How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences and Political Divisions:
The Psychology of Intercultural Communication – Germany, Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and the International Community as Cases

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Abstract
This paper is part of a broader attempt to establish humiliation as a psychological concept. It hypothesises that many cultural differences and subsequent political divisions may be a result of humiliation. It is argued that when people feel humiliated they construct and deepen difference and division where there was none or little before. This paper does not dispute that cultural differences have to be respected; it is grounded in fundamental sympathy with the normative context of human rights advocacy. But the paper suggests that an idolisation of diversity and otherness is detrimental in instances where cultural differences stem from humiliation. It is argued that such cases require reconciliation and the creation of greater mutual understanding, not the reification and celebration of identities that are the product of humiliation and which may undermine the human dignity of those concerned. Cases illustrating the argument are Germany, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, based on research from 1997-2000 about humiliation, Holocaust and genocide.

Keywords: psychology, cultural differences, cultural diversity, humiliation, respect, reconciliation, genocide
How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences and Political Divisions:
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This paper is part of a series of papers about humiliation. It has its place within a larger research project that looks at humiliation and its connections to war and violent conflict. The general objective of the project is to examine how relevant humiliation is in hampering peace. Genocides in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi (on the background of the German Holocaust) are the cases included, as is the international community’s handling of these conflicts. The project is entitled: The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties. 216 qualitative interviews have been carried out by the author in Africa (Somalia, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Egypt) and Europe (England, Norway, Germany, Switzerland) from 1998-2000. A pilot study was carried out in Norway with 52 respondents (1997-1998).

One of several aspects of this research is to clarify the part played by humiliation as a factor in two relationships, firstly in the relationship between opposing parties and/or perpetrators and victims in massacres committed in the contemporary world as Holocaust, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, and secondly in the relationship between third parties (international community, United Nations and international humanitarian organisations) and parties in conflict. The method used in this project is, among others, Grounded Theory, as first developed and presented by Glaser and Strauss, 1967. The issue of methodology will be expanded on further down.

Johan Galtung and Finn Tschudi write, ‘After violence, the relief that violence is over may make people blind to the invisible, long-lasting consequences of violence (such as traumas and the desire for more glory and revenge) and blind to how cultures, structures and actors may have become even more violent’ (Galtung and Tschudi, 1999). This quote marks a third party’s perspective on other party’s conflicts and highlights the possibility of third party blindness. The motivation to write this article has been triggered by precisely this phenomenon of third party blindness that needs to be examined more closely.

The author encountered this blindness during the fieldwork – not least in the author’s own initial perspective on cultural difference that was put under severe strain in the course of the research, in Germany, and in Africa, as well during the author’s seven years of working as a psychological counsellor in Cairo, Egypt (1984-1991). This article accepts Galtung’s and Tschudi’s thesis that cultures might become more violent after having gone through violence, and asks how this happens. An attempt to answer this question means dissecting the phenomenon of violence, and in other papers by the present author the suggestion is put forward that humiliation may be seen as a driving force that makes cultures become more violent. The main point of this present article, however, is not how existing cultures become more violent, but how new cultures may be brought into being by humiliation.

The argument put forward in this paper is that some forms of cultural differences may be created by humiliation; in other words, that the very existence of different cultural entities may, at least partly, originate from humiliation.

The following definition of humiliation, developed in the course of the field research, informs this paper: Humiliation is the ‘enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to
be placed, against your will and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It involves acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless’ (Lindner, 2000a, 6). Humiliation presents itself as a term that systematically connects many aspects of the human condition: it is inscribed within a societal process (and implies the existence of oppressive hierarchy); it is a process between people including a ‘humiliator’ and a ‘victim’ (and implies an interpersonal act), and, not least, it is an emotional state (and implies the occurrence of an experience and feeling).

‘Cultures’ are often conceptualised as ‘containers’ with more or less opaque walls, as being the product of diverse environments and diverse cultural beliefs in human groups that have developed in isolation. A small allowance is typically made for ‘diffusion’ since cultures are expected to be in contact with each other and learn from each other, but this does not alter the basic concept of cultures as isolated ‘containers.’ In fact, post-modern thought makes this approach its very foundation and assumes that different cultures are fundamentally impenetrable, unknowable, and enigmatic to each other. The post-modern assumption that no overarching grand narrative is valid and that different cultures are basically foreign and fundamentally unfathomable to each other is a clear expression of this line of thought.

However, this article proposes another approach to cultural differences. It argues that many cultural differences may be interpreted as a response to the process whereby one group has humiliated another. To a significant degree and in many cases, cultural difference may be understood as a response to humiliation, as a defensive reaction inserted within a discourse of humiliation between groups. The central point is that when people feel humiliated they construct and deepen difference where there was none or little before. If this hypothesis is valid, it would suggest that much of cultural difference is secondary, not primary. Those cases would stand in contradiction to the post-modern assumption of unbridgeable difference. As is clear, the definition of culture adopted in this paper entails a deeply relational perspective. It is assumed that social groups, communities, social institutions, and societies are continually developing systems that interact with – and influence – each other continually. A particular, relatively clearly bounded network of social relationships may for a while remain in a fairly stable ‘steady state’ in respect of the constellation of assumptions, understandings, customs and habits that prevail within it, and this condition may be called ‘having a distinctive culture.’ However, this condition may also develop in the direction of greater fluidity, openness and uncertainty, and the appearance of having a clear and distinct culture may diminish.

This article draws attention to the specific process in the course of which groups ‘move into’ such a ‘steady state’ under conditions of humiliation and learn to identify this ‘steady state’ as their ‘culture.’ Intercultural communication is usually defined as communication between people of different cultures; this implies that the process of communication is secondary to pre-existing cultural differences. A different approach is adopted here, one that adapts and enlarges the definition of ‘intercultural communication.’ One consequence of this change of approach is that communication is conceptualised as having the potential to create cultural differences. More specifically, communication that entails humiliating acts and causes feelings of humiliation may be seen as a possible primary cause of cultural difference. Furthermore, and equally significant, communication that is based upon respect between equals could be understood, from this perspective, as moving the emphasis away from cultural differences toward common cultural ground.

To summarise: it is hypothesised that the process of humiliation is capable of turning intra-cultural communication into inter-cultural communication; in other words, one culture
may be turned into two cultures. The mechanism by which this may occur is that one part of a group that shares a common culture imposes humiliation upon another part of the same group. The concept of 'cultural differences' within this context refers to a specific process whereby a group that feels humiliated invents, elaborates and emphasises beliefs, customs and traditions that differentiate it from the beliefs, customs and traditions of the perceived humiliate.11

Bond formulates a similar idea as follows: ‘Perceived denigration of a group’s respect and appreciation communicated across group lines are powerful bonding forces whose withholding or denial can generate intense conflict. Perceived denigration of a group’s language, dialect, customs, religion, art, music, dress and traditions can fuel intense defensive reactions and counterattack’ (Bond, 1998, 11). In Unity in Diversity, Bond writes about interactional justice and its universal validity: ‘Procedural considerations show no evidence of cultural variability… What appears to vary culturally is the restraint of anger in the face of injustice.’ Following Bond’s writing, the conflict between denigration - or as I call it, humiliation - and respect figures as a universally enacted and understood discourse that contributes to either the creation and deepening, or the de-emphasising of cultural differences.

This paper does not dispute that cultural differences have to be respected; it is grounded in fundamental sympathy with the normative context of human rights advocacy of respect for the dignity of every human being sui generis, irrespective of any secondary characteristics such as religion, gender or group affiliation. Human rights advocates emphasise that ethnocentrism and lack of respect for cultural diversity have to be overcome, and this paper is anchored within that normative framework. Against this background, however, the paper intends to show that going to the opposite extreme and idolising otherness may be detrimental to the interests of the ‘other’ in those cases where cultural differences stem from humiliation. It suggests that such differences may require to be reconciled, overcome and de-emphasised, not approached with an attitude of idolisation (or ‘other-worship’) misunderstood as respect. The position this paper takes is that humiliation, respect, and cultural differences are woven together in an intricate socio-cultural web that includes opposing and, indeed, third parties, and it suggests that parts of this web have not yet been understood sufficiently.

As stated above, this paper wishes to speak primarily to third parties. It aims to present the hypothesis that humiliation may create differences between opposing parties; differences that these parties then claim are cultural differences and the basis of group identity. The paper also intends to show that intervening third parties may compound humiliation by their own behaviour. This is because the idolisation of difference by third parties may inflict a double humiliation in cases where this difference has its roots in humiliation. The point is that such idolisation implicitly demonstrates approval for the humiliation that has been inflicted – and this reinforces the humiliation.

It is proposed that the process of ‘inter-cultural dialogue’ between first, second and third parties may benefit from vigorous scrutiny which will improve its ability to provide respect and heal humiliation that has occurred, instead of compounding it.13 Clearly, the objection is valid that cultural practices that begin for one reason often continue for another reason, and a practice that begins as a response to, or an expression of, humiliation may persist because it is valued as something very different. For example, the symbolic acts of feudal homage that aristocrats made to the monarch at the time of coronation may originally have been expressions of the loss of independence (of their ‘successful’ humiliation) by feudal lords, but over the centuries they became exclusive and highly-valued marks of aristocratic status; however, such examples, though they are connected with the argument of this paper, lie outside its scope. This paper wants to emphasise those cases where the suffering and anger produced by humiliation stands behind proclaimed cultural differences. It
is seen as important that third parties who feel indebted to a human rights framework do not fail to explore this possibility. The research project from which this paper derives was influenced by reflections upon the widely known hypothesis that Germany began World War II because of the Versailles Treaty after World War I. The infamous war-guilt clause\textsuperscript{14} in the Versailles Treaty imposed total responsibility for the war on the Germans and demanded that they ‘make complete reparation for all… loss and damage’ caused. The Germans were thoroughly humiliated. It is now recognised that this had disastrous results.\textsuperscript{15}

The hurt of humiliation created hunger for retaliation and Hitler promised to put this into effect. He claimed that he could restore Germany’s power, pride and honour, putting it beyond the reach of enemies who wished to impose further humiliations upon it. He created a new ‘culture,’ the ‘culture’ of the Aryan ‘Übermensch’ [‘super-human being’] who, according to his advocates, had a right, even an obligation to rule the world. The present author addresses these issues in several articles,\textsuperscript{16} and aims at future research that will probe the supposed correlation between the degree to which Hitler and his followers felt humiliated and the degree of alleged cultural superiority that they constructed for themselves. The research project was triggered by this hypothesis and its potentially dangerous implications, since, if this correlation does exist, humiliation is capable of not just creating mild cultural differences, but also constructing a degree of cultural arrogance that has the potential to bring about genocide and Holocaust. This has, of course, to be carefully studied in further research.

The qualitative interviews that were carried out in the course of the fieldwork started out in Somalia in November 1998 with the application of a structured interview guideline. However, the author quickly found that any attempt to administer the questions in a formal and systematic way reinforced conditions of mistrust that the researcher was trying to overcome. In fact, there was a great danger that the process of research, if carried out in that way, would humiliate the respondents. This point will be addressed in a separate section further down. The author shifted to a methodology of asking fewer questions, allowing the interlocutors to take the lead to a great extent, and framing the encounter between the researcher and the respondent as a shared search for understanding. This produced a great deal of important information and insights that would otherwise have been hidden from the researcher. The process of changing the methodological approach during the course of the fieldwork is described in the article ‘How Research Can Humiliate: Critical Reflections on Method’ (Lindner, 2001).

The interviews were taped on audiotape and digital video film, or they were protocolled. More than 100 hours audiotape and 10 hours film were produced. The change of method of material collection entailed also a change of the approach to analysis and theory building; the sequence of first collecting material from respondents and developing theory thereafter was transformed into a process of developing theory together with the respondents/co-researchers, jointly using the material they were willing to contribute.

The change in method was supported by the author’s experience in Germany after 1989. As explained above, it was German history as inscribed in its humiliation thesis, which triggered the initial interest in the research topic. After German reunification in 1989 the author found that there were deep and complicated feelings hidden behind the official façade provided by East German people. The author learned a great about this, informally, through meeting family members who had lived in East Germany. It became clear that it required an especially close relationship for a person who had lived her life in East Germany to open up to a person who had lived in West Germany. In the case of the author this close relationship was provided by the fact that the author stems from a family of refugees or displaced persons (‘Vertriebene’) who were forced to leave Silesia and the other regions that today form Poland after World War II, and were scattered throughout Germany – some by chance ending up in
the part of Germany that later became part of the Eastern Communist bloc and others in what later became West Germany. Thus, the second generation of family members who had by pure chance grown up in different systems met in the middle of their lives to inspect the implications of this ‘psycho-sociological experiment’ inscribed in German post-war history.

This paper is organised in six parts that are preceded by an overview of the current state-of-the-art. The six parts illuminate the argument made in this article with different aspects of three cases, namely (1) Germany, (2) Somalia, and (3) Rwanda/Burundi. Each case provides an example of the process whereby groups that feel humiliated show their resentment by inventing culture or at least deepening cultural differences that otherwise would be less significant. These three cases are supplemented with three cases that address the relationship of specific third parties with others. These third parties are (4) the international community in the ‘global village,’ (5) the third party that arrives in another culture as a researcher, and (6) the third party that tries to ‘celebrate’ diversity.

**Current State-of-the-Art**

Compared with topics such as ‘trauma,’ or ‘shame,’ few researchers have studied humiliation explicitly. Humiliation and shame are often confounded rather than differentiated; the present author often met the assumption, for example in discussions with colleagues, that humiliation is just a more intense reaction than shame. Among others, Silvan S. Tomkins (1962-1992), treats shame and humiliation interchangeably. However, the point of the research project that is the larger framework for this article is precisely that humiliation, though in many respects related to shame, deserves to be treated separately, and requires future research and theoretical conceptualisation that differentiates it from other notions.

The notion of shame, for example, does not entail an element that is essential to humiliation, namely the ‘downward push’ that is already indicated in the etymology of the word ‘humiliation.’ The word humiliation has its roots in the Latin word *humus*, or earth. In spatial terms, it entails a downward orientation, literally a ‘de-gradation,’ or being put with your face into the mud. ‘Ned-verdigelse’ (Norwegian), ‘Er-niedrig-ung’ (German), ‘a-baisse-ment’ (French), all mean ‘de-gradation.’ These words are built on the same spatial, *orientational* metaphor of striking *down*, putting *down* or taking *down* (for the act of humiliation), or being put *down* (for the experience of humiliation). Lakoff and Johnson describe orientational metaphors such as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, and central-peripheral (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). In the piece entitled ‘Humiliation in the Flesh. Honour Is “FACE,” Arrogance Is “NOSE UP,” and Humiliation Is “TO BE PUT DOWN”’ the present author discusses various facets of the metaphorical use within which the notion of humiliation is embedded (Lindner, 2000b).

‘Trauma’ is another notion related to humiliation. Trauma has been addressed by uncountable publications, again largely without appreciating the distinctive role of humiliation for the traumatic experience. In ‘Humiliation – the Worst Form of Trauma’ (Lindner, 2000c) the present author examines how humiliation relates to trauma and suggests that the feelings associated with trauma are especially intense when humiliation plays a role. Traumatic experiences stemming from disasters such as earthquakes, storms, or accidents can be dealt with much more easily than damage that is intentionally inflicted by other people and creates feelings of humiliation in the victim, feelings of humiliation that may lead to depression, or resentment that forecloses co-operation, or even to violent retaliation.

This analysis is supported by the research of, for example, Vogel and Lazare, who document ‘unforgivable humiliation’ as a core obstacle in couples’ treatment (Vogel and Lazare, 1990). Robert L. Hale addresses *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder* (Hale, 1994). James Gilligan, a psychiatrist, suggests that humiliation creates
violence (Gilligan, 1996). Retzinger and Scheff (Retzinger, 1991; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991), who study shame (their main focus) and humiliation in marital quarrels, show that the bitterest marital divisions have their roots in shame and humiliation. Scheff and Retzinger extended their work on violence and Holocaust and studied the part played by ‘humiliated fury’ (Scheff, 1997a, 11) in escalating conflict between individuals and nations.

William Ian Miller wrote a book entitled Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence, where he links humiliation to honour as understood in The Iliad or Icelandic sagas. Miller explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Also the honour to which Cohen and Nisbett (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996) refer is the kind of honour and humiliation that Miller addresses; the South of the United States harbours pockets of the ‘old way.’ They operate also in the more traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds.

As mentioned above, the list of publications that use the term humiliation explicitly and as distinct from other notions is short as compared with other fields, and spread over very disparate thematic fields. Humiliation has been addressed in such fields as love, sex and social attractiveness, depression, society and identity formation, sports, and serial murder. A few examples from history, literature and film illustrate humiliation. The Journal of Primary Prevention pioneered work on humiliation in 1991 (Klein, 1991), and 1992 (Barrett and Brooks, 1992; Smith, 1992). In 1997 the journal Social Research devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation, stimulated by Margalit’s The Decent Society (Margalit, 1996). Margalit’s work pertains to the literature in philosophy on ‘the politics of recognition,’ claiming that people who are not recognised suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence (see also Honneth, 1997 on related themes).

Max Scheler sets out these issues in his classic book Ressentiment (Scheler, 1961). In his first period of work, for example his book The Nature of Sympathy Scheler focuses on human feelings, love, and the nature of the person. He states that the human person is at bottom a loving being, ens amans (Scheler, 1954) who may feel ressentiment. Liah Greenfeld, writing in the field of political science, also focuses on ressentiment and sees its dynamics at the heart of nationalism (Greenfeld, 1992; Greenfeld, 1996). For the analysis of humiliation at the macro level publications on issues such as international relations, war and violence is relevant. Bloody Revenge by Scheff, and Roots of Evil by Staub, are important works that analyse emotions within their sociological environment in an integrative way, touching upon humiliation as one variable among others.

In the field of psychology, Linda Hartling (Hartling and Luchetta, 1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (Humiliation Inventory) where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring ‘being teased,’ ‘bullied,’ ‘scorned,’ ‘excluded,’ ‘laughed at,’ ‘put down,’ ‘ridiculed,’ ‘harassed,’ ‘discounted,’ ‘embarrassed,’ ‘cruelly criticized,’ ‘treated as invisible,’ ‘discounted as a person,’ ‘made to feel small or insignificant,’ ‘unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service,’ ‘called names or referred to in derogatory terms,’ or viewed by others as ‘inadequate,’ or ‘incompetent.’ The questions probe the extent to which respondents had felt harmed by such incidents throughout life, and how much they feared such incidents. The fieldwork that was carried out in Africa for the research project within which this article is placed indicated that this questionnaire, though suitable for the purpose of humiliation within a Western context, may have insufficient validity in situations were genocide survivors from different cultures are asked whether humiliation (act and feeling) can lead to war.

The research project started out with collecting relevant academic literature and a pilot study (1997–1998 in Norway with 52 respondents). The result were very divergent accounts of the nature and dynamics of humiliation, partly – as the author has since discovered – because the broader historical and socio-cultural contexts of humiliating acts, processes and
relationships were not yet analysed in a systematic way or with proper regard for intersocietal variations. Drawing upon the 216 interviews carried out in the course of the fieldwork (1998-2000) first steps towards this analysis are presented in writings by the present author, Lindner, 2000a and Lindner, 2000d. This article, however, focuses on the issue of cultural difference, as does also Lindner, 2000e.

Six cases will now be explored to illuminate and develop the argument that has been presented so far.

Humiliation Creates Cultural Difference

Germany

The Berlin Wall fell in late 1989. East Germans declared ‘Wir sind ein Volk! [We are one people!]’ and danced together with West Germans in the streets of Berlin. West and East Germans were ‘one people’ again, they were re-united. This should have been the beginning of a blissful intra-cultural communication among this ‘one people.’ However, things did not develop all that well. ‘I Want My Wall Back!’ This is the message broadcast on T-shirts only a few years after re-unification. ‘The irony of unification is that it has produced an eastern identity that decades of Communist propaganda failed to achieve. Products made in the east sector are experiencing a revival as a way to assert a separate identity… The invisible wall that now exists will take generations to fall because the redevelopment of a homogeneous society takes time’ (Jandt, 1995, 272).

‘I Want My Wall Back!’ How could such a sentiment gain popularity? How could Eastern-made products, so recently despised, become desirable markers for an Eastern cultural identity? What had happened? Many people, especially in Eastern Europe, would claim that East Germans have enjoyed a very favourable situation since reunification. Their rich compatriots have helped them, a privilege other East Europeans were denied. Why are East Germans not more satisfied with their current situation?35 And, on the other side, should it not be a welcome burden for West Germans to be able to help their fellow Germans, disadvantaged for so many decades? Why are differences now being played ‘up,’ which were played ‘down’ when the Wall came down? Why has cultural separation rather than cultural unity become the key topic of discussion?

It is commonly argued that the reason for the surprisingly large split between East and West Germans is the existence of an unexpected cultural difference, a cultural difference that developed during the years of separation into two blocks. In the words of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, ‘We have drifted much further apart than we thought’ (Jandt, 1995, 267).

This is certainly one way of viewing the situation, but not the only possible interpretation. It will be argued that cultural differences may be of much more recent origin, and that humiliation may play a role, too. It will be proposed that the perceived ‘arrogance’ of ‘Wessies’ may be responsible, at least partly, for cultural differences. The German example is taken to support the suggestion that humiliation may have the power to create, maintain, or deepen cultural differences, even where there is a strong willingness to be one culture.

The point is that West German ‘help’ does not necessarily dignify its recipients but may repeatedly humiliate them. It is help that demands from the East German receiver an admission of cultural, moral, and personal bankruptcy, in other words, the abandonment of pride.36 The core humiliation in this case originates from what social psychology calls a ‘fundamental attribution error.’37 The ‘fundamental attribution error’ of which ‘Wessis’ are accused of is that while they excuse their own failures in life by attributing them to unfavourable circumstances instead of lack of ability, they do not make the same allowance in
However, East Germans explain,\(^38\) almost apologetically, that they have done their best to survive in the former DDR environment and find it humiliating to be expected to confess to ‘inherent stupidity’ in exchange for help, help that the donors know only too well East Germans cannot do without. To be locked helplessly in a situation of degradation, even more, to be pushed to self-degradation in a situation of need, fulfils the definition of humiliation. One defence available for East Germans seems to be to respond more or less passionately along lines such as ‘We are worth something, our lives in the former DDR were not altogether useless! We would, in fact, be happy if we could do without your help! And, by the way, your help is not as fantastic as you think after all! Be honest, don’t you profit yourself from helping us? Perhaps we would actually prefer to live in a dignified way behind the Wall, than be humiliated without it! And look, we have a valuable and distinct East German culture, which we are proud of! We know, for example, what loyalty is, unlike you!’\(^39\)

East German uneasiness has been increasing during the past few years. This process can be measured: The PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) is the successor party of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), the old communist party of the DDR. The West assumed that the PDS (the ‘red socks’ or ‘roten Socken’ as the conservative CDU called them) would just wither away in a rich and unified Germany. But the unexpected happened. In several East German ‘Länder’ the PDS grew instead of withering away. In Sachsen [Saxony], for example, the PDS collected 14.3 % votes for their candidates (so-called ‘Erststimmen’), and 16.5 % votes for their party (so-called ‘Zweitstimmen’) in 1994. The elections in 1998 showed a remarkable increase: 24.5 % of the voters gave their Erststimme to PDS candidates, and 22.2 % gave their Zweitstimme to the party. By comparison, the average strength of the PDS in Germany as a whole is minimal. Here the PDS reached a negligible 4.9 % of the Erststimmen, and 5.1 % Zweitstimmen in 1998.

These numbers make it clear that the PDS, the saviour of East German identity, was five times as strong in Saxony in 1998 as it was in Germany as a whole and that the Erststimmen increased by about ten percent between 1994 and 1998. Many East Germans who vote for the PDS do that not so much because they want communism back, but because they want their self-respect back.\(^40\) This is acknowledged with a mixture of astonishment and disgust on the West German side. Sociologist Dietmar Wittich\(^41\) says in an interview by ‘Neues Deutschland’ titled ‘The majority can’t be fooled’ that the gains of the PDS are a ‘considerable defeat, a clear signal of failure for the political elite of the Federal Republic of Germany.’ He continues that it is also ‘a sign of their lack of ideas, their arrogance of power’ (Wittich, 2000, 1)\(^42\)

Wittich continues (1): ‘German unity was enacted as an enforcement of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany] system. The chance to create something common of the two very different societies, to link their special features has been wasted. As the West Germans to this day continue one-sidedly interpreting the history of the GDR [German Democratic Republic, or East Germany] according to their prejudices, redefining biographies, they remain alien in the East and keep reproducing the relative autonomy of the GDR society. This lack of desire to learn on the part of the West German elites is fascinating me because in the competition of the systems the victory of the West, of parliamentary democracy and market economy resulted from the very fact that this system proved to be more capable of learning. Paradoxically, in the moment of victory this society, in particular its elite, lost its ability to learn.

Wittich is asked: ‘Would it then be too simple to explain these election results merely by economic crisis and unemployment?’ He replies, ‘That does play its part, of course. But these opinion shifts have also to do with identities. Particularly in times of crisis it is vital to
fall back on one’s own identity. Everyone must be sure of him/herself to find his/her way in a crisis-ridden society which, no doubt, is existing right now. This is also important to preserve one’s mental health. This is very much underestimated.’

Humiliation has made many East Germans bitter.43 Jokes tell the story. They are a covert way to express and illustrate feelings of anger, especially in times of helplessness and/or oppression. What options do people have when they cannot afford to ‘bite’ the hand of the master who feeds them too hard? Creating an artificial cultural difference is one way of expressing anger; humour is another:

‘What the difference is between a fox and a Wessi?
The fox is sly and tries to look stupid - the Wessi does it the other way round...’44
-
‘What is the difference between a cow tail and a Wessi-tie?
The cow tail covers the ass hole entirely...’45
-
‘What is the difference between Wessies and Russians?
We got rid of the Russians...’46

Interestingly enough, ‘Ossies’ are not alone in their anger; West German donors also find reasons to be bitter. West Germans are surprised when East Germans fail to extend sufficient appreciation to them. They are shocked when East Germans express bitterness at being humiliated. Donors expect thankfulness and are disappointed or even infuriated by its absence. Some of them ‘want the Wall back’ in order to escape being accused of being arrogant donors. From the ‘Ossies’ point of view, however, the ‘Wessies’ are blind to their own arrogance. They have an exaggerated self-respect and are insensitive to the wounds they inflict upon East Germans; even worse, they inadvertently rub salt into East German sores. West Germans, being in the stronger position, do not need as many jokes as the East Germans to express their views. Only a few can be found on the Internet:

‘Says the Ossi to the Wessi: ‘We are one people’
Answers the Wessi: ‘Yes, we also!’’47
-
‘Why do the Chinese always smile [triumphantly] at the WEST-German?
Because the Chinese still have the wall...’48

One may ask, ‘Why is the expression of anger or bitter humour associated with creating an artificial cultural difference?’ The tentative answer depicts bitter humour as one way of expressing the effects of humiliation, namely hurt and anger, while the deepening or creation of cultural differences would be another. Bitter humour shows quite openly the hurt and anger of the humiliated victim while the creation of cultural differences presents a more covert way of communicating this hurt and anger. ‘Somebody who humiliates me cannot be of my family or culture,’ this is the message. Wittich explains (in the same interview that is quoted above, 1), ‘Particularly in times of crisis it is vital to fall back on one’s own identity. Everyone must be sure of him/herself to find his/her way in a crisis-ridden society which, no doubt, is existing right now. This is also important to preserve one’s mental health. This is very much underestimated.’ The argument being made here is that the search for and construction of ‘our cultural identity’ as distinct from and opposed to ‘your cultural identity’ may not just be a response to what Wittich calls ‘crisis’ – after all, crises are much more efficiently overcome jointly than separately – but a response to the hurt and anger that stems from humiliation.
The proposition is that an emphasis on cultural markers, from material products to attitudes and beliefs, may be rooted in wounds that stem from humiliation and are answered with covert anger. This anger shines through not only in jokes, but also in the widespread view among East Germans that ‘Wessi’ culture is characterised by arrogance and social coldness, while ‘Ossies’ supposedly have developed a culture that values friendship and solidarity under difficult circumstances – a view that sharply collides with the reality of constant suspicion that reigned in the former communist German Democratic Republic, DDR. The reality in the DDR was that the watch-dog organisation, Staatssicherheit or Stasi, which aimed at securing the population’s communist enthusiasm, penetrated the whole society and turned friends and neighbours into spies and enemies. One spectacular case was unveiled 1989 when a female dissident, Vera Wollenberger, had a Stasi ‘shadow’ whose job it was to inform the Stasi about her activities and contacts. He married her and had a child with her, everything as part of his job. She divorced him when she learned about the truth of her husband’s feelings, and many sympathised with her and felt deceived and humiliated in her place. Thus, a society, which held its citizens in humiliating subjugation and in which neighbours – indeed, even spouses – systematically spied on each other, portrays itself just a few years later as heaven of a culture of solidarity. This article puts forward the interpretation that this astonishing turn may illustrate a solidarity within a new in-group that is born out of a new humiliation, namely the humiliation felt from a new master, the unexpectedly ‘arrogant’ West.

**Somalia**

Another case that was part of the research project on humiliation was Somalia. From 1997 to 1999 58 qualitative interviews were carried out with Somalis in the self-proclaimed republic Somaliland in the North of Somalia, in Kenya, Norway, and England.

The colonial powers had split the Somalian people five ways, although ethnic Somalis are united by language, cultural, and devotion to Islam. ‘There was during the colonial period a British Somaliland, an Italian Somaliland, and a French Somaliland. A section of the Somali people was also absorbed separately into Kenya under British colonial rule. The fifth component became the Ogaden, a section of Ethiopia. The dream of independence for the Somali was in part a dream of reunification’ (Mazrui, 1986, 71). In other words, when Somalia became independent in 1960 a dream existed, the dream of a united Somalia. ‘Most other African countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification’ (Mazrui, 1986, 71).

Somalia’s desire to be united drove them far, and even triggered war; in 1978 Somalia tried to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia. ‘Siad Barre [the Somali President] had to go to war, he was carried by public enthusiasm and would not have survived politically if he had not carried out his people’s wish,’ this is the opinion put forward by two of his close allies, an opinion that was confirmed by every other informant in Somalia who was included into the fieldwork. In other words, the Somali desire to become one united country was overwhelming, certainly no less compelling than the German desire to reunify. Not only was no cultural difference perceived as standing in the way, and no clan schisms deemed as relevant, but, even more, cultural unity was taken as a justification for war aiming at ‘bringing home’ brothers and sisters.

How is it possible that Somalia today is a deeply divided country, war-torn for almost a decade, full of bitterness and suffering? The government as an institution disintegrated when
dictator Siad Barre fell in 1991. The country was left to the traditional form of clan rule. However, clan relations had turned sour because of the abuse that they had endured from dictator Siad Barre who had pitted clan against clan in order to stay in power after the defeat in the Ogaden war. In this way Siad Barre had upset the formerly delicate balance that elders were traditionally able to keep up between clans. After 1991 peace conference followed upon peace conference, none succeeded.50 Only the Isaaq in the North of Somalia held the successful Borama peace conference and managed to pacify their region.51 They went as far as to proclaim their own state, Somaliland (Somaliland is not recognised by the international community or by other Somali leaders, who bitterly resent this secession.)

Said S. Samatar understands that the deep rift between the North and the South of the country may be the result of what may be called ‘humiliation that went too far’: ‘Somaliland’s decision to declare independence in May 1991 was a result of massive popular opposition to further rule from Mogadishu. This hostility resulted from the suffering inflicted on the north by the Barre regime’ (Samatar, 1995, update). During the fieldwork in 1998 in Somaliland Samalilanders urged the researcher to promote their dream to become an internationally recognised independent republic. They all agreed that they have been humiliated to such a degree by their Somali brothers and sisters that they are no longer able to be part of a united Somalia. They insisted that the differences, and they label these differences as ‘cultural,’ between them and the other Somalis are, after all, too significant.

On 27th August 2000, after almost a decade without a government, and yet another peace conference in Djibouti, a new president, Abdulqasim Salad Hasan, was elected in the South of Somalia. However, he is not recognised by all Somalis. Somaliland, among others, does not recognise the new government in Mogadishu. On 27th October 2000 IRIN (the English service of the UN’s IRIN humanitarian information unit, http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN) sent out the following message: ‘Somaliland leader Muhammad Ibrahim Egal has said he would never hold talks with President Hassan as long as he disregarded Somaliland’s secession and independent existence, according to press reports monitored by the BBC. Egal’s reiteration of his position came after a recent visit by diplomatic envoys from Italy, Ethiopia and Somalia to Hargeysa, capital of the self-declared republic of Somaliland, to mediate and try to effect a reconciliation between the two leaders, the reports said’ (Horn of Africa: IRIN Weekly Round-up 8 covering the period 21 - 27 October 2000).

One may ask whether or not the goal of Somaliland’s independence is a function of the ‘tribal rivalries that plague the entire country,’52 and ask, further, what form the humiliation took and how one would distinguish humiliation from other motives that prompt separatist movements. Unanimously, the respondents in Somaliland explained that their plight had nothing to do with traditional clan rivalries, which would have their traditional ways of being settled through elders’ sitting together and finding compromises. They all agreed that humiliation is at the core of this rift and that it is, furthermore, a new rift.

Karim Hassan explained: ‘The worst humiliation is when women and children are touched. What the men in the North will never accept is that ladies or children are maltreated. They will prefer to die in defence. A man can kill a man, but he cannot kill a lady or a baby. Barre’s soldiers took girls to the garrisons by force, had parties, and the people had to stay at home, because of the curfew.’

Karim Hassan confirmed what many others also said: ‘Rape was new, it was a change of culture.’ Asha Ahmed, Information/Dissemination Officer at Somalia Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, explained to the author on 11th January 1999 in Nairobi how the ICRC invited historians from all Somali clans to do research and come up with what eventually became the Spared from the Spear booklet (International Committee of the Red Cross Somalia Delegation, 1997). This booklet shows that women and children
traditionally were ‘spared from the spear’ and that Somali war code explicitly protects civilians against warrior onslaughts. Women are not to be touched. It is only in this way that women could embody bonds between clans, because they could move freely, even in wartime. Asha pointed out: ‘When you look at this booklet, the Geneva Convention is all in there! At first the Geneva Convention was like Latin to the Somalis!’

Former Somali Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh confirmed this view in an interview on 9th January 1999 in Nairobi (see also Lindner, 2000f), ‘There is one thing which never was part of traditional quarrelling between clans, and this is rape, especially mass rape in front of the family. This is new. It happened for the first time when Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime sent soldiers to annihilate us. Soldiers would rape our women in front of their husbands and families.’ Dualeh continued, ‘This is the reason why today Somalia is so divided. We Somalis are united through our common ethnic background; we speak one language, and are all Muslims. Why are we divided today? Humiliation through rape and its consequences divides us. The traditional methods of reconciliation are too weak for this. It will take at least one generation to digest these humiliations sufficiently to be able to sit together again.’ Dualeh rounded up by saying: ‘…believe me, humiliation, as I told you before, was not known to the Somali before Siad Barre came to power! It is somehow a “tradition” that young men of one clan steal camels from another clan, and sometimes a man gets killed. But women were never touched, never. There might have been a rare case when a girl was alone in the semi-desert guarding her animals, and a young man having spent a long time in the desert lost control and tried to rape her. She would resist violently, and at the end the solution would perhaps be that he had to marry her. But mass rape, especially rape in front of the family, this never happened before, this is new.’

The conclusion drawn by everybody interviewed in the North was that, upon reflection, the North, after all, was culturally incompatible with the South, and that it had been a misconception to believe that it was possible to be part of the same state together with the Southerners. Similar to marriages that disintegrate, the Isaaq try to remember the times before the marriage and state that they now understand that they were too different to begin with and never should have gotten married (the North and South of Somalia united upon independence). The last interview concerning this topic was carried out in Germany (December 2000) with a woman from the North: ‘We have to remember that we from the North were different from those in the South before we united, we had a cosmopolitan tradition, we were used to be traders…’ a long list of cultural identity markers followed that at times of independence or at times of the Ogaden war were deemed as totally insignificant, and are, so it seems, ‘dug up,’ or even newly constructed, when humiliation has gone too far.54

Rwanda / Burundi
The first white man to set foot in the enigmatic mountain region of the Great Lakes in the heart of Africa was the German Count von Goetzen from Silesia on a transafrican expedition in 1893 and 1894. He ‘discovered’ ‘a thousand hills,’ the legendary *mille collines*, in an area that is a fraction the size of Somalia, but the more fertile. So far, the region’s history is undisputed. Almost everything else that the reader expects to find from here on in a short overview of history is passionately debated: Different parties involved in the current conflict paint it in different ways and ‘imagine’ different kinds of communities (Anderson, 1991). As Lemarchand formulates it, ‘the historical message is radically different among Hutu and Tutsi. For the Hutu, resurrecting a fictitious past gives their collective self-awareness as an oppressed majority a powerful primordial appeal; for the Tutsi, on the other hand, investing the past with an assumption of unadulterated harmony and equality between groups allows
them to claim that Burundi is a basically healthy society, only periodically perturbed by malcontents and “selfish” politicians” (Lemarchand, 1994, xiv, xv).55

To remind the reader, both in Rwanda and Burundi a minority elite called ‘Tutsi’ traditionally ruled over underlings called ‘Hutu,’ except for the period from around 196066 to 1994, when Hutu held power in Rwanda. Since several decades, both groups in Rwanda and Burundi are involved in cycles of violence, harassment and genocidal killings, including the widely known genocide of 1994, when Rwanda’s Hutu-led government orchestrated a genocidal onslaught against the Tutsi minority during which at least half a million people were slaughtered in a period of eight weeks.57

To quote a widely-available source, the Encarta Concise Encyclopedia58 presents the ‘primordialist’ ‘three-wave’ version of Rwandan history that is also the most widely used in the typical international media coverage on the Great Lakes: ‘The original inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa people. The Hutu were also established by the 15th century, when the Tutsi conquered the area and made the Hutu a caste of serfs.’59 This ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ argues that the Tutsi of the Great Lakes invaded the Great Lakes region from somewhere between Egypt and the Horn of Africa.

Pierre Erny (Erny, 1995, 29) highlights the competing ‘neo-Tutsi’ version of history, as set out, for example, in Kashamura’s Essai sur les moeurs sexuelles et les cultures de peuples des Grands Lacs africains (Kashamura, 1973). This version accuses Western ethnology of having invented the thesis of the existence of different ethnic groups that invaded the region in waves. The neo-Tutsi version states, that, on the contrary, Twa, Tutsi and Hutu belong to one single ethnic group within which a differentiation ‘emerged.’ Indeed, the author of this paper was strongly advised never to use categories such as Tutsi and Hutu and never to ask a person of her origin.

Forty-five interviews with Rwandans and Burundians were carried out by the author in Africa and Europe from 1998 to 2000. These interviews indicated that respondents who identified with a Hutu background tended to emphasise humiliation stemming from the age-old oppression imposed by Tutsi who had forced themselves into the region, while those with Tutsi affiliation usually said that they felt perfectly well-intentioned and at home in the region. ‘The concept of humiliation is therefore related to tradition and culture; Tutsi are convinced that they are “born to rule,” they cannot imagine how they can survive without being in power.’ Joseph (this is not his real name), from a Hutu family, explains this in an interview in autumn 1998 in Africa (I am not authorised to give the exact place and date of the interview).

The example of Rwanda and Burundi thus shows how the past may be retrospectively ‘colonised’ by underlings and masters, masters maintaining that their rule did not humiliate anybody, that on the contrary, all are of ‘one harmonious family,’ while the underlings emphasise that they are deeply different from their oppressors, that they even belong to different ethnic groups with different geographical roots, and different customs and traditions. This cases is maintained by the ‘underdogs’ even though the existence of a common language, common religion, intermarriage, mixed clan membership, and the traditionally porous definitions of who is Tutsi and who is Hutu make this argument rather difficult to promote.

The debate on the historic ‘truth’ in the Great Lakes region is irrelevant for the argument of this article. More relevant is the evidence this case provides that underlings who feel humiliated may go as far as to de-emphasise obvious similarities that could very well serve as common ground for peaceful co-existence in the Great Lakes – and, in fact, neither side puts the existence of similarities that connect all Rwandans and Burundians into question. However, those who feel humiliated see the need to accentuate and underline difference, in this case not just in cultural identity, but also in ancestry from different geographical regions.
The question of separate or common ancestry is not, as could very well be possible, of marginal academic interest to Great Lakes scholars of history or archaeology, but is a hot and central topic – a fact that makes clear that the underlings, indeed, feel humiliated. The 1994 genocide witnessed unspeakable scenes that put these feelings into practice. Tutsi bodies, slain in the 1994 genocide, were thrown into rivers by their Hutu killers to be ‘shipped back’ to their ‘nilo-hamitic origins.’

This leads to the macro-political level and the relationships between the rich and the poor, the North and the South, and the West and the rest.

The Global Village
Sam Engelstad, UN’s Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, and, on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in Mogadishu in 1994, wrote: ‘During my own time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent.’ Engelstad adds that ‘Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us.’

How did the Somalis react? ‘One of the defining images of the late twentieth century is a dead American soldier being dragged by a triumphant crowd through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia. It was an act of humiliation. The Somali crowd was wreaking vengeance upon America and the UN. In the words of a former Somali diplomat, ‘the UN came with the agenda that they know what is good for the Somali people[,]…got entangled in the fight with [General] Aideed, … spent so much money on that …[and] caused the death of no less than 10,000 Somalis!’ The Somalis felt humiliated by the apparently well-meaning intervention of the UN and reacted with an act of counter-humiliation’ (Lindner, 2000d, 46).

It seems evident that General Aideed did not want his powers curbed and preferred to continue trying to bring all of Somalia under his control. Dragging a dead American may be seen as a way of discouraging the Americans from continuing their participation in UNOSOM. However, General Aidid could not have acted alone, he got widespread active support from the Somali population, and this happened although, as every Somali confirmed during the fieldwork, Somalis do not follow their leaders subserviently, on the contrary, they are proud, stubborn and single-minded. However, even the harshest critic of General Aideed was forced into his camp, the researcher was told, because their pride as members of his clan or as Somalis was at stake; foreign humiliation could not be accepted. Even severe critics of Somali politics among the Somali population regrouped under the umbrella of defending ‘Somali pride and culture’ in the face of what they perceived as foreign humiliation.

The example of Somalia in its relation to the international community is included here to open up the topic of worldwide conflicts. Samuel P. Huntington, in his widely discussed book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Huntington, 1996) puts forward the theory of the clash of civilisations (units with common cultural characteristics) and warns that wars will arise at the ‘fault lines’ between them, for example between three major civilisations, China, the Islamic World, and the West (to simplify his argument). In his keynote address at the Colorado College’s 125th Anniversary Symposium delivered at Colorado College 4th February 1999 Huntington says, ‘I congratulate the organizers of this conference for their prescience and insight in selecting culture as the theme of this meeting. The twentieth century was the century of ideology, of the competition of socialism,
communism, liberalism, authoritarianism, fascism, democracy. Now, while we have not had the end of history, we have arrived, at least for the moment, at the end of ideology. The twenty-first century is at least beginning as the century of culture, with the differences, interactions, and conflicts among cultures taking center stage. This has become manifest, among other ways, in the extent to which scholars, politicians, economic development officials, soldiers, and strategists are all turning to culture as a central factor in explaining human social, political, and economic behavior. In short, culture counts, with consequences for both good and evil’ (Huntington, 1999, 1).

Huntington’s thesis about the clash of civilisations (or cultures) may have been inspired – and is supported – by conceptualising it as the clash between those who feel humiliated and their humiliators. Perhaps, ‘civilisations,’ especially in today’s global village, are part of a grand common discourse of humankind, and acquire much of their separateness not from underlying deep-seated differences, but from responses to humiliating sequences in this discourse? For example, could the extreme version of the Islamic concept of ‘jihad,’ or holy war, be a response to humiliation rather than a characteristic of cultural or religious beliefs? The political scientist Benjamin Barber, in his book *Jihad Versus McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World* (Barber, 1996) argues in a similar vein, although he does not use the term humiliation, namely that the forces of globalisation have led to counterforces of re-tribalisation or reaffirmation of cultural difference.

The author’s seven years of experience as a psychological counsellor in Egypt (1984-1991), in close touch with a society that moved during these years towards more fundamentalist views and practices of political Islam (with extremist definitions of ‘jihad’ as its most excessive expression), suggests that globalisation is a complex notion that heightens feelings of humiliation among the non-haves in the world through a contradictory development: on one side the gap between rich and poor increases, and on the other side there is a growing awareness of human rights; and these human rights indicate that this gap ought not to increase – that it is even immoral. The author addresses this contradictory unfolding of globalisation in several pieces and discusses its humiliating effects.

‘Double standards’ is the phrase in the minds of many Africans who were interviewed during the humiliation research fieldwork. In other words, as they saw it, the rich of the world, the West, construct a normative framework in which human rights indicate that every human being has a right to a dignified life and enabling environment, but at the same time the rich allow for these rights to be denied in practice. In countries such as Egypt the humiliating effect of this contradictory unfolding of globalisation is compounded by memories of a glorious past, a past of great Arab civilisation as well as of shining Pharaonic times, a history that vastly surpassed Western civilisation when it was at its peak. For example, much of what the West knows about Greek philosophy is available only because Arab translations preserved it. Arab excellence in fields such as mathematics is another case, forgotten and unknown in today’s West. This is felt as humiliation by the victims, they feel being put down, degraded, and abased by the perpetrators, the rich.

This thesis also relates to Senghaas’s comments on Huntington (1998), insofar as it addresses the phenomenon of culturalisation, asks whether culture is primary or secondary to conflict, and analyses typical causes of conflicts. Senghaas writes: ‘Most ethno-political conflicts in the modern world result from protracted socio-economic discrimination rather than from cultural roots. The culturalization of such conflicts is, … a … phenomenon in an escalation process, turning socio-economic conflicts into identity conflicts once the level of
collective frustration becomes high’ (Senghaas, 1998, abstract). This paper focuses on collective humiliation as a special aspect and salient driving force in frustration (stemming from a range of sources and not just frustration triggered by socio-economic discrimination), and its capacity to be culturalised into cultural identity differences.

**Third Parties and Research Method**

Another aspect of humiliation and culture is highlighted by the author’s experience in coping with the challenge of implementing an appropriate methodology for fieldwork in Africa. As a representative of the international community and third party to African conflicts, the researcher learned through experience that scientific methodology as developed by Western scientists may have humiliating effects if applied in Africa, effects that create obstacles to valid knowledge and understanding. Thus the conclusion was drawn that Western scientists’ views on methodology, their ideological and cultural ‘home’ with regard to methodology, may hamper its very aim, namely validity, if its possible humiliating effects are overlooked.

After a long struggle with the internal divisions within psychology concerning methodology – for example with regard to the epistemological standing of qualitative versus quantitative method – the approach finally chosen by the author before leaving for fieldwork in Africa in 1998 was a multi-layered interview strategy, combining “Psycho-Logic” reasoning, Grounded Theory (already commented above), and part/whole analysis, including as quantitative elements Cantril’s well-established Self-Anchoring Scale (Cantril, 1965, 22) that was adapted to the notion of humiliation. Thus qualitative and quantitative methods were joined, following views put forward, among others, by Bryman, 1988, that the gulf between qualitative and quantitative represents an ideological divide and that “these differences are more apparent than real and that there is in practice a considerable underlying unity of purpose” (Robson, 1993, 6).

Against this background, a semi-structured interview guideline was developed addressing questions such as: Can humiliation lead to war, to Holocaust, genocide and ethnic cleansing? Can humiliation lead to international terrorism? And also the more fundamental questions such as: What is humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated?

When the author attempted to apply these methods in Africa, several shortcomings became apparent. The one especially relevant for this article is that validity appeared to be undermined as a result of the humiliating effects of the researcher, a representative of the ex-colonisers and the rich West, examining the failures and sufferings of the poor and ex-colonised. As already explained above the author shifted to a methodology that was much more dialogical than the original approach. Steinar Kvale writes, “The conversation … is not only a specific empirical method: it also involves a basic mode of constituting knowledge; and the human world is a conversational reality” (Kvale, 1996, 37). The new approach changed the relations the author had in Africa. Before, the author met polite faces, telling, if they gave their time at all, what they thought the visitor wanted to hear, but deep down not believing for a minute that this foreigner could understand even a tiny percentage of their reality; this the author was told later.

The shift in method produced a great deal of important information and insights that would otherwise have been hidden. After opening up, the researcher learned, for example, that an average African view of the Western visitor could be described as follows: ‘You from the West, you come here to get a kick out of our problems. You pretend to want to help, but you just want to have some fun. You have everything back home, you live in luxury, and you are blind to that. You arrogantly and stupidly believe that you suffer when you cannot take a shower or have to wait for the bus for more than two hours! Look how you cover our people with dust when bumping childishly and proudly around in your four wheel drive cars! Look
how you enjoy being a king, while you would be a nobody back home in your country! You 
could not afford anything the like back home! All you want is having fun, getting a good 
salary, writing empty reports to your organization back home, in order to be able to continue 
this fraud. You pay lip service to human rights and empowerment, but you are hypocrites! 
And you know that we need help, - how glad would we be if we did not need it! And how 
good would it be if you were really to listen to us once, not only to the greedy among us who 
exploit your arrogant stupidity for their own good!’ (this is a condensation from statements 
that were repeated in Somalia and Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya).72

If the methodology to which a scientist community subscribes to is defined as the 
cultural framing this community creates for itself, then the initial methodological/cultural 
approach used by the author introduced a master/underling framing into the encounter with 
the African interlocutors. Such a framing compounded and, in a sense, tore open the wounds 
stemming from humiliation, for example from the colonial past and the currently increasing 
gap between rich and poor. Their response was foreclosure of validity, or, in other words, 
potential informants retreated behind walls of silence, or behind attempts to manipulate the 
researcher.

Somali intellectual Hassan Abdi Keynan (interview 25th November 1999 in Oslo) 
comments this point and criticises foreigners who do not understand that the rules in a worn-
torn country like Somalia are different from those in peaceful Norway; that living in constant 
conflict and emergency, often under humiliating circumstances, has effects that alter 
everything, from ‘communication styles to the sense of self and reality,’ and that it leads to 
survival strategies that a Westerner may be blind to, strategies entailing not least the 
‘intentional manipulation of the topic of humiliation.’

Third Parties and ‘Celebrating’ Diversity
On the basis of the proposition being advanced here – that much of cultural difference may be 
artificially constructed as a response to humiliation – it may be hypothesised that some 
aspects of cultural difference would disappear or be de-emphasised if the practice of 
humiliating others were to be discontinued and a discourse of respect put in place.

This hypothesis may be seen in the broader context of how cultural differences are 
treated by third parties. For example, that the term ‘cultural diversity’ carries connotations of 
respect. Just as biodiversity has many advocates today, so also cultural diversity is 
increasingly being perceived as extremely valuable and worth protecting. According to this 
perspective, it would be a severe loss if cultural diversity were to be levelled out.73

The ‘State of the World Forum,’ for example, launched a worldwide co-existence 
movement in May 1999 in Belfast,74 which wanted cultural diversity to be not just accepted 
but also celebrated. Coexistence was defined as follows: ‘Coexistence does not deny 
distinctiveness; in fact, it encourages it, respecting the rich diversity in an ethnically rich 
global society.’ ‘Celebrating diversity’ indicates that looking down on others is no longer 
acceptable, that humiliating others on account of their otherness is to be abandoned, that 
otherness is to be respected. It may be concluded that ‘celebrating diversity’ is a strategy for 
‘solving’ the problem of humiliation since it extends the respect to otherness that otherness 
deserves. It may be concluded that ‘celebrating diversity’ conveys the highly principled 
intention of ceasing to humiliate others for their otherness, and initiatives like the co-existence 
movement powerfully advocate this.

However, there are problems with this strategy and this article introduces a caveat. 
Good intentions may, in certain instances, fall short of their own aims, or even undermine 
them. It may be forgotten that for some people in some situations it can be humiliating to be 
fixed in an otherness they do not value. To illustrate this point, a Norwegian teacher recounted
(1998) her experiences in the North of Norway, where an ethnic minority (Lapps) once experienced discriminations and today has reached quite a degree of cultural autonomy, having, for example, schools of its own. The point is, however, that some parents are not satisfied with this kind of ‘respect’ towards their otherness; on the contrary, they wish to send their children to a ‘Norwegian’ school.

The same teacher commented further that she also knows foreign children in Norwegian schools who react by getting upset when the teachers encourage them to be proud of ‘their own culture.’ They would much rather be included in Norwegian culture, because they are living in Norway and have little connection with ‘their own culture.’

Respect for otherness means allowing others to control their identity as far as possible. To put it another way, it is ‘process control’ (control over the formation and definition of one’s own identity) which has to be provided to the maximum degree possible; ‘process control’ is one aspect of justice (Bond, 1998).75

The above examples underpin the prediction that respect, or the discontinuation of humiliation, might actually diminish the need to hold on to cultural differences. It is an intriguing paradox that respecting cultural differences may mean humiliation. The paradox is explained by the fact that ‘respect’ may fix the other in an unwanted otherness. In many cases, the cultural differences that arise from humiliation may, however, be regarded as unworthy of celebration and worthy only to be ‘healed’ and discarded. It would be widely rejected, for example, to respect the German ‘Übermensch’ culture. In the German case, healing humiliation went hand in hand with abandoning the construction of the ‘Übermensch’ culture. The constant effort to include Germany into NATO, or the European Union, represents exactly this attempt to heal humiliation and make any ‘Übermensch’ culture construction superfluous.

Concluding Remarks
This paper drew on the examples of Germany, Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and the global community. All of them are, intriguingly, both unified and divided. In all these cases, ‘cultural’ differences may, at least partly, stem from humiliation. The ‘victims’ are likely to feel doubly humiliated when the perpetrators also figure as norm-shaping third parties that are blind to their own deeds. In these cases, ‘perpetrators’ not only behave in humiliating ways but are also more or less blind to the fact that their behaviour has the effect of injuring others, at the same time as they are emphasising the very human rights norms that bring their own shortcomings to the attention of everybody except, apparently, themselves.

In the case of re-unified Germany, for example, the ‘perpetrator,’ the so-called arrogant West German, does not understand these psychological dynamics; large sums of money are being paid to needy East Germans. The fact that the latter signal their feelings of humiliation by an assertion of cultural difference is overlooked. Instead, their thankfulness is ‘commanded,’ and its failure to materialise is taken as an attempt to humiliate their benefactors. Yet, not all West Germans are arrogant. Amongst those who are blind may be found West Germans who would like to extend respect to the new German citizens from the East. They may start out by showing respect for the newly-emphasised Eastern cultural identity and by giving praise to Eastern products. However, as has been highlighted in this article, their high goals are likely to require even greater efforts.

This is because showing respect for products made in the Eastern Länder of Germany is some way short of fully implementing a relationship of respect embedded in human rights. Yet, it does not actually infringe those rights, and as a result this example may be regarded by some as being a rather unimportant case. However, it does exist on a continuum that also includes cases where showing ‘respect’ for ‘the other’ not only falls short of complete
reconciliation, but actually endangers peace. It would be disastrous for the prospects of peace, for example, to extend ‘respect’ to ‘Übermensch cultures’ à la Hitler, even if the ‘Übermenschen’ themselves advocate it passionately and violently. Both cases show, one mildly and the other starkly, that making an effort to detect and heal the humiliation that may lie behind, for example, an ‘Übermensch’ ideology is the only enactment of ‘respect’ that fulfils its spirit.

In Somalia the humiliating experiences stem from civil war. This means that in the case of Somalia the ‘perpetrators’ were not helpers as in Germany, but soldiers in the army of dictator Siad Barre, or administrators in his state apparatus. They try to defend themselves today by saying, ‘We from the South were forced to rape your women in the North and bomb your cities; dictator Siad Barre turned everybody into a victim, even us, therefore we are brothers and sisters, and you should not feel humiliated by us, and, by the way, you are no angels either.’ Such comments only feed the bitterness on the part of those who suffered the rapes and the bombings, this became clear in the interviews the author carried out in the North.

In the case of Somalia the perpetrators of the South are not part of the norm-shaping power elite that rules over the victims, as in Germany. The Somalilanders’ aim is precisely to forestall such a situation by asserting their own independence. They turn for support to a third party, the international community as ultimate human rights norm-shaper and enforcer. Somalilanders beg for the recognition of their independence. The international community has several choices: it can close her eyes, be blind towards Somalilanders’ sufferings and urge them to unite with the South (which is the Egyptian position, as confirmed in the author’s interviews in Egypt in 1999); the international community may ‘respect’ the newly created rift between the North and the South and support separate state-building; or – and this is the most productive option in terms of the argument made here – the international community may also go further, and actively urge the parties involved to focus on acknowledging former acts of humiliation as a precondition for reconciliation, not a reconciliation that necessarily brings about political unity but, one that may at least improve co-existence.

Former ambassador Dualeh points out (in the same interview that has been quoted above): ‘The international community does not understand that traditional fighting is different from today’s problems. When I was young, once in four or five years clans were fighting, because camels were stolen - and the looting would be done by young men without being authorised; then shooting; then killing; then the elders would come together and make peace. This clan warfare lasted for a month, and then the leaders would come together, and through compensation, exchange of the camels, peace would be restored. Today’s problems are different! The institutions of the state were hijacked by Barre, they became like a new clan, which oppressed the rest with new methods!’ He advises: ‘Before you form a government in Somalia, all clans have to come together, accept that each clan carries blame for what happened, and when the blame is accepted, forgiveness is offered. Only then we can form a government of Somalia! Clans have broken all the rules which make clans co-exist – only after forgiveness trust will come, and after that government comes. All clans took part in killing one another, and unless they come together, led by their traditional chiefs, and unless forgiveness is sought, there will be no solution - we have to involve the traditional leaders to meet and forgive each other. After that it will not take more than a month to form a government! Before Siad Barre, it was good! Nomadic culture is based on forgiveness! Once we have that, we can form a government! There are so many things that Somalis have not talked about, because of nomadic pride: To a forum of Somali clans everything should be put on the table, from looting, to killing, to rape! From there we then start to accept blame, and to apologise. This is the way out, and I hope the international community will accept that!’
In Somalia the Northerners are sharply aware of the fact that the way they were treated – harassed, raped, and bombed – was a gross violation and flagrant humiliation. The situation is different in Rwanda and Burundi. The Great Lakes region looks back on a long tradition of hierarchical societal structures that traditionally legitimised a multitude of social ranking and domination practices. Rwanda and Burundi share the experience of many other peoples in the world who are met by the advent of a human rights ideology and its slow permeation into the minds and hearts of masters and underlings. The paradoxical effect of growing awareness of human rights is that it may heighten and even produce feelings of humiliation that were not there before. This is because human rights de-legitimise hierarchical structures in which some human beings are defined as lesser beings and others as ‘super-human.’

Often it is a third party that ‘imports’ human rights ideas, and thus ‘stimulates’ feelings of humiliation in the underlings. For example, in Rwanda and Burundi many Hutu underlings may initially have been quite unaware of their suffering, since they themselves may have deemed hierarchy to be ‘God’s will’ or the ‘natural order.’ One man in particular, Guy Logiest, born in Ghent, was sent to Rwanda as a colonial officer to restore calm and order. He brought about a turn-over, single-handedly, in one day. On the 17th November 1959, judging that Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were oppressors (perhaps his view was inspired by his embeddedness within the Belgian dynamics of humiliation and subjugation between the Flemish and the Walloons), he replaced them with Hutu. In other words, one of the ways in which the societies of the Great Lakes suffered from colonialism was that the colonialists initially enforced a rigid hierarchy of ‘worthy’ Tutsi as opposed to ‘unworthy’ Hutu, only to reverse this situation later, when they ‘discovered’ pity for the underdog. Later, in 1994, extremist Rwandan Hutu perpetrated genocide against their former Tutsi masters and those moderate Hutu who opposed the slaughter.

This example illustrates the responsibility of third parties who promote the dismantling of hierarchical orders. A process may be set in motion whereby those who start feeling humiliated may be tempted – driven by their suffering – to erect defensive cultural, political and bureaucratic walls around themselves to an extent that these walls impede co-existence with the former masters and may even lead to their killing.

While the Hutu underlings gained awareness of their rights (and the suffering connected with this awareness wherever these rights were violated) half a decade ago, there are other groups who go through this process today. In the case of female genital mutilation, for example, there are some victims who declare this to be a ‘cultural humiliation.’ In a personal communication, a Somali woman who does not want to be named exclaimed to the author (August 1998), ‘My culture humiliates me!’ In other words, this woman is in the process of defining an alternative culture, namely a Somali culture that does not include female genital mutilation. She urges the international community to refrain from ‘respecting’ Somali culture that allows for female genital mutilation and instead acknowledge her new and different culture. Her new culture reminds of former uprisings by Western feminists. Incidentally, feminism also has its extremist camps where the process of humiliation may be handled by claiming an essentially and profoundly separate culture for women as opposed to men.

In the case of female genital mutilation the third party deals with a situation in which passions are hot and underlings feel subjugated and humiliated by dominators, in other words, where a process of humiliation is at stake that is disguised in a discussion of culture. Female genital mutilation is not the only topic of this kind; the issues of honour killings and forced marriages are also high on the agenda, for example in countries such as Norway that has a considerable Pakistani population.

The argument in this article indicates that an emphasis upon ‘culture’ would be misleading in these cases and that third parties, for example the academic community or...
governmental authorities in countries such as Norway, should consider urging conciliation between those representatives of Somali or Pakistani culture who advocate female genital mutilation, honour killing and forced marriage, and those who feel that these practices represent a humiliating violation of their basic human rights. Instead of increasing the rift between ‘perpetrators’ (those who inflict female genital mutilation, honour killing and forced marriage and claim that these practices are part of their culture) and ‘victims’ (those who claim that these practices are not part of their culture), the third party has the option of highlighting the need to heal feelings of humiliation by conciliatory communication.

This conciliatory communication requires careful planning in order to succeed. In a small focus group (5 women, including the researcher, December 2000 in Germany) with three German and one Somali activist engaging in protest against female genital mutilation, it became clear that the German side actually humiliated the Somali side by threatening with stricter laws in Germany and reminding the Somali woman of her duty as a guest to abide with German laws. The Somali woman tried to explain to her German friends that this behaviour and German moral indignation towards female genital mutilation had a humiliating effect on her and likeminded Somalis – that threatening with laws and duty would not help. The Somali campaigner called for dialogue within an atmosphere of respect that would not exclude those who actually stand for the practice of female genital mutilation. As recommendation coming out of this discussion it may be formulated that a learning process within an atmosphere of respect was what the Somali activist called for, a learning process that would not humiliate adherents of old practices, but enable them to learn by dignifying the learning process.

To summarise the argument: the most salient triggers for humiliation were in the case of Germany West German arrogance, in the case of Somalia public rape, in the case of Rwanda and Burundi the fact that old hierarchical structures were seen in a new human rights light, in the case of female genital mutilation, honour killings and forced marriage the fact that the subjugation of women is seen as an affront to dignity as enshrined in human rights, and in the case of the rich versus the poor the failure of the rich to help bring about the enabling environments promised to the poor by human rights. The main examples of cultural divisions that have been presented in order to show that the third party’s perception of primordial cultural diversity may in certain cases be a misreading of an actual condition of humiliation are as follows: the cultural divide between East and West Germans, between Northern and Southern Somalis, Hutu and Tutsi, women and men, the West and ‘the rest’ (non-Westerners). Table I draws together these examples.

SOME EXAMPLES OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES CREATED AS RESPONSE TO HUMILIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Humiliating act</th>
<th>Emphasis on separate culture for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>West German arrogance</td>
<td>East Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Public rape</td>
<td>Somalilanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda / Burundi</td>
<td>Hierarchical structures in the light of human rights</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many world regions</td>
<td>Hierarchical structures, expressed, among others, in female genital mutilation, honour killings and forced marriages, in the light of human rights</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many world regions</td>
<td>Poverty, lack of enabling environment</td>
<td>Non-Westerners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I: Some examples of cultural difference created as response to humiliation
To summarise, it seems that humiliation, respect, and cultural difference are woven together in an intricate web. This paper draws attention to the fact that cultural differences may be the tip of an iceberg. Jokes are a relatively benign expression of feelings of humiliation. They convey dreams of violence, concealing them beneath a coat of humour. Humour is not present, however, in the case of a ‘culture’ of the ‘Übermensch.’ Such a ‘cultural identity’ is dangerous for peace and detrimental to a decent (Margalit) global society. If peace is to be secured, this has to be attended to, not only in Germany and Somalia, but also in other world regions.85

Humiliation, wherever a human being or group feels it, needs attention from the alleged humiliators, even if they do not perceive themselves as humiliators and have to be taught to recognise that they fill this role. Perhaps even more crucial is the role of the bystander (Staub, 1993; Staub, 1989; Staub, 1989). Bystanders, including the international community, or the academic community, at least those who place themselves within a human rights framework, have, hopefully, been stimulated by this paper to discern and address humiliation in more depth than before. This article wanted to encourage reflection on the hypothesis that humiliation, and the suffering caused by it, may make itself ‘known’ through phenomena such as ‘cultural differences.’ In such cases ‘respect for cultural differences’ would only fulfil its mission by helping the other, - where possible and appropriate, - out of ‘artificial’ cultural ‘otherness.’

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Schneider, R. (1994). Like Muted Sheep, Culture and Cultural Politics in East-Germany. *Merkur-Deutsche Zeitschrift Für Europäisches Denken*, 48, 6, 537-


© Evelin Gerda Lindner, 2000, How Humiliation Creates Cultural Differences


1 Lindner, 1999a; Lindner, 1999b; Lindner, 2000a; Lindner, 2000b; Lindner, 2000c; Lindner, 2000d; Lindner, 2000e; Lindner, 2000f; Lindner, 2000g; Lindner, 2000h; Lindner, 2000i; Lindner, 2000j; Lindner, 2000k; Lindner, 2000l; Lindner, 2000m; Lindner, 2000n; Lindner, 2000o; Lindner, 2000p; Lindner, 2000q; Lindner, 2000r; Lindner, 2001.

2 See for case studies as method of inquiry in political psychology, Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999.

3 See project description on www.uio.no/~evelinl. The project is supported by the Norwegian Research Council and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am grateful for their support, and would also like to thank the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo for hosting it. I extend my warmest thanks to all my informants in and from Africa, many of whom survive under the most difficult life circumstances. I hope that at some point in the future I will be able to give back at least a fraction of all the support I received from them! I thank Reidar Ommundsen at the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo for his continuous support, together with Jan Smedslund, Hilde Naftad, Malvern Lumsden (Lumsden, 1997), Carl-Erik Grenness, Jon Martin Sundet, Finn Tschudi, Kjell Flekkøy, and Astrid Bastiansen. Michael Harris Bond, Chinese University of Hong Kong, helped with constant feedback and support (see Bond, 1996; Bond, 1986; Bond and Venus, 1991; Smith and Bond, 1999; Bond, 1998; Bond, Chiu, and Wan, 1984). The project would not have been possible without the help of Dennis Smith, professor of sociology at Loughborough University (UK). Without Lee D. Ross’s encouragement my research would not have been possible; Lee Ross is a principal investigator and co-founder of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN).

4 The title of the project indicates that three groups had to be interviewed, namely both conflict parties in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, and representatives of third intervening parties. These three groups stand in a relationship that in its minimum version is triangular. In case of more than two opponents, as is the case in most conflicts, it acquires more than three corners.

Both in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi representatives of the “opponents” and the “third party” were interviewed. The following people were included in the “network of conversation”:

- Survivors of genocide were included, that is people belonging to the group, which was targeted for genocide. In Somalia this was the Isaaq tribe, in Rwanda the Tutsis, in Burundi also the Hutus. The group of survivors consists of two parts, namely those who survived because they were not in the country when the genocide happened - some of them returned after the genocide - and those who survived the ongoing onslaught inside the country.

- Freedom fighters (only men) were interviewed. In Somalia these were the SNM (Somali National Movement) fighters who fought the troops sent by the central government in Mogadishu from the north of Somalia; in Rwanda these were the former Tutsi refugees who formed an army, the RFP (Rwandese Patriotic Front), and attacked Rwanda from the north in order to oust the Hutu government which carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; in Burundi these were also Hutu rebels.

- Somali warlords who have their retreat in Kenya.

- Politicians, among them people who were in power already before the genocide and whom survivors secretly suspected of having been collaborators or at least silent supporters of perpetrators.

- Somali and Rwandan/Burundian academicians, who study the situation of their countries.

- Representatives of national non-governmental organizations who work locally with development, peace and reconciliation.

- Third parties, namely representatives of United Nations organizations and international non-governmental organizations who work with emergency relief, long-term development, peace, and reconciliation.

- Egyptian diplomats in the foreign ministry who deal with Somalia; Egypt is a heavy weight in the OAU.
African psychiatrists in Kenya who deal with trauma, and forensic psychiatry. In Kenya many nationals from Somalia and also Rwanda/Burundi have sought refuge, both in refugee camps, but also on the basis of private arrangements.

Those who have not yet been interviewed are masterminds of genocide in Rwanda, those who have planned the genocide. Many of them are said to be in hiding in Kenya, and other parts of Africa, or in Brussels and other parts of Europe, or in the States and Canada. Some are in the prisons in Rwanda and in Arusha, Tanzania.

5 Using Grounded Theory means trying to avoid simply applying existing theories to data (usually interviews, taped and written down), or merely accepting conventional explanations, but instead to be as open as possible and to develop arguments and categories out of the data, as they emerge.

6 See, for example, Lindner, 2000d; Lindner, 1999b.

7 The theory of the humiliation process will be developed further in a book I am currently writing in collaboration with Dennis Smith. Smith is professor of sociology at Loughborough University (UK), see his publications: Smith, 1981; Smith, 1983; Smith, 1984a; Smith, 1984b; Smith, 1991; Smith, 1997a; Smith, 1997b; Smith, 1999; Smith, 2000a; Smith, 2000b; Smith, 2000c.

8 Humiliation is a macro-social process, an interpersonal mechanism, and an emotion experienced by individuals and groups. Common sense language uses the same word, namely ‘humiliation,’ for the act and the experience of humiliation. In order to make this article readable, it will largely follow this practice and expect the reader to discern from the context which kind of humiliation is meant at the given moment. See also Smith, 2000a, forthcoming.

9 See Triandis, 1997, Cultural and Social Behavior.

10 See, for example, Bauman, 1993; Bauman, 1992; Smith, 1999. See also Casnir, 1999.

11 Regarding ‘artificial’ or ‘imagined’ identities see ideas developed in Imagined Communities (Anderson, 1991). See also Eriksen, 1993a; Eriksen, 1994; Eriksen, 1999; Eriksen, 1993b; Eriksen, 1992.

12 Bond refers to two conclusions (drawn in an unpublished manuscript by Leung and Morris): ‘First, the available evidence suggests that the content of procedural and interactional justice is largely similar across cultures . . . Second, the consequences of perceived procedural and interactional justice also seem to be similar across cultures’ (Leung and Morris, 1996, 40 - 41).

13 See also Dimuccio on the constructive aspects of appeasement (Dimuccio, 1998).

14 ‘The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies’ (Versailles Treaty 1919, part VIII, section I, article 231).

15 See, for example, Elias, 1996, and Haffner and Bateson, 1978.


17 Tomkins’ work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson, and Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of altogether nine affects, namely as a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, 1st October1999; see also Nathanson, 1992; Nathanson, 1987). See for further examples, Ahmed, Ahmed, 1990; Allan and Goss, 1994; Braithwaite, 1989; Braithwaite, 1993; Campbell, 1994; Fischer, Manstead, and Mosquera, 1999; Heimannsberg and Schmidt, 1993; Miller and Tangney, 1994; Miller, 1988; Mindell, 1994; Moore, 1993; Moses, Volkan, Demetrios, and Montville, 1999; Nathanson, 1987; Nathanson, 1992; Peristiany, 1965; Retzinger, 1991; Rosaldo, 1983; Rybak and Brown, 1996; Scheff, 1988; Scheff, Kemper, 1990; Scheff, Retzinger, and Gordon, 1992; Schenk et al., 1995; Steinberg, 1991a; Steinberg, 1991b; Steinberg, 1996; Swartz, 1988; Tangney, 1990; Wikan, 1984; Wong and Cook, 1992.

18 However, shame and its relation to PTSD has been addressed, see, for example, Wong and Cook, 1992, ‘Shame and Its Contribution to PTSD.’
See also Lehmann, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998.
See, for example, Scheff, 1990; Scheff, 1988; Scheff, Kemper, 1990.
See for literature on blood revenge, for example, Boehm, 1984, or Rodina, 1999. I owe these references to Adam Jones.
See, for example, Baumeister, 1986; Baumeister, 1997; Baumeister, Wotman, and Stillwell, 1993, Brossat, 1995; Gilbert, 1997; Proulx et al., 1994; Vogel and Lazare, 1990.
See, for example, Brown, Harris, and Hepworth, 1995; Miller, 1988.
See for literature on blood revenge, for example, Boehm, 1984, or Rodina, 1999. I owe these references to Adam Jones.
See, for example, Hale, 1994; Lehmann, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998.
See, for example, Peters, 1993; Stadtwald, 1992; Toles, 1995; Zender, 1994.
It was Dagfinn Føllesdal and later Thomas Cushman, editor of *Human Rights Review*, as well as Reidar Ommundsen, who drew my attention to Scheler and Honneth.
See, for example, Cviic, 1993, Luo, 1993; Midiohouan, 1991; Steinberg, 1991b; Steinberg, 1991a; Steinberg, 1996; Urban, Prins, 1990.
See, for example, Masson, 1996; Vachon, 1993; Znakov, 1989; Znakov, 1990.
Staub, 1989, see also Staub, 1996; Staub, 1988; Staub, 1990; Staub, 1993.
See also the work of Rapoport, 1997, and Volkan, 1997.
As mentioned above, many of the insights presented here concerning Germany stem from the author’s unique background of being part of a refugee group that had its families arbitrarily split between the West and the East after World War II, thus becoming participants in each system, to a certain degree, but also staying third party through their status as displaced persons in both systems. The post-1989 encounters with family members that never met before was a unique source of information and insight that could not have been created by any artificial methodological set-up. As the author argues elsewhere (Lindner, 2000o), validity cannot always be forced artificially, especially not when feelings play a role. In many cases validity hinges on the respondents’ openness and this has to be earned by the researcher entering into an authentic relationship with respondents, or, as in the case of the split German refugee family background of the author, entering with an open mind into a unique set of family relations.
Another ‘unification,’ Hong Kong returning to China, has been addressed by Brewer, 1999; Fu et al., 1999; Hong, Abrams, and Ng, 1999; Hong et al., 1999.
Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen write about the humiliating aspect of help-receiving in the mid-1970’s, see their current work at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/kgergen1/text7.html. I owe this reference to Michael Bond. See also Rosen, De Paulo and et al., 1983. It would be interesting to examine whether trade advances peace, as opposed to aid, because it does not entail humiliation, see for trade and conflict O’Neal and Russett, 1999; Morrow, 1999, and Hegre, 2000.
‘Fundamental attribution error’ means, - very condensed, - that I attribute the other’s actions to him/her, and not to the situation, and that I attribute my failures to the situation, and my successes to me.
The sources for this statement are provided by the author’s network of family relations, but also by close monitoring of the media; for example, in political talk shows this topic ‘creeps in’ and presents itself in its various shades of mutual understanding and misunderstanding that hovers between participants from the former East and West.
This uttering is condensed from accounts from 12 encounters and media coverage. Mummendey describes general expectations towards East Germans also in her research: ‘In general, East Germans were expected to consider their status position as inferior compared to West Germans’ (Mummendey et al., 1999). See also Billig for ‘everyday thinking,’ discourse and society, ideology and opinions Billig, 1995; Billig, 1976; Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1991; Billig, Robinson, 1996; Howitt and Billig, 1989.
See a social identity approach to understanding party identification in Greene, 1999.
See also, for example, Reinell and Wittich, 1995; Hinrichs and Wittich, 1994.
See also Pickel, Pickel, and Walz, 2000.
German television produces programmes that dramatise the East-West division and make the other side’s feelings ‘understandable’ (for example ‘Tatort,’ a serial of detective stories produced in the German ‘Länder’). See for literature about rising xenophobia among East German youth and its extremist expressions Hagan et al., 1999; Steinmetz, 1994; Stock, 1994; Watts, 1996. McFalls, 1993 addresses the topic of cultural difference between East and West before unification. Sauers, 1993 writes about the Breakup of the Internal Wall. Schneider speaks of ‘muted sheep’ in Like Muted Sheep, Culture and Cultural Politics in East-Germany (Schneider, 1994).


Was ist der Unterschied zwischen einem Kuhschwanz und einem Wessi-Schlips? Der Kuhschwanz verdeckt das Arschloch ganz…

Was ist der Unterschied zwischen Wessies und Russen? Die Russen sind wir wieder losgeworden…

Meint der Ossi zum Wessi: ‘Wir sind ein Volk’ Antwortet der Wessi dem Ossi: ‘Ja, wir auch!’

Warum lächelt der Chinese den WEST-Deutschen immer so an?

Weil die Chinesen die Mauer noch haben…

Dr. Gaboose, until his flight from the country Siad Barre’s personal physician (interview in 30th November 1998 in Hargeisa, Somaliland), and a high official until the fall of Siad Barre who does not want to be named (interview 25th November 1998 in Hargeisa, Somaliland).

It would be interesting to look into the cases which Atlas and Licklider present, and ask whether humiliation played a role in initiating rifts which were covered before: ‘recent analysis of four negotiated settlements of civil wars (Sudan in 1972, Zimbabwe in 1980, Chad in 1987, and Lebanon in 1989) reveals that in all four cases the critical conflict was actually between former allies’ (Atlas and Licklider, 1999, abstract).

The North was not without violence though: ‘The stability experienced in the north after the Borama conference was shattered by eruption of violence, over control of Hargeisa Airport…’ However, ‘the government came out stronger…’ (Farah, Haakonsen and Keynan, 1995, 35).

Critical question put forward by an anonymous reviewer of this article, received by the author in November 2000.

A man in his fifties who was a high official when Somalia still put all hopes on Siad Barre. I am not authorised to disclose his name and will call him Karim Hassan. The interview took place in November 1998 in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

‘Macho’-cultures as, for example, Kurdistan, Afghanistan, or Albania, seem to be aware of the salience of humiliation for cultural identity and use humiliation and revenge routinely as means of reinforcing their culture. I owe this remark to Finn Tschudi, 2000.

See for more literature on both Rwanda and Burundi, for example, Braeckman, 1996; Chrétien, 1997; Guichaoua, 1994; Lemarchand, 1970; Reyntjens, 1994; Scherrer, 1997.

On 1st July 1962 Belgium granted formal political independence to Rwanda, however, the Hutu uprising began to win ground in 1959.


See http://links.expedia.com/am/

The Twa are a minority of ca. 1% that is largely insignificant for the overall conflict.

Personal communication from Sam Engelstad (28th September 1999), quoted with his permission.

See for more literature, for example, Haakonsen and Keynan, 1995; African Rights, 1993; Allard and National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995; Boutros-Ghali, 1996; Clarke and Herbst, 1997; Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997; Drysdale, 1994; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung et al., 1995; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995; Jan, 1996; Jan, 1998; Lindner, 2000o; Lyons, Samatar, and Brookings, 1995; Rakiya, De Waal, and African Rights,
I owe this comment to an anonymous reviewer of this article; I received this comment in November 2000.

I owe this example to a personal comment from Michael Bond, January 2000. See also Dehnes, 1998. However, the notion of ‘jihad’ as label for bloodthirsty fanaticism is an extreme version of this concept that needs to be differentiated from less extreme versions.

I owe this reference to an anonymous reviewer of this article, the review was received in November 2000.

See, for example, Lindner, 2000m; Lindner, 2000o; Lindner, 2000n; Lindner, 2000h; Lindner, 2000a.

See for a longer version of this section the article ‘How Research Can Humiliate’ (Lindner, 2001).

Michael Quinn Patton writes: ‘The high esteem in which science is held has made it culturally acceptable in Western countries to conduct interviews on virtually any subject in the name of science. Such is not the case worldwide. Evaluation researchers cannot simply presume that they have the right to ask intrusive questions. Many topics may be taboo. I have experienced cultures where it was simply inappropriate to ask questions of a subordinate about a superordinate. Any number of topics may be taboo, or at least indelicate, for strangers - family matters, political views, who owns what, how people came to be in certain positions, and sources of income’ (Patton, 1990, 339).

Jan Smedslund argues that “even though ordinary words have very variable meanings, they also have a stable core meaning, and many partly overlapping words may also refer to the same core meaning. In summary, it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language… A formulation of such a system can only approximate some of the psychologically relevant features of ordinary language and must necessarily ignore others. However, one may envisage successively more complex scientific language, including an ever higher number of psychologically important distinctions” (Smedslund 1988, 5).

Thomas Scheff (1997) recommends proceeding from “the ground,” comparing data from different locations in a “part/whole analysis,” and, finally, developing hypotheses that can be tested quantitatively. Scheff, 1997b, 9: “Quantitative analysis leads to verification or disconfirmation of a hypothesis. But verification is the third step in part/whole morphology. Before taking the last step, it is usually necessary to take at least one of the earlier steps: exploration (conventional eyewitness field work using qualitative methods), and/or microanalysis of single specimens and comparisons of specimens.”

Cantril’s original version was adapted as follows: There is a ladder from 0 to 10 (IMAGE OF LADDER). Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the highest amount of respect for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible humiliation for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Where would you put (name of group, for example Tutsi or Hutu) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) at the present time? Where did (name of group) stand five years ago? Just as your best guess, where do you think (name of group) will be on the ladder five years from now?


See also Maren, 1997 and Hancock, 1989.
minorities and greater understanding between peoples. What are the medium and long-term steps that need to be taken to create a world safe for difference? These were the questions posed in a series of meetings, roundtables and consultations that have been held by the State of the World Forum during the last two years.’

75 ‘A key feature of process control is the opportunity to express one’s point of view’ (Bond, 1998, 16 in the digital version that Bond sent to the author). Bond refers to Folger, 1977.

76 Statement condensed from different interviews in 1998 and 1999 with Somalis in Somalia and Kenya.

77 The numerous Somali peace conferences during the past decade, supported by a multitude of third parties, received a lot of criticism from all sides during the fieldwork. However, they give witness of the fact that there are many within the international community who at least have the intention to promote reconciliation.

78 A Flemish region of Belgium. Logiest’s family was both French and Flemish-speaking, and thus he was familiar both with the French ‘master’ culture and Flemish ‘underling’ plight.

79 ‘Et dès le 17 novembre, ce pur néophyte en politique rwandaise, réunissant les administrateurs de territoire, décide d'assurer l'avenir en renversant d'un seul coup, brutalement, la politique traditionnelle menée par la Tutelle belge depuis les origines: à la place des chefs et des sous-chefs tutsi, il décide de nommer systematiquement, en masse, des Hutu’ (Logiest, 1982, I, in the 'Préface du Professeur Stengers').

80 Unni Wikan addresses such topics in her work in Norway (Wikan, 1995).


82 Standpoint theory criticises logical positivism and claims that there is no ‘neutral’ perspective. Individual perspective is seen as influenced by class and gender position. Moderate standpoint theory attenuates radical standpoint theory’s assertion of ‘aggressive men’ and ‘nurturing women.’ Standpoint theory has been criticised for being too essentialist. See for literature at the crossroad to politics, for example, Zalewski, 1993.

83 ‘The Government will take up women’s rights in political dialogues with relevant States. In countries where forced marriages and honour killings take place, Norway will seek to improve the situation by making the authorities and civil society aware of the States’ international obligations and the international prohibition of forced marriages’ (11, chapter 5 ‘International Human Rights Efforts’ in report no. 21 to the Norwegian Parliament Storting (1999-2000), Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).

84 See the film work of Gerd Inger Polden during several decades on female genital mutilation, Norwegian Broadcasting NRK (Norsk Riks-kringkasting). In a meeting with her in November 2000 in Oslo she confirms the views put forward here.

85 See Kelman, Rothstein, 1999.