were killed.’

Readers who are confronted with this text are appalled and may decide once and for all who are the ‘bad guys,’ - and this paragraph suggests that the Hutu regime was ‘bad,’ and the direct opposite of ‘Love.’

The same report on Rwandese history continues: ‘In 1975 President Habyarimana formed the Mouvement Revolutionnaire Nationale pour le Developpement (MRND), a single ruling party that was to promulgate, in 1978, a sham constitution that repeatedly returned him to office by organising “elections” in which he was the sole candidate. Both the first and second republics repeatedly stated that Rwanda was a small overpopulated country that could not accommodate Rwandese refugees if they were to return. Increasingly, the population across the ethnic lines was marginalised and impoverished while Habyarimana’s regime became more violently intolerant.’

So, President Habyarimana obviously was a despot. Or perhaps not? Many described him to me as a moderate man. Habyarimana ‘instituted a more moderate stand on the issue of Hutu-Tutsi relations than had been the case under the previous administration’ (Dorsey, 1994, 246). Erny describes him as a man of evident charisma, moderate and reasonable (*homme doté d’un charisme évident, modéré et raisonnable*, Erny, 1995, 19). Erny asks suspiciously who actually made it impossible for him to control his rather extremist entourage.²⁰⁷ Many explained to me (January 1999 in Kigali) how under Habyarimana there was the ‘équilibre ethnique’ which meant that 9% of all positions in the government, or places in school were reserved for Tutsi, 90% for Hutu, and 1 % for Twa. (I was told that this meant that only the

²⁰⁶ <http://www.rwandemb.org/info/geninfo.htm>.

²⁰⁷ ‘Comment cet homme doté d’un charisme évident, modéré et raisonnable qu’était le général Habyarimana en est-il arrive à ne plus contrôler un entourage trouble et les dérives extraordinairement dangereuses qui avaient pour point de départ le palais de la présidence?’ (Erny, 1995, 19).

best Tutsi were selected, and at university level more Tutsi made it than Hutu, because they were 'better,' a fact that sometimes humiliated Hutu colleagues.)

Many publications try to capture the last years leading up to the 1994 genocide, a genocide that was thoroughly planned and set in motion at the day of President Habyarimana's death in a airplane accident, an accident that is unexplained even today:

On 3rd March 1999 I met Lisbet Palme who is member of the 'International Panel of Eminent Personalities, appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity to investigate the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the surrounding events' at the opening session of the Panel, together with Folke Löfgren, Swedish Ambassador in Switzerland. On 8th September 2000 Folke Löfgren informed me that the report was finished and to be found on the Internet, www.oau-oua.org. The Panel writes in the covering letter, 29th May 2000: 'We also understand that not all truths are welcome to everyone with an interest in Rwanda. Many people have strikingly different interpretations of the genocide, views they hold with great passion. For our part, we have pursued the evidence wherever it took us, without bias or prejudice. We were rigorous in our research and scrupulous in our analyses and findings, and we stand firmly by our conclusions. But we have no doubt our views will not please everyone.' This letter may serve as an introduction into yet another passionately disputed chapter of Rwandan history.

Gérard Prunier points to economic reasons for the genocide, contained in a larger global context. He claims that 'the whole system went wrong for reasons which at first were economic and then turned politico-cultural' (Prunier, 1995a, 350). He proposes that 'Rwanda's slide from relative heaven to absolute hell is a perfect textbook illustration of the theory of dependence. The Third World in general, and Africa in particular, might have been in the past victims of what Pierre Jalée and Samir Amin called "looting". But this is definitely no longer the case. In Africa today it is infinitely more profitable for Europeans to loot the UN or bilateral aid than an African peasantry that owns little that can be looted anyway. But far from making the situation any better, it makes it worse. Because there is nothing of interest left to loot in Africa except aid contracts, Europeans have lost interest in the intrinsic workings of the African economies... They have been left to stagnate in a kind of postcolonial aftermath, producing increasingly useless products which compete savagely on the world markets with the same commodities turned out more efficiently in Asia' (350).

Prunier continues his ruthless report: 'In the case of Rwanda, the free fall of world coffee prices in the late 1980s corresponded with the political disintegration of the regime. The murder of Colonel Mayuya can even be said to mark a sort of official beginning. The

elite... had been kept reasonably satisfied with the proceeds of coffee, foreign aid, tin and tea, roughly in that order. By 1989 coffee and tin prices were both near to total collapse, and foreign aid was shrinking. The elite started tearing each other apart to get at the shrinking spoils' (350). Prunier does not forget to address the fact that women also had lust for power, as had Siad Barre's wives in Somalia: 'Mme Habyarimana, nicknamed "Kanjogera" in memory of the murderous nineteenth-century *Nyina Yuhi*, emerged at the top of the heap as the best player; she was the true mistress of the country, not her big *umugabo* of a husband' (350, 351, italicisation in original).

Des Forges describes the period just before the genocide: 'President Juvenal Habyarimana, nearing the end of two decades in power, was losing popularity among Rwandans when the RPF attacked from Uganda on October 1, 1990. At first Habyarimana did not see the rebels as a serious threat, although they stated their intention to remove him as well as to make possible the return of the hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees who had lived in exile for a generation. The president and his close colleagues decided, however, to exaggerate the RPF threat as a way to pull dissident Hutu back to his side and they began portraying Tutsi inside Rwanda as RPF collaborators. For three and a half years, this elite worked to redefine the population of Rwanda as "Rwandans," meaning those who backed the president, and the "ibyitso" or "accomplices of the enemy," meaning the Tutsi minority and Hutu opposed to him' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Introduction, Genocide).

Des Forges continues: 'In the campaign to create hatred and fear of the Tutsi, the Habyarimana circle played upon memories of past domination by the minority and on the legacy of the revolution that overthrew their rule and drove many into exile in 1959. Singling out most Tutsi was easy: the law required that all Rwandans be registered according to ethnic group. Residents of the countryside, where most Rwandans lived, generally knew who was Tutsi even without such documentation. In addition, many Tutsi were recognizable from their physical appearance.'

However, and this is an important point, '... shattering bonds between Hutu and Tutsi was not easy. For centuries they had shared a single language, a common history, the same ideas and cultural practices. They lived next to one another, attended the same schools and churches, worked in the same offices, and drank in the same bars. A considerable number of Rwandans were of mixed parentage, the offspring of Hutu-Tutsi marriages. In addition, to make ethnic identity the predominant issue, Habyarimana and his supporters had to erase - or at least reduce - distinctions within the ranks of the Hutu themselves, especially those between people of the northwest and of other regions, those between adherents of different

political factions, and those between the rich and the poor' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Introduction, Genocide).

When the genocide started, it was not, as naïve media reports suggested, an outburst of popular fury, but a bureaucratically organised campaign directed by the Hutu government. Michael Chege excellently describes the academic input into the planning of the genocide in his article 'Africa's Murderous Professors' (Chege, 1997). And it was not only a well-planned genocide, but also a genocide 'according to the book': Alain Destexhe is the former Secretary General of *Médecins sans Frontières* and author of *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Destexhe, 1995). He reckons that the massacre of the Tutsi in Rwanda is the first incontestable case of genocide since 1945. 'Yet the term has been frequently used by the media to emphasise the horror of many of the world's mass killings: from Cambodia and East Timor to Somalia and Bosnia' (Destexhe, 1995, introduction). Destexhe urges to limit the term to situations 'where it is clearly applicable under the terms of the UN Convention on Genocide, we are detracting from the gravity of the offence. Setting the study in its historical context by analysing the Armenian and Jewish genocides, Destexhe concludes that a failure to grasp the reality of the situation in Rwanda undoubtedly explains the failure of the international community to take adequate action' (Destexhe, 1995, introduction).

The *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948 and came into force on January 12, 1951. According to article II 'genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Genocide is 'massive category killing by direct / structural violence plus legitimacy from cultural violence. Genocide is *direct violence* that kills quickly, *structural violence* kills slowly, and *cultural violence* provides the justifications (traditionally the clergy does the cultural violence, the merchants the structural violence and the aristocrats the direct violence).' This is the analysis of peace researcher Johan Galtung (at the Conference of Higher Education for Peace, 4th – 6th May 2000 in Tromsø, North Norway).

Instead of enumerating horrific statistics to introduce the genocide here, I would like to give the reader the opportunity to get a feeling for the situation by presenting the account of a young boy, Jean-Hubert, with Hutu background, who was in danger because his mother was a human rights activist:

'I arrived in Montreal in July 1994 after a long and difficult journey from Rwanda. I am nineteen years old. When the genocide started in April 1994, I lived with my mother, my younger brother William, and my sister Sylvie in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. My father had died long before the war. To avoid trouble we hid in our house. Through the windows we could see people being killed or running to escape. We heard many cries of pain. Soldiers and militia trained by the government carried lists of people to kill. My mother called people she knew in Kigali. They told her that killing was going on throughout the city. The National Radio was being run by extremist elements of a new government. It was encouraging the population to "look for the enemy." "Enemy" meant the Tutsi, members of the political opposition, and all those who had criticized the regime of President Habyarimana.

We knew that we were in danger because my mother was a well-known human rights activist. Human rights activists and journalists were two groups of people who were massacred in the first hours of the killing. The fact that there had been a murder attempt on our mother in 1993 made us extremely nervous. We thought we would all die. We sat in the house waiting and getting as much information as we could' (Twagilmana, 1997, 35, 37).

Hubert reports that through connections in Kigali, his mother arranged to send her children to an aunt in Save, near the Southern city of Butare, the second-largest city in Rwanda, the university city, and also the city that initially did not join in to the genocide, but had to be coerced into participating, through the murder of opposing persons and their replacement by extremists especially brought from the capital. Hubert: 'My mother could not go. She was well-known and would be recognized at the numerous roadblocks inside Kigali and between Kigali and Butare. She said she was ready to die alone, but could not bear to be killed with her children. So it was with much pain that we left her alone in the house and ventured through the city. With our identity cards that showed that we were Hutu, we passed the roadblocks without a problem. Roadblocks, as everybody knew, were established not really to check people's identities but to check which ethnic groups they belonged to. All those whose cards showed that they were Tutsi were killed on the spot, beaten, or stabbed with machetes. We saw many dead bodies at the various roadblocks' (37, 38).

Although the region surrounding Butare resisted the call to kill and remained relatively calm for two weeks, the killing started there too. Hubert: 'we hid in our aunt's house. We

were saved because she had a watchman. But the threat to kill us increased when my aunt hid a Tutsi. People said that he used to brag about a Tutsi victory. My aunt had hidden him in the ceiling. It was a very tiny and dark space, but he had no choice. The killers somehow got word that he was at my aunt's house. They eventually forced the door open and killed him. We thought we would be killed, too. We had hidden a person they called an enemy, thus we were friends of the enemy. We were saved at the last minute by a soldier who had been a friend of my father in the army. Otherwise our tears and pleas would not have saved us. I will never forget the cruelty with which the Tutsi was killed, despite his pleas for mercy. We felt helpless because there was nothing we could do to save him' (38).

Hubert's mother managed to flee to Canada. From there 'she arranged for us to join her with the help of Rwandan and Burundian friends. First we were taken to Burundi, where we stayed for a short time. From there we flew to Kenya and then to France. Since we did not have Canadian immigration papers, the police at the airport in Paris did not allow us to board the plane. William, Sylvie, and I were quite upset. This was our first time ever out of Rwanda, and we did not know about immigration requirements. We assumed that because our mother was already in Canada, we would also be able to go there. Eventually, the airport authorities received a message from the Canadian ministry of foreign affairs allowing us to enter Canada. We later found out that our mother had obtained help from people in Ottawa' (39).

This was Hubert, a Hutu, who 'will never forget the many neighbors killed, the numerous corpses on the roadblocks, the Tutsi killed at my aunt's house, and the innocent children murdered without even knowing why. I felt sad at being unable to do anything. I knew that it was terribly wrong for innocent people to be killed.'

Father Vito Misuraca, born in Catania, Italy 1950, had consecrated his life to the service of Africa, and of Rwanda in particular. In his diary he makes the following notes for the 23rd April 1994: '6 o'clock p.m. Claudine Nyiraneza, a seven year old girl, arrives at the Nyanza orphanage. She has walked for about 30 kms or maybe more, her right foot has been injured after been hit by a machete, she leans on a stick. Her family has been killed, and she hasn't been eating for days. We hope that others will be able to make it here, as she has, thus escaping the massacre. We put her up as well as possible, we feed her a little, and we give her some medical treatment. Her slash is very bad, but it will heal. She is terrified. Maybe she will tell us her story tomorrow' (Misuraca, 1995, 46).

During my stay in Rwanda and Burundi in 1999 I was presented with very many horror stories of this kind, often several each day. For example: A young Tutsi, I choose to call him Charles, was in Kigali during the genocide in 1994. A Hutu friend of his hid him in

his house. Whenever Hutu militia came to search the house for Tutsi, Charles got into a hole that was dug in a rubbish heap in the garden. There he stood, only his nose poking out, covered by a plastic sheet, for hours, until the soldiers went away. This went on for weeks. During this whole time his Hutu friend had to participate in the Tutsi killing outside in the streets, in order not to be killed himself; and his Hutu friend was telling everybody, that Charles was dead, in order to protect him. Even Charles's family believed that he was dead, until only a few days before they themselves were killed. His grandmother was already old, almost 90, and weak. She was locked into a room with a hungry dog, which ate her.

The gruesome stories that were related to me did not end, of grandmothers forced to parade naked in the street before being killed, of people systematically cut up, starting with their legs - the tall 'arrogant' Tutsi were thus 'shortened' and literally humiliated - or of Tutsi paying for bullets to be shot instead of being mutilated to death. 'There had not been enough guns to go around, and in any case bullets were deemed too expensive for the likes of Tutsis: the ubiquitous flat-bladed machetes (pangas), or any farm or kitchen implement, would do the job just as well. Thus the Rwandan tragedy became one of the few genocides in our century to be accomplished almost entirely without firearms. Indeed, it took many strong and eager arms to carry out the strenuous work of raping, burning, and hacking to death a half-million people (and mutilating many thousands more by slicing off their hands, their breasts, their genitals, or their ears) with pangas, kitchen knives, farm hoes, pitchforks, and hastily improvised spiked clubs' writes Elliott Leyton in his report on *Médecins sans Frontières* (Leyton, 2000, 3).

I saw many scars on the bodies of survivors, caused by machetes; I was accustomed, through my medical training, to notice scars on other people's bodies, and I was used to assuming that they were caused by accidents; the fact that it is much more likely that they stem from genocidal killings was new to me.

Psychological scars, though equally present, were less visible. Apart from a strange rigid emptiness, a kind of frozen sadness on many faces, nothing in Kigali 1999 betrayed that it had been the scene of atrocities a short time ago. Even close friends would not talk to each other about their nightmares. Rape, especially, had been employed as part of the genocide, and women told me that they would only realise that their closest friend had been raped, when she asked to be accompanied to take a HIV test. 'In attacks on Tutsi before 1994, women and children were generally spared, but during the genocide - particularly in its later stages - all Tutsi were targeted, regardless of sex or age. Especially after mid-May 1994, the leaders of the genocide called on killers not to spare women and children. The widespread incidence of

rape accompanied this increase in overall violence against groups previously immune from attack. "Rape was a strategy," said Bernadette Muhimakazi, a Rwandan women's rights activist. "They chose to rape. There were no mistakes. During this genocide, everything was organized. Traditionally it is not the custom to kill women and children, but this was done everywhere too" ... Other Rwandans characterized the choice of violence against women in the following ways: "It was the humiliation of women;" or "It was the disfigurement of women, to make them undesirable;" or, "Women's worth was not respected." (Human Rights Watch, 1996, 41).

The United Nations and the humanitarian aid organisations failed to prevent or at least halt the genocide, holding to a post-Somalia hands-off policy. 'A January 11, 1994 telegram from General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force, to his superiors was only one, if now the most famous, warning of massive slaughter being prepared in Rwanda' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Introduction). But Dallaire did not get help.

In *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families* (Gourevitch, 1998) Philip Gourevitch sharply criticises the lack of UN responsiveness to the signs of looming danger and cries for support. He reports General Roméo Dallaire's appearance on Canadian television, 1997, where Dallaire professes: 'I haven't even started my real mourning of the apathy and the absolute detachment of the international community, and particularly of the Western world, from the plight of Rwandans. Because, fundamentally, to be very candid and soldierly, who the hell cared about Rwanda? ... How much is really being done to solve the Rwandan problem? Who is grieving for Rwanda and really living it and living with the consequences?'

In the chapter 'April 1994: "The Month That Would Not End"' in *Leave None to Tell the Story* (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999) the situation is described that in April 1994 led to the death of Belgian peacekeepers: 'Rwandan soldiers took the fifteen UNAMIR peacekeepers prisoner and, at about 9 a.m., delivered them to the Kigali military camp, only a few hundred meters from the prime minister's residence. There the five Ghanaian peacekeepers in the group were led away to safety and the ten Belgians were left at the hands of a furious crowd of soldiers, including a number who had been wounded in the war. The Rwandan soldiers had been prepared to hate the Belgian troops by months of RTLM broadcasts and believed the rumor - spread by their officers and later broadcast by RTLM - that the Belgians had helped the RPF shoot down Habyarimana's plane. They set upon the Belgian peacekeepers and battered most of them to death. The surviving Belgians took refuge

in a small building near the entrance to the camp. They killed a Rwandan soldier and got hold of his weapon. Using that, they fought off the attackers for several more hours.'

Almost all foreigners fled from Rwanda ('re-formed' elsewhere), in a hurry, leaving behind to be slaughtered all those they were supposed to protect. However, Dallaire writes: 'It should also be noted that, unlike most of the other international organisations and foreign nationals, a small UN civilian humanitarian cell and the magnificent and courageous ICRC stayed in Rwanda. The remainder of the NGOs reformed and operated from Nairobi, with advance stations in either Bujumbura and/or Kabale, Uganda. The problem with these moves, and with Nairobi in particular, was that the coordinating staffs were too distant and too limited in experience (with the exception of some distinguished individuals) to be able to coordinate all of the NGOs and UN Agencies in any coherent planning process' (Dallaire, in Whitman, 1996, 210). I had the opportunity to talk to one of those courageous individuals.

In May 1994, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali admitted that the international community had failed the people of Rwanda in not halting the genocide. '>From that time through 1998, when U.S. President Bill Clinton apologized for not having responded to Rwandan cries for help and Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed regret in vaguer terms, various world leaders have acknowledged responsibility for their failure to intervene in the slaughter. The archbishop of Canterbury has apologized on behalf of the Anglican Church and the pope has called for clergy who are guilty to have the courage to face the consequences of their crimes' (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999, Conclusion).

The end of the 1994 genocide is quite well known. 'Rwanda Background'²⁰⁸ reports: 'The Tutsi rebels defeated the Hutu regime and ended the genocide in July 1994, but approximately 2 million Hutu refugees - many fearing Tutsi retribution - fled to neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire, now called the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, in 1996 and early 1997 nearly 1.3 million Hutu returned to Rwanda. Even with substantial international aid, these civil dislocations have hindered efforts to foster reconciliation and to boost investment and agricultural output. Although much of the country is now at peace, members of the former regime continue to destabilize the northwest area of the country through a low-intensity insurgency. Rwandan troops are currently involved in a crisis engulfing neighboring DROC.'

²⁰⁸ <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rw.html>, retrieved 1999.

In the meantime, the victorious Tutsi diaspora 'seized control of Rwanda's government and claimed it wished to create a remodelled non-racist state,' says Elliott Leyton, 2000, 17.²⁰⁹ The man in power in Rwanda is Major Kagame, a former Tutsi refugee who lived in Uganda. When I saw him at a meeting at the parliament in Kigali where a government reshuffle was presented (9th February 1999), I was surprised to see a tiny frail young man, almost nothing but controlled tense energy. 'As a refugee in Uganda, he became head of the Uganda National Revolutionary Army's military intelligence from November 1989 to June 1990. He also spent seven years fighting guerrilla campaigns with Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda. Major Kagame is considered to be a brilliant military strategist and was enrolled in the United States Army Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth, Kansas, to learn how to become a general when the October invasion of Rwanda began. As chairman of the high command, Major Kagame established his base of operations in the heavily forested Virunga Mountains in northwest Rwanda. He has reportedly rebuilt the RPF from a ragtag band of 2,000 men to a 15,000 efficient guerrilla army' (Dorsey, 1994, 267).

Very recently, Africa News Online distributed the news (24th March 2000) that Rwanda's Hutu President Pasteur Bizimungu, in power for almost five years since the genocide of 1994, had resigned: 'As of today, March 23, 2000, for personal reasons, I give up my duties as the president of the Rwandan Republic,' Bizimungu said in a letter to the speaker of parliament and to political parties (New Vision, 2000). The article explains further: 'Bizimungu, a member of Rwanda's majority Hutu ethnic group, was installed as head of state in July 1994 after the mainly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), now the dominant political party in Rwanda, routed Hutu soldiers and militias held responsible for the genocide. The development comes in the wake of internal RPF rows over the formation of a new government which was announced on Monday. The president had threatened to resign if these internal squabbles were not resolved. Bizimungu has on several occasions crossed swords with Vice-President and Defence Minister Paul Kagame, who led the RPF as a rebel force and is a more powerful actor on the Rwandan political stage.'

Rwanda is currently attempting to consolidate and build a 'good image': 'Rwandan President Paul Kagame on Monday said insecurity was not a problem in the country after he

²⁰⁹ A Swiss embassy employee in Kigali informed me in January 1999 that many people are leaving Rwanda again: 'They came after the genocide, with hopes, and now they leave again. A doctor gets circa 200 US Dollars as salary at a state hospital; the Swiss embassy paid a returnee doctor married to a French lady 8000 Dollars in addition for staying here. Now he is without job and might return to France.'

visited the eastern prefecture of Kibungo from where thousands of refugees have crossed into neighbouring Tanzania. They fled, citing instances of “mysterious disappearances and deaths”. The Rwandan leader blamed “rumours being spread by genocide perpetrators to create confusion”. He urged local leaders to ignore the “rumours” and “protect the good image of Rwanda.” (IRIN, 22nd August 2000).

Or, ‘The Rwandan government has appealed for international help to secure the return of an estimated 30,000 children who were flown out of the country during the 1994 genocide. Some of the children taken by charity organisations have since been adopted in European countries such as Italy, Belgium and France, as well as neighbouring African countries. “The issue of children that left the country during the bad days of the 1994 genocide needs to be sorted out,” the minister of state for social affairs, Odette Nyiramirimo, told IRIN. “These children were adopted in foreign countries under unclear circumstances. Some of them have parents who want to know their whereabouts. In case of adoption, the laws of this country demand that the parents and government be involved.” (IRIN, 12th -18th August 2000).

Clearly, the situation in Rwanda is part of a greater contestation for control between the francophone and anglophone world: ‘In Uganda and Rwanda, the U.S. remained close to President Museveni and Vice-President Kagame and muted public criticism of their actions. Although the U.S. continued to claim that they did not have much leverage, especially with Rwanda, it seemed clear to outside observers that the U.S. was the most important foreign power in that country. The U.S. could have used its influence to press for human rights improvements and specifically for restraint on the part of what seemed to be an increasingly erratic and adventurous government. Not surprisingly, its close identification with Rwandan and Ugandan governments led to substantial criticism of Washington among African leaders, especially those who were allied with Kabila, overtly and covertly’ (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999).

France figured prominently in all my conversations on the genocide, as being a supporter of it. Repeatedly, it was hinted at me that French military advisors taught how the Achilles tendon must be cut if a victim is to be prevented from running away. On many occasions I had to confirm that, although I spoke French, I was not a French national; otherwise I would not have been welcome. Many asked me this question before even opening the conversation with me; in other words, they would not talk to me if I were French. And clearly, the dispute about French involvement is still touchy, even after many years. From the newsroom of the BBC World Service we hear (7th April 1998): ‘A former French minister says France continued to supply arms to the Rwandan government after the start of the

genocide - but only for a few days. Bernard Debre - who was a minister for cooperation at the time - said the French government was not aware of the genocide. French press reports had said France continued to send arms to the Hutu-led army for up to a month after the beginning of the massacres. Mr Debre also rejected reports that a French missile was used to shoot down the plane carrying the former Rwandan and Burundian presidents, whose deaths are widely believed to have triggered the genocide.'

Clearly, the generalisation that 'all French' are guilty is wrong. It was precisely a French interlocutor who experienced the onset of the genocide from within official organisations (and who does not want to be named), who reported to me 'off the record' (1999 in Kigali): 'The French parliamentary commission to examine the French involvement in the genocide was in Kigali, and the government wanted me to talk to these people. Many times an attempt was made during an evening of an official dinner. After a long time (first there was a meeting with journalists, then dinner, then....) I was asked about what I thought about Opération Turquoise.²¹⁰ I said that it came too late, when the genocide was already almost over. The French delegation got very angry and criticised me: How could I put doubt on an operation that saved so many people...! I did not say anything anymore and was angry that I had lost a whole evening, only to be criticised and not listened to.'

The African Rights report, and the African Rights co-directors Rakiya Omar and Alex de Waal are suspicious of French motives for Opération Turquoise: 'The French intervention appears to have been launched for a range of motives, including playing to the domestic humanitarian constituency and reassuring francophone African leaders that France would remain loyal. The worst potential result of the intervention was the strengthening of the extremists in power. That was fortunately averted as a result of the outright military victory of the RPF shortly after French troops arrived. Operation Turquoise brought some modest benefits, but also considerable solace to the killers. The manner in which the operation was decided upon and launched casts the gravest doubts on the integrity of the U.N.' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, xxxi).

²¹⁰ 'On the ground in Kigali on April 6th when the genocide commenced were UN peacekeeping troops serving under the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). These were first reduced in number by Security Council action --and then, well after the genocide had run its course, augmented later in the year. Soon joining the action in two separate stand-alone initiatives of two months' duration each were French soldiers in Operation Turquoise in June and U.S. troops in Operation Support Hope in July. Responding to the deteriorating situation in the latter half of the year was a third configuration of forces: national contingents deployed to the region in support of, and at the request of, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)' (Minear, 2000).

As a response to French involvement, Rwanda is to replace French with English as its official language. 'President Bizimungu said the reason for the change was due to France's involvement in the 1994 genocide, the weekly "The East-African" reported. "If you followed the recent report of investigations from the French Parliament, it is clearly indicated that France has been involved in the genocide in Rwanda and in the events which proceeded the massacres, because they wanted to 'defend their own language'," Bizimungu was quoted as saying' (IRIN, 22nd January 1999).

Up to now this historic introduction to the Great Lakes region has mainly concentrated on Rwanda. Burundi is both similar and different to Rwanda. Or, as Jean-Pierre Chrétien argues, 'the fate of the two countries [has been] parallel, as in a game of mirrors in which each reflects the fantasies of the other' (Chrétien, 1996, abstract). Clearly, this view is too simplistic, and contested, but may serve as an entry point.

The genocide provides a gruesome connection between Burundi and Rwanda: 'Among the killers who have inspired the greatest fear in Rwanda have been refugees from Burundi. Their reputation for brutality became so widespread in several regions that militias would use the threat of taking victims to the Burundi refugees, with comments like "Of course there will be nothing left you if they get their hands on you." Some of the people we interviewed were visibly shaking when they spoke of the cruelty of some of the refugees from Burundi. Villagers who were under official pressure to kill their neighbours sometimes looked for Burundi refugees to "do the job."' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, 63).

The African Rights report continues: 'The arming and training of militiamen among the refugees was well-attested in 1993. The Kigali office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees formally protested in a letter in November, 18 in which it pointed out that training refugees in military activities was contrary to Article 3 of the OAU convention on refugees, and requested an end to this practice. Needless to say, the protest had no effect' (64).

Incidentally, neighbouring Zaire was not unaffected. Hutu extremist propaganda at the border crossing from Cyangugu to Bukavu says: 'Attention Zaireans and Bantu people! The Tutsi assassins are out to exterminate us. For centuries the ungrateful and unmerciful Tutsi have used their powers, daughters and corruption to subject the Bantu. But we know the Tutsi, that race of vipers, drinkers of untrue blood. We will never allow them to fulfil their dreams in Kivuland' (The African Rights report finds this information in Crawford, 1994).

'Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in an interview with Reuters, on Wednesday defended his country's occupation of neighbouring Congo saying it was to guard against a

repeat of the 1994 genocide. The Rwandan leader said Hutu militia and former Rwandan government soldiers, who fled to Congo when Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) came to power and ended the killings were now fighting alongside Kabila's army' (IRIN, 7th September 2000).

Like Rwanda, Burundi is part of the hilly mountain region of the Great Lakes; it is as tiny a country as Rwanda, about as populated and fertile; and it has historically been ruled by kings drawn from a Tutsi elite, who dominated Hutu underlings. However, one significant difference between Rwanda and Burundi is the fact that in Burundi a Hutu revolution never occurred; the 'slave' never became the 'master' so-to-speak, meaning that Burundi traditional power structures stayed much more untouched after independence than in Rwanda.

Both countries are similar insofar as they have experienced more or less widespread genocidal killings after independence. 'Nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small a space as in Burundi during the years following independence. Since 1965, when thousands perished in what turned out to be only the premonitory sign of even greater horrors, Burundi society has been torn by ethnic conflicts of unprecedented scale in the country's history. The 1972 bloodbath took the lives of an estimated one hundred thousand - some say two hundred thousand - in what must be seen as one of the most appalling human rights violations in the annals of post-independence Africa. Informed estimates suggest that as many as twenty thousand may have been killed by government troops in 1988 and another three thousand in 1991. Seldom have human rights been violated on a more massive scale, and with more brutal consistency, anywhere else on the continent. Whether the demons of regionalism and ethnicity can be exorcised long enough for democracy to put down roots remains an open question' (Lemarchand, 1994a, xi).

The above-mentioned Michel Micômbero (1940-1983), Burundi military and political leader, Prime Minister in 1966, and President of the country from 1966 to 1976, ruthlessly crushed a revolt against his government by Hutu in 1972: 'Hundreds of thousands of Hutu were killed, including many of the educated Hutu elite, and many sought refuge in Rwanda and neighboring countries. Between 80,000 and 200,000 Hutu and Tutsi died in the disturbances, and about 100,000 Hutu sought refuge abroad, mainly in Tanzania. In November 1976, Micômbero's army chief of staff, Jean-Baptist Bagaza, overthrew him in a non-violent coup' (Dorsey, 1994, 295).

As reported above, Micômbero represents an interesting link both to Somalia and to Hitler. Micômbero was exiled to Mogadishu, Somalia, after having been overthrown. He was welcomed by Somali dictator Siad Barre, and died in Somalia in 1983 (Marc Minani reports

that his death in 1983 was suspect²¹¹ Minani, 1992, 168). And, ‘All civilians, military and religious representatives, men and women, the old and the young, all adopted the Nazi “Heil Hitler” in the following way: “Gira amahoro!” which has to be answered with: “Na Micômbéro yayaduhaye!” (“Peace be upon you!” “With us also Micômbéro, whom we have to thank for this peace!”). Even the widows and orphans, victims of the regime Micômbéro have to salute in this way and have to respond with this provoking slogan.’²¹²

‘Heil Micômbéro,’ does link up to Hitler and the Holocaust, and this is exactly the mapping done by many Hutu, that Lemarchand questions: ‘For many Hutu, the “Simbananiye Plan” provides irrefutable evidence of the extraordinary combination of cunning and perversity that lies behind the physical liquidation of hundreds of thousands of Hutu civilians in the spring and summer of 1972. Like most conspiracy theories, this one reduces an inherently complex and tragic sequence of events to the logic of a master plot. At the heart of the “Simbananiye Plan,” we are told, lay one single overriding objective: to kill enough Hutu to achieve ethnic parity in the countryside. The master plotter behind this diabolical plan was Artemon Simbananiye, at the time minister of foreign affairs in the Micômbéro government.’

However, René Lemarchand calls for caution when making comparisons with Hitler. Conspiracy theories characterise oppressed communities anywhere in the world and are especially widespread in Africa. Lemarchand states: ‘Note, for example, the extent to which conspiracy theories have penetrated the cognitive map of African-Americans. In the words of one journalist, “Many blacks live with the fear of being killed or physically harmed by whites. They often use the word “conspiracy.” There is, some believe, a final solution for blacks like the one Adolf Hitler invented for Jews - a genocidal scheme to inflict [sic] blacks with AIDS, drug addiction, crime, poverty, welfare dependence and scant education’ (Lemarchand, 1994a, 26).

In an excellent passage of writing, Lemarchand illustrates how what I call the ‘yes – but’ structure of all discussions on the Great Lakes could be understood: ‘Pending a more detailed account of the 1972 killings, we can note that the consensus of opinion among impartial observers is that there is no basis whatsoever for assuming that the carnage was part

²¹¹ ‘Micômbéro passa trois mois en résidence surveillée à Ngozi avant d’être exilé à Mogadiscio, en Somalie, où il mourut en 1983 d’une mort que certains trouvent suspecte’ (Minani, 1992, 168).

²¹² Translated by the author from: ‘Tous, civils, militaires et religieux, hommes et femmes, vieillards et enfants, tous ont adopté le “Heil Hitler” nazi en ces termes: “Gira amahoro!” Il faut répondre: “Na Micômbéro yayaduhaye!” (“La Paix soit avec vous!” “Avec nous aussi Micômbéro, grâce à qui nous bénéficions de cette Paix!”) Même les veuves et les orphelins victimes du régime Micômbéro sont tenus de saluer et de répondre par ce slogan provocateur’ (Kiraranganya, 1977, 102).

of a master plan drawn up well ahead of time by Simbananiye or anybody else or that ethnic parity was ever considered as an ultimate goal. If there is any evidence of plotting, it must be found among those Hutu politicians and army men who unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the Micômbero government in April 1972. This is not to imply that Simbananiye does not bear responsibility for the extreme brutality of the repression. The intent to physically annihilate all Hutu elites and potential elites and the degree to which this macabre endeavor was put into effect leave no doubt as to its genocidal character. But it is one thing to view the 1972 killings as a Tutsi response to the perceived threats posed to their security by the Hutu attacks, and it is quite another to describe such killings as the outcome of a longstanding, carefully calculated plot aimed at the statistical “equalization” of Hutu and Tutsi’ (Lemarchand, 1994a, 27).

Burundi has been placed under an embargo by its neighbours, in order to coerce it into more democratic dealings with its population, - the embargo was lifted during the time I was in Burundi in February 1999. Parallel to the embargo the Arusha peace process has been going on, led by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, until his death, followed by Nelson Mandela as Burundi peace mediator. Here is a piece of the Arusha proceedings: ‘The fourth round of Burundi peace talks opened in Arusha last night with an appeal to participants by mediator Julius Nyerere not to “unnecessarily prolong” the process. He added: “We can’t end this century without giving hope to the people of Burundi,” the independent Agence Hirondelle reported...The Arusha peace process has cost US \$1.1 million between June and December 1998 and is projected to rise to US \$6 million by June 1999. Nyerere stressed donors would be unwilling to fund endless talks’ (IRIN, 19th January 1999).

Clearly, Burundi’s neighbours are increasingly impatient with Tutsi ‘superiority’: *Mandela Blasts Tutsi* is the title of an IRIN notice: ‘Mandela said that all 19 parties had accepted the draft accord, and particularly promised not to question the final proposal. He said a group representing mainly the Tutsi community “which is a minority of 14 percent in Burundi forgot about the agreement”. “They wanted to reopen almost everything,” Mandela added. “Now I do not think there are many countries in which some leaders will take a solemn decision on very important matters, when their people are being killed inside their own country, who do not care for that massacre, for that slaughter, and wanted to drag out these proceedings,” Mandela said’ (IRIN, 28th August – 1st September).

The Burundi peace agreement is seen by many observers in the context of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda: “In the case of Rwanda, the region was not united. Today we cannot allow genocide to happen anywhere, let alone Burundi,” Ugandan President Yoweri

Museveni, the chairman of the regional initiative on Burundi, told delegates during the signing ceremony. A total of 200,000 people estimated to have been killed since the murder of democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993...”What is important is to avoid a vacuum. We have to start implementation of the process as soon as possible,” Professor Haysom told IRIN’ (IRIN, 29th August 2000).

‘We have done it together,’ were the words of Nelson Mandela at a conference hall packed with Burundi delegates, African heads of state and international envoys as the signing ceremony for a peace accord finally started in the northern Tanzanian town of Arusha late on Monday, 28th August 2000. Mandela ‘was referring to the last-minute agreement by Tutsi parties to join Hutu parties in signing the regionally brokered agreement. But the togetherness referred to by Nelson Mandela was not shared by the Burundi parties, whose sharp differences almost caused the signing ceremony, attended by US President Bill Clinton, to abort. “The Hutu think they have an agreement and the Tutsi think they still have room to negotiate, because they signed with reservations. All the same it is a good start,” a Cape Town-based consultant in political analysis, conflict resolution mediation and advocacy, Jan Van Eck, told IRIN. Despite Tutsi parties signing with reservations, delegates hugged and congratulated each other after the signing and speculated on the future’ (IRIN, 29th August 2000).

This means that at the end of the year 2000 hope reigns both in Somalia and in the Great Lakes Region. Conferences seem to have gone the right way, both in Djibouti and in Arusha, Tanzania. Neighbours are helping neighbours to achieve peace. May hope be justified.

Part I: Humiliation and Its Conceptual Background, or Tools for Diagnosis and Prognosis

1. Humiliation and Trauma

What is humiliation? What does it mean for a person to be put down, abased, demeaned, debased, dishonoured, disgraced, lowered, degraded, tainted, besmirched, tarnished, belittled, subjugated, mobbed, bullied, and abused? Does it mean stress? Or trauma? Can the effects of humiliation be viewed within the framework of research on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)? Are its effects similar to those of abuse, for example child abuse? But how can a whole nation then feel humiliated? And what about people who, far from avoiding humiliation, seek it, for example as sexual pleasure? And what about self-humiliation in religious rites? And how are we to view the necessary humbling society inflicts on criminals who have violated the law, by holding them responsible for their deeds and putting them into prison? In other words, what about the relationship between humiliation on one side and humility and humbleness on the other, - how can the same abasement be abhorred in one case and called for in another, or even relished and desired?

And, how can people perpetrate horrific acts of humiliation? What makes neighbours hack each other to death as has happened during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda? How can they humiliate their victims beyond killing them, by raping their neighbour's wife in front of her family before killing everybody, by letting the neighbours' grandmother parade naked in the street before killing her, or by carrying out literal humiliation by cutting short the legs of their Tutsi neighbours? How can a whole people arrive at a state, as has happened in Rwanda, where victimized citizens paid for bullets in order to be shot and avoid being slowly 'cut shorter' and thus tortured to death?

'How can someone develop the capacity to stalk, torture, murder and mutilate another human being and feel no remorse – even feel pleasure? How can a 14 year old kill someone over a jacket? How can someone load a truck with explosives and blow up a building full of anonymous and innocent people? How can someone beat senseless the woman they "love" and, if she leaves, taking the children, track them down and kill them all? ... What happens to people to make them act like "animals"?' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 126).

My claim is that the dynamics of humiliation may lie at the heart of many such atrocities. Why? Because suffering humiliation is equivalent to enduring the most extreme

abuse, an abuse that leads to more than stress and trauma. Humiliation has to do with the core definition of the human being in her relationship with others; humiliation concerns the inner nucleus of human social identity. It addresses the most basic question of a human being: ‘Who am I?’ ‘How ought I to be treated?’ ‘What is my worth, significance and meaning as a human being in this world?’ And, - here comes the connection to national humiliation: ‘What is the worth and value of my group, the group I identify with, in the family of all other groups?’

Perry relates a gruesome story that gives evidence to the severity of the potential effects of humiliation; in this story a consequence for children is addressed, namely ‘affective blindness’: ‘A fifteen year old boy sees some fancy sneakers he wants. Another child is wearing them – so he pulls out a gun and demands them. The younger child, at gunpoint, takes off his shoes and surrenders them. The fifteen year old puts the gun to the child’s head, smiles and pulls the trigger. When he is arrested, the officers are chilled by his apparent lack of remorse. Asked later whether, if he could turn back the clock, would he do anything differently, he thinks and replies, “I would have cleaned my shoes.” His “bloody shoes” led to his arrest. He exhibits regret for being caught, an intellectual, cognitive response. But remorse – an affect – is absent. He feels no connection to the pain of his victim. Neglected and humiliated by his primary caretakers when he was young, this fifteen-year-old murderer is, literally, emotionally retarded. The part of his brain which would have allowed him to feel connected to other human beings – empathy – simply did not develop. He has affective blindness. Just as the retarded child lacks the capacity to understand abstract cognitive concepts, this young murderer lacks the capacity to be connected to other human beings in a healthy way. Experience, or rather lack of critical experiences, resulted in this affective blindness – this emotional retardation’ (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 128).²¹³

213 Very narrow windows - critical periods - exist during which specific sensory experience is required for optimal organization and development of any brain area (e.g., Singer, 1995; Thoenen, 1995). Absent such experience and development, dysfunction is inevitable (e.g., Carlson et al., 1989). When critical periods have been examined in great detail in non-human animals for the primary sensory modalities, similar use-dependent differentiation in development of the brain occurs for the rest of the central nervous system (Diamond, Krech, & Rosenzweig, 1964; Altman & Das, 1964; Cragg, 1967; Cragg, 1969; Cummins & Livesey, 1979). Abnormal micro-environmental cues and atypical patterns of neural activity during critical and sensitive periods can result in malorganization and compromised function in other brain-mediated functions such as empathy, attachment and affect regulation (e.g., Green et al., 1981). Some of the most powerful clinical examples of this are related to lack of “attachment” experiences early in life. The child who has been emotionally neglected or abandoned early in life will exhibit attachment problems which are persistently resistant to any “replacement” experiences including therapy (Carlson et al., 1989; Ebinger, 1974). Examples of this include feral children, Spitz’s orphans (Spitz & Wolf, 1946), the Romanian orphans (Chisholm et al.,

This child is so gravely damaged that it may not be able to ask the questions about identity that I enumerated above. However, many adults I met in Africa were haunted by these questions. In the course of my fieldwork in Africa I got a glimpse of insight into the endless ruminations in the heads of millions of traumatised people about what all this mayhem is supposed to signify; it is difficult for victims of an earthquake or a plane accident to put their trauma behind, but genocide can hardly ever be put behind.

Being exposed to acts of utter humiliation is more than being inflicted with a singular crisis that a person can shake off after a while; being the victim of acts of thorough humiliation engulfs the whole personality and attacks its fundamentals. And the time horizon for humiliation may last for generations; acts of humiliation may form societal or even cultural structures of humiliation and thus be part of a human anchoring within culture.

Four Perspectives²¹⁴

‘Humiliation and trauma,’ this could be the title of several chapters or sections – four perspectives shall be differentiated in the following. The first perspective or chapter could be called ‘Humiliation and Trauma: A Documentation of its Characteristics and Effects’ and describe the evidence of trauma and PTSD as a result of humiliation that I actually found during the fieldwork in Africa. The second section could address the effect of humiliation on children, while the third would focus on adults and their ways of defining and dealing with humiliation. A fourth angle would be to analyse in what way humiliation actually damages identity and inflicts traumatic wounds on the inner core of dignity of human beings.

Humiliation and Trauma: A Documentation of its Characteristics and Effects

Did I find, for example, signs of peri-traumatic ‘dissociation’ and ‘fight and flight’ reactions in Africa? Did I find PTSD? And, furthermore: What does a country have to expect that has been the scene of widespread atrocities and that is far from post-traumatic, but, in many cases, peri-traumatic, and may fear to be pre-traumatic? What are the psychological consequences of such social conditions on citizens who are either survivors of war and genocide, or perpetrators, or bystanders? How damaged are citizens within such a context? What does the

1995) and, sadly, the remorseless, violent child (Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas, 1988; Myers et al., 1995; Mones, 1991; Hickey, 1991; Greenberg, Speltz, & DeKlyen, 1993)’ (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 128).

²¹⁴ See also Lindner, 2000n, ‘Humiliation - the Worst Form of Trauma: an Analysis Based on Fieldwork in Germany, Rwanda / Burundi, and Somalia.’

national health care system, and also its foreign helpers, have to be aware of? What lesson teaches the German experience of ‘waking up’ and starting to talk fifty years after World War II? Germany, indeed, currently experiences some kind of ‘awakening,’ people who never talked before, begin to explain what happened during die Hitlerzeit [the Hitlertime], both in the private and in the public sphere. Is this the long-term consequence of dissociation? Or, one may also ask, why did Germany go to war after the Versailles humiliation, but not after the total humiliation of defeat in World War II? Under which circumstances can cycles of humiliation and violence be halted?

Humiliated Children: From Obedient Underlings to Remorseless Murderers

A second focus, for a second chapter, would be the situation of children as related to humiliation. Children are affected by humiliation in a much more profound way than healthy adults: in children humiliation may lead to the dangerous condition that has been introduced above, namely the ‘affect blindness.’ The difference between traumatic humiliation in the case of children as opposed to healthy adults is that children have fewer means for escaping being structurally damaged, compared to adults who often have more resources to defend themselves – if not their material possessions, so at least their sanity. A healthy adult can stay healthy within humiliation, even rise to national grandeur as Nelson Mandela; a child may have no choice but be broken. In the case of children, humiliating them creates at best obedient underlings, at worst such murderers as described in Perry’s case.

Indeed, it was exactly the aim of earlier child rearing practices to create the trauma response of dissociation, because such children become more ‘malleable’ underlings, ‘fitting’ into oppressive hierarchies. ‘Breaking the will of the child’ as described by Alice Miller, 1983, was once viewed as royal way for child rearing. Today this is called child abuse. However, this child abuse is still regular practice in some social contexts and world regions. One may ask, how victims typically react who are caught in the meta-narrative of a society that justifies and legitimises this dissociation, and what strategies for change underlings could develop who want to escape a practice of humiliation that is legitimised in their social environment.

*How the Trauma Diagnosis Invades the Practice of Humiliation*²¹⁵

A third chapter would have to address adults and humiliation: the current global transition from traditional culture codes of honour, as epitomised in the practice of the duel, to modern codes of human rights, causes the trauma diagnosis to ‘swell,’ because it is ‘eating up’ formerly legitimate forms of humiliation in hierarchical honour societies. Or, formulated in another way, the trauma diagnosis ‘invades’ formerly legitimate occurrences of humiliation. Currently murderers waiting in the death rows of American prisons provide an example of this transition: conservatives are adamant that those prisoners deserve their plight, that it is good for society to have them in the death row, in short, that this practice serves as a kind of ‘vaccination-through-humiliation’ against evil for the whole of society. Conversely, human rights advocates deplore the fact that many of the convicts may not be guilty, but may just be too poor and too black to be able to acquire enough legal support to prove their innocence, in short, that their plight must be called illegitimate and traumatic humiliation. Or, similarly, some Somali aristocrats believe that the outcast minorities that live in their midst are far from being humiliated, while the outcasts themselves claim the diagnosis of humiliation and trauma for their predicament. A Somali aristocrat the present author talked to (interview in Nairobi on 9th January 1999 with former Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh) calls the existence of outcasts ‘cultural parting’ and ‘our culture;’ he is not convinced by the victims’ claim to the diagnosis of traumatic humiliation. The same debate pertains to the Tutsi-Hutu relationship in Rwanda and Burundi, as amply shown in the historical introduction given above. The third chapter should thus address the frameworks of meaning in which something is called hurtful trauma or beneficial ‘vaccination.’ In the case of processes of humiliation in relation to adults such cultural codes are important – something can be regarded as humiliating that was not seen as such before, and what is perceived as humiliating in one culture may not be perceived as such in another – while children, when humiliated, typically are affected at the core of their need and their ability to bond, and this ability and need seems to be universal for human beings, and not culture-dependent.

*Humiliation Is the Worst Trauma*²¹⁶

A fourth section would address the issue of degree of damage and why humiliation, especially in a human rights context, is the worst trauma. This chapter would have to address the

²¹⁵ See, for example, Lindner, 2000n.

²¹⁶ See, for example, Lindner, 2000n.

question of how identity is built, what lies at the core and what at the periphery, and in what way humiliation, particularly in a human rights environment, affects the very core of a person's identity and dignity.

In the following I will intermingle the four perspectives outlined here and address them in the course of another red thread, namely a journey from available research and theory – starting with research on stress, continuing with the notion of bullying and mobbing, and, ultimately going beyond this concept – underway inserting the evidence that I collected in Africa, and discussing the conceptual questions unfolding.

These four chapter headings are recommendations for future focuses for research on humiliation and are not actually used as headings here. Instead a more condensed introduction will be presented in the following, touching upon the points made in this section, starting with an example that shows how humiliation changes from legitimate structure to illegitimate trauma.

From Structural Humiliation to Open Humiliation – An Example from Burundi

An introductory example shall now map out the field. If we look for evidence for structures of humiliation that last for generations, then accounts of humiliation that we find are initially described within academic fields such as history and anthropology, then by political science, sociology, and finally psychology. In the following an account will be quoted that the present author received in 1999. It demonstrates especially well the subtle transition from anthropology to modern politics and psychology, and how humiliation is inscribed within this transition (the name of the informant is confident, even the place of the interview that was carried out in 2000 cannot be disclosed):

‘I was born in the Burundian countryside in a Hutu family. When I grew up I did not notice that, although my family had Tutsi friends and I played with their children, it was Hutu children who fetched the water, not the Tutsi children, it was my mother who ground the flour, not the Tutsi women, - the list of the chores that were done by the Hutu serfs was long, and the Tutsi were the ‘seigneurs,’ the masters. There were also poor Tutsi, but they were only few. It was structural humiliation that I did not feel [anthropologists would describe this state-of-the-world as ‘how-Burundians-live’].’

The account continues: ‘I only slowly understood the inequality in this situation, for example when my father asked me if I had money to buy a piece of land that my family always had worked on and that I had considered ours. My father also had cows, and as a child

I believed they were ours, but at some point I learned that a Tutsi family had given the first cow to us [here the interviewee starts understanding the situation as structural humiliation, and the issue moves from anthropology to other fields, for example psychology].’

The interlocutor resumes his painful report: ‘Only later I was systematically humiliated in a way that made me suffer and at the same time be conscious of it: At school I was ridiculed when we were playing Volleyball, - I was too short!; I was a brilliant student, but suddenly I was not the first in class anymore, but number eight or nine or ten; and whenever I made a mistake the teacher openly ridiculed me [at this point structural humiliation transforms into open humiliation and becomes visible as a political tool, to be studied for example by political scientists, as well as a field for psychological research on trauma, stigmatisation, prejudice, bullying (also called mobbing)].’

The interviewee carries on: ‘Later I became a teacher myself, a French teacher. After having worked for five years at a school I one day came to work in the morning and was told that I was not listed as a teacher there anymore. I was in deep shock. I inquired and was told that I had a dossier at the secret service, saying that I was having meetings in the forest at night with students. Again some time later kids would come to my house telling my people who were working for me in my house that they should tell me to leave this part of the city that was a Tutsi quarter, because I would make it “smell bad” [here dehumanisation starts that typically characterises societies in which genocidal killings are being seen as a viable strategy].’

Now the account blends the psychological concept of humiliation into the domain of political science and history: ‘After independence there were elections and a very good and authentic Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected, who would have made a good job. He was killed. Micômbéro, a Hima (Pariah Tutsi) took over, he himself a very humiliated man! With him, systematic torture of the worst kind started!’

Some months later the interviewee writes in an email: ‘Concerning your project on humiliation, I now read everything with a lot of interest. I agree totally with your reflections. Indeed, humiliation is the hard core of any conflict. It is absolutely necessary to take account of it in order to solve problems between conflict parties. Remember, for the case of Burundi, the Hutu have experienced infantilisation for the past four centuries; the Hima have been humiliated all their lives by the other Tutsi, who today take revenge on the Hutu. They kill them, torture them, push them into exile, and imprison them at all occasions. All those who

want to help the Burundians have to play on this theme. Since we met, I have not stopped thinking of it. Humiliation, this is daily life in my home country!’²¹⁷

The reader who is touched by this witness account may ask: ‘How would I react when I was tied down in a societal context that humiliates and dehumanises me systematically? Would I succumb to apathy and depression? Would I flee and want to become an unwelcome refugee in some other country? Or would I think of masterminding counter-humiliation? In Rwanda, extremist Hutu rulers ordered the killing of almost a million Tutsi (and moderate Hutu who were not willing to participate in the killing) in the course of a few weeks, by their neighbours – a massive counter-humiliation.

Is this a field that can be covered by research on stress, trauma, neglect, abuse, bullying and mobbing? I think, to a certain extent yes. Because humiliation entails all aspects that are also addressed by research on these topics. However, as discussed above, humiliation reaches further, not only in the case of genocide. Even in cases that are bland compared with genocide, humiliation is what hurts most: After having their apartments invaded and burgled, people said in an interview with the present author (1997), ‘The worst for us is not the loss of possessions and it is not the shock (stress, trauma), but the humiliation!’

Humiliation, PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) and GAD (General Anxiety Disorder)

In the following a look shall be taken at research on stress, trauma, neglect and abuse, and, in the course of the argument, repeatedly the question in what way humiliation reaches further will be addressed.

In 1945 Grinker and Spiegel wrote in *Men Under Stress*: ‘Fear and anger in small doses are stimulating and alert the ego, increasing efficacy. But, when stimulated by repeated psychological trauma the intensity of the emotion heightens until a point is reached at which

²¹⁷ Translated by the author from: ‘A propos du projet sur l’humiliation, je l’ai lu avec beaucoup d’intérêt. Je suis tout à fait d’accord avec ta réflexion. En effet, l’humiliation, en tant que cause, effet ou moyen reste pour la plupart des conflits le noyau dur. Il faut absolument en tenir compte pour résoudre les problèmes entre les partis au conflit. Souviens-toi, pour le cas du Burundi, les Hutu ont connu plus de quatre siècles d’infantilisation; les Hima ont été humiliés toute leur vie par les autres Tutsi. Aujourd’hui, ceux-ci se vengent sur les Hutu. Ils les tuent, les torturent, les poussent à l’exil, les emprisonnent à toutes les occasions. Tous ceux qui veulent aider les Burundais doivent jouer sur ce thème.’

the ego loses its effectiveness and may become altogether crippled...' (Grinker & Spiegel, 1945, 82²¹⁸).

Abraham Kardiner, 1941, was among the first to systematically address posttraumatic stress. He observed that sufferers from 'traumatic neuroses' develop an enduring vigilance for and sensitivity to environmental threat. He stated that 'the nucleus of the neurosis is a physioneurosis. This is present on the battlefield and during the entire process of organization; it outlives every intermediary accommodative device, and persists in the chronic forms. The traumatic syndrome is ever present and unchanged' (Kardiner, 1941, quoted in van der Kolk, 1994, 2).

In 1945 Grinker and Spiegel studied combat soldiers and observed that some developed excessive responses under stress that went as far as 'flexor changes in posture, hyperkinesis, violently propulsive gait, tremor at rest, masklike facies, cogwheel rigidity, gastric distress, urinary incontinence, mutism, and a violent startle reflex' (2). They noted the similarity between many of these symptoms and those of diseases of the extrapyramidal motor system. Van der Kolk and Fisler comment these findings from today's point of view: 'Today we can understand them as the result of stimulation of biological systems, particularly of ascending amine projections. Contemporary research on the biology of PTSD, generally uninformed by this earlier research, confirms that there are persistent and profound alterations in stress hormones secretion and memory processing in people with PTSD' (2).²¹⁹

²¹⁸ In van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 6.

²¹⁹ Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, DSM code-nr 309.89): Two authoritative psychiatric diagnosis manuals exist. One, the one presented here, is edited by the American Psychiatric Association. The other (ICD-10) is published by the WHO in Geneva. The guidelines for post-traumatic stress disorder, according to the American DSM, are divided into five criteria groups: PTSD criteria group A (version 1987): The individual has witnessed something, beyond normal human experience, that would be very trying for almost anybody, such as a serious threat against one's life or one's physical or psychological integrity; a serious threat against or injury to one's children, partner or even other close relatives or friends; sudden and extensive destruction of one's home or home district; seeing a person who has just been seriously injured or killed due to an accident or violent act; or witnessing the entire course of events. PTSD criteria group B: The traumatic event is relived repeatedly in at least one of the following ways: (1) Returning, insistent and painful memory images of the events. (2) Recurring nightmares about the event. (3) The individual can suddenly act or feel as if the traumatic event is repeated (experiencing a feeling of going through the event again, illusions, hallucinations and dissociative episodes (flashbacks), even those which occur while waking up or being under the influence of drugs). (4) Intensive psychological discomfort in the presence of phenomena that symbolize or are similar to some aspect of the traumatic event, such as might be experienced on the anniversary of the trauma. PTSD criteria group C: The individual constantly avoids stimuli that can be associated with the trauma, or shows a general blunting of the ability to react emotionally which was not present before the trauma and which is shown in at least three of the following ways: (1) Efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings that are associated with the trauma. (2) Efforts to avoid activities or situations that arouse

The diagnosis 'post-traumatic stress disorder' has thus originally been associated with war veterans, for example former Vietnam combat veterans; however, it has since become a recognised health problem. Symptoms and suspected causes of the disorder include feelings of helplessness suffered by victims of child abuse, sexual assault, domestic violence, rape, physical and mental abuse.

memories of the trauma. (3) Inability to remember some important aspect of the trauma (psychogenic amnesia). (4) Marked reduced interest in important activities. (5) Feeling of a lack of interest or expulsion by others. (6) Limited affects; such as inability to cherish loving feelings. (7) A feeling of not having any future; not expecting to have a career, get married, have children, or live a long life. PTSD criteria group D: Permanent signs of hypersensitivity (which were not present before the trauma) and are shown in at least two of the following: (1) Difficulties in falling asleep, or uneasy sleep. (2) Irritability or bursts of fury. (3) Concentration difficulties. (4) Tense vigilance. (5) Exaggerated reaction to unexpected external stimuli. (6) Physiological reactions in the presence of events that symbolize or are similar to some aspect of the traumatic event. PTSD criteria group E: The disturbance must be present for at least one month (with symptoms according to the above-mentioned groups B, C and D). PTSD criteria group F: The disturbance has major influence on daily family and occupational life and other social events.

Humiliation Is More Than Stress

Humiliation is more than stress. What differentiates humiliation from stress is the relationships with other people within which humiliation is embedded, and the significance of these relationships for the humiliated person. Humiliation is more than a shock-like event; it is in many cases a protracted process that has to do with the meaning of social relations.

Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, writes: 'It is not the finger pulling the trigger that kills; it is not the penis that rapes – it is the brain. In order to understand violence we need to understand the organization and functioning of its birthplace – the brain' (4). I would add that it is not just the brain (although brain damage may lead to violent behaviour) that has to be understood, but the forces that form the brain, or what we call the psyche. In the case of humiliation it is the social environment in its interdependence with the individual person that forms the brain and the psyche – it is the social environment that stimulates neural development during childhood, as well as the use of the brain within social relations of adults. Perry underlines this point: 'Human beings evolved not as individuals, but as communities. Despite Western conceptualizations, the smallest functional biological unit of humankind is not the individual – it is the clan. No individual, no single parent-child dyad, no nuclear family could survive alone. We survived and evolved as clans – interdependent – socially, emotionally and biologically' (12).

This means, in short, that research on the concept of humiliation must draw more heavily on social relations and social identity than research on stress and trauma does. Research on humiliation must not only draw on concepts such as social identity, even further, social identity and social relations are at the very centre of humiliation: A stone falling on my head shocks me and stresses me, but it does not necessarily humiliate me; however, if my co-worker throws the stone on my head to 'teach me the lesson' that he is the boss and I but a little rat, then the stone is part of a story of humiliation. And even more, if I am a member of a group of people who, since centuries, get stones on their heads, then this is a story of humiliation that encompasses more than one person, and more than one lifetime, it encompasses the history of societies and embeds me within it. The concept of humiliation thus connects macro, meso, and micro levels, it connects the group to the individual: at the macro level humiliation has to do with real and/or imagined stories of humiliation of whole communities (see for the process of imagining group identities for example *Imagined Communities*, Anderson, 1991), at all three levels humiliation links up with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, Turner, Billig), which itself builds on theories of Social Categorisation, and thus ultimately connects to Cognitive Psychology.

The concept of social identity is particularly useful as a ‘bridge’ since it connects the individual level with the highest macro level and allows for the analysis of peace and conflict at all levels. A couple of quotes from two cases in which large scale violence has been at stake shall illustrate that. First a quote related to the sufferings from Apartheid in South Africa; Desmond Tutu’s *Final Report of the Truth Commission* (1998) explains: ‘It may be noted that social identity theory does not explain violence itself, but the preconditions of violence. It is employed here in order to emphasise the necessity of locating explanations of mass violence at the inter-group rather than the interpersonal or intrapsychic levels alone. It is obvious enough that racialised identities loomed very large on the South African landscape. There is plenty of evidence of racialised prejudice, stereotyping and distancing’ (Tutu, 1998, paragraph 108).²²⁰

Also Daniel Bar-On, renowned researcher on the German Holocaust draws upon Social Identity Theory when he addresses the healing of conflict: ‘The themes of inter-group conflict and their resolution are of particular scientific and applied importance. An observation of relations between groups within the same society or relations between nations will lead to the conclusion that competition and conflict is a permanent feature of group life (Bar-On & Nadler, 1999, 3). Bar-On and Nadler mention as relevant reading Elias, 1991, Fiske & Ruscher, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993, and Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986. They continue: ‘Conciliation requires that a party expresses empathy and understanding to the adversary’s sufferings (Staub, 1989), admits responsibility for causing these pains, and seeks the adversary’s forgiveness (Rothstein, in Rothstein, 1999). Also... when former adversaries begin to build an environment of cooperative interdependence they have to maintain a positive image of their social identity. This is possible only when the former adversaries perceive themselves as equal partners who work together to guarantee a more prosperous future for all’ (7).

²²⁰ When an oppressed majority finally gains political power, what happens to its attitudes to its erstwhile oppressor, and to its perceptions and feelings about its socio-economic disadvantages that were established during its oppression? These questions were taken up in an article by (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998. ‘Longitudinal data from pre- and post-transition surveys of black South African college and high school students indicate marked reductions in perceptions of and outrage about intergroup socio-economic inequity and deprivation relative to English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking whites, but no change in attitudes toward these groups or toward whites in general. The findings are discussed in terms of contemporary theory and research on justice, intergroup relations, and group conflict. Some tentative implications for the prospects for a democratic political culture in South Africa are noted’ (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998, Abstract).

The most important theorists in the Social Identity approach are Henri Tajfel,²²¹ together with John C. Turner,²²² and Michael G. Billig.²²³ They emphasise the group's influence on the individual as opposed to the American highlighting of the single person's social categorisations (see current American theorists in the field of categorisation and identity such as Mackie, Hamilton, Fiske, Dovidio²²⁴). According to Social Identity Theory, every individual divides his/her social world into distinct classes or social categories. Within this system of social categorization, individuals locate themselves and others. The sum total of where they are located with respect to each category and classification constitutes their social identity. In other words, one's social identity consists of how one defines oneself in each social category (gender, geographic location, class, profession, and so forth).

Mobbing, Bullying, and Humiliation

If we look for research that addresses trauma as embedded in social relations at the level where individuals meet, the nearest we find are studies on emotional neglect, and on bullying²²⁵ (also called mobbing; the confusion around the use of the terms mobbing and bullying stems from the fact that these phenomena are addressed differently in different countries;²²⁶ also research on the relationship between mobbing and stress has slightly varying

²²¹ See for example Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel, 1978b; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, Fraser, & Jaspars, 1984; Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986; Tajfel & Minority Rights Group, 1978; Turner, in Tajfel, 1982; Israel & Tajfel, 1972.

²²² See for example Brown & Turner, 1979; Brown & Turner, in Turner & Giles, 1999; Haslam & Turner, 1998; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986; Turner, in Tajfel, 1982.

²²³ See for example Billig, 1976; Billig, 1987; Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1991; Billig, 1995; Billig, in Robinson, 1996; Billig, 1998; Billig, 1999; Howitt & Billig, 1989; Tajfel et al., 1971.

²²⁴ See Mackie & Hamilton, 1993, with chapters by Dovidio & Gaertner, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Fiske & Ruscher, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Smith, in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993.

²²⁵ Heinz Leymann writes in his 'Introduction to the concept of mobbing': 'I introduced this phenomenon in 1984. It certainly is a very old one, well known in every culture from the very beginning of these cultures. Nevertheless, it has not been systematically described until the research started in 1982 which led to a small scientific report written in the fall of 1983 and published in early 1984 at The National Board of Occupational Safety and Health in Stockholm, Sweden...' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000g, 1).

²²⁶ 'Different research groups have chosen - in the English language - different terminology regarding destructive activities at workplaces, in schools among schoolchildren or in military organizations regarding drafted young people. In England and Australia the word "bullying" is preferred for this kind of behavior in all three of these societal settings. In the USA and Europe "bullying" is used regarding school situations and "mobbing" regarding the workplace. Beside of this, certain other terminology exists: Harassment, psychological terrorization, horizontal violence or just conflict' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000f, 1).

orientations in different countries²²⁷ - Leymann suggests to keep the word bullying for activities between children and teenagers at school and reserving the word mobbing for adult behaviour at workplaces).

Research on bullying and mobbing reveals that traumatising that is embedded in the meaning of social relations is far more virulent than traumatising by a single event: 'If we compare the difficulty of diagnosing our patients with that of, for example, individuals who have run-over and killed suicidal persons on train... or subway tracks... we see pronounced differences. In general, people seem to be able to intuitively imagine how it must feel to try to brake a train that weighs hundreds of tons and how it feels, despite these desperate efforts, to finally run over the person who has lain on the tracks in order to die. Nevertheless, the driver's PTSD reaction is - statistically speaking - very much milder than that of our patients. Also, a considerably smaller proportion of train engineers suffer a PTSD reaction or share severe PTSD diagnose. Indeed the number is very small in comparison with that which prevails for patients such as ours, who almost all were diagnosed as having severe PTSD. This comparison might illustrate what the latter group of patients must have gone through in terms of psychological pain, anxiety, degradation, helplessness - that led to such extensive PTSD injuries' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000b, 1).

Brodsky, 1976, in *The Harassed Worker*, the first book ever to deal with mobbing/harassment in the workplace (according to Leymann), did not yet differentiate between bullying and other topics, such as industrial accidents, stress due to heavy workloads, chemical pollution in the workplace and so forth. 'The author looked at the stressed worker as being a victim of his own powerlessness. Because of poor discrimination between workplace problems of various sorts, this book never made any impression. Nevertheless, this is the first time that some mobbing cases were published' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000a).

Evidently, what Leymann describes here, is a transition the academic community has performed by starting out with research on the individual in isolation (an approach particularly emphasised in the United States), and later differentiating this view by

²²⁷ 'In regard to psychologically oriented stress research in Germany in particular, it may be argued that mobbing can be seen as a certain extensive and dangerous kind of social stress... The different use of terminology in different countries is a theoretical problem. Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian research has focused more intensively on the biological character of the stress phenomenon... due to the fact that this research was mainly carried out in the field of stress medicine in the USA and Sweden. Stress research in Germany was often carried out by focusing on, in part, different stress items. Still another direction in the use of the term "stress" can be observed in Australia, where the term is influenced by its clinical usage as a medical diagnosis... These circumstances cause some confusion when comparing the results from stress research within the different research areas. Thus, discussions can arise concerning the difference between stress and mobbing...' (Leymann, 2000, 1).

increasingly studying the social embeddedness of the individual (a rather European approach): the American research with its emphasis on the individual has studied Social Categorisation, later Social Identity Theory has been formed on this fundament. In a similar movement, Brodsky started out with lumping all stress that affects workers together in one category, later researchers on bullying differentiated this view and delineated bullying as a particular kind of stress that occurs within human relations.

The concept of humiliation reaches further than mobbing and bullying in two respects: Firstly it identifies humiliation as the most intense wound that can be inflicted within human relations (in line with the first quote from Leymann above, and findings in marital counselling presented above²²⁸), and secondly it characterises humiliation as not just happening between individuals or groups in an a-historical here-and-now, but as having deep historical roots.

In the following a closer look shall be taken at research on mobbing and bullying. Research on mobbing has been initiated in Scandinavia (most prominent in Norway is Dan Åke Olweus²²⁹). Leymann's work on mobbing suggests that PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) and GAD (General Anxiety Disorder) are the appropriate psychiatric diagnoses of the effects of mobbing (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000c, 1). Group 1 and 2 stress symptoms are memory disturbances, nightmares, concentration difficulties, abdominal or stomach pain, low-spirited depressed, diarrhoea, lack of initiative, apathetic, vomiting, easily irritated, feeling of sickness, general restlessness, loss of appetite, aggressive, lump in the throat, feeling of insecurity, crying, sensitive to set-backs, lonely, contactless. Group 3 and 4 stress symptoms are chest pain, backache, sweating, neck pain (posterior), and dryness of the mouth, muscular pain, heart palpitations, shortness of breath, blood surgings. Group 5 and 6 are difficulties falling asleep, weakness in legs, interrupted sleep, feebleness, early awakening. Group 7 are fainting, tremor.

The categorisation of groups into 1-7 is the result of factor analysis and indicates that 'Group 1 deals with cognitive effects of strong stressors producing psychic hyperreactions. Group 2 indicates a syndrome with psychosomatic stress symptoms. Group 3 deals with

²²⁸ 'The Unforgivable Humiliation - A Dilemma in Couples Treatment' (Vogel & Lazare, 1990).

²²⁹ 'Mobbing is a word not previously used in this context in the English language. It was used by the late Konrad Lorenz, an ethologist, in describing animal group behavior. He termed the attacks from a group of smaller animals threatening a single larger animal "mobbing" (Lorenz, 1991). Later, a Swedish physician who happened to become interested in what children could do to each other between their class hours, borrowed this terminology from Lorenz and called the very destructive behavior in small groups of children directed against (most often) a single child, "mobbing" (Heinemann, 1972). The present research on this type of child behavior has been carried out over the past 20 years, one of the most prominent researchers being the Norwegian Dan Olweus' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000h, 1). See for example Olweus, 1997a; Olweus, 1997b; Olweus, 1993.

symptoms arising in connection with production of stress hormones and activities of the autonomic nervous system. Group 4 describes symptoms which company health care physicians often encounter in individuals who have been stressed during very long periods of time and where the symptoms deal with muscular tensions. Group 5 comprises symptoms concerning sleep problems. Groups 6 and 7 are difficult to interpret as too few items are shown' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000c, 2).

Leymann reports further: 'These results were compared with well known psychiatric syndromes as described in the manuals of psychiatric diagnoses (DSM and ICD-10) leading to the hypothesis that PTSD may be the fitting diagnosis. These above generated symptom groups (groups 1 to 5 in Table 1) fall psychiatrically under the DSM category "anxiety disorders". The groupings or parts of these are described under the diagnosis "post-traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD), but also under "generalised anxiety disorder" (GAD). Examining the diagnostic criteria for "generalised anxiety disorder" (300.02 D in the manual), we find the factor groups 4, 6, and 7 amongst the DSM group "motor tension"; factor groups 2 and 3 in the DSM group "autonomic hyperactivity"; and factor groups 1 and 5 in the DSM group "vigilance and scanning". The diagnostic criteria for "post-traumatic stress disorder" (309.89 D in the manual) corresponds to factor groups 1 and 5. In the ICD-10, published by the WHO, these diagnoses are similarly described' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000c, 2).

Leymann explains that the triggering situation is always one that can be described as a conflict. He defines mobbing therefore as an escalated conflict. He admits, 'So far, not much is known about what details transform the development of a conflict into a mobbing situation, but, he concludes, 'It must be emphasized here that it is futile to discuss who caused the conflict or who is right, even if this is of practical interest' (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000c, 1).

There is another point at issue, explains Leymann, namely the remarkable social destructiveness of mobbing and bullying, a destructive potential in the workplace, of the supposedly peaceful Western world, that indeed resemble the size and tactics of humiliation that were used as preparations for genocidal killings in Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. Leymann writes: '...we are discussing a type of social and psychological assault at the workplace, which may lead to profound legal, social, economic and mental consequences for the individual. These consequences are so grave and out of balance, that it should be made very clear that this phenomenon should mainly be seen as an encroachment of the individual's civil rights. These cases show very tragic fates including the violation of civil rights, which has been forbidden in most societies for a long time. In the societies of the highly industrialized western world, the workplace is the only remaining "battlefield" where people

can “kill” each other without running the risk of being taken to court. In Sweden, it has been found that approximately 10% to 20% of annual suicides are the result of mobbing in the workplace’ (Leymann, in Leymann, 2000d, 1, 2).

Humiliation and Trauma in Africa

PTSD and GAD in Africa

Leymann identifies PTSD and GAD as the appropriate diagnoses for the effects of mobbing and bullying. Did the present author find PTSD and GAD in the course of the fieldwork in Africa? In Rwanda, in February 1999, I talked to a man (whose name I do not want to disclose), who explained to me how his wife reacted to the genocide, ‘She was not killed, because she was in Paris at the time. Her father had been killed already in 1973, now it was her mother, sisters, brothers, and nephews. Members of her family got their heads cut off, dogs were put into a room and ate bodies, young women were raped, elder women forced to undress, - an utmost humiliation. And all this was committed by the neighbours! I went to Rwanda just after the genocide and found destroyed houses and dead bodies. I informed my wife, who came a little later, and we collected and buried the corpses. My wife spat at a neighbour who wanted to give her his hand, and she told a woman who wanted to greet her: “What do you want, do you want to finish me too!?” We have a little daughter now and only since her birth my wife slowly is getting back the taste of life. Also our house was completely emptied when we came back to Kigali. During the first two years after this she did not want to buy anything for the house or herself, only the necessary things for the daily survival.’

Clearly, this woman’s emotional state oscillates around the lower part of the order of emotions that Gerbode proposed (Gerbode, 1989²³⁰); it will be presented in a table as follows, see Table 8:

²³⁰ Quoted in Descilo, in Figley, 2000, 15.

ORDER OF EMOTIONS
Elation
Enthusiasm
Complacency
Contentment
Ambivalence
Antagonism
Anger
Resentment
Hidden Hostility
Anxiety
Fear
Grief
Apathy

Table 8: Order of emotions

Can Trauma Be Researched?

At this point the following quotes linking back to the discussion on research method seem to be timely, quotes that indicate that it is difficult to actually study trauma (trauma is defined as an inescapably stressful event that overwhelms people's existing coping mechanisms):

'Traumatic memories are difficult to study, since the profoundly upsetting emotional experiences that give rise to PTSD cannot be approximated in a laboratory setting: even viewing a movie depicting actual executions fails to precipitate post-traumatic symptoms in normal college students (Pitman, personal communication, 1994)... Clearly, there is little similarity between viewing a simulated car accident on a TV screen, and being the responsible driver in a car crash in which one's own children are killed' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 2).

Van der Kolk and Fisler continue: 'Without the option of inflicting actual trauma in the laboratory, there are only limited options for the exploration of traumatic memories: 1) collecting retrospective reports from traumatized individuals, 2) post-hoc observations, or 3) provoking of traumatic memories and flashbacks in people with PTSD' (2). Later van der Kolk and Fisler conclude: '...in the process of trying to gain a deeper understanding of

traumatic memories, great caution should be exercised against making careless generalizations that infer how traumatic memories are stored and retrieved from laboratory experiments that do not overwhelm people's coping mechanisms' (14).

Van der Kolk and Fisler differentiate between 'normal' stress reactions and PTSD: 'While stress evokes homeostatic mechanisms that lead to self-conservation and resource-re-allocation (e.g. Selye, 1956), PTSD involves a unique combination of learned conditioning, problems modulating arousal, and shattered meaning propositions. Shalev (1995) has proposed that this complexity is best understood as the co-occurrence of several interlocking pathogenic processes including (a) an alteration of neurobiological processes affecting stimulus discrimination (expressed as increased arousal and decreased attention), (b) the acquisition of conditioned fear responses to trauma-related stimuli, and (c) altered cognitive schemata and social apprehension' (2).

The authors also point at the fact that comparatively little research has been carried out: 'Surprisingly, since the early part of this century, there have been very few published systematic studies that explore the nature of traumatic memories based on detailed patient reports' (2). And, especially the predicament of women and children is reported to being neglected: 'In the last ten years, our society has spent billions of dollars studying and treating adult trauma victims, primarily male combat veterans -- this despite the fact that many more females are traumatized by rape in our society than males by combat. In comparison, few resources have been dedicated to research or treatment focusing on childhood trauma, and only a fraction of those on studying or treating the traumatized infant (Perry, in Murberg, 1994; Perry, 1995)' (Perry et al., 1995, 272).

Clearly, what the present author's fieldwork in Africa was about, was acquiring 'retrospective reports from traumatized individuals,' with, and here comes the point that particularly characterises humiliation, 'shattered meaning propositions' and 'altered cognitive schemata and social apprehension' causing or combined with 'alterations of neurobiological processes affecting stimulus discrimination (expressed as increased arousal and decreased attention),' 'conditioned fear responses to trauma-related stimuli.'

*‘Alterations of Neurobiological Processes Affecting Stimulus Discrimination,’
‘Conditioned Fear Responses to Trauma-Related Stimuli,’ ‘Altered Cognitive Schemata
and Social Apprehension,’ and ‘Shattered Meaning Propositions’*

In Nairobi I often spoke to a highly qualified and gifted Tutsi whose name cannot be exposed and who had survived the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, together with his wife and children, only because he was in Nairobi and not in Rwanda. He hesitated intensely whether he should speak to me. He was extremely hurt and traumatised. What particularly devastated him, were Western double standards, as they unfolded before and during the genocide, but, worse, even at the time we spoke together. He was shattered by the genocide and Western neglect of the victims, and support for the genocidaires. Shortly after the genocide he travelled to Rwanda and found and buried the dead corpses of almost twenty of his family, including parents and siblings. Back in Kenya, he subsequently lost his ability to work; he could not even hold a pen. His wife had to support the family. Full of bitterness he accused: ‘There is this Rwanda trauma, and nobody helps! Because of this apathy in the international community! And out of political reasons! France, for example, wanted to keep Anglo-Saxons out and let one million people be killed to protect their francophone sphere of influence! And the UN is a bunch of mercenaries!’ He knew Tutsi who worked with an international organisation in Kigali, ‘everybody thought they would be protected, but on the contrary, they were betrayed by their Hutu colleagues, who, with the help of radio communication, could identify the hiding places of their Tutsi colleagues and send killers to them!’

From several sources I heard that not only victims, but also perpetrators of genocide, ‘genocidaires,’ were hiding in Nairobi and that also the last group had to seek psychiatric help because they saw, for example, little children’s fingers on their plates when they were eating because they had killed children during the genocide (‘Hutu women married to Tutsi men were sometimes compelled to murder their Tutsi children to demonstrate their commitment to Hutu Power. The effect on these mothers is also beyond imagining’²³¹).

Should the yearlong ‘fixation’ with the loss of his dear family members that the above quoted Tutsi living in Nairobi endured, and the feeling that the world had traded them for some linguistic advantages be labelled as ‘obsession’ with, or ‘ruminations’ over ‘shattered meaning propositions’? Or, seeing small tiny children’s fingers on one’s plate, are these ‘alterations of neurobiological processes affecting stimulus discrimination,’ ‘conditioned fear

²³¹ The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 16, paragraph 4.

responses to trauma-related stimuli,' and 'altered cognitive schemata and social apprehension'? These terms seem too weak; more, they seem to belittle the ruthless and brutal experiences that engulf, in the case of this research, not just one person, but whole societies, for example the populace of Somalia, Rwanda or Burundi; here entire communities are swallowed up by unfathomable grief and agony. Such questions, occupying my mind before and during my fieldwork, compelled me to reflect on the risk that research itself may humiliate, reflections that I expanded upon in the article 'How Research Can Humiliate,' Lindner, 2001b.

Memories Are So Vivid

For the past century, many students of trauma have observed that the imprints of traumatic experiences seem to be qualitatively different from memories of ordinary events. '...accounts of the memories of traumatized patients consistently mention that emotional and perceptual elements tend to be more prominent than declarative components...These recurrent observations about the nature of traumatic memories have given rise to the notion that traumatic memories may be encoded differently than memories for ordinary events, perhaps via alterations in attentional focusing, perhaps because of extreme emotional arousal interferes with hippocampal memory functions'²³² (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 4).

During my stay in Rwanda and Burundi in 1999 the researcher was presented with uncountable horrifying stories, often several each day. For example: A young Tutsi, called Charles in this manuscript, was in Kigali during the genocide in 1994. A Hutu-friend of his hid him in his house. Whenever Hutu-militia came to search the house for Tutsi, Charles got into a hole that was dug in a rubbish heap in the garden. There he stood, only his nose poking out, covered by a plastic sheet, for hours, until the soldiers went away. This went on for weeks. During this whole time his Hutu-friend had to participate in the Tutsi-killing outside in the streets, in order not to be killed himself; and his Hutu-friend was telling everybody, that Charles was dead, in order to protect him. Even Charles's family believed that he was dead, until only a few days before they themselves were killed. His grandmother was already old, almost 90, and weak. She was locked into a room with a hungry dog, which ate her (25th January and 2nd February 1999 in Kigali).

²³² Christianson, 1992b; Heuer & Rausberg, in Christianson, 1992; Janet, 1889; LeDoux, in Christianson, 1992; McGaugh, in Christianson, 1992; Nilsson & Archer, in Christianson, 1992; Pitman, Orr, & Shalev, 1993; van der Kolk, 1994).

It was, indeed, amazing, how incredibly detailed the memories of endured atrocities were that were presented to the researcher. For many the genocide seemed to be present all the time, overshadowing daily life as if it happened again and again every day afresh in the imagination of the survivors (and presumably also in the minds of the perpetrators). ‘...studies of people’s subjective reports of personally highly significant events generally find that their memories are unusually accurate, and that they tend to remain stable over time (Bohannon, 1990; Christianson, 1992b; Pillemer, 1984; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). It appears that evolution favors the consolidation of personally relevant information... Contemporary memory research has demonstrated the existence of a great complexity of memory systems, with multiple components, most of which are outside of conscious awareness. Each one of these memory functions seems to operate with a relative degree of independence from the others. To summarize: 1) declarative, (also known as explicit) memory refers to conscious awareness of facts or events that have happened to the individual (Squire & Zola Morgan, 1991). This form of memory functioning is seriously affected by lesions of the frontal lobe and of the hippocampus, which also have been implicated in the neurobiology of PTSD (van der Kolk, 1994). 2) Non-declarative, implicit, or procedural memory refers to memories of skills and habits, emotional responses, reflexive actions, and classically conditioned responses. Each of these implicit memory systems is associated with particular areas in the Central Nervous System (Squire, in Schacter & Tulving, 1994)’ (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 4).

Van der Kolk and Fisler specify: ‘The DSM definition of PTSD recognizes that trauma can lead to extremes of retention and forgetting: terrifying experiences may be remembered with extreme vividness, or totally resist integration. In many instances, traumatized individuals report a combination of both. While people seem to easily assimilate familiar and expectable experiences and while memories of ordinary events disintegrate in clarity over time, some aspects of traumatic events appear to get fixed in the mind, unaltered by the passage of time or by the intervention of subsequent experience. For example, in our own studies on posttraumatic nightmares, subjects claimed that they saw the same traumatic scenes over and over again without modification over a fifteen year period (van der Kolk et al., 1984)’ (4).

How Accurate Are Memories?

If memories are vivid, - does this mean that everything that interlocutors relate happened exactly as they tell it? In Somalia this question was the issue of hot debate. I had videoed many hours of survivor accounts of the various harassments and the general attempt to humiliate and exterminate the Isaaq in the 1980s, culminating in genocidal killings in 1988. Surprisingly (or rather not surprisingly!), when I later was to show film fragments of interviews that I had recorded in the North, to Somalis from the South, they reacted with passionate anger; they disagreed violently with what the interview partners from the North said in the film. Some bitterly complained, 'You know, these people from the North, they were humiliating others before, but this they do not tell you! They behaved arrogantly and humiliated us!' (conversation in December 1999, the interlocutor does not want to be named).

Following this discussion I introduced a 'disclaimer' into the film: 'Somalia is a deeply divided country today, where almost everything is politicised, and almost everybody seems to have a political agenda. This film touches upon many very sensitive political topics. It has to be kept in mind that the interview partners speaking in this film respond to an interviewer who is a white woman, and thus a member of the international community who is not neutral, but part of the overall political arena.'

One could ask: Did this mean that whatever the researcher observed and learned in Somaliland was politically manipulated rhetoric to influence me as a representative of the international community? Was I manipulated as a 'naïve lady' with human rights ideals and a soft heart and blue eyes? When I asked Southerners whether their brothers and sisters from the North were telling lies when giving gruesome accounts of harassment and quasi-genocide, I learned, 'Sure, many of them have suffered terribly, and sure, many feel thoroughly humiliated. But they forget to tell you what they did to others, this is one thing, and the other thing is that they politicise their originally authentic feelings and exploit and instrumentalise these feelings for political aims' (my interlocutor does not want to be named).

'The question whether the sensory perceptions reported by our subjects are accurate representations of the sensory imprints at the time of the trauma is intriguing. The study of flashbulb memories has shown that the relationship between emotionality, vividness and confidence is very complex, and does not necessarily reflect accuracy. While it is possible that these imprints are, in fact, reflections of the sensations experienced at the moment of the trauma, an alternative explanation is that increased activity of the amygdala at the moment of recall may be responsible for the subjective assignment of accuracy and personal significance. Once these sensations are transcribed into a personal narrative, they are subject to the laws

that govern explicit memory: they become a socially communicable story that is subject to condensation, embellishment and contamination. While trauma may leave indelible sensory and affective imprints, once these are incorporated into a personal narrative this semantic memory, like all explicit memory, is subject to varying degrees of distortion' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 13).

Was this the researcher's situation in Somaliland – a researcher being a representative of the international community, and therefore influenced and manipulated for political causes? What would be the adequate reaction if this were the case? Should the reaction be to shrug shoulders and say to Northern Somali requests for the researcher to become their ambassador and promote their desire to become a separate nation, 'I hear that you want a nation, yet, this is not a researcher's business; on the contrary your attitudes and behaviour are just another facet of humiliation to be studied by the researcher, namely that humiliation is like a disease, - you may have it and need help, or you may pretend to have it because you crave the incentives that are entailed in getting help.' In short, a distant and neutral researcher could conclude, 'Humiliation rhetoric is as much my topic as authentically felt humiliation.'

These reflections, going on in the researcher's mind in Somalia, opened up a dilemma that has already been discussed above, namely that 'hands-off' attitudes might be scientific, yet unethical. As already described above the present author chose to enter into dialogue with interlocutors, a dialogue that entailed elements of Rogerian client-centred approaches, insofar as the researcher sometimes behaved like a therapist who empathically acknowledges feelings and attitudes, yet, I did not stop there, but asked the interlocutor later on for his or her views on how critical voices may be met.

I Cannot Eat Fish

'Trauma can affect a wide variety of memory functions. For convenience sake, we will categorize these into four different sets of functional disturbances: a) traumatic amnesia, b) global memory impairment, c) dissociative processes, and d) the sensorimotor organization of traumatic memories' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 4).

I flew to Bujumbura on the 22nd February 1999 (for the second time during my fieldwork) on board a Boeing 707, half cargo plane, half filled with passenger seats, with only two passengers turning up, me and Arlene (this is not her real name). Arlene was a young twenty-three years old elegant, kind and brilliantly sharp Burundian woman. The flight was

not announced on the departure screen; it seemed to be one of the flights that had been reported to me as circumventing the embargo (although the embargo had been lifted just recently). Clearly the cargo on board had paid for the flight so that paying passengers were not really needed. When we were about to enter the plane Arlene was being subjected to difficult interrogations and I helped her through insisting that I wanted to accompany her.

Finally in the plane, we sat together in the vast empty space and talked during the whole journey. She started touching upon her sad experiences when we were being served food: fish repulsed her, she explained, because the bodies of her parents were thrown into the river, in front of her eyes, and eaten by the fish. She escaped being raped and killed only because her tormenters got into a fight among themselves.'

Arlene could not bear the smell, sight and taste of fish. Numerous authors on trauma, for example Janet, 1889, van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1991, Kardiner, 1941, and Terr, 1993, have observed that trauma is organised in memory on sensori-motor and affective levels. 'Having listened to the narratives of traumatic experiences from hundreds of traumatized children and adults over the past twenty years, we frequently have heard both adults and children describe how traumatic experiences initially are organized without semantic representations. Clinical experience and reading a century of observations by clinicians dealing with a variety of traumatized populations led us to postulate that "memories" of the trauma tend to, at least initially, be predominantly experienced as fragments of the sensory components of the event: as visual images, olfactory, auditory, or kinesthetic sensations, or intense waves of feelings (which patients usually claim to be representations of elements of the original traumatic event). What is intriguing is that patients consistently claim that their perceptions are exact representations of sensations at the time of the trauma. For example, when Southwick and his group injected yohimbine into Vietnam veterans with PTSD, half of their subjects reported flashbacks that they claimed to be "just like it was" [in Vietnam]' (Southwick et al., 1993)' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 7).

This supports Piaget's notion that when memories cannot be integrated on a semantic/linguistic level, they tend to be organised more primitively, as visual images or somatic sensations. 'Even after considerable periods of time, and even after acquiring a personal narrative for the traumatic experience, most subjects reported that these experiences continued to be come back as sensory perceptions and as affective states. The persistence of intrusive sensations related to the trauma after the construction of a narrative contradicts the notion that learning to put the traumatic experience into words will reliably help abolish the occurrence of flashbacks' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 12).

'Speechless Terror,' or the Necessity to Dissociate in Order to Survive

What touched me most during my fieldwork was 'speechless terror.' The pauses in otherwise vivid witness accounts were often the most painful. Even more, 'speechless terror' filled the faces of the people the streets. An uninitiated person walking around, for example in the streets of Kigali, would never dream that a genocide happened there – so neat and orderly is this city. However, having worked both in psychiatry and as a clinical psychologist, I was very much aware of a kind of 'intense emptiness' in the faces of the people.

On 19th January 1999 I inquired at the German Embassy in Bujumbura, whether it was advisable to take the minibus through rebel area from Burundi to Rwanda. I was told that, if I did that, I would have to do this at my own risk; embassy personnel, for example, would not get the permission.

I took the minibus. I was the only white person. About 20 people were squeezed into a small vehicle; nobody talked, I was never addressed. I saw unapproachable, closed faces around me, - not hostile, just very, very controlled. There was a concentrated, intense, enforced emptiness in these faces, looking like the desperate attempt to look 'normal.' Perhaps, I thought, this is how fear looks like when one cannot escape, when one is compelled to make this journey. The chauffeur drove so fearfully fast that the greatest danger did not seem to come from rebels but from a road accident. Passengers told him to calm down: otherwise nobody would survive; the occasional car-wreck along the road spoke its own language. The bus leaked; the weather was stormy and cold and it rained; everybody got wet. After a day of such travelling through forests and hills, after having passed lengthy controls at the border between Burundi and Rwanda the bus (not we, since no 'we' feeling had developed on this journey) arrived in Kigali where the passengers disappeared almost within seconds in all directions.

I believe I got a glimpse of the 'survival strategies' that my co-travellers, who – unlike me – were forced to subsist under continuous traumatic circumstances, employed, survival strategy that include 'dissociation.' And dissociation leads to the 'speechless terror' that I so often observed. Christianson, 1984, has described how, when people feel threatened, they experience a significant narrowing of consciousness, and remain merely focused on the central perceptual details. 'As people are being traumatized, this narrowing of consciousness sometimes evolves into amnesia for parts of the event, or for the entire experience. Students of traumatized individuals have repeatedly noted that during conditions of high arousal

“explicit memory” may fail. The individual is left in a state of “speechless terror” in which the person lacks words to describe what has happened (van der Kolk & Kadish, in van der Kolk, 1987). However, while traumatized individuals may be unable to give a coherent narrative of the incident, there may be no interference with implicit memory: they may “know” the emotional valence of a stimulus and be aware of associated perceptions, without being able to articulate the reasons for feeling or behaving in a particular way’ (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 6).

Van der Kolk and Fisler specify: ‘Recently we collaborated in a neuroimaging symptom provocation study of some of the subjects... When these subjects had their flashbacks in the laboratory, there was a significantly increased activity in the areas in the right hemisphere that are associated with the processing of emotional experiences, as well as in the right visual association cortex. At the same time, there was significantly decreased activity in Broca’s area, in the left hemisphere (Rauch et al., 1994). These findings are in line with the results of this study: that traumatic “memories” consist of emotional and sensory states, with little verbal representation. In other work we have hypothesized that, under conditions of extreme stress, the hippocampally based memory categorization system fails, leaving memories to be stored as affective and perceptual states (van der Kolk, 1994). This hypothesis proposes that excessive arousal at the moment of the trauma interferes with the effective memory processing of the experience. The resulting “speechless terror” leaves memory traces that may remain unmodified by the passage of time, and by further experience’ (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 13).

By participating in the bus trip through rebel area the researcher was putting herself into the same situation as the people she was ‘studying’ and could thus research her own reactions. Normally researchers shuttle in and out of fieldwork – and the present author is no exception, - untouched by the real situation of their research ‘objects.’ However, I several times shared a glimpse of their situation and partook in a fraction of their feelings, in addition to my personal background as somebody deeply affected by gruesome recent European history of two World Wars and a Holocaust and thus having knowledge of how it feels to be trapped in long-term trauma.

What About Children?

What about children who participated in the genocide? ‘How does violence change the child? What is the impact of being repeatedly assaulted by a parent -- how is that different from

being targeted in a drive-by shooting or watching a loved one being assaulted or watching a ‘pretend’, but graphic, murder on television? How do these childhood experiences contribute to the much-discussed but little-understood “cycle of violence”? (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 125).

‘Thousands of minors (children and adolescents) have participated in genocides and in assassinations. Adults used bribery, drugs and personal influence to incite these young people to consider killing trivial. Many adolescents have been drafted into the militia and the army. They have lost all notion of respect for human life. Just as in the case of adults guilty of such crimes, these minors – at the same time both executioners and victims – must be identified and judged. Whatever the outcome, they should be entitled to therapy to facilitate their reeducation and their social rehabilitation. Simple confinement would make these “executioner” children even more violent and would represent a great potential danger for the societies of the region. It is an acute problem requiring the rapid establishment of specialised structures’ (Institut Universitaire d’etudes du developpement Genève (IUED), 1995, 5,6).

Perry admits, ‘Clearly the DSM IV does not have adequate descriptive categories for the majority of trauma-related neuropsychiatric syndromes observed in children, especially from deliberately-inflicted trauma’ (Perry et al., 1995, 85). The story of the boy who kills without remorse that was presented above fits here.

I met Stephen V. Gerardo for the first time on 20th January 1999 in Bujumbura. He was the Resident Representative of the Dutch Relief & Rehabilitation Agency, DRA (Reconciliation Programme) and responsible for community building. His dedicated work together with Jean-Chrys Biseta, the Project Counterpart, by far exceeded the imagination of what usually is understood as professional life; both invest their whole existence, and basically are prepared to risk their lives. On 12th February 1999 Stephen took me to a youth camp where circa three hundred Hutu and Tutsi youth came together for *bushingantahe* (or *bashingantahe*) discussions, a traditional form of respectful problem solving through talking. We drove through outskirts of Bujumbura where almost all houses were destroyed. Stephen explained the precarious situation, namely that in the mountains surrounding the city there were around 20 000 Hutu rebels, and in town perhaps as many Tutsi soldiers; Hutu fathers often stayed in the mountains, their wives as “widows” in town. In other words, some Hutu youth I was to meet in the youth camp probably had their fathers in the mountains.

When we arrived at the camp, a large group of youth, mostly around sixteen was having lunch. Many had visible scars on their bodies, scars that spoke an infallible language. I met Joseph Bigirumwami, Dr. Sciences du Langages, a wise *ubushingantahe*, a traditional

conflict solver. We spoke about a possible editor for his doctoral thesis *Nomination des espaces et topologie fictive au Burundi* at the university of Toulouse, and I hope intensely that he will be able to publish his invaluable work. After a while the *bushingantahe* session started. Several people translated for me. I was thoroughly amazed by these children answering the *ubushingantahe*'s questions like: 'Who is responsible for that you participate in killings?' The discussion was extremely lively, many hands went up, and many different opinions were aired. Some identified politicians as inciters of killings; others accepted that also those who allow being incited might be guilty.

This was one of many moments when I realised how much crisis management usually builds on the assumption that there are long stretches of 'normality' and short incidents of 'crisis.' I wondered how the lives of these children would continue after this session, when I was back in town and safe. They would live under continuously traumatic circumstances; trauma was 'normal' for them.

Van der Kolk and Fisler report on a study they did and explain that children have a harder time constructing coherent narratives of traumatic experiences: '...there are critical differences between the ways people experience traumatic memories versus other significant personal events. The study supports the idea that it is in the very nature of traumatic memory to be dissociated, and to be initially stored as sensory fragments without a coherent semantic component. All of the subjects in our study claimed that they only came to develop a narrative of their trauma over time. Five of the subjects who claimed to have been abused as children were even as adults unable to tell a complete narrative of what had happened to them. They merely had fragmentary memories that supported other people's stories, and their own intuitive feelings, that they had been abused' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 12).

Traumatic amnesia affects children more than adults. 'While the vivid intrusions of traumatic images and sensations are the most dramatic expressions of PTSD, the loss of recollections for traumatic experiences, followed by subsequent retrieval is well documented in the literature....A recent general population study of 485 subjects by Elliot and Briere (unpublished) reported significant degrees of traumatic amnesia after virtually every form traumatic experience, with childhood sexual abuse, witnessing domestic violence as a child, and combat exposure yielding the highest rates. Traumatic amnesias are age- and dose-related

: the younger the age at the time of the trauma, and the more prolonged the traumatic event, the greater the likelihood of significant amnesia' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 4²³³).

Van der Kolk and Fisler report on the differences between adult (adult onset trauma (AT) group) and adolescent victims (the childhood onset (CT) group), regarding dissociation: 'There were non-significant differences in the modalities in which the trauma was experienced, which a larger sample size might clarify further: the subjects first traumatized as children tended to first remember their abuse in the form of olfactory images and kinesthetic sensations. The CT group had significantly more pathological self-soothing behaviors than the adult group, including self-mutilation and bingeing. This supports the notion that childhood trauma gives rise to more pervasive biological dysregulation, and that patients with childhood trauma have greater difficulty regulating internal states than patients first traumatized as adults (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1994)' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 4).

Global memory impairment is worse for children. 'While amnesias following adult trauma have been well-documented, the mechanisms for such memory impairment remains insufficiently understood. This issue is even more complicated when it concerns childhood trauma, since children have fewer mental capacities to construct a coherent narrative out of traumatic events. More research is needed to explore the consistent clinical observation that adults who were chronically traumatized as children suffer from generalized impairment of memories for both cultural and autobiographical events. It is likely that the combination of autobiographical memory gaps and continued reliance on dissociation makes it very hard for these patients to reconstruct a precise account of both their past and current reality (Cole P. & Putnam F.W., 1992)' (5).

At that point van der Kolk and Fisler draw a frightful conclusion: 'The combination of lack of autobiographical memory, continued dissociation and of meaning schemes that include victimization, helplessness and betrayal, is likely to make these individuals vulnerable to suggestion and to the construction of explanations for their trauma-related affects that may bear little relationship to the actual realities of their lives' (5).

Perry et al., 1995, call for more awareness for the 'Profound socio-cultural and public policy implications' that arise from 'understanding the critical role of early experience in determining the functional capacity of the mature adult -- and therefore our society. Persistence of the destructive myth that "children are resilient" will prevent millions of

²³³ See also Briere & Conte, 1993; Herman & Shatzow, 1987; van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz & Mandel, 1993.

children, and our society, from meeting their true potential. Persistence of the pervasive maltreatment of children in the face of decreasing global and national resources will lead, inevitably, to sociocultural devolution. It need not be so' (Perry et al., 1995, 287).

Whole Communities in Peri-Traumatic Stress Disorder

Earlier Somalia was presented as follows: 'The Somalia of today is unique in its failing. The South has oscillated between high intensity and low intensity civil war for about a decade. Never-ending in-fighting and violence inflict unceasing sufferings on all inhabitants... "My emotions for Somalia are used up!" says a Somali professor, widely respected Ahmed I. Samatar, James Wallace Professor and Dean of International Studies and Programming, at Macalester College, in Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA, in a personal conversation.'

In February 1999 the present author participated in a UNDP field trip to Kibungo and Umutara in the Northeast of Rwanda. A long convoy of mostly white four-wheel drive cars hastily passed through the countryside, up to the less fertile areas in the Northeast. We stopped and the whole group was welcomed for lunch. I spoke to my neighbour who told me that he had been a student in Butare before the genocide and had left the country in 1989, only to return recently. All his family had been killed. He confessed that he had grave problems with coping. He got married and had now two children, 'that helps,' he said. But he felt that he lives among 'animals,' he felt that the official order to reconcile was impossible, was imposed by the government: 'I see the murderers walking around, sometimes I just try to forget, and get on with life, but I feel so alone.'

The researcher got accounts like this every day during fieldwork, often several each day, fragments of endless sufferings that were presented in the most unexpected settings. The endlessness and degree of this suffering is unknown to 'average people' in the richer and more peaceful parts of the world, especially those parts that were less touched by the wars of the past century. In the more blessed parts of the world perhaps only parents whose children fell victim to crime and were killed live engulfed in similar ever-continuing nightmares. The accounts I received from my African interlocutors made me realise again the point made above, namely how much Western crisis management (for example psychiatric attendance after accidents) typically builds on the supposition of stretches of 'normality' interrupted by short incidents of 'crisis.' Where I went it was the other way round. And, the crisis is not finished. After an earthquake the victims can rebuild their houses – this is so much more

difficult for people who say to you: ‘There, look, this man on the other side of the street killed my uncle.’ How can people be expected to ‘rebuild’ in such contexts?

I met young and extremely dedicated Alphonse on the 25th January 2000 and on several later occasions for long conversations. He deeply reflected on the issue of reconciliation: ‘Can I forgive the killers of my grandmother who has been made to parade naked in the street before being killed? Can I speak for her? Can I speak for my mother and reconcile with her killers?’

And how are people in Burundi to reconcile? An expatriate expert on Burundi whose name cannot be disclosed, judged ruthlessly: ‘Tutsi do not seem to remember 1972, when circa 300 000 Hutu were killed and nobody has been made responsible. No investigation! Those who did it are today driving around in their Mercedes and are in power! The international community did not say anything; neither block in the Cold War was interested at that time! The OAU even congratulated the regime for keeping law and order! This must be terrible for the Hutu and must contribute to radicalise them! The 1993 killings of Tutsi by Hutu, on the other side, were labelled as genocide by the UN! I believe that this was one of the gravest mistakes made by the international community. This must be very difficult to understand for the Hutu that he is labelled “genocidaire” in 1993, while the Tutsi get away with 1972 without a word, without any persecution or labelling. 1972 around 300 000 Hutu were killed, and then they killed circa 30 000 Tutsi... There must be a lot of frustration and anger among the Hutu.’ And he continues: ‘It is here that humiliation is happening! And humiliation is furthermore a daily experience in the field of justice. The prisons are full, with Hutu. The judges and lawyers are Tutsi...’

What can be learned from these quotes is that it cannot be expected that a situation be back to normal just because immediate genocidal killing is over. And – worse – it is unknown how many lists with names marked ‘to-be-killed’ are still being written at the moment.

On 16th February 1999 I had a long meeting with the UNHCR head Ulf T. Kristoffersson, Délégué, Haut Commissariat Des Nations Unies Pour les Réfugiés. Incidentally, he had been the one to open the UNHCR office in Hargeisa and had been responsible for the Horn of Africa in Geneva before that. He described his strategy as leading representative of an international organisation as one of ‘neutrality and distance towards local governments,’ a neutrality that ought to characterise international community altogether. He skilfully describes the Great Lakes’ dilemma of Tutsi fearing extermination (genocide in Rwanda, and still 150000 Hutu *interahamwe* in Congo who want to attack and take over Rwanda), and Hutu wishing to rise from being excluded from power and resources. He agreed

with my proposition that the extremists in both camps are the ones that have to be pacified. I asked him whether the situation could be compared, as I had heard, to the old colonial times, only that the Tutsi were the colonisers and could not go home, or whether the situation resembled South Africa. He said, 'no, a dynamic like here I have not seen anywhere!' In his doctoral dissertation he had portrayed the situation quite negatively and his thesis had been rejected because of that; however, he said, his judgement had been only too correct, events subsequently proved that 'my description of the situation had not been negative enough!'

The entire social and political situation in regions that are engulfed in protracted conflict could be described as ongoing trauma, and dissociation seems to be the very least people can do to survive. The question that imposes itself is what consequences dissociation has and what price people have to pay for this survival strategy.

Twice in January 1999 I met a young and excellent journalist at *The New Times*, 'Rwanda's Leading Weekly,' who took me on his personal journey of death, despair and defiance that he endured during the genocide. He talked about all the horrifying details that are documented in the genocide reports; dogs eating the elderly; elder women forced to undress – an utmost humiliation – before being killed; rape to death, hacking to death. He talked about all this calmly, as if he were an old man who was beyond the sufferings of this world. He explained that foreigners often wonder how Rwandans cope, and that they urge Rwandans to not repress their agony. I admitted to Kennedy that I felt ashamed and perhaps even humiliated by too naïve proposals from those among my colleagues who travel to places such as Rwanda for a short trip and return home to safety after some weeks without having attempted real understanding. I asked, humbly: 'How can one "work through" agony, when this agony is overwhelming, and perhaps not finished? Perhaps focusing on daily tasks is a good way to "work through"? Perhaps getting married and having children is the best "therapy"? Surely, building sustainable peace in a global context will be the only real "therapy," however, in the meantime, perhaps dissociation is the only way to survive?'

'The capacity to dissociate in the midst of terror appears to be a differentially available adaptive response. Some people dissociate early in the arousal continuum -- some people dissociate only in the state of complete terror. Viewed dispassionately, because of the diminished cognitive capacity of an adult in the full-blown fight or flight response, there is great teleological logic in a partial dissociative response (it is what allows the soldier to fight without panic)' (Perry et al., 1995, 282).

'Dissociation refers to a compartmentalization of experience: elements of the experience are not integrated into a unitary whole, but are stored in memory as isolated

fragments and stored as sensory perceptions, affective states or as behavioral reenactments... While dissociation may temporarily serve an adaptive function, in the long range, lack of integration of traumatic memories seems to be the critical element that leads to the development of the complex biobehavioral change that we call Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Intense arousal seems to interfere with proper information processing and the storage of information into narrative (explicit) memory. This observation was first made by Pierre Janet, and is confirmed by a subsequent century of clinical and research data' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 6).

This means that PTSD is the price to pay for dissociation: 'Recent research has shown that having dissociative experiences at the moment of the trauma (peritraumatic dissociation) is the most important long term predictor for the ultimate development of PTSD (Holen, 1990; Marmar et al., 1994; Spiegel, 1991)' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 5).

Bremner et al., 1992, measured that Vietnam veterans with PTSD reported having experienced higher levels of dissociative symptoms during combat than men who did not develop PTSD, and Koopman, Classen, & Spiegel, 1994, established that dissociative symptoms early in the course of a natural disaster predicted PTSD symptoms seven months later. 'A prospective study of 51 injured trauma survivors in Israel (Shalev, Orr, & Pitman, 1993) found that peri-traumatic dissociation explained 30% of the variance in the six months follow-up PTSD symptoms, over and above the effects of gender, education, age, event-severity, and intrusion, avoidance anxiety and depression that followed the event. Peri-traumatic dissociation was the strongest predictor of PTSD status six months after the event' (5).

Kardiner, in describing the *Traumatic Neuroses of War* (1941) observed that when patients develop amnesia for the trauma, it tends to generalize to a large variety of symptomatic expressions: 'triggered by a sensory stimulus, a patient might lash out, employing language suggestive of his trying to defend himself during a military assault' (quoted in van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 6). Kardiner noted that many patients, while riding a subway train that entered a tunnel, had flashbacks to being back in the trenches. Kardiner also viewed panic attacks and hysterical paralyses as the re-experiencing of fragments of the trauma.

We may conclude that 'People who have learned to cope with trauma by dissociating are vulnerable to continue to do so in response to minor stresses. The continued use of dissociation as a way of coping with stress interferes with the capacity to fully attend to life's ongoing challenges. The severity of ongoing dissociative processes (often measured with the

Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES)- Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) has been correlated with a large variety of psychopathological conditions that are thought to be associated with histories of trauma and neglect (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 6). Van der Kolk and Fisler (7) enumerate 'severity of sexual abuse in adolescents,' 'somatization',²³⁴ 'bulimia',²³⁵ 'self-mutilation',²³⁶ and 'borderline personality disorder'.²³⁷

Not only Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, but other regions, too, suffer similar dilemmas. I was very touched by Dr. Caroline Nyamai, who talked at the 1st Regional Meeting of the World Psychiatric Association and the Kenya Psychiatric Association in Nairobi (24th - 25th May 1999) about the help Kenya had received from American psychiatrists after the bomb blast of the American embassy in Nairobi in 1998, where those who survived the blast received psychiatric counselling. She explained with great appreciation how Kenyans benefited from the opportunity to learn from their visiting American colleagues (on 25th May 1999 I was able to speak to one of those American psychiatrists who came from the USA in connection with the bomb blast, it is Dr. George W. Woods, who calls for a new, global psychology, that contains not only Western psychology, but draws upon the psychology of all cultures). Several papers at the conference addressed the 1998 bomb blast and the treatment of its traumatised victims. It was embarrassingly clear to everybody in the conference, although nobody dared to bluntly verbalise it, that Africa is filled with potential patients for such treatment, and that they go without it, exactly because it is African 'normality' and not a quickly passing event such as the blast that also affected Westerners.

Why Humiliation Is the Utmost Challenge to the Diagnosis – Prognosis – Therapy Paradigm

'For the surviving victims, the persecution of the Jews by the National Socialists represents a form of traumatization so extreme as to beggar comparison with any other kind of traumatic event, say, a natural catastrophe. Interviews with people caught up in the machinery of persecution as adolescents have revealed to the author that they were subject to psychic lesions with devastating consequences hardly susceptible to adequate description in the framework of traditional psychoanalytic trauma theories. In puberty the internal separation

²³⁴ Saxe et al., 1994.

²³⁵ Demitrack M.A. et al., 1990.

²³⁶ van der Kolk, Perry, & Herman, 1991.

²³⁷ Herman, Perry, & van der Kolk, 1989.

process from the parents as love-objects is in itself difficult enough. When this is compounded with an external persecution situation the threat to a sound physical and psychic constitution is infinitely greater' (Gassler, 1995, Abstract).

As noted above, after an earthquake or a flood people get their 'act together.' After a plane crash survivors receive psychiatric attention and, thus 'debriefed,' get better. Those who lost dear family members mourn; they master their grief eventually. As long as people are convinced that a trauma occurred accidental or was 'natural,' people get on with their lives after a while. This is the most likely outcome in cases of natural disaster, but even in the case of human failure; the airplane's captain's incompetence may still 'pass' as accident.

However, the situation is completely different if I believe that somebody has intended the trauma that befell me. For example, if I am convinced that God intended the natural disaster to hurt me, then the context is radically altered. Did God punish me in order to teach me a lesson that is good for me? Did He want to get me down from arrogance and teach me humility? Or is He a brutal God that finds pleasure in degrading me? Or is there after all no God? These are pressing questions. Such questions intensify when another person humiliates me, or a whole group systematically humiliates another group. Then brief psychiatric attention is not the method to be chosen. In other words, it is not enough to 'debrief' 'genocidaires' and their victims. Collective therapy and healing have to be sought; truth commissions in South Africa were an attempt to do precisely such collective therapy.

In the following a continuum will be drawn that maps out the transition from 'pure' trauma to trauma that is precisely traumatic because it is perceived as humiliation, see Table 9:

1. A natural disaster such as an earthquake or a flood brings trauma, but not humiliation, when it occurs arbitrarily and no actor can be made responsible.
2. An accident involving an actor may cause trauma, but not necessarily humiliation. After a car accident the driver who involuntarily caused the accident may apologise to the traumatised victim. The relationship between actor and victim may thus be characterised by trauma, but not humiliation.
3. A misfortune happening accidentally and involving an actor may bring trauma, and it may mark the entry point into a humiliating relationship. For example, rebels may kidnap me and treat me in a humiliating way, although I am an arbitrary victim, and not their real target.
4. A situation, involving an actor, may evolve in a way that humiliation develops over time. Marriage may develop into a humiliating relationship; history shows that

dictators may be loved and welcomed at first, just to bring humiliation over their followers later.

5. An actor may bring trauma on me intentionally to teach me humility, and I may accept this lesson humbly. I may believe that God wants to teach me humility, such as the *Bible* describes in the case of Job.
6. An actor may bring trauma on me intentionally to teach me that I am unworthy, and I may perceive this as legitimate. This typically happens in the context of hierarchical honour societies, where humiliation is a routine to maintain the ranking order. My super-ordinates violate my honour routinely, and also I defend my honour routinely by humiliating those under me. History books describe how duels were means to calibrate ranks in honourable hierarchies. Furthermore, 'breaking the will' of children was recommended as rearing method, in order to teach them obedience in a hierarchy (see Miller, 1983).
7. An actor may bring trauma on me intentionally to teach me that I am unworthy, and I may perceive this as illegitimate violation. This happens typically in a democratic society that is built on human rights principles where I expect to be treated with respect as an equal among equals.

TRAUMA AND HUMILIATION						
Suffering		← →			Intense suffering	
Trauma without humiliation		← →			Humiliation as core of trauma	
An actor intends to educate me	No actor	Actors are involved, but not intending to humiliate me, at least not initially			An actor intends to humiliate me	
An actor wants to teach me humility.	A natural disaster happens to me, and I see no perpetrator.	An accident happens to me and the perpetrator apologises.	An accident happens to me and the perpetrator treats me humiliating.	An accident leads to a humiliating situation after some time.	An actor wants to teach me unworthiness in a context where this is routine behaviour and everybody does it.	An actor wants to teach me unworthiness in a context where this is not routine but illegitimate and violating my inner core of dignity.
God and Job.	Earthquake, flood.	A car accident; the driver apologises.	Rebels arbitrarily kidnap people.	Marriage; dictators.	Duels; 'breaking the will' of children; torture.	Mobbing and bullying.

Table 9: Trauma and Humiliation

Is There Any Therapy? Or Are the Therapists Themselves Too Afraid?

Further above a young Tutsi was introduced who survived in a garbage hole while his family was slaughtered outside. As reported above, he talked about all these horrifying atrocities remarkably serenely, and humbled foreign voices that tried to remind him that ‘one should not repress,’ an advice especially difficult to follow in the face of a continuously traumatic situation that may not yet have seen its end. Perhaps getting married and having children was the best ‘therapy’ as long as sustainable peace – the only real ‘therapy’ – had not been implemented.

The question that imposes itself is the following: What can traumatised communities such as Somalia and Rwanda learn from other countries burdened with a Holocaust past, such as Germany and German 'working through' their gruesome past? Barbara Heimannsberg and Christoph J. Schmidt edited the book *The Collective Silence: German Identity and the Legacy of Shame*; Sammy Speier writes there: '...reports from witnesses, historians, and therapists show that the reality of the concentration camp far outstripped the possibility of capturing it in words. On the one hand, it is impossible to enter completely into the experience of the concentration camp inmates; on the other hand, it was never possible for the victims themselves to express their experience fully in words. Nonetheless, if we are serious in our desire and our struggle for a future, we must confront ourselves again and again with this reality and find language to express it' (Speier, in Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993, 63).

Speier presents a devastating portrayal of German's efforts to do a 'therapy' that would include its unspeakable history. Speier writes about the failure of German psychoanalysts and accuses them of backing away from touching upon unbearable experiences, because, he presumes, they themselves would not be able to deal with such exposures. Bluntly put, he thinks, that their 'nice little world' would crumple under fantasies of extreme humiliation. Speier quotes Simenauer: 'When the analyst is confronted with undisguised fantasies of violence and extreme degradation, his generally recognized and familiar world of psychoanalysis may threaten to collapse' (Simenauer, 1982, 9).

Speier accuses German psychoanalysis of shying away from the fact that their 'classical version' has its limits if confronted with sufferings that go beyond average thresholds: 'The fear of such confusion and destabilization leads many psychoanalysts even today to deny that the possibilities of "classical" psychoanalysis are limited in dealing with both the monstrous forces of impulse which were lived out unrestrainedly in the Nazi period and the severe traumatization which resulted. There is a tendency to deny the existence of traumatic childhood experiences which cannot be directly verbalized afterward, as well as experiences which were mediated nonverbally. In both cases a reconstruction by means of classical psychoanalysis alone is impossible (see Grubrich-Simitis, 1984). Among psychoanalysts, the implications of the experiences of concentration camp survivors for the psychic illnesses of their children are much debated; even the use of the term "psychic illnesses" shows that the traditional diagnostic vocabulary of psychoanalysis is insufficient here. It is difficult, often impossible, to find a "classical" diagnosis for patients who have grown up with fear of extermination (see Wangh, 1985, 51). And I would like to stress that

here I also mean the fear of extermination experienced by the children of the perpetrators, onlookers, and bystanders, when they looked at their own parents, relatives, and others' (63).

Speier reports how 'psychoanalytic practices in Germany are full of patients who are the children of the persecutors, accomplices, witnesses, and bystanders' and how this state of affairs is, to his great bewilderment, 'collectively denied.' Speier deplures, that 'Apart from a few attempts to describe this phenomenon (Mitscherlich-Nielsen, 1981; Rosenkötter, 1979; Simenauer, 1982), it would seem that this "second generation syndrome" of the perpetrators, accomplices, followers, and witnesses is nonexistent; it has disappeared in the fog of fantasies of normality and the "zero hour." The attempt in Germany to perform "classical" psychoanalyses, without taking account of the historical space in which the patients and therapists move, is symptomatic of the "inability to grieve" (one ought rather to speak of a *refusal to grieve*)' (64, italicisation in original).

Speier believes that an 'empty therapy' may pave the way for new catastrophes: 'Among psychoanalysts in training, this leads to an identity diffusion and to the much-lamented empty, apolitical psychoanalysis. Unbearable reality produces an impulse to flee: one would like, in memory, to leap over the terrible years from 1933 to 1945 and return to the "healthy world" of the years before 1933. That which is immeasurable, inconceivable, unimaginable and in part unutterable, is surely that which troubles us most deeply as people and as analysts, and which impels us to try again and again to flee to a supposedly "healthy world." And yet the repression, here as elsewhere, is doomed to failure. Nonetheless, it contains enormous explosive power: the denial of Auschwitz (see Wangh, 1985) can pave the way for a new catastrophe for mankind' (64).

Fifty years after his parents had to flee from the Nazis, the Israeli psychologist Daniel Bar-On travelled to Germany in order to talk to children of perpetrators. He found silence, and wrote the book *The Legacy of Silence*. The book cover explains his work as follows, 'He knows that identity and life planning are deeply linked to that of parents and grandparents. He tries to trace the psychological structures of the perpetrators' families in the childhood memories. The emotional burden of the "legacy of silence" is not just limited to the private realm, but permeates the here-and-now of society at large. Dan Bar-On brought some of his interview partners together with children of victims to speak to each other and reports on that.

The author wishes to motivate to do a first step to go beyond the 'legacy of silence' (Bar-On, 1996a, book cover²³⁸).

What Speier calls for and Bar-On tried to stimulate is the building up of a narrative that has and gives meaning. As van der Kolk and Fisler report, it is difficult to achieve such a meaningful narrative: 'When people receive sensory input, they generally automatically synthesize this incoming information into narrative form, without conscious awareness of the processes that translate sensory impressions into a personal story. Our research shows that traumatic experiences initially are imprinted as sensations or feeling states that are not immediately transcribed into personal narratives, in contrast with the way people seem to process ordinary information. This failure of information processing on a symbolic level, in which it is categorized and integrated with other experiences, is at the very core of the pathology of PTSD (van der Kolk & Ducey, 1989)' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 13).

'All these subjects, regardless of the age at which the trauma occurred, claimed that they initially "remembered" the trauma in the form of somatosensory flashback experiences. These flashbacks occurred in a variety of modalities: visual, olfactory, affective, auditory and kinesthetic, but initially these sensory modalities did not occur together. As the trauma came into consciousness with greater intensity, more sensory modalities came into awareness: initially the traumatic experiences were not condensed into a narrative. It appears that, as people become aware of more and more elements of the traumatic experience, they construct a narrative that "explains" what happened to them. This transcription of the intrusive sensory elements of the trauma into a personal narrative does not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence with what actually happened. This process of weaving a narrative out of the disparate sensory elements of an experience is probably not dissimilar from how people construct a narrative under ordinary conditions. However, when people have day-to-day, non-traumatic experiences, the sensory elements of the experience are not registered separately in consciousness, but are automatically integrated into the personal narrative' (van der Kolk & Fisler, 2000, 12).

²³⁸ Translated by the author from: 'Fünfzig Jahre nachdem seine Eltern vor den Nazis fliehen mußten, reiste der israelische Psychologe nach Deutschland, um mit Kindern von Tätern zu sprechen. Er weiß, daß Identität und Lebensgestaltung zutiefst mit der der Eltern und Großeltern verknüpft ist. Er versucht, in den Kindheitserinnerungen den psychischen Strukturen in den Familien der Nazitäter auf die Spur zu kommen. Die emotionale „Last des Schweigens“ bleibt nicht nur auf das Private beschränkt, sondern prägt auch die gesellschaftliche Gegenwart. Dan Bar-On brachte einige seiner Interviewpartner mit Kindern von Opfern in Gesprächsgruppen zusammen und berichtet darüber. Der Autor will zu einem ersten Schritt zur Überwindung der „Last des Schweigens“ motivieren' (Bar-On, 1996a, book cover).

This means that the first task in any therapy should be to facilitate the building of a narrative, a process that is ‘automatic’ in case of non-traumatic experiences, and must get help when traumatic memories are concerned.

A First Step to Healing: Cognitive-Clinical Psychology and a Coherent Narrative

Almost a decade ago, Pierre Janet²³⁹ observed: ‘Forgetting the event which precipitated the emotion ... has frequently been found to accompany intense emotional experiences in the form of continuous and retrograde amnesia’ (Janet, 1909, 1607). He asserted that memories cannot be transformed into a neutral narrative when people experience intense emotions: a person is ‘unable to make the recital which we call narrative memory, and yet he remains confronted by (the) difficult situation’ (Janet 1919/1925, 660). This results in ‘a phobia of memory’ (661) that prevents the integration (‘synthesis’) of traumatic events and splits off the traumatic memories from ordinary consciousness. ‘Janet claimed that the memory traces of the trauma linger as what he called “unconscious fixed ideas” that cannot be “liquidated” as long as they have not been translated into a personal narrative. Failure to organize the memory into a narrative leads to the intrusion of elements of the trauma into consciousness: as terrifying perceptions, obsessional preoccupations and as somatic re-experiences such as anxiety reactions (Janet, 1909, van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1991, in van der Kolk & Fislser, 2000, 6).

So, how could memory of traumatic experiences be organised into a narrative? In 1997 the journal *Cognitive Therapy and Research* celebrated its 20th anniversary. Rick E. Ingram writes in the ‘Editorial Statement’²⁴⁰: ‘The journal was founded by the pioneers of contemporary cognitive-clinical psychology, many of whom still serve on the advisory board. Cognitive Therapy and Research’s appearance came at a time when the examination of cognition was only beginning to be considered a legitimate approach to the treatment and study of psychological dysfunction. This ascendance to legitimacy started largely with the development of social learning theory, and was followed primarily by research whose aim was to expand the role of cognitive approaches in the development of effective treatment procedures. More recently, examination of the cognitive mechanisms of psychological disorders has become a central focus of cognitive-clinical research efforts. Through all of

²³⁹ See, for example, Janet, 1889; Janet, 1893; Janet, 1909; Janet, 1925.

²⁴⁰ Retrieved from <http://www.sci.sdsu.edu/CAL/CTR/CTR.html> on 15th October 1999.

these efforts, cognitive approaches to psychopathology have become a well-accepted and respected subset of scientific approaches to the study of psychological functioning.’²⁴¹

‘One of the primary targets of cognitive therapy is the identification of negative or distorted automatic thoughts. These cognitions are the relatively autonomous thoughts that occur rapidly while an individual is in the midst of a particular situation or is recalling significant events from the past. Patients with depression and anxiety have many more negative or fearful automatic thoughts than control subjects, and these distorted cognitions stimulate painful emotional reactions. In addition, negative automatic thoughts can be associated with behaviors (e.g., helplessness, withdrawal, or avoidance) that make the problem worse. In depression or anxiety disorders, there is often a “vicious cycle” of dysfunctional cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. Automatic thoughts are frequently based on faulty logic or errors in reasoning. Cognitive therapy is directed, in part, at helping patients recognize and change these cognitive errors (sometimes called cognitive distortions). Some of the commonly described cognitive errors include: all or nothing thinking, personalization, ignoring the evidence, and overgeneralization. In cognitive therapy, patients are usually taught how to detect cognitive errors and to use this skill in developing a more rational style of thinking. Another focus of cognitive therapy is on underlying schemas. These cognitive structures are thought to be the templates, or basic rules, for interpreting information from the environment. Schemas (sometimes termed core beliefs) can be either adaptive or maladaptive. Cognitive therapists assist patients in modifying problematic schemas. Generally, cognitive therapy for dysfunctional schemas is more complex and demanding than therapeutic work with automatic thoughts.’²⁴²

We read above: ‘Failure to organize the memory into a narrative leads to the intrusion of elements of the trauma into consciousness: as terrifying perceptions, obsessional preoccupations and as somatic re-experiences such as anxiety reactions.’ And we read also about cognitive errors such as ‘all or nothing thinking, personalization, ignoring the evidence, and overgeneralization,’ as well as maladaptive rules for interpreting information. And, further above we learned from Bar-On: ‘...when former adversaries begin to build an

²⁴¹ ‘Cognitive Therapy is the most heavily researched form of psychotherapy and has proven effectiveness in the treatment of several psychiatric illnesses, including depression and anxiety. It is based on the idea that people with psychiatric disorders have maladaptive patterns of thinking. By understanding and changing these patterns, a patient may bring about positive changes in his or her mental functioning’ (‘Basics of Cognitive Therapy,’ retrieved from <http://mindstreet.com/cbt.html> on 15th October 1999, 1).

²⁴² ‘Basics of Cognitive Therapy,’ retrieved from <http://mindstreet.com/cbt.html> on 15th October 1999.

environment of cooperative interdependence they have to maintain a positive image of their social identity.'

One may ask: How can whole communities of people who are haunted by a variety of anxiety reactions, who are trapped in all-or-nothing patterns of thinking, who tend to personalise problems that ought not to be personalised, who may feel compelled to ignore evidence and overgeneralise, and who in addition are victims of all kinds of maladaptive rules for interpreting information, - how can these people attain and maintain a positive image of their social identity and begin to build an environment of co-operative interdependence?

The Narrative Must Also Be Meaningful

An expatriate whose name cannot be exposed gave me a very frank overview over Burundi's plight; he spoke 'off the record' (February 1999 in Bujumbura), 'Burundi is a primary example for selective perception: For the Tutsi 1972 has somehow not happened! In 1972 Hutu were slaughtered, and the killers were the security forces, army, police, or extremist Tutsi youth organisations.' My source continued his report with disbelief, 'I was told that some Hutu obediently followed orders to come to the gendarmerie where they then were killed, worse even, when the evening came, they were told that it was now 18.00 and they could not be finished today, that they should come back next day – and,' he exclaimed 'they came back!' This, my source assumed, 'must be utterly humiliating and shameful for the Hutu, to know that some of them accepted to be slaughtered like lambs! This must be similar to the feelings of Jews who are ashamed that their people did not rise up against the Holocaust in Germany!' He concluded: 'The entire history of the Hutu is a story of humiliation, even more so since 1972; many educated Hutu have been killed; the opposition has very few educated people!'

Perhaps it would help Burundians (and others in similar situations) to ask: Why were the Jews so passive? Or, why did most of the Jewish Holocaust survivors not even take revenge on Germans after the war? This question is addressed by Bar-On, whose parents had to flee Germany. He writes: 'We know of a few post-war acts of revenge, but they cannot be considered seriously in light of the fantasies of revenge which camp inmates reported and which many German citizens were afraid of. Psychologically, this discrepancy can be accounted for by the inability of victims to retaliate against their aggressors in situations of severe asymmetry and harsh aggression. It is suggested that the internalized aggression

among the victims did not vanish and can later be found in a displaced aggression against weaker groups' (Bar-On, 1999, 1).

How can Hutu in Burundi attain 'a positive image of their social identity'? Perhaps, those who did not resist being slaughtered lacked what the two next quotes demonstrate, a specific inner strength, a strength that forecloses any succumbing to humiliation:

In November 1998, in Hargeisa, I asked the members of the Hargeisa group (today SORRA group) how they were able to survive solitary confinement for years, never facing any other treatment than cruel humiliation by their guards. One of them gave witness: 'Yes, one of the prisoners got mad. He started singing Siad Barre songs – you know, those songs praising Siad Barre [he sings the beginning of such a song], you could hear them every morning from the guards outside. The prisoner would not stop singing, day and night. One day, we believe, he was beaten to death by the guards.' However, the others did not get 'mad.' Another SORRA friend continued: 'We knew why we were in prison. We had a purpose and a meaning. We were heroes. Our suffering contributed to the uprising of our people. Sometimes we would become depressed, yes, sometimes we thought that we had been forgotten, since all contact was cut and we did not get any news from our families or the overall situation for years, but still, we knew our suffering had a meaning!'

Edna Adan related to the present author in December 1998 in Hargeisa how she on several occasions resisted humiliation; the following examples stems from the times of the Siad Barre regime: 'Once they said I was planning to escape from the country, and I spent six days in jail for that. (Why didn't they wait until I tried to escape, why arrest me from my house!) They put me in a cell of my own, but I didn't have a toilet. And right in front of the place where they put me, there was a toilet, and it had no doors. And there was the cell next to me, it was full of men, of criminals, of thieves, I don't know, just men, men all behind the bars. And, so I called out, and I said, - you know, - "I, - I, - I need to go and use the bathroom!" And that is after I had been the first lady of the country! And they said: "Well, you want to use the bathroom? There is the bathroom! You use everybody's bathroom! There! You are not better than the others! There is the bathroom they use!" And I thought - how can I use the bathroom with no doors facing a cell full of men! Full of criminals and people who, - you know, - and I just came out of my cell and I just looked at those men, and I said: "Listen. I am going to use this bathroom. And, - would you be watching your mother or your sister if she was using a toilet and she had no door, - is this the kind of men you are that you would watch a woman using a bathroom?" And they said, "No." And the first one said "turn around," and they made everyone turn the other way, until I finished using the

bathroom. And that was one of the most emotional moments of my time. And the police was so shocked, because they couldn't get their objective, they couldn't get me to be humiliated and using a bathroom with all these men watching and shouting at me. So, this is another form of resistance, and resisting humiliation!

I asked Edna Adan: Does humiliation lead to war? Edna replied: 'I would answer that question by saying, "Yes, it does!" You can push human beings too far, just far enough until they turn back and say, "Hi, wait a minute, enough is enough!" And then they begin to resist with violence, with strength, with force, with whatever way they know. And, I think a good example of resisting humiliation through war is what has happened to our country!'

Does Edna's answer signify that 'healing of humiliation' means nothing but giving a good recipe for bloody uprisings? The whole rest of this book is dedicated to the attempt to deal with this question. The ultimate aim of therapy must be: How can I, and the group I identify with attain and maintain a 'positive image of our social identity' and how can we 'begin to build an environment of cooperative interdependence' with our former adversaries?

In the following it will be attempted to attend to the dynamics of humiliation from various angles, at first from the angle of its core logic.

2. Humiliation As Body, Metaphor, and Cycle²⁴³

Is there a universal core logic of humiliation? Is it a universal phenomenon? Do all human beings feel it the same way? Or is it culture dependent? Or, has it, as proposed in the original project description, a universal core, and culture-dependent triggers?

As documented above, at the outset of this research the following hypotheses had been formulated:

Hypothesis Ia: In most cultures feelings of humiliation are a central determinant in violent conflicts, hampering conflict solutions described by rational choice theory.

Hypothesis Ib: What is perceived as humiliation and how it is responded to, varies across cultures.

How should such questions be explored? Perhaps a theoretical discussion should stand at the beginning of such an exploration and recognition of the fact that humiliation is a concept that is heavily linked to the body: honour is '*face*,' arrogance is '*nose up*,' and humiliation is '*to be put down*.'

Is the human body a culture-dependent entity? Or is it a universal phenomenon, universal at least for the species of *Homo sapiens*, meaning that it is so independent from human culture that it provides all human beings with a common set of experiences? If the body is a universal phenomenon that lets all people share similar experiences, and if furthermore humiliation is expressed in all cultures with the help of metaphors that are close to the body, then we could claim that humiliation is a 'universal,' or at least has a universal core. If the body is but culture-dependent, then post-modern contextualists are right who claim that there is nothing we share, not the body and not humiliation either.

The debate is raging. The body may very well be culture-dependent, at least when we listen to what George Lakoff answers when asked in an interview 'What is the body?' George Lakoff replies with Pierre Bourdieu (Brockman, 2000, 1²⁴⁴) 'that our bodies and what we do with them differ significantly from culture to culture. Frenchmen do not walk like Americans do. Women's bodies are different than men's bodies. The Chinese body is not like the Polish body. And our understanding of what the body is has changed drastically over time, as postmodernists have often observed.'

However, then Lakoff defends the 'universalist' point: 'But nonetheless, our bodies do share a lot. We have two eyes, two ears, two arms, two legs, blood that circulates, lungs used

²⁴³ This chapter is adapted from a revised version of Lindner, 2000o and Lindner, 2001c.

²⁴⁴ http://www.feedmag.com/re/re185_master2.html, 1.

to breathe, skin, internal organs, and on and on. The common conventionalized aspects of our conceptual systems tend to be structured by what our bodies have in common, which is a lot' (1).

How are we to conceptualise this peculiar mixture of universality and particularity that the body seems to present? John Kennedy frames this problem in terms of infinite 'open sets,' and restricted 'closed sets': 'Lego is a system with a single block shape that can be combined into as many permutations as we wish. The element and the rules for building are a closed set that offers an open set of permutations. Likewise, arithmetic offers a few rules that permit an infinite number of Arabic numbers to be envisaged. The discovery of polar perspective was based on squares and diagonals but it enables us to portray a landscape stretching into the indefinite distance with an infinite number of objects on it, with an infinite variety of shapes. These systems use a few rules and elements, and so are closed, but each allows infinite numbers of examples to be generated' (Kennedy, 2000, 6).

Kennedy seems to bridge the gulf between the two extreme camps that are engaged in this debate, namely contextualists on one side, such as Sonia Sedivy, 1997, and John Vervaeke, 1997, who challenge the very foundations of cognitive science and deny that any major area of thought can be systematised, and for example Charles Forceville (Forceville, 1996) who stands for the opposite perspective.

Similar gulfs that fuel hot debates are to be found also in social psychology: The above introduced Jan Smedslund, for example, the founder of 'Psycho-logic' warns against psychological research that tries to appear 'scientific' by mistaking 'scientifically looking' methods for sound science. He writes: 'The finding that all bachelors are in fact unmarried males cannot be said to be empirical.' Smedslund warns that a lot of research is as pointless as trying to make surveys in order to find out 'whether bachelors really are all males' (Smedslund, 1988, 4). This, Smedslund states, would be an inexcusable waste of time and resources, and in addition a basic confusion of 'the *ontological* status' (4, italics in original) of psychology's research object. As reported above, Lee D. Ross disputes Smedslund's position and argues that psychology is not about asking whether phenomena exist or not, but about the question how they exist, to what extent and in which way.²⁴⁵ 'Psycho-Logic does not make research superfluous;' this is Ross's position (and Smedslund will surely agree), similar to Kennedy's stance.

²⁴⁵ Personal communication with Ross January 2000, quoted with his permission.

The situation may be conceptualised as follows. Sedivy and Vervaeke one side, and Forceville and Smedslund on the other side appear to build the poles on which the bridge hinges, while Kennedy, Lakoff and Ross build the bridge and create room for analysis of all kinds of aspects, namely aspects that vary, and aspects that are stable, see Table 10.

THE RANGE BETWEEN CULTURE-DEPENDENT AND UNIVERSAL ASPECTS		
Aspects that are stable:	← →	Aspects that vary:
universal core		culture-dependent periphery

Table 10: The range between culture-dependent and universal aspects

This present author appreciates the polar stances as well as the ‘bridge’ and proposes to conclude as follows: The closer a concept (such as humiliation) is to the human body, the more stable and also universal it may be expected to be, because in such cases it is a rather ‘closed set,’ a ‘Lego block,’ with stable features. Conversely, the further away from the body a concept is, the more variable and culture-dependent it may be expected to be. This is because the basic characteristics of the human body are quite stable over time, and they are furthermore quite similar in all specimens of human species around the world. We thus can study the stable aspects of the ‘Lego block’ humiliation, an endeavour that does not prevent us from also studying the infinite use to which it can be put, thus opening up for the double-layer hypothesis of humiliation suggested above.

Humiliation Has a Universal Core

The statement that some aspects of thought and reason are stable is the very fundament of Lakoff and Johnson’s work on the embodiment of human thought. The title of their last book signifies this: *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). They argue that the early development of human intelligence evolves within the body and its interactions with the physical environment, and that therefore early human development and learning are essentially embodied and concrete. It is also therefore, they claim, that the cognitive mechanisms for abstract thinking are based on neurological layers that are built above the sensorimotor systems. For Lakoff and Johnson metaphor is therefore the fundamental mechanism of mind.

They exemplify their claims by discussing the workings of the eye and how it ‘creates’ colour (this already intrigued the present author when she dissected brains as a medical student). They conclude: ‘Living systems must categorize. Since we are neural beings, our categories are formed through our embodiment. What that means is that the categories we form are *part of our experience!* They are the structures that differentiate aspects of our experience into discernible kinds. Categorization is thus not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience. Rather, the formation and use of categories is the stuff of experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 19, italics in original).

How may we link humiliation to the work of Lakoff and Johnson? Or, to what extent is the concept of humiliation embodied?

Humiliation and the Face

Humiliation appears to be near the body in all cultures, at least in all cultures the author is familiar with.²⁴⁶ But perhaps it is not even necessary to have deeper knowledge of the world’s cultures to answer this question. Almost everybody – and readers who ask themselves will agree – has some notion of the concept of humiliation in other cultures. When asked about the most pertinent characteristics of, for example, Chinese, or Japanese culture, most people around the world will answer: *face-saving!*²⁴⁷ And, on second thought, everybody will acknowledge that the *face* is not only relevant in Asia, it is very important in Arab culture as well. Indeed, it can be found in many regions of the world, for example in the Kabyle region of Algerian mountains where Bourdieu did his research; to lose or to save one’s face is central there.²⁴⁸ A movement with the hands indicates that somebody loses face, it is a movement where both hands are sliding down over the face, palms towards the face, as if pulling down a mask. Kabyles typically say that a man who had to sell his land has lost the face with which he could affront other people.

²⁴⁶ Before working as a psychological counsellor in Cairo, Egypt (1984-1991), the author studied and worked from 1974-1984 in New Zealand, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Israel, West Africa, USA, Germany, Norway, and handles around 12 languages.

²⁴⁷ See, for example, Earley, 1997; Gao, 1998; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998; see also Michael Harris Bond’s work on China (Bond, 1996; Bond & Cheung, 1983; Bond & Cheung, 1984; Bond, 1993); see also Szalay, 1994, as well as Asai & Barnlund, 1998; Barnlund, 1989; Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Koyama, 1992; Minami, 1998; Mita, 1992; Miyahara et al., 1998; Sugimoto, 1998; Thomas, 1993; Yamada, 1997.

²⁴⁸ This description is based on the account of two Kabyle informants to the present author, 16th May 2000, in Geneva, Switzerland.

Even more refined, the Kabyle interlocutors explained to the present author that the symbol for honour is not just the face, the *nose* is particularly important. Somebody who ‘*has a nose*’ is somebody who cannot be humiliated so easily.

Humiliation, the Hymen, the Vagina and the Penis

In some honour cultures in the Islamic world and in Africa embodiment goes even further. The woman’s hymen is not just metaphorically, but literally regarded as a symbol of the woman’s, but especially her family’s honour, and for this reason female genital mutilation is practiced and honour-killings perpetrated.²⁴⁹ In Somalia I was confronted with the struggle of uncircumcised Somali women who, having lived outside of Africa and returning back in their early twenties, were regarded as ‘prostitutes’ because they were ‘open.’ According to the information I gathered, such cases might end with the woman choosing to get an operation and ‘close’ herself, because the consequences of this stigma are too difficult to bear. Jeanne D’Haem brilliantly addresses several aspects of such ‘closing’ (D’Haem, 1997). She describes with great empathy, how a Somali woman, - incidentally her neighbour, - had been forced by difficult circumstances to subsist by prostituting herself, and how she ‘celebrated’ the start of a new and better life in her forties by making the operation of ‘closing’ herself just before getting married to the man she had had a relationship with already for years. The important and relished point for her was that she wanted her husband to honourably ‘open’ her in the wedding night. A raped girl has a severed hymen, and, as I also witnessed in Egypt, in some, very traditional families it is deemed ‘necessary’ to kill her in order to restore the honour of the family. This is because the female is a token, or representative, of the family or group to which she belongs and ‘intact’ daughters are needed for marriage into those other families ‘her’ males want as allies.²⁵⁰ A rapist humiliates the girl’s family’s honour, and for a family to give such a spoiled token of honour in marriage to another family would be amount to a blatant attempt to humiliate the ‘recipient’ family.

²⁴⁹ See Wiseberg (Human Rights Internet, HRI, www.hri.ca) for the currently increasing attention to ‘honour-killings’ as violation of human rights, as opposed to just being treated as private affair (Laurie S. Wiseberg at the Seminar om Sosial Utvikling og Menneskerettigheter, 10th February 2000, Diakonhjemmet Internasjonale Senter, Oslo).

²⁵⁰ See for the practice of exchanging women between groups Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss (Mauss, 1950; Lévi-Strauss, 1968; Lévi-Strauss, in Coser & Rosenberg, 1957). I was confronted with this practice during my fieldwork in Somalia 1998, where the exchange of women between clans was widely regarded as the last step on the way to solve the current divisions (Lindner, 2000a).

In an interview in 'Somaliland' a gynaecologist told the present author (25th November 1998) that until some years ago moral strength and purity was still laudable, but that it started to decline now, because times were so difficult. He explains: 'The South of Somalia, formerly colonised by Italy, learned loose morals from their colonisers, while the north protected its noble morality during colonial times, among others because it was only a protectorate, not a real colony, and the British interfered comparably little with Somali affairs. I knew families here in the North where the mother would check the hymen of a daughter when the daughter came home. Sadly enough, the Italians destroyed this moral rigour and uprightness in the South, and in the North it started to be undermined recently through civil war, social turmoil, and poverty.'²⁵¹

The female vagina, the hymen thus is the stage on which competition between males is played out: A woman's intact hymen is the proof that her males are able to guard their women against unwanted intruders; violated hymen are the proof of their protectors' humiliating defeat and failure.

Latin-American macho-cultures stand for another variant of the same basic concept. Here the penetration of the hymen, or the 'conquest' of as many women as possible, serves as a proof of male prowess. Viewed from the point of view of Arab culture, this behaviour could be translated into men humiliating other men by penetrating the honour of their families. This is similar to war-rape that aims at the honour of the enemy, not just the enemy's women's honour, but, primarily, the male enemy's honour. Rape in front of the family, as perpetrated in Somalia during the quasi-genocidal slaughter in 1988, and also in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, or in the Balkans, 'demonstrates' to the male protectors of the raped victims that they are helpless and cannot guard their family. This humiliation is the intended aim of war-rape, it is a weapon in war employed to do more than killing the enemy, namely letting him suffer humiliation. As a Somali proverb says: 'A man deserves to be killed, not humiliated.'

The male penis is another 'stage' for acts of humiliation. Mutilation of the penis as the symbol of male pride and honour, is yet another weapon in war and torture. Examples fill the books of human rights reports. Reports from the Balkans are perhaps the most recent witnesses of incidents of this 'use' of the body for purposes of doing more harm to the enemy than killing, namely humiliation.

²⁵¹ All others who were interviewed in 'Somaliland' shared his view on declining morals; however, not necessarily that morals have to be 'protected' by circumcising women and controlling the state of their hymen.

Humiliation and the Male Group Member

Not only women are victims of such logic. A raped girl whose hymen had been severed, may, in a very traditional honour family in the Arab world, be perceived as such an unbearable stain on the family's honour that she has to be killed. A similar fate could also befall a man. There are cases where a man could be killed because he committed deeds that dishonoured the group he belongs to. The above introduced literature on Mafia culture illustrates how male members embody their groups honour, and may have to be killed, 'cut out from the body of the group' so-to-speak, if they violated the group's honour code. Similarly, in the case of blood feuds, the male is but a token of his family's honour and is 'legitimately' to be killed in honour wars between families. In this case the women can move freely and do not risk their lives.

Wherever hymen, vagina and penis are targeted, the issue behind is ruthless competition between groups of men (from different families, clans, tribes, ethnic groups, or nations). The enemy is always a group of men. In war and genocide the attempt is to kill them all. But, as indicated in the Somali proverb, humiliating is 'worse' than killing. If I were to ask a perpetrator of massacres and torture, 'How do I best humiliate a group of men who try to protect their women?' He would perhaps answer (and human rights reports document this reply): 'I humiliate a group of men best by not killing all, but only some (so that the living ones can be humiliated), by mutilating their penis, and by raping their women.'

Women are not killed in blood feud and traditional warfare, and they are not raped either, see, for example, *Spared from the Spear* (International Committee of the Red Cross Somalia Delegation, 1997), a report about the rules of traditional warfare in Somali, rules that resemble the Geneva Convention. In traditional warfare as described in *Spared from the Spear*, only men fight against men. Women and children are taboo. However, taboos are the ideal stage for humiliation. When they are broken the enemy is 'taught the lesson' that he is not regarded as honourable, not 'eligible' for respectable warfare between men of honour.

Humiliation Is the Violation of the Wall of the Container of Honour

Lakoff and Johnson would perhaps use their Container metaphor to explain embodiments of honour. They would argue that in these cases a family (clan, tribe, ethnic group, or nation) is conceptualised metaphorically in terms of a container image schema and that honour and the hymen are taken to be the 'skin' or the 'wall' of the container. A 'hole' in the 'skin' would then represent spoiled honour. Traditionally men are assigned the task to defend their

family/clan/tribe/nation, and nothing can prove their humiliation better than a penetrated hymen brought about by enemies sneaking into their camp and violating their women. Likewise, a Latin-American macho has no better way to show his competitors his superiority than by proving to them by vagina-penetration that they are too weak to guard their women. Or, in the case of Mafia culture, a traitor has to be killed, because he represents a hole in the 'skin' of the container. Blood feud may in addition draw on Lakoff and Johnson's metaphor of Retribution (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 'Moral Accounting Schemes,' 293ff), and lead to arguments such as 'You empty my container, I empty your container,' until whole families have all their male members being killed.

Humiliation As Spatial Metaphor

As mentioned above, analysis of the word humiliation suggests a spatial downward orientation, 'a-base-ment,' 'de-base-ment,' 'de-grad-ation,' 'ned-verdig-else' (Norwegian), 'Er-niedrig-ung' (German), 'a-baisse-ment' (French). All these words are built on the same spatial, *orientational* metaphor. Already in *Metaphors We Live By* Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) describe orientational metaphors as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. Humiliation clearly is 'down.' 'These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial environment: for example, HAPPY IS UP' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 14, capitalisation in original). If 'HAPPY IS UP,' then 'UNHAPPY IS DOWN,' meaning that 'being put down' or being humiliated makes unhappy.

What Lakoff and Johnson claim here is that we take a bodily orientation from the sensorimotor domain, in this case 'up,' and map it on to a subjective judgment, namely happiness, which links 'I'm feeling up today' with the primary experience of feeling happy and energetic and having an upright posture (correlation between affective state and posture) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 50).

Lakoff and Johnson call it 'phenomenological embodiment' as opposed to 'neural embodiment' when 'we schematize our own bodies and things we interact with daily' in a way that gives rise to concepts such as 'up' and 'down,' or 'front' and 'back' that depend on the body, and 'would not exist if we did not have the kinds of bodies we have. The same is true of fundamental force-dynamic schemas: pushing, pulling, propelling, supporting, and

balance. We comprehend these through the use of our body parts and our ability to move them, especially our arms, hands, and legs' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 36).

Humiliation is to be put down; humbleness is to keep ones head down; pride is to keep ones nose up. In Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi the nose and head carried 'high' and the head bowed 'down' are not just metaphors, but literal. Humbleness is inscribed into the body of many Hutu citizens of Rwanda and Burundi to a very deep extent and linked to an age-old hierarchical structure of the society, as much as pride is embodied in egalitarian Somali nomad culture. Since historically the Hutu population are the 'underlings' in Rwanda and Burundi, ruled by a Tutsi elite, the Hutu population over centuries learned a body language of 'inferiority.' Many Tutsi interviewees, as well as foreigners, told the present author during the fieldwork in 1999 that it was a myth to believe that one could differentiate Hutu from Tutsi if one looked at their physical appearance (Tutsi = tall and slender, Hutu = short and broad), since Hutu and Tutsi are not really distinct ethnic groups, but very much mixed – however, that any trained person would recognise Hutu from their submissive, obsequious, servile, obeisant, and subservient demeanour that they hardly could suppress – so much is it embodied. Conversely, Tutsi would behave proudly and 'superior,' 'upright,' as 'upright' in their body language as nomads in Somalia and Ethiopia.

Nomads are proud and look down on farmers; Somalia was a good place to learn that. For proud nomads it is unfathomable to become farmers, because a farmer has to '*bow his back*' and toil the soil. Free and proud nomads 'carry their heads high' and regard bowing as extremely humiliating and inferior. During my fieldwork I perceived even a moral 'indignation,' I felt that those 'free-born' nomads believed they are 'better' than those 'slaves' of farmers. Why, one may ask? Why does not the pastoralist merely juxtapose himself to the farmer and says, 'you do farming, I do animals, we are just diverse'?

Perhaps nomads feel morally superior because they confound upright body bearing with moral uprightness? Lakoff and Johnson: 'The metaphor of Moral Strength is complex. It consists of both the strength to maintain an upright and balanced moral posture and also the strength to overcome evil forces. The uprightness aspect of this metaphor is experientially grounded in the fact that, other things being equal, it is better to be upright and balanced. When one is healthy and in control of things, one is typically upright and balanced. Thus, *moral* uprightness is understood metaphorically in terms of physical uprightness: Being Moral Is Being Upright; Being Immoral Is Being Low' (291, italics in original). After having read this quote, perhaps one understands why Somalis believe that they are 'better' than farmers, not only different.

This discussion makes clear that there is a debate ‘out there’ about levels: Who is *higher*, you or me? Should you not regard me *higher* than you do? Have I *de-graded* myself? Isn’t this *under* your dignity? Do you really deserve your *high/low* status?

In the following the workings of levels of high and low will be addressed in their relation to humiliation.

Humiliation, and Spatial Metaphor in Action

In the following the options for reactions that are available to a person or party who feels humiliated will be systematised. ‘Classification is at the heart of every intellectual, empirical, and pragmatic endeavor. It helps to establish the boundaries of a given topic under consideration, and paradoxically it enables the topic to be broken into manageable parts for closer scrutiny and comparison. It is also a process to use when modeling complex problems before developing practical solutions’ (Taylor, 1999). The tools that spatial metaphor offers will be used to view potential responses as attempts to ‘negotiate’ the outcome of cycles of humiliation with respect to who gains and maintains control, or who takes the place of the final victim, the humiliated or the humiliator. For example, depression will terminate a cycle of humiliation insofar as the victim literally keeps her head down and ‘freezes’ in the victim role, while a revolutionary up-rising that topples an oppressive dictator ends a cycle of humiliation by abasing the humiliator, at last, down to the level of a crushed victim.

Edna Adan, former first lady of Somalia (before dictator Siad Barre came into power in 1969), defines humiliation in an interview 3rd December 1998 in Hargeisa: ‘I think humiliation is a very difficult thing to describe. But I think humiliation is when someone tries to bring someone down to their level. They think that you are above them and they want to hurt you, humiliate you, bring you down to their level, so that you have no more self-respect, so that you lose the respect you have for yourself and others lose the respect they have for you.’

Earlier Edna Adan’s experience in prison was recounted; she was supposed to use a toilet without doors as a means to humiliate her, the former first lady of Somalia. Humiliation and respect seem to be intimately connected, but also humiliation and admiration or fear. Edna Adan’s humiliators may have admired her when she was the first lady; they may have even feared her influence, ‘looking up’ to her. Humiliation means for them ‘to bring her down to their level,’ as she puts it in her definition (her tormenters wanted most probably to get her even further down than their level). Figure 1 and Figure 2 try to illustrate this point. The

relationship between a person B and a person A may initially be characterised by admiration, or ‘*looking up,*’ and then transform into a relationship of ‘*feeling put down*’ and ‘*putting down.*’ These dynamics are not only played out between person A and person B, but are also represented in the mental apparatus inside of person A and B. What can be observed as action emanating from A and B is the effect of the inner dialogue that plays on this inner scene.




Figure 1: Fear and/or admiration




Figure 2: Humiliation

Figure 1 and Figure 2 can be used to describe numerous stories of humiliation and also non-humiliation. A story of humiliation seems to start with a relationship between two or more

persons, where one side admires or fears the other, that is, ‘looks up,’ see Figure 1. Then the admirer perceives the admired person as looking down on the admirer, and this may be real or imagined. Feelings of humiliation then make the admirer want to ‘put down’ the admired person (or group of persons).

A humiliated person or group who is feeling humiliated has four ‘containers’ available for placing a response; a victim of humiliation can either change her self-perception and ‘size’ of self-respect, or her respect for the perpetrator, or she can attempt to change the perpetrator’s self-respect or the perpetrator’s view of the victim. Usually a victim may first focus on the perpetrator, the source of her suffering, and, if courageous enough, fight the humiliator. The graphical presentation makes clear that the victim has two more options, namely to change her own inner representation of the situation. This is the way a Nelson Mandela has chosen, as will be discussed further down in more detail. The graphical presentation has the function of formulas in physics that indicate in theory that there must be other physical entities out there. Similarly the graphics suggest a ‘solution’ of humiliation that is difficult to be aware of, even more difficult to carry out – and only a few actually succeed and are then called ‘wise’ or even ‘holy’ – but it may be very basic to peace.

Acceptance of Being Inferior: Humility

A person who is looked down upon may accept being defined as inferior, she may have committed a crime, or a sin, which makes her feel that it is justified to be looked down upon. In this case the person who is looked down upon feels rightly inferior. This is not a story of anti-social humiliation, but of necessary, pro-social humiliation, or humility.

Examples at the individual level entail religious people who accept to be inferior after being converted to a creed. They may accept punishment by humiliation; flagellants at medieval times, for example, whipped themselves until the flesh was raw, as proof of faith to God.

Germany may serve as an example at the inter-group level. Many self-critical Germans, even if they are born long after World War II, feel responsible for the atrocities Germany committed against its neighbours during World War II. They therefore tend to show understanding if they find themselves in a situation where they are being humiliated by people from European neighbours who suffered under German occupation.

In many societies, offenders against social norms are publicly shamed and humiliated. Many feel that their wrongdoing requires this punishment. Nowadays lists of performance

Humility may be described as a voluntary abasement of one's self-image (container 1 is made smaller); depression is the same process, only that it is occurring reluctantly. Depression is an involuntary diminishing and weakening of one's self-image and self-respect.

Aggression As Reaction to Humiliation

A person who is looked down upon, may react with aggression, either hidden or open.

Hidden Aggression As Reaction to Humiliation

A person, who is looked down upon, may react with hidden aggression. She may, like the person who gets depressed, feel that she is unjustly looked down upon, and also have insufficient resources to stand up against the humiliator. But she may at least plan on standing up, she may struggle to do some sabotaging acts against the humiliator, she may teach her children to fight the humiliator or his people. This is a story of ongoing humiliation, but where the victim protects herself against depression.

Charlie Chaplin may serve as an example at the individual level. His films are incarnations of archetypical sabotage of oppression. The Czech 'good soldier Schweik' (a figure created by Jaroslav Hasek, 1883-1923) is an example of a person who resists oppression in very subtle ways, he resists with humour, with appearing stupid, with well-hidden sabotage, and with especially clever argumentation.

The Czech population as a whole may serve as an example at the inter-group level. Czech people are said to have the abilities of the 'good soldier Schweik.' Egyptians, having been occupied for more than 2000 years, are called 'the Czechs of the Arab World.' Conceivably, oppressed populations develop special abilities in the field of communication, abilities that cover a whole range of subtle manipulation methods.

Oppressors have a difficult existence under such conditions. They never know whether a 'yes' from their subordinates really means 'yes,' or whether 'yes' just covers up for an attempt to divert attention, and whether the underling will subsequently perhaps do the opposite of what was ordered. And oppressors furthermore never know to which extent the oppressed secretly may build up forces to rebel. Oppressors are leading a difficult and sometimes even dangerous life. They are well advised to learn to read subtle signs of protest

coming from their dependants.²⁵² If they are really wise, they try to balance the situation in a way that the oppressed at least think they are less oppressed.

This case is especially relevant, since third parties entering conflict regions with the aim to promote peace, may actually provoke feelings of humiliation among the people they want to pacify, - cross-cultural misunderstandings may easily happen. When peacemakers face open opposition they know where they stand, but subtle sabotage of their peace plans, especially if they find themselves in a culture that has developed subtle ways of protesting, is much more difficult to tackle.

During the fieldwork in Africa in 1998 and 1999 the present author met many humanitarian aid workers who had worked both in Somalia and Rwanda. The prevailing view among them was that Somalia is the most difficult place in the world to work in 'because Somalis are aggressively honest and tell you right in your face if they don't like you.' However, they added, 'but at least you know where you stand.' By contrast, in Rwanda, 'people are much more polite, but you never know where you stand. People in Rwanda and Burundi are masters in manipulating information.'

It can be concluded that a 'good soldier Schweik' does not manipulate any part of the game to a large extent; he just keeps up his own self-image and self-respect in the face of humiliation (keeps container 1 up), occasionally tries to subtly undermine the perpetrator's self-image (diminish container 3), and dreams of a future where the perpetrator '*comes down*.'

Open Aggression As Reaction to Humiliation

An open fight may lead to various results depending on the balance of material and immaterial resources between both parties.

Open Aggression From a Weak Position

If the person who feels humiliated has insufficient resources compared with the resources of the humiliator, she will be destroyed in the fight, possibly even lose her life. The story of humiliation will end here, if not children or other people identify with the plight of the humiliated person and continue the fight later on.

²⁵² During my seven years of psychological work in Egypt, I was counselling numerous Western managers leading branches of western companies with Egyptian employees. Several reached the point of what they called 'nervous breakdown' because they did not understand that their authoritarian management style that lacked the elements of care typical for Egyptian communication modes would not yield effective obedience, but quiet sabotage.

A prisoner in a concentration camp may serve as an example at the individual level, or a prisoner under torture. He or she may despair, stand up against the oppression, even though he or she may expect to be killed, and perish.

History provides numerous examples at the inter-group level, examples of groups of people who stood up against oppression without having any chance to win.

In all these cases the victim perishes (container 1 and 2 disappear).

Open Aggression From a Balanced Position

A person, who feels humiliated and is strong enough to take to acts of sabotage and terrorism, may gain a kind of balance of forces. In this case the story of humiliation will be ongoing, even perpetuating itself.

Examples at the individual level may be taken from tragic family cases where the father humiliates his wife and his children, and increasingly faces a struggle between equals, especially as the children grow up and learn how to defend themselves.

Examples at the inter-group level are provided by incidents such as terrorism. Extremists in Northern Ireland, or among the Kurdish people, or the Basques create an atmosphere of constant insecurity in the regions where they operate. International terrorism is even more virulent. It threatens to hit anywhere at any time, it is impossible to absolutely guard against it; the only solution is to remove the need for it. This requires a careful handling of feelings in international relations, especially feelings of humiliation.

During my stay in Egypt the present author learned to comprehend the feelings of humiliation in citizens of a former high culture that descended to the state of a needy and poor member of the world community. Books like *Global Village* or *Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction From the Bottom Up* (Brecher & Costello, 1994) give a glimpse of the humiliation and bitterness caused by the vast and increasing inequality between the rich and the poor in the Global Village. This inequality may trigger feelings of humiliation and anger that may increasingly lead to violence.

Open Aggression From a Position of Strength

If the person who feels humiliated is stronger than the humiliator, she will end the story of humiliation by winning the fight and putting the humiliator down, in extreme cases the humiliator will be killed.

Children who are humiliated by their parents may serve as an example at the individual level. They may try to fight their abusive parents for many years in vain, but as

soon as they grow up and gather sufficient strength, they may go as far as to kill the torturous parent.

Examples on the inter-group level may be taken from the French aristocracy who lost their lives to the guillotine during the French Revolution.

In all these cases the perpetrator perishes (container 3 and 4 disappears).

Elimination of the Humiliator

The following cases are related to the above-enumerated ones, but it is not the aggression that is prominent, but the elimination of the humiliator.

Elimination of the Humiliators by Removing Their Representation

A humiliated person has the option to respond to humiliation with the same attitude, namely to look down upon the humiliator. She can look down to such a degree upon the humiliator that the humiliator becomes irrelevant – as if the humiliator does not exist anymore. The humiliated person thus ‘kills’ the humiliator, not in reality, but she removes the representation of the humiliator from her inner world, from her mind, from her psyche, from her feelings. This elimination process is an intra-psychic process. An extreme form of such annihilation makes revenge superfluous, because there is no target person anymore. Both, perpetrator and victim look down upon each other, both do not regard it as important any more to be respected by the other. At this final stage the story is not a story of humiliation anymore.

As examples at the individual level battered wives may serve who try to get away from their humiliator. They may achieve this by erasing his representation from their minds. Also employees, who are humiliated by their boss, may tackle this situation by eliminating the boss from their inner world as a human being; they just discontinue considering the actions of the boss as being relevant to them. People under torture may use this method in order to stay sane.

Occupied and colonised people may be taken as examples at the inter-group level, they, too, may take to such measures in order to be able to survive humiliation.

Figure 4 illustrates this case and shows how the victim may eliminate the perpetrator’s representation in herself (container 2), without ever aiming at the perpetrator directly.




Figure 4: Elimination of the humiliators by removing their representation

Elimination of the Humiliators Through Killing Them

The elimination process may also be an extra-psychic process: The humiliated person may, as discussed above, kill the humiliator.

The killers may remove the representations of the killed persons after they have perished from their minds or not. If the representations of the killed persons stay in the mind of the killers they may haunt the killers, they may give them feelings of guilt, or the killers may stay in a constant inner 'dialogue' with the killed persons, the killers may also repeatedly re-live the satisfaction of having won over their humiliators.

Examples at the individual level may be taken from the above-mentioned case of traditional honour-societies where a girl's virginity represents the honour of the family. As pointed out above, if she has sex with a man before being married, voluntarily or not, it may lead to so-called honour-killing, meaning that her family's perceives it as her duty to kill the girl. In this case the killer, for example her brother, may kill her and later erase her from his memories: She brought dishonour upon the family, this is the killer's deliberation, and would have humiliated the family totally, if the family had not killed her; in his eyes she may not deserve to be remembered. Although she is far from being judged as being a humiliator if viewed from a human rights perspective – on the contrary, killing her is seen as atrocity – she may be perceived as such within an honour context.

An example from Mexico may illustrate another angle. A Belgian recounted to the researcher: 'It happened around 1950 when I was in Mexico. A Belgian friend, [let us call him Robert], owned a big farm there. He was pleased with having a good relation with the workers who were all Mexicans, all of them proud people. One day the foreman of the workers [let us

call him Manuel] approached him and asked him for a loan. Robert felt honoured by this otherwise unusual trust and granted the loan. The Mexican foreman promised to pay back after three months. Several months passed and suddenly, one day, my friend was approached by another Mexican who warned him: “Be careful, your foreman will kill you!” Robert was extremely astonished and asked: “Why that!” He received the explanation: “Your foreman cannot pay back the loan in time to you. He will not be able bear to appear untrustworthy in your eyes. He cannot bear you looking down on him. This would be too humiliating to him. Therefore he has to kill you.”

This story unfolds in three phases: The perceiver of humiliation, the Mexican foreman, knows that he will provoke being humiliated by not being able to pay back in time. The actor, the Belgian, does not even know that he is perceived as a yet-to-come actor. If killed, he would not even know that he is killed because he is perceived as the actor in a case of humiliation. This is a case where the humiliator is not intending to perpetrate any humiliation; on the contrary, he is a benefactor.

A related case at the individual level might be the following: A man who committed an atrocious crime is killing his wife and his children before committing suicide. He kills them, because he cannot bear the thought that his wife is confronted with the knowledge of his crime, he cannot bear the humiliation of her looking down on him. She figures, unwittingly, as a humiliator, although also she is a rather caring person.

Hitler and his followers may provide an example at the inter-group level. They fabricated the gruesome story that Jews were planning to exploit and humiliate the German ‘Volk,’ and the world community. Eliminating them was therefore seen as a duty. Some SS-men in concentration camps, and bureaucrats planning the Holocaust, are told to have done their ‘duty’ with cold hearts, others were later haunted.²⁵³

However, also humiliators may be killed who know that their behaviour hurts others, but believe that they can get away with it. For example, a son may kill his father after having suffered a decade of physical and psychological torture at his hands.²⁵⁴ The son may not be able to erase the image of his father from his memories after the killing, he may be haunted by it, or, perhaps, he ‘deletes’ his father’s image from his mind.

In all these cases the ‘humiliator’ perishes (container 3 and 4), and their representation in the killer (container 2) either stays on or not.

²⁵³ See also Eichmann and the description of his court case in Arendt, 1964.

²⁵⁴ See, for example, Mones, 1991.

Gaining the Humiliator's Respect, or the Best Way of Eliminating an Enemy is Making Friends

Instead of fighting the humiliators, instead of eliminating them, the humiliated party could also try to convince the humiliators that they are wrong in looking down on the humiliated party.

Examples at the individual level may be taken from children. Children seem to be prone to try this strategy even under very adverse circumstances. They have a tendency to hold on to their parents, even if the parents are abusive and routinely and cruelly humiliate their children. Children seem to be willing to go very far to make their parents happy, hoping to finally gain their parents acceptance.

People in former colonies may provide examples at the inter-group level. They often seem to develop similar strategies. They oppose their colonisers on one side, but there seems often to be another side, where they try to imitate their colonisers as if they want to finally impress them sufficiently in order to be respected as equals. Frantz Fanon describes eloquently how he tried hard and failed (Fanon, 1986). As reported above, in Rwanda Hutu are said to have an 'inferiority complex' in relation to the Tutsi, who traditionally ruled. Actually, as in the case of children, this 'inferiority complex,' may also be called 'tolerance' and 'wisdom.'²⁵⁵

Nelson Mandela succeeded with this strategy. He managed to keep his self-esteem strong in the face of humiliation and prevented humiliation from spoiling his dignity. At the end he taught the perpetrators of Apartheid much about respect, dignity and human rights. For thirty years most people expected a bloodbath in South Africa. It did not happen mainly because Nelson Mandela taught his followers how to overcome the pain and anger caused by humiliation under the system of apartheid.²⁵⁶ In South Africa the humiliators and the humiliated sat down together and planned for a society in which 'both black and white' could be 'assured of their inalienable right to human dignity.'²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ 'A Tutsi learned that he could kill a Hutu at any time. When Hutu got power they had no experience of ruling, which means that Hutu were the same as the Tutsi before. Hutu have an inferiority complex' (letter from a Rwandan interview partner, 1999).

²⁵⁶ It is equally important to recognise Mandela's prior role as one who engaged in violent resistance to apartheid. Reconciliation was only possible once apartheid had been abolished.

²⁵⁷ The quotation is taken from President Mandela's inaugural address, May 10, 1994.

Humiliation Is a Cycle²⁵⁸

The conceptual space of the term humiliation will be mapped in the following text by analysing 15 representative scenarios, each starting with a statement or ‘utterance.’ The aim is to achieve a preliminary systematisation of the field humiliation. These scenarios offer characteristic or representative constellations. The 15 utterances are arranged in such a way that the complexity of elements entailed in humiliation is illustrated. The 15 utterances are condensed from the above-described initial pilot study from 1997 to 1998 and developed further with the material stemming from the 216 qualitative interviews that were carried out during the period of November 1998 to December 1999 in Africa and Europe, and from 1997 to 2001 in Europe (in Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and in Belgium).

Each presentation starts with a person’s utterance. This utterance is chosen to illustrate the character of the case. Following this, a more general description of the case is attempted, where the following signs will be used: a plus (+) sign symbolises ‘present,’ a minus (-) sign ‘absent.’ Then the inter-group level is looked at, in other words, it is asked whether the scenario in question could also be relevant between ethnic groups, or between nations. At the end of each scenario a third party evaluation and a normative evaluation will be discussed, meaning that it will be asked how a third person who observes the scenario as an independent observer would evaluate ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’ Firstly, eight scenarios of humiliation as viewed from the humiliator’s (or actor’s) perspective will be presented, thereafter seven scenarios as viewed from the perspective of the victim (or re-actor or humiliated party).

Humiliation and Its Elements Seen From the Humiliator’s (or Actor’s) Perspective

Scenario 1.1

Utterance: ‘I hate my wife, she treats me so badly; I now want to humiliate her; I want to see her suffer; I already have a plan of how to proceed.’

General description: This man has decided to proceed with acts of humiliation; he has the intention to humiliate and he will act; he wants to cause the suffering of his wife, and it is her suffering, he hopes, which will directly satisfy his urge for revenge. This means:

- Intention +,
- act +,

²⁵⁸ This section is adapted from a revised version of Lindner, 2000g.

- the intended outcome is the suffering of the humiliated person,
- the satisfaction is entailed in the suffering of the humiliated person as direct compensation for the suffering of the humiliator.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Many stories of ethnic groups or nations humiliating each other over centuries show similarities to the utterance just presented. A clan, who had the upper hand for a while and engaged in humiliating the weaker clans, may have to face revenge one day. Terrorists often justify their terrorist acts with the argument that they have no other choice but to humiliate the arrogant oppressor by acts of sabotage and disruption. Revolutions, when they succeed, may end in public humiliation of the former suppressor, as was the case in the French Revolution when the aristocracy was publicly executed at the guillotine.

Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, as well as Germany are other examples of these dynamics, the German humiliation through the Versailles Treaty being the most widely known. In Somalia the dictator Siad Barre called the Isaaq clan in the North of Somalia ‘arrogant.’²⁵⁹ As described above, when Siad Barre ordered his bureaucracy and army to harass, humiliate and destroy the Isaaq clan in the 1980s, the Isaaq responded by forming an underground army (the Somali National Movement, SNM), which finally contributed to the fall of the dictator. Today Isaaq feel that they were humiliated to such an extent by their Southern brothers that they do not want to be in one state with them anymore; they proclaimed their own republic ‘Somaliland.’ Thus Northern behaviour was perceived as ‘arrogant’ and humiliating by Southerners, who reacted with violent acts of counter-humiliation, which in turn were responded to with separation of the North.

In Rwanda and Burundi a Tutsi elite used to rule by maintaining an intricately woven hierarchy with mainly Hutu at the bottom. In Rwanda Hutu overthrew the Tutsi rule in a ‘Hutu revolution’ in 1961 (Des Forges & Human Rights Watch, 1999), in Burundi Tutsi rule continued also after independence in the 1960s. Since independence both countries have been tormented regularly by small-scale and large-scale genocidal killings, each group targeting the other. A circle of humiliation and counter-humiliation is in motion.

²⁵⁹ See the above quoted interview on 30th November 1998 in Hargeisa. An interview partner recalled how she was able to meet the dictator and how she asked him why he hated the Isaaq. He answered: ‘You Isaaq, you are so arrogant!’

The third party's evaluation of such cases is bound to be difficult. It is difficult for a third independent person to decide who deserves sympathy; is it the wife who is right in humiliating an abusive husband, or is it the poor husband who is terrorised by his hysterical wife? Does the husband suffer from an inflated narcissistic ego (Kohut, 1976), feeling hurt by even the slightest criticism, or is it his wife who is 'evil'?

On the inter-group level the situation is just as difficult. As explained earlier, talking to Hutu and Tutsi, or Somalis from different parts of Somalia during my fieldwork in 1998 and 1999, I seemed only to meet victims who felt humiliated by their counterparts and reckoned that any counter-humiliation was justified by the extent of the original humiliation. Nobody disclosed himself or herself as a perpetrator.

The normative evaluation of the strategy responding to humiliation with counter-humiliation is clear in a modern society that is built on the concept of human rights: War, violence, and killings are not regarded as viable means to solve circles of humiliation. In contrast, in a tradition honour-based society this may be evaluated completely differently and norms would suggest the opposite, namely that only killing that can purge humiliation.

It may be globalisation that is shifting the balance towards the human rights approach (Lindner, 2000c), certainly there are segments within the international community, particularly among NGOs and other international organisations, that lend their third party voice to the human rights normative evaluation today.

Scenario 1.2

Utterance: 'My boss bullies me constantly; I have a thousand fantasies about how I could humiliate him; but since I depend on the job, I cannot do anything.'

General description: This man would like to humiliate his boss, he has the intention, but his dependency on his job will stop him from acting. His satisfaction would be the suffering of the boss. This means:

- Intention +,
- act -,
- the intended outcome is the suffering of the humiliated person,
- the satisfaction, if achieved, would be entailed in the suffering of the humiliated person. That would function as direct compensation for the suffering of the humiliator.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: On the inter-group level many examples seem to be relevant. All occupied people who are too weak to stand up against occupation, find themselves in a similar situation. Somalia provides an example. It is a country of proud nomads. Among them live 'minorities' (preponderant in some regions) consisting of occupationally specialized caste-like groups (such as shoe makers, metal workers), members of which are attached to Somali lineages or clans. The major clan members routinely humiliate members of these minorities, their daughters cannot intermarry, they can be killed without requiring the traditional diya-compensation ('diya' means compensation for injuries), and they never lose their stigma, even if they are highly educated.

When I asked members of the major clan why these minorities do not retaliate for their suffering, for example by forming a guerrilla force, as the major clans did against dictator Siad Barre, they answered without exception, 'Because these minorities are scattered and cannot collect the necessary forces.' They continue, 'These minorities may have been too powerful and arrogant once in time, just look how intelligent they are! Many of us believe that we conquered them back in time, and that we, the victors, make sure that they do not come back by keeping them scattered and by treating them as outcasts.'²⁶⁰

The present author's fieldwork in and about Somalia (58 interviews with Somalis, mainly in 'Somaliland' and Nairobi, 1998 and 1999) included a number of interviews with members of these minority groups, who related to the researcher that they, for the first time in history, are able to gather and exchange experiences, even if it is only in a refugee camp in North Kenya. The fact that they are less scattered gives them force and motivates them to speak up. They try to convert their fate of helplessness (case 1.2) into a fate of agency, by calling upon the international community to acknowledge their fate and support their plight. The researcher was urged to become a voice for them in the world.

The third party's evaluation seems to be clearer in this case than in scenario 1.1: A person or group who is in a position of power and abuses this position in order to hurt the weaker, will be condemned by a majority of third parties who observe this situation. The wish by the hurt person or group to retaliate will be widely understood; the victim's wish to retaliate will be seen as being more 'right' than the suppresser's actions.

²⁶⁰ It is difficult to get reliable information about historic facts in and about Somalia, since Somalia is a thoroughly oral society, with script only introduced in 1972. The hypotheses related here may be taken as psychological theory, not necessarily as historic truth.

This view will not be shared, though, by representatives of traditional hierarchical societies, who find it legitimate to ‘teach’ lesser beings ‘the lesson’ that they have to ‘understand’ that their ‘natural’ place is at the bottom of the pyramid of power.

The normative evaluation within a framework of human rights indicates clearly that holding people down is illegitimate, whereas a traditional hierarchical society may state the opposite.

Scenario 1.3

Utterance: ‘I am a gang leader; my followers are all about 16 years old. When a boy from another gang humiliates us, I have to humiliate them, not because I particularly hate them, but because I have to maintain my influence. The degree of their suffering is equal to the extent of my own power.’

General description: This boy does not humiliate out of hatred, but out of obligation to his reputation. He has the intention to humiliate, and he will act. This means:

- Intention +,
- act +,
- the intended outcome is the suffering of the humiliated persons,
- the satisfaction is the suffering of the humiliated persons which is a means to support the status of the humiliator.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: On the inter-group level we think of leaders of clans, ethnic groups, parties, and even of companies, who use ‘weapons’ like humiliation in order to secure their power position. This way of using humiliation has its place in traditional honour-based societies, where humiliation is a routine mechanism of maintaining and re-arranging the ranking order within hierarchical and mostly patriarchal structures. A gang-leader may not even get emotionally involved, or he may get into a ritual rage. Ritual rage is known from old times when warriors used to work themselves into fighting rage using all kinds of catalysts from songs to drugs; Vikings for example are said to have used poisonous mushrooms.

The third party’s evaluation is dependent on the societal context. Clans in traditional honour-based social structures, who judge their honour as being a superior asset to be guarded, will believe that a leader is right in using humiliation as a weapon. After all, humiliation is the

basic coinage in such systems. In contrast, a modern Western person educated in human rights will argue that the use of humiliation is destructive to long-term social peace.

The normative evaluation within the context of a human rights framework is clear, humiliation is illegitimate under any circumstances. It is called ‘bullying,’ and not ‘defending one’s honour.’ See Lindner, in Breines, Gierycz, & Reardon, 1999 for an analysis of the receding influence of macho culture in a globalising world.

Scenario 1.4

Utterance: ‘I will try to humiliate my colleague at work; not that I hate him, no, but I would like to snatch some of his customers from him and I reckon that humiliating him will weaken him.’

General description: This man has the intention to humiliate and he will act; but the suffering of the humiliated person is not his actual objective, his aim is to weaken the humiliated person in order to reach another goal, namely to take his customers from him; humiliation in this case is used as an instrument. This means that

- Intention +,
- act +,
- the intended outcome is the weakening of the humiliated person,
- the satisfaction is entailed in obtaining resources that may be freed after weakening the humiliated person.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Examples abound where competitors try to seize resources by using humiliation. This applies to all kinds of groups, be it clans, ethnic groups, parties, or companies. The most gruesome example is rape in war, as has been perpetrated in Somalia, Rwanda, South Eastern Europe. Rape in war has acquired a terrible reputation as a ‘weapon.’ Its ‘efficiency’ builds on its potential to humiliate thoroughly not only the raped victim, but also the family and the whole group to which the victim belongs. This humiliation is so devastating that it very ‘efficiently’ weakens the enemy. It may be deliberately used as a weapon to achieve this effect.

The third party's and normative evaluation depends on the societal anchoring of this third party. A third party may consider pure utilitarian behaviour as justifiable, and/or may reckon that humiliation is legitimate. She may, however, believe the opposite, namely that human rights standards which de-legitimise humiliation should guide one's behaviour. In a globalising world where human rights gain ground and creativity is seen as main resource, it is not only increasingly ostracized, but in fact also unproductive and inutile to try to increase one's power or influence by weakening others, be it by using humiliation or other means. This is because win-lose situations yield lower returns in the long run than win-win situations. And win-win situations can only be created through mutual respect (Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Ross & Samuels, 1993; Ross & Ward, 1995; Ross, in Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995; Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996).

Scenario 1.5

Utterance: 'I want to become the leader of my party. I will weaken my opponents by telling each of them how the other is humiliating them.'

General description: This man is using the notion of humiliation as an instrument; he does not humiliate anybody himself. This means:

- Intention -,
- act -,
- the intended outcome is the weakening of the humiliated persons,
- the satisfaction sought is an increase in power and influence for the actor through the weakening of the humiliated persons.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: 'Divide and rule' is a well-known formula for leaders of all kinds of groups. Setting circles of humiliation in motion is the most potent and 'efficient' way of achieving divisions, since it entails strong emotions that make it difficult for those caught in them to sit together again and unite.

The goal of power elites to maintain their dominance may be embodied in social and societal institutions, social customs and tradition, and architecture. Lukes proposes the concept of 'ascriptive humiliation' (Lukes, 1997, 44): 'By this I intend a kind of maltreatment that consists in domination that results in distinctive kinds of injustice. By "domination" I mean to refer to the systematic use of power in a social context of unequal power relations. In

such a context ascriptive humiliation consists in mistreating people by means of ascription, in the classical sociological sense of the term: that is, by reference to statuses that are assigned to individuals, identifying what individuals are, not what they do, such as “attributes of sex, age, intelligence, physical characteristics, status in relational systems, e.g., collectivity memberships” (Parsons, 1951, 64).’

The third party’s evaluation of this case will have the same result as in case 1.4. As will the *normative evaluation*.

Scenario 1.6

Utterance: ‘I do not want to humiliate my wife, but sometimes I cannot control myself: I beat her, I shout at her, and I try everything to humiliate her.’

General description: This man is not conscious of any intention to humiliate, but he admits that there must be somewhere in him, beyond his conscious control, an intention to humiliate, one could call it an unconscious intention. The man does not consciously want to cause the suffering of his wife, and her suffering does not satisfy a conscious urge for revenge. This means:

- Conscious intention -,
- act +,
- the not consciously intended outcome is the suffering of the humiliated person,
- the not consciously sought satisfaction is the suffering of the humiliated person as direct compensation for the suffering of the humiliator which also may not be conscious.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: This case is relevant on the inter-group level in relation to people who are convinced they are open-minded and tolerant towards such groups as, for example, foreigners or drug-addicts, but, who can only maintain their tolerance as long as those groups stay at a certain distance. They actually do discriminate against foreigners and drug-addicts as soon as they are actually confronted with those people in their daily lives.

Third party’s evaluation: Both actor and third person will agree that the actor’s behaviour is inconsistent.

Normative evaluation: Both actor and third person will agree that the actor's behaviour is also wrong.

Scenario 1.7

Utterance: 'I recognise that I inadvertently humiliated my best friend; I did not have the intention to do so, but obviously I must have done it.'

General description: This person did not have the intention to humiliate, but did so. This means:

- Intention -,
- act +,
- no intended outcome,
- no satisfaction.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: This case is very relevant on the inter-group level, because communication between groups, especially groups with different cultural backgrounds, is even more prone to produce uncertainties than communication between individuals with the same cultural background. A German or French citizen for example, may perceive it as extremely humiliating if s/he is addressed with 'Du' or 'tu' instead of 'Sie' or 'vous.' A foreigner with English background, who is used to a simple 'you,' will not be able to fathom the humiliation entailed in addressing somebody inappropriately with 'you.' A police officer in France or Germany for example, who intends to humiliate a criminal, uses 'Du' or 'tu' because of its strong humiliating potential. Thus a foreigner may humiliate a German or French citizen inadvertently just by being uninformed.

Third party's evaluation: Both actor and third party will agree that the actor is wrong, though this is excusable in a case of authentic ignorance. The third person will try to educate such actors and show them that they are blind to their ignorance. They will try to enlighten the perpetrators and show them that the humiliating effect and its aftermath – from hampered communication to open violence – is perfectly understandable, though this may surprise the actors involved.

Normative evaluation: The actors' behaviour is evaluated as normatively wrong. However, authentic ignorance on the perpetrators' side may diminish the extent to which they are held accountable for their behaviour, because ignorance may be taken to lessen their ability to be responsible for their acts.

Scenario 1.8

Utterance: 'My husband beats me when he is drunk. I left him, although I love him. Now I have decided to go back to him. My friends are shocked and beg me not to humiliate myself. But I love my husband, I will swallow my pride, I will humiliate myself and go back to him.'

General description: This woman has the intention to bring about her own humiliation and she will do it. The special feature of this case is that she is both, the actor and perceiver of the humiliating act. This means:

- Intention +,
- act +,
- the intended outcome is the maintenance of a love relationship,
- the satisfaction stems from the maintenance of the love relationship.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Wherever we find strong leaders who have followers who depend emotionally on them, for example in sects, many of these followers will be willing to humiliate themselves if this is necessary in order to stay with their leaders. Many religions build on self-humiliation, as we see for example in flagellants in medieval times who whipped themselves until their flesh was bloody and raw. This was seen as a service and proof of faith to God. Yet, Oksenberg Rorty writes, 'the deepest wound can be that of being so manipulated that one remains unaware of one's condition. Sometimes the very awareness, the outrage of experiencing the feeling of humiliation is the seed of self-respect' (Rorty, 1997, 113).

Third party's watching such situations from outside, will in most cases condemn such husbands or leaders of sects and accuse them of exploiting their followers. The case of religion is complex, though, many may maintain that it is a person's own decision to humiliate herself for her beliefs.

Normative evaluation: In modern secular societies self-humiliation may be found in love relationships, and some sects, but not anymore to the larger extent to which it occurred in medieval times. When it happens in love relationships or sects it is not seen as socially acceptable and the person who humiliates herself may be offered therapeutic help.

The scenarios 1.1 to 1.8 will now be collected in Table 11 (HR means Human Rights):

HUMILIATION AND ITS ELEMENTS SEEN FROM THE HUMILIATOR'S PERSPECTIVE								
Scenarios	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8
Intention to humiliate present (+) or not (-)	+	+	+	+	-	conscious - not conscious +	-	+
Humiliating act present (+) or not (-)	+	-	+	+	-	conscious - not conscious +	+	+
Intended outcome of humiliating act	the humiliated person shall suffer	the humiliated person shall suffer	the humiliated person shall suffer	the humiliated person shall be weakened	the humiliated persons shall be weakened	the humiliated persons shall be weakened	no intended effect, misunderstanding	maintaining dependence
Satisfaction from humiliating act	compensation for hurt feelings of humiliator	compensation for hurt feelings of humiliator	gaining of advantages	gaining of advantages	gaining of advantages	compensation for hurt feelings, not conscious	no satisfaction, misunderstanding	maintaining dependence
HR evaluation of humiliating act	actor could be right or wrong	actor is right	actor is wrong	actor is wrong	actor is wrong	actor is wrong	actor is wrong	actor neither right nor wrong, but weak

Table 11: Humiliation and its elements seen from the humiliator's (or actor's) perspective

Scenarios of Humiliation Analysed From the Humiliated Party's Perspective

In the following section the process of humiliation will be analysed by including the perspective of the party who is feeling humiliated, whether these feelings of humiliation are intended by an actor or caused by misunderstanding. It is difficult to find a word for the humiliated person: is it the victim, the perceiver, the re-actor, the object, or the targeted person? The situation is complicated, because the humiliated person may even be the actor. As explained above, during my fieldwork in Somaliland I recorded interviews on video, produced a film and showed it later to other Somalis. As described earlier, some of them responded with fury because they felt that it was a rhetoric of humiliation that was used in the film to mislead and manipulate the interviewer in her capacity as a representative of the international community, believed to be naively open to accounts of feelings of humiliation. The angry commentators claimed that their Northern Somalian compatriots more or less pretended to have felt humiliated during the quasi-genocide in the 1980s perpetrated against them by the dictatorial government based in the South. They angrily maintained that the Northern 'Somalilanders' in the film were actually not victims, but actors, actors because they defined the situation in a way that stigmatised their Southern brothers as perpetrators.

This section uses the term 'humiliated party' since this allows for the possibility that the humiliated party invents a story of humiliation and thus is not a victim but a perpetrator. Hitler provides a clear and the most horrific example – he accused Jews of plotting to humiliate the entire world.

Scenario 2.1

Utterance: 'I feel humiliated by my neighbour, I feel he is looking down on me without having any right to do that; if I only knew why he does that and whether he does it intentionally. The whole thing could also be a misunderstanding.'

General description: This person is uncertain about the intentions of the neighbour, the neighbour may or may not have the intention to humiliate, the person is also uncertain whether her perception of a humiliating act from the neighbour is correct; she suffers, but is not sure whether she should actually suffer or not.

We do not know what is really happening on the actor's side:

- intention to humiliate + or -,

- humiliating act + or -,
- intended outcome is the neighbour's humiliation + or -,
- satisfaction stemming from neighbour's humiliating + or -.

From the humiliated party's perspective the actor is difficult to judge:

- the actor's intention is indiscernible by the perceiver, intention + or -,
- it is uncertain whether there is an act of humiliation at all, act + or -
- the perceiver does not know whether s/he shall suffer or not, suffering + or -.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Similar to above reported case 1.7 this scenario is very relevant on the inter-group level, because communication between people with different cultural backgrounds is more prone to produce uncertainties than communication between individuals with the same cultural background.

The third party's evaluation is necessarily uncertain, since the situation is unknown. The same concerns the *normative evaluation* of the case. A process of mutual education and illumination is necessary. Globalisation, which brings cultures closer together, therefore increases the need for cross-cultural education.

Scenario 2.2

Utterance: 'My wife tries to humiliate me constantly; as far as I understand it, she feels justified in doing so because I was having an affair with another woman; but I think that her behaviour is unjustified; she should accept me like I am, are not all men hunters by nature? All her attempts to humiliate me do not really touch me.'

General description: This man recognises the intention of his wife to humiliate him and he observes her acts of humiliation; but he does not feel humiliated, he does not suffer the pain that his wife intends to inflict on him.

We have reason to conclude on the actor's side:

- Humiliating intention +,
- humiliating act +,
- intended outcome is the suffering of the humiliated person.

On the humiliated party's side we find:

- Perception of humiliating intention on the actor's side +,
- perception of humiliating acts coming from the actor +,
- but perceiver's suffering -.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: On the inter-group level we see examples of groups who resist feeling humiliated by acts that are aimed at humiliating them. When slavery still was part of daily life, slaves may have tried to humiliate their abusive masters many times, but in vain.

The third party's evaluation can vary widely: An abusive husband, terrorising his wife, will be seen by most third parties as being very wrong in not letting his wife's protest touch him. The main exception, it is to be supposed, will be those who hold the same beliefs as the husband. On the other side torture victims who are humiliated by torturers will be regarded as heroic in not letting the torturer's humiliation touch them.

The normative evaluation will depend on whether the humiliating act is seen as justifiable retaliation for wrongs suffered, as in the case of a terrorised wife, or whether the humiliating act is seen as wrong in itself.

Scenario 2.3

Utterance: 'My mother is so dominating; she only wishes the best for me, but her patronising way of treating me humiliates me.'

General description: The daughter recognises that the mother does not actually have the intention to humiliate her, but she feels humiliated anyhow.

On the actor's side we find:

- Humiliating intention -,
- humiliating act -,
- intended outcome and satisfaction is helping the daughter.

On the humiliated party's side we find:

- Perception of humiliating intention -,
- perception of humiliating acts +,
- perceiver's suffering +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: This case shows very clearly that humiliation is a term that carries the relation between at least two persons at its heart. It cannot be described by looking at just one individual. The question which poses itself explicitly in this case is: If I want to help another person, but my arrogant way of behaving humiliates the person I want to help, do I then commit a humiliating act? From my point of view I do not commit a humiliating act, from the perceiver's point of view I do commit such an act. Regarding the inter-group level this case is extremely relevant in all aid situations such as humanitarian aid, peace keeping, or peace enforcing, where all involved persons struggle with the possibility that their actions may humiliate those who shall be helped.²⁶¹

The debate around 'double standards' is very relevant here, double standards concerning the West's human rights advocacy which often contradict its actual behaviour. During fieldwork in Africa the researcher was constantly confronted with this contradiction. The former first lady of Somalia, Edna Adan, said in an interview (December 1998) about the lack of Western response to the quasi-genocide in the North of Somalia in the 1980s, 'I think the international world has different standards. It preaches human rights, and fairness, and so on, in literature, in Europe. But then when that humiliation, and that aggression, and that hurt, took place in a poor, remote, developing country like Somaliland, no one wants to be bothered, - let them stew in their own juice. And these are divided standard, and unfair standards...' She continued, 'It is a humiliation, of course. So, the international community is to blame and I hope you have very strong cupboards in which you can lock up your conscience.'

The third party's evaluation is very difficult to carry out: Who is wrong, the donor who gives unsuitable aid with good intentions, or the receiver who thinks that donors should have studied the situation better before designing their helping strategy? After many years of failed aid programmes, most observers will probably agree that it is primarily the donors'

²⁶¹ Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen write about the humiliating aspect of help-receiving in the mid-1970's, see their current work at <http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/kggergen1/text7.html>. I owe this reference to Michael Bond. See also Rosen, in De Paulo & et al., 1983. See also Lindner, 2000e.

responsibility to ensure that their help really meets the needs of the recipients. The recipients will therefore be evaluated as being ‘right’ in feeling humiliated by ill-considered help.²⁶² On the other side it cannot be excluded that help may be well intentioned and well designed, but that it meets a receiver who shows insufficient appreciation for the effort of the helper. Then the receiver’s reaction would be evaluated as ‘wrong.’

The normative evaluation is delicate and hinges on the definition of the concept of responsibility. Is it the responsibility of the donor to do sufficient research on the recipients’ needs? Where is the recipients’ responsibility? What about empowerment of the recipients? Wherever the present author went during my fieldwork in Africa (1998 and 1999) the War-torn Societies Project in Somalia,²⁶³ received a lot of praise for being different from the common run of NGOs or similar aid agencies. These NGOs were often described in terms of a parody (that contains elements of truth): ‘These NGOs come along, build wells (or some other installations or services liable to be ecologically unsound or unmanageable in the longer run), create a few jobs for some chauffeurs, secretaries and security personnel, and then disappear again.’²⁶⁴

The War-torn Societies Project,²⁶⁵ in contrast, concentrates on ‘research’ and attempts to develop an agenda for development together with the communities concerned; it thus tries to ‘empower’ people and turn them from ‘recipients’ into ‘actors.’ Empowerment means undoing humiliation; and ‘research’ means moving – intellectually and psychologically – more often and more carefully between, on one side, the ‘incoming helper’s perception or ideology of what people need as aid,’ and the ‘support that local people *really* need’ on the other side. This tailor-made approach seems to be the one that could be advocated as normatively right and responsible.

Scenario 2.4

Utterance: ‘My neighbours try to humiliate me whenever they meet me; I am an alcoholic and I hit my wife when I am drunk, it is terrible; I know I am a bad person; they are right to

²⁶² See the discussion at organisations as for example the World Bank, where ‘empowerment’ and ‘good governance’ currently become buzzwords after the failure of ‘helping’ developing countries with financial and/or technical assistance. See, for example, Stiglitz, 1998.

²⁶³ See <http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/index.htm>.

²⁶⁴ See also Maren, 1997.

²⁶⁵ See <http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/index.htm>.

look down on me, I deserve no better; their humiliation only adds to the guilt and shame I feel myself.'

General description: This man perceives the neighbours' humiliating intentions and their acts aiming at letting him suffer. He suffers, and accepts that as justified.

On the actors' side we find:

- Humiliating intention +,
- humiliating act +,
- intended outcome is the suffering of the targeted person,
- satisfaction is entailed in the compensation for the suffering of the wife. The last point shows that compensation of hurt feelings through humiliation can be differentiated further into hurt feelings of the humiliator or hurt feelings of a third person. In this case the neighbours want to let the beating husband compensate for the suffering of the beaten woman, not because the neighbours themselves are beaten, but because they regard it as unjust that she suffers. In all above reported cases the suffering of the humiliated person is meant to compensate for hurt feelings in the humiliating person herself, not in a third person.

On the humiliated party's side we find:

- Perception of humiliating intention +,
- perception of humiliating act +,
- suffering +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Germany may serve as an example on the inter-group level. Many self-critical Germans feel responsible for the atrocities Germany committed against its neighbours during World War II, even if they are born long after World War II. They therefore tend to show understanding if they find themselves in a situation where they are being humiliated by people from European neighbours who suffered under German occupation during World War II.

In many societies, offenders against social norms are publicly shamed and humiliated. Many feel that their wrongdoing requires this punishment. Nowadays lists of performance indices, for example of employees in a company, or universities in a country, may have a

similar effect, intended or not. This ‘prosocial humiliation’ including its potential to become ‘anti-social humiliation’ is addressed by Klein (1991, 103): ‘a series of humiliating degradations ... have as their final aim making a gung-ho Leatherneck out of an undisciplined, self-centered teenager. Finally, there are studies which document the fact that medical education abounds with instances of personal put-downs and ridicule used by faculty and supervisors in the teaching of medical students and residents.’

The third party’s evaluation and also the normative evaluation are perhaps clear in the case, where even the targets of humiliation agree that it is ‘right’ to humiliate them. However, as Klein points out, there is a price to pay for using humiliation, even if it is meant to ‘civilise’ ‘imperfect’ beings, because after having been ‘civilised’ those ‘beings’ will have the need to look down on others, and will acquire a ‘lifelong sense of vulnerability’ (Klein, 1991, 103).

Scenario 2.5

Utterance: ‘My mother is humiliating me by quarrelling with me in front of my friends; if she quarrels with me when we are alone, it does not affect me, but to do this in front of others, that is humiliating.’

General description: The presence of a third party leads to humiliation. It is possible that the mother does not want to humiliate her son; however, it is also possible that she actually wants to humiliate her son.

On the actor’s side we find:

- Humiliating intention - or +,
- humiliating act - or +,
- no intended outcome, just lack of sensitivity on the actor’s side,
- no satisfaction sought, just lack of sensitivity on the actor’s side, or satisfaction from suffering of the humiliated person.

On the humiliated party’s side we find:

- Perception of humiliating intention +,
- perception of humiliating act +,
- suffering +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: At the inter-group level many examples come to mind. Negotiations between groups are often conducted secretly in order to avoid considering third parties too early in the process. The notion of ‘face-saving’ is widely known and has been discussed earlier, and especially perceived as culturally relevant in Japan, China and other parts of South East Asia.

The third party’s and normative evaluations depend on the evaluation of the actor’s intentions. If the mother in the above-cited example really wants to humiliate her son, then most observers will consider that as lack of love and as even normatively ‘wrong,’ suggesting that the mother should use alternative methods to express discontent with her son. If she is not aware of the fact that she humiliates her son, her actions may be evaluated as being beyond right and wrong, since she is not aware of the consequences of her actions.

Scenario 2.6

Utterance: ‘My wife sometimes has a harsh way of talking to me; my friends tell me that her behaviour humiliates me, they ask me not to accept her behaviour, but I just do not feel humiliated, I love her.’

General description: This man does not feel humiliated, his friends feel humiliated in his place. It is possible that his wife does not want to humiliate him; it is also possible that she does want to humiliate him.

On the actor’s side we find therefore:

- Humiliating intention - or +,
- humiliating act - or +,
- intended outcome -, or suffering of the humiliated person,
- satisfaction -, or suffering of the humiliated person.

On the humiliated party’s side we find:

- Perception of humiliating intention -,
- perception of humiliating act -,
- suffering -,

- perception of humiliating intention and act only by third persons +, third persons suffer in the target person's place.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: On the inter-group level we find fanatical followers of sects and other extremist groups who impress non-believers with their willingness to accept humiliation and still stay loyal to the group.

A *third party* who is in favour of extremist groups will support their behaviour, while neutral third parties most probably will not. Most modern citizens of Western countries will regard this kind of dependency as 'stupid' and also as *normatively* 'wrong.'

Scenario 2.7

Utterance: 'This teacher of ours, he is so arrogantly convinced that he knows everything. But in fact he tells us nonsense most of the time. He is completely blind to the fact that he is humiliating himself in our eyes.'

General description: The teacher himself does not feel humiliated, and this appears in this case to be a sign of his social inability; if he were a normally sensitive human being, he would feel humiliated. The teacher humiliates himself only in the eyes of third persons; the whole subject of humiliation is irrelevant for him. In the eyes of the others he humiliates himself through being blind to the fact that he has a bigger self-image than he can maintain. He humiliates himself passively through being blind.

On the actor's side we find therefore:

- Humiliating intention -,
- humiliating act -,
- intended outcome -,
- satisfaction -.

On the humiliated party's side we find blindness, lack of social abilities:

- Perception of humiliating intention -,
- perception of humiliating act -,
- suffering -.

Third persons feel the humiliation he should feel:

- Perception of humiliating intention by third persons +,
- perception of humiliating act by third person +,
- suffering by third person +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Michael Kimmel explained how privilege is invisible and how he understood that he had humiliated himself by naïve blindness: ‘I got up one morning and looked into the mirror. Suddenly I understood that I was not just a “normal human being” but a “white middle class man”!’²⁶⁶

All privileged and powerful groups and nations live with the risk of not detecting their own faults, mistakes, or misperceptions out of arrogant blindness. ‘Masters’ often live in the false belief that they know all and that their underlings love them. At best they appear ridiculous in the eyes of their subordinates and are laughed about, but they run the risk to be pulled out of their naïve existence by more unpleasant reactions from their unimpressed underlings. ‘A dictator has got that feeling that he is always right, what ever happens he is right. He is right and right’ (Dr. Gaboose, personal physician of ousted and late Somali dictator Siad Barre in an interview 30th November 1998).

The third party will agree that it is not very wise to be blind to one’s own weaknesses, though a *normative evaluation* of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ cannot be applied.

The scenarios 2.1 to 2.7 will now be collected in Table 12:

²⁶⁶ At the expert group meeting on ‘Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace,’ Oslo, Norway, 24-28 September 1997. See also Kimmel, 1997, and Kimmel, 2000.

SCENARIOS OF HUMILIATION ANALYSED FROM THE HUMILIATED PARTY'S PERSPECTIVE								
Scenarios		2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7
Actor	Intention	+ or -	+	-	+	- or +	- or +	-
	Act	+ or -	+	-	+	- or +	- or +	-
	Intended outcome of humiliating act	- or victim's suffering	victim's suffering	help	victim's suffering	- or +	- or victim's suffering	-
Humiliated Party	Satisfaction from humiliating act	+ or -	compensation for hurt feelings	help	compensation for hurt feelings of a third person	- or any kind of hurt	- or any kind of hurt	-
	Humiliated party perceives humiliator's intention to humiliate as	+ but not sure	+	-	+	+	- third person +	- third person +
	Humiliated party perceives humiliating act as	+ but not sure	+	+	+	+	- third person +	- third person +
Observer	Humiliated party's suffering	+	-	+	+	+	- third person +	- third person +
	Observers judge humiliator's and humiliated party's behaviour	observer is uncertain	humiliated party may be right or wrong	humiliated party mostly right	humiliator is right	depending on humiliator's intentions	humiliated party is wrong	humiliated party is right

Table 12: Scenarios of humiliation analysed from the humiliated party's perspective

Table 11 and Table 12 are clearly not exhaustive. However, they are intended to present the complexity of the subject in a systematic way. Further cases could be added and many other ways of differentiating the enumerated points further are possible.

What may be taken to the next chapters is the notion that humiliation is a profoundly relational process, which cannot be disentangled from the intimate relationship that two or

several parties have to each other. Furthermore it should be kept in mind that it may in many cases be difficult to pinpoint actor and victim (victims may become actors, and actors victims), as well as starting point and endpoint. A person may not intend to set off a cycle of humiliation, however, unintentionally may do it anyway, for example in cases where help is perceived as humiliating. Another party may try to end a cycle of violence, for example by striking a peace accord, as in the case of the Versailles Accords, and the very peace accords may produce humiliation.

In the following chapter another approach will be taken to systematisation, namely a analysis of history and how the concept of humiliation developed and changed during time.

Part II: Humiliation As Socio-Historical Process, or Diagnosis and Prognosis of Human History

3. From Pride to Honour, and Human Rights²⁶⁷

Approximately 250,000 years ago, a few thousand Homo sapiens (our first genetically-equivalent ancestors) migrated out of Africa, beginning the long trans-generational process of inhabiting and, increasingly, dominating the rest of the natural world (Leakey, 1994). ‘This fragile process was aided by a great deal of luck and the remarkable potential of the human brain to allow non-genetic, trans-generational transmission of information (socio-cultural evolution). For thousands of generations, life was characterized by danger – omnipresent threat and pervasive intra- and interspecies violence. Humankind and our current socio-cultural practices evolved in – and, therefore, reflect – a brutal, violent and unpredictable world. The evolution of complex cultures and “civilization” have not protected millions from the brutality which characterized the “ascent” of humankind. While “civilization” has decreased our vulnerability to non-human predators, it has done little to decrease intra-species violence (Keegan, 1993)’ (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 124).

Perry continues his historical sweep: ‘Indeed, modern history is characterized by increasingly efficient, systematic and institutionalized violence (e.g., the Inquisition, slavery, the Holocaust, the Trail of Tears). Men were, and men remain, the major predators of vulnerable humans (typically women and children). The profound impact of domestic violence, community violence, physical and sexual abuse and other forms of predatory or impulsive assault cannot be overestimated. Violence impacts the victims, the witnesses – and, ultimately, us all. Understanding and modifying our violent nature will determine, in large part, the degree to which we will successfully “adapt” to the challenges of the future – the degree to which future generations of human beings can actually experience humanity (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 124).

²⁶⁷ The following is adapted from revised versions of Lindner, 2000a, and Lindner, 2000l.

This book tries to contribute to the task Perry calls for, namely ‘understanding and modifying our violent nature’ so that we can ‘experience humanity.’ The way this book attempts to do this in this chapter is, among others, by explaining that the process of humiliation has extremely relevant historical roots that, if understood and healed, may relieve us from some of its inhuman consequences such as horrendous cycles of violence. Hopefully, by improving the clarity and sophistication of our knowledge of the anchoring of humiliation in human history, we will enhance our capacity to grasp and, ultimately, modify its effects.

As already discussed, humiliation may be conceptualised as a cycle played out at the international, interpersonal, or intra-personal level, starting with an action carried out by one party, who intentionally or unintentionally causes feelings of humiliation in another party, who then re-acts, and so forth. Humiliation is degradation under the condition of respect (the victim respects the perpetrator), or even admiration/fear (the perpetrator admires and/or fears the victim) plus helplessness.

The capacity to humiliate and be humiliated are aspects of a dense web of ‘hot’ filaments wired into the tissue of culture, giving it a potentially explosive character. This chapter will probe this dense web in its historic context and explore how it acquired its present character. As will be suggested, our conceptualisation of humiliation has changed as our sense of human dignity has grown. A characterisation of humiliation will be presented, showing that it can be understood as not simply an extreme or marginal condition but a central feature of the social order. Viewed within this broader context, the elements that constitute humiliation may be recognised as fundamental mechanisms in the formation of society.

Culturally embedded metaphors such as the earlier described ‘*nose up*’ and ‘*face down*’ express the everyday working ‘logic’ immanent in a society’s habitus. As Scheff puts it, ‘In every society there is an “attitude of everyday life,” a life world, which most of its members assume, indeed, take for granted, most of the time. This world goes without saying to the point that it is invisible under most conditions. Elias and Bourdieu referred to it when they spoke of the habitus, our second nature, the mass of conventions, beliefs and attitudes, which each member of a society shares with every other member. The habitus is not the whole culture, but that part which is so taken for granted as to be virtually invisible to its members. As Geertz suggested, ... for the members of a society, the habitus is just “commonsense”’ (Scheff 1997, 219).

The habitus found in a particular society represents a particular realisation of the range of possibilities embedded in the available cultural repertoire. The point of this chapter is that

the range of possibilities available for embodiment in the common-sense understandings of specific societies has changed over time.

The common sense, everyday meaning of humiliation, which many of us agree to at the start of the twenty-first century, is the experience of a sore and hurtful exposure to the negative judgement of other people in circumstances that are forced upon the victim. This definition carries the implication that a very painful ‘lesson’ is being imposed at the cost of the victims’ dignity and their deepest sense of identity. The idea of humiliation covers a wide range of experiences from being the object of genocide to being the victim of gossip. However, in all these cases a behaviour that is designed to humiliate contravenes the normative expectations built into modern notions of human rights. Today it is regarded as being fundamentally wrong to humiliate people.

In this chapter it will be argued that humiliation is not just a matter of feeling an emotion. It is a social process or, perhaps, a social mechanism. To be properly understood, humiliation should be seen within a wider context as a central aspect of the interaction between human beings and their social and natural environment. As will be explained, this interaction or ‘dialogue’ has passed through three distinctive phases whose effects have accumulated and interacted with each other to produce a complex and multi-layered cultural repertoire. This repertoire is one upon which human beings draw and by which they are guided, driven or constrained in their dealings with each other.

Anthropological Background²⁶⁸

In his book *Getting to Peace. Transforming Conflict at Home, at Work, and in the World* (Ury, 1999), the Harvard anthropologist William Ury²⁶⁹ presents a ‘brief history of conflict’ that passes through three phases. The first phase is a very long period of relatively peaceful co-existence during which hunter-gatherer groups wandered over the earth. Although nomadic hunter-gatherer societies were not free from conflict and violent acts against humans, there was a great emphasis upon cooperation within and between groups, for example in carrying out hunting and sharing the prey. Cooperation was essential for survival.²⁷⁰ Disagreements had to be debated until a consensus emerged.

²⁶⁸ This section is quoted from Lindner, 2000a.

²⁶⁹ William Ury is director of the Project on Preventing War at Harvard University, and also co-author of *Getting to Yes* (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991).

²⁷⁰ See also Sahlins, 1972, *Stone Age Economics*.

In Ury's view, the situation changed during the relatively short second phase when systematic cultivation of the earth began. Farming was more productive than hunting and gathering and, as a result, population densities increased. Human groups became fixed in a single place. Land became scarcer relative to people. Coercion became endemic. Winners subjugated losers and unequal relations between masters and subordinates were maintained by force. This pattern of violence and coercion persisted into the urban-industrial era.

Ury uses the Book of Genesis to illuminate his analysis: 'In the biblical story... Adam and Eve live in the Garden of Eden, wandering freely and gathering wild plants and fruits, much as humanity did for most of human evolution. After the expulsion from Eden, Adam and Eve settle down and have a son Cain, who becomes a farmer, and a son Abel, who becomes a herdsman. The first farmer kills the first herdsman. Cain's son Enoch goes on to build the first city and the killing of men continues by Enoch's great-great-grandson, Lamech' (61).

Ury believes we are now entering a third phase in which many of the conditions that were conducive to peaceful co-existence in the first phase are reappearing. One reason is that the 'Knowledge Revolution' (83) is transforming the way in which human beings relate to each other. In all spheres self-organising, cooperative networks reminiscent of hunter-gatherer societies are replacing the old hierarchies of coercive control. Leaders have to persuade, not bully. Scientific knowledge is advanced by sharing and cooperation within extensive networks. Unlike land, knowledge is not a 'fixed pie' (84) but an expandable one.

Ury's main message is that humankind, in order to survive, has to rediscover the skill of resolving conflicts through negotiation informed by the 'thirdsider' perspective. In the final part of his book, Ury presents a methodology for preventing, resolving or containing conflict. He distinguishes between ten roles that Homo Negotiator may adopt: the provider, the teacher, the bridge-builder, the mediator, the arbiter, the equalizer, the healer, the witness, the referee and the peacekeeper.

The aim of this book is to assist teachers, bridge-builders, mediators, arbiters, equalizers, healers, witnesses, referees and peacekeepers around the world, be it politicians, academicians or practitioners, to deepen understanding of conflict by highlighting the humiliation process. Ury himself hints at the part played by humiliation: 'At the core of many conflicts...lie emotions – anger, fear, humiliation, hatred, insecurity and grief. The wounds may run deep' (162). I would add that the deeper the wounds, the more likely it is that humiliation played a central part in inflicting them.

In this chapter a complementary narrative of the development of human society is presented, an account that is, at the same time, a typology of contemporary forms of humiliation. It will be argued that the history of humankind and of humiliation have a very close relationship and that at different phases of human history the process of humiliation has taken different forms and has been perceived in different ways. This relationship has passed through clearly distinguishable phases. Each of these phases builds upon and incorporates its predecessor, and in successive phases the meaning and experience of humiliation are transformed.

The Adam and Eve myth, building upon Ury's insight that the biblical couple were the original hunter-gatherers, may serve as an illustration. Adam and Eve were favoured occupants of the Garden of Eden and had permission to pluck and eat the fruit of almost every tree in the Garden. Adam, the proud hunter-gatherer, was given a license to enjoy and 'pin down' nature: 'and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof' (*Genesis* 2, 19). His words were tools to control nature, ways of subjugating nature to the human will. God permitted this. Adam 'humiliated' nature by imposing his linguistic concepts upon it.

However, Adam and Eve went too far. As everybody knows, they were not supposed to take fruit from 'the tree of the knowledge of good and evil ... for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die' (*Genesis* 2, 17). They picked fruit from the forbidden tree. This was an attempt to impose their own will over a part of nature's garden that God was protecting from their intrusion. The human pair committed a forbidden act of attempted humiliation against Nature and God. Urged on by the serpent, and the desire to have godlike wisdom, Adam and Eve ate fruit from the forbidden tree. The pride of the hunter-gatherers brought punishment from God. He made Adam and Eve feel ashamed and threw them out of the Garden. God forced Adam to become a farmer, condemned 'to till the ground from whence he was taken' (*Genesis*, 3, 23). Humankind was kicked off its pedestal and made to accept a much more lowly place in the scheme of things.

The Genesis myth has many interpretations, but from the particular perspective adopted here it illustrates the shift from a pristine human condition of equality and pride to one in which the majority of human beings are in a subjugated situation within hierarchical societies.

Some elements of Adam and Eve's pristine human condition of equality and pride still exist in a few societies (they are *Islands of History*, writes Sahlins, 1985), especially those with strong nomadic traditions such as Somalia. In such societies, human beings share a

culture of strong *self-pride*. They are free from the constraints imposed by strong and stable political hierarchies and, in turn, do not hesitate (like Adam and Eve) to subject nature to domination as far as they are able, wresting a living from their land, trees, rivers and seas.

There is a second, a hierarchical, type of society in which human beings aspire to social *honour*. In unequal societies of this kind, not only is nature the subject of forceful domination but so are human beings. Most participants in such societies find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy. Many learn to accept as legitimate the humble position imposed upon them. Others struggle to rise in the hierarchy or try to downgrade their rivals. However, few challenge the fact of hierarchy as such.

In the third kind of society all human beings claim equal human rights and a condition of *dignity*. Competition is an accepted aspect of life as are social hierarchies, but such factors are supposed to operate within the limits set by respect for universal human rights. The ideas of universal rights and dignity are currently even extended beyond humankind. In particular, there is increasing opposition to unrestrained forceful domination over the natural world by humankind. All acts of forceful domination are perceived as an illegitimate attack upon the intrinsic rights and nature of their victims. A crucially important difference from the second kind of society is that the experience of demeaning treatment at the hands of others imposes much deeper hurt in ‘dignity societies’ than in ‘honour societies’ where the imposition of inequality is accepted to a greater extent.

In practice, especially today, many societies are complex amalgams of the three tendencies just outlined. The case of the United States is one example. The frontier tradition of pioneers wresting an existence from the wilderness feeds a spirit of *self-pride* among Americans. This element of pristine pride at the heart of American culture is interwoven in a complex way with the Southern *honour* code bred into plantation owners (Cohen et al., 1996), and the emphasis on human *dignity* that runs through documents such as the American Declaration of Independence.²⁷¹

The rest of this chapter will elaborate in greater depth the distinctions just made between social orders based upon pride, honour and dignity and their implications for the ways in which humiliation manifests itself.

²⁷¹ ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’

Pride and Pristine Equality

Hunters and gatherers and, also, nomadic herdsmen such as the Somalis do not have much experience of subjugating other human beings, a fact which is reflected in their egalitarian societal structure.

As Abdirizak A. Osman, a young Somali intellectual and author²⁷² wrote to the present author (personal communication, 5th October 1999, capitalisation in original), ‘Evelin, Somalis are an extremely proud people. This had and has both positive and negative sides. During slavery and colonisation Somalis lost and gained a lot. Perhaps more than the rest of other Africans. Because of their pride they succeeded in holding onto their language, culture and religion, where virtually ALL the other black Africans “accepted” the languages and religions of the European masters. Somalia is the only black African nation-state whose national language is hers except for Ethiopia who was NEVER colonized. ...’

‘By the same token Somalis did not benefit from the Europeans in the sense that they did not inherit universities and schools after they left their country like the rest of black Africa. In a way that explains why Somalis are not as “educated” as their brothers and sisters in the Mother Continent. It’s only now we can see “educated” Somalis around and that’s mainly due to the fact that many Somalis left for the “West” after the war... But being a nomad is being noble, Evelin. And therefore it is only understandable to see a former nomad seeking a high status city job: they both are of a high position job with a respect and good income. A Somali wouldn’t work as a garbage collector, gravedigger, bricklayer, etc. even if he never learned to read. In fact I remember a doorman (my neighbour’s house back in Somalia) who beat his employer who shouted at him in the middle of the night to open the door. Of course he lost his job and probably went to jail for it but he KEPT his dignity and pride. I work here I am NOT your slave!’

Somali society has a strong egalitarian tradition in spite of the fact that outcast ‘minorities’ live among the ‘proud’ nomad clans.²⁷³ The hand of colonialism rested relatively

²⁷² See his book *In the Name of the Fathers* (Osman, 1996).

²⁷³ The lower castes or sab (as opposed to ‘noble’ or gob), today also called ‘minorities’ (who may be in the majority in certain places), are the Yebir (or ‘Hebrew’), Madiban (also called Midgan, a derogatory name, as their members told me) and the Tomal: ‘Physically, the lower caste groups do not look different from the other Somalis, but they had different social status and were not mixed in marriage with the other Somalis. The yebir group were occupied with leather work, e.g., saddlery, scabbards, shoe making. The midgan were normally armed with small daggers, bows and poisoned arrows; they engaged in hunting and mainly collected myrrh and frankincense for which the land of Punt was famous. The tomal were the blacksmiths. They engaged in iron work and fashioned all kinds of traditional arms’ (Hussein, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 167, italicisation in original).

lightly upon them and they think of themselves as a free people managing their own affairs. As described above, after independence in 1960, Somalia adopted a modern state administration. Somali society did not experience an oppressively centralising bureaucratic apparatus of hierarchy until the last half of Barre dictatorship that started in 1969, ultimately turned into a brutal ‘experiment,’ and was discontinued in 1991. Since then centralised government has broken down and been abandoned, leaving behind a divided and devastated country. Although a new government has been put in place in 2000, as described above, the Somali clans returned to dividing up control between themselves in the same rather egalitarian way as ever before in history, while trying to regain a sense of meaning and working order. The new government may hopefully bring a state to the fore that is able to balance egalitarian Somali traditions with a modern democratic state.

In my interviews in Somalia I asked what circumstances Somalis would consider ‘humiliating.’ In fact, most people had little use for this concept. They frequently replied that when they were afflicted with ‘grievances’ or ‘wrongs,’ their clan would decide whether their claim was justified and, if it was, the clan would do what it could to obtain compensation.

This system was disrupted during the dictatorship of Siad Barre who made the state into an oppressive ‘super-clan.’ However, before and after Barre the clan system was the main mechanism for regulating grievances among equals. Abdirizak A. Osman wrote (7th October 1999): “‘Humiliation’, as I understand as a Somali myself, means when one did not fight back during the PROCESS of that action and NOT what you feel AFTER. In other words, what you might call humiliation, a Somali might call “losing” a war, property, etc.’ (capitalisation in original).

Barre’s quasi-genocidal onslaught on his own population inflicted enormous ‘grievances’ on the victims – the use of humiliation through public rape was especially resented.²⁷⁴ The victimised clans responded with the creation of liberation armies who finally deposed of the dictator.

I suggest that the near-absence of humiliation among the major Somali clans is a product of the near-absence of hierarchy. The sparse Somali semi-deserts do not provide material resources for building up such a hierarchy, neither from within nor from outside. Why, for example, should outsiders take the trouble to subjugate the Somalis?

England used its protectorate in the North of Somalia to feed their people in Aden, only Italy colonised the South slightly more thoroughly, among others because the two rivers

²⁷⁴ As pointed out by the majority of Somali informants.

in the South provide fertile land that can be used for large scale banana cultivation. An Australian humanitarian aid worker confirmed in an interview (29th November 1998, I do not want to disclose his name) that even today he can feel the effects of the relatively unoppressive colonial relationship in the North of Somalia: ‘There was respect for the Somalis, there was a kind of equal relationship. When England gave away the Ogaden [or Haud, a semi-desert which England gave to Ethiopia against the promises they had given the Somalis], the Somalis were very angry: “You are our friends (!) how can you betray us!” And also the British officers would be furious at London, who just gave the Haud away as a kind of normal bargaining chip. So, there was a kind of partnership [between the Somalis and British].’²⁷⁵

In other words, the Somalis, especially in the North, have not been ‘taught’ the lesson of hierarchy and humiliation that other peoples were forced to learn long time ago. As a consequence, Somalis have a national habitus of immense pride,²⁷⁶ which may be differentiated from honour in hierarchical societal systems. This pride may express itself in an identity and experience of freedom that is characteristic of Somali elders (virtually all male heads of families over a certain age), who enjoy almost total independence in their decision making, and their families who only have one single layer of super-ordination above them.

Identity in Pre-Modern Times

Questions pertaining to identity may be asked such as: How are we to depict the identity of a member of a Somali clan? How does the world look like from the perspective of such an individual? Where does the individual place herself? How are responsibilities, duties and rights distributed? What can I as a member of a bigger collective such as a clan expect from others and what do I have to perform myself and provide others with? Which roles may I have to take on for my own benefit and the benefit of others? In the following personal identity in its social embeddedness will be mapped out, see Figure 5. Further down this analysis will be carried further and personal identity as developing in the course of history will be outlined.

Responsibilities of the leader towards his family / clan / tribe may be described as follows:

²⁷⁵ On the historical background see, for example, Mazrui, 1986. Many people I talked to were proud of the ‘equal’ colonial relationship with the British. For examples, see Hanley, 1971.

²⁷⁶ The Somali habitus of pride does not imply that Somali society is in all respects completely equal. There is also the issue of gender relations, a theme I intend to take up in a future paper. See also Lindner, in Breines, Gierycz, & Reardon, 1999.

- Management of defence against outside enemies, usually sending the male group members into war (in a state the government and the Ministry of Defence is responsible for such decisions)
- Management of relations with outside neighbours (in a state this task is assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Trade and Commerce)
- Risk-control inside the group, for example in case of natural disasters, care for the sick and the aged (state: social welfare system, insurance companies)
- Definition and allocation of in-group members' positions and relations (state: career guidance in a differentiated, complex, industrial-urban society)
- Securing of in-group cohesion, for example through conflict management (state: Ministry of Justice, courts, police, and so forth)
- Representation of mythical gods and thereby embodiment of a moral system (state: church and similar institutions)
- Rewards to the leader: Material well-being, no physical work, some moral freedom

Activities of group members may be outlined as follows:

- Securing of livelihood
- Development and maintenance of in- and out-group relations
- Development and maintenance of cultural identity for example through myth creation and continuation
- Implementation of and/or submission to leaders in their capacity of swaying between the poles of being protectors and/or oppressors.




Figure 5: Pre-modern identity

Honour and Imposed Hierarchy: The Advent of 'Honour Humiliation'

In 'pride societies,' such as Somalia, nature was subjected to human order through the use of language (imposing human categories and concepts), the making of tools, and the semi-domestication of animals by herdsmen.

The introduction of agriculture based on the digging stick and the plough inaugurated a new kind of subjugation, the subjugation of people. This involved the instrumentalisation of some human beings (the ‘slaves’) by others (the ‘masters’).

This means that the state of factual equality between individuals came to an end where agriculture was ‘invented.’ Agriculture gave the surplus to build hierarchical societies. Some human beings asserted stable domination over other human beings, and – this is a deeply important point – this condition came to appear ‘normal’ – just as normal as using a hammer on a nail. Feudalism, chiefdoms, absolutist states and empires all developed under these conditions of ‘normal’ inequality from which the ideal of equal human rights was absent. The imposition of hierarchical structures typically involved a process of humiliation carried out by new overlords who reduced those around them to a subordinate situation and believed that this is their absolute ‘right.’ Yet, also many of their underlings learned to identify the new order as expression of civilisation. ‘If egalitarianism was known, it was as a feature of some of the despised, barbarian societies that existed beyond the borders of the civilized world’ (Trigger, 1993, 53-54).

History offers numerous examples of this process, and no world region is exempted. To name just a few: the making of tax-collecting and corvée-enforcing states in Mesopotamia in the late fourth century BC; the creation of feudal obligations in early medieval Europe through vassal homage; the Iberian conquest of Central and South America; the establishment of a stable centralised French monarchy during the seventeenth century after the French religious wars; or the British conquest of India.²⁷⁷ The strategy of expanding resources by instrumentalising human beings was intensified and optimised in the course of history.²⁷⁸

In every case, a violent assertion of superior force was carried out in order to put a new hierarchical structure into place. In every case, the subordinated people experienced a radical loss of autonomy and a devastating blow to their pride. They were taught to bow down to their new masters. They were humiliated.

Humiliation means in these cases the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will and in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is significantly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It involves acts of force, including

²⁷⁷ See Bloch, 1962, 145-62; Mann, 1986, 73-93; Elias, 1983.

²⁷⁸ See Trigger, 1993, 52: ‘...slavery appears to have been a less extensive and less oppressive institution in the early civilizations than it was in classical Greek and Roman society.’

violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless.

Some 'masters' within hierarchical systems offered protection,²⁷⁹ others were just oppressive. In both cases, many 'slaves' accepted their lot as God's will or nature's order, a pattern partly illuminated by Johan Galtung's notion of 'penetration,'²⁸⁰ the idea of 'learned helplessness,'²⁸¹ and the discussion of the 'Stockholm Syndrome.'²⁸² Norbert Elias, in his book *The Civilizing Process* (Elias, 1994), outlines how proud feudal warriors learned to accept and internalise humility. In this book Elias outlines how the French court taught etiquette to its underlings, an etiquette that was not enforced by direct punishment, but rather by the underlings' own wish to belong to the 'civilised society' – a sense of belonging that would cause them to react with shame if they abridged the rules. Yet, not all 'slaves' readily adopted shameful humility, many had to be forced or bribed into humility by their 'masters.'

An extreme manifestation of the tensions engendered by hierarchy and humiliation is found in Rwanda. To quote the words of a Hutu from the North of Burundi, now an international intellectual²⁸³: 'A son of a Tutsi got the conviction that he is born to rule, that he was above the servants, while a son of a Hutu learned to be convinced that he was a servant, therefore he learned to be polite and humble, while a Tutsi was proud. A Tutsi learned that he could kill a Hutu at any time.' He added: 'The concept of humiliation is related to tradition and culture: Tutsi are convinced that they are "born to rule," they cannot imagine how they can survive without being in power.'

Rwanda and Burundi belong to a broad category of cases that includes most European and Asian societies before the 'Human Rights Revolution' of the twentieth century. These are societies in which bowing, curtseying, kow-towing and prostration are commonplace. In all

²⁷⁹ 'Peasants were also locked into a situation in which their well-being depended on rulers who could defend them from external attack and maintain the internal order on which the systems of production had come to depend... Hence, so long as rulers did not exploit their subjects beyond conventional limits, their rule was accepted.' (Trigger, 1993, 53, 54).

²⁸⁰ 'implanting the topdog inside the underdog ...' (Galtung, 1996, 199).

²⁸¹ 'A term coined by M. Seligman to characterize the generalization that helplessness is a learned state produced by exposure to noxious, unpleasant situations in which there is no possibility of escape or avoidance.' *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology* (Reber, 1985). See also Peterson & Maier, 1993.

²⁸² 'An emotional bond between hostages and their captors which is frequently observed when the hostages are held for long periods of time under emotionally straining circumstances. The name derives from the instance when it was first publicly noted, when a group of hostages was held by robbers in a Stockholm bank for five days.' *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*, 1985.

²⁸³ He wishes to stay anonymous. The interview was carried out in December 1998.

such cases, processes of humiliation create, maintain and express inequalities *between* groups and *within* them. They mark out the dominant ‘honourable’ classes, estates or castes from the ‘servile’ subordinate classes, estates or castes. They also separate out the higher ranking from the lower ranking individuals or families *within* each class, estate or caste.

The principle of inequality, enforced through violence and humiliation, is accepted as legitimate in such societies. The forceful techniques of humiliation are used to challenge or reassert the particular place that individuals, families or groups have within the hierarchy. This typically does not involve a challenge to the fact of hierarchy as such.

For example, in medieval and early modern Europe, armed combat among members of the most ‘honourable’ class, the aristocracy, was a means of defending or enhancing family honour. Defeat in a duel lowered the loser’s rank in the scale of honour. Small humiliations could be borne by those who had fought bravely. However, a cowardly response to a challenge could mean that all honour was lost. Furthermore, it was not possible to accept defeat by an opponent one did not respect. In extreme cases where no road back to honour existed, suicide was preferable. The main point is that within ‘honour societies,’ humiliation and violence were regarded as normal means of managing tensions. For the most part, people accepted them and got on with their lives. Violence did not have the strong connotation of ‘violation’ it has since acquired.²⁸⁴

There is a link between humiliation and the civilizing process as described by Norbert Elias. According to Elias, human beings acquired a civilized habitus as they became subject to control ‘from above’ at the hands of a powerful state apparatus. They learned that exercising self-control was the best way to survive when they had been stripped of their weapons. To quote Fletcher’s summary, ‘The process of civilization involves the gradual, partial and unplanned long-term pacification of human societies, within, and increasingly between, states – a process which is “never completed and constantly endangered”’ (Fletcher, 1997, 178).²⁸⁵

According to Elias, pacified and civilized people learn to feel embarrassed.²⁸⁶ Widespread ‘social anxiety’ among inferiors is one outcome of the successful implementation of honour humiliation. This attitude among inferiors helps to keep the hierarchy in existence.

²⁸⁴ To put it another way, honour-humiliation regards ‘structural violence’ (Galtung, 1996) as legitimate.

²⁸⁵ See also Mennell, 1989; Goudsblom & Mennell, 1998.

²⁸⁶ See Miller, 1996. See also Smith, 2000b forthcoming.

Nothing serves a ‘master’ better than people who, humbly and fearfully, ‘keep their heads down.’²⁸⁷

Despite the normality and ubiquity of violent coercion in ‘honour societies,’ and the aura of legitimacy that surrounds it, the humiliation it imposes was resented by many of those who come out worst. Typically, when the opportunity to ‘do your (actual or supposed) oppressor down’ came along, it was taken. For example, when the ‘old regime’ of Belgian colonialism came to an end and Rwanda approached independence political power was given to Hutu, the majority group who had traditionally been subordinate to the Tutsi under Belgian rule. Hutu feelings against the Tutsi provided the basis for the genocidal attacks upon the latter orchestrated by the government in 1994. The genocide was directed from Hutu extremists in the government the killers were acting under their orders. In other words, it was not a spontaneous popular movement, yet, the genocide would not have been possible if the government had not been able to exploit the bitterness of a population that resented its age-old servile condition. Furthermore, citizens who are accustomed to humiliation, because it is a legitimate part of their hierarchical societal environment, may be ‘inoculated’ – they know not only how to receive humiliation, but also how to deliver it.

A similar pattern may be found in other ‘honour societies.’ For example, the peasantry was both oppressed and servile under the Tsarist regime in the early twentieth century. When the Russian empire collapsed and power was achieved by the Bolsheviks, the new government was eventually able to liquidate the richer stratum of peasants known as the kulaks. 15 million peasants perished or were killed between 1929 and the end of 1933 (Bullock, 1991, 299). In this case, too, old resentments were exploited by the authorities. The half-starving majority peasant population had little sympathy for those who seemed to be doing better than themselves.

The final example comes from Germany. The Kaiser’s empire was infamous for its rigid authoritarianism at every level of society. The resentment experienced by the majority who were subject to this oppressive system was intensified by Germany’s defeat and the empire’s collapse in 1918. As in Rwanda and Russia there was a government-inspired programme of mass liquidation a few years after the collapse of the ‘old regime.’ Once again,

²⁸⁷ Today a person with ‘social anxiety’ may be ready to pay for psychotherapy in order to ‘undo’ this learning process.

the government was able to exploit the resentment of the majority and direct it against members of a stigmatised category, in this case, the Jews.²⁸⁸

The processes discussed in this section of the chapter could be labelled ‘honour humiliation.’ This makes it possible to distinguish them from another set of processes, to be discussed in the next section, which will be called ‘human rights-humiliation.’ The crucial point is that in cases of honour humiliation it is possible, indeed normal, to accept that the forceful imposition of inequality is legitimate even if one objects to the particular place in the hierarchy that one occupies and yearns for an opportunity to replace the master.

The core of humiliation is the process by which human beings subject aspects of their environment to control. This has the effect of subordinating that part of the natural or human environment to the judgements and wishes of the subjugator. This process of subjugation leads to the instrumentalisation of the subjugated piece of nature (for example cutting down a forest, tilling a plot of land) or the subjugated individuals or groups (for example reducing them to slavery). In extreme cases, subjugation may extend to destruction if the object of control is deemed useless or harmful.

Zygmunt Bauman writes that nature was the victim of a ‘declaration of hostilities that made the unprocessed, pristine world into the enemy. As is the case with all genocide, the world of nature...had to be beheaded and thus deprived of autonomous will and power of resistance...The world was an object of willed action: a raw material in the work guided and given form by human designs...Left to itself, the world had no meaning. It was solely the human design that injected it with a sense of purpose. So the earth became a repository of ores and other “natural resources,” wood turned into timber and water – depending on circumstances – into an energy source, waterway or the solvent of waste’ (Bauman 1992, x-xi).²⁸⁹

This chapter suggests that in the same way ‘wood’ turned into ‘timber,’ ‘human beings’ turned into ‘slaves.’ In the above quoted passage from Bauman he makes us see nature in a different way by according it the same dignity that the notion of human rights is designed to protect in the case of men and women. He imaginatively restores to nature its pristine autonomy and intrinsic meaning in a deliberately provocative or shocking way. This rhetorical device throws a switch that opens our eyes and enables us to recapture the process

²⁸⁸ For a comparison the treatment of the Jews and the kulaks, see Bullock, 1991, 299.

²⁸⁹ I owe this reference to Dennis Smith. See also Smith, 1999, on Bauman. As Smith points out, Bauman’s analysis overlaps with the approaches of critical theory (e.g. Adorno and Habermas) and post-structuralism (e.g. Foucault and Lyotard) but cannot be fully aligned with either.

of assertion, resistance and subjugation that resulted in human domination over nature. The subjugation of nature has been a central feature of the programme of modern science, accepted as 'normal,' as Adorno and Horkheimer, among others, have argued.

This section requires another effort of the imagination. It is necessary for the reader to imagine a situation in which the protection provided by the idea of human rights is absent because the very idea of human rights is absent from the cultural repertoire of humankind.

In other words, in egalitarian pre-hierarchical hunting, gathering, or herding societies such as Somalia the idea of equality is not existent in the same way as in post-hierarchical egalitarian societies. Hunting, gathering and herding societies live practical equality in their everyday existence insofar as they lack the intricate institutionalised hierarchical layers of later agricultural societies. However, this equality is not guaranteed by, or dependent upon, the idea of human rights.

While 'noble' and 'free-born' Somali warriors cannot imagine that they could view honour humiliation perpetrated on them as legitimate under any circumstances, peoples who underwent decade-long cycles of subjugation get 'used' to the thought that honour humiliation is legitimate. They do not yet incorporate the idea that all human beings are equally worthy of respect and have a core of dignity irrespective of their particular place in any social hierarchy. This idea, however, is central to post-hierarchical societies that accept the ideal of human rights. In societies based on human rights, humiliation takes a new form: human rights humiliation. In cases of human rights-humiliation, the forceful imposition of inequality is regarded as completely and utterly unacceptable.

Identity in Strictly Hierarchical Societies

The identity of 'masters' and 'slaves' in the context of hierarchical societies that are governed by absolute rulers is permeated by the ranking order that characterises the overall social environment. The locus of agency is rigidly linked to the rank a person occupies. Proud and free Somali nomads are masters when they can, and apprentices when they have to. But they are never underlings. Somali children learn about the difficult life in the bush, but this does not mean that they are slaves. They are taught to become their own rulers. Also Somali women lead quite a self-defined life, even though their dependence on males – father, husband, or brothers – is considerable. To sum up, personal pride in societies such as Somalia undermines ranking, and turns any relationship of dependency into a fragile one.

The situation is fundamentally different in rigidly stratified societies where underlings are expected to continue being 'children' all their lives and never assume the full range of choices that masters dispose of (see Figure 6). Adult underlings have to 'artificially' limit their judgement and impose upon themselves humility. They are taught that they do not have the intellectual capacity to make decisions that only a master can make. Their 'super-ego' tells them: 'You cannot judge yourself, you have to accept the guidance of your super-ordinates.'

To maintain child-status all life is not an easy and 'natural' thing to achieve. Therefore hierarchical societies often develop draconian strategies of 'breaking the will' of children and adults. Alice Miller has amply described these practices in her book *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence* (Miller, 1983). Further down some material will be presented that was collected by the *Journal of Psychohistory* that documents the wide range of strategies that were designed to keep adult people humble and childlike.




Figure 6: Identity in strictly hierarchal societies

Dignity and Human Rights: The Advent of ‘Human Rights-Humiliation’

At a still later stage it became ‘normal’ to assume that all human beings should enjoy equality of rights. All men and women came to be seen as deserving the human rights asserted in such documents as the American Declaration of Independence, the revolutionary French

Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, the dominant culture within international organisations asserts that all forms of 'tyranny' and 'dictatorship' are a dire infringement of those rights.

Three focal ideas at the centre of Ury's argument are *interdependence*, *knowledge* and *coercion*. To oversimplify his argument: the demands imposed by increasing *interdependence* and the *Knowledge Revolution* are undermining *coercive* hierarchies. As Ury shows, the Knowledge Revolution has weakened all social hierarchies and is gradually making servility obsolete. Modern society needs people who have a sense of competence and self-possession. Such people are more creative and motivated, more likely to develop innovative new products, services and strategies.²⁹⁰ One aspect of the Knowledge Revolution is the startling advance in the technology of mass communications.²⁹¹ Satellite television and the Internet mean that local evidence of conflict, cruelty and abuse almost always becomes visible, sooner or later, to a global audience. Oppression can no longer be perpetrated for long without being observed by third parties.²⁹²

Among the global audience are institutions and groups who oppose honour humiliation on the grounds that it undermines human rights. This global third party is deeply hostile to the suggestion that some people are 'sub-human' (at the bottom of social hierarchies) and others 'super-human' (at the top). From this critical point of view, the 'legitimate' humiliations of 'honour societies' are translated into illegitimate forms of

²⁹⁰ TORONTO, June 23rd 1997 (UPI) -- U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan says the information revolution is the key to ensuring democracy and wiping out poverty around the world. 'Information has a great democratizing power waiting to be harnessed to our global struggle for peace and development,' Annan told the opening session of Global Knowledge 97, an international conference in Toronto on the information revolution and the developing world. The Global Knowledge conference, organized by the World Bank and the Canadian government, is intended to explore ways of extending the information revolution to the poorer regions of the world. Annan called on the nearly 2,000 delegates to work to promote access to information technology, to eliminate censorship, to foster the transfer of technology and to ensure that young people are the first to be involved in information revolution.

'The extreme inequalities in the world are morally untenable, economically irrational and politically indefensible,' Annan said. 'The great democratizing power of information has given us all a chance to effect changes and alleviate poverty in ways we cannot even imagine today.'

The conference, the first of its kind, has attracted delegates from 124 nations, including 500 representatives from some of the least-developed countries, World Bank President James Wolfensohn said.

²⁹¹ Relevant work in this area is being carried out by Ray Loveridge who has been exploring the growing importance of new information communication technologies in organising decision making within companies and the new flexibility of boundaries this produces. See, for example, Hooley, Loveridge, & Wilson, 1998; Casson, Loveridge, & Singh, in Boyd & Rugman, 1997.

²⁹² See, for example, Pavri, 1997; Watkins & Winters, 1997.

‘structural violence,’ to borrow Galtung’s term.²⁹³ This critical perspective is the outcome of a long period of cultural change. The very word ‘humiliation’ gradually altered its meaning as the idea of universal human dignity slowly percolated through Western societies and then became global.

These changes of meaning have significant sociological and psychological consequences. After the Human Rights Revolution the wounds of humiliation strike much deeper than they did before.²⁹⁴ In honour societies, the threat of dishonour endangers the public face presented by each individual or group. Honour humiliation menaces the status enjoyed by each within an asymmetrical network of social relationships. This form of humiliation takes the form of dishonour done to the coat of arms, so to speak, displayed on one’s shield. By contrast, in ‘dignity societies’ humiliation is a lance that brushes aside the shield and penetrates the body. Human rights-humiliation attacks the very self.

In societies that value human rights, every human being is seen to possess an inner core of dignity in his or her capacity as a human being. This inner dignity is untouched by ‘outer’ characteristics such as social position. From this modern perspective, even criminal offenders should keep their dignity: they should be humbled (‘brought down to earth’) but not humiliated (ground down into the earth).²⁹⁵ To humiliate a person is now regarded as one of the worst violations possible. It is akin to the destruction of that person, an intolerable violation of their inner core of dignity as a human being.²⁹⁶

The advent of universal human rights means that humiliation has ceased to be a legitimate device for maintaining social order. Even less is it acceptable as a means of enforcing a coercive hierarchy. On the contrary, the notion of universal human rights spreads the revolutionary idea that the powerful should respect the weak. It dignifies everybody’s hopes, wishes and personal sensitivities.²⁹⁷

However, the increased popularity of the ideal of human rights certainly does not mean that those rights are universally implemented. On the contrary, inequality, both globally

²⁹³ Galtung, 1996.

²⁹⁴ As Graham Dyson points out, in South Africa (and elsewhere) it was not simply a matter of human rights denied. ‘Apartheid and its predecessors were a question of humanness denied.’ This may or may not be the same thing as “human rights” (personal communication). See, on this matter, the work of Manfred Max-Neef, e. g. Ekins & Max-Neef, 1992.

²⁹⁵ See Zehr, 1990.

²⁹⁶ For a valuable discussion of some aspects of the complex relationship between identity and dignity, see Kelman, 1997.

²⁹⁷ See for example Bauman, 1993; Ignatieff, 1997; Weiner, 1998.

and locally, increase.²⁹⁸ Yet, what can be observed today, is an international community that is growing in size and forming a strong movement in favour of the values and practices expressed in the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights; this movement has gained particular confidence since the collapse of the Soviet empire.

Often honour codes and human rights codes collide and adherents of both codes misinterpret each others acts and intentions. In Kosovo during the early months of 1999 people from two 'honour' cultures – Serbian and Albanian – were fighting each other. NATO decided to intervene with the stated objective of protecting the Kosovan Albanians from a humiliating denial of their human rights. With its superior technology, NATO humiliated the Serbian state, forcing it to sue for peace. From a Serbian perspective, NATO's actions were hypocritical, using unconvincing 'human rights' rhetoric in order to pursue a 'dishonourable' intervention in the affairs of a sovereign neighbour. In short, NATO tried, only partly successfully, to prevent violent acts between Serbs and Albanians that Western observers perceived in terms of human rights-humiliation; in doing so they imposed upon Serbia what many Serbians saw as honour humiliation.

In other words, in some societies the rhetoric and practices of honour humiliation remain dominant. In fact, this tradition remains strong in many political establishments, especially in matters where national sovereignty and external relations are at issue. Independent states protect their honour as jealously today as members of the French aristocracy at Versailles. This is as true of the British and American states as it is their Serbian and Iraqi counterparts. Indeed, it applies to practically every sovereign state represented in the United Nations General Assembly. Some of these 'honourable' states claim to be implementing universal human rights within the polities they control; others do not.²⁹⁹

However, despite the resilience of the old paradigm of honour humiliation, there are strong internal and external pressures today that make regimes pay at least lip service to human rights. Although lip service is a feeble token of change,³⁰⁰ its potential should not be

²⁹⁸ See, for example, Brecher & Costello, 1994, or Hurrell & Woods, 1999. Hurrell and Woods argue that inequality is becoming an urgent issue of world politics at the end of the twentieth century. Their book investigates eight core areas of world politics. It suggests that growing inequality is reducing the capacity of governments and international organizations to manage effectively the challenges confronted in respect of international order, international law, welfare and social policy, global justice, regionalism and multilateralism, environmental protection, gender equality, military power, and security.

²⁹⁹ These processes are in fact more complex than this brief discussion conveys. See also, for example, Billig, 1995; Featherstone, 1990; Urry, 1999.

³⁰⁰ During my fieldwork in Africa in 1998 and 1999 one of the most prominent results was the detection of almost unequivocal suffering from 'double standards.' Almost everybody I talked to

underestimated. As Lee D. Ross has commented,³⁰¹ ‘You are what you pretend to be.’ Hypocritical words, however false, put pressure upon those who utter them to back up those words with actions. These considerations ultimately increase human rights’ chances, especially as monitoring organisations such as Human Rights Watch gain international respect.

Similar tensions between practice and lip service may be found within business organisations and public sector bureaucracies.³⁰² As has been noticed, human creativity is increasingly acknowledged as an underused resource, one that requires team-mindedness and the co-operative (as distinct from the submissive or aggressive) personality. The new requirement to be creative undermines the old coercive hierarchies. However, those who have ruled can hardly be expected to accept with equanimity that they are no more than equals among equals. In the early stages, many ‘masters’ will try to restrict equality to relations between ‘underlings’ while keeping themselves ‘above’ this process. They will support empowerment, flat hierarchies, and teamwork as long as they can stay out of it themselves. However, it will become increasingly difficult for ‘masters’ to pay mere lip service to equality. The authority of managers will, increasingly, depend upon their ability to join wholeheartedly this co-operative, team-minded culture.³⁰³

Most importantly, no leader can afford to overlook the fact that the modern regime of human rights makes inequality more socially and politically dangerous than ever before. This is the most urgent point this chapter makes. It can be illustrated by using the myth of a kind and jovial Father Christmas.³⁰⁴ The rich countries who dominate the international community are like Father Christmas with a sack full of presents. The presents bear the label ‘human

expressed grievance about ‘double standards’ which they felt are being used by ‘the powerful’ around the world. Almost everybody related to me that these ‘double standards’ are a source of deep and painful feelings of humiliation among those who believe in human rights and finally are ‘forced’ to become cynical. The former first lady of Somalia, Edna Adan, said: ‘I hope you have strong cupboards to put your conscience into! Where are all the weapons produced which kill innocent people?’

³⁰¹ In a personal conversation 1999.

³⁰² See, for example, ‘Humiliation, Human Rights, and Global Corporate Responsibility’ Lindner, 2000f, where the present author addresses the relationship between human rights and corporate success.

³⁰³ And, insofar as life in the ‘Global Village’ becomes defined as a ‘community game’ rather than a ‘Wallstreet Game,’ people will in fact acquire ‘co-operative personalities,’ helping to push toward a situation where Human Rights become a reality, not simply an ideal. See Lee D. Ross’ work on Naïve Realism (Ross & Ward, in Brown, Reed, & Turiel, 1996) and ‘Construal and Social Inference’ (Ross & Samuels, 1993), where he describes how people act in a co-operative way when they are asked to play the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game as a ‘community game,’ while people act non-co-operatively when the same game is called ‘Wallstreet Game.’

³⁰⁴ Father Christmas in the British and American traditions is meant here, rather than the more stern and severe figure of Saint Nicolas who chastises naughty children.

rights.' Father Christmas travels the world. In some places (for example, China and other 'honour societies') he cannot gain easy entry. Many doors are barred because their masters feel threatened by human rights.³⁰⁵ The ordinary people living in those places have heard about Father Christmas (perhaps even through the Internet) and they are deeply distressed that Father Christmas does not visit them. Why should they be denied having something that every one should get? It is deeply humiliating to be prevented from enjoying your basic human rights.

In other places (for example South Africa) Father Christmas is welcomed in with open arms. The people there are unjustly deprived and look forward to what is in Father Christmas's sack. However, when the people open their presents they find that the human rights they have been given are not enough. They still lack what they need. In fact, they are further behind than before. Their new rights give them a new freedom to go out into the capitalist market place but the market makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. These people, too, feel very upset. It is deeply humiliating to discover that the human rights you have been given are not enough to achieve the human dignity you deserve.

As already noted, economic inequality between poor and rich is actually growing at present, both locally and globally. The gap between the human rights' vision of an equal and just world and the actual state of inequality in the Global Village is creating feelings of humiliation that are intensely wounding. The world's poor are facing a worsening life-situation *at the same time as they are learning that such a situation 'ought not' to prevail.*

In summary, it is possible to represent the three stages described in the previous three sections schematically with reference to key turning points in human development: the humbling of nature by humankind, the humbling of some human beings by others, and the dignifying of all humankind (see Table 13 and Table 14).

³⁰⁵ It may be expected that in time the Knowledge Revolution will break down coercive hierarchies that support honour cultures in a slow and peaceful way, just as differences between supporters of human rights and adherents of traditional codes of honour were gradually overcome within Western societies. Most Western societies avoided full-scale bloody revolutions in achieving human rights. In other words, it is possible to imagine that the gradual extension of those rights to the non-Western world may be peacefully achieved and that it is, hopefully, not necessary to accept that a 'clash of civilizations' is inevitable, see Huntington, 1998.

THREE TURNING POINTS		
I	II	III
The abasement of nature by humankind	The abasement of some human beings by others	The dignifying of all humankind

Table 13: Three turning points

THE THREE ELEMENTS OF HUMILIATION			
	Subjugation of nature (many thousands of years ago)	and of human beings (about ten thousand years ago)	is illegitimate (very recently)
Phase 1.	X		
Phase 2.	X	X	
Phase 3.	X	X	X

Table 14: The three elements of humiliation

Table 15 expands on the tables just presented:

PRIDE, HONOUR AND DIGNITY: THREE MODALITIES OF HUMILIATION			
	Egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies	Hierarchical agrarian and industrial societies	Today's global and egalitarian knowledge society
Step one: Nature is subjugated, instrumentalised, turned into a series of tools for human purposes.	Pride and pristine equality. Humiliation is rare in human relationships. Rhetoric of 'wrongs', 'grievances' and restitution of fairness and equality.		
Step two: Human beings are subjugated, turned into tools. 'Honour humiliation' involves the 'legitimate' violation of honour.		Honour and imposed hierarchy. Humiliation is a 'normal' device of hierarchy-building. Honour is attacked, defended, won and lost within a social hierarchy of dominant and subordinate groups, and this is accepted as legitimate.	
Step three: Moral condemnation of the subjugation of human beings, including their use as tools or their destruction. 'Human rights-humiliation' involves the 'illegitimate' violation of human rights and the infliction of moral and emotional injury.			Dignity and human rights. Humiliation attacks a person's core as a human being, and inflicts very deep emotional wounds.

Table 15: Pride, honour and dignity: three modalities of humiliation

Identity in Modern and Post-Modern Times

Religion loses its place as leading guidance principle and is pushed aside by science³⁰⁶: Scientific research proves to be more effective than prayer, modern technology more miraculous than divine miracles. Such technological wonders as aeroplane, car, television, telephone, first seen as evil, become globally desired objects. The basis of science, the isolated experiment, acquires quasi-holy status. Western culture as principal discoverer and master-manipulator of physical laws sells the results of these manipulations to the rest of the world, and becomes rich and desirable. Modern technology supplies both, saleable products, and the means to market them internationally, thereby finally creating an interdependent Global Village. Modern science is possibly less suitable than religion to be used as legitimator for hierarchical power structures, since it is (1) testable by everybody, and since (2) free people are better producers and consumers. In Europe many see religion as being incompatible with modern science; the USA saves religion by linking God with 'progress,' as do Islamists in some way, while China has never been very religious.

People's moral systems are less based on religion, and more on secular moral philosophies than before. The individual has more choices, and can develop own definitions of moral behaviour. Since society is not anymore held together by the unifying force of a ruler, but by a broader cultural discourse, individual 'super-ego' structures become more elaborate and important. The individual takes over parts of the ruling task in a democratic system. And since people are no longer primarily subjects of a God or ruler, but producers and consumers of goods, society differentiates into layers, or classes.

³⁰⁶ See also Lindner, 2000p.




Figure 7: Identity in modern times

The post-modern individual has no undisputed guidance from 'above' anymore, except the notion that everybody has to navigate through life in a way only the very top leaders did in former times³⁰⁷: Every person has to be her own 'priest' (has to have a 'super-super-ego') and 'government' ('ego'). The implication is freedom and space for personal creativity, but also loneliness and depression. Social distance between people widens, because individuals communicate on different levels and with different faculties, as for example 'super-ego,' 'ego,' 'id,' or even with more fragmented faculties.

Individual psyche structures may be expected to mirror society structures and transform accordingly, certainly not in perfect correlation, perhaps for some individuals with a certain time interval insofar as some may be ahead of their time, others may lag behind. Post-modern relationships between people increasingly acquire characteristics of state relations between equal states and are characterised by a decrease of hierarchical layers and more co-operation and/or competition between independent 'experts.' All relations between people become permanently open to redefinition, rigid gender role patterns disappear, and life becomes a question of constant reflexive self-management (Giddens, 1991).

³⁰⁷ See, for example, Ulrich Beck's work on risk (Beck, 1992; Beck, 2000), or Anthony Giddens on *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Giddens, 1991).




Figure 8: Identity in the Global Village

This chapter outlined a historic development that spans the whole of humankind’s existence on earth and categorises it, very broadly, into three stages, or phases, that, however, may co-exist in today’s world. In the following chapter the transition from hierarchical societies to more egalitarian societal structures will be addressed in more detail.

4. From Slavery to Equality: Humiliation and the Difficult Transition from Honour to Human Rights

If we look at human history then the grand trend, as described above, passes from hunting and gathering (rather egalitarian insofar as few institutionalised hierarchical layers governed life), to agriculture and later the industrial society (rather hierarchical), and at last to today's knowledge society (having tendencies back to egalitarian societal structures). These transitions carry many implications and are played out in uncountable social spaces. The micro-process of the last transition, the one from hierarchy to equality – unfinished as it is in today's world – is in the following identified in different contexts.

Current Transitions from Hierarchical to Egalitarian Structures

Zero Sum, or Win-Win

How did the world present itself to its inhabitants around 5000 years ago, or 20000 years ago? Clearly, the planet earth has a limited surface, 20000 years ago as much as today. This means that all human life that draws on this space is bound to be defined by zero-sum logic.³⁰⁸ Hunters and gatherers, perhaps, were little aware of this logic, because they moved around and, presumably in many cases lived in the illusion that habitable space on earth was endless. However, when agriculture became an increasingly widespread practice around 10000 years ago, people became more conscious of the size of land, of borders and limits – they started building fences where there were none before. In other words, the zero-sum reality of the earth increasingly impinged on its inhabitants. However, also many farmers may have lived in the illusion, at least until it was widely accepted that the earth is a ball, that land is limitlessly available if only one moved there – as those did who, a hundred years ago, left for America 'to start a new life on a plot of land that would be ours' and thus introduced intensive agriculture to a region that formerly was used by Indian hunters and gatherers.

As William Ury indicates, knowledge potentially has no limits. The advent of today's Knowledge Society thus stands for a revolution in the history of humankind. Win-win situations increasingly characterise those areas of human life that are linked to knowledge,

³⁰⁸ See for Hobbes and game theory in relation to political theory, for example, Barley, in Bazerman, Lewicki, & Sheppard, 1991; Bell & Coplans, 1976; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1992; Gert, 1991; Hampton, 1986; Jehn & Weigelt, 1999; Morrow, 1994; O'Neill, 2001; Ordeshook, 1986; Rapoport, 1974; Rapoport, 1960; Rapoport & Chammah, 1970; Ridley, 1996; Schmidt, 1991; Tsebelis, 1990.

and, furthermore, increasing sections of human life are being invaded by knowledge-based artefacts and frameworks. We may conclude that the transition from land to knowledge as a resource for human beings' endeavour to make a living marks a significant and profound change from zero sum to win-win, a change that, indeed, never in history occurred in this drastic form.

It is to be expected that the dynamics of humiliation are played out differently in a win-win or zero-sum context. A water hole in the Somali semi-desert that has not enough water for all represents a zero-sum situation. Defeat is identical with death: 'A man deserves to be killed, not humiliated.' This changes in an agrarian context with a large surplus that may be increased by means of strict hierarchy. Humiliation may be accepted in such cases as utile humility with the function to secure that all get a larger piece of the cake even though the masters consume the biggest piece. A civilisation build on a river, such as the Nile, for example, may thrive on obedient farmers as long as the elite does not rob the country of its resources to the extent of its exhaustion. Conversely, a modern knowledge society requires another type of citizen in order to reach win-win conditions, not the obedient humble taxpaying farmer, but the dignified creative knowledge carrier and developer.

Many Villages, or One Village

If we look for more transitions in human history that have similar revolutionary effects, then the coming into being of One Single Global Village³⁰⁹ is remarkable and unprecedented in the entire past of humankind. Never before has technology made so much mobility possible, and never before so much global communication. And never before has humankind possessed the notion of One Single Planet the way it is reconfirmed today at the outset of every news show when an image of the globe turns to the tune of the introductory melody of the news programme. The term 'Global Village' in itself adds to the force of this transition – firstly it carries a host of connotations of conduct that typically reigns within villages, namely an awareness that ecological and social sustainability is important, and, secondly – because there is only One Village that covers the whole planet – it removes the notion of 'outside of the

³⁰⁹ Coined by McLuhan & Fiore, 1986, in their book *War and Peace in the Global Village*. See for further relevant literature, for example, Manuel Castells's work on the network society (Castells, 1996; Castells, 1997a; Castells, 1997b), or Harvey, 1990; Luke & Toulouse, 1998; Luke, 1989; Luke, 1990.

village' from the planet's surface, together with its traditional use as a kind of 'black hole' into which 'enemies,' 'unwanted villagers' and ecological 'waste' are to be 'thrown.'³¹⁰

In other words, in a Global Village it might carry an unbearably high price to humiliate people, not least because those who become resentful cannot leave or be made to leave – to Australia or the Americas – as easily as before. Hitler's initial plan was to move Jews to Madagascar (Madagascar-Plan or Operation Madagascar, Jäckel, 1991, 60), yet, already at his time this proved unfeasible, and the only 'option left' – to him – was extermination, or – as would be proposed today – better integration of Jews and discontinuation of scapegoating them. The ensuing Holocaust represented the utter humiliation of Jewish citizens of the world and turned all of those still alive after the horrific onslaught into humiliated survivors, whose ensuing attempts to create a safe haven in Israel meet the geographical limits of the globe and the fact that nowhere is it 'empty' and the resulting lack of human rights for Palestinians. In short, the unfathomable humiliation through the Holocaust excluded Jews to a degree that they, understandably, do not feel safe anymore unless they have their own place that they can defend themselves – and this at historic times where the square opposite, namely overcoming frontiers – not drawing them – seems the timely way to coexist in One Village. In conclusion, humiliating and excluding people in the Global Village puts them, and the rest, into an impossible situation.

Enemies, or Bad Neighbours

A multitude of theoretical and practical premises collapses with the withering of frontiers between villages and the emergence of One Single Global Village. Even the use of day-to-day language is affected. For example, words such as 'enemy' lose firm ground. The 'enemy' typically was the one to threaten from 'outside' and to be killed by soldiers. In a world where there is no 'outside' anymore, there is no enemy. There is still hostility though, violence and conflict, but this is a familiar phenomenon and has always existed within a village; it has typically been relegated to neighbourhood mediation, police, or courts. The word 'enemy' thus loses its meaning together with the space that harboured it – 'difficult neighbour' becomes its replacement. And, indeed, the United Nations sends – no longer soldiers on killing-missions – but peacekeepers who try to pacify 'neighbours' who fight.

³¹⁰ See also Lindner, in Breines, Gierycz, & Reardon, 1999.

At times when the term ‘enemy’ still was popular, humiliating and even exterminating people was ‘legitimate,’ and it was, furthermore, doable – since there was ample space for people caught in cycles of humiliation and counter-humiliation to move between ‘villages’ or play them against each other. Interdependence in One Village had not yet arrived, an interdependence that makes it dysfunctional (and immoral) to neglect one’s neighbour’s need for respect and dignity. The current implementation of various conflict resolution institutions – from community mediation to international peace talks – illustrates the Village community’s awareness of the necessity to prevent neighbourhood conflicts from destroying the social fabric that is essential for the survival on a deeply interdependent globe.

*Male Soldiers, or Fe/Male Peacekeepers*³¹¹

The terminology and reality of gender relations is affected by this transition as well. In the past, when war meant death, men were sent out to die. Women and children were the ones that were supposed to stay alive, either protected by their men or enslaved by the victors. If we take it that the ‘selfish gene’ (Dawkins, 1976) frames the reality of long-term survival of groups of human beings, in other words, if we accept that men and women as individuals are ‘redundant’ as soon as they have secured the survival of their genes, then men are ‘redundant’ at a younger age, because they can ‘produce’ many children in a short time span, something a woman cannot. Any group that ever developed the custom to send out woman as warriors to protect their men and children had much less chance to survive and safeguard the continuation of their genes; if such a cultural set-up ever existed, it did not leave many traces.

However, as soon as traditional imperial war ‘between villages’ ceases to exist together with the division between them, the old division of roles into those who are ‘ready to die,’ in order to protect others, disappears with it. Women today increasingly enter into professions that once were ‘too dangerous’ for them, from lorry driver to airplane pilot. This is because there are large regions in the world today where mobility is safe, as opposed to former times where bandits waited for anybody who moved beyond the city walls. In other words, it is dangerous to move between villages – and this was the sphere were men traditionally move – but it is much less dangerous to move inside a village – and therefore women stayed ‘inside.’ The fact that it is safer ‘inside’ has not changed since villages exist – however, today the whole planet is in the process of turning into one single ‘inside-the-

³¹¹ See also Lindner, in Breines, Gierycz, & Reardon, 1999.

village' where both women and men can move. The 'outside,' the sphere of men, the field where they gave their lives as warriors, is currently disappearing, and with it many male roles.

This transition indicates that women may rise from their former place of subordination where humiliation was their daily lot, and become full members of a human society of men and women. Indeed, this transition is currently unfolding in all parts of the world at different paces, creating complicated patterns of cycles of humiliation; for example female opposition to humiliation may be interpreted by some men as meant to humiliate them.

Man Is Aggressive, or Noble

If we address the origins of violence then two concepts compete. The philosopher Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, 1951) believed that there exists a 'state of nature' in which humans cannot escape their urge for power, enmity and war, and that only a 'social contract' can enable humankind to tame evil.³¹² Realist theory, the first international relations theory,³¹³ is grounded in the Hobbsian assumption that human beings are naturally 'avaricious,'³¹⁴ rapacious and aggressive, and therefore in need of a social contract as foundation of a state, if they at all were to have a chance to live together in some kind of peace. Hobbes affirms that life outside of the state is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' (Hobbes, 1951, 91).

On the other side we find Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was impressed by the 'noble savage.' The French philosopher did not deny that there is violence between people, but he turned the relationship between cause and effect upside down: According to him nature has provided human beings with a repugnance to see ones own kind suffer. According to him violence and brutality arise from society's influence.

Rousseau claimed that everybody emerges out of early childhood either with a 'slave' mentality or with that of a 'tyrant.' Fanita English writes: 'These terms can well be applied to the extremes of two defensive existential positions, for at about age three the child decides either that he must submit, be a "slave" or that he'll have to keep trying to find ways to control others at all costs, to become a "tyrant." Whichever position he settles on henceforth determines his character and his future attitude in relation to power issues, particularly at times of physical, or social stress. (English, 1999, 1)

³¹² See also Hampton, 1986.

³¹³ See, for example, Groom & Mitchell, 1978; Neuman, 1998; Keohane, 1989.

³¹⁴ See, for example, Turner, 1998.

Fanita English continues by saying that contrary to becoming either ‘slave’ or ‘tyrant,’ ‘Of course most of us do also develop the more stable position: I’m O.K., You’re O.K.’ (1). With ‘I’m O.K., You’re O.K.’ she describes the basic principle of mutual respect in a ‘decent society’ as it is discussed by Avishai Margalit (Margalit, 1996). His book *The Decent Society* is being commented upon by Stuart Hampshire³¹⁵ with regard to Rousseau: ‘The Decent Society develops with great subtlety a theme largely neglected in political philosophy since Rousseau. Alongside the denial of freedom, in a less than decent society, there can also be the humiliation that comes from second-class citizenship and the pain of exclusion from full humanity. Margalit’s account is notable for its fine discriminations, sensitivity, and care.’

Accordingly, we find that later versions of International Relations theory (Liberalism and Structural Realism) do not assume anymore that ‘man is aggressive by nature.’ Today human beings are not anymore seen as necessarily either aggressively dominating or fearfully cowering, but, on the contrary, authors write books with titles such as *The Decent Society* and acclaim Rousseau’s view on human nature as ‘noble.’ Again we are confronted with a historic change that may have something to do with the word ‘enemy’ that loses potency inside the Global Knowledge Village and leaves as worst case the ‘bad neighbour’ with whom I have trouble, who I may hate, but who the other ‘villagers’ do not necessarily regard as evil. On the contrary, instead of condemning one side as evil and supporting the ‘good’ side, the other villagers get frustrated and tired of conflict (in Israel-Palestine, Northern-Ireland, on the Balkans, and so forth) and sigh, ‘Why on earth can’t they keep peace, these people – don’t they understand that they are neighbours and have to find peaceful ways of living together!?’ We are tired of seeing these pictures of blood and death on our television screens! Surely, both sides are partly right and partly wrong, they have to sit together and find a solution to their problems! When on earth do they learn reason!’ And with ‘reason’ these voices mean that human beings ought to be seen as basically ‘good’ and entitled to a life within the context of human rights.

This book and the present author’s own work is inscribed in this transition insofar as, coming from clinical psychology, I am used to search for ‘good’ reasons for my clients’ behaviour, even if their behaviour seems ‘evil’ at first. I worked with clients for thirteen years, six years in Germany, seven years in Egypt. Often ‘evil’ behaviour turns out to be quite an understandable and even ‘reasonable’ adaptation to past situations, especially to a child’s

³¹⁵ See http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8621/book_decentsociety.html or <http://www.opengroup.com/open/phbooks/067/0674194365.shtml>, retrieved in October 1998.

repertoire of responses. Clients who understand their ‘evil’ sides in a new and more constructive light are able to better accept their self and to integrate those ‘evil’ sides in an equally new and more constructive way into their personalities. I apply the same ‘therapeutic urge’ when confronted with armed conflicts like raids, oppression, war, Holocaust, genocide, freedom fighting, or global policing and would like to minimise the field of ‘evil’ and make clear that certain phenomena are quite understandable, even rational, if understood in the context in which they developed. And humiliation seems to be a suitable concept to gain such an understanding and also develop counter-measures that heal and prevent future cycles of humiliation.

Security Dilemma, or Co-operation

In a context where the world is seen as guided by ‘anarchy’ – anarchy as the ‘state of nature’ (Hobbes, 1951), the Security Dilemma is unavoidable: ‘I have to amass power, because I am scared. When I amass weapons, you get scared. You amass weapons, I get more scared’ ... and thus an arms race and finally war can be triggered.’³¹⁶ Beverly Crawford explained: ‘Even “nice” leaders or countries have to end turn traitor when the Security Dilemma effects a spiral of insecurity and preventative war. World War I illustrates how Russia mobilised troops, and Germany and Austria, seeing this, mobilised even quicker. Later Hitler wanted more territory to be more powerful than the allies who had “betrayed” Germany before.’

Clearly, the Security Dilemma is a cruel dilemma, a dilemma that makes human beings appear ‘evil,’ independent from any debate on nature (even ‘nice’ leaders have to go to war). Combined with the ‘innovative idea’ of agriculture that gave rise to the creation of empires, it pitted not only clan leaders but huge societal entities with massive capacities to develop gruesome weapons against each other. Hobbes may be correct in arguing that a ‘social contract’ for the creation and maintenance of super-ordinate structures can tame this ‘evil.’ However, this is difficult to carry out, exactly because of the forceful nature of the Security Dilemma.

Yet, the current trend of globalisation – if understood as an increase of interdependence – may, at least in the long run, have the beneficial effect of weakening the Security Dilemma on a global and local level and facilitate conditions that lend themselves to the implementation of global and local social contracts, an effect that, indeed, is already beginning to be felt. Super-

³¹⁶ Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th – 25th July 1997.

ordinate structures, though only starting to be institutionalised at a global level are in the process to form.³¹⁷

To conclude, if global interdependence, both imagined and real, at the level of institutions and cultural beliefs, indeed represents a push towards weakening the Security Dilemma, then humiliation, both in its traditional form as honour humiliation and as human rights humiliation, will increasingly become dysfunctional and immoral.

Strict Father, or Nurturing Parent

‘We live in a world full of dangers, pitfalls, and conflict. To survive in such a world we need to be strong and we need to have our values firmly in place. The Strict Father family model emerges in response to this perception of life as hard and dangerous. It is a model of the family geared toward developing strong, morally upright children who are capable of facing the world’s threats and evils’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 313). This is how Lakoff and Johnson describe the basic Strict Father family model in which ‘the father [is] having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family,’ and the ‘father has authority to determine the policy that will govern the family’ (313).

‘Because of his moral authority, his [the father’s] commands are to be obeyed. He teaches his children right from wrong by setting strict rules for their behavior and by setting a moral example in his own life. He enforces these moral rules by reward and punishment. The father also gains his children’s cooperation by showing love and by appreciating them when they obey the rules. But children must not be coddled, lest they become spoiled. A spoiled

³¹⁷ The UN global conferences – from Rio de Janeiro (1992) to Rome (1996) – have all emphasised the relationship between the three main goals of the UN Charter: peace, development and human rights. A state that abuses human rights cannot anymore trust that its sovereignty will prevent inference from newly emerging super-ordinate structures at the highest, the global level, and dictators from around the world observe with special attention how Chile’s General Augusto Pinochet was apprehended in London. The adoption of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court on 17th July 1998 represented a historic breakthrough for international criminal justice. See also, for example, paragraph 123 retrieved from <http://www.unog.ch/genet/reform/intro.htm> on 6th January 2001: ‘The momentum towards nuclear disarmament has increased significantly with the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its endorsement by the General Assembly; the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the establishment of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone; efforts to bring fully in force the Treaty of Bangkok, which establishes a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South East Asia; and the strengthening of Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Other positive developments have been the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the strengthening of the prohibition against biological weapons. Recent progress in the effort to reduce and eliminate landmines is also of crucial importance to the United Nations.’

child lacks the appropriate moral values and lacks the moral strength and discipline necessary for living independently and meeting life's challenges' (313).

The Strict Father family model 'gives top priority to the metaphors of Moral Authority, Moral Strength, and Moral Order. The Strict Father family is seen as manifesting an appropriate moral order in which the father is naturally fitted to run the family and the parents have control over their children. The strict father's moral authority comes from his natural dominance and strength of character. His moral strength and self-discipline make him the fitting embodiment of morality, a model for his children' (314).

The Nurturant Parent family is the contrasting moral system that Lakoff and Johnson describe. 'The primal experience behind this model is that of being cared for and cared about, having one's desires for loving interactions met, living as happily as possible, and deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care' (315).

Lakoff and Johnson explain that the Nurturant Parent family model assumes that 'children develop best in and through their positive relationships to others, through their contribution to their community, and through the ways in which they realize their potential and find joy in life' (315). Children in this model are expected to become responsible, self-disciplined, and self-reliant through being cared for and respected and through caring for others. 'Support and protection are part of nurturance, and they require strength and courage on the part of parents. Ideally, as children mature, they learn obedience out of their love and respect for their parents, not out of the fear of punishment' (315).

Lakoff and Johnson caution critics by emphasising that Nurturant Parent morality 'is not, in itself, overly permissive. Just as letting children do whatever they want is not good for them, so helping other people to do whatever they please is likewise not proper nurturance. There are limits to what other people should be allowed to do, and genuine nurturance involves setting boundaries and expecting others to act responsibly. Of course, there are what Lakoff has called "pathological" versions of Nurturant Parent morality that are excessively and imprudently permissive' (316).

Later in their book on the embodiment of philosophy, Lakoff and Johnson refer to evidence from three areas of psychological research, namely attachment theory, socialisation theory, and family violence studies, and explain that this research shows that the Strict Father model 'does not, in fact, produce the kind of child that it is supposed to foster. It is supposed to develop children who have a conscience and who are morally strong, capable of resisting temptations, independent, able to make their own autonomous decisions, and respectful of others. But such research, especially socialization research, shows the Strict Father family

tends to produce children who are dependent on the authority of others, cannot chart their own moral course very well, have less of a conscience, are less respectful of others, and have no greater ability to resist temptations' (327).

To summarise, Lakoff and Johnson's book is inscribed into the current transition from hierarchical societal structures to egalitarian structures. The Strict Father family model reproduces hierarchy by inflicting humiliation, the Nurturant Parent family model creates citizens in a world where human rights reign within egalitarian societal structures – and, significant for the current direction of social change, Lakoff and Johnson, instead of defending the former, stand for the latter.

No Empathy (the Other Is Out There), or Empathy (the Other Is in Me)

'Parents who showed empathy toward their children were thought sinful. When one concerned mother took her sick infant from the nurse's breast and rocked her to sleep herself, a relative warned her that "such exaggerated love was a crime against God, and He would surely punish it"' (Aksakov, 1924 in de Mause, 1990, 3). 'Those who didn't whip their children but rather treated them kindly were considered odd. At the end of the nineteenth century, Grigori Belinskii, who didn't beat his children, was described as "the only father in the city who understood that in raising children it is not necessary to treat them like cattle"' (D.P. Ivanov in de Mause, 1990, 3).

The *Journal of Psychohistory* documents the gruesome past of childrearing and the weak standing of empathy in the past. Alice Miller terms the *Journal of Psychohistory* as 'the first journal that doesn't gloss over the facts of childhood.'³¹⁸ Alice Miller is the renowned author of the book *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence* and often quoted analyst of Hitler's childhood in the light of the then practiced childrearing methods of 'breaking the will of the child.'

Lloyd de Mause, the editor of the journal, uses the example of Russia to demonstrate the transition from old to new child rearing practices; he writes (2): 'It is not surprising that until recently child mortality in Russia was triple that of Western Europe, with well over half of all born dying during childhood.'³¹⁹ In Western Europe...severely abusive childrearing

³¹⁸ See http://www.psychohistory.com/htm/01_journal.html, 1, retrieved in March 2000.

³¹⁹ De Mause presents the following sources for this claim: Patrick P. Dunn, in de Mause, 1974, 385, and Nancy M. Frieden, in Ransel, 1978, 236-237. He writes: 'The statistics summarized in these sources (69 percent childhood mortality in nineteenth century Moscow, for instance) are for more

practices had gone out of style centuries earlier. Ice-water bathing, for instance, had been a standard practice in all of Europe, but began to be widely criticized during the eighteenth century. While earlier diaries had often reported that newborns had “Died of being baptized” in ice-water³²⁰ and doctors had recommended daily ice-water baths for children,³²¹ parents by the end of the eighteenth century began to consider such “hardening” practices unnecessarily severe.’ De Mause refers to a voice from 1797: ‘To see a little infant [washed] in cold water...itself in one continuous scream, and the fond mother covering her ears under the bed-clothes that she may not be distressed by its cries has ever struck me as a piece of unnecessary severity...’³²²

Patrick P. Dunn reports that beating little children with whips was a normal practice even among the educated and was called ‘the eradicator of evil and the cultivator of virtue’ (Dunn, in de Mause, 1974, 396-397, in de Mause, 1990, 3). De Mause refers to the traditional Russian family handbook, *Domostroi*, that suggested, that one must ‘inflict more wounds on him and you will rejoice afterward...crush his ribs while he is not yet grown, or else he will harden and cease to obey you.’ Barbara Alpern Engle, in Ransel, 2000 reports (47) how a woman revolutionary remembers that even daughters were often whipped unmercifully: ‘Unconditional obedience and crushing discipline was our father’s motto’ (in de Mause, 1990, 3). Eve Levin, 2000 reports (237) that the whip was so often used on children and wives that it was often presented to the husband as part of the wedding ceremony (in de Mause, 1990, 3).

De Mause continues his account and explains how ‘Parents were usually cold and unempathic to their children’s needs. Children of the nobility were usually sent to wetnurse in peasant families for their early years, and handed over to servants when they returned home.’ He refers to Engle, in Ransel, 2000, 48, who reports: ‘Children kissed their parents’ hands in the morning, thanked them for dinner and supper, and took leave of them before going to bed’ and to Dunn, in de Mause, 1974, 390, who lets Kostomarov sum up traditional Russian childrearing as follows: ‘Between parents and children, there reigned a spirit of slavery...’

De Mause concludes his journey through the psychohistory of childrearing strategies and its relations ‘The evolution of childhood from incest to love and from abuse to empathy has been a slow, uneven path, but one whose progressive direction is, I think, unmistakable. This evolution of parent-child relations is, I contend, an independent source of historical

advanced areas; the rate for all of Russia is certain to be much higher, especially if infanticide rates are considered, which they are not.’

³²⁰ De Mause presents as source Alice Morse Earle, 1968, 2.

³²¹ De Mause presents as source John Floyer, 1702, and John Jones, 1579, 3.

³²² Scevole de St.Marthe, 1797, 63.

change, lying in the ability of successive generations of parents to live through their own childhood traumas a second time and work through their anxieties in a slightly better manner this second time around. It is in this sense that I say that history is like psychotherapy, which also heals through revisiting one's childhood traumas and reworking earlier anxieties. If the parent – the mother, for most of history – is given even the most minimal support by society, the evolution of childhood progresses, new variations in historical personality are formed, and history begins to move in new, innovative directions' (de Mause, 1998, 7).

De Mause explains that Stalin had an alcoholic father who used to give his wife and children 'frightful beatings,' kick them with his boots and try to kill them. His mother used to beat him as well' (Rancour-Laferriere, 1988, 36, 59, in de Mause, 1998, 4). De Mause continues and reports that Stalin also beat his own children and that he, predictably, as a leader, was responsible for the deaths of millions of his countrymen. In contrast, de Mause points out, Gorbachev, born in 1931, had parents who treated him with respect. 'Although hardly a crusading democrat, Gorbachev has personality traits that are quite different from those of his predecessors. Calm and even-tempered even as a child, able to be romantic toward women, including his wife, he can represent those in the Soviet Union who no longer need political swaddling and violence and who are able to tolerate democratic reform' (de Mause, 1998, 4).

De Mause rounds up his account and views the predicament of leaders in to that of their followers (4): 'Leaders, after all, are only delegates of the people's wishes, and these take several decades to change after childrearing has changed. By the time Gorbachev came to power, it had been five decades since the nightmare of traditional Russian childhood had begun to disappear, so that many in the Soviet Union now find they no longer need totalitarian leaders, violent collectivizations or Gulags.'

To summarise, De Mause identifies humiliating treatment of children as a major culprit of malign leadership because both followers and leaders are caught in a lifelong need to create and maintain cycles of humiliation. He also describes how humiliating child rearing practices diminished, in different parts of the world to varying degrees and pace.

Peace Is the Absence of Conflict, or Peace Is the Presence of Institutional Channels to Calibrating Conflict

In the spirit of earlier chapters it can be suggested that strictly hierarchical societies will define peace as the absence of conflict and discord as a result of successful oppression of

underlings (including nature and women), while human rights give rise to alternative mottos, for example that of ‘conflict resolution,’ with the idea that conflicts should be ‘solved’ once and for all to guarantee peace, and later to the even more fluid notions of conflict transformation. Today many would promote the concept of discourse³²³ where conflictual positions can be aired and continuously adjusted in an atmosphere of mutual respect and equality. Democracy, for example, thrives on debate, and debate thrives on diverse positions, and conflict does not necessarily require resolution, but channels for expression – arenas and institutions that enable diversity on the background of human rights. Peace defined in a human rights context is when equals have many institutional forums to fruitfully discuss different points of view; conflict, discord and diversity often are potential sources of creativity that ought to be fostered. Humiliating each other is seen as counterproductive and immoral in such democratic contexts.

Revolution Leads to Just Another Hierarchy, or Human Rights As Continuous Revolution

Rebellions and revolutions characterise human history. In the past they usually led to either victory or defeat of one party, however, to the unchanged continuation of the hierarchical nature of the system. In other words ‘slaves,’ who rose, toppled the old master and became ‘masters’ themselves in case they won the uprising, but hierarchy itself was not toppled, even in those cases where the revolutionaries put exactly that on their banners; communism, to name just one example, preached equality but practised hierarchy.

Today’s communication technology introduces a deep change: it enables a never-ending continuous revolution to unfold, a revolution that hinders new hierarchical structures to settle. Human rights would, perhaps, not have much of a chance, if not modern communication technology made it increasingly difficult to hide their violations. Human rights advocacy could thus be described as a continuous revolution against humiliating practices and institutions. The cycle of breaking up and hardening of structures that took centuries in former times, today transforms into a continuous process of keeping structures fluid: human rights are never securely ‘won,’ they have to be regained again and again in a continuous revolution that – thanks to telephone, internet, airplanes, and so forth – has a better

³²³ See on discourse especially Habermas, 1996, and, furthermore, Baumann, 1996; Bremer, 1996; Clyne, 1994; Crawford, 1999; Edwards, 1999; Gee, 1999; Habermas, 1996; Harper, 1996; Hoffman, 1996; Marshall, 1996; Milliken, 1999; Morgan, 1998b; Sitaram & Prosser, 1998; Yanai, 1996.

chance than ever to be sustained by the ‘revolutionaries’ of every generation against any would-be humiliator in the Global Village.

Vaccination and Surgery Are Necessary and Hurt, or Hurting is Illegitimate

There were historic times where it was generally accepted that people wanted power and domination. Especially since the French revolution, however, equality, or the eradication of hierarchy itself, has been the great new aim. Since then revolutionaries who may just want power – and not at all equality – are compelled to pay at least lip service to the ideal of equality, or they have to find specific justifications for their wish to dominate others. Hitler, for example, found that Aryans were ‘Herrenmenschen,’ who are destined to rule. In other words, in his eyes nature or ‘providence’ gave him a justification for dominating others that went further than pure lust for power. In the same way as cruel child rearing methods were characterised as ‘for your own good’ (see Alice Miller’s book with the same title), Hitler and his followers tried to put forward the argument that ‘lower people’ would in fact benefit from being led by Aryans, and that the process of forming the kind of world where Aryans ruled was like a ‘surgical operation,’ or a ‘vaccination’: in both cases it hurts, but it is necessary and, in the long run, beneficial.

Heinrich Himmler indoctrinated the SS with an apocalyptic ‘idealism’ beyond all guilt and responsibility, which rationalised mass murder as a form of martyrdom and harshness towards oneself. In his infamous speech at Poznan on 4th October 1943, Heinrich Himmler explained to his SS-men that he understood how difficult it was to exterminate the Jews, but that this was their duty, heavy and difficult, but necessary for the future. He said:

‘One principle must be absolute for the SS man: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood and to no one else. What happens to the Russians, what happens to the Czechs, is a matter of utter indifference to me. Such good blood of our own kind as there may be among the nations we shall acquire for ourselves, if necessary by taking away the children and bringing them up among us. Whether the other peoples live in comfort or perish of hunger interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur. Whether or not 10,000 Russian women collapse from exhaustion while digging a tank ditch interests me only in so far as the tank ditch is completed for Germany. We shall never be rough or heartless where it is not necessary; that is clear. We Germans, who are the only people in the world who have a decent attitude to animals, will also adopt a decent attitude to these human animals, but it is a crime against our own blood to worry about them and to bring

them ideals. I shall speak to you here with all frankness of a very grave matter. Among ourselves it should be mentioned quite frankly, and yet we will never speak of it publicly. I mean the evacuation of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish people...Most of you know what it means to see a hundred corpses lying together, five hundred, or a thousand. To have stuck it out and at the same time – apart from exceptions caused by human weakness – to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has never been written and shall never be written.’³²⁴

The ‘Morgan Report,’ an official top secret report on ‘implemented and recommended measures’ for a ‘final solution’ to Somalia’s ‘Isaaq problem’ was written by General Mohammed Sidi Hersi ‘Morgan,’ Siad Barre’s Majerteen son-in-law, on 23rd January 1987. Morgan writes that the Isaaq and their supporters must be ‘subjected to a campaign of obliteration,’ in order to prevent that they ‘raise their heads again.’ He continues: ‘today, we possess the right remedy for the virus in the [body of the] Somali State.’³²⁵

Hitler’s Germany and Siad Barre’s Somalia did collapse, and arguments in the line of ‘necessary vaccination’ or ‘surgery’ with respect to the enslavement and eradication of whole groups of human beings have since acquired the highly negative label of ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing,’ as much as at the family level cruel child rearing practices are being discontinued in large parts of the world – even more, such practices are called ‘child abuse.’

Even medicine itself, the source of the vaccination or surgery metaphor, is not spared of this development; the practice of vaccination and surgery has changed even there. Undoubtedly, vaccination has its important place in medicine, and will presumably always have it, as has surgery in case of well-defined diseases. However, the argument of vaccination is handled with more care today – side effects are more cautiously weighed against desired protective effects than in former times. Equally, surgeons had to retreat from a too relaxed use of the knife. Hysterectomy (the removal of the uterus), just to give one example, was once an operation that was performed at the slightest sign of distress in the relevant part of the body of a woman, and in case of breast cancer the radical removal of the breasts used to be the immediate answer. Today, less invasive methods are preferred, among others because patients cannot be convinced anymore as easily as before that vaccination and surgery are ‘necessary’ at any cost.

³²⁴ Retrieved from <http://holocaust.about.com/msub1.htm?pid=2765&cob=home> in October 1999.

³²⁵ A worn-out copy of this report was shown to the present author in Hargeisa, November 1998.

In summary, enduring or perpetrating humiliating treatment is no longer being portrayed as necessarily being ‘good for you,’ or ‘good for our people.’ On the contrary, it is often perceived as infringement of human rights.

Purity, or Diversity

The argument of purity is another way of disguising desires for usurpation of power.³²⁶ Purity carries positive connotations, as does cleaning, or ‘extinguishing,’ for example a fire. Hitler promoted the argument that it would be ‘for the good’ of non-Aryans if a pure Aryan race ruled them – and that the purification and cleaning process, though unfortunately painful, was necessary. As quoted above, Jäckel reports how Hitler thought that ‘he had been the first to tackle the Jewish question realistically, that was the merit of National Socialism and therefore – in Hitler’s last words during his last conversation on April 2, 1945 – “the world will be eternally grateful to National Socialism that I have extinguished the Jews in Germany and Central Europe.”’ (Jäckel, 1991, 64).

Indeed, Hitler perceived a dying-off of the Aryans as happening around him. ‘Germany’s loss of World War I and subsequent economic problems were the visible contemporary evidence of Aryan decline. This descent occurred by the original sin of blood poisoning, or the contamination of the Aryan blood (soul) by an inferior race: The Aryan gave up the purity of his blood and, therefore, lost his sojourn in the paradise which he had made for himself. He became submerged in the racial mixture, and gradually, more and more, lost his cultural capacity, until at last, not only mentally but also physically, he began to resemble the subjected aborigines more than his own ancestors....’ (Spielvogel & Redles, 2001, 2). And, ‘the “serpent” that brought about the contamination of pure Aryan blood was, of course, the Jew’ (2).

In Rwanda ‘purification’ was meant to target the so-called ‘Inyenzi,’ meaning ‘cockroach’ in Kinyarwanda. ‘Inyenzi’ was a term used to describe Tutsi who invaded Rwanda in the 1960s. It was revived in 1990 to refer to members of the RPF.³²⁷ There are many more examples, not only pertaining to Germany or Rwanda. George Yacoubian writes (Yacoubian, 1999, 4), ‘From 1975-1979, the Pol Pot regime systematically subjected the

³²⁶ See, for example Mary Douglas’s book on *Purity and Danger* (Douglas, 1984); see also Malkki, 1995; Moore, 2000; Neusner & Douglas, 1973.

³²⁷ See, for example, Gourevitch, 1998 or African Rights, 1994 and Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995.

Cambodian population to forced labor, starvation, and outright murder. From the outset, the Khmer Rouge proclaimed the need for complete ideological and racial purity.³²⁸ R. J. Rummel, 1995, summarises (9). ‘Now, we do know well that in some genocides the victims have been perceived by the regime as a threat and publicly characterized as less than human, as apes, pigs, cockroaches, vermin, and the like.’

To conclude, the kitchen (cleaning), the hospital (vaccination, surgery), as well as the fire brigade (extinguishing a fire) with their connotations of ‘purification,’ ‘saving life’ and ‘enhancing human life’ are easily abusable metaphors for rulers who need to discretely circumvent any direct display of their will for power or desire for revenge. Genocides all over the world follow the same ‘recipe’: those to be killed are defined as ‘off,’ as in ‘offal,’ or as ‘un,’ as in ‘unworthy,’ in order to be ‘eligible’ for cleaning processes that would ‘vaccinate’ the body that supposedly has to survive, and ‘free’ it from ‘cancerous growths.’

Yet, today ‘diversity’ has become the buzzword that outshines the concept of purity. The ‘State of the World Forum,’ for example, launched a worldwide co-existence movement in May 1999 in Belfast,³²⁹ which wants cultural diversity to be not just accepted but also celebrated. Coexistence is defined as follows: ‘Coexistence does not deny distinctiveness; in fact, it encourages it, respecting the rich diversity in an ethnically rich global society.’³³⁰

Human history thus went from open display of lust for power to disguised strategies (use of cleansing- and purity metaphors) to the illegitimation of such practices and at last to the ‘celebration’ of diversity on the background of equality. At the same rate the application of open humiliation on underlings lost its taste of legitimacy and in many places changed into

³²⁸ The genocide in Cambodia was perpetrated against three categories of victims: religious groups, ethnic groups, and a part of the majority national group (Kiernan, in Andreopoulos, 1994). Yacoubian writes, ‘During Pol Pot’s effort to remold society, eradicate individualism, and create “total communism,” Cambodia was subjected to what was likely the world’s most radical political, social, and economic revolution.’ As Kiernan (1994, 191, quoted in Yacoubian) affirms, ‘the country was cut off from the outside world; schools and hospitals were closed; families were separated; and 1.5 million of its nearly 8 million people were starved to death or massacred.’

³²⁹ See www.worldforum.org: ‘The mission of the Coexistence and Community Building initiative is to catalyse a global awareness of and commitment to creating a world safe for difference. The initiative on coexistence and community building has as its goal to formulate and implement a strategic plan, which will bring coexistence into the mainstream consciousness of people around the world. How can coexistence become a compelling and enduring vision for humanity in the 21st century? How can we avoid the human tragedies, the genocides, and ethnocides that have characterised the history of the 20th century? How can we build a world where there is tolerance for minorities and greater understanding between peoples. What are the medium and long-term steps that need to be taken to create a world safe for difference? These were the questions posed in a series of meetings, roundtables and consultations that have been held by the State of the World Forum during the last two years.’

³³⁰ Adapted from Lindner, 2000e, 7.

disguised humiliation, and finally into the ideal that humiliating underlings ought to be abolished and diverse dignity among equals be celebrated.

Obedience, or Creativity

In strictly hierarchical societies obedience is what underlings learn. Slaves had to obey their masters, feudal ‘subjects’ their lords, and later on workers their foremen. Underlings were ill advised to try to be creative and find innovative solutions that would surprise their masters – innovation was only welcome if the master ordered it.

Modern businesses, however, increasingly do not only rely on knowledge that is obediently applied, but on creativity.³³¹ Creativity, however, is a very difficult concept. It cannot be ordered. Whoever is confronted with the concept of creativity is baffled by its paradoxical nature: if you try to command it, it disappears, when you least expect it, it comes. A wide range of empirical studies tries to examine the nature of creativity (to what extent the hemispheres of the brain are involved, for example³³²) and intelligence is defined in novel ways, including, for example, emotions.³³³

Creativity requires a certain attitude and an atmosphere of equality and freedom, particularly freedom from ‘terror’: In Lyotard’s (Lyotard, 1984) philosophy, the term ‘paralogy’ means a flood of good ideas that are inspired by conversation. ‘Postmoderns, he tells us, have a quest for “paralogy,” a hunger for stimulating conversation and ideas that work in a satisfying way. To get those ideas paralogists often share an irreverent attitude towards well accepted theories, breaking them up and recombining them in revolutionary new ways. The point of paralogy is to help us shake ourselves loose of stultifying traditional frameworks that we have come to take for granted in order to enhance our spontaneous creativity’ (Shawver, 2000, 1).

Shawver asks how we can enhance our creativity and answers that (1), ‘Lyotard observes that people today (in our postmodern era) have discovered ways to create paralogy... When paralogy works, it seems to rely on two techniques: First, postmoderns avoid “terror”, where terror means arbitrarily removing people from the discussion, in order to prevent them from talking even when they are presenting themselves in ways not designed

³³¹ See, for example, Lindner, 2000f.

³³² Representative for others, see, for example, Katz, 1983, ‘Creativity and Individual Differences in Asymmetrical Cerebral Hemispheric Functioning.’

³³³ See, for example, Damasio, 1994; Gardner, 1993; Goleman, 1996.

to shut us up. Second, paralogists allow people to define their terms locally. That is, if someone says “What I mean by ‘stuff’ is everything that I have that isn’t worth anything to anyone else,” in paralogy we let that definition stand as a local and provisional definition of ‘stuff.’ Rather than challenge the definition, we try to step inside the speaker’s vocabulary. This is generous listening and it promotes a reciprocal generosity when it is our turn to speak.’

Creativity depends also on motivation – and motivation depends on respect. Shawver writes about paralogy (Shawver, 2000, 1): ‘Lyotard also felt that paralogy would be fostered by agonistics, or contention [with] angry words. He thought that people would be inspired by a good fight.’ Shawver disagrees, ‘A good fight may be inspiring, but in the end, if the verbal weapons are lethal enough, it shuts the conversation up.’ Shawver believes that what is needed is agreeable disagreement, alternative disagreeing ideas presented in ways that do not offend, ‘Good ideas seem much more likely to flow when people do not anticipate having their character assassinated in pejorative language and when disagreement is less personal and more directed at the text being challenged’ (1).

Shawver suggests that paralogy is more likely to happen ‘when the participants give each other space to speak, let them negotiate the language they are going to use to say what they want to say. Generous paralogical listeners simply try to step inside each other’s language and make sense of it before they extend alternative statements. This requires us to ask people good questions but also to give people the space and support they need to answer those questions. People often do not know what they think unless others are willing to ask about it and listen’ (1).

To summarise, while childlike obedience permeated the lives of the majority of human beings during the past centuries – since the majority were underlings – this societal framing is in the process of changing. Creativity is widely sought today; whole nations tremble before global competition and the challenges that the global market presents to them. Creativity and paralogy seem to thrive in conditions of mutual respect for each other’s dignity, as opposed to subjugating underlings in humiliating lowliness. Shawver’s position confirms that non-humiliating conditions are the best suited for achieving creativity as an asset within a knowledge-based society, as opposed to humiliating abasement and requirements for obedience that would not render such assets.

Transcendent, or Immanent God

Why did industry finally flourish in the West and not the rest of the world, although China was ahead in many ways – the compass, just to name one example of Chinese innovativeness, made mobility much more efficient – and also the intellectual light of the Arab world vastly outdid the dark medieval age in Europe? Max Weber proposed that it was the Protestant Ethic that gave rise to capitalism (Weber, Winckelmann, 1978). Weber argued that Western legal and commercial changes were not in themselves a satisfactory explanation. Indispensable was the set of values called for by ascetic Protestantism: self-discipline, hard work, the careful use of time, the reinvestment of one's gains, personal honesty, creative innovation, and faith in the rewards of a just God. H. B. Jones presents empirical research that examines Weber's claims (Jones, 1997). This research found positive correlations between Protestant ethic values and internal locus of control (self-discipline), hard work, honesty, and belief in a just world; however, findings with regard to the use of time and money were inconclusive (the relationship with creative innovation was not examined).

If we look deeper into the issue of religion and its relation to the advent of modern technology, then we notice that far back in history the spiritual life of the earth's inhabitants was populated with deities that 'played' with human beings – Gods had their own lives, and humans were more or less insignificant to them. In Greek and Nordic mythology Gods were busy spinning intrigues and, if at all interested in human beings, then mostly in duping them. Also the God of the Old Testament was interested in humans only insofar as he disciplined and tested them, as the story of Job illustrates, in which God competes with Lucifer and Job's life is the stage. And the rule for human beings' dealings with each other was 'Do not love the other as yourself.'

It was only later, with the New Testament, that a loving God emerged who issued the rule of 'Love the other as yourself.' In all cases, however, God was far away, a transcendent God. At about the same time, in India, Hinduism was countered – not with a loving God – but with a godless religion, or a philosophy; Buddhism does not rely on a personified God, similar to Taoism in China. Increasingly, the rest of the world follows suit today with new age movements or 'preserve the earth' organisations that advocate immanent divinity also in the West.

If we were to analyse which spiritual concept is more conducive to peace, then the answer will be twofold: as long as a transcendent God is 'read' as teaching peace and tolerance, a transcendent concept of deity does, indeed, further peace. Quakers, for example, believe that God orders them to forsake violence. However, as soon as a transcendent God is

‘read’ as ordering violent competition, giving rise to slogans such as ‘this is “our” land and not yours!’ – war may easily be the result. Especially if God is understood as offering ample post-mortem rewards for particularly fearless martyrdom, this may be taken as an attractive offer.

An immanent God on the other side keeps people’s attention focused on life down on earth, not in heaven, and on life before death, not after death. An immanent divine concept may therefore, taken all factors together, be more conducive to peace than a transcendent concept, however, at the price of loss of guidance: if I believe that God orders me to either abstain from violence or use it, I have a clear guidance. This I lose when I believe in an immanent God and perceive my life as ‘embedded’ as opposed to ‘steered.’

If we hypothesise that, if the divine realm is related to the inner logic of people’s lives on earth, then we may conclude that the transition towards a win-win context in a Global Knowledge Village may promote increasingly immanent concepts of divinity, or, in other words, if I do not see a point in fighting until death, because I live in a win-win context inside a village, then I do not need divine support for war. The point relating to humiliation is that a worldview based on the concept of an immanent God, does not give much justification tools for perpetrating or accepting humiliation, since an immanent God gives dignity to everything and can hardly explain humiliation as ‘divinely ordained.’

Many more such small sections could be written. Further headings could be: ‘The Abasement of Human Beings Is Legitimate and Beneficial, or Illegitimate and Harmful,’ ‘Reason Rules, or Philosophy Is Embodied,’ or ‘Conservatives, or Liberals.’ Yet, at this point the listing of examples illustrating the current transition from hierarchy (and honour humiliation seen as legitimate) to equality (with human rights humiliation seen as illegitimate) is terminated and the underlying structure of these transitions is described.

The Core Structure of Current Transitions

One may ask what the above-described transitions have in common. Figure 9 depicts the core structure of these transitions, namely the movement from hierarchical rankings of the worth, value and importance of people as super-human or sub-human, to equal dignity for all human beings, or, in other words, the collapse of the top and bottom line into the line of equality. This transition entails the humbling of masters insofar as they have to descend from the top level of hierarchy that they ‘arrogated;’ and it entails the rising of the underlings or slaves who have to collect confidence to gain the level of equality. In short, ‘arrogant’ masters

descend and learn humility, while humiliated slaves rise and learn how to display pride and dignity. Clearly, as mentioned at other places in this book, this process is not proceeding without problems; master, for example, may not at all wish to descend, and underlings may not have the necessary confidence to rise, or, rising underlings may be perceived as humiliators by masters, while descending masters may be criticised as traitors by their peers.




Figure 9: The transition to equal dignity for every human being

Many parties – actors and reactors – are involved in the here-described transformative process of dismantling hierarchical structures that characterises current social change. Bringing somebody down – be it as humiliation or humbling (humiliation: denying due respect; humbling: rejecting conceited arrogance) – these are acts carried out by actors. Humbling, for example, may be intended by an actor as prosocial humbling to build and maintain equality. Dictatorships, totalitarian systems, coercive hierarchies, these are structures that can only be dismantled by humbling those who believe that they have a right to stand above others and decide over their lives. The actors in such cases intend to introduce or maintain a line of equality for the whole of humankind (human rights/dignity paradigm). Advocates of human

rights around the world and members of international organisations that promote human rights are the actors that promote such transformations.

However, humbling may also be intended by actors who belong to the old hierarchical order as – at least in the mind of such an actor – prosocial humbling, however, in their case in order to build and maintain hierarchy. Such actors intend to introduce or maintain ‘horizontal’ lines demarcating lower classes or categories of people. Yet a lower line is introduced when humiliation is intended to facilitate eradication of people. Actors in such cases introduce a ‘bottom line,’ under which victims are placed, turned into ‘pests,’ and excluded from humanity. This prepares the situations for killing (as in cases of genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and Holocaust). Thirdly, humiliation may be an entirely unintended and unnoticed side effect of an actor’s conduct.

After having been triggered the process of humiliation or humbling may unfold in various ways and at different levels, for example at macro levels (for example in international relations) meaning, for instance, that the actor may be a leader who incites followers to humiliate members of another group, it may unfold at meso levels (for example in intergroup and interpersonal relations) meaning, for instance, that the actor may be a person humiliating another person, or at micro levels (for example in intra-psychic relations) where, for instance, Emmanuel Kant requires Reason to dominate and humble Will and Passion within a person. Table 16 systematises these strands of the tapestry of humiliation.

<p>BRINGING SOMEBODY DOWN – be it as humiliation or humbling (humiliation: denying due respect; humbling: rejecting conceited arrogance) – THESE ARE ACTS CARRIED OUT BY AN ACTOR</p>		
<p>↙ ↘</p>		<p>↘</p>
<p>Humbling may be intended by the actor</p>		<p>Humiliation may be intended by the actor</p>
<p>↙ ↘</p>		<p>↓</p>
<p>as prosocial humbling to build and maintain equality. The actor in this case intends to introduce or maintain a ‘horizontal’ line of equality for the whole of humankind (human rights/dignity paradigm).</p>	<p>as prosocial humbling to build and maintain hierarchy. The actor intends to introduce or maintain ‘horizontal’ lines demarcating lower classes or categories of people (hierarchy/honour paradigm).</p>	<p>to facilitate the eradication of people. The actor in this case introduces a ‘bottom line,’ which excludes the victims from humanity, turns them into ‘pests,’ and prepares for their killing (as in cases of genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and Holocaust).</p>
<p>↓</p>	<p>↓</p>	<p>↓</p>
<p>The process of humiliation or humbling may unfold at</p>		
<p>↙ ↓ ↘</p>		
<p>macro levels (e.g. in international relations)</p> <p>↓</p> <p>meaning e.g. that the actor may be a leader who incites followers to humiliate members of another group.</p>	<p>meso levels (e.g. in intergroup and interpersonal relations)</p> <p>↓</p> <p>meaning e.g. that the actor may be a person humiliating another person.</p>	<p>micro levels (e.g. in intrapsychic relations)</p> <p>↓</p> <p>Kant e.g. requires Reason to dominate and humble Will and Passion.</p>

Table 16: Humiliation and humbling as act

There are many variations possible of how a victim may react to humiliation. A victim may correctly perceive a perpetrator's intentions to humble or humiliate the victim, or a victim may not perceive a perpetrator's humiliating act as humiliating. In the last instance the victim may not be labelled 'victim' – unless a third party suggests that this person or party ought to be called 'victim' after all, since they ought to feel humiliated, or since they appear to merely being unconscious of actually feeling humiliated (see here the problem of 'false consciousness' that Marxists struggled with when they expected that workers worldwide ought to feel humiliated and rise). A victim may also perceive as humiliation what a perpetrator does not intend to be humiliating, as for example in the case of helping, which may have a humiliating effect and turn the recipient of help into a victim of humiliation.

A victim's response to humiliation may vary also in other ways. A former master, confronted with human rights activists, may label humiliation as prosocial humbling and become a participant in a world of equal human beings. Another victim, in a traditional oppressive hierarchy, would perhaps also label humiliation as prosocial humbling, but transform into a humble underling – thus either accepting the perpetrator's intentions to draw 'horizontal' hierarchical demarcation lines, or misjudging the actor's intentions in this way (many Jews lost their lives to this misjudgement since the perpetrator's aim was not to include them into a lower class in an existing hierarchy, but to exclude them totally and kill them). Victims of humiliation tend to introduce rifts of enmity, either as response to the rift the perpetrator meant to introduce, or as new rifts that the perpetrator did not intend to create (many perpetrators misjudge their underlings and expect thankfulness when they actually breed resentment).

The consequences of humiliation/humbling may be happiness for a 'victim,' a former master and now free and equal human being, for example, may find happiness, and this is what human rights advocates work for. Yet, even humble underlings in hierarchical orders may find happiness in being humble underlings; religious faith is often built on such humility. In the case of misjudgement, as in the case of Jews who thought that they were 'only' about to be humbled, and not killed, the consequence is bitter disappointment and death. However, in most cases the response to being exposed to humiliation may start with depression, lead to the creation of hitherto non-existent 'culture differences' and subtle sabotage of the humiliator's actions, finally it may lead to counter-humiliation in the form of massacres, including violence, riots, terrorism, genocide and war. Table 17 depicts this web of connections.

HUMILIATION (as opposed to feeling recognised and respected) AND HUMBLING ARE FEELINGS FELT BY A VICTIM		
	↙ ↓ ↘	
A victim may correctly perceive a perpetrator's intentions to humble or humiliate the victim.	A victim may not perceive a perpetrator's humiliating act as humiliating and may in this case not be labelled as 'victim,' - unless a third party suggests that this person or party ought to be called 'victim' after all, since they ought to feel humiliated, or since they appear to merely being unconscious of actually feeling humiliated (e.g. the problem of 'false consciousness').	A victim may perceive as humiliation what a perpetrator does not intend to be humiliation, as for example in the case of helping, which may have a humiliating effect and turn the recipient of help into a victim of humiliation.
	↘ ↓ ↙	
A victim's response to humiliation may be to		
	↙ ↓ ↘	
label humiliation as prosocial humbling and become a participant in a world of equal human beings (in case this was what the actor intended)	label humiliation as prosocial humbling and transform into a humble underling, - thus either accepting the perpetrator's intentions to draw 'horizontal' hierarchical demarcation lines, or misjudging the actor's intentions in this way (many Jews lost their lives to this misjudgement since the perpetrator's aim was not to include them into a lower class in the existing hierarchy, but to kill them).	introduce a vertical exclusive rift of enmity, either as response to the rift the perpetrator meant to introduce, or as a new rift that the perpetrator did not intend to create (many perpetrators misjudge their underlings and expect thankfulness when they actually breed resentment).
↓	↓	↓
The consequence may be happiness, i.e. a free and equal human being may find happiness. This is what human rights advocates work for.	The consequence may be happiness, i.e. a humble underling may find happiness in being a humble underling. Religion e.g. is built on this. In the case of misjudgement the consequence is bitter disappointment and death.	The response may start with depression, lead to the creation of hitherto non-existent 'culture differences' and subtle sabotage of the humiliator's actions, finally it may lead to massacres including violence, riots, terrorism, genocide and war.

Table 17: Humiliation and humbling as feeling

At this point an analysis seems to be timely of why humiliation is so much more virulent and destructive in human rights contexts than in hierarchical honour-based structures. The first reason, often pointed out in this book, is the fact that humiliation is seen as legitimate in honour contexts, whereas it is judged as illegitimate in human rights environments. However, there is another reason that is related to the number of lines available to which a person or group can be debased to and still feel included. This is related to the fate of the Jews who accepted deportation by Hitler's helpers because they thought they were going to be sent to camps for work and not for extermination. They were prepared to accept degradation and abasement, because they imagined that they would still be part of the human family. However, Hitler's plan was to exclude them entirely from the ranking system of humankind – where he saw the Aryan super-human masters at the top. The fact that so many Jews did not refuse to be transported away, that they did not fight to death when put on trains, but queued up in orderly ways, shows the difference between abasement and total exclusion: abasement can, under certain circumstances, be psychologically survived, however, total exclusion and extermination is unfathomable, not just for the victims at the moment when they realise that death is their fate, but also for the survivors and all those born later.

However, in a context in which human rights reign, there is only one line left into which people ought to be included, namely the line of equality; abasement is no longer an option that still may be inclusive: the choice of the human rights code is but twofold, either 'equal' or 'excluded.' In other words, hierarchy offers ways for people to survive in conditions of abasement and humiliation, though painfully, since they still may feel part of the human family, yet, as soon as only one single line of equality is left into which humankind ought to fit, all expressions of humiliation, degradation, or abasement acquire the characteristics of total exclusion from the family of humankind and thus trigger unfathomable pain that cannot be psychologically supported even if it does not mean death.

Table 18 depicts how many version of humiliation a hierarchical honour society may contain, as opposed to a human rights context that allows for but one kind of humiliation – and in addition the worst, namely exclusion. Honour humiliation entails at least four variants.³³⁴ A master uses conquest humiliation to subjugate formerly equal neighbours into a position of inferiority. As soon as the hierarchy is in place, the master uses reinforcement humiliation to keep it in place. The latter may range from seating orders according to honour and rank, to bowing rules for inferiors in front of their superiors, but may also include brutal

³³⁴ See also Smith, 2000a.

measures such as customary beatings or even killings to remind underlings of their place. A third form, relegation humiliation, is used to push an already low-ranking underling even further down, and, finally, exclusion humiliation means excluding victims from the hierarchy altogether, in other words, exiling or killing them. The Holocaust and all genocides around the world are gruesome examples of the latter form of humiliation.³³⁵ In human rights contexts, the four types available in hierarchical structures collapse into one type, namely exclusion humiliation, since losing one's dignity means being excluded from the family of humankind. Human rights define the parameters of human dignity, thus their violation amounts to excluding those who suffer this exclusion from humanity.

³³⁵ See Lindner, 2000f, 8.

FOUR VARIANTS OF HUMILIATION		
	Honour humiliation Entails:	Human rights humiliation entails:
Conquest humiliation: When a strong power reduces the relative autonomy of rivals, previously regarded as equals, and forces them into a position of long-term subordination. Creation of hierarchy or addition of a new upper tier within a hierarchical order.	X	
Relegation humiliation: When an individual or group is forcefully pushed downwards within an existing status hierarchy.	X	
Exclusion humiliation: When an individual or group is forcefully ejected from society, for example through banishment, exile or physical extermination.	X	X
Reinforcement humiliation: Routine abuse of inferiors in order to maintain the perception that they are, indeed, inferior.	X	

Table 18: Four variants of humiliation, see also Smith, 2000a

In a human rights context exclusion humiliation, or the total expulsion from humankind – a fate that is not only unfathomably painful but also illegitimate, a fact that increases the pain even more – is the form in which humiliation expresses itself even if no killing is carried out. This is the reason why humiliation is so much more hurtful in a human rights context, and why so many practices that before were ‘normal’ and far from traumatic, acquire medical labels such as that of ‘trauma.’ Table 19 depicts this process and uses the former practice of ‘breaking the will of the child’ as example. Other examples could be inscribed.




Table 19: The notion of humiliation moves into the notion of trauma

The present author participated in the First International Conference on ‘The Role of Education in Promoting a Culture of Coexistence and Community Building’³³⁶ (23rd - 26th February 1999 in Bujumbura, Burundi), where she presented a paper on humiliation. The conference took place in Bujumbura which is dominated by the Tutsi elite, while Hutu typically live in the surrounding mountains from where shots could be heard at night and burning houses be seen in the morning. The organiser of the conference, the Education Minister, a Hutu intellectual and opposition leader, was part of a Tutsi government that tried to include Hutu. Any researcher confronted with such circumstances would have been in a very difficult situation, however, giving a talk on humiliation seemed almost impossible. A researcher could potentially even risk life if perceived as either supporting the Hutu or the Tutsi side, or if perceived as not supporting either side. Partiality can be as ‘dangerous’ as impartiality, as one person said it, ‘You are either for us or dead.’ In case of partiality one side feels empathetically understood, while the opposing side feels rejected, in case of impartiality no party feels empathetically understood. The present author had therefore to develop a

³³⁶ Conférence internationale sur le rôle de l’éducation dans la promotion d’une culture de convivialité et d’édification des communautés.

presentation for the conference that could be seen as impartial by both present groups, namely the Tutsi minority dominating the capital and government, and the Hutu Minister representing the majority of the population out in the countryside; but the presentation had also to be so 'partial,' so close to the reality of both groups, that both felt empathetically understood and correctly depicted.

This situation forced me to look for a wider framework in which to describe what is known as the Hutu-Tutsi struggle. I used the metaphor of the 'master' and the 'slave,' starting with traditional relationships between man and nature, men and women, coloniser and colonised, black and white. I then tried to describe which strategies both masters and slaves theoretically could use. One strategy would be to just accept the situation as it is and manipulate and 'optimise' it. This was done by early colonisers who gave privileges to some of the 'slaves,' thus introducing 'sub-masters' over the rest of the 'slaves,' 'sub-masters' who stayed on as 'master' when the former 'masters' left.

However, as described above, the strategy of accepting the 'master-slave' hierarchy is increasingly difficult in today's historic times that move towards egalitarian societal structures in which every person ought to enjoy equal human rights and nobody is supposed to be a slave anymore. In such a situation the 'slave' learns to understand that his or her subordinate position could in fact be seen as humiliation and thus should be changed. The 'slave' could firstly try to level the existing inequality by rising up to the 'master's' rank, for example, by imitating the master – getting, for example, an education in Oxford or Paris and becoming more French or English than the former coloniser (Fanon, 1986). This strategy is often unsatisfactory since the 'slave' understands that 'masters' does not really consider a person as equal who imitates them. The 'slave' might then rise up, and finally organise a freedom fight. Now it would be the 'master's' turn to feel humiliated, humiliated by the 'slave's' lack of 'thankfulness' for what the 'master' perceives as his or her benevolent parental care for the 'slave.' The 'master' would then try to suppress the 'slave's' freedom fight. Both parties would be locked in bitter war.

At this point genocide, ethnic cleansing and Holocaust could loom, such as in Rwanda where the Hutu, the 'former-slave-now-master' perpetrated an unfathomable genocide on the former 'master,' the Tutsi. The 'risen slave,' less experienced in being a leader than the former 'master,' therefore potentially less skilled or at least used to believe to be less skilled, could be haunted by feelings of inferiority towards the former 'master,' feelings which the 'risen slave' could perceive as humiliating, insofar as he or she believed that fighting for equal dignity ought to be justified and preceded by equal skills. Feeling inferior in a situation

where this is felt to be 'wrong,' could thus be translated by the 'former-slave-now master' into the metaphor of an 'infection' within the own body, an infection that then could be seen as having been caused by a microbe, namely the former 'master.' This could be said to be the context of genocide, ethnic cleansing and Holocaust, where a group of people is dehumanised and named 'cockroach,' 'vermin,' or 'microbe' before being exterminated with a 'cleaning' attitude.

The way out, the healing of the situation, would be the coalition between the moderates on both opposing sides. The real dividing line would not be the line between the opposing parties, but the line between extremists on both sides, who advocate either/or-strategies of 'preventing further infection or die,' and moderates on both sides, who try to regain more pragmatic views. Only a coalition of moderates could overcome the division. Extremists could even be said to be the most credible future moderates, in line with a Nelson Mandela who started out as an extremist, and turned into being a moderate.

This presentation was welcomed highly by all parties at the conference in Burundi, and was partly shown on television. During the following days the present author was stopped in the streets by people who wished to discuss this matter. The line of argument presented seemed to convince the involved parties.

Part III: Humiliation Today, or Therapy and Prevention

5. Holocaust and Genocide, and How Leaders Use Humiliation³³⁷

This chapter asks: Were ordinary Germans Hitler's 'Willing Executioners'? Goldhagen, 1996 wrote a hotly debated book entitled *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. Were ordinary Somalis 'willing rapists and killers'? Were Rwandans 'willing genocidaires'? Or were ordinary citizens rather victims of humiliating seduction and abandonment?

In this chapter it will be argued that the 'little people' or 'broad masses' were routinely humiliated in the hierarchical structure of German society before and after World War I, and that they were lifted up by Hitler insofar as he gave them a sense of importance and purpose. It was only after the 'Zusammenbruch' [break-down] after World War II that they slowly and painfully recognised that he had abused their gratitude and loyalty. It is claimed that similar dynamics are to be found in Somalia, and Rwanda. 'Hutu women married to Tutsi men were sometimes compelled to murder their Tutsi children to demonstrate their commitment to Hutu Power. The effect on these mothers is also beyond imagining' (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 16, paragraph 4). Such a Hutu mother, while perpetrating the murder, thought that her loyalty lay with her Hutu group and the sacrifice of her children was necessary. Today she is devastated, not only has she deprived herself of her family – she is also despised as 'genocidaire' and finds herself either in hiding or in prison. Her sacrifice was more than in vain, it was wrong; she, and so many other Rwandan 'genocidaires' understood – but too late – that their dedicated loyalty was misplaced.

³³⁷ This chapter is adapted from a revised version of Lindner, 2000q and Lindner, 2000i.

However, not every Hutu was loyal with the extremist Hutu elite; many moderates paid with their lives for their unwillingness to join in the killings. Also in Hitler's Germany not everybody felt the loyalty to Hitler. The German aristocracy, for example, did not share the feelings of the 'broad masses' who loved Hitler and legitimised him. The Hitler-veneration by the 'little people' was infuriating for many members of the aristocracy who were used to believing that they were the rightly ordained rulers. To be ruled by a lowly little painter from Austria, who was, furthermore, hiding behind the masses, this could be counted as the third big humiliation faced by the aristocracy in the time span of only a few decades. The first humiliation was the loss of World War I and the Versailles Treaty. Since the aristocracy were the primary carrier of national sentiment, they, above all, experienced the national humiliation resulting from the Versailles Treaty.

But humiliation did not end there for the aristocracy. The abdication of the emperor, and the founding of the Weimar republic was the next blow. It entailed the destruction of the divinely 'ordained' aristocratic order and caused constant humiliation. And thirdly, the rise of Hitler was the most unbelievable humiliation. The aristocracy thought at first, quite falsely, that they could 'domesticate' Hitler. For them he was a parvenu who highjacked their dearest theme, national sentiment, and worse, incited 'the masses,' making himself irreplaceable as their master.

Hitler was thus both a reason for pride, pride among the 'broad masses,' and also a cause of humiliation, humiliation for the aristocracy. On the 3rd August 1999 the present author visited members of two important aristocratic German families near Bonn (their names cannot be disclosed). One of them stems from a family of Hitler adversaries; she grew up with the image of Hitler as 'the demon.'³³⁸ The aristocracy clearly underestimated Hitler and were humiliated by the fact that he was much more successful than expected and they had to bow to him, while hoping that Hitler would become their puppet, and would help them to regain national honour.

Thus during the war Hitler was a reason for pride among the 'broad masses' but a source of humiliation for the aristocracy. Many a aristocrat served in the German 'Wehrmacht' [army] as generals and were executed by Hitler when they did not follow his suicidal orders. Many showed civil disobedience, not only those who tried – in vain – to kill him with a bomb (Claus Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg tried to kill Hitler in July 1944). Hans

³³⁸ I sincerely hope she will one day write the book that she began many years ago; the material she has collected, and the memories she carries are invaluable.

C. von Sponeck, a United Nations official with German aristocratic background, went in the footsteps of his father when he showed what he certainly would define as civil disobedience [he stepped down from his post as the head of the United Nations humanitarian programme in Iraq in opposition to the embargo against Iraq³³⁹]. In an interview on the BBC World channel ('hardtalk' with Tim Sebastian in May 2000) he explained how his father, a general, had been executed by Hitler because he refused to let his soldiers be slaughtered in a situation that would have meant their sure death.

However, after World War II, nobody could be proud. Humiliation was not a public phenomenon as it was after World War I, when a proud nation had been brought to its knees. After World War II humiliation was an inner experience felt by individuals. Every follower of Hitler must have felt humiliated by their own adherence to Hitler: the 'little people' for allowing a dangerous and dubious character like Hitler capture their hearts, the aristocracy for letting it happen.

This chapter includes a detailed discussion of Hitler's views about propaganda and his use of this instrument to seduce the masses. It concludes that present-day Germans suffer feelings of humiliation and anger not only at having lost World War II (and in some cases at being labelled accomplices in genocide) but also at having been 'taken in' by Hitler, and by their own desire to participate in the strong and positive feelings he created among the people at large. A similar chain of events unfolded in the case of the Somalian population in relation to the late dictator Siad Barre, and also in the case of Rwanda loyalty with the extremist Hutu elite set the stage for genocide. It is argued that the feelings of humiliation and resentment experienced by many Germans, Somalis, and Rwandans, are similar in important respects to the feelings many women and some men experience when they have been 'taken in' by a suitor who seduces and then cruelly disappoints them.

³³⁹ 'In a move that will certainly embarrass the United States, Hans Von Sponeck, the head of the United Nations humanitarian programme in Iraq, resigned after he publicly criticised the economic sanctions imposed on it. Von Sponeck, a German career UN official, who assumed office in Baghdad in 1998, has asked to leave his post as of 31 March, one month before his term would have ended. On Monday, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who has consistently defended Von Sponeck, said he had accepted the resignation of the UN official "with regret". Annan also praised Von Sponeck as an international servant "who has served the United Nations well for 36 years". Annan did not explain why he agreed to let his man in Baghdad leave, although he had previously rejected an American request to remove him from the post after Washington declared him persona non grata. Diplomats, who asked not be identified, said Von Sponeck decided to go after the United States expressed impatience with Annan because of his employee's repeated criticism of Washington's Iraqi policies' (Hemeid, 2000, retrieved from <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2000/469/re2.htm> on 20th May 2000).

Germany is currently undergoing a period of ‘working through’ the ‘Nazizeit’ [Nazi period]. ‘Zeitzeugen’ [witnesses of history] are interviewed, so-to-speak ‘before they die’ and it is ‘too late,’ in documentaries and TV chat shows that fill German TV programmes. But not only on television, also in private homes people reflect more openly than ever before and ‘unearth’ their memories, people who have been almost completely silent for over 50 years. This may indicate that the ‘Unfähigkeit zu trauern’ [the inability to mourn], described by Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich, 1982, had its origins in an inability to talk. The only ones who always had a voice were those few ‘Unverbesserliche’ [those who cannot be reformed], who at the far right of politics have continued to broadcast Nazi ideals ever since World War II, or those few critical intellectuals with historical interests who have written books. Now however, more than 50 years after the ‘Zusammenbruch’ [collapse] of Hitler’s Germany, the ‘little people’ are beginning to reflect. Whoever had thought those times were forgotten, had been misled by a façade of silence.

During the researcher’s fieldwork in Germany, especially during the years of the research on humiliation, she immersed myself in this discourse. When I began preparing the project’s idea in 1994 and started my research in 1997, the term humiliation was marginal; later, in 2000 and 2001, the whole German nation seems to talk about humiliation.

I heard people talk about World War II who had avoided this subject before, and they said things that shocked, surprised and moved me. The façade of silence had misled many into believing that those times were forgotten. But, clearly, memories had only been lingering under a thin cover for decades, waiting for the right time to come out. And astonishingly enough, even small details are still remembered now, both in the conversations I had and in the television documentaries or talks I monitored, details in all their multi-facetedness, memories so alive that it is as if the war had ended only yesterday, and the torment is still fresh and vivid.

The aim of the present author’s fieldwork was to collect impressions that could illuminate questions stimulated by competing interpretations of German behaviour. How did Hitler manage to incite a whole population to follow him? As Alan Jacobs puts it: ‘Why do people join political, religious, professional, or social movements, of whatever size, and surrender so completely, giving up, in the extreme, everything; their fortunes, their, critical thinking, their political freedom, their friends, families, even their own lives? What causes people to create a system or perhaps merely follow a system that creates Auschwitz, the Lubianka, the killing fields of Cambodia...’ (Jacobs, 1995, 1).

Several rival views may be contrasted. The first is represented by Goldhagen's view of the Germans as thoroughly complicitous. According to Goldhagen, because of their antipathy and cruel indifference to the victims of Nazism, the Germans were willing, even eager, to 'do their part' (Goldhagen, 1996). Another analysis is offered by Norbert Elias, who argues that Hitler used his skills as a propagandist to build up the resentment of ordinary Germans and then directed the aggressive energy fermented by humiliation against Germany's neighbours and against the Jews (Elias, 1996). Theodor Adorno focuses on the authoritarian personality whose principal characteristic is obedience and blindly following orders, irrespective of their moral contents (Adorno et al., 1950). Alice Miller highlights yet another facet in her writings on child rearing practices that create personalities who become disposed to develop into perpetrators (Miller, 1983). Another notion claims that Germans were 'ignorant dupes, guilty mainly of shutting their eyes to unpleasant realities that they could readily have discerned if they had been willing to look.'³⁴⁰ Finally, Ervin Staub, in his book *The Roots of Evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence* (Staub, 1989), concentrates on group dynamics and highlights the important role of bystanders.

In this book a further view is offered, in which social identity theory with its emphasis on the group³⁴¹ is linked with a more individual based analysis. It suggests that ordinary Germans were ideal targets for seduction by Hitler. They went along with him, enthusiastically, although in many cases with ambivalence, because of his flattering message about themselves and Germany's future. They were also caught up in the social dynamics he created. It was attractive to share the passions of the group, to be swept up in its enthusiasm. At the same time, it was disagreeable, and increasingly dangerous, to remain isolated from that enthusiasm and group feeling (to say nothing of the dangers of active opposition). This approach sees the masses not as willing executioners but as *willing disciples* or *willing partners in seduction*. After the seduction, they had the experience of being betrayed and abandoned to a terrible fate by a once-beloved parent or lover.

Germany is not the only country in the world where atrocities have happened, although the Holocaust stands out for its unfathomable cruelty. Rwanda and Somalia are but two cases that may be compared with Hitler's Germany.

³⁴⁰ Lee D. Ross, Stanford University, in a personal message 6th May 2000.

³⁴¹ Tajfel's (1981) social identity theory proposes that the social part of our identity derives from the groups to which we belong. He suggests that we, by favouring attributes of our own groups over those of outgroups, acquire a positive sense of who we are and an understanding of how we should act toward ingroup and outgroup members. See Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel, Fraser, & Jaspars, 1984; Tajfel & Turner, in Worchel & Austin, 1986.

This chapter is organised in three parts. The first part introduces a case of seduction and abandonment from within family therapy, and thus attempts to link the macro level with the micro level. The second part addresses the process of seduction, that is how Hitler seduced his people, how Siad Barre's began his 'love affair' with the Somali population, and how Rwanda fell victim of well organised propaganda. The third part examines the 'ending of the love affair' between dictator and population, namely abandonment. It illustrates how this may later cause feelings of humiliation in the victims.

Humiliating Seduction and Abandonment: a Clinical Case

Turning to the micro level, a case from the present author's clinical experience shall now be provided as a kind of 'blueprint' for later reflections on the meso level and macro level. Alice (the name has been changed) came to me as a client in 1991 because her marriage had collapsed. Alice was an intelligent well-educated European woman. She told me the following: 'I met Robert 10 years ago. He is 18 years older than me. When I met him, I had just come out of a relationship with an abusive man who could not endure an intelligent woman at his side. I was happy to meet somebody who was older and kinder. I yearned for kindness, for being taken care of, for not being hurt several times a day. I was touched and happy when Robert said that he needed me. My former husband had never said that, he only said that I was old and ugly. I was happy about the new compliments in my life. I was ready to give Robert everything, I was happy to have found somebody who finally loved me, and obviously did not feel threatened by me, my education, my intelligence.'

Robert lived and worked in Indonesia, and Alice moved to Indonesia to join him. He was separated from his wife who lived back in Europe, and told Alice that he considered her his wife now, but that he could not get a divorce because of the laws back home in his country. She accepted. She preferred a happy relationship to a painful marriage. When she arrived in Indonesia she was full of plans, wanted to do research, get another degree, and have a family.

Alice continued her account: 'Nothing of that happened. Now I am 10 years older and I have nothing. I have wasted all these years on this man. And the worst, I did not even recognise that I wasted my time while I did it! Every time we wanted to realise one of my goals, there was an existential crisis in his life. He had problems with his job, problems with his family; we always lived in emergencies. I hardly ever relaxed. I was all the time busy

helping him with his problems, hoping that we would start ‘our’ life ‘then,’ and that thus also ‘my’ life would start one day. It never started.’

Alice cried out: ‘How on earth could I have been so stupid as to accept all that?’ Then she continued, exhausted from a life of emergencies and sacrifices: ‘Stupid me, I tried terribly hard to be optimistic! Whenever I felt that I was not optimistic enough, I felt guilty of not loving him enough. I told myself: “How can I be weak in supporting this wonderful man who has so many troubles!” “How blind, how stupid,” I say today! How could I ever be proud of being intelligent while being so stupid? And proud of being a ‘good woman’? But now I realise that Robert used all these emergencies to hide behind them, to avoid real commitment to me. He was not really interested in my needs, my dreams, and my happiness. He needed my presence, he enjoyed me being near him, this was what he wanted.’

‘Today my loyalty to him, as well as my intelligence, which made me proud once, make me feel disgusted of myself. I am not only ashamed of myself, I feel that I humiliated myself in front of the Alice who once thought highly of herself. I feel exploited by Robert; he manipulated me into helping him and sacrificing my life for him. And at the end he leaves me with the feeling that it was alone my fault, that I exploited myself, and - he is even right! I feel that he raped me, in a slow process, a slow humiliating rape, which I allowed. I could kill Robert. He destroyed me and my inner core of dignity. What he did to me is worse than overt rape. A brute rapist does at least not lie. Robert raped me and made me believe it was love. The resentment, pain and suffering which this brought into my life cannot be measured.’

It may be asked, Can the case of Alice be placed within the same theoretical framework as many of the German accounts concerning the ‘Hitlerzeit’? It seems that the sorest humiliations stem from one’s own beliefs. Could one conclude that many of Germany’s ‘*kleine Leute*,’ the ‘little people,’ were, so to speak, ‘raped’ by Hitler? Not just seduced, but raped and humiliated?

How Dictatorial Regimes Seduce Their People and Begin a ‘Love Affair’ With Them

The Case of Germany

Hitler was obviously very competent at putting into practice what he calls the ‘correct psychology’ of seduction at the beginning of his career as ‘Führer.’ He wrote on page 165 of his book *Mein Kampf* (Hitler, 1999, italics added): ‘The art of propaganda lies in understanding the emotional ideas of the great masses and finding, through a psychologically

correct form, the way to the attention and hence to the heart of the broad masses.’ Two pages later, he continues: ‘The broad mass of a nation does not consist of diplomats, or even professors of political law, or even individuals capable of forming a rational opinion; ... The people in their overwhelming majority are so *feminine* by nature and attitude that sober reasoning determines their thoughts and actions far less than emotion and feeling. And this sentiment is not complicated, but very simple and all of a piece. It does not have multiple shadings; it has a positive and a negative; love or hate, right or wrong, truth or lie, never half this way and half that way, never partially, or that kind of thing.’

According to Lee Ross,³⁴² ‘The use of the term feminine suggests that Hitler’s own view of the propaganda process was explicitly linked to the process of seduction, or at least of winning love and personal devotion.’ Ross continues, ‘Again, however, I think he was presenting himself as much as the ideal father as the ideal lover, although the connection between the two is itself intimate, at least in the eyes of psychoanalytic theory.’ Not surprisingly, women in particular were drawn in by Hitler’s charisma. ‘Women were glued to the radio whenever Hitler spoke,’ this I was told innumerable times during my investigations in Germany. Owings, too, documents this phenomenon in her recent book about German women (Owings, 1995).³⁴³

Hitler continued his lesson in successful propaganda on page 168: ‘... the most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly and with unflagging attention. It must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over. Here, as so often in this world, persistence is the first and most important requirement for success.’

Simplicity and persistence, this was the recipe Hitler advocated to get the masses moving, and it is chilling to see how well Hitler put this into action as soon as he became ‘Führer’: ‘The purpose of propaganda is not to provide interesting distraction for blasé young gentlemen, but to convince, and what I mean is to convince the masses. But the masses are slow-moving, and they always require a certain time before they are ready even to notice a thing, and only after the simplest ideas are repeated thousands of times will the masses finally remember them. When there is a change, it must not alter the content of what the propaganda is driving at, but in the end must always say the same thing. For instance, a slogan must be

³⁴² Lee D. Ross, in a personal message 6th May 2000.

³⁴³ I owe this reference to Jorunn Sem Fure.

presented from different angles, but the end of all remarks must always and immutably be the slogan itself. Only in this way can the propaganda have a unified and complete effect' (169).

Hitler did more than just write about how to seduce masses. He thoroughly succeeded in doing it, arousing deep passions in the 'broad masses.'³⁴⁴ Hitler was a master in displaying emotions, his repertoire ranged from heroic pathos to passionate tears. At his mass gatherings he employed means that later became the trademark of pop-stars. He was not just a distant authority exercising patrician self-control; in his intense emotionality he was 'one of the Volk.' By being like them and yet at the same time at the top, he lifted them up with him. Men and women who were used to occupying a humiliatingly lowly place in German society suddenly found themselves at the summit of history alongside him. Hitler did not burden them with complicated programmes ('... the art of all truly great national leaders at all times consists ... in not dividing the attention of a people, but in concentrating it upon a single foe,' *Mein Kampf*, 108); he glorified 'the Volk's' supposed ability to sacrifice for the 'Endsieg' (final victory).

Elias wrote on page 387: 'One of Hitler's greatest talents – and one of the main factors in his success – was his intuitive, emotional understanding of the needs which a leader of the Germans and his crew had to satisfy in a critical situation. His own emotional needs corresponded to those of his followers. He reacted, without much reflection, to their emotional signals, verbal or non-verbal, with the emotional signals which they demanded and expected of a leader if they were to trust that he would be able to save them from an apparently hopeless situation of danger and despair' (Elias, 1996). Also Janka wrote about the collective dream, which Hitler amalgamated in his personality (Janka, 1997).³⁴⁵

'The Volk' was so 'thankful' for being included and raised up by their 'Führer' that they were ready to 'reciprocate' by dedicating themselves to what they thought he wanted, namely the 'Endsieg.' '...Hitler, and Hitler alone, seemed in the end to stand in the eyes of many Germans between them and total annihilation' (Elias, 1996, 387).

Everybody who ever heard recordings of Hitler's speeches has an inkling of the emotional power with which he conveyed his message, and the emotional response he received. An elderly man illustrated that fact in an interview (1999, on German television): 'I was a boy in my teens when I heard that Hitler would visit our little town. Already many hours in advance I went to the square where he was to arrive. I tried to stand on my toes, to

³⁴⁴ See Lepsius' text about charismatic leadership (Lepsius, 1993). I owe this reference to Odd-Bjørn Fure.

³⁴⁵ I owe this reference to Jorunn Sem Fure.

put my head up, in order to get a glimpse of Hitler behind the masses of people who stood in front of me. A man told me that I should not worry; first I would see yellow banners, and motorcycles. Twice I thought I saw yellow banners, but each time it was false alarm. Then, finally, Hitler came, but I saw nothing, because I fainted.'

This account illuminates the refrain the present author encountered during her research in 2000: 'You could not say anything against 'die Bewegung' ['the movement,' meaning Hitler's movement], there was this enthusiasm! My elder brothers and sisters experienced 'den Aufschwung' [literally the 'upswing,' i.e. the first period of Hitler's reign when the economy improved]. You could not say a word! They were taken over by it! I was the younger one, I did not dare to talk, and at the end of the war I had to take the shit! By then my brothers were dead! Killed as soldiers before they were 20! What could I have done? I am just disgusted, I can hardly see all these television programmes about the 'Hitlerzeit' [Hitler's times] now! I get sick! It is so humiliating how we were duped' (interview with a former farmer now in his seventies, April 2000).

This voice merits emphasis, since the common view has been that the 'seduction process' depended upon the susceptibility of each individual German to Hitler's rhetoric and mesmerizing style, rather than being driven by strong social pressures, by the desire to merge oneself in a mass movement that was thrilling and empowering – or, perhaps, the desire to avoid standing completely aloof when all around other people are feeling such passion, power, enthusiasm. The desire to immerse oneself in something large, heroic and exciting, to feel not only a sense of purpose but a sense of belonging, was undoubtedly a critical part of the power of Hitler's 'movement.' It was these positive sources of gratification, I would argue, that made people willing to submerge their doubts, their scruples and, ultimately, their humanity. Following Hitler's policies was the price to be paid for those feelings, a price that some paid eagerly because they enthusiastically agreed while others acquiesced rather than be 'left out' and/or exposed to the risks of being a deviate.³⁴⁶

The Case of Somalia

After the failure of quasi-democracy – that was perceived as similarly 'chaotic' as the Weimar Republic in Germany – Somalis yearned for a 'strong hand' who could 'put order into

³⁴⁶ These reflections were developed in dialogue with Lee D. Ross, social-psychologist, Stanford University.

things.³⁴⁷ President Mohammed Siad Barre from the Southern Marehan sub-clan was enthusiastically welcomed and established a strictly centralised political order. Similar to Hitler, he gave people new hope by lifting up the economy. More, he even became the embodiment of his people's national feelings, a phenomenon that reached its peak when he tried to fulfil Somalia's dream of unification. He attempted to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia in 1978.

He failed, and Somalia's defeat was a considerable humiliation that undermined Barre's political position. He attempted to preserve his power by finding scapegoats. In particular, he put the blame upon the Northerners, first the Majerteen and later the Isaaq people. As reported earlier, he exclaimed, 'You Isaaq, you are so arrogant,' to a Somali woman (who wants to stay anonymous) who met the dictator when she pleaded for her imprisoned family members.

The dictator unleashed the military against the Isaaq population with quasi-genocidal results. Isaaq were potential suspects everywhere, in the South they lost their jobs, they were detained, some executed, and subsequently their main cities fell prey to bloody destruction. Hargeisa, capital of the North, was bombed and destroyed in 1988.

Dr. Gaboose, personal physician of late Somali dictator Siad Barre and member of his cabinet fled the country when he felt that he could no longer support the regime. In several long interviews in November 1998 he reflected on the dictator's personality and why he succeeded to stay on so long (1969-1991). He recounted, using a form of English that reflects the style of Somali language and shows the oral talent that Somalis are famous for and proud of: 'I think that Siad Barre was different compared to the majority of the people. Probably that difference made him a dictator. He got some unique characteristics in his personality: vigorous, - active, - and charismatic. He got that ability of attracting the people around him, that energy, that atmosphere of making you secure!'³⁴⁸

Dr. Gaboose continued: 'Siad Barre, I think – he was brave – I think many dictators have got this – but perhaps it is not braveness, it is madness. These people confront challenges where the normal intelligent man would say, "no, no, don't do that!" But they have got this personality to go beyond normality, beyond the common people. So you think it is brave. But I think that it was not – it was just beyond the normality of common people. Siad Barre was very intelligent. He had very little education in his life even though he was the general of the

³⁴⁷ Interview carried out by the present author in November 1998 in Hargeisa, 'Somaliland.'

³⁴⁸ Two interviews were carried out by the researcher in Hargeisa in November 1998.

nation. When he was participating in a discussion or giving a speech – without writing, without preparing anything – the way he was articulating was just beyond imagination! Probably because of those speeches, that were so talented in the way they were articulated, he attracted many people, many Somalis.’

‘So, he was intelligent, but more than that, he always tried to get close to the community. He was an expert in the Somali way of seeing things. Many Somalis believe that he did so many good things. Because he built roads, he built universities; he built so many things in the nation. But not only Siad Barre, all dictators in the first years build their nation.’

‘So, I think that a dictator becomes a dictator because he thinks that he has got some talents, and in these talents he sees himself above other people, above everyone. So, he believes, at the end, that he is more intelligent than others, that he sees things farther than others, that he is more sincere, that he is more, more, more ...! So, of the word ‘more’ in every respect regarding humanity, he convinces himself. And the rest of the people become like children listening to him, - not like comrades or colleagues who are discussing, giving and taking ideas from each other!’

The Case of Rwanda

Rwandan Hutu had high ideals: Grégoire Kayibanda wrote to Guy Logiest (see earlier quote): ‘However, your action carries further: it has proven, in a concrete way, that idealism is not just vain smoke, but an efficient force provided by God in the course of the world’s history. Could other people follow your example, not only in Africa, but also in those countries where riches are equalled by savagery, where technological progress is equalled by fundamental errors, because a number of their leaders have not understood the primordial significance of Love. Your righteous conduct will serve as an example for generations to come.’

For long Rwanda was the ‘best’ (Somalia also wanted to be the ‘best,’ and many told the present author that there were years where Mogadishu indeed was one of the best places in Africa): ‘In the 1970s and ‘80s, Rwanda was a favourite for aid donors, receiving perhaps two hundred million dollars annually. In the 1970s, Rwanda enjoyed a reputation for a well-managed economy and a commitment to rural development that attracted official and non-governmental aid agencies alike’ (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, 23).

Did Rwanda have a Siad Barre or Hitler? Were Kayibanda or Habyarimana Hitler-like despots? Clearly the situation is more complicated in Rwanda. The only ruler who had a Hitler image was, as mentioned above, Michel Micômbero in Burundi.

Siad Barre had a car accident in 1986, and many people are unsure to what extent his mental capacities were reduced after that, giving his entourage of clan and family members more influence than before. As reported by many, this entourage was so afraid to lose power that they, instead of bringing Barre into hospital, brought him to the palace first, and only later to the hospital. The issue of ‘entourage’ relates directly to Rwanda and the *Akazu*. ‘The *akazu*, or “little house,” was a special circle within the larger network of personal connections that worked to support Habyarimana. It was composed mostly of the people of Habyarimana’s home region, with Madame Habyarimana and her relatives playing a major role’ (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, chapter about history). And, ‘Mme Habyarimana, nicknamed “Kanjogera” in memory of the murderous nineteenth-century *Nyina Yuhi*, emerged at the top of the heap as the best player; she was the true mistress of the country, not her big *umugabo* of a husband’ (Prunier, 1995a, 350, 351, italicisation in original).

‘The Akazu (little house) was the special inner circle of advisors to Habyarimana, most of whom came from his north-western prefecture or were relatives of his wife. Their close personal ties to the President made them the centre of political, economic, social, and military power in Rwanda. The Akazu, which included one of Madameme. Habyarimana’s brothers, bankrolled the interahamwe (the MRND militia) and death squads known as Network “Network Zero” and Amasasu, (Bullets), both of which had carried out political killings prior to April 6 and during the genocide.’ (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 14, paragraph 43).

Questions may be asked such as: Who was the actor? The ruler himself or was he only a puppet? If a puppet, then a puppet of whom? Did Hitler have a similar ‘entourage’ around him? And why did the ‘entourage’ of Mussolini oust him, instead of intensifying the hardening of cleavages as in the case of Somalia and Rwanda? As is apparent in today’s Burundi, Israel, Palestine, Iraq, and many other places, the course of an elite may sway towards moderation or extremism, with the leader and/or his entourage working together or not. Habyarimana was shot down in his plane, perhaps by his own people, and also Yitzak Rabin was killed by his own people. There are people today who are afraid for the life of Burundian President Buyoya: ‘The Burundi peace agreement is seen by many observers in the context of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda’ (IRIN, 29th August 1000).

The hardening of cleavages leading up to genocidal killings, after a period of relative ‘harmony’ or even love between the ruled and their rulers (one man as a ruler or a small elite), this connects the fate of Germany, Somalia, and Rwanda, as well as Burundi. Hitler ruled

Germany, Said Barre, his sub-clan, and especially his family were the ruling elite in Somalia, the North-Western Hutu of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, and especially Habyarimana's family ruled Rwanda, and Burundi had Michel Micômbero.

'All societies have their extremists. The Hutu extremists were able to tap deep currents of popular feeling. As well as economic resentments and frustrations, these have included basic concepts of communal identity. In addition, Hutu extremism was not a fringe phenomenon: it was cultivated by those holding high government office, to justify and entrench their position. Hence, the extremists had all the state-controlled organs of mass communication at their disposal, and could pay the salaries of ideologues in the universities, ministries and media. These were what made them so powerful. Ideologues like Leon Mugesera, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Osco Barayagwiza articulated, polemicized and gave ideological shape to the supposed grievances of "the masses." Zeroing in on a litany of historical grievances helped to keep alive chauvinist emotions through the powerful use of historical and political myths, fiery speeches and relentless propaganda on the radio. Using a finely tuned propaganda machine, they worked towards a ferocious dream that was to reach its climax in the genocide unleashed in April 1994' (Rakiya, De Waal, & African Rights, 1995, 37, 38).

Elliott Leyton believes that 'genocidaires' in Rwanda may even have killed out of love to their country: '*Genocidaire* Innocent told distinguished journalist Alan Zarembo how he was able to beat two children to death with a club. "I didn't want to. I didn't mean to kill them. I didn't know what I was doing. If you were there, things were strange. I can't find a way to explain it to you. Can you imagine the radio saying, "Go kill these people"?' (Leyton, 2000, 6, italicisation in original).

Leyton acknowledges: 'He has a point. Government orders had instantly organized the infinitely hierarchical Hutu world, in which each cluster of ten houses had a leader who was connected to all other local group leaders in the commune, themselves under the direction of regional authorities who in turn received their instructions by radio from the central government. "The message got to the local authorities," Innocent explained. "They mobilized the soldiers and the militias, and they were going to the villages getting civilians to kill people. We accepted. They said we were fighting for the country."' (6).

'Innocent seems to have truly loved fighting for his country and may well have been responsible for many more murders than the two child killings to which he admits. How could he help but enjoy the massacre when it was all done in such a communal carnival spirit, and with such encouragement and approval from the central authorities?' (6).

“The grave is not yet full,” the Rwandan government radio proclaimed. “Kill them all.” Radio is the only means of mass communication in an impoverished African nation, and the Nazis taught us long ago that to control the national radio is to control the people. Nazis also taught us - if such a lesson needed to be learned - that the human reluctance to kill is rarely extended to other ethnic groups. We should be grateful to the Nazis because they taught us so much’ (1)

‘In neighbouring Burundi a quarter-century before, the oppressive ruling Tutsis had ruthlessly murdered 250,000 "influential" Hutus. Now in Rwanda, the Hutus were the oppressors, and the radio said clearly what the loyal Hutus must do. They must kill all the Tutsis: “Kill them all. Spare none, or their children will return to kill us.” They must also “kill all those Hutus who will not help us in this sacred duty of the Interhamwe militia we who fight together.” The people did what they were told, and did so with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Months later, when their side was defeated in one of the most daring military manoeuvres of our century, the *genocidaires* claimed they murdered their neighbours only out of fear that they themselves would be killed. But no examples could be found of the punishment of any reluctantly homicidal Hutu’ (2, italicisation in original).

There had not been enough guns to go around, and in any case bullets were deemed too expensive for the likes of Tutsis: the ubiquitous flatbladed machetes (pangas), or any farm or kitchen implement, would do the job just as well. Thus the Rwandan tragedy became one of the few genocides in our century to be accomplished almost entirely without firearms. Indeed, it took many strong and eager arms to carry out the strenuous work of raping, burning, and hacking to death a halfmillion people (and mutilating many thousands more by slicing off their hands, their breasts, their genitals, or their ears) with pangas, kitchen knives, farm hoes, pitchforks, and hastily improvised spiked clubs’ (2).

What Makes a People Susceptible to the Dictator’s Seduction

The Case of Germany

I remember an old German woman once saying: ‘Wir kleinen Leute haben sowieso nichts zu sagen. Die da oben machen doch was sie wollen!’ [‘We ‘little people’ have nothing to say anyhow. Those ‘up there’ do what they want anyhow!’] With these words the old woman expressed the worldview of many ‘little people’ in Germany, especially of today’s elder generation. Germany was a society in which humiliation was a daily experience for social

inferiors. Since at least the eighteenth century, ‘Particularly at the smaller and relatively poorer courts of the German empire it was customary to make social inferiors emphatically aware of their subordinate position’ (Elias, 1993, 95). The humiliating helplessness of the ‘little people’ in Germany was ‘commonsense,’ part of their ‘life-world,’ or their ‘habitus.’

‘The experience of humiliation shaped the German national habitus, in Elias’s view. Hitler had the political skills as a propagandist and speech-maker to build up the resentment of ordinary Germans during inter-war years. He had two sources of resentment to work on. One was the fact that German men and women had suffered constant humiliation at the hands of the militaristic aristocracy that had been the dominant class in the Kaiser’s empire. The other was the fact that Germany had been very severely treated by the Allies after World War I. They made Germany a pariah nation and heaped suffering upon its people. Elias traces the way that as Germany grew stronger in the 1930s and early 1940s the energy brewed by humiliation was released against Germany’s neighbours and against the Jews’ (Smith, 2000b).

Feelings of humiliation were not the only burden Germans had to carry, As is well known, the economic crisis that hit the whole world in the 1920s made life difficult also in Germany. The crisis affected Germany especially hard because it added to the already heavy load of the war reparations Germany had to pay after World War I. The crisis created joblessness and general hopelessness, making the population even more susceptible to promises by a ‘saviour.’ Ervin Staub describes this mechanism in *The Roots of Evil* (Staub, 1989).

Hitler offered the ‘little people,’ who never before in history had been taken seriously, an elite identity and a clear sense of direction. Hitler even arranged for symphony orchestra music to be played in factories, thus giving the ‘little people’ a sense of greatness.³⁴⁹ Hitler ennobled the ‘little people’ by including them in the elite Germanic Aryan race with an important national mission. The ‘broad masses’ may have paid little attention on their account to details of the national humiliations inflicted by the Versailles Treaty after World War I, - being far too with daily survival – but Hitler ‘explained’ the situation to them and gave them a leading role to play.

Perhaps the German ‘masses’ felt as inferior as Hutu underlings, as much used to age-long humiliation and humbling? Even though Somalia is not a hierarchical society, in all three cases the rulers are slave-turned-into-a-masters.

³⁴⁹ I owe this detail to Odd-Bjørn Fure and Jorunn Sem Fure.

The Case of Somalia

In *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa* (Lewis, 1961) Ioan M. Lewis describes how decisions are made in an egalitarian society of nomadic clans. During the fieldwork in Somalia (1998) the present author was given the following account, ‘Elders preside over meetings without leading or dominating them, let alone deciding anything. They wisely summarise what has been said after every participant [men] has spoken. Decisions are made by consensus.’³⁵⁰

In Somalia, contrary to Western democracies, to be defeated in a vote is humiliating for the loser, potentially to such an extent that the effects – resentment, anger and revenge – may disrupt the whole system. People in the West who have been living within democratic structures for generations may not be able to grasp such reactions because they are used to the idea that in democracy defeat must be accepted and not be defined as humiliation. Democracy in the West takes the humiliation out of defeat, thus defining defeat in more tolerable terms.

Egalitarian nomads, however, who are accustomed to decision-making by consensus, cannot take such a sanguine view of defeat. The speaker of the parliament in Hargeisa, capital of ‘Somaliland,’ explains in November 1998 in an interview to the present author: ‘When people are voted down in parliament, I will go to them afterwards and calm them down. I will make it clear to them that their ideas are good and that they will be heard another time.’ He explains that it is in this way he removes the aspect of humiliation from defeat by majority vote. He adds: ‘In the traditional clan meeting decisions are made by consensus, everybody has to be convinced. If not, war will start.’

In other words, when Somalia became independent and ‘tried’ democracy, it created new mechanisms for creating suffering through sources of humiliation that were not there before. Worse, democracy was increasingly perceived as chaotic in almost every respect: ‘before elections the number of parties multiplied, every clan a party, just to join the party in power after elections; also corruption was rife... people were increasingly disillusioned and many were very relieved when a ‘strong hand’ seized power (interview in Hargeisa, 1998).

‘I think then, why a dictator comes, why this man comes forward and arrives at such a powerful stage? Probably it is the atmosphere that helps the dictator to be created. Why? Because at a certain stage of a nation, people are fed up of things: wars, poverty, so many mistakes ... and then ... that light comes!!! You see the light and hope in the personality of

³⁵⁰ This account was independently confirmed by everyone else I spoke to.

that person. And then the whole nation is lost into identifying with the personality of that person' (Dr. Gaboose, November 1998).

The Case of Rwanda

Whether it was an elite (Akazu) or a single man (Hitler), Germany and Rwanda are similar insofar as they both look back on a tradition of strict societal hierarchy. Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi suffered what many described to me as 'inferiority complex.' During fieldwork the present author spoke to a highly educated international official with Hutu background, whose name cannot be disclosed. In the following he will be called Joseph. Joseph tried to find explanations for the ultimate disaster of Hutu endeavours to successfully and peacefully rule Rwanda: 'When Hutu got power they had no experience of ruling, which means that Hutu just did the same as the Tutsi before. Hutu have an inferiority complex. Power changed hands but not mentality; those Hutu who came into power just imitated the Tutsi, they tried to be like the Tutsi, marry Tutsi women...'

Later a French expert on the Great Lakes will explain to the researcher ('off the record'): 'Concerning the feeling of Hutu inferiority: It is the fear that the other party will after all be able to carry out their hidden intentions of dominating "us." How must I feel as a Hutu, coming from an uneducated provincial background, when I encounter people who really are arrogant, who really look down on me? How do I tackle these feelings? How must I feel, as Hutu elite in Rwanda for example, when I sense that I am unable to integrate these sophisticated Tutsi people? "Slaves" think in old terms, they expect domination; this is not what masters usually expect. Therefore extermination may appear as the only solution for a slave-turned-into-a-master for handling this challenge, while for self-confident masters oppression of rebellions is sufficient. Hutu inferiority has been heightened through the fact that the Tutsi went out and lived all over the world some decades before the first Hutu did that. A cosmopolitan Tutsi diaspora exists since a long time, while a Hutu diaspora exists only since 1994. Tutsi have had time to get used to exile and its problems, to meet other cultures, to learn new languages and found journals that cater to Rwandan culture abroad. Those who go out, acquire "recul," distance of observation, they learn to see that things are relative, they become less narrow-minded. It is very difficult to have some inner distance as long as one is in Burundi, Rwanda. One has to have some distance!'

How a Dictator Abandons His People and Causes Feelings of Humiliation

The Case of Germany

As has been argued, Hitler lifted up the broad masses. Under his leadership they felt important, after centuries of being routinely humiliated. Today, many feel humiliated by their own belief in Hitler. ‘You cannot believe how humiliating it is to remember that I believed, for example such things as that we should get our Sold [pay] after the Endsieg [final victory]! We were told that our Sold would help Germany win the Endsieg, and that we would get it afterwards! I believed that! This is so humiliating! You cannot imagine!’ (interview in April 2000 with a man who as an adolescent was forced to become a soldier at the end of World War II).

‘The most disgusting and humiliating thing is the trace of belief and enthusiasm that was once also in me! But I was young, what could I have done? Of course everybody wanted to be part of it! Nobody wanted to be an outsider! When I had to become a soldier the war was hell. It made me sick. Ever since then all this makes me sick!’ (interview with a former farmer now in his seventies, April 2000).

The same person continues: ‘Göring boasted of German Lufthoheit [control of airspace] over France! But we were in France as German soldiers and we could not go out!!! We were not protected, but shot at!!! How humiliating! How we felt betrayed! At that time there were ‘Auflösungserscheinungen’ [signs of dissolution] in the German army!’

Interestingly enough, Hitler knew about the devastating effect of telling lies to the ‘broad masses’ in circumstances where they were in a position to test those lies against reality for themselves. He learned this during World War I. He wrote about the devastating effect of the failure of the ‘psychology’ contained in German propaganda and contrasts this with the British success: ‘And so German war propaganda offered an unparalleled example of an “enlightenment” service working in reverse, since correct psychology was totally lacking. There was no end to what could be learned from the enemy by a man who kept his eyes open, refused to let his perceptions be ossified, and for four and a half years privately turned the storm-flood of enemy propaganda over in his brain’ (166).

On page 165 Hitler analysed the German mistakes in more detail: ‘For instance, it was absolutely wrong to make the enemy ridiculous, as the Austrian and German comic papers did. It was absolutely wrong because actual contact with an enemy soldier was bound to arouse an entirely different conviction, and the results were devastating; for now the German

soldier, under the direct impression of the enemy's resistance, felt himself swindled by his propaganda service. His desire to fight, or even to stand firm, was not strengthened, but the opposite occurred. His courage flagged. By contrast, the war propaganda of the English and Americans was psychologically sound. By representing the Germans to their own people as barbarians and Huns, they prepared the individual soldier for the terrors of war, and thus helped to preserve him from disappointments. After this, the most terrible weapon that was used against him seemed only to confirm what his propagandists had told him; it likewise reinforced his faith in the truth of his government's assertions, while on the other hand it increased his rage and hatred against the vile enemy.'

Hitler described how the German soldier in the end 'rejected everything coming from this source [German propaganda] as "swindles" and "bunk"' (166), and thus lost faith in the national cause. Hitler did not foresee that this was exactly what would happen to 'his' Germany after World War II. Lee Ross commented, 'Again to me the betrayal in this case seems more like betrayal by a parent: "He promised that if we obeyed and trusted, our future would be bright and that a future glory and prosperity would come to us that would more than justify our immediate sacrifices...But he turned out to be a liar and a swindler, who played with us and used us, and abandoned us to our fate when his schemes began to unravel."' ³⁵¹

It was not only the Germans who felt betrayed. At the end of his life, Hitler turned his back to the German population and felt let down by them. Before he died at his own hand he made clear that the German population deserved to be destroyed, since they had obviously not lived up to his expectations. In his view they had not been good enough Aryans after all!

The Case of Somalia

Dr. Gaboose reflected on dictators and how they begin their 'career' by building 'the nation.' He explained: 'But, they are not building the nation, they are building just roads, they are building just streets – but not for the people, but for their egos: to see the roads done by me, Siad Barre, or to see that this or that big huge building is done by me, Siad Barre. So, probably dictators are identifying all these achievements with themselves, not to build the nation. Because if they had really helped the people, if they really had built the nation, the end would not have been so drastic.'

³⁵¹ Lee D. Ross, in a personal message 6th May 2000.

He continued: ‘Hitler became so drastic – Siad Barre became so drastic – Mussolini also. I don’t want to take only Hitler; the end of every dictator was horrible. Because they never build their nation, with the nation I mean the people. The most important aspect for a nation is to build the people, not the roads, or the universities – I mean, the buildings – if the people are built enough then the nation will sustain, will survive. Otherwise it will collapse with the dictator. Because if the nation was the dictator, the nation will disappear with him. So, Somalia doesn’t exist any more, it disappeared with Siad Barre!’

‘I believe, if we take only the first ten years he could be described as a very nice ruler. But all dictators have got two faces. That was the first face and then comes the other face, which is not any more intelligent. Then you see him: Very instable government, instable economy, instable military, and at the same time he is doing a war here, a war there and a war every place! So you see that he is not any more the kind of man that you had seen before. Sometimes you think that this sort of men has used, has consumed his energy before, and in the later years just sits on his seat because of the energy of the past. But he is not any more the same person. Probably he used in his campaigns all his personality and all his energy. And then what comes... first it is up and then down, down, down. And you cannot stop him, whatever happens, because the energy is less and less to stop. So, I think he was a person that many people will make a dispute in what they will write on him. Because he has got so many faces that everyone can write whatever he wants.’

Dr. Gaboose then reflected on the feelings of betrayal, both in Siad Barre’s followers, but also in Siad Barre himself. First, he described the process of disappointment and how it unfolded in him: ‘What I found in him [Siad Barre] and the humiliation that I, - not only me but I think many of my colleagues, - found, was that his plan and his intention was a road in his mind and he expected you to just follow, and not to judge, or not to discuss, or not to give any different opinion about that. So, you got just a path drawn before you, by him, and the whole cabinet, the state instrument, should follow that. And even if you saw that the end was dark, you had to tell others that it is not dark, but that there is light, there is paradise we see after that. So, when the line of communication is cut off, when you find a person who is leading the country, and you are so close to him, and the result is always a deaf ear, than you feel that the noble gift of all humans is misused, it is not valued any more, which is to communicate to each other; that through talking we can understand each other, that through talking our ideas and achievements could be larger than “I and I and I.” Then when I understood that I could not reach any more that membrane of the ear that became so hard to me, I fled outside. I chose to be a refugee rather than a minister in that government.’

Dictator Siad Barre went into exile about a decade ago. Perhaps this is too short a time span ago for ordinary Somalis to be able to admit to feelings of humiliation stemming from their own loyalty to him. During the fieldwork in Somalia the researcher was strongly reminded of times in Germany when it seemingly was not yet 'possible' for people to admit to such feelings. Being in Somalia made me see clearer earlier reactions in Germany, for example, the obvious need to accuse others of having been taken in by Hitler, 'pretending' of having been against him from the very beginning. In Somalia I elicited a very expressive pause, a silent, but clearly painful glance into a far away past, when I asked people whether they had been taken in by Siad Barre themselves and how this felt today.

Dr. Gaboose finally described how not only the Somalis, but also Siad Barre felt betrayed, just like Hitler, how he felt that he had sacrificed everything for his people, '...later, he sees that his people were not grateful for what he did for them in the past. Because he sees himself as the one who was always right, he always gave them the best of his life and at the end there is sadness and sorrow – not from any foreigners, but from his own people. Because from them he expected the greatest appreciation. But he does not see that they have given him the highest appreciation for years: there were years that his name was like religion, that his personality arrived near to God and they did what ever he wanted and was always right. But at the end, when the things get to the end of the track, the blame was to the same people of the nation. He was right even at the end of his life. He helped the Somalis, he helped the Germans, he helped the Italians, but the Italian were not good, the German were not good, and the Somalis were not good.'

The Case of Rwanda

Germans paid for their loyalty to their leader with the destruction of their country and the loss of large territories in the East to Poland; Somalis paid with the long-lasting disintegration and devastation of their country that continued even years after their leader's fall; Rwandan Hutu fled their homes and recollected – under appalling circumstances – outside of the Rwandan frontiers in refugee camps. ‘Well before the genocide had even been halted, two million mostly Hutu Rwandans – an impossible number to grasp – were stranded as refugees in neighbouring countries, their status and future anything but clear... Some had actually been herded out by the genocidaires, using them as shelter for their own escape, while most others, terrified by a combination of real human rights abuses by the RPF and hysterical Hutu Power propaganda, gratefully sought refuge from the advancing troops’ (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 19, paragraph 1). The Panel's report asks crucial questions, ‘Would they want to return? Could they be trusted if they returned? Would they be armed? Could they be disarmed? Could they trust the new government? Could the new government cope with the needs they would generate? What about the large numbers of Ex-FAR and Interahamwe and genocidaire leaders who had escaped into the camps? The RPF knew better than most that refugees were a potential political and military problem, not just a humanitarian one. It had itself been a refugee-warrior army. Created by conflict, they returned three decades later to create conflict. What would be the impact of the Hutu refugees now in Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania? The answer proved infinitely more convulsive than anyone could have anticipated’ (chapter 19, paragraph 1).

This account illustrates the bitter result of a genocide that was perpetrated with the intention to heal past humiliation by the former master and prevent future humiliation by the master's return. Instead the former master overpowered the genocidaires and the genocide contributed to destabilising the whole region. Chapter 23 of The International Panel's report *Rwanda: the Preventable Genocide*, entitled ‘Rwanda Today,’ lays out the gruesome effects of this ongoing instability.³⁵²

³⁵² ‘As in Rwanda, so throughout the region war, human rights abuses, ethnic tensions, and humanitarian problems are all interconnected. For example, besides Rwanda, among the countries in Africa named in 1999 by FAO as having exceptional food emergencies were Angola, Burundi, DRC, Congo, and Uganda. The reason in every case was “civil strife,” sometimes combined with insecurity and population displacement.[UN FAO press release, ‘Nearly 10 million in Sub-Saharan Africa need emergency food aid as food supply situation worsens,’ PR 99/48e, 9th August 1999] Throughout the Great Lakes Region last year, according to OCHA, people requiring humanitarian assistance grew

Even near his disastrous end Siad Barre felt that he was right, as did Hitler. Rwanda may not be different. ‘While the RPF demands that the genocide be recognized as the defining event in Rwandan history, Hutu radicals who still claim to speak for Hutu in Rwanda refuse to acknowledge even that there was a genocide: a civil war in which both sides committed atrocities, yes; Tutsi-inflicted genocide, in which Hutu were the victims, yes; perhaps even genocide by both sides. But denial of the one-sided genocide of April to July 1994 remains an unshakeable article of their faith. Accordingly, there is no need for collective atonement or for individual acknowledgement of culpability.[Prunier, 1997] (The International Panel’s report, chapter 23 paragraph 61).³⁵³

The Malignant Combination for Followers

Many former followers of dictatorial and genocidal regimes in Germany, Somalia and Rwanda later felt misled by their former leaders, ashamed of their former loyalty to them, and humiliated by the results of their loyalty, while the leaders themselves – unwilling to see that they led their countries into the abyss – stayed on being caught in their old conceptualisation of the situation that in their eyes justified atrocities that they refuse to call genocide – and it is them who feel let down by their followers.

The shame over the humiliation that seduced and disappointed followers brought on themselves is perhaps the reason why for example the Germans seemingly neither got depressed nor angry after the ‘Zusammenbruch’ [collapse]. The ‘broad masses’ who had tried to give their ‘Führer’ what they thought he wanted, namely the ‘Endsieg,’ these ‘broad masses’ must have felt devastated and even deeply ashamed that their sacrifice did not suffice. ‘It is probably true to say that a large part of the German people continued to believe

constantly to about four million in the DRC, Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Not only did their numbers increase, so did their vulnerability. The situation was largely attributable to “continued instability in the region arising from the intensification of military activities on various fronts.” [IRIN Update, ‘Human suffering grows as conflicts intensify,’ 30th August 1999] (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 23, paragraph 47).

³⁵³ ‘To complicate the subject further, yet another knowledgeable observer, Gerard Prunier of France, revised his own views of this issue between the first and second editions of his important book, “The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide.” Prunier has consistently agreed with Human Rights Watch that the RPF was guilty of serious abuses.[Prunier, 321-327] In the earlier edition, however, based on field work done in late 1994, he judged the numbers involved to be dramatically lower than the Human Rights WatchRW estimates.[Prunier, 324] But further research that he conducted two years later for an updated version convinced him that the figures might well be even greater than Human Rights Watch calculated.[Prunier, Chapter 10] (The International Panel’s report, chapter 22, paragraph 8). See Prunier, 1995a and Prunier, 1997.

unshakeably in the Führer until he was dead, and perhaps for quite a time afterwards' (Elias, 1996, 387).

Why took Germans to work after the 'Zusammenbruch' at the end of the World War II instead of getting depressed or angry? Were not the humiliations after World War II considerable? Large territories were for example lost to Poland, to 'Slavs,' and Germans had learned to despise the Slavs as lowly beings.³⁵⁴ Why did this humiliation not lead to 'appropriate' reactions such as, for example, plans for retaliation? Was it the 'Unfähigkeit zu trauern' [the inability to mourn], described by Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich, 1982, which inhibited the German people? Or was it, as Sem Fure³⁵⁵ hypothesises, that Germany was perhaps too destroyed to be able to imagine retaliation? What additional reasons could we find? Could it be that the 'Zusammenbruch' triggered too many divergent feelings, too many feelings other than national humiliation? Could it be that the 'Zusammenbruch' was felt to be shameful by those who could not offer Hitler the 'Endsieg,' and as a triumph by those, especially the aristocracy, who had felt humiliated by Hitler?

Perhaps those who were devastated and ashamed, the 'broad masses,' furthermore slowly understood that Hitler had abused them? The 'broad masses' had been like Hitler's children, they had extended to him a kind of absolute faithfulness, as adolescents might thank someone who had talked to them like grown-ups and made them feel important. But, in fact, they had not been mature enough to test their hero's true intentions. Like children they were seduced. Could it be that they 'grew up' after World War II? Could it be that national humiliation was unimportant compared with the shame the 'broad masses' felt as soon as they understood that Hitler had abused them?

But these 'broad masses' had learned something under Hitler; they had learned that they were important and that their work could make a difference. Perhaps this made them take to work after World War II instead of taking to national honour again? Perhaps they separated out their capacity to sacrifice and work from any ideology, even from national ideology?

And meanwhile the aristocracy had reason to be ashamed, since they had helped discredit national ideology by allowing a 'mad-man' to spoil it, without even having had the 'guts' to stop him. Their only feeble satisfaction was to say to themselves afterwards: 'We knew that this Hitler was an incompetent parvenu.' Therefore, for the aristocracy, at least for

³⁵⁴ 'Negative attitudes towards Polish people were indeed present both before, during and after the war in some parts of the eastern German population...' writes Jorunn Sem Fure in her chapter 'Controversial memories. Departing historical experience and contexts for memory' which is part of her not yet published doctoral dissertation.

³⁵⁵ Jorunn Sem Fure in a personal note 30th November 1999.

those segments who felt marginalised by the Weimar republic and by Hitler's advancement, the loss of World War II must have been more than a disaster for Germany; the 'Zusammenbruch' of Germany could also have been a secret triumph – a triumph because it represented Hitler's failure.

The 'broad masses' had been lured, the aristocracy had let it happen: nobody could be proud after World War II. The humiliation was not a national one like after World War I, when a proud nation had been brought to its knees. Instead, after World War II humiliation was an inner experience. Every follower of Hitler must have felt humiliated by his or her own adherence to Hitler. After World War II Germans recognised that they had humiliated themselves by allowing a hazardous character like Hitler to capture their hearts, and they were ashamed. They hid their faces and devoted themselves to work.

This chapter explored the process of seduction and abandonment that lead to feelings of humiliation. It examined the cases of Germany, Somalia, and Rwanda, where feelings of humiliation were felt by ordinary citizens because of their credulousness and loyalty to their leader, and it took up the case of humiliation felt by a woman who had been seduced and abandoned by a lover or continually exploited by a manipulative spouse. Several important parallels between these cases have been shown. In other words, the chapter claims that feelings of humiliation and resentment are in fact familiar to most people, not only Germans, Somalis or Rwandans, and are akin in some important respects to the humiliation and resentment many women and also many men feel when they have been 'taken in' by a suitor who seduces and then cruelly disappoints them. In such circumstances, the expectations of the weaker party have some resemblances to the expectations that a child has of a parent.

Finally, the structure of the development of the three relationships examined here (Hitler and the Germans, Siad Barre and the Somalis, and Robert and Alice) may be set out as follows:

the suitor/parent gives hope to a rather weak or helpless lover/child (a child is helpless by definition, whereas a 'lover' may, for example, be a population weakened by routine humiliation and economic crisis, or an abused and humiliated woman);



the lover/child is thoroughly dedicated and accepts the suitor's/parent's leadership, in other words the lover/child accepts, gladly, a position of humility, interpreting as patronage what might also be labelled as domination and oppression;



in this phase an abusive suitor/parent can persuade the lover/child to participate in atrocities (it is especially during this phase that group dynamics may shape individual feelings in a way that creates and secures 'space' for atrocities);



the suitor's/parent's promises become increasingly empty and insubstantial;



the suitor/parent accuses the lover/child of betrayal as soon as things go wrong, love turns bitter;



the suitor/parent falls (s/he is defeated, or it becomes clear that his/her promises were empty, and that the atrocities s/he demanded were in fact not helping to fulfil them)



some lovers/children will always continue loving their former idol, while others will feel deeply humiliated by having been 'taken in' and having wasted valuable lifetime on false hopes;



also for his/her part, the suitor/parent is deeply disappointed at having been betrayed by his/her lover/child.

This chain of events seems to replicate itself in many contexts. Ex-DDR citizens, for example, struggle with feelings of humiliation; they feel humiliated by the loyalty and enthusiasm that they once felt for the old regime. Anyone who has stopped acting on their own behalf and transferred agency to another person or institution, will have been vulnerable to this kind of humiliation. This is so hurtful that only those who are strong enough to step outside of the deception upon which their life is based will ever confront such feelings. Others will prefer to close their eyes and live in a state of illusion rather than admit that they have wasted their life on a false hope.

The Malignant Combination for Perpetrators

One may ask where leaders such as Hitler, Siad Barre, or the Akazu came from and why they acted in the way they did. Perhaps Perry, 1997, is right in pinpointing humiliation at an early age. He identifies the 'Malignant Combination' during childhood, see Table 20, 'Developmental neglect or traumatic stress during childhood can profoundly alter development. Unfortunately, emotional and cognitive neglect usually occur in combination

with traumatic stress. The combination of a lack of critical emotional experiences [he means stable bonding to a caretaker that enables a child to develop empathy] and persisting traumatic stress leads to a dramatic alteration in the brain’s modulation and regulation capacity. This is characterized by an overdevelopment of brainstem and midbrain neurophysiology and functions (e.g., anxiety, impulsivity, poor affect regulation, motor hyperactivity) and an underdevelopment of limbic and cortical neurophysiology and functions (e.g., empathy, problem solving skills). This experience-based imbalance predisposes to a host of neuropsychiatric problems -- and, violent behavior’ (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 20).

THE MALIGNANT COMBINATION (NEGLECT + TRAUMA)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anxiety • Impulsivity • Motor hyperactivity 	<p>↑</p>
	<p>↓</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empathy • Problem solving skills • Affect regulation

Table 20: The malignant combination (neglect + trauma)

Can the ‘malignant combination’ make masterminds plan and organise genocide? Who were Hitler, Siad Barre and the extremist Hutu who led the 1994 genocide when they were children? Masterminds grow up in the same environment as the ‘average’ person. Alice Miller has addressed the case of Hitler and identified supposedly ‘good upbringing’ that in reality represented a ‘poisonous pedagogy,’ insofar as it justified the practice of ‘breaking the will of the child’ as beneficial for the child (Miller, 1983). She explains: ‘Hitler was certainly not an isolated phenomenon. He would not have had millions of followers if they had not experienced the same sort of upbringing. I anticipated a great deal of resistance on the part of the public when I advanced this thesis – which I am convinced is a correct one – so I was surprised to discover how many readers, both young and old, agreed with me. They were familiar from their own backgrounds with what I depicted. I didn’t have to adduce elaborate arguments; all I needed to do was describe Hitler’s childhood in such a way that it served as a mirror, and suddenly Germans caught their own reflections in it.’³⁵⁶

³⁵⁶ Excerpted from For Your Own Good by Alice Miller. Retrieved from <http://members.xoom.com/childhistory/hidden.htm> on 22nd May 2000.

Children exposed to chronic violence are more likely to be violent.³⁵⁷ “This is related to many factors, including modeling and learning that violent aggression is acceptable, even a preferable and honorable, solution to problems. Analysis of much of the violent behavior by children and adolescents today reveals a troubling degree of impulsive, reactive violence. This violence is often interpreted by the perpetrators as defensive. “If I didn’t shoot him, he would have shot me.” “I could tell that he was going to jump me -- he looked me in the eyes.” “Listen, man, I just did him before he did me. So.” These verbalizations reflect the persistence of a state of fear, literally, a persisting “fight or flight” state which these adolescents are unable to get out of. The persistence of this originally adaptive internal state is due to growing up in a persistently threatening environment (Perry, in Murberg, 1994; Perry, 1996)’ (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 8).

Perry, 1997, continues, ‘The implications of this for the violent youth are profound. First, any child exposed to chronic intrafamilial violence will develop a persisting fear-response. Because there are marked gender differences in this response (Perry et al., 1995b; Perry, Pollard, Blakley, Baker, & Vigilante, in press), with females more likely to dissociate and males more likely to display a classic “fight or flight” response, more males will develop the aggressive, impulsive, reactive and hyperactive symptom presentation. Males will more likely be violent (George et al., 1979). This can be explained, in part, by the persistence of this “fight or flight” state -- and by the profound cognitive distortions that accompany this neurodevelopmental state. A young man with these characteristics, then, will very easily misinterpret a behavior as threatening and will, being more reactive, respond in a more impulsive and violent fashion. Literally, using the original (childhood) adaptive “fight or flight” response in a new context but, now, later in life, in a maladaptive fashion’ (9).

Perry, 1997, sees multiple pathways to engaging in violent behaviour.³⁵⁸ Some are defensive, some are predatory, some are impulsive. All of these pathways, however, are facilitated by the individual practitioner’s belief system.³⁵⁹ He points out that the majority of neglected and traumatised children never become violent.³⁶⁰ Belief systems, in the final analysis, are the major contributors to violence. Perry identifies ‘Racism, sexism, misogyny, children as property, idealization of violent “heroes”, cultural tolerance of child maltreatment, tribalism, jingoism, nationalism’ and proposes that they ‘all unleash, facilitate, encourage, and

³⁵⁷ See for example Loeber et al., 1993; Lewis, Mallouh, & Webb, in Chicchetti & Carlson, 1989; Koop & Lundberg, 1992; Hickey, 1991; Halperin et al., 1995.

³⁵⁸ See, for example, Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967.

³⁵⁹ See, for example, MacEwen, 1994; Burton et al., 1994.

³⁶⁰ See, for example, Belmore & Quinsey, 1994.

nurture violent individuals. Without these facilitating belief systems and modeling, neglected and abused children would carry their pain forward in less violent ways -- as silent, scarred, adult members of the vast army one commentator has termed the "Children of the Secret" (Vachss, 1991, 56)' (Perry, in Osofsky, 1997, 10).

Perry puts together the puzzle of malignant experiences that leads to violence as follows, 'The most dangerous among us have come to be this way because of a malignant combination of experiences -- lack of critical early life nurturing (Radke-Yarrow et al., 1995), chaotic and cognitively impoverished environments (Carlson et al., 1989), pervasive physical threat (O'Keefe, 1995), persisting fear (Schwab-Stone et al., 1995) and, finally, watching the strongest, most violent in the home get what he wants, and seeing the same aggressive violent use of power idealized on television (Miedzian, 1991) and at the movies... These violent offenders have been incubated in terror, waiting to be old enough to get "one of those guns", waiting to be the one who controls, the one who takes, the one who hits, the one who can "make the fear, not take the fear." Nowhere is this predatory food chain more evident than in juvenile justice settings where, too often, the youth is either victim or predator -- with no third option. Due to clear socio-cultural devolution in some segments of our communities, there are more and more undersocialized, traumatized children (Horowitz, Weine, & Jekel, 1995; Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, 1995). These children get little cognitive stimulation -- the public schools are falling apart; their lives are devoid of emotional contact - - mom is a child herself and pregnant again; no predictability, structure or nurturing can be found out of the home -- the community has dissolved' (10).

Finally Perry concludes with recommendations for public policy, 'Ultimate solution to the problems of violence -- whether from the remorseless predator or the reactive, impulsive youth -- is primary prevention. Our society is creating violent children and youth at a rate far faster than we could ever treat, rehabilitate or even lock away (Groves et al., 1993; Garbarino, 1993; Sturrock, Smart, & Tricklebank, 1983; Richters, 1993). No single intervention strategy will solve these heterogeneous problems. No set of intervention strategies will solve these transgenerational problems. In order to solve the problems of violence, we need to transform our culture' (12).

What Perry enumerates is today's street violence and its causes. Would similar reflections be a relevant backdrop for understanding genocidal dictators? What were the malignant combinations in Somalia, Rwanda and Germany? War and genocide occurred at times of economic crisis when resources became scarcer. In Somalia this was caused by a lost war and dwindling aid money, as in Rwanda, where also coffee and tee prices fell, refugees

came back, and the land/population ratio worsened; in Germany the 1929 world economic crisis brought unemployment. However, dwindling resources do not necessarily have to lead to genocide. On the contrary, they may very well bring people together in a common attempt to reverse this tendency. And, as is evident to everybody, the killing of diligent compatriots such as Isaaq, Tutsi and Jews is counterproductive to increasing a country's capacity to earn money. Even genocide masterminds typically see that, and no perpetrator puts much effort into the argument that the presently endured shortages are the ones to be countered by genocide.

In all three cases, Somalia, Rwanda and Germany, the masterminds of war and genocide *imagined future destitution and humiliating subjugation of one group at the hands of another* that typically figures as justification for genocidal killings: In Germany it was the fear, projected into the future, of lack of 'Lebensraum' [land to live] for the 'Aryan race,' and of a future 'Weltherrschaft des Judentums' [the world dominated by Jews]; in Rwanda it was the fear that future democratic power-sharing with Tutsi would mean but Tutsi domination; and also Somalia's future was regarded as threatened – by the Isaaq. The significant question is: Which additional conditions compound the suffering from dwindling resources so that people want to exterminate imagined future dominators? And: How is it possible that minorities (Isaaq, Tutsi, Jews), who are already quite subdued and marginalised, can still figure as so threatening that their extermination seems to be the only solution? Why is marginalisation not 'enough'?

Evidently, the masterminds of genocide in Germany, Somalia and Rwanda ascribed high talents to the targeted minority, namely the ability to dominate them, but also the intention to inflict unbearably humiliating subjugation upon the rest. Where did this suspicion come from? Was it pure fabrication by masterminds who wanted to stay in power? Did they believe in their own propaganda? Did Hitler, Barre and the Akazu members authentically believe that killing their competitor was a 'rational' plan and would help them stay in power, even though they eventually all ended up ousted or dead? Obviously the mission was to humiliate the humiliator and not to personally stay in power or even alive, at least for Hitler. As quoted above, 'Hitler's last words during his last conversation on April 2, 1945' were: "the world will be eternally grateful to National Socialism that I have extinguished the Jews in Germany and Central Europe." (Jäckel, 1991, 64). Hitler seems to have gladly sacrificed his and his Aryan's lives for his 'mission' to exterminate the Jews. Jäckel writes about the end of World War II: 'Did Hitler begin to doubt the final victory? He would not admit it, but it now became obvious that the extermination of the Jews became increasingly the most

important aim of the war as such; as the fortunes of war turned against Germany, the destruction of the Jews became National Socialism's gift to the world. That became totally clear towards the end of the war' (Jäckel, 1991, 63, 64). Also Barre is being described as 'not any more intelligent' but suicidal (see interview with his personal physician). Suicide is clearly not a way to stay in power.

One may ask: Where does this overstretched and suicidal obsession with killing come from? Does it have its roots in earlier experience? May we conclude – also as a prognosis for similar cases – that those members of an elite who experienced *personal humiliation* at the hands of people they admire, may be expected to incite genocidal killings of precisely the people they look up to? May we expect suicidal-genocidal tunnel vision that discards any rational long-term strategy, in cases of humiliation in general, and in cases of personally humiliated leaders in particular? As Edna Adan expresses it: 'they want to bring you down to their level.' Jäckel suggests that Hitler became Anti-Semite 'during his years in Vienna (1907-1913)' (Jäckel, 1991, 48), and Hitler describes this fervently in *Mein Kampf*. Barre felt humiliated by the Isaaq (see interview above). And what about Habyarimana's Hutu wife? How was she affected by the fact that Hutu men who acquired status would prefer to marry Tutsi women because they were regarded as more beautiful than Hutu women? Clearly, more evidence has to be collected to underpin this point.

Masterminds seem to follow a *refrain of humiliation* well known to clinical psychologists and forensic psychiatrists, a refrain presented by any person who feels unbearably humiliated and rages at her humiliator as follows: 'You have humiliated me so deeply!, and what you did was so immoral!, and you do not belong here anyway - go back!, and surely your only intention is to humiliate me and my people again!, I want to counter-humiliate you!, and not only you, but all of you!, not enough, I loath you so much that I do not deem you worthy of even my hatred! - you are but weed to be walked over!

Or, in the case of genocide, 'they' are collectively declared as 'arrogant' and in need to be put down, 'they' are seen as morally unworthy (all Tutsi women are prostitutes, Jews eat babies), 'coming from far away and not belonging here,' and 'they' are defined as but 'pollution' (cockroaches, rats, weeds).

This chapter concentrated on atrocities and how they could be perpetrated on a large scale. In the following chapter healing humiliation will be addressed.

6. Healing Humiliation

In 1998 the present author started her fieldwork in Somalia and met with survivors of the quasi-genocidal onslaughts that had occurred in that society, reaching a peak in 1988.³⁶¹ I was very moved by the survivors' accounts. I put myself into their shoes, as far as I could, and tried to empathise with their perspective. At the end of each interview I asked what forms of healing might be envisaged. I thought, for example, of truth commissions like in South Africa. I imagined victims and perpetrators talking to each other, the perpetrators asking for forgiveness after having listened to the victims' accounts, and the victims reaching a kind of 'catharsis' by opening up, speaking about their feelings, and being able to forgive. I imagined that such a process would conclude in a mutually satisfactory way to be followed by peaceful co-existence between opponents. This way of thinking and feeling was in line with Smedslund's definition of humiliation as being a violation of the deepest core of personal dignity.

However, in the interviews another answer to the question about strategies for healing was given, repeatedly. It was as follows (1997, 1998, and 1999): 'The elders of the opposing groups (clans, sub-clans, or so-called diya-paying groups³⁶²) must sit together and talk. They should decide on the amount of compensation to be paid. Finally, in order to stabilise the situation in the long term, women should be exchanged between the groups for marriage. These women will embody the bridges between opposing groups, since they have their original family in one group and their children in the other.'

Whenever I got this response I was sharply reminded of my Western individualistic background as opposed to the much more collectivistic and group-oriented Somali view. Paying compensation and exchanging women was not at all what I had thought of. It would certainly have been the last thing I, as a European woman, would be willing to participate in myself. If I were one of the victims concerned, knowing that my clan had received compensation and that women were being exchanged would hardly satisfy me. I would certainly feel that my personal dignity required another kind of healing.

Former Somali Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh (in an interview on 9th January 1999 in Nairobi) formulated the traditional Somali procedure in more 'Western' terms and inserted forgiveness at the point where parties get ready to settle their differences: 'Before you form a government in Somalia, all clans have to come together, accept that each clan carries blame

³⁶¹ The following three paragraphs are adapted from Lindner, 2000a.

³⁶² 'diya' means compensation for injuries.

for what happened, and when the blame is accepted, forgiveness is offered. Only then we can form a government of Somalia! Clans have broken all the rules, which make clans co-exist - only after forgiveness trust will come, and after that government comes. All clans took part in killing one another, and unless they come together, led by their traditional chiefs, and unless forgiveness is sought, there will be no solution – we have to involve the traditional leaders to meet and forgive each other. After that it will not take more than a month to form a government! Before Siad Barre, it was good! Nomadic culture is based on forgiveness! Once we have that, we can form a government! There are so many things that Somalis have not talked about, because of nomadic pride: To a forum of Somali clans everything should be put on the table, from looting, to killing, to rape! From there we then start to accept blame, and to apologise. This is the way out, and I hope the international community will accept that!’³⁶³

At the Conference of Higher Education for Peace (4th – 6th May 2000 in Tromsø, North Norway), the peace researcher Johan Galtung praised Somali pastoralist democracy as a model for modern global dealings because it entails respect for independent minds (5th May 2000, italicisation added): ‘A man leading a Somali *shir*,³⁶⁴ or a woman leading a Polynesian *ho’o pono pono*,³⁶⁵ they know it all! Problems at the geopolitical level resemble family problems. Micro, meso and macro level are all connected. Compassion and perseverance are important!’

³⁶³ Such procedures indeed characterised the peace conference that successfully pacified the North of Somalia. Adam writes in his chapter entitled *Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Ibn Khaldun and Reflections on the Catastrophe in Somalia*: ‘By mutual consent, they also created a supreme legislative body, divided into a council of elders (*guurti*) and a popular chamber; and an executive power headed by a president, vice president and cabinet built on clan diversity and representation’ (Adam, in Adam & Ford, 1997, 109, 110).

³⁶⁴ Ioan M. Lewis, anthropologist and legendary Somali expert explains the *shir* as follows, ‘In the smallest structural unit, the *rer*, which is the tertiary section of tribes whose segmentation is tripartite, and which is also a minimal lineage, the council regulating and controlling the affairs of the group is composed of the heads of the families which it comprises... The council (*shir*) is open to all adult free-born males (*hubqad*) who are entitled to carry spear and shield. This excludes attached occupational-caste *sab*... Any adult can speak at the deliberations of the council, but the views of family heads carry the greatest weight. The elders sitting in council (*ashiar*)... with their elected head (*gob*) control the relations of their own group with other sections and regulate their own internal affairs. The ultimate sanction for conforming to the decisions of the council is expulsion from the group... Among the Helai, if a man absconds after committing a wrong and does not stay to face the consequences, the elders direct the systematic looting of his property, which he has forfeited by deserting the tribe... Elders have fairly strong powers of compulsion for they can hand over a man guilty of homicide to the family of his victim if its members are unwilling to accept compensation...’ (Lewis, 1998, 97).

³⁶⁵ At the ‘Finnologisk Seminar’ on 15th August 1998 in the Norwegian mountains Johan Galtung explains that *Ho’o pono pono*, means ‘putting right,’ and is a series of meetings practised in Polynesia, in which 20-30 people come together, for example the victim of a crime, the perpetrator, the family of both, and one or more facilitators.

Interestingly enough, terms such as ‘respect,’ ‘perseverance,’ and ‘mutual consent,’ are not only terms characteristic for a *shir* and a *ho’o pono pono*, but, incidentally also for creative networks in the modern business world. And Avishai Margalit (1996) defines a *decent society* as a society in which institutions do not humiliate people – meaning that they do not undermine a person’s reasons for self-respect – and a *civilised society* as one in which citizens do not humiliate each other. Introducing these principles into the implementation of social policy in several areas including international relations is an important challenge of today’s global and local societies. Clearly, there is still a long way to go. Pettit, for example, deplores the current lack of attention for the notion of respect, ‘we are stuck with a way of thinking about freedom that knows and cares nothing, in itself, about whether liberty comes with respect’ (Pettit, 1997, 74).

Healing and preventing humiliation is a central aspect of achieving decency. It is a good topic upon which to focus in this last chapter. As Ripstein puts it, ‘Forgiveness might be thought a more befitting attitude for a decent society than are punishment and denunciation. God is said to pray that His love of compassion will outweigh His demand for strict justice... Compassion and forgiveness have their place. But it is up to those who have been humiliated to forgive, not up to others. If society, through its institutions, decides to forgive one person for humiliating another, it is joining in the humiliation, rather than answering it’ (Ripstein, 1997, 110).³⁶⁶ Earlier in this manuscript it has been indicated that indeed the concept of forgiveness has received increasing attention lately and that websites such as www.forgiveness.org propose research on numerous applications of forgiveness. The work of Howard Zehr, *Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice* (Zehr, 1990), points into the same direction.

Klein enumerates several approaches to the task of coping with humiliation: ‘psychological immunization, refusing the role of victim by redefining one’s identity, participating in self-help and mutual support groups, using healing laughter, achieving a state of transcendent humility and responding with one’s capacity for appreciation to the potential humiliations that come one’s way’ (Klein, 1992, 255). Transcendent humility is associated

³⁶⁶ This discussion is urgent in countries like Rwanda, where people when walking in the street are able to point at a passer-by saying, ‘this man killed my uncle.’ Reconciliation is promoted by the current Rwandan government, led by those Tutsi forces that ended the genocidal onslaught on their brothers and sisters in 1994. However, genocide survivors feel that they may not be able to reconcile, ‘I may perhaps be able to co-exist with those who let my grandmother parade naked in the streets before killing her, but I cannot achieve reconciliation with them. How can I speak for my grandmother? Those responsible have to be punished.’

with Mahatma Gandhi, the Dalai Lama,³⁶⁷ and Nelson Mandela. The practical value of this approach is well summed up by Gandhi's comment that 'An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind.'³⁶⁸

The Dalai Lama formulates the matter as follows: 'In human societies there will always be differences of views and interests. But the reality today is that we are all inter-dependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore, the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes of interests, whether between individuals or nations, is through dialogue. The promotion of a culture of dialogue and non-violence for the future of mankind is thus an important task of the international community. It is not enough for governments to endorse the principle of non-violence or hold it high without any appropriate action to promote it' (Dalai Lama, 1997, 4).

This book is intended to make a contribution towards building a decent society, both globally and locally, by presenting preliminary elements of a theory of humiliation that may improve our understanding of the workings of humiliation. This will, hopefully, be a useful tool in identifying and thus helping to prevent or heal humiliation – and also provide an orientation for the further research that is urgently needed.

Dialogue and Forgiveness: Easy to Advocate, but Difficult to Carry Out

The point of this chapter is that it is easier to advocate dialogue and forgiveness than make opponents who are caught in cycles of humiliation actually engage in it. If it were easy, dialogue and forgiveness would reign everywhere. However, obviously there are many obstacles, and it is hypothesised here that humiliation is one major – and perhaps the core – obstacle. For example, when Southern Somalis flocked to the Djibouti peace conference in 2000 to engage in reconciliation as former ambassador Dualeh proposed, Somaliland (and Puntland) refused to come. Not only did Somaliland refuse to come, it also detained unauthorised individuals who did attend anyhow, for example Garad Abshir Salah of Sool, Southern Somaliland. He was charged with treason and sentenced to seven years of jail (he

³⁶⁷ I thank Nandita Chaudhary for her suggestion to include Gandhi and the Dalai Lama (in her comments from 10th November 2000). See, for example, Gandhi, 1940 and Dalai Lama & Lokesh Chandra, 1981 and more recent, Dalai Lama, 1999.

³⁶⁸ See http://www.cyber-nation.com/victory/quotations/subjects/quotes_revenge.html.

was released after three weeks upon protests in Buhoodle town, HORN OF AFRICA: IRIN Update, Thursday 5th October 2000).³⁶⁹

Said S. Samatar understands that the deep rift between the North and the South of the Somalia may be the result of what may be called ‘humiliation that went too far’: ‘Somaliland’s decision to declare independence in May 1991 was a result of massive popular opposition to further rule from Mogadishu. This hostility resulted from the suffering inflicted on the north by the Barre regime’ (Samatar, 1995, update). During the fieldwork in 1998 in Somaliland Somalilanders urged the researcher to promote their dream to become an internationally recognised independent republic. They all agreed that they have been humiliated to such a degree by their Somali brothers and sisters that they are no longer able to be part of a united Somalia. They insisted that the differences, and they label these differences as ‘cultural,’ between them and the other Somalis are, after all, too significant.

In ‘Recognition or Humiliation – the Psychology of Intercultural Communication’ (Lindner, 2000d) and ‘How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences’ (Lindner, 2000e) the present author transposes Vogel and Lazare’s observations on ‘The Unforgivable Humiliation – a Dilemma in Couples Treatment’ (Vogel & Lazare, 1990) on to the cultural level and claims that humiliation may be the most important force that causes rifts between people, not only in marriage between partners but also between larger groups. The result of humiliation is not openness for dialogue and forgiveness, but, as Vogel and Lazare point out, ‘unforgivable humiliation.’

The examples that were presented throughout this book illustrated the point that dialogue and forgiveness are difficult to achieve when humiliation is involved. As has been discussed earlier, the intentions and reactions of perpetrators and victims are vital for any process of dialogue or forgiveness. What happens, for example, when perpetrators do not acknowledge their role? In the case of Rwanda these people are called genocide-deniers. Or, as reported earlier, in the case of Northern Somali victims are even accused of instrumentalising feelings of humiliation and magnifying them in order to portray the perpetrators as evil and beyond reconciliation, thus transforming themselves from victims into perpetrators. It seems obvious that healing hinges on perpetrators acknowledging and understanding what they have done, and victims accepting apologies without humiliating the

³⁶⁹ For the views of the Somaliland government on the Djibouti-hosted peace process see <http://www.somalilandforum.com>.

repenting perpetrators by constantly berating them for their former deeds. Only then may the path of forgiveness be attempted.

One response adopted by perpetrators or by those who sympathise with them may be to deny that their actions were humiliating or even to deny that they took place at all. This produces an almost intractable situation. How can, for example, a genocide survivor achieve reconciliation with a genocide denier? The most 'reconciliatory' response a victim may think up in such cases may be to take the attitude of forgiving those who do not know better. This approach has the effect of dislodging the perpetrator's deeds from the category of intentional humiliation and placing them in the category of 'accidents' that only God can judge. However, this approach does not contribute towards achieving mutual understanding between former opponents.

However, even under more favourable circumstances, reconciliation may be psychologically impossible, especially for the victim, and the best that may be hoped for may be coexistence. Earlier, the young Rwandan Tutsi Alphonse was introduced with his words: 'Can I forgive the killers of my grandmother who has been made to parade naked in the street before being killed? Can I speak for her? Can I speak for my mother and reconcile with her killers?' This young man insisted that the most he could imagine doing was living in coexistence with former perpetrators, not more. He was adamant that he would not want to make friends or reconcile himself with any perpetrator. Perhaps coexistence is a better term than reconciliation?³⁷⁰

The concept of coexistence was central to the Coexistence Initiative launched in Belfast by the 'State of the World Forum' in May 1999,³⁷¹ where it was defined as follows: 'Coexistence does not deny distinctiveness; in fact, it encourages it, respecting the rich diversity in an ethnically rich global society.' 'Celebrating diversity' includes the idea that

³⁷⁰ See, for a discussion, Weiner, 1998, *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, with a foreword by Alan B. Slifka.

³⁷¹ See www.worldforum.org: 'The mission of the Coexistence and Community Building initiative is to catalyse a global awareness of and commitment to creating a world safe for difference. The initiative on coexistence and community building has as its goal to formulate and implement a strategic plan, which will bring coexistence into the mainstream consciousness of people around the world. How can coexistence become a compelling and enduring vision for humanity in the 21st century? How can we avoid the human tragedies, the genocides, and ethnocides that have characterised the history of the 20th century? How can we build a world where there is tolerance for minorities and greater understanding between peoples. What are the medium and long-term steps that need to be taken to create a world safe for difference? These were the questions posed in a series of meetings, roundtables and consultations that have been held by the State of the World Forum during the last two years.'

looking down on others is no longer acceptable, that humiliating others on account of their otherness is to be abandoned, that otherness is to be respected. From this point of view, it may be concluded that ‘celebrating diversity’ is a strategy for ‘solving’ the problem of humiliation since it extends the respect to otherness that otherness deserves. It may be thought that ‘celebrating diversity’ conveys the highly principled intention of ceasing to humiliate others for their otherness, and initiatives like the co-existence movement powerfully advocate this.

Yet, the strategy of ‘celebrating diversity’ may be hampered not only by psychological barriers within an individual victim but also by a prevailing belief system. Earlier, there was a discussion of how the currently ruling Tutsi elite in Rwanda propagates the view that there is but one ethnic group in Rwanda. The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000 sent the following message to the current Tutsi government in Rwanda: ‘...pretending that ethnic divisions do not exist and will not be recognized is an answer that satisfies no one. These divisions exist and everybody knows they exist. Many of the government’s actions exacerbate the divisions; the war reinforces them; and the political turbulence within the government keeps them in the public eye. By themselves, all the reconciliation projects in the world will do nothing to change this situation’ (chapter 23, paragraph 58). The International Panel continues in the next paragraph, ‘Rwandan is unlikely ever to be an ethnic-free nation, but this need not be a cause for despair. Diversity, properly appreciated, strengthens a society, and unity in diversity is the mark of a strong nation. We believe Rwandans should acknowledge ethnicity for what it is – legitimate, value-free distinctions between groups of people who share and accept a larger identity in common. There can be Rwandan Hutu and Rwandan Tutsi and Rwanda Twa without ascribing superior or inferior value implications to those groupings.’

Power Asymmetry and the Healing of Humiliation

Daniel Bar-On and Arie Nadler ask, ‘Does reconciliation mean, that groups lived in the past in peace with one another and only have to re-establish it? Or, does conflict-resolution imply that the conflict can be resolved, once and for all? What is the relationship between coexistence and asymmetry of power?’ (Bar-On & Nadler, 1999, 9). And, on the same page they deplore the fact that ‘We have almost no psychosocial research on forgiveness and the research on conflict management and conflict resolution overemphasizes the cognitive aspects, while neglecting the social, emotive and psycho-dynamic aspects of these terms

(Barley, in Bazerman, Lewicki, & Sheppard, 1991; Morely, Webb, & Stephenson, in Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, & Hewstone, 1988).

These questions may be illuminated as follows. Structural violence³⁷² is a way to keep negative peace³⁷³ and secure calm and order. However, oppression as a means to keep calm and order not only violates human rights ideals, but also leads to a loss of the creativity that could otherwise unfold and that is so eagerly sought in all spheres of life including modern business. In 'Humiliation, Human Rights, and Global Corporate Responsibility' (Lindner, 2000f) the present author explores the advantages society, including the corporate sector, may gain from discontinuing humiliating practices, namely the freeing of the potential human beings have for creativity. Freedom, equality and an enabling environment are the 'price' to be paid if the fruits of creativity are to be reaped. Again, psychology is the prime discipline to study empowerment and creativity in their relation to conflict and its handling. The current dismantling of hierarchies, however, must be expected to trigger an intermediate increase of conflict, since it creates feelings of humiliation among underlings that were not there before and triggers violent resistance from masters who do not wish to descend to the line of equality. Underlings who accepted their lowly position as a law of nature and did not feel humiliated before, begin to suffer from burning feelings of humiliation as soon as they learn that they may be entitled to a better fate. As the example of Rwanda illustrates, rising underlings may even perpetrate genocide on their former masters, or, in other words, feelings of humiliation, combined with feelings of humility (inferiority plus admiration) for the former master elite may develop into a hot and explosive mixture that paves the way even for unspeakable massacres and atrocities. 'Humiliation entrepreneurship' is easy to carry out with underlings who feel humiliated. The third party, the international community, who introduces human rights ideals of equality, has therefore a great responsibility to ensure that the resulting feelings of humiliation and the shame over former humility are channelled in peaceful ways.

Figure 10 illustrates how the curve of feelings humiliation is linked to the curve of awareness of human rights ideals and descends only as human rights ideals are implemented.

³⁷² Galtung, 1996.

³⁷³ See, for example, Galtung, 1969; Galtung, 1996; Galtung & Tschudi, 1999.




Figure 10: The curve of feelings of humiliation in relation to human rights awareness and social change

As reported above, at the First International Conference on ‘The Role of Education in Promoting a Culture of Coexistence and Community Building’³⁷⁴ (23rd - 26th February 1999 in Bujumbura) the present author presented a paper. The conference organisers took notes: ‘This paper was presented in Burundi, in an environment of ongoing violence and low-intensity warfare in the hills surrounding the capital. The presentation tries to draw lessons from clinical psychology and attempts to apply them to social and political psychology. It starts with the assumption that even the most rational human beings are not always able to master

³⁷⁴ Conférence internationale sur le rôle de l’éducation dans la promotion d’une culture de convivialité et d’édification des communautés.

themselves. There are urges and desires, which have a mighty strength and power.

Humiliation is among the strongest.'

The notes of the talk taken by the host of the conference continue as follows, 'We currently observe a worldwide tendency for societies to transform from hierarchical to more egalitarian democratic structures that are built on human rights. Three "categories" of actors can be differentiated who influence this transition: (1) the rising "slave" (the "category" of the oppressed, for example former colonised populations, black people, women, also nature, together with related phenomena as feelings, creativity, and individual privacy), (2) the affronted "master" (the "category" of the oppressors, for example colonisers, white males, also human control over nature, together with related phenomena as ratio, intellect, normative control), and (3) third parties coming from outside, for example the international community, entailing both "master" and "slave" tendencies.'

Humility and Humiliation

Several recommendations were advocated by the author as means to foreclose violent outcomes of uprisings. The first recommendation addressed the need for rising underlings to become actors with clear autonomous (rather than heteronomous) goals and abandon being merely 're-actors.' This recommendation suggests that rising underlings would be well advised to become aware of the pitfalls of their own feelings of humility and inferiority and their persistent admiration for the 'despised' master elite (present, former, or imagined).³⁷⁵ The first task for rising underlings should be to accept their feelings of admiration for the oppressor and not censor them. It is often the case that long-established elites carry a society's assets of excellence since such elites typically accumulate more resources – that enable them to excel – as compared to the underlings. However dissonant it may seem to admire excellence that is born out of oppression, it would be more constructive for underlings to recognise that wanting to be equal does not make it possible to dispense with a period of learning. The point is that to oppose excellence in order to avoid (or deny the need for) a learning curve destroys the resources of a society, resources that are valuable even if they were produced through exploitative societal structures. Tutsi excellence, for example, is an asset for the Great Lakes region and many highly educated Hutu do indeed recognise that – in

³⁷⁵ Being incapable of confronting one's dissonant psychological reality – namely concurrent hatred and admiration for the elite – and projecting one's indignation over one's own dissonances on this elite, leads to a situation where resistance and self-deception are confounded.

Rwanda particularly in the region of the university centre of Butare. (Hutu in this region are said to be more moderate than Hutu in the North of Rwanda and they did not participate in the genocidal killings of Tutsi until they were forced to do so by officials coming from the capital Kigali). Today's Germany is still impoverished by the exodus and death of its Jewish population (the imagined oppressive super-elite); depriving Germany of their talents was highly detrimental to the level of intellectual excellence in Germany, while the United States benefited from the influx of outstanding Jewish scientists.

The main point is that underlings may need to accept that they may stand at the beginning of a learning curve, and that the process of learning is not detrimental to the basic notion of equal dignity. Conversely, being trapped by un-dealt with and unwanted feelings of humility and inferiority in relation to an elite while denying admiration for that elite's excellence has the effect of locking rising underlings into a painful 're-actor identity' that prevents them from developing a strong sense of confident self-possession. An example of this syndrome occurred in Rwanda, where killing the former elite seemed the only way out to freeing oneself, a strategy that actually led to the perpetrators' ultimate self-destruction.

Underlings would be well advised to think carefully about the process whereby they started painfully realising that oppressive hierarchies are no longer regarded as legitimate, and how they began to feel humiliated by occupying their lowly position at the mercy of their domineering rulers' arrogance. Through such a process of self-reflection, Nelson Mandela managed to keep his self-esteem strong in the face of humiliation and prevented it from spoiling his dignity. Indeed, he taught the perpetrators of Apartheid as well as his followers much about respect, dignity and human rights. Instead of inciting genocidal killings of whites, he convinced the humiliators that they were wrong in looking down on the humiliated party, that their 'underlings' deserved to be viewed as equals from a human rights stance. Nelson Mandela's example demonstrates that rising underlings (as well as third parties) have a task of educating unwilling masters, a task that cannot be carried out successfully while maintaining a victim identity. Figure 11 depicts relations of mutual respect and shows that the victim's task is to gain internal confidence and stature, achieving an identity that does not lead him or her to wish to impose abasement upon others.




Figure 11: Respect

Extremism and Moderation

The second recommendation relates to the dynamics of extremism. Underlings who feel utterly humiliated and have the resources to become leaders may develop extremist stances. As discussed above, humiliation may lead to obsessive and addiction-like urges for retaliation, which, if present in a leader, may lead to uncompromising extremist stances. Extremist leaders try to force populations into black and white dichotomies such as 'them and us' or 'friend or foe.' The more they succeed in polarising citizens the more they are enabled to promote atrocities against neutrals and critics who may be accused of 'siding with the enemy.' In such settings peaceful criticism becomes impossible and extremist leaders can incite

massacres such as those that happened in Rwanda. The more that violations of moral codes go unpunished, the greater the opportunity for impunity to reign. 'Breaking With the "Culture of Impunity" in Rwanda and Burundi' (Institut Universitaire d'etudes du developpement Genève (IUED), 1995) is then the task faced by moderates. This requires an alliance between the moderates of all conflict parties involved. Their task is to treat, pacify and marginalise their extremist wings, using a methodology based upon the strategy of maximum human respect and dignity for all parties.

The moderate leaders have to minimise humiliation and frustration in the population in order to 'decommission' psychological 'weaponry' that could be used by extremist leaders. As discussed before, feelings of humiliation are released during the transition of societies to more democratic concepts and structures and this can lead to violence and extremism on all sides. The task to be tackled is to transcend extremism and strengthen more moderate standpoints. Also third parties have the responsibility for making alliances between moderates from all involved conflict parties. Moderates should be supported in their task of pacifying the extremists within their respective camps, as well as minimising feelings of humiliation among the broad population.

Concluding Remarks

As has been explained above, International Relations theory initially (in Classical Realism) favoured the assumption that man is aggressive by nature; later developments of International Relations theory (Liberalism and Structural Realism) do not maintain this assumption.

Is man aggressive by nature? The French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau was taken by the idea of the ‘noble savage’ – not that he denied violence between people, but in his eyes it was not man, but society who was evil.

Is thus society evil? As discussed earlier, Classical and Structural Realism see the world as being guided by ‘anarchy’ – anarchy as the ‘state of nature’ (Hobbes, 1951). International Relations theory teaches that in such a context the Security Dilemma is unavoidable, and Beverly Crawford formulated this succinctly as, ‘I have to amass power, because I am scared. When I amass weapons, you get scared. You amass weapons, I get more scared’ ... and thus an arms race and finally war can be triggered.³⁷⁶ Thomas Hobbes’ ‘social contract’ is often considered to be the only way to enable humankind to tame evil.

³⁷⁶ Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th – 25th July 1997.

Reminiscent of Rousseau, William Ury argues that human beings are inclined to avoid violence. He points out that the archaeological record of organised violence and warfare is almost completely restricted to the last ten thousand years, and that this period is only a tiny proportion of all human existence. It, indeed, represents just one percent of the two and a half million years during which human societies have been evolving on earth.

As discussed earlier the Security Dilemma seems to be a cruel dilemma, a dilemma that makes human beings appear evil, independent of any debate about human nature (or the role of benevolent leaders). Hobbes argues that a 'social contract' for the creation and maintenance of super-ordinate structures can tame the evil of anarchic violence. It may be hoped that the current trend of globalisation – its push towards growing interdependence and its potential for the framing of One Single 'In-group,' (namely humankind) as the inhabitants of One Single Global Village – and the accompanying unfolding Knowledge Revolution will in the long run have a beneficial effect and remove the Security Dilemma from the globe.

The Human Rights Revolution seems to advance although the transition period must be expected to be lengthy and difficult. As highlighted earlier, it seems very likely that global society will become more violent (atrocities, massacres, genocide, ethnic cleansing, terrorism) in the medium term. This is because of the dynamics already described by which degradations that were normal and accepted in 'honourable' societies become unforgivable violations in societies whose members have been 'dignified' by the acquisition of human rights. And unforgivable humiliations trigger unforgiving responses.³⁷⁷ A related prediction is that only insofar as the global information society develops more egalitarian structures will the tendency towards atrocities be reversed, producing the peaceful society envisaged by theorists such as William Ury.

Hitler perceived his role as responding to the challenge of honour humiliation. By contrast, Mandela has seen his task as healing the wounds inflicted by human rights humiliation.³⁷⁸ Fortunately for the West, human rights humiliation in the Third World has not yet found its Hitler. It would be disastrous if such a leader created a global following among the humiliated by arguing, for example, that the West's human rights' rhetoric was merely a hypocritical device to divert attention from the fact that the divide between rich and poor is greater than before.

³⁷⁷ See for 'moral disengagement' Bandura, in Reich, 1990.

³⁷⁸ From the perspective of many white people in South Africa, Apartheid was the expression of an utterly legitimate form of honour-humiliation. Mandela taught them to see that it was an illegitimate deprivation of the human rights of the majority.

In view of the danger that a new Hitler would present, the West is fortunate that the influence and prestige of Nelson Mandela are so great. Mandela has filled three of the roles that Ury identifies for Homo Negotiator. He is a *bridge-builder* helping to prevent further violent conflict, a *healer* binding the wounds of humiliation, and a *witness* to the suffering of apartheid's victims who include himself. The fact that Nelson Mandela is involved as Burundi peace mediator adds to his stature as peacemaker.

However, Mandela is not just trying to prevent violence within the existing structures. He is also trying to change those structures. That is why Mandela repeatedly proclaims the need for a great increase in educational provision. It is a theme to which he repeatedly refers, going as far back as the speech at his trial in 1964.³⁷⁹ It is a deeply radical demand. He acknowledges that the Knowledge Revolution may be a core driver of the Human Rights Revolution. It will continue to break down coercive social and political hierarchies and empower an increasingly educated workforce.³⁸⁰

Empowerment means the disappearance of barriers to the free availability of information and ideas. However, empowerment may be accompanied by an increase in anger, namely the anger of the oppressed who discover that their subjection is an immoral attack upon their human rights, and the anger of ex-underlings who find that the current breakdown of oppressive hierarchies – something which feeds their hopes for more equality and human rights – actually coincides with a disappointment of these hopes through rising inequality and thus an increase in their humiliation.³⁸¹

If the global rich – in their twin guise as the 'North' and the 'West' – wish to convert the healing, bridge-building spirit of Mandela into lasting peace they seem to be well advised to begin by taking seriously the anger of newly-empowered citizens throughout the world. The North may have to respond more constructively to the needs of the South for trade,

³⁷⁹ As Mandela said on 20th April 1964, during his trial, 'The complaint of Africans...is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation' (www.historyplace.com/speeches/mandela.htm).

³⁸⁰ One example of the efforts being made is the work of the Desmond Tutu Educational Trust that is seeking to redress the educational imbalance experienced by Black, Coloured and Indian students in the Western Cape during the regime of apartheid.

³⁸¹ 'While the Enlightenment philosophers and the "bourgeois" revolutions in the 18th century placed civil and political rights on the political agenda, the emergence in the 19th century of an organised labour movement played a similar role in relation to economic, social and cultural rights. To this day, the relationship between these categories of rights is still a much-discussed topic in the international debate on human rights' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999).

investment, infrastructure, training, health services and so on. The North may have to adopt on a global scale the strategy Mandela has attempted in South Africa: '[to] produce an actual...reality that will reinforce humanity's belief in justice.' This will do much to answer the charge that the rich countries are applying double standards by preaching human rights without delivering them. When this begins to happen, then the East (for example China, India, South East Asia) may begin to respond more positively to the West's demand that they respect human rights. If none of these things happen, then the pain and anger caused by unhealed humiliation could bring global torment.

In fact, the pattern of humiliation, flawed communication, disappointment and cynicism is not restricted to international relations. As discussed before, it also affects gender relations, human relations within business organisations, and national politics. All these spheres of life provide illustrations of Ury's maxim that as the Knowledge Revolution brings greater interdependence, society's vulnerability to conflict increases. This book has argued that the task of keeping conflict non-violent is made much more difficult by the deep wounds inflicted by humiliation.

As has been discussed in this book the current dismantling of hierarchical societal structures is crucial for the understanding of conflict and its possible peaceful transformations. Table 21 summarises a possible unfolding of events as pertaining to the transition from hierarchical to egalitarian societal structures, an unfolding that may be incomplete even within the same person.

‘SLAVE’ AND ‘MASTER’ AND THE DISMANTLING OF OPPRESSIVE HIERARCHIES		
	‘Slave’	‘Master’
1. Pre-hierarchy	Institutionalised domination and subjugation is still unknown	
2. ‘Happy’ hierarchy: humility/arrogation	The slave is proud of being humble (humility, or accepted inferiority plus admiration for God’s order, nature’s law, just world)	The master is proud of being the patron of the slave (arrogation, or accepted superiority and admiration for God’s order, nature’s law, just world)
3. ‘Unhappy’ hierarchy: humiliation/arrogation	The slave shifts from feeling humility to feeling humiliation (rage at illegitimate debasement, plus shame over former humility)	The master is pleased by the slave’s eagerness
4. ‘Desperate’ hierarchy: retaliation/arrogation	The slave rebels against the master – and his or her feelings of humility – by using means ranging from sabotage to terrorism and civil war, or even genocide against the former and/or imagined future master (Rwanda, Hitler-Germany); the rising slave believes that humiliators do not merit empathy	The master feels humiliated by the slave’s ‘lack of thankfulness’ and retaliates for rebellion with brutal oppression; the master believes that ‘unthankful’ underlings breaking God’s age-old order do not merit empathy
5. Post-hierarchy: peaceful conflict transformation	Moderation and co-operation on both sides	

Table 21: ‘Slave’ and ‘master’ and the dismantling of oppressive hierarchies

Table 21 makes clear that ‘conflict’ may in many cases not be conflict between equal partners, but the struggle of underlings for recognition and rights. This struggle may be fraught with the psychological pitfalls that the transition from feelings of humility to feelings of humiliation may entail. Intriguingly, the Rwanda/Burundi and Hitler-Germany may be

compared in many ways. Above the Tutsi were discussed as victims of a Holocaust that targeted them as imagined future oppressors, similar to the way the ‘International Jewry’ was feared by Hitler. There are other parallels. In Burundi, the Tutsi elite never abandoned their rule, in contrast to Rwanda, and Burundian Hutu largely remained at the bottom of the country’s hierarchical order, until today. A German expert on Burundi (whose identity cannot be exposed, interview in Bujumbura 1999) recounted that Hutu ‘wurden zur Schlachtbank geführt,’ meaning that they were slaughtered in 1972. The German interlocutor continued, ‘the Hutu were ordered to call in at the office of local authorities (the killers were the security forces, army, police and extreme Tutsi youth organisations) – and they must have understood that they were to be killed there – however, they went there – even more, when they were told at 18.00 to come back the next day, since “the job” could not finished the same day, they, indeed, came back next day.’ This, the German expert reported, ‘must be utterly humiliating for today’s Hutu – that their forefathers allowed their own death to happen in such a meek way!’ He continued, ‘before this incident Hutu were much more “unterwürfig,” [subservient], yet, since then they have built up strength.’ Another foreign expert on Burundi (whose identity cannot be exposed either, interview in Bujumbura 1999) said, ‘The Tutsi do not seem to remember 1972, when about 300 000 Hutu were killed and nobody has been made responsible. No investigation. Those who did it are today driving around in their Mercedes and are in power. The international community did not say anything; neither Cold War block at that time was interested. The OAU even congratulated the regime for keeping law and order. This must be terrible for the Hutu and must contribute to radicalise them.’ The German Burundi expert alluded to the fate of Jews who experienced their ‘Schlachtbank’ when they went to the concentration camps during the Holocaust. He made the connection by saying: ‘Many Burundian Hutu may feel the same shame as Jews feel today when they think back to the lamb-like manner in which some of their grandparents went to being slaughtered.’

This example shows that humility and subservience, attitudes that were ‘normal’ in traditional hierarchical societies, may cause shame at a later stage, when human rights ideals have altered the overall framework of what is legitimate and what not. The feelings of humiliation that occur when one understands that a hierarchical order that debases some human beings to the level of ‘sub-humans’ ought not to prevail may become compounded with shame over one’s own group’s former and/or present feelings of humility. This mixture, toxic as it became among the extremist Hutu rulers in Rwanda, may be just as toxic in other cases. Germany, for example, was ashamed about its own weakness; the defeat of World War I was supposedly caused by internal traitors (Dolchstoßlegende) – it was, from that point of

view, not just something imposed by the victors, but a disaster caused by shameful shortcomings on the part of the Germans themselves. One of Hitler's responses was to boost latent antisemitism and construct an image of a super-humiliator, the Weltjudentum [the International Jewry], who could serve as a scapegoat and carry all the blame. Hitler was also personally caught in this dynamic. He did not start out as proud member of an elite; on the contrary, he began his life as a lowly person among Austrian Germans who were gravely humiliated. Hitler devotes a substantial part of *Mein Kampf* to less well-known historical facts, namely the humiliating position Germans suffered from in Austria. He describes how the Czech part of the Austrian population tried to 'eradicate' German influence, and how enraged he was that only a handful of Germans in the Reich had any idea of the 'eternal and merciless struggle' under way 'for the German language, German schools, and a German way of life' (Hitler, 1999, 10). The following quote shows that fear of future humiliation built on feelings of humiliation stemming from past subjugation compounded with shame over past humility, may foreclose feelings of empathy for a targeted adversary and/or scapegoat. This mixture may be at the core of the most unfathomable aspect of genocidal contexts, namely the absence of empathy perpetrators feel for their victims and the obsessive determination to 'exterminate' every single member of the targeted victim group so as to 'purify' the world.

The lack of empathy on the part of rising underlings is perhaps the most difficult aspect to understand, since they should know better – having experienced at first hand how painful it is to be subjugated. The mixture of feelings of humiliation and shame at their own humility may be at the core of obsessive genocidal urges that exclude empathy. Undoubtedly, traditional masters may also be expected to be unfamiliar with empathy. For example, the French aristocracy before the revolution viewed their underlings as lesser beings that did not merit empathy. However, it seems that masters in long-standing hierarchies are 'satisfied' if underlings bow. That is all they ask for. They are not obsessed by killing even the babies in the wombs of their mothers and thus 'purify' themselves from their painful relation with their former or imagined elite.

To conclude, it may, after all, be easier for masters to descend to the level of equality than for underlings to rise to the same level, because rising underlings have to confront remnants of their own belief in their divinely ordained inferiority and the resulting admiration for elites; they have to escape from a dyadic relation in which they were used to being the reactor. Gaining inner stature is their prime task. Nelson Mandela had the necessary preconditions, perhaps since he was the son of a chief and thus prepared to carry his head high even though he belonged to a humiliated group. People like Mandela possess the

indispensable calm and moderation to enter into ‘rational’ and balanced conflict transformation, without urges to ‘purify’ an unbearable ‘master-slave’ relationship by exterminating the opponent. Moderates like Mandela, around the world, would have to ally and work for a process whereby extremists are marginalised and calmed, and populations are lifted out of hardship that may be transformed into political ‘fuel’ by extremist leaders.

It is not only a normative stance, namely human rights, that promotes efforts to invest in the respectful and non-humiliating relations and institutions a *Decent Society* (Margalit, 1996) requires, but also utility. As discussed above, creativity, the raw material for future corporate success, cannot be stimulated by oppression. People who feel self-possession and enjoy dignified social relations are the ones needed societies that want to excel at the global level and be part of a global *Decent Society*. Studying the mechanisms and dynamics of humiliation seems to be an urgent task if healing humiliation shall be more effective in the future. This book tried to contribute to this task.

To summarise, this book consisted of three parts that addressed the three elements of the paradigm of diagnosis – prognosis – therapy/prevention in their relation to the process of humiliation. The first part analysed the conceptual background of the concept of humiliation and provided theoretical tools for the diagnosis and prognosis of the role of humiliation in relation to the human condition. The second part of the book focused on humiliation as socio-historical process and thus presented reflections pertaining to the diagnosis and prognosis of human history with respect to the role of humiliation. The third part contributed examples of recent incidents of humiliation, such as genocidal killings in Rwanda, Somalia, and Germany, and turned to the issue of therapy and prevention in the last chapter. The findings of the research carried out for the research project on humiliation that forms the basis for this book will be summarised in the following section.

Summary of Results and What the Author’s Research Added to Pre-Existing Knowledge

The research on humiliation yielded results that in many ways represent paradigm shifts since they suggest an innovative conceptualisation of reality, both diachronic and synchronic, from the perspective of relations between individuals and groups and whether these relations are characterised by acts and feelings of humiliation or respect.

Clinical Experience and a Historic Hypothesis Triggered the Interest in Research on Humiliation

Two initial observations triggered the author's interest in the topic of humiliation.

- The author's experience as clinical psychologist (1980-84 in Germany, 1984-1991 in Egypt) indicated that humiliation is of crucial importance in human relations, both as act and experience, and that cycles of humiliation may permeate people's lives with an all-consuming intensity. Vogel and Lazare (1990) illustrate this point in 'The Unforgivable Humiliation – a Dilemma in Couples Treatment.' The severity of rifts caused by humiliation to be observed between people called for research.
- Furthermore, it is often assumed, that the humiliation of the Germans through the Versailles Treaties after World War I was partly responsible for the Holocaust and the Second World War. It seemed therefore very important to understand the nature of humiliation and how it is related to the occurrence of genocide and mass violence. Work by Scheff (1990), Staub (1989), Volkan (1990), or Rapoport (1970) addresses parts of the dynamics that pertain to humiliation, but humiliation is normally not differentiated from other notions such as, for example, shame. It seemed important to focus on the notion of humiliation and differentiate it from other concepts.

The First Overview Over Literature and a Pilot-Study (1997-1998) Rendered Extremely Divergent Perspectives on the Notion of Humiliation

- Miller (1993), and Cohen and Nisbett (1996) describe humiliation as part of honour societies, such as illustrated in *The Iliad*, or to be observed nowadays in some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, or the South of the United States. The research question that imposed itself was whether humiliation is a notion that is restricted to honour cultures.
- Smedslund (1997 in a personal communication with the author) conceptualised humiliation as antonym of respect within the framework of human rights. The above noted research question could be expanded to asking in what way humiliation in an honour context is similar or different to humiliation in a human rights context, and whether honour and human rights are the only parameters.
- Hartling started to develop a Humiliation Inventory (published 1999) where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring 'being teased,' 'bullied,' 'scorned,' 'excluded,' 'laughed at,' 'put down,' 'ridiculed,' 'harassed,' 'discounted,' 'embarrassed,' 'cruelly criticized,' 'treated as invisible,' 'discounted as a person,' 'made to feel small or

insignificant,' 'unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service,' 'called names or referred to in derogatory terms,' or viewed by others as 'inadequate,' or 'incompetent.' The question arose whether such an Inventory can be used to study humiliation cross-culturally in genocide contexts such as Rwanda and Somalia. It seemed premature for these cases.

- Margalit (1996) wrote a book on *The Decent Society*, a society that ought not to entail humiliating institutions. This book highlighted the notion that humiliation may be more than an act or an emotion played out between individuals but may be institutionalised. Research had to attend to this point as well.
- The results of the pilot study presented humiliation as an intricately complex concept that requires research for better understanding and differentiation. Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will (or in some cases with your consent, for example in cases of ^fsado-masochism) and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless. However, the role of the victim is not necessarily always unambiguous – a victim may feel humiliated in the absence of any deliberately humiliating act – as a result of misunderstandings, or as a result of personal and cultural differences concerning norms about what respectful treatment ought to entail – or the 'victim' may even invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of a loathsome perpetrator. People react in different ways to being treated in humiliating ways: some just become depressed, others get openly angry, and others again hide their anger and plan revenge. The person who plans for revenge may become the leader of a movement. A perpetrator might want to commit humiliation but not succeed, a 'benefactor' might humiliate while trying to do good, a third party might observe 'victims' who do not see themselves as such (or fail to see victims in cases where they do exist), or humiliation is sought instead of despised.

Findings Confirmed the Initial Assumptions

Findings Confirmed the Initial Assumption That Feelings of Humiliation are Among the Strongest Emotions Available to Human Beings

The above reported observations concerning the significance of processes of humiliation that triggered the research were confirmed by the fieldwork. Being exposed to acts of humiliation has in many cases significant consequences.

- Children who are systematically humiliated may not be able to develop the full range of human capacities and become so severely damaged that they show signs of ‘affective blindness’ and lack of empathy. The fieldwork in Somalia and Rwanda shed particular light on the plight of children who are forced to become soldiers at a very young age and represent a ‘danger’ to security as soon as the war is over and they are not instrumental anymore.
- Adults who are exposed to acts of humiliation may become obsessed with and caught within cycles of humiliation and counter-humiliation that entail a whole range of conditions including depression, anger, and violent behaviour. The research project collected broad evidence for this assumption.

Findings Confirmed That Feelings of Humiliation Are Among the Most Potent Forces That Create Rifts Between People, Rifts That Are Also Among the Most Difficult to Heal, and that Form the Most Serious Barriers to Building Trust and Co-operation

The fieldwork suggested that many differences, for example cultural differences, may not be primary, but secondary, namely consequences of processes of humiliation. Experiences of humiliation may lead to the

- heightening of cultural and ideological antagonisms that otherwise would be
- played down.

The cases of Somalia versus Somaliland, Hutu versus Tutsi, or West Germans versus East Germans demonstrate that available cultural and historical elements that indicate unity are not utilised, on the contrary, feelings of humiliation lead to an emphasis on differences and unbridgeable rifts, similar to the ‘unforgivable humiliation’ that represents the ultimate obstacle to couple treatment (Vogel & Lazarus, 1990).

New, Innovative Findings and Analyses Concerning the Global Historic Development of the Human Condition

The Fieldwork Shed Light on Different Societal Contexts in Which Humiliation Occurs

The fieldwork carried out in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi by the author (on the background of German history) made clear that there are at least three contexts within which humiliation is played out in different forms:

- Firstly, what could be named the context of ‘pride’: in Somalia ‘noble,’ ‘proud,’ and ‘free’ nomads promote a proverb that says: ‘A man deserves to be killed, not humiliated,’ in other words, humiliation is feared and averted, if necessary at the cost of one’s life, not endured.
- Secondly, the context of ‘honour’: in Rwanda/Burundi humiliation is deeply institutionalised in intricately hierarchical societal structures that attach honour to rank – similar to Germany before Hitler’s ascent – and underlings are used to lowly positions characterised by humility and an exposition to routine acts of humiliation by superiors;
- Thirdly, the context of ‘dignity’: all societies on the globe are currently affected by human rights ideals that postulate that each person’s dignity ought to be respected and not humiliated.

Findings Were Mapped onto Human History and the Discovery Was Made That the Act and Experience of Humiliation May be Taken As Defining Parameters of Human History

Somali egalitarianism, Rwandan/Burundian hierarchical structures, and recent egalitarian human rights ideals, though coexistent today, may be mapped onto human history, which, according to the author’s view, leads to both interesting and stimulating perspectives on history that are new and innovative in their comprehensive modelling: Humiliation may be taken as a term that describes the core transformation of the human condition from hunting and gathering to agriculture and today’s knowledge society. The notion of humiliation describes the application of a universal idea, namely that something may be ‘put down,’ or ‘turned into a tool.’ This ‘downward push’ may be applied to the biotic and abiotic world: nature may be instrumentalised, as may human beings. Instrumentalising human beings, subjugating and degrading them, for example as slaves, has long been regarded as ‘normal,’ however, it becomes an illegitimate practice as soon as a society transforms from traditional hierarchical ranking orders to human rights based egalitarian structures. Currently a transition

is taking place from an old condition where societal structures build on ranking orders that are associated with honour and customary practices of humiliation, towards a new condition where the ideal of human rights indicates that every human being has an inner core of dignity that ought not be subject to abasement. The significant historic transition thus progresses from

- Pride societies (egalitarian societal structures that have not yet experienced systematic subjugation) to
- Honour societies (hierarchical societal structures based on agriculture) to
- Dignity societies (knowledge society with egalitarian networks).

The above reported descriptions of humiliation as related to honour (Miller, Cohen, Nisbett) and human rights (Smedslund) may therefore be mapped onto different societal profiles that developed during human history and that vary according to the mode in which the act of ‘putting down’ is employed, whether only upon the abiotic world (tool making), or also upon the biotic world (human beings as tools or slaves), and whether this is regarded as ‘normal’ (honour societies), or as illegitimate (human rights contexts).

Findings Showed That Reactions to Humiliation Vary According to the Societal Setting Within Which They Occur

The fieldwork rendered important evidence that people universally react with depression or anger and violence when humiliated, however, that such reactions vary according to the three main societal settings described above. These findings are extremely relevant for cross-cultural encounters that fail because the cross-cultural differences pertaining to processes of humiliation are not understood:

- **Pride:** In an aggressive egalitarian nomad culture such as Somalia, people tend to display open anger and aggression when confronted with attempts to humiliate them.
- **Honour:** Reactions of covert anger or depression are to be expected in hierarchical systems such as Rwanda/Burundi or Germany before Hitler’s rise where people have been trained, over centuries, to accept humiliation, and some even develop humble acceptance of their lowly position in the hierarchical ranking order.
- **Dignity:** Modern human rights societies, in contrast, try reversing this learning process. They attempt to empower their citizens and teach them civil disobedience and self-possession; this happens more in some segments of society, and less in others. Individuals as well as the corporate sector, for example, are willing to pay large sums for seminars and workshop that reverse the learning process that in the old order was designed to create

humble underlings, while other segments of society – for example, governing bodies and elite groups – try to preserve old style power asymmetries.

The ‘unlearning’ of formerly state-of-the-art upbringing methods and communication styles that entailed routine humiliation for underlings is an important field for more research on the notion of humiliation.

Multidisciplinary Analysis and Synthesis Indicated That Humiliation – Together With Other parameters – May Be Seen As a Parameter That Defines the Human Condition³⁸²

The author analysed the role of humiliation (versus respect) in a model that also includes other parameters such as the Security Dilemma, the pie of resources and time horizon. This means that the three above-described historic phases may be viewed through the lens of

- the Security Dilemma, whether it is weak or strong,
- the pie of resources, whether it is expandable or fixed,
- the time horizon, whether it is long or short, and
- social identity as pertaining to humiliation or respect.

The most benign scenario is a combination of weak Security Dilemma, expandable pie, long time horizon, and an atmosphere of respect. Conversely, the worst scenario brings together a short time horizon, positioned in an environment that represents a fixed pie of resources, combined with a strong Security Dilemma, within which individuals or groups are exposed to humiliating assaults. As already mentioned, feelings of humiliation and their consequences may be so strong that they override and undermine otherwise ‘benign’ scenarios, in a downward spiral. This model of the human condition may be instrumental to analysing social change over long time stretches and in different world regions, as well as aid future strategy planning for governments and international organisations.

³⁸² This section is expanded upon in the author’s doctoral dissertation (2000), *The Psychology of Humiliation: Somalia, Rwanda / Burundi, and Hitler's Germany*.

Policy Relevant Findings Related to Currently Occurring Transitions

Findings Indicated That Feelings of Humiliation Become Stronger at the Current Historic Turning Point As the Act of Humiliation Becomes Illegitimate and at the Same Time More Wide-Spread

Central findings of the research – with urgent policy relevance – concern the consequences of the current historic transition from ‘honour humiliation’ (humiliation as legitimate subjugation of some human beings by others in honour societies) towards ‘human rights humiliation’ (modern human rights based societal structures that regard humiliation as illegitimate).

This transition dangerously increases feelings of humiliation in many segments of the world population:

- Feelings of humiliation increase whenever underlings come to perceive that their condition of subjugation – a condition they may have accepted as divinely ordained or nature’s order – is far from legitimate and represents but illegitimate and humiliating lowliness.
- Global promotion and awareness of human rights is currently contrasted with an increase of its violations – the growing gap between rich and poor is but one example – and this gap increases feelings of humiliation among the less privileged because they feel victimised by what they see as humiliation by ‘double standards’ or empty ‘human rights rethoric.’
- Formerly recommended communication styles that entailed routine humiliation increasingly receive medical labels such as trauma, bullying or mobbing, and thus expand the repertoire of existing medical diagnoses insofar as processes of humiliation become the core of new diagnostic labels.

Since feelings of humiliation have the potential to lead to anger and violence an increase of those feelings within the world population may be described as being as dangerous as a pressure cooker that collects steam.

The fieldwork revealed that the most intense feelings of humiliation may be linked to feelings of admiration

The fieldwork revealed that

- the most intense feelings of humiliation may occur in victims who admire their humiliators.

- In cases where such victims gain access to means for counter-humiliation this will be carried out with particular brutality and may include genocidal killings.

Edna Adan, admired first lady of Somalia obviously triggered feelings of humiliation that she was unaware of and later suffered imprisonment with particularly brutal attempts of counter-humiliation by her former admirers; in her words: ‘Humiliation is when someone tries to bring someone down to their level. They think that you are above them and they want to hurt you, humiliate you, bring you down to their level, so that you have no more self-respect, so that you lose the respect you have for yourself and others lose the respect they have for you.’ Equally, Hutu admired Tutsi and felt humiliated by them, and ultimately subjected them to genocide. The sequence of humiliation and counter-humiliation occurs particularly at times of change, when underlings begin to expect more respect from their superiors and feel humiliated by the lack of this respect. They may attempt – if they get access to means for it – brutal counter-humiliation of their former masters, who typically are surprised, because they are unaware of such dynamics. The policy recommendation for elites is therefore to be aware of the degree of admiration and expectation for respect from underlings.

Findings showed that the current rise of underlings to the level of equality as described by human rights ideals is characterised by a certain diachronic pattern (that also occurs synchronically)

The results of the research project on humiliation as related to genocide and war showed that processes of humiliation are elementary, because genocide and war often occur when underlings try to replace their masters (and keep hierarchy intact), or attempt to rise to equality (and dismantle hierarchical structures) as described by human rights ideals. The research yielded the thought-provoking results that the current rise of underlings to the level of equality as described by human rights ideals is characterised by a certain sequence of actions and reactions, and that this sequence is not only diachronic, but also synchronic. The sequence of actions and reactions may be summarised as follows:

- Underlings in traditional hierarchical societies may humbly accept their lowliness as divinely ordained or nature’s order (see notions of penetration, structural violence, Galtung, 1969, 1996). Masters view their superiority in the same terms – they typically assume that their underlings deeply admire and love them and that their domination represents nothing more than parental patronage.
- Underlings may attempt to rise within ranking orders by imitating elites. Masters typically view this effort with mild sympathy or ridicule.

- At some point underlings recognise that by imitating masters they do not actually achieve the status of a master or gain respect as an equal (Frantz Fanon, 1986) and they develop feelings of humiliation regarding their lowly position. They may call for major changes of hierarchical structures, even for revolution and violence, and may accuse masters of having arrogated their superiority illegitimately. At this point masters themselves typically experience feelings of humiliation due to the withdrawal of the thankfulness and subservience that they feel entitled to receiving from their underlings. Violent oppression of their underlings may be the masters' reaction in cases where they stay in power; genocide of the former elite (imagined or real) may be the result when underlings gain access to the country's power instruments (Hutu in Rwanda).

These three stages may occur in the course of macro-historical changes – such as the demise of slavery – however, the same society, even the same person, may harbour all stages and incremental transitions between stages within herself at the same time. An underling, for example, may rebel against an elite and feel humiliated by it, while at the same time admiring it and feeling ashamed of this very admiration. The intricate web of threads of feelings and actions that accompany the rise of underlings requires thorough disentangling in order to understand and prevent violent expressions. Processes of humiliation and counter-humiliation stand at the core of this web and give it a comprehensive meaning. The research project on humiliation has shed valuable light on this web, however, more research is required.

Findings Showed That the Current Transition Towards Human Rights Ideals Is Characterised By a Multitude of Confrontations and Contradictions

The author found ample evidence for the problems entailed in the current transition to human rights based societal structures and facilitates the tackling of such problems by systematising these problems with the help of the concept of humiliation. Today's global society includes

- promoters of human rights who regard degradation of others as illegitimate,
- and at the same time representatives of the opposite stance who justify the same practice as highly recommendable.

Often the elite of a country or organisation displays the 'old values' and pays at best lip service to human rights, while others call for an earnest implementation of the ideal of human rights. This antagonism creates a host of misunderstandings and bitter feelings that relate to the notion of humiliation. Oppressive dictatorial regimes, for example, face criticism from human rights advocates and are accused of humiliating their underlings, however, such regimes may return the same accusation and deplore that Western imperialist ideas are used to

humiliate the non-West. An important policy recommendation arising from the research is that human rights advocacy that does not display respect for those who still adhere to the old honour code, may have humiliating effects on the accused that create secondary problems in the course of a transition that is already difficult in itself. In order to facilitate a smoother transition towards human rights, these findings are crucial, and further research necessary.

Findings Indicated That Feelings of Humiliation May Drive Leaders to Perpetrate Genocide

Since feelings of humiliation are extremely powerful, leaders who feel humiliated may be prone to guide their followers into the perpetration of atrocities that they present as a form of ‘healing through humiliation.’ This scenario becomes particularly complicated

- when feelings of humiliation are compounded by feelings of humility and inferiority together with shame about these very feelings. This may be the case, for example, when underlings rise to power and are confronted with the effects of their own former humble acceptance of their lowly state. The genocide perpetrated by the former Hutu underlings on their former Tutsi elite, is but one illustration; Hitler, who started his life under humiliating circumstances as member of a downtrodden German minority in Austria another example.
- For long-standing elites oppression of underlings may be ‘sufficient,’ while former underlings – risen to power – may attempt genocide on the former elite minority. This systematisation is suggested by the fieldwork, however, requires much more research to be further substantiated.

Findings Confirmed the Wide-Spread Assumption That Feelings of Humiliation Can Be Instrumentalised by Leaders

Since feelings of humiliation have an exceptional force, leaders who wish to accomplish atrocities with the help of a population may be tempted to incite feelings of humiliation among their followers and promote atrocities as a way to ‘heal humiliation.’ This may work even if the story of humiliation is imagined or fabricated and the proposed ‘healing’ not effective, as many examples show, among others that of Hitler’s genocide upon the Jews – his imagined and feared ‘super-humiliator.’

- It may be the case that a populace that experiences frustrating and humiliating living conditions is especially prone to fall for stories of humiliation that supposedly explain their

predicament that may be 'healed' with atrocities proposed by their leaders. Hitler and Siad Barre were experts in mobilising masses that felt that their contribution to their leaders' vision provided them with a significance they never had before. The desire of people for more respect was thus abused by their leaders.

- Populations that live under more satisfying conditions and feel that their desire for respect has been met may be less seducible.

Findings and Analysis Indicated That the Current Rise of Underlings to the Level of Equality As Described by Human Rights Ideals Includes Many Segments of Society and Many Social Practices

Though the research on humiliation here presented focused on war and genocide and shed light on the rise of groups or classes from humiliating lowliness in this context, it yielded the important finding that the rise of underlings characterised by the above-described sequence of actions and reactions that negotiate the issue of humiliation, is not only relevant for incidents of war and genocide, but also for other contexts within which underlings rebel. The diachronic and synchronic transitions from humility through ambitious imitation to humiliation and protest, and the possibility of putting into effect a psychological process of moderation that may lead to constructive change, are both relevant for

- Women as they rise out of humiliating subjugation by males and patriarchal structures;
- Blacks as they struggle out of a humiliating position in relation to whites;
- The poor as they try to cope with the increasing gap between themselves and the rich;
- The struggle between two forms of rationality: rationality as defined as a long-term holistic approach against rationality defined as short-sighted instrumentalisation;
- Nature in its transition from being an object of short-sighted instrumentalisation towards being protected as sustainable fundament of human life.

In all cases feelings of humiliation may be expressed in terms of violence and destructive confrontation that compound an already difficult transition with avoidable secondary problems of violent cycles of humiliation and counter-humiliation.

Epistemological and Methodological Findings and Analyses

Multidisciplinary Analysis and Synthesis Yielded the Insight That Humiliation Presents Itself As a Term That Systematically Connects Many Aspects of the Human Condition and Academic Scholarship

The fieldwork shed more light on the interesting fact that humiliation provides not only a ‘red thread’ through human history, but is also inscribed within many aspects of the human condition. It is

- a societal process (and addresses the legitimacy of subjugation and power asymmetries);
- a process occurring between ‘humiliators’ and ‘victims’ (and implies an intergroup and interpersonal act);
- an emotional state (and implies the occurrence of an experience and feeling).

In other words, the concept of humiliation connects the form of societal structures, the mode of intergroup and interpersonal relations, and an emotional state (common sense language uses the same word, namely ‘humiliation,’ for the act and the experience of humiliation).

The concept of humiliation thus also connects basic research in

- psychology, as for example research on emotions, with large macro-political analyses that include
- anthropology,
- sociology,
- philosophy and
- political science.

The Fieldwork Showed That the Validity of Research Hinges on Non-Humiliating Research Methods

The author left 1998 for the fieldwork in Africa with a guideline for semi-structured interviews. However, this strategy had to be abandoned because it became clear that great care has to be taken to not humiliate potential interlocutors who are expected to speak about the atrocities they lived through and the failings of their countries to a person who represents the former white colonisers and who flies in on a scholarship that they would like to have themselves.

- Western-style methodology that turns the interlocutor into a mere object humiliates this person – this happens in Western contexts, however, even more in non-Western contexts that carry memories of being instrumentalised by colonisation before. Furthermore, the

economic gap between the white researcher's standard of living and the grave lack of resources under which most informants in Africa have to live is in itself humiliating for them.

- Reflexive dialogue covering the same basic topics with many different people and faithfully capturing their beliefs and feelings was the new method that was developed by the author. These dialogues had to be conducted with humility and authenticity on the interviewer's side. Research data often are being paid for, at least indirectly, insofar as students are obliged to offer their services to research, or patients or refugees expect therapy or asylum for their willingness to talk about memories they rather would forget. However, in cases where the interviewee has no reward but the contact with the researcher during their encounter, the researcher may not be provided with any valid data, if she is not entering into an authentic and non-humiliating dialogue with her interlocutors.

Multidisciplinary Analysis and Synthesis Yielded the Insight That the Concept of Humiliation Entails, at Least, Seven Layers

- The core of the concept of humiliation builds on the universal idea of 'putting down.'
- The next layer plays out the core in two diametrically opposing ways, namely, on one side, 'putting down' as being legitimate and 'good for you,' or, on the other side, as illegitimate and traumatising.
- A first peripheral layer pertains to cultural differences that affect groups of people.
- Four additional peripheral layers relate to differences in the personalities of individuals and the way these differences are linked to experiences of humiliation.

The Pervasiveness of Acts and Feelings of Humiliation in All Aspects of Human Life and Its Multidisciplinary Character May Be the Reason Why Few Researchers Have Studied Humiliation Explicitly

Humiliation and shame, for example, are often confounded rather than differentiated. The point of this research is that humiliation, though in many respects related to shame, trauma, and other conditions, deserves to be treated separately, and requires future research and further theoretical conceptualisation that differentiates it from other notions.

Policy Recommendations to Third Parties Who Wish to Mediate in Conflicts or Create Strategies for Future Social Change

Findings Suggested the Recommendation to Third Parties Who Intend to Respect Diversity, for Example Cultural Difference, to Ensure That Such Difference Is Not a Symptom of Processes of Humiliation That Call for Healing Instead of Rigidification

The fieldwork showed that it is important for third parties to understand whether proclaimed differences (cultural, ideological, ethnic, and so on) are

- primary (and the result of separate cultural development) or
- secondary (result of processes of humiliation),

since respect for differences becomes a difficult concept in cases where these differences are caused by humiliation. In such cases 'healing' may be called for, instead of the rigidification of rifts by a misunderstood concept of respect. 'Ethnicity,' or 'clanism,' for example, often called upon as explanatory factors, may have their roots in dynamics of humiliation and must not be blindly taken as explanatory factors. Somali clans, for example, used to merge in the dream of Somali unity before they fought each other, and Hutu and Tutsi have more in common than may be expected.

Recommendations for the Healing of Processes of Humiliation

Recommendations for Healing Humiliation by Creating Alliances of Moderates

Healing cycles of humiliation and counter-humiliation can only be brought about when moderates on all sides form alliances against extremists who are driven by obsessive feelings of humiliation. The important fault lines do not run between the camps of opponents (such as Hutu-Tutsi), but between the moderates and the extremists in both camps.

- Usually conflict resolution efforts concentrate on pacifying relations between opposing groups (such as Hutu-Tutsi).
- It may be more fertile to focus on the fault lines between moderates and extremists in both camps and attempt to create an alliance between moderates of both camps with the aim of reducing feelings of humiliation among their extremist group members and minimising humiliating living conditions of the broad masses so as to foreclose the

opportunity for extremist leaders to instrumentalise feelings of frustration and humiliation among the broad masses.

Third parties may be well advised to pay close attention to fault lines, asking which of those are really relevant and instrumental for peaceful change. Third parties may need to concentrate on supporting moderates of all camps in their attempts to heal feelings of humiliation that fuel violence. This is because opposing groups can never enter into compromises unless their extremist members have been pacified. This innovative finding of the research on humiliation turns the usual approach to conflict transformation away from negotiating the contents of compromises towards the feelings that fuel the need to create and maintain rifts and disunity. It is a truism that conflicts of interest are best solved in unity. They are unsolvable if disunity is a psychological need among some of the opponents. Humiliation provides a need for rifts – rifts that no negotiation can bridge – this is the conclusion of this research on humiliation. Therefore feelings of humiliation and attendance to them has to be the priority for third parties that attempt to mediate in violent conflicts.

Recommendations for Healing Feelings of Humiliation

Feelings of humiliation may lead to violent protest that triggers cycles of humiliation and counter-humiliation. These are perpetrated and endured by all citizens in societal structures of asymmetrical power that are perceived as illegitimate and humiliating by those at the bottom of the pyramid. In such cases societal structures that have humiliating effects may not be improved, on the contrary, they may deteriorate under conditions of war and violent conflict. This is one way the dynamics humiliation may be played out. However, humiliation may also be overcome peacefully, both as a feeling and as social condition (see the case of Nelson Mandela).

- To overcome the feeling of humiliation, underlings have to step outside of the master-slave dyad and learn to act autonomously, instead of re-acting to the master's actions and definitions. This is a psychological process that requires great personal strength.
- To overcome humiliating social conditions entailed in power asymmetries that violate human rights, underlings need to 'stand up' and exercise autonomy. Then they may be able to teach their masters that change is necessary and unavoidable, both normatively and practically, and that a peaceful transition is preferable to war.

Rising underlings who have achieved such autonomy and stature, such as Nelson Mandela, may be called 'moderates' who are able to teach both masters and extremist underlings how

to tackle the transition from oppressive hierarchy to respectful equality. Moderation is not to be confused with softness; it is autonomous analysis and action (Mandela). Research on humiliation has shed light on the psychological processes that are necessary for peaceful transition, more research is necessary. The important point is that social change towards more human rights awareness and implementation, necessary and difficult as it is, may be compounded with avoidable secondary problems, if feelings of humiliation lead to destructive violence instead of constructive change.

Findings That Were Surprising

Several findings of the fieldwork were surprising and contradicted former expectations.

- Typical expectation: Emotions are to be studied by psychology, institutions by sociology and political science. Important finding by the author: In the case of humiliation many academic fields and aspects of the human condition are interlinked. Humiliation is thus a multidisciplinary topic, a situation that may provide an explanation for the scattered state of scholarship on humiliation and why it has hitherto not been analysed in a similar multidisciplinary and comprehensive manner as carried out by the author.
- Typical expectation: Detached quantitative methods secure high quality of research. Important finding by the author: Validity may become low when humiliating research methods are applied on human beings in social sciences. An interviewee, turned into an object for research, may feel humiliated, close up and not provide valid data.
- Typical expectation: Research in social sciences taps the social knowledge of people without preconditions. Important finding by the author: It is often forgotten that interviewees are indirectly rewarded for opening up (students, patients, refugees), while interviewees in many real life situations lack this reward. Interviewees, especially in non-Western contexts, may not be motivated to speak about difficult experiences just for the sake of research, let alone provide valid data. The researcher has to win the trust and interest of interviewees and has to convince them to become co-researchers.
- Typical expectation: Africa is homogeneous. Finding: Africa is not at all homogenous; many have observed this before, but this view has been confirmed by the author's research. Somalia with its pride culture marks one extreme pole of a continuum that stretches from egalitarian societal structures to hierarchical structures, while

Rwanda/Burundi and pre-Hitler's Germany with their extreme hierarchies and honour rankings mark the other pole.

- Typical expectation: We live in an era where history has ended: The end of history (Fukuyama, 1993). Finding: The author's findings confirm Ury's (1999) speculations concerning modern knowledge society's return to former nomadic egalitarianism. Human rights ideals that promote egalitarian networks and untouchable personal dignity may be located towards the Somali pole, at least in some respects; pre-hierarchy and post-hierarchy are related.
- Typical expectation: Ethnicity plays a large role in violence currently to be observed around the world. Important and innovative finding by the author: Rifts pertaining to culture, ethnicity, and ideology may be the result of dynamics of humiliation rather than primary differences. Thus the theory of humiliation marks a point in academic thinking where relations between players – entailing humiliation or respect – are seen as central explanatory factor, as opposed to explanations that are based on various static contents related to ideology (Cold War), ethnicity (current paradigm of explanation) or culture and civilisation (Huntington, 1996). The theory of humiliation highlights the malleability of expressions of ideology, ethnicity, culture or civilisation according to the degree of existing feelings of humiliation between players.
- Typical expectation: Victims of humiliation loathe their humiliators. Important finding: The most intense feelings of humiliation may occur in victims who admire their humiliators. In cases where such victims gain access to means for counter-humiliation this will be carried out with particular brutality and may include genocidal killings.
- Typical expectation: Long-standing elites that fear loss of power perpetrate genocide. Important and innovative finding by the author: It may rather be the case that former underlings, risen to power, perpetrate genocides. Long-standing elites may want to oppress, but not necessarily commit large-scale genocides. The reason is that former underlings may harbour feelings of humility and inferiority and may partly admire their victims (often some kind of elite) while denying this admiration. It may mainly be their own admiration that perpetrators try to exterminate through genocide. Genocide would thus be, at least partly, an attempt by perpetrators to 'purify' their own confusion and shame over their feelings of humility and admiration in face of the members and characteristics of the victim group.

- Typical expectation: Human rights are widely violated and this is a sign of their failing. Important and innovative finding by the author: Human rights awareness is on the increase around the world, and it is this increase that guides the perception and definition of human rights violations. In the old hierarchical honour order humiliation was legitimate and recommended; the fact that violations are at all perceived as such proves how the human rights ideology has permeated societies. The gap between awareness and implementation of human rights, however, creates intense feelings of humiliation. People, who become aware that their demeaning position represents a case of humiliation, feel humiliated until their life conditions have been improved. The transition from awareness to implementation of human rights (political, civil, political, cultural, social, and economic) causes feelings of humiliation that lead to anger, depression and violence.
- Typical expectation: Conflicts are often characterised by an antagonism between masters and underlings (who attempt to rise or have recently risen). Third parties who wish to mediate often have problems gaining the trust of both sides. The research on humiliation rendered the important conceptualisation of the transition from humble to humiliated underlings and contrasted this with the time lag that occurs before masters understand that they cannot keep arrogating illegitimate superiority. This conceptualisation provides a comprehensive image of the overall process of current social change towards human rights, and includes both masters and underlings in such a way that they feel their plight is understood and respected. This conceptualisation does not demonise any conflict party but makes it transparent that both sides are caught in the course of change that triggers a predictable chain of feelings and actions.
- Typical expectation: Current efforts in conflict transformation focus on conflicts of interest between opposing sides and expect that this will 'solve' the conflict. The research on humiliation yielded innovative results insofar as it suggests that such a focus may be futile in many cases. This is because even the most difficult conflicts of interest may be solved comparably easily as soon as people are willing to co-operate. The fact that people do not want to co-operate may therefore not be caused by the difficult nature of their conflicting interests, quite the opposite, unwillingness to co-operate may be fuelled by rather distinct sources, namely accumulated feelings of humiliation that hamper openness for compromise. Unless these feelings are attended to, no compromise may be reached or promise of peace fulfilled. The psychological transformation of opponents may therefore be the precondition for any real peace accord, a transformation

that may be aided by this research on humiliation. The research led to strong recommendations to third parties regarding the need to focus on the psychological transformation of leaders and followers involved in conflicts – away from extremism towards moderation, on supporting moderate leaders across conflict lines to form alliances, and on diminishing humiliating living conditions for the broad masses who otherwise may be open to manipulation by extremist leaders. This represents an agenda of healing, a ‘moratorium on humiliation.’

Outlook

In conclusion it may be stated that the concept of humiliation is not only exceptionally fertile and interesting in its capacity to bridge several academic disciplines and elements of the human condition and human history, but that it is also extremely timely to do research on humiliation. Not only does it represent a particularly strong emotional force, a force that creates unbridgeable rifts between individuals and groups, including ethnic, cultural and ideological rifts, and a force that can be instrumentalised by leaders for the perpetration of atrocities – even more, the current historic turning point characterised by the advent of ideas of equality and human rights creates feelings of humiliation that were not present before. The current growth of human rights awareness around the world turns former acceptance of inequalities into sufferings from humiliation, and depicts, for example, the currently increasing global and local gap between poor and rich as an even greater human rights violation. The effects of these growing feelings of humiliation call for urgent academic and policy attention.

The author has advanced knowledge on humiliation from a scattered state, where humiliation was confounded with other notions, to a systematised and comprehensive model of the human condition, both diachronically and synchronically. The author’s systematisations render access to understanding that is useful particularly at the current turning point where formerly recommended practices and institutions of humiliation transcend towards illegitimate violations of human dignity. This transition creates and sets free feelings of humiliation – together with their potential to lead to anger, depression or violence – that require urgent attention by policy makers and academics. The author provides a platform for a ‘moratorium on humiliation’ that was not present before, and calls for further research.

Appendix

Interview Guidelines

Oslo, 25.8.1998

Summary of questions (see Dagfinn Føllesdal's formulation of questions 1997):

What is experienced as humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? When is humiliation established as a feeling? What does humiliation lead to? Which experiences of justice, honour, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? How is humiliation perceived and responded to in different cultures? What role does humiliation play for aggression? What can be done to overcome violent effects of humiliation?

Start of the interview:

The interviewer writes down:

date of the interview,

time of the day,

place where the interview takes place,

weather conditions,

with whom he/she was talking in order to get in contact with the interviewee.

The interviewer asks the interviewee for consent,

and lets the interviewee sign, if he or she wishes that. Oral consent is sufficient as well (we would want to avoid being mistaken for a government official or tax collector).

The interviewer collects biographical data

from the interviewee, but only as far as the interviewee agrees to give them. Like: "Tell me a bit about your family, how many brothers and sisters do you have, ..." (gender, ethnic background, religion, highest level of education, family background, marital status,

occupation, economic status, whether or not s/he owns own land or is an agricultural or urban worker, political preference)

The interviewer asks the following questions:

Definition of humiliation:

“If you should define and describe the term humiliation, what would you say?”

Prototypes of humiliation:

“What is the worst instance of humiliation you can think of?”

“What is the most common instance of humiliation you can think of?”

“What is the prototypic, archetypal instance?”

Personal experiences with humiliation:

“Did you yourself live through situations where humiliation played an important role?”

“How exactly did it happen?”

“What did you do, what did the others do?”

“What did you feel, what did the others feel?”

“Do you think that your reactions are universal, i.e. that all people in the world would react like that?”

“Or do you think that people of other cultures would react differently?”

Humiliation in history and society:

“Do you know about events in your near environment where you think that humiliation was important?”

“How exactly did it happen?”

“What did the people who were involved do?”

“What did the people who were involved feel?”


“What made the situation humiliating?”

“When you think of the examples you told me, how do you explain what the people in situations of humiliation did?”

“What would you have done?”

Cantril’s “Self-Anchoring Scale” (1965) concerning respect (Cantril’s original version adapted to “respect”):

Here is a picture of a ladder:



Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the highest amount of respect for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible humiliation for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Step number. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? Step number. And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Step number. Where would you put (name of group) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) *at the present time*? Step number. Where did (name of group) stand *five years ago*? Step number. Just as your best guess, where do you think (name of group) will be on the ladder *five years from now*? Step number.

Universality of the humiliation, and its culture-relative triggers:

(see hypotheses in the project description)

“Do you think that peoples’ reactions to humiliation are universal, i.e. that all people would react in the same way?”

“Was it right, or proper, inevitable for those people you described to behave like that?”

“Which choice did they have?”

“Could it be that all people know about humiliation, but that they react differently to different triggers?”

“Could it be that all people feel humiliation, but that the reasons for feeling humiliated vary? What are the ‘triggers’ which can make Americans feel humiliated, Europeans, other Africans, your fellow countrymen, the members of your group, your family, you? Please give examples if possible.”

Retaliation for humiliation:

“At what point is a humiliation so big, that you think it is right to risk ones life in the course of retaliation?”

“What would you die for?” “Is any insult worth dying for?”

“At what point is a humiliation so big, that you think you would sacrifice your life in the course of retaliation?”

“If you think of a prototypical situation of humiliation, what could heal this situation?”

Humiliation and respect:

“What would make a man/woman lose respect for himself/herself?”

“What would make you lose respect for yourself?”

Humiliation, justice and fairness:

“Has life been fair to you?”

“Is life fair to anybody?”

“Is it ever just or fair to humiliate somebody else or some other group?”

Humiliation and power structures:

“Is it all right for people with power to hurt other people?”

“When is it all right?”

“When is it not all right?”

“What about husbands and wives?”

“What about chiefs and fellow tribe members?”

Other views on the subject humiliation:

“What other thoughts do you have when you think of the notion of humiliation?”

Humiliation as cause of violent and armed conflict:

“Do you think that humiliation can escalate conflict to violent conflict?”

“Which other factors except humiliation do you think play a role in escalating conflicts to armed conflict?”

Genocide (Rwanda) or civil war (Somalia) in general:

Genocide/war, who talks about it and who participated:

“Is it okay to talk about the genocide/war?”

“Who does talk openly to whom about that?”

“Will perpetrators talk with each other, will bystanders talk, will rescuers talk?”

“Do you know about people who did not participate in the genocide/war?”

“Why did they not participate?”

“Do you know people who actively rescued people from the ‘other side’ who were in danger?”

“What did they do, much or little?”

“Why did they do that?” (perpetrators, victims, rescuers, and bystanders: e.g. international community was bystander, people could have done something if only written letters to their governments).

Helpers and perpetrators:

“What would you do, if somebody from your adversary group stood in front of your door and asked you for help?”

Level of analysis:

“Who is important in such situations, the individual, the group, or the leaders?”

“How much influence do particular individuals have?”

“How much influence did you have, your family, your village, your tribal leaders?”

Gender relevance:

“Do you feel that your mother, your aunts, your sisters and female cousins think and act different from your father, your uncles, brothers, male cousins?”

“Do women and men think and act differently concerning topics of violence?”

Aggression, violence, and control:

“What makes you angry?”

“What could get you to become violent?”

“How do you express your anger?”

“Do you think anger should be controlled?”

“By whom (by yourself or others)?”

“Why?”

“Is it wrong if anger is uncontrolled?”

Enemies and friends:

“Who is your friend, who is your brother, and who would you call your enemy?”

“What is an enemy for you?”

“Who is it your job to look after?”

“Whose job is it to look after you?”

How does your map of the world look like?

“Which groups of people (e.g. clan, sub-clans) are friends and which are enemies of your group of people?”

“Which other countries are friends and which are enemies of your people?”

“Which geographical distances have you covered in your lifetime?”

“Which other means of communication do you use? Telephone, fax, email? How often?”

“Do you listen to radio? Do you watch TV? Which radio and TV? How often per month?”

“How many hours?”

Prevention of genocide and war:

“How do you think the bad things which you experienced could have been avoided and prevented?”

“How do you think genocide/war could be avoided and prevented?”

Role of third parties:

“Did you or your group feel humiliated by foreigners in your country, or foreign powers?”

“How do you feel about a foreigner trying to understand you, and posing you questions?”

Cantril’s Self-Anchoring concerning the personal future:

All of us want certain things out of life. When you think about what really matters in your own life, what are your wishes and hopes for the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the best possible light, what would your life look like then, if you are to be happy? Take your time in answering; such things aren’t easy to put into words. (PERMISSIBLE PROBES: What are your hopes for the future? What would your life have to be like for you to be completely happy? What is missing for you to be happy? [Use also, if necessary, the words “dreams” and “desires.”] OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?). Now, taking the other side of the picture, what are your fears and worries about the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the worst Possible light, what would your life look like then? Again, take your time in answering. (PERMISSIBLE PROBE: What would make you unhappy? [Stress the words “fears” and “worries.”] OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?). Here is a picture of a ladder (see above). Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the best possible life for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible life for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Step number. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? Step number. And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Step number.

Cantril’s Self-Anchoring concerning the country’s future:

Now, what are your wishes and hopes for the future of our country? If you picture the future of (name of country) in the *best possible* light, how would things look, let us say, ten years from now? (OBLIGATORY PROBE: Anything else?) And what about your fears and worries for the future of our country? If you picture the future of (name of country) in the worst possible light, how would things look about ten years from now? (OBLIGATORY PROBE:

Anything else?) Now, looking at the ladder again, suppose your greatest hopes for (name of country) are at the top (POINTING); your worst fears at the bottom (POINTING). Where would you put (name of country) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) *at the present time*? Step number. Where did (name of country) stand *five years ago*? Step number. just as your best guess, where do you think (name of country) will be on the ladder *five years from now*? Step number.

“Satisfaction with Life Scale,”

(Ed Diener, <http://www.psych.uiuc.edu/~ediener/hottopic/hottopic.html>):

Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale below indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. (7 - Strongly agree, 6 - Agree, 5 - Slightly agree, 4 - Neither agree nor disagree, 3 - Slightly disagree, 2 - Disagree, 1 - Strongly disagree)

- ___ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
- ___ The conditions of my life are excellent.
- ___ I am satisfied with my life.
- ___ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
- ___ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Planning a questionnaire:

“A questionnaire shall be developed which examines humiliation.” “Which questions should be put in a questionnaire?”

Interviewer’s observations.

The interviewer describes the situation in which he/she finds the interviewee (refugee-status, living in a house/tent, living conditions, etc.) insofar as the interviewee has not yet given this information.

End of the interview.

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