Making Enemies Unwittingly: Humiliation and International Conflict

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This manuscript builds on a research project that examined Rwanda and Somalia, comparing these recent disasters with what occurred in Hitler's Germany. It explains how a profound but little studied emotion – humiliation – often sparks or plays an explosive role in conflicts internationally.

This book draws on my experience as a clinical psychologist and counselor and I thank my clients for extending their confidence to me. From 1980, I did counseling work in Germany; from 1984-1987, I spent time as a psychological counselor at the American University in Cairo; and from 1987 to 1991, I had my own private practice in Cairo. I offered counseling in English, French, German, Norwegian, and, after some study, in Egyptian-Arabic. My clients came from diverse cultural backgrounds, many from the expatriate community in Cairo. They were Americans, Europeans, Scandinavians, Palestinians, and citizens of other African countries, as well as from the local community. Some were Western-oriented. Others were traditionally-oriented Egyptians. Part of my work was what could be called *culture-counseling*, helping foreigners understand Egyptian culture, Arab culture, and Islam.

Before coming to Egypt in 1974, I studied and worked in New Zealand, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Israel, West Africa, USA, Germany, and Norway, as a student of both psychology and of medicine. I thank all those people who kindly opened their minds and homes to me during the years of my international work.

Finally I would like to thank my parents. The impact of the trauma of World War II weighs heavily on them, even today, decades after the end of the war. Their courageous handling of this trauma gave my work its direction and motivation.

FOREWORD BY MORTON DEUTSCH

I first met Dr. Evelin Lindner in December 2001 when she was the speaker at a Colloquium of the Peace Education Program at Teachers College, Columbia University. I was attracted to the Colloquium by the title of her talk, "Humiliation and the Roots of Violence." When she spoke, I was impressed by the importance and originality of her ideas. She showed how humiliation – a profound emotion which, unfortunately, has been little studied by psychologists – often plays a critical role in leading to destructive international and interpersonal conflicts. Her talk was illustrated by fascinating examples drawn from her rich and varied international experiences in such countries as Rwanda, Somalia, Egypt, Germany, and the United States.

As a result of her talk, she was invited to teach a Workshop course on the psychology of humiliation in the Program on Conflict Resolution at Teachers College during the summer sessions of 2002 and 2003. Her course was extremely well-received by the students and faculty. During the summer of 2002, I read many of Dr. Lindner's papers and had an opportunity to talk with her about her work. I urged her to write a book which would present her ideas to a wider social science audience as well as to policy makers and the lay public. Despite a very painful illness, she began work on this book in the Fall of 2002.

I consider this book to be a very valuable and original contribution to understanding how the experience of humiliation can lead to destructive interaction at the interpersonal and international levels. She aptly describes humiliation as the "nuclear bomb of emotions." It has profound and devastating effects. It shakes the foundation of one's identity by devaluing one's worth and by undermining one's inherent human right to care and justice.

Dr. Lindner develops with great insight the important idea that humiliation has emerged only recently as a powerful and pervasive experience in human affairs. She attributes this emergence to two phenomena: *egalization* and *globalization*. Egalization refers to the development of the political ideal of equal dignity during the 18th century, as reflected in the American and French revolutions. Globalization refers to the increasing interdependence and interconnectedness of peoples throughout the world. A woman in Afghanistan who has always accepted her husband's right to beat her if she disobeys feels humiliated when she learns (through her exposure to television) that, in other parts of the *global village*, women are viewed as equal to men and husbands are imprisoned for beating their wives.

Dr. Lindner is a very thoughtful woman who has read widely and deeply in the social sciences. She has also had a rich, varied experience in many countries as a researcher, as a psychotherapist and counselor and as a global citizen, immersing herself in and embracing diverse local cultures.

The book should interest a wide audience. Psychologists and other social scientists will find new ideas to enrich their understanding of how humiliation contributes to destructive conflict and violence at the international as well as interpersonal levels. Policy makers will not only be exposed to these new ideas but also to their policy implications. And, beyond the foregoing, all readers – whether they have a professional interest or not – will find much of value to their personal lives.

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PROLOGUE

This book explains how a profound but little studied emotion – humiliation – often sparks or plays an explosive role in conflicts internationally.

When the statue of Saddam Hussein fell and Iraqis danced on that "body" hitting it with their shoes, there was joy. Moments later, an American soldier climbed the statue to place an American flag on the face, and that brought a national gasp, a moment of national Iraqi humiliation. The Americans had claimed to be "liberating" the Iraqis, but the placing of the U.S. flag was a sign of conquest. The Iraqi's own symbolic humiliation of ex-leader Hussein had been acceptable; this American action was not. The flag was quickly removed and replaced with an Iraq flag. But those tense moments were a brief example of the far-reaching and potentially volatile effect that humiliating acts, even unintended, can have. Along with more predictable effects of humiliations like those at Abu Ghraib, this book examines and explains, across history and nations, how this little-understood emotion sparks outrage, uprisings and war.

This book addresses how words and actions can humiliate, how the "victim" perceives those words and actions, what the consequences may be, and how individuals and organizations can work to avoid such instances in the future. From acts of humiliation in Nazi Germany to bloodbaths in Rwanda and Somalia, and attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, this book gives vivid examples and unravels events to explain humiliation at the core and shows what we can do to avoid unwittingly making enemies this way.

The horrific events that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001 shook the world. By taking down the World Trade Center's Twin Towers, symbols of Western power, Osama bin Laden sent a cruel message of humiliation to the entire Western world. 911 was terrible, but for years, I had feared much worse. I had seen the simmering resentment experienced by the disenfranchised worldwide and dreaded an explosion in which hundreds of thousands – or even millions – would die. I wrote in numerous publications that the world was lucky that no Hitler-like leader had yet seized on the rage boiling around the world and devised grander strategies of destruction. Indeed, the audacious attack on the Twin Towers spread shock and awe[1] with the same overwhelming effect as if millions had died.

It is common wisdom that World War II was triggered, at least partly, by the humiliation the Versailles Treaties inflicted on Germany after the First World War. The urge to redress and avert humiliation was the "fuel" that powered Hitler and provided him with followers. Hitler unleashed war on his neighbors to remedy past humiliation inflicted on Germany. He perpetrated the Holocaust to avert future humiliation that he feared from "World Jewry." The Aryan race, he hallucinated, was to do "good" and "save" the world from humiliation. This, he believed, was the noble task that "providence" had put on his shoulders. Sadly, the German population harbored enough feelings of frustration and humiliation to feed into Hitler's nightmarish vision. Hitler on his own would have been a lone player – he became dangerous through the resonance his *narratives of humiliation* found in the larger population.

Mussolini was quietly deposed in 1943 by his own people. Hitler's response to humiliation resonated with a large number of German people until as late as 1945, even

as it became increasingly obvious that the price of loyalty to this deluded leader was self-destruction – in effect, suicide.[2]

Early in his career, during World War I, Hitler was an isolated human being, scorned for his strange pathetic ramblings. He resembled those disturbed creatures who babble wretched gobbledygook at street corners, believing they are god-chosen. Without the simmering rage that humiliation induces, Hitler may have remained a marginal figure, unable to gather the following that made World War II and the Holocaust possible.

This hypothesis has been taken seriously by politicians and historians at the highest international level. After the Second World War, the Marshall Plan was devised – whatever ulterior motives it may have had – with the result that Germany did not experience another round of soul-wounding humiliation. Germany became a respected member of the European family. What this teaches us is that humiliation may lead to war, while avoiding humiliation may be the road to peace.[3]

Humiliation: A new basis for understanding conflict and violence

Recently, Hitler's Germany has been invoked to explain Saddam Hussein's Iraq, with many insisting that the Iraq war was necessary, just as the allied intervention in World War II was necessary, to "take out" evil. I suggest that the similarities between Germany and Iraq are not about evil, but rather about humiliation. The lesson of the Marshall Plan teaches us that long-term prevention through the peaceful "weapons" of respect and dignity may be more effective in handling human affairs than emergency policing of the backlash that always looms after humiliation. The lesson of 20th century history is that humiliation has to be avoided if we are to drain the murky waters in which tyrants and instigators of terror swim. Hitler's regime could possibly have been prevented if there had been a Marshall Plan after World War I. Then there would have been no tyrant and no need to disarm him.

Humiliated hearts and minds may represent the only "real" weapons of mass destruction. Europe was a hotbed of war and death. The Marshall Plan introduced respect and dignity. Implementing it – against strong political forces that wanted to humiliate Germany again – required courage and vision. Who would have predicted the emergence of a European Union, "a union of arch enemies"? The Marshall Plan teaches us important lessons about courage, serenity and resolve, about what these terms really mean for the safety of our loved ones and where the will to act and stand firm has to focus.

Current analyses of terror and violence, both local and global, usually ignore the element of humiliation. If not pure unfathomable evil, then poverty, deprivation, or marginalization are cited as driving people into terrorist activities or other forms of violence. Why then do we frequently see well-to-do and highly educated terrorists organizing and perpetrating atrocities? Why do poverty, deprivation, marginalization, ethnic incompatibilities, or even conflict of interest and struggles over scarce resources sometimes lead to cooperation and innovation, instead of to violence?

Humiliation is presented in this book as the "missing link," explaining this discrepancy. In a globalized and interdependent world, humiliation may work as a *nuclear bomb of emotions* that instigates extremism and hampers moderate reactions and solutions. In 1996, I wondered whether the link between humiliation and different forms

of war and violence has ever been explored by social psychologists. I had many questions. Does humiliation always lead to war, Holocaust, genocide, terror and violence? Was the humiliation dynamic more important in previous generations than it is today? Is humiliation only important in politics – or does it also play a role in organizations, corporations, and private lives, perhaps even determining how we think about ourselves? Is it possible that the planet's chances for survival may depend on how we manage humiliation?

A literature search showed that the term humiliation appeared seldom, not even in social psychology. An implicit awareness of the phenomenon, however, permeates virtually all research on trauma, violence, or aggression. Despite this awareness, humiliation has hardly ever been researched as a separately definable dynamic, except by a handful of particularly insightful researchers some of whom include humiliation in the category of shame. I, on my part, do not regard humiliation merely as a variant of shame, but as a highly toxic and powerful human experience to be studied on its own.

In 1996, I designed a doctoral research project to focus on the concept of humiliation, differentiating it from similar emotions and exploring its role, not only in history, but also in more recent events of violence, genocide and war. In implementing this design, I interviewed more than 200 people who were either implicated in or knowledgeable about the genocides in Rwanda and Somalia. This fieldwork was supplemented by my interviews with people involved in German history (Lindner, 2001l). The project was generously financed by the Norwegian Research Council (on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the Research Programme on Multilateral Development Assistance). In 2001, I defended my doctoral dissertation on humiliation at the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo, earning my second Ph.D., in social psychology (subsequent to my first doctorate, in social medicine, in 1994, that addressed the concept of quality of life in Egypt and Germany).

Since 1997, I have concentrated on building a *theory of humiliation,* helping to create a new multidisciplinary subfield in the academic landscape.[4] This emerging field incorporates ideas from social psychology, anthropology, history, sociology, political science, and philosophy. The theory*,* still in its infancy, needs a great deal of future research to reach maturity. I am currently working with other scholars to develop a research agenda and an international network of individuals and organizations interested in humiliation studies. I invite all readers to contribute to the building of a rich and multilayered theory of humiliation with their own reflections and research (see http://www.humiliationstudies.org). The theory of humiliation addresses humiliation primarily as it occurs in the political realm, but is also useful in understanding and improving the inner workings of organizations and corporations, as well as our private lives and internal dialogues. The dynamics of humiliation, in other words, affect all levels, from the macro to the micro level.

I see the theory of humiliation as a beginning for our search for ways to prevent violence, war, Holocaust, and terror, believing with David Hamburg, that "An ounce of prevention is worth many pounds of cure" (Hamburg, 2002). In this book, I am an educator, advocate and social scientist. In the chapter about the United States, I try to send a therapeutic message to Americans, a message designed to counteract the message of "we hate you" that Americans received on September 11, 2001. The therapeutic aim is

not to make everybody love everybody else, but to begin to move us all toward "a minimum standard for human relations" as formulated by the Coexistence Initiative.[5]

This book does not ask who is right or wrong. Such narrow questions can't help build an inclusive and lasting peace for the *global village*.[6] My questions are broader, less personal, more focused on finding solutions than on placing blame. Included among the questions are: "What are the tendencies we can observe in many human organizations?" and "Which tendencies should we strengthen to achieve a lasting peace?" or, "Which strategies work best in today's unprecedented set of circumstances?"

This last question is based on the conviction that strategies can be "right" in some contexts and "wrong" in others. This book invites adherents of "old" contexts and "old" solutions to enter the "new" context of the emerging *global village* and the novel solutions that are "right" in this new situation. This book's framing of the human condition is very hopeful. It stipulates that there may be a *benign future* for the *global village* in store, if we *steer clear* of the mine fields that loom in the short term. I conclude the book with a call for a *Moratorium on Humiliation*.

INTRODUCTION

The Olympic Committee promotes the following *Ideals of Olympism*[7] in the message it sends to all participants:

> You are my adversary, but you are not my enemy.
> For your resistance gives me strength.
> Your will gives me courage.
> Your spirit ennobles me.
> And though I aim to defeat you, should I succeed, I will not *humiliate* you.
> Instead, I will *honor* you.
> For without you, I am a lesser man.

Olympic ideals are a fitting starting point for this book because they link *defeat*, *humiliation* and *honor* in a very distinct way and make clear two of the book's aims. First, the message – like this book – was written for people who are highly focused and motivated. Both the Olympic message and this book were written for those who wish to show leadership and make a difference in the world, not for those who are content to wallow in finger-pointing, hand-wringing and depression. Similarly, the people I am writing for want to win metaphorical medals not only for themselves but for all humankind. This book aims at helping all of us to win the Nobel Peace Prize for our world.

The second point highlighted by the *Ideals of Olympism* is the significance of humiliation in human striving. Reflecting on the phenomenon of humiliation and attempting to avoid humiliating people, is not a pastime for whining losers, but a noble task for courageous winners, a task worthy of our greatest leaders, those empowered to make big changes. I feel compelled to stress this because psychology is often demeaned (particularly by men in power) as a "soft factor," secondary to "hard facts" and "hard thinking." The *Ideals of Olympism* suggest that psychology may be at the heart of success, the hardest fact of all. It is with good reason that top sports-men and -women are invited as coaches by leaders in the corporate and political sector. Gold medal winners often know a lot about the psychology of success and failure. Knowing about the psychology of humiliation is crucial for success, not only for successful leadership, but for humankind's survival.

The book covers the role played by humiliation in the modern context – the emerging world of globalization with its conflicting interests with regard to human rights, culture differences, inter-group conflict, cooperation and violence, competition and negotiation, and power and trust. It is a world in which the global threat of terrorism and the frequency of violence in our countries, cities, schools, and families combine to make it imperative that we find an answer to the age-old question "why can't we live in peace?"

One of my premises is that feelings of humiliation may be the biggest obstacle to our search for a workable peace. The humiliation dynamic creates a vicious cycle – humiliating acts can cause the victims to feel justified in returning the insult. Once cycles of humiliation are in motion, they are extremely difficult to interrupt – nobody wants to be the first to "back down" after he or her country has suffered humiliation. It is,

therefore, extremely important to prevent such cycles from occurring. The insights and skills required to effect such prevention are laid out in this book.

One important point is that humiliation does not have to be intentional. Even help can humiliate without the helper being aware of it. Resentment and violent backlashes often shock those who thought they were doing good. In such cases, close analysis often reveals that violence is based on feelings of humiliation, elicited by actions that were not meant to humiliate.

There is an important distinction between humbling and humiliating. Humbling may be a necessary experience that liberates human beings from the kind of baseless pride that keeps them from connecting fully with others. Humbling may be painful – who likes to recognize that their pride has no basis – but it is not soul-scorching, as humiliation usually is. It is not unusual, however, for a person to perceive humbling as humiliation and react with the rage that humiliation often entails, a rage that can look like "unfathomable evil" to those who lack insight.

Yet another essential point in this book is that globalization is contributing to emerging feelings of humiliation. When people move closer to each other, expectations rise. If expectations are defined by human rights ideals, this is an explosive mixture because human rights ideals – with their notion of equal dignity and respect – are interwoven with the concept of humiliation. The first sentence in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." When people accept the human rights message, they will feel that their humanity is being humiliated when their dignity is violated. Human rights ideals oppose hierarchical rankings of human worthiness that were once regarded as "normal" – and are still "normal" in many parts of the world. In the cross-fire between the old paradigm and the new, particularly hot feelings of humiliation emerge.

Organization of this book

This book is organized in three sections. Each section has four chapters. The first section is entitled "What is humiliation?" It starts by unfolding the *Mental Landscape* that forms the background for any dynamic of humiliation. It describes how humiliation is regarded as highly legitimate tool in traditional honor societies, but becomes a profoundly illicit violation of dignity when the concept of human rights permeates the moral and ethical framework. *Globalization and humiliation*, the last chapter of Section I, describes how globalization has the potential to elicit humility and transforms domination into a painful violation.

Section II addresses how humiliation operates in the world and in our lives. Its first chapter suggests that humiliation is at the core of *Egalization*. The following chapter discusses how *Misunderstandings* can elicit feelings of humiliation. The ensuing chapter, *Addiction to Humiliation,* addresses how victims of humiliation may become addicted to the experience and pull their neighbors into malign cycles of humiliation. Section II ends with a chapter on *Love* and *Help* and how both activities may evoke feelings of humiliation.

Section III discusses what we can do about humiliation and proposes ways out of the humiliation cycle. It makes suggestions to all players, victims, perpetrators and third parties – all those who want to prevent humiliation from playing a toxic role in our future.

A few preliminary comments

In writing this book, I tried to avoid jargon to make the work accessible to as many people as possible. Kenneth Gergen (1997) complains:

> Professional writings in social psychology inherit stale traditions of rhetoric; they are intelligible to but a minute community of scholars, and even within this community they are overly formal, monologic, defensive, and dry. The nature of the social world scarcely demands such an archaic form of expression. Constructionism invites the scholar to expand the repertoire of expression, to explore ways of speaking and writing to a broader audience, perhaps with multiple voices, and a richer range of rhetoric (Gergen, 1997, p. 17).

To make the writing more immediate and vivid, vignettes and examples from psychotherapy and research are used throughout the book. The names are not real and the identities of the people are obscured to protect their privacy except where I obtained their consent. I have translated many of the examples into English and usually do not indicate what the original language was. I often paraphrase and summarize.

Several important themes could not be expanded because of space limitation. Among these are: how social and cultural change unfold; how the individual interacts with the group and vice versa; and the nature of the *group self.* In the following paragraphs, I will provide just the briefest abstract of the many pages that would be necessary to do these subjects full justice.

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur writes, "What would we know of love and hate, of moral feelings and, in general, of all that we call the self, if these had not been brought to language and articulated by literature?" (Ricoeur, 1981, p.143). This reflects the stance taken in this book – that group, individual, and historical cultural and social change are intricately interwoven. You will encounter sentences such as "humankind understood…" This does not mean that humankind collectively and consciously reflected on a problem and "understood" it. Social and cultural change occurs in more complex ways and with considerable inertia. Sometimes it is slow, occasionally sudden transformations occur. Hunting and gathering hominids refined their lifestyle over millions of years, then suddenly almost everybody on Earth became a farmer. Farming was invented in several places independently – first, about 10,000 years ago in what is known today as Turkey. From there it spread over the whole of Europe. In another turn, today, at least in Western countries, almost nobody farms anymore. Again, this movement from an agrarian to an urban lifestyle was a comparably "sudden" transformation.

The relationship between the individual and the group is equally complex. It took the Church more than 300 years to accept Copernicus's theory that the Earth revolves around the sun. Sometimes situations are *ripe* for ideas, sometimes not and individuals are embedded in this *ripening* process. Individuals may resonate with the feelings of the

masses – or they may not. Hitler was a nobody during World War I, an isolated "strange" guy, then, suddenly, the time was *ripe* for him.

Worldviews, *cultural mindsets*, *scripts*, *paradigms* or *Zeitgeists* are often defended for long time stretches, only to crumble in a moment. Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) describes how *paradigms* shift (Kuhn, 1962). First they rigidify, people identify with them and stand up for them, only to be toppled by a new generation who asks new questions that undermine the edifice. Anderson (1991) explains how communities can be *ideated* and *imagined*; however, how such *imaginations* can also suddenly change (Anderson, 1991). The question of social and cultural change has been addressed by many, not the least by evolutionary psychology and its view on the generation of culture (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (Eds.), 1992) is a related field.

Any discussion of these theories must question how much these approaches turn humans into passive objects of impersonal forces outside of their control and of how and to what extent impersonal forces impinge on individuals and societies. Whether social change is a *constructive* group "adaptation" or a *destructive* one, is often decided only in hindsight. Most of us agree that the church did well in accepting Copernicus's heliocentric worldview. Consenting to Hitler's ideas, however, was suicidal. Over longer stretches of time, some group "adaptations" may filter out as more "useful" than others and form long-term cultural traits. It is possible, for example, that there once existed communities who sent their daughters – not their sons – to die in war. Such communities would probably have died out simply because men are more "expendable." Even in the short lives warriors often have, they can beget more children than women would. Throughout history and across the globe, sons – and not daughters – were usually trained as defenders of security, prepared for early death in war (Goldstein, 2001). The relationship between limitations given by "reality" on one side (in this case male-female procreative differences), the cultural mindsets that prescribe ways of handling this reality on the other side (male warrior culture), and the individual on the third side (the men and women born into this environment) may be adaptive or maladaptive, but it is always mutually interwoven.

The individual is both actor and acted upon, the shaper of the world and shaped by the world. Individual decisions and feelings may not resonate with anybody else and remain singular. Or, they may resonate with many others, causing whole communities to move in one direction. It is when this happens on a large scale that "humankind" makes a move.

In this book the term *master* will frequently be used for the powerful, and *underling* or even *slave* for the less powerful (see Hegel's theme of *Lord* and *Bondsman*). Persons or groups can be masters and underlings at the same time since most underlings are also masters who rule over even lower underlings; only a few top-masters have nobody above them. The category of *underlings* employed here contains such categories as *the colonized, people of color, women, advocates on behalf of nature, feelings, creativity,* or *individual freedom* as opposed to the *master category* entailing *the colonizers, the white man, men, humankind's control over nature, ratio, intellect,* and *normative control*.

The *epistemological spirit* – the philosophical underpinning – of this book is best described as *reflective equilibrium*. Dagfinn Føllesdal,[8] explains that *reflective equilibrium*, or *circular thinking*,[9] has been "en vogue" since the 1950s. Prior to that time, thinkers preferred to build their arguments from the ground up, placing each layer of logic firmly upon the previous foundation. They were committed, in other words, to

building their ships on secure ground. They could not conceive of "building their ships at sea" as do the modern practitioners of reflective equilibrium. The kind of certainty for which our classical thinkers strove was admirable. But, I'm not the least bit sure that it is attainable. *Reflective equilibrium,* therefore*,* can be described as a "humble" method of reasoning that does not try to do the impossible or call for the impossible to be possible.

As a system of thought, r*eflective equilibrium* has six features: it is 1) a method of justification,[10] 2) it emphasizes coherence, 3) it entails total corrigibility (it can, in other words, be easily revised or corrected), 4) it includes different fields of academia, 5) it does not exclude pre-reflective intuitive acceptance, and 6) it draws on different sources of evidence. Related to *reflective equilibrium* is the *hermeneutic circle*. This book repeatedly "travels around" the *hermeneutic circle* whereby the analyst journeys back and forward between the particular and the general, producing generalizations in which the subtleties of particular cases are embodied. It is the essence of this approach that some landmarks are passed more than once and on each subsequent occasion the reader understands them better and in a more complex manner.

Jan Smedslund is another thinker who influenced the creation of this book. Smedslund argues that human beings create *meta-myths* that are explicable in terms of common-sense psychology or *Psycho-Logic* (Smedslund, 1988).[11] Smedslund is interested in the stable core meanings, rules and elements entailed in ordinary words[12] and cautions psychological research not to overlook them. He warns social scientists against trying to appear "scientific" by mistaking "scientifically looking" methods for sound science in places where core rules are blatantly apparent and studying "infinite objects" would be silly. "The finding that all bachelors are in fact unmarried males cannot be said to be empirical," he said (Smedslund, 1988, p. 4). "This would be an inexcusable waste of time and resources, and a basic confusion of 'the *ontological* status' (p. 4, italics in original) of psychology's research object."

In the spirit of *Psycho-Logic* this book reflects on the human condition in social philosophical ways. It asks what *options* human beings have under certain circumstances, and how humankind, intentionally or not, with conscious awareness or not, brought these options to the fore in the course of human history. Without their tool-making talent, for example, humans may never have adopted the practice of humiliating fellow human beings into slavery. In early civilizations, humiliation was merely a way of turning human beings into tools; the practice of humiliation was embedded in a mindset of tool-making and did not carry the connotation of violation. However, this book is not based on reflection only. Thirty years of international medical, psychological and cross-cultural experience flow into it, along with many years of qualitative research on humiliation (since 1996), including hundreds of interviews (Lindner, 2001l).

The criticism that this book is not based on a large body of established empirical research is valid. However, novel worldviews would not be novel if they were based on a large body of established empirical research. Novelty by definition entails the problem that it is more a proposal and an invitation to the reader than a final conclusion. To make this invitation as compelling as possible, I sometimes make stark, even provocative statements. The concept of humiliation may often seem to be overused, due to the fact that the core element of humiliation, a *downward movement*, is taken as an entry to analysis. This book does not deal with feelings of humiliation alone or acts of humiliation

alone. It includes the wide spectrum of *downward movements* that has been experienced throughout human history.

The reader is invited to reflect upon and draw up research on the questions that form the core of author's research on humiliation. These questions include: What is experienced as humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? When does humiliation become a feeling? What does humiliation lead to? What experiences of justice, honor, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? How is humiliation perceived and responded to in different cultures? What role does humiliation play in aggression? Is humiliation relevant for relationships between "civilizations" or cultural regions such as was described by Samuel P. Huntington, 1996? What can be done to overcome the violent effects of humiliation?[13]

I conclude this introduction with a thought from history. In 1905, Norway and Sweden stood at the brink of war. Norway wished to liberate itself from the "union" with Sweden (for Norway "union" was a euphemism for "Swedish occupation"). The great Norwegian researcher, explorer, diplomat, and Nobel Peace Prize winner Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), a crucial player in the peaceful dissolution of this "union," said:

> We are just as little desirous of inflicting humiliation as we are of suffering it. Such desires, aside from being bad politics, are the mark of inferior breeding. It is, therefore, reasonable and politic for us – to try to help Sweden by concessions and liberality, so that the dissolution of the Union may be carried through without the Swedish people's feeling humiliated.[14]

Related reading

The terms *humiliation* and *shame* are often used interchangeably. Among those who do so are Silvan S. Tomkins (1962–1992), whose work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson. Nathanson describes humiliation as a *combination of three innate affects* (out of altogether nine affects), namely as a combination of *shame, disgust* and *dissmell* (Nathanson in a personal conversation, October 1, 1999).[15]

Read about on Hegel's theme of *Lord* and *Bondsman*,[16] and note that Hegel's discussion of the *struggle for recognition* is the subject of an extensive literature in contemporary political theory (see, among many others, Honneth, 1995, or Bauman, 2001), this being a broader concept than the North American individualistic "need for positive self-regard" (see Heine et al., 1999). Max Scheler set out these issues in his classic book *Ressentiment* (1912/1961).[17] In his first period of work, for example in his *The Nature of Sympathy* (1913/1954),[18] Scheler focuses on human feelings, love, and the nature of the person. He states that the human person is a loving being, *ens amans,* who may feel *ressentiment*.[19] There is a significant literature in philosophy on *the politics of recognition*, claiming that people who are not recognized suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence (see Honneth, 1997, on related themes). Wendt, 2003, observes "an intriguing possibility that the struggle for recognition may actually explain much of the *realpolitik* behavior, including war, which Neorealists have attributed to the struggle for security" (Wendt, 2003, pp. 510-511, see also Ringmar, 2002).

Read furthermore on the *origins of the Second World War*,[20] *social psychology*,[21] on *scripts*,[22] on *social representation* and *constructionism*,[23] on *complexity theory*,[24] on *cultural change*,[25] on how the *individual interacts with the group* and vice versa,[26] on *group dynamics*,[27] on *cognition* as an *interpersonal* process,[28] on "*group self*,"[29] *theories of social order*,[30] on *tipping points*,[31] on *imagined communities*,[32] on *evolutionary psychology* and *memetics*,[33] and on the *hermeneutic circle*.[34]

PART I: THE ELEMENTS OF HUMILIATION

Chapter 1: Its Mental Landscape of Humiliation
(Debbie: The Psychological Elements of Humiliating and Being Humiliated)

Humiliation is about *putting down* and *holding down*. The word humiliation comes from humus, which means *earth* in Latin. On September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers were taken down to the ground, to the dust of the earth. What the towers stood for was *debased* and *denigrated*. On April 9, 2003, another set of dynamics of humiliation unfolded before of the eyes of the world. The statue of Saddam Hussein in Paradise Square in Baghdad was brought down to the ground. This statue, which depicted Saddam Hussein with his arm pointing to Jerusalem, had been erected only a year earlier.

The images broadcast around the world began with some young Iraqis trying to tear the statue down and enlisting American help. An American armored vehicle arrived on the scene and pulled the statue down to the cheers of the people. The statue fell only halfway at first, leaving the statue with Saddam Hussein's head hanging down. This was the beginning of a strong symbolic marking of the ultimate humiliation of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Disgusted, the Iraqis threw whatever they could gather at the statue. When the core of the statue fell to the ground, the Iraqis chanted and jubilated, jumped up and down and danced on the statue's body. They smacked this image of their former dictator with their shoes, a highly offensive gesture of humiliation in Iraq (meaning something like "I throw the dust under my feet into your face!"). Half an hour later, they dragged his head down. A tyrant was being debased and denigrated, the first dynamic of humiliation to unfold in this scene. An Iraqi guest in the BBCWorld studio expressed his delight in the symbolic debasement of Saddam Hussein.

However, a second dynamic of humiliation had occurred moments earlier when an American soldier climbed to the neck of the statue of Saddam and put an American flag on Saddam Hussein's face. The Iraqi, in the BBCWorld studio, shrieked "Oh, NO!" The planting of the American flag, a symbol of conquest rather than liberation, was, as a BBC reporter said, "a moment of thoughtless triumphalism." A minute later, the American flag was replaced by an old Iraqi flag, remedying this sour moment of national Iraqi humiliation.

The world community witnessed the power of humiliation as it unfolded, with two perspectives intertwined in the same event. *Debasement, denigration, degradation* are words that contain the prefix *de-* which signifies *down from* in Latin, *from great heights down to the ground*. In the case of the Twin Towers, thousands of innocent victims paid with their lives for a powerful "message of humiliation" sent to the mighty masters of

today's world in the act of "taking down" a symbol of the rich West. Taking down and humiliating Saddam Hussein's statue sent a powerful message to him and his followers that his supremacy was broken.

The first case, the Twin Tower tragedy, we consider a disaster, the second, the deposing of a tyrant, a victory. It seems that humiliation can work for both "good" and "evil." Yet, this is not the case. We will understand this better in the further course of this book. What is lacking so far in this description is a differentiation of humiliation and humility. Humiliation is not the only word with roots in Latin "humus," earth. There is also *humility* and *humbleness*. Both can be wonderful assets. Not humiliation is the opposite of arrogance, but humility. Humility and humbleness stand for the humble acknowledgement of limits and the absence of arrogated superiority and hubris.

The following story may help make the distinction between humility and humiliation clearer:

Julius Paltiel, a Norwegian Jew I met in October, 2002, was imprisoned in the "SS Strafgefangenenlager Falstad" during World War II. Falstad is situated in breathtakingly beautiful country in the middle of Norway, not far away from Trondheim. Falstad, a large, forlorn building constructed around a rectangular courtyard, was once a special school for handicapped boys. However, in 1941, it was taken over by the German occupiers and turned into a detention camp for political prisoners.

Paltiel told me about an incident that occurred at Falstad when one of the prisoners – a cultivated German Jew with a beautiful voice – was asked to sing.[35] SS officers and prisoners, including Julius Paltiel himself, stood in the courtyard, listening. The prisoner sang several traditional German songs so touchingly that the German SS officers – who usually shouted orders and insults – listened in complete silence.

After a quarter of an hour of this beautiful sound, there was a pause. Complete silence which ended when a dog began to howl. This "woke up" the SS officers who immediately set out to cover up for their vulnerability by inflicting humiliation on the prisoners. They began by announcing that no Jew was capable of singing so beautifully – the proof was supposedly provided by the dog's howling: even an animal could recognize how bad the Jewish singing was.

The officers ordered the Jewish prisoners to go to a tree in the middle of the courtyard, shake off its remaining autumn leaves and lying on their bellies, take the leaves one-by-one into their mouths and crawl to the corners of the courtyard. The non-Jewish prisoners were ordered to watch and shout. However, many turned their backs.

The beautiful, touching songs seemed to have undermined the hierarchy of *Übermensch* and *Untermensch* the SS officers worked so hard to maintain. The songs humbled the SS officers and, for a moment, introduced humility. However, they could not accept the truth that they were mere humans among other humans, capable of being touched by the singing of another mere mortal. When the singing stopped, they remembered the ideological frame they subscribed to, one that made them the masters, allegedly ordained by nature to rule over these lesser beings. Interestingly, they did not beat the prisoners "mindlessly" or treat them with mere physical brutality. Instead they chose to transmit a highly symbolic and intelligent "message" to both prisoners and themselves, one that reinstated physically, mentally and emotionally the hierarchy of *Übermensch/Untermensch,* sending the prisoners literally *down*, down to the dust of the

ground to carry out "services" that were so *low* that there could be no doubt of who was the master.

Top and bottom: How the vertical dimension can be used

The word *humiliation* paints a vivid, three dimensional picture. The prisoners of Falstad and the employees in the Twin Towers tragically met perpetrators who perceived them to be arrogating superiority and were cruelly and devastatingly brought down. To avoid such atrocities in the future, we must understand the inner workings of the phenomenon of humiliation, even if it is painful and difficult to step into the perpetrators' shoes.

Whatever language, we always find a downward spatial orientation connected with words that signify humiliation. Consider the words *de-gradation*, *ned-verdigelse* in Norwegian, *Er-niedrig-ung* in German, or *a-baisse-ment* in French. The syllables *de*, *ned*, *niedrig*, and *bas* all mean *down from*, *low*, or *below*. *To put down, degrade, denigrate, debase, demean, derogate, lower, lessen,* or *belittle*, all these words are built on the same spatial, orientational metaphor, namely that something or somebody is pushed down and forcefully there. These spatial metaphors are found in all languages; they are global. This suggests that the mental landscape that entails the vertical scale is global, too.

Figure 1 (as initially developed in Lindner, 2001c) depicts the mental landscape of arrogation, humiliation, and humility. The Aryan *Übermensch* arrogates superiority, defining himself as positioned far above *lesser* beings called *Untermenschen* or *sub*-humans. (*Über* means *above* in German, *unter* means *below*, and *Mensch* means *human being*.) The *Über*mensch is a *higher* human being and the *Unter*mensch a *lesser* human being. In the middle of this mental landscape we can imagine a line of equality, humility, and humbleness – the shared humanity so despised by the Übermensch. The Übermensch lives in a world where human beings differ in value and worth, some are of higher value, others of lesser. The Übermensch puts in place a vertical scale of human worth ranging from *above* to *below*. I call this the *hierarchy of human worthiness*, or the *vertical scale of human worth and value*, or *the vertical scale of human worth*.

The Vertical Scale of Human Worthiness

Master	Top of
*Über*mensch	the
Arrogation	scale
Humility	Line of
	equal dignity
Underling	Bottom of
*Unter*mensch	the
Humiliation	scale

Figure 1: The vertical scale of human worthiness

Our physical environment includes heaven and the blue skies *above*, with the floor of our home *down* at our feet and the basement even *lower*. Below even that is the darkness *down* inside the earth. Why do we organize the world thus in our minds? Perhaps it's the force of gravity that keeps our feet on the ground and suggests a vertical ordering of the physical world. If we were designed to hover about irregularly without gravity keeping us put, we would probably not emphasize the concepts of *up* and *down*.

Objective observers from other parts of the universe may find our preoccupation with up and down a bit silly, asking (quite logically) why we insist that the surface of planet Earth is *down* and the Sun *u*p. Yet, earth-dwellers all share the experience of gravity, so the vertical scale provides a useful common reference frame. It is so much a part of our consciousness that we use it for an unconscious metaphor for good and bad and high and low and apply this scale to the value and worth of things and beings. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) address this activity when they speak about *moral ranking* (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

We apply such rankings to our evaluations of both the abiotic and the biotic worlds. Gold, worth much, is high *up* on the scale of worth and value, silver a little less, dirt is worth little and is somewhere far *down*. When we turn to the biotic world, we see divine powers usually being placed at the absolute top, somewhere in heaven, far *above* humans. The human scale begins just *below* gods and angels. At its "pinnacle" the human scale champions divinely ordained masters and continues downward until it reaches the lowest underlings, who are often seen as of little more value than animals.

Even animals are ranked – many put the lion (the "king of animals") at the top, with "vermin" at the bottom of the scale.

I have not encountered any culture or language on this planet that does not use such rankings. History is full of examples in which the scale of human value was applied literally. Having one's head higher than the emperor's was forbidden in the former

Chinese empire and many others. Even today, we encounter the vertical scale in our lives, minds and hearts. Recently, a business man told me about his visit to Africa. He was trying to hire employees and was annoyed by the way some of the applicants sat during his interviews. One very tall young African man almost slipped out of his chair, exhibiting a bodily sloppiness that seemed to make him unfit for any serious job. It wasn't until the businessman learned that in this African culture it is regarded as unfitting to have one's head higher than a person of older age and rank that he was able to properly interpret the so-called "sloppiness" of his prospective employees as an attempt to show respect, to avoid humiliating their future boss.

We humans use the vertical scale – like we use other tools – without reflecting on it or even being aware of it. This section began a process of heightening awareness of the vertical scale and its often literal expression in our lives. The next section will continue this endeavor.

Lesser and higher beings: the vertical scale as applied to human worth

We all, through the language we learn as children, apply the vertical dimension to our thinking about the relative value of things and beings. This might seem harmless enough, yet it can bring immense suffering and pain. Slavery and Apartheid, for example, stringently institutionalized this vertical ranking. Human rights advocates, on the other hand, aim to dismantle such practices, to collapse the gradient between *top* and *bottom* into *One single line of equal dignity*.

There is nothing automatic about how the vertical scale operates to rank human beings. It is not a natural law, like gravity. The vertical scale's use on human worthiness is purely ideological, dependent upon the worldview or philosophy that individuals and cultures construct for its expression. Some such philosophies accept the scale's use to justify a hierarchical ordering of society. Other such philosophies encourage society's members to meet at a middle line of equal dignity. In the course of human history, innumerable variations on such philosophies have been tried out and disagreements about how the vertical scale should be applied have often been disruptive and harmful.

For many centuries Jews, to give one of many possible examples, had to deal with the accusation that they "arrogate superiority" and needed to be "taught a lesson" about "where they belong." Eastern Europe's pogroms and the Holocaust were fueled by the desire of some extremists to teach the Jews to "come down" and think of themselves as inferior beings. The truth was that these Jews, far from "arrogating superiority," were merely trying to survive. Any impartial observer would see that the accusations against them were wrong, cruel, evil scapegoating.[36] Whatever privileges Jews had acquired were hard-earned or brought about by their exclusion from other ways of living (denial of the right to own land, for example).

We can, therefore, see two opposing applications of the vertical scale. From the Jewish point-of-view there was no arrogation of undue superiority, rather a hard and uphill struggle for life under harsh circumstances. Their persecutors saw a totally different landscape, one that justified atrocities throughout Western history. The interesting point is that the Jews, their tormenters, and uninvolved by-standers all used the same vertical scale, though differently.

Genocide is perhaps the cruelest example of the application of the vertical scale to human beings. Genocide is about killing. However, ugly as that definition is, it is inaccurate. If genocide were merely about killing, bringing victims to death would be "sufficient." (Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond, 2005). Yet, killing is only the last act and there are victims who almost yearn for it. The perpetrators of genocide care much more about humiliating their victims than they do about killing them. In the genocide in Rwanda, grandmothers were forced to parade naked in the streets before being killed and daughters were raped in front of their families. As the following quotations illustrate, victims were willing to pay for bullets and begged to be shot rather than slowly humiliated to death.

There had not been enough guns to go around, and in any case bullets were deemed too expensive for the likes of Tutsis: the ubiquitous flat-bladed machetes (pangas), or any farm or kitchen implement, would do the job just as well. Thus the Rwandan tragedy became one of the few genocides in our century to be accomplished almost entirely without firearms. Indeed, it took many strong and eager arms to carry out the strenuous work of raping, burning, and hacking to death a half-million people (and mutilating many thousands more by slicing off their hands, their breasts, their genitals, or their ears) with pangas, kitchen knives, farm hoes, pitchforks, and hastily improvised spiked clubs (Elliott Leyton (2000) in his report on *Médecins sans Frontières*, Leyton, 2000, p. 3).

Some killers tortured victims, both male and female, physically or psychologically, before finally killing them or leaving them to die. An elderly Tutsi woman in Kibirira commune had her legs cut off and was left to bleed to death. A Hutu man in Cyangugu, known to oppose the MRND-CDR, was killed by having parts of his body cut off, beginning with his extremities. A Tutsi baby was thrown alive into a latrine in Nyamirambo, Kigali, to die of suffocation or hunger. Survivors bear scars of wounds that testify better than words to the brutality with which they were attacked. Assailants tortured Tutsi by demanding that they kill their own children and tormented Hutu married to Tutsi partners by insisting that they kill their spouses. Victims generally regarded being shot as the least painful way to die and, if given the choice and possessing the means, they willingly paid to die that way.

Assailants often stripped victims naked before killing them, both to acquire their clothes without stains or tears and to humiliate them. In many places, killers refused to permit the burial of victims and insisted that their bodies be left to rot where they had fallen. Persons who attempted to give a decent burial to Tutsi were sometimes accused by others of being "accomplices" of the enemy.[37] The Hutu widow of a Tutsi man killed at Mugonero in Kibuye expressed her distress at the violation of Rwandan custom, which is to treat the dead with dignity. Speaking of Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana of the Adventist church, she stated: What gives me grief is that after the pastor had all these people killed, he didn't even see to burying them, including his fellow

pastors. They lay outside for two weeks, eaten by dogs and crows[38]" (Des Forges and Human Rights Watch, 1999, p.119).

Genocide is about humiliating the personal dignity of the victims, denigrating their group to a sub-human level. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 provides a gruesome catalogue of intricate practices designed to *bring down* the victims' dignity. The most literal way of achieving this debasement was, as Human Rights Watch reports, and as I heard described many times, cutting off the legs of tall Tutsi to *shorten* not only their bodies, but "bring down" their alleged *arrogance*,

The verb *to arrogate*, the opposite of the verb *derogate,* is part of the linguistic web of humiliation. Both verbs are built on the Latin verb *rogare*, which means *to ask. Rogare* can be combined with the prefix *de*, which means *down from*, or the prefix *ad*, which means *toward*. To *arrogate superiority* means to appropriate superiority (Latin *to ask toward*), and to *derogate* means to belittle, denigrate, and minimize a person (Latin *to ask down from*). Tutsi were perceived to have *arrogated superiority*, and by cutting their legs *short* they were derogated, cruelly forced to *come down*.

It is extremely important to understand the arbitrariness, the ideological bases, of the application of the vertical scale on human worthiness. There is no "fixed" or "natural" connection between human worthiness and *lesser* and *higher* categorizations. Even though everybody has this scale mentally available, it is a principle, or a tool, that can be used in different ways. One can choose to use this tool to extend a gradient between *lesser* and *higher* beings or one can reject this use, choosing to collect all humankind at *One middle line of equal dignity*. This tool is like a hammer that can be used to hit nails into the wall, or to pry them out. It is a tool that is always there even when some of its potential uses are outlawed. Those who consider the vertical ranking of human worth legitimate regard humiliation as morally justified humbling. Their thinking is: "I degrade you, I push you down the scale of human worth and value, and you deserve it and better accept it." Those who regard such ranking as illegitimate, say, "You are being degraded, pushed down the scale of human worth and value, however, you do not deserve it and must not accept it."

A note of hope at the end of this section: The vertical scale is much more than a source of suffering. It can also generate wonderful wisdom, based on humility. To use the hammer metaphor, humiliation equates with hitting nails into the wall, and humility with prying them out again. Adolf Hitler stands for cruel humiliation and Nelson Mandela for wise humility. In the following chapters, we will delve a little deeper into the workings of the vertical scale and the extent to which it permeates and determines our lives.

Summary

This section highlighted the fact that the vertical scale is a tool that has been used to rank human worth and value throughout human history, sometimes in horrific ways. We also made the point that this use is not compulsory. It can be rejected.

The entire chapter was designed to sharpen the reader's comprehension of the fact that a vertical scale may be applied to human worth and value in many ways – it can generate

rigid caste systems or it can generate a sense of the equal dignity and brotherhood of all humans.

The following three chapters will spell out how the vertical scale has been applied throughout human history. Later, we'll talk about what this means for our contemporary lives.

Related reading

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe orientational metaphors as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. Humiliation clearly is down. "These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial environment: for example, HAPPY IS UP" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 14, capitalization in original). If up is happy, then down must be unhappy: being put down thus makes unhappy. No empirical research should be necessary to find this – Smedslund's argument seems perfectly correct – the analysis of the utilized metaphors suffices. And since the same metaphors are used in many languages, perhaps in all languages, no research except linguistics is necessary to claim that "being put down" has the potential to cause unhappiness in all cultures.

Chapter 2: Humiliation as "Honorable Medicine": The Old Order

(Debbie: Looks at the 'normalcy' with which the scaling of human worth has been regarded as legitimate across history; the humiliation/violence that results.)

Nazi Germany is not the only society that operated on the assumption that it is legitimate to rank humans as beings of more or less worth and value, although Nazi culture exhibited unusual cruelty in the way it implemented its belief in the variable worth of its members. The Holocaust was of unspeakable horror. The vertical scale was applied so as to push certain categories of people out of humanity entirely, into the abyss of "sub-human vermin." Other genocidal killers, as well, have dehumanized their victims, labeling them as vermin and pests. In Rwanda, in 1994, the Tutsi were humiliated as "cockroaches," or "inyenzi."

However, I do not want to discuss the unspeakable cruelty of ranking people as sub-human at this point. I would like to shed light on something perhaps even more difficult to accept, namely the *normalcy* with which the vertical scaling of human worth was regarded as legitimate throughout human history. For thousands of years, humanity believed in hierarchically ordering human value, calling it the *order of nature* or *divine order*. The cradle of democracy, the Greek city state of about 2,000 years ago, was adamant that women and slaves could not have a voice. Closer to our own time, the *American Declaration of Independence*, which stipulated that "all men [sic] are created equal and have "unalienable rights" to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," was signed by people who owned slaves.

Know your place! How humiliation can lack the connotation of violation

Human history may be interpreted as a discourse circling around questions concerning the vertical scale: whether and how the vertical scale is known to people, whether they are aware they have a choice in applying it, and to what extent they believe it is legitimate to apply it.

For millions of years, hominids evolving towards Homo sapiens roamed the globe as hunters and gatherers. They lived in small bands of approximately 200 individuals who enjoyed rather egalitarian societal institutions and remarkably high qualities of life. There is no proof of organized fighting among hunters and gatherers (Ury, 1999). "The Hobbesian view of humans in a constant state of 'Warre' is simply not supported by the archaeological record" (Haas, 1998, p. 8).The absence of evidence for homicide does not mean that it did not occur, but it would be safe to posit that organized killing did not occur until much later (suggesting that "man" is perhaps not aggressive by nature, but rather by circumstance).

It is certainly wrong-headed to idealize hunters and gatherers or to romanticize them as harmonious golden age dwellers. Yet, in the face of dissonance, conflict, disharmony, disease, or danger, their core ethos, their core moral sentiment seems to have been egalitarian. In other words, human worth and value was not ranked hierarchically in any deep institutionalized form. Every individual faced the world more or less from a stance

of pristine pride. Throughout approximately ninety percent of human history, hunters and gatherers populated the planet at their leisure.

However, there came a time when they were confronted with the fact that the globe has a limited surface and that abundance was not guaranteed. In some ways we could call this "hitting of the wall" humankind's *first round of globalization* – the species had managed to populate the entire globe, or at least the known and easily habitable parts of it. Anthropologists call this set of circumstances *circumscription*.[39]

Circumscription meant that there was no longer enough – not enough space and not enough resources. Our planet is small and gives the illusion of being unlimited only as long as one has not yet reached its limits. Though the problem had been building up slowly over many prehistoric eons, it reached a critical moment at one very "brief" historic moment, namely when the global climate changed dramatically 11,600 years ago. The Pleistocene's last ice age ended and the Holocene[40] period of relatively warm, wet, stable, CO2 rich environment began.

However, Homo sapiens had developed specific toolkits over a long time and were pre-adapted, thus "prepared." When sudden climatic change transformed the planet, many scholars agree, the practice agriculture over a large fraction of its surface began. "The spread of agriculture throughout the world resulted from a single, strong, manipulation" (Richerson, Boyd, and Bettinger, 1999, p. 2).

The emergence of a supportive environment enabled the experiment of intensification, the domestication of plants and animal. Through intensification, human populations were able to increase their resources when the old method of simply wandering off into untouched abundance was no longer feasible. (Some populations chose a second alternative – that of raiding their neighbors. This alternative will be discussed further down.) Through the environmentally stimulated adaptation of agriculture and intensifications, humans began to *subdue* the Earth. We read in the Bible, Genesis 1:28 (New International Version of the Bible): "God blessed them and said to them, 'Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the Earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.'" In other words, for 10,000 years (until very recently) humankind was profoundly satisfied with its agrarian survival strategy, convinced that it was following divine order.

Zygmunt Bauman (1992) writes that from the time humans began to practice agriculture, nature – the entire unprocessed, pristine world – became our enemy. "…the world of nature…had to be beheaded and deprived of autonomous will and power of resistance…The world was an object of willed action: a raw material in the work guided and given form by human designs…Left to itself, the world had no meaning. It was solely the human design that injected it with a sense of purpose. So the earth became a repository of ores and other 'natural resources,' wood turned into timber and water – depending on circumstances – into an energy source, waterway or the solvent of waste" (Bauman, 1992, x-xi).[41]

Humiliation as "Honorable Medicine"

Following Baumann's logic, we can see that humans began to turn other humans into underlings and slaves in the same way they turned *wood* into *timber*. *Intensification* set off a chain of events that slowly evolved into an increasingly stark vertical scale of human value, or power distance, with *higher* beings, the *masters*, at the *top* and *lesser* beings, the slaves and *under*lings, at the *bottom*. For the period of the last 10,000 years this order defined most communities and societies.

   This hierarchical order was regarded as profoundly legitimate, either divinely ordained or prescribed by nature. It was held dear as the backbone of civilization and its maintenance was deemed to be indispensable for human life. Within an hierarchical order, "holding down" underlings is deemed a necessary injury inflicted on lower beings, lest they forget their position and disturb the holy order. Surgery hurts but must be endured because it is "good for you," so oppression "had" to be perpetrated and the accompanying pain accepted.

   Maintaining the hierarchical gradient was hard work, but those involved were convinced that the efforts were well invested. If you did not hold your subordinates in their *sub* position, you risked being called *lazy*. The "lazy kings" (les rois fainéants) of the sixth and seventh centuries in France, for example, were ridiculed because they allowed their immediate subordinates, the "maires du palais," the managers of the palace, to usurp power. One of these "maires du palais" indeed eventually took over the throne in the year 751.

   Marvin Harris (1997) provides a description of the laborious task of keeping a vertical ranking of human worthiness in place. He writes about the necessity of having "specialists" who perform ideological services in support of the status quo:

> The elaborate religions of the Inca, Aztecs, ancient Egyptians, and other nonindustrial civilizations sanctified the privileges and powers of the ruling elite. They upheld the doctrine of the divine descent of the Inca and the pharaoh and taught that the balance and continuity of the universe required the subordination of commoners to persons of noble and divine birth. Among the Aztecs, the priests were convinced and sought to convince others that the gods must be nourished with human blood. They personally pulled out the beating hearts of the state's prisoners of war on top of Tenochtitlán's pyramids. In many states, religion has been used to condition masses of people to accept deprivation, to look forward to material rewards in the afterlife, and to be grateful for small favors from superiors lest ingratitude call down a fiery retribution in this life or in a hell to come (Harris, 1997, p. 299).

Seduction, as well as coercion, was used, according to Harris. "A considerable amount of conformity can be achieved by inviting the ruled to identify with the governing elite and to enjoy vicariously the pomp of state occasions. Public spectacles such as religious processions, coronations, and victory parades work against the alienating effects of poverty and exploitation. In Rome, the masses were controlled by encouraging them to watch gladiators, chariot races, circuses, and other mass spectator events." (Harris, 1997, p. 299-300).[42]

Thus the *normalcy* of the vertical scale's application as legitimate social classification system of human worthiness began roughly ten thousand years ago with the invention of agriculture (Ury, 1999) and in subsequent *civilizations* as they emerged in Mesopotamia, along the Nile and many other places. In his book *Early Civilizations*, Bruce Trigger (1993) reminds us that "because of the pervasiveness of inequality, no one who lived in the early civilizations questioned the normalcy of this condition. If egalitarianism was known, it was as a feature of some of the despised, barbarian societies that existed beyond the borders of the 'civilized' world" (Trigger, 1993, p. 52). During long stretches of human history that inequality – the vertical ranking of human worth – was much more than a reluctantly tolerated evil; it was hailed as the very core of civilization. Equality was "barbaric."

Once low, always low! Peripheral characteristics can be ranked and essentialized

I prefer to use the term *vertical ranking of human worth and value,* rather than *inequality*, *hierarchy*, or *stratification*. The significant point for my discussion is not the absence or presence of hierarchy, inequality or stratification, but the ranking of human worth. Hierarchy, inequality and stratification can very well coexist with the absence of ranking. Robert W. Fuller (2003) describes this in his book *Somebodies and Nobodies* (Fuller, 2003) According to Fuller, humiliation is not the *use* of rank, but the *abuse* of rank. The pilot in a plane or the captain of a ship are masters over their passengers when in the sky or at high sea. Clear hierarchy and stark inequality characterize these situations. The pilot and the captain, however, need *not* look down on their passengers as *lesser* beings.

In other words, using concepts such as hierarchy, inequality or stratification, could be somewhat misleading, inviting objections such as, "There have always been differences between people! Human beings have never been the same and never will be! Are you a dreamer who believes that we could or should all to be the same? This is not only impossible, but boring!" Such objections are irrelevant to the discussion of this book and represent a grave miscomprehension of its focus, which is the way how human worth and value can be ranked or not. Diversity and difference can, without a problem, go with sameness of value and worth; there is no automatic mechanism that necessarily links diversity and difference to rankings. The vertical scale of human worth is conceptually independent of hierarchy, inequality or stratification.

A system that condones the vertical scale of human value *essentializes* hierarchy, inequality, and stratification. In such a social framework, a street sweeper not only does a lowly *job*, the lowliness of the task is essentialized as inner core of his entire being: He or she *is* a lowly *person*. Something that could very well be peripheral to this person's essence, namely the task of sweeping the street, is turned into her core definition: this person is deemed to be of lower human value and worth. This essentialization is what we find in many, if not most, traditional societies. A street sweeper and a bank director could very well be seen as fellow human beings of equal dignity, differentiated only by their occupations. However, in traditional societies, this basically neutral difference is ranked as *lesser* and *higher*. *My Fair Lady*, the musical, illustrates beautifully how Professor Higgins regards the poor flower girl Elisa as a *lower human being*, even after she has learned *higher manners*. Her essence, in his view, is fixed in lowliness through her initial

poor status in society. For Professor Higgins nothing can turn Elisa into a human being of worthiness equal to him and his class.

Affaire d'honneur! Honor is nothing but ranked pride and dignity

The concept of *honor* was, and still is, linked to the vertical scale. The German SS officers under Hitler learned that humiliating "Untermenschen," holding them to the ground, sometimes literally, was an honorable and noble duty. "Meine Ehre heißt Treue" or "my honor is loyalty," was the German motto, loyalty to the "Führer's" vision of a world of Aryan Übermenschen. Young German soldiers in Falstad, together with millions of Germans, were imbued with the ideology that pushing and holding down those who "belonged" below was their honorable obligation. An officer who disobeyed this mandate would not only risk losing his life, he would be risking the loss of his honor. Obedience to the "Führer's" will was his supreme honorable duty, not merely for the sake of his immediate superordinates or political leaders, but for the sake of the entire German people, even (in his mind) of the global order as a whole. The Aryan race was the savior of the world and young German soldiers learned that it was their highest duty to safeguard Aryan superiority and secure a bright future for the entire globe.

During long stretches of history, humiliation was reason enough for honorable gentlemen to risk their lives in duels or duel-like wars. In America, around 1800, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Aaron Burr entertained virulent animosities against each other. At some point Burr demanded satisfaction for insults he felt he had endured from Hamilton. Hamilton hesitated, but finally acquiesced to Burr's desire, writing to his wife Elisabeth that he would have liked to avoid this duel, but he could not because to do so would make him unworthy of her esteem. On July 11, 1804, the duel took place. Hamilton intentionally missed his shot, refusing to kill Burr, possibly expecting the same gentleman's decency from his adversary. Burr, however, shot Hamilton in the stomach and Hamilton died painfully next day (Fleming, 1999). Hamilton's experience illustrates that a man who wanted to remain in public esteem had to conform to the code of honor, regardless of what his personal feelings for his adversary might be. Burr was passionate in his hatred, Hamilton was not. But, under the code of honor, Hamilton had no choice and he paid with his life.

Honor was not only inescapable, but also ranked. Aristocrats had *more* honor than other people, but everybody cared for the honor allotted to him in the appropriate way. Thomas Scheff, researcher on the sociology of emotions, tells a story in Yiddish and English that illustrates how the honor of masters was not the same as the honor of underlings (2002 in Oslo). "Two Jews get into a fight," Tom recounts. "Neither manages to win the quarrel. Finally, they agree to have a duel." This, explains Tom, is the first joke, because duels were something for aristocrats, not for such insignificant underlings as Jews. "Next morning, before dawn, one of the opponents arrives at the little clearing in the forest where the duel was to take place. There he waits. He waits. And he waits. His opponent does not come. He simply does not show up! Finally, a messenger arrives with a note from the opponent saying he is late and that the other should start without him!"

In traditional honor-based societies, each social stratum, be it called caste, class, group, or sub-group, cultivates indigenous idiosyncratic sets of honor definitions related

to the vertical scale. The honor of a slave is different from the honor of a master, but both defend their honor against attempts to humiliate them, to bring them lower. The servant or slave who works in the emperor's private suite attaches his honor to this important rank and resists being degraded to the quarries (note the words *servant* and *to serve* stem from the Latin word *servus,* meaning *slave*). The master, equally, resists being debased into the second rank; he only succumbs if otherwise he would be debased even further.

Honor is a more collective feeling and institution than pristine pride or dignity. It is a learned response to institutionalized pressures. Honor is worn like armor and people may defend their group's honor against humiliators (for example in duels) merely as a duty (as Hamilton did), without feeling much personal emotion. I once counseled an Egyptian lawyer who had studied in Europe and almost forgotten his roots in the Egyptian countryside where blood feuds were common. One day, to his great surprise and shock, he was visited by villagers who told him that he was next in line to be killed. He neither knew why nor by whom. He had not done anything to elicit other people's hatred. His place in the genealogy of his village was sufficient to give him a place in the honor game.

Honor, furthermore, is linked to gender. In an honor society,[43] men are defined as the principal actors, no matter how functionally important female activities might be. He is the *actor*, she is his *object*. He is the defender of honor. He is defined as responsible, self-reflexive, and rational. He is expected to protect *his* women, at least as long as he values them as a *resource*, as prizes and symbols of *his* honor, or as mothers of *his* children. A woman who lives in an honor society learns that she either is not a human being at all or a lowly human being. In the first case, she is perceived as a passive recipient of male actions, as "material" to be used or thrown away by him; she is on the same level as household items or domesticated animals. Also in the second case she is seen as a passive recipient, this time on a level with children or slaves. It is therefore, in blood feud societies, that she can move freely around, only men are "worthy" of being killed "honorably," not women.

Some honor cultures in the Arab world and Africa regard the woman's hymen as a symbol of the family's honor. This is one justification for the practice of female genital mutilation – through this practice, the family's honor (in which she shares) is "protected." In many traditional honor societies, a female is a token, or representative, of the family or group to which she belongs. Daughters or sisters are valued as "gifts" for marriage into other families *her* males want as allies. Only "undamaged," "honorable" girls make honorable gifts.

In conclusion, honor is a form of ranked pride or dignity, with every stratum in a hierarchical society having its own honor code. Honor, unlike pride and dignity, is often played out as a group phenomenon – usually heavily gendered – more than an individual feeling. People may even find themselves caught in games of honor beyond their control – affaires d'honneur important to their group without themselves identifying much with these affaires as individuals.

Don't complain! Pain of humiliation can be accepted as "prosocial suffering"

In social and societal structures of honor, any pain or suffering endured by those near or at the bottom of the pyramid of power is deemed to be *necessary pain* or even *prosocial*

suffering. For thousands of years, the suffering of underlings was regarded as "good" for them and for the health of society as a whole. Vaccinations or surgical operations, albeit painful, are accepted as "good" for patients. Similarly, underlings' pain was seen as "good" for society by those subscribing to the vertical scale of human value, including many of the underlings themselves.

Jeanne D'Haem (1997) wrote a very sensitive book, *The Last Camel. True Stories of Somalia* (D'Haem, 1997), in which she describes what I also found during my fieldwork in Somalia. As a Peace Corps volunteer in a small Somalian village in 1968, D'Haem had a neighbor who was forced to support herself and her child through prostitution. At the age of 40, she met a man who fell in love with her and was willing to marry her as his second wife. She was very fond of this man and thrilled by the prospect of marriage. To mark this new step toward a better future, she committed a highly symbolic act. She had herself "closed up" (the vagina sewed up so only urine could pass through) as if she was a virgin. Her husband had to open her up in the wedding night with the force of his member. The pain of all the procedures and the agonizing reopening did not deter her since she was convinced that short-term pain would safeguard a happy future. And since she sincerely believed in the worldview of her social environment, namely that female genital mutilation is not a mutilation but a symbol of honor, the procedure did, indeed, make her proud and confident.

However, during my research, I met a woman from the Somali Diaspora who had developed a deeply contrasting worldview. At a conference in Finland in 1998 she said:

> I feel that female circumcision is a humiliation carried out and justified by my culture. Please do not accept that part of my culture – on the contrary, help me change this! Do not cover up for the wrongdoings of my culture just for the sake of wanting to recognize and respect Somali culture![44]

Not many months later in Somalia, I met two young women who had recently returned to Somalia from England with their parents who despised the practice of genital mutilation and had refused to have their girls "closed." Yet, instead of bringing liberation, their condition was a source of great social pain to the girls. They told me that they were treated as if they had leprosy and made to feel as if they were prostitutes. Merely going out and buying bread was agony. Desperate, they decided to pay for an operation against the will of their parents. The argument that this operation represented a painful humiliation had no effect on them. So, these two girls sided with the conceptualization of female genital mutilation of Jeanne D'Haem's neighbor.

The concept of a *just war* is another example of the idea that short-term pain can bring long-term benefits. All the pain elicited in the 2003 war in Iraq was deemed by many as regrettable but prosocial, a necessary prelude to a better future.

More so, there have been situations throughout history in which pain was valued on *its own account*, not just as regrettable yet necessary side effect. Medieval flagellants were happy to whip themselves, to lower their bodies to the ground and crawl on their knees for miles. They inflicted these, and worse, humiliations on themselves as acts of penance, to advance themselves morally and to honor God, demonstrating the sincerity of their reverence. Through such self-lowering they reckoned they climbed up on the human

ranking scale, up, nearer divinity. They wished to gain worth and value through closeness to God. Their self-inflicted humiliation elevated them on the vertical scale.

Such practices can still be found today, as, for example, in current Shia celebrations. Bowing to divinity enhances one's moral standing and reputation as long as the object of worship is a widely-accepted divinity and not some obscure sectarian guru (bowing to a kitchen knife, or other trivial objects, would be ridiculous and bring the practitioners to a madhouse rather than boost their reputation). The Christian God is believed to have reached out to humans by giving his son through the most humiliating death available at the time, namely crucifixion. God lowered himself so as to connect to humanity.

Stockholm syndrome! Lowliness can be widely accepted

Throughout history, underlings accepted their lowly lot, often even defending it. Women, for example, kept their heads down for large parts of human history. In Europe, women risked being branded, punished, and even burnt as witches if they dared to arrogate more importance than was "due" them. A woman had to "know her place." She was not supposed to define her lowly condition as humiliation in the sense of violation. On the contrary, she was expected to accept it with "due humbleness," and "female modesty." It was her "honor" to be of service. Her duty, she taught her daughters, was to "respect" this order, not humiliate it by disobedience. Rebellion against female lowliness was regarded as disrespectful to the overall order.

Many women internalized these rules, believing that they represented the right order of the universe. It would be a mistake to believe that only men accused women of failing in modesty, women kept each other down as well. In the last years of Queen Elizabeth I, up to 53 per cent of all charges against witches were made by other women. (Jones, 2000, p. 206). In large parts of the world, women still today believe that they are born inferior.

The history of former slaves or colonized or minority peoples is full of examples of acceptance of inferiority. A member of a low caste in India might see her fate as God's will that should not be opposed. Many colonized *subjects* (*jacere* is Latin for *to throw*, and the prefix, *sub* means *under*) deemed their colonizers to be more "civilized." Many yearned to become "more French than the French," or "more British than the British." Frantz Fanon (1986) wrote a book entitled *Black Skin, White Masks*, where he describes how he was once very proud of being almost "French," of climbing *up* the vertical scale of human value (Fanon, 1986). What he initially overlooked was that his pride validated his former lowliness. You cannot be proud of being *up* without judging your former status as *down*.

There are many terms describing this *identification with the oppressor*. *Learned helplessness* is "a term coined by Martin Seligman to define that helplessness that is a learned state produced by exposure to noxious, unpleasant situations in which there is no possibility of escape or avoidance" (The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology, Reber, 1995). Likewise, the *Stockholm syndrome* is "an emotional bond between hostages and their captors, frequently observed when the hostages are held for long periods of time under emotionally straining circumstances. The name derives from the instance when it was first publicly noted, when a group of hostages was held by robbers in a Stockholm bank for five days" (Reber, 1995). *Identification with the oppressor* is not always an

individual process; it can also be a societal process. As discussed before, many underlings turned their lowliness into a "culture." Johan Galtung's notion of *penetration*, or "implanting the top dog inside the underdog" (Galtung, 1996, p. 199), illustrates the fact that acceptance of subjugation may become a culture of its own. Ranajit Guha's understanding of the term *subaltern* also points at this process (Guha and Spivak (Eds.), 1988).

However, it would be arrogant to frame underlings as passive victims. Lowliness and helplessness can also be displayed out of conviction. As discussed before, many underlings accepted their lot as God's will or nature's order. They were not coerced or seduced into believing in their own lowliness; they shared their superiors' views on the legitimacy of ranking human essence in a way that turned them into lesser beings.

Break the will of the child! Parents can reproduce underlings

Parents were central to the reproduction of obedient underlings. Alice Miller (1983) spelled out how, in the period that lead up to the two World Wars, leading pedagogues regarded *breaking the will of the child* as an essential part of responsible childrearing.[45] Lakoff and Johnson (1999) describe this philosophy as the *Strict Father model* (as opposed to the *Nurturant Parent model*.)

> The father has authority to determine the policy that governs the family. He has moral authority and his commands are to be obeyed. He teaches his children right from wrong by setting strict rules for their behavior and by setting a moral example in his own life. He enforces these moral rules by reward and punishment. The father also gains his children's cooperation by showing love and by appreciating them when they obey the rules. But children must not be coddled, lest they become spoiled. A spoiled child lacks the appropriate moral values and the moral strength and discipline to live independently and meet life's challenges. The mother has day-to-day responsibility for the care of the household, raising the children; and upholding the father's authority. Love and nurturance are a vital part of family life, but they should never outweigh parental authority, which is an expression of love and nurturance – tough love. As children mature, the virtues of respect for moral authority, self reliance, and self-discipline allow them to incorporate their father's moral values, empowering them to be self-governing and self-legislating (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp. 313-314).

The result is described as follows:

> Evidence from three areas of psychological research – attachment theory, socialization theory, and family violence studies – shows that the Strict Father model …"tends to produce children who are dependent on the authority of others, cannot chart their own moral course very well, have less of a conscience, are less respectful of others, and have no greater ability to resist temptations" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 327).

Thus, the *Strict Father model* seems to produce what Theodor Adorno called the *authoritarian personality* whose principal characteristic is obedience and a willingness to blindly following orders, irrespective of their moral contents (Adorno et al., 1950).

John came to my clinic because he was desperately lonely. He had recently retired and felt that life had been in vain. He told me:

 My father always repressed me. I was never good enough for him. He put me down wherever he could. He thought parental love means "making the boy tough." He used to say, "What will not kill him, will make him strong." I am surprised that he even fed me. In hindsight, I would have preferred he had starved me to death. I learned from him to either look up or down on people and I developed a taste for the latter. My main concern was to push down people who were better than I. I studied them until I could subjugate them. In the course of about twenty years, I became the president of a large international corporation. I was ruthless. I spotted my "enemies'" weaknesses – I mean of course my colleagues' weaknesses – almost immediately. When a colleague was better than me, I was consumed by the need to "kill him." I had to be the only one.

My wife left me and my children do not even send me birthday cards. When I was working, I did not mind. Since I retired, I have realized that I never learned to enjoy being equal with another person. I never learned to create friendship or love. I love my car, my dog, and my luxurious house. But have I ever loved another human being, apart from idolizing Superman symbols? There is this automatic reflex in me to measure my *opponents* – you see, for me there are never *interlocutors* – for their strengths and weaknesses. My aim is not to enjoy their company but to get on top of them. I am the ultimate humiliator. I am obsessed with dominance. I cannot relax until I am the master.

All that brought me loneliness and utter emptiness. I succeeded, I was the boss, but for what? Is this the meaning of life? Shall I write on my grave stone "Here rests the man who could bite like a dog?" Although I was the boss, I was a slave. I blindly obeyed some cold law of supremacy. I am no longer proud of my life.

Be "civilized"! How humiliation may elicit shame and humility

Earlier I mentioned humility and humbleness and their place vis-à-vis humiliation in the mental landscape of the vertical scale of human worth. Norbert Elias (1994) describes this in his seminal book *The Civilizing Process* (Elias, 1994). Durkheim, Marx, Weber and historians such as Marc Bloch developed similar lines of reasoning. Elias explains that the process of subjugation may have had a civilizing effect on rough and haughty knights, lords, and commoners. He studied the French court and how feudal lords were seduced into bowing to the absolute ruler. Unruly, proud local warlords were "civilized" by being taught the lessons of shame. According to Elias, pacified and civilized people learn to feel embarrassed; they learn "social anxiety." The *civilized habitus* that Elias describes could also be called the "successfully humiliated habitus"(Smith, 2001). The French court, the Indian caste system, the Chinese system of kowtowing and the Japanese bow all express and reinforce strong hierarchies, all constructed around practices of ritual humiliation.

Habitus is a Latin word meaning *character* or *appearance*. The civilized habitus is a habitus of self-control and detachment that emerges, as Smith (2001) writes, "as a consequence of humiliation mechanisms – ranging from massacres to verbal insults – employed to create and maintain social hierarchies. The humiliated habitus is consistent with intense self-discipline. For example, slaves try to avoid visible behaviour that would prompt masters to punish them" (Smith, 2001, p. 2).

Does this mean that humiliating people is a good thing? That it promotes peace? What is the relationship between shame, humiliation and humbling here?

Shame can be defined as a humbling experience a person agrees to; humiliation are those experiences a person does not agree to. Shame seems to be lowering accepted by the receiver and interpreted as due humbling. A "civilized" person might blush when he breaks wind inadvertently. He might feel ashamed even if nobody notices because he has learned to subscribe to the notion that farting is a transgression of decent civilized behavior.

Human beings are intersubjective beings, we see ourselves as others see us, and we can either feel pride or shame when we look at ourselves with others' eyes. Many people have nightmares of strangers standing above them, laughing and ridiculing them, while they lie naked on the floor in their excrements (not surprisingly, this horror dream is a script for torture). Torture uses feelings of shame to humiliate its victims and it uses humiliation to create shame. Torturers can shame victims to attain their goals precisely because shame is widely regarded as an asset. A human being incapable of shame is seen as a monster. Shame is what keeps us within the limits of the social contract. We all hope that shame will deter our neighbors from lying to us and stealing from us. We trust that our neighbor will feel guilty, feel moral shame, and not have an affair with our spouse. We all hope that our neighbors will bow in humility to the rules that make it possible for us to live in community with one another. We hope that shame and guilt will limit social disruption.

Thus, shame, guilt and humility all have prosocial aspects. Humility has been enshrined in most religions as a necessary virtue to spiritual development. All three are associated with the action of bowing. Arrogant people believe they can reach the sky and do what is not possible to normal mortals. Humble people, on the other hand, recognize

that there are limits. Shaming may thus work for the good of the larger society. Corporations and governments are often "shamed" into abiding by the promises of humility they made. They are asked if they are not ashamed of cutting down the trees that are the backbone of a healthy global climate, of destroying bio-diversity, the very gene pool that may one day provide humankind with all the medicine it will ever need. In other words, one person may feel ashamed and humbled without feeling humiliated; another person may feel humiliated but not ashamed. Shame can take either of two pathways – the path of self-humiliation and self-destructive depression or the prosocial path of self-humbling and allowing oneself to grow into a more mature human being.

Summary

- During long stretches of history it was almost universally accepted as the *normal order of things* that human beings were ranked along a vertical scale, with those of *more* worth at the *top* and those of *less* value at the *bottom*.
- In an honor society, each level has its own honor. *To humiliate* means maintaining this hierarchical order by "reminding" those further down of their "due" place.
- Humiliation was a universally accepted and honorable tool – and still is in many places – to keep *stability, law and order*, which was the order of vertically ranking human value and essence.
- Many an underling assisted by voluntary self- humiliation, wrapped in various definitions of honor.

Related reading

Nisbett and Cohen (1996) examine an *honor-based notion* of *humiliation*.[46] The honor to which Cohen and Nisbett refer is the kind that operates in the more traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in *blood feuds*.[47]

   William Ian Miller (1993) wrote a book entitled *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence*, where he links humiliation to honor as understood in *The Iliad* or *Icelandic sagas*, namely humiliation as violation of honor. Miller explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Miller suggests, "that we are more familiar with the culture of honor than we may like to admit. This familiarity partially explains why stories of revenge play so well, whether read as *The Iliad*, an Icelandic saga, *Hamlet*, many novels, or seen as so many gangland, intergalactic, horror, or Clint Eastwood movies. Honor is not our official ideology, but its ethic survives in pockets of most all our lives. In some ethnic (sub)cultures it still is the official ideology, or at least so we are told about the cultures of some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, and so on. And even among the suburban middle class the honor ethic is lived in high school or in the competitive rat race of certain professional cultures" (Miller, 1993, p. 9).

   Read in Dennis Smith, 1999, on Bauman's analysis and how it overlaps with the approaches of critical theory (e.g. Adorno and Habermas) and post-structuralism (e.g. Foucault and Lyotard) but cannot be fully aligned with either.

Read furthermore on hunters and gatherers and their rather harmonious societal structures,[48] *circumscription*,[49] on *women* as *objects*,[50] on the practice of *exchanging women* between groups,[51] on *just war*,[52] on *oppression* and the *psychology of oppression*,[53] "*civilized oppression*,"[54] on *learned helplessness*,[55] on subaltern studies,[56] on the *authoritarian personality*,[57] on *crimes of obedience*,[58] on Elias and *civilized* people who learn to feel *embarrassed*[59] and acquire *social anxiety*,[60] and read more on *shame*.[61]

Humiliation as Painful Violation of Dignity: The New Order of Dignity

A slave who lives in a world where beating slaves is seen as part of the divine order does not suffer the same emotional pain as an individual who lives in a more liberal culture might suffer after incurring a beating. Likewise, a woman who lives in a culture where it is codified by law that husbands ought to beat disobedient wives does not endure the same painful emotions a battered wife in a culture that values female autonomy might endures.

Norway ranks Number One on the Gender-related Development Index, GDI.[62] Nevertheless, as recently as the end of the 19th century, Norwegian law gave husbands the right to beat insubordinate wives. Which effect do such *legitimizing myths* (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) have? *Cognitive appraisal theory of emotions* addresses this question.

In a culture that legitimizes wife-beating, a disobedient wife is regarded as sinning against her husband and against the whole social order. It is thus possible that such a wife accepts the pain of the beating because she regards it as justified and prosocial pain. It is likely, in fact, that a huge amount of humiliation has been endured quietly by human beings throughout history for precisely this reason.

In long-standing hierarchical societies, the underling and master relationship is static – both believe their relationship to be the natural order of things. Underlings may be happy or unhappy, but they do not view their inferior status as a significant variable in their happiness equation. They accept their position in the same way they accept that some people are taller than others, that time passes, or that we grow old and die. People may not be happy about these facts of life, but there is little any of us can do about them.

In conclusion, a person cannot be humiliated in the sense of hurtful violation as long as she agrees to be lowered or lowers herself, even if this degradation is extremely painful. This is particularly true when the degradation occurs within a wider social context that acknowledges the validity of ranking human beings on a vertical scale.

The discussion in this book highlights the different ways in which suffering can be processed – as *unavoidable pain similar to natural disaster, as necessary pain similar to medical treatment*, or as *torment that is unduly inflicted and should stop.*

Many of my female clients (and some male ones, as well) are caught in a struggle against "prescribed lowliness." Eighteen-year-old Nadia was regularly beaten by her mother, who shouted: "Why did we send you to school to give you haughty ideas. So you could forget the rightful place of a woman. We should never have sent you to school! A woman bears her husband's children and obeys him! That is her role! Stop whining!"

Stop! How humiliation means violation

William Ian Miller (1996)[63] informs us that "the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757." In other words, in the English-speaking world, humiliation was not seen as hurtful until about 250 years ago. English-speaking people were not isolated in their attitudes. For millennia, people around the world believed that it was normal and

morally correct to have masters and underlings, and that masters were entitled to be treated as *higher* beings and underlings deserved to be shown "where they belonged." Even when underlings rebelled, it was to replace the master rather than to dismantle the hierarchy.

The emergence of the modern meaning of the word *humiliation* (1757) co-occurs roughly with the *invention of the self*. The author of *The Invention of the Self*, John O. Lyons (1978) analyzed travelers' descriptions of their experiences and found that around 1750 the authors began to insert themselves as subjects with a personal perspective on what they observed.[64] This change closely preceded the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) and the French Revolution (August 4, 1789), rallying points for the development of the human rights movement. Undoubtedly, the ideas that culminated in today's concepts of human rights predate 1757. Religions such as Christianity and Islam teach ideals of equality. However, these ideals did not move to forefront of Western consciousness until about 250 years ago.

Human rights ideals are not the sole property of the West, but, I propose, the West was the first region to be impacted by what I call the second round of *globalization*, which brought about a new set of global realities. Those realities eroded the old *age of honor and fear* and gave way to the new *age of dignity and humiliation*. The new moral sentiment condemns handling fellow human beings in ways that degrade their innate value. Self-empowered, dignified individuals are the ideal of the new human rights paradigm. Individuals operating within this paradigm are encouraged to stand up in civil disobedience if blackmailed and extorted by fear. This new dignified individual easily feels humiliated if equal dignity is violated, producing a new kind of defiance.

After 10,000 years of hierarchical domination, a very sudden and very major transition occurred, marked by the 1757 change of the meaning of the word *humiliation*. The new *Zeitgeist* urges the dismantling of the vertical scale on human worth. What masters and underlings once colluded in calling *benevolent patronage* is now criticized as *brutal domination*. Virtually nowhere in the modern world is *subjugating* people, *putting/pushing/holding down* people, even if done, regarded as reason for pride and satisfaction anymore today.

William Ury, an anthropologist and director of the *Harvard University Project on Preventing War,* drew up *a simplified depiction of history*, see Table 1. In this effort, he pulls together elements from *anthropology, game theory* and *conflict studies* to describe three major types of society: *simple hunter-gatherers*, *complex agriculturists*, and the current *knowledge society*. In Ury's system, simple hunter-gatherers live in a world of coexistence and open networks, within which conflicts are negotiated, rather than addressed by coercion. The abundance of wild food represents an expandable pie of resources that does not force opponents into win-lose paradigms. Complex agriculturalists, on the other hand, live in a world of coercion. They lead their lives within closed hierarchical pyramids of power on land that represents a fixed pie and pushes antagonists into win-lose situations governed by strict rules.

Knowledge society resembles the hunter-gather model because the pie of resources – knowledge – appears to be infinitely expandable, lending itself to win-win conflict solutions. This type of society rejects the tightly-knit hierarchical structure in favor of the open network espoused by our earliest ancestors. Negotiation and contract replace command-lines and coexistence is the primary strategy.

A Simplified Depiction of History

Type of Society: Conditions:	Simple hunter-gatherers	Complex agriculturists	Knowledge Society
Basic resource	Expandable pie (wild foods)	Fixed pie (land & power)	Expandable pie (knowledge)
Basic logic of conflict	Both-gain or both-lose	Win-lose	Both-gain or both-lose
Basic form of organization	Open network	Closed pyramid	Open network
Basic form of decision making	Negotiation	Orders	Negotiation
	⇓	⇓	⇓
	Coexistence	Coercion	Coexistence

Table 1: A simplified depiction of history (Ury, 1999, p. 108)

"Subjugating human beings is illegitimate!" How the sentence of humiliation evolved

We can integrate Ury's chart and the practice of humiliation, starting by reflecting on the sentence, "Subjugating people is illegitimate" or, in an expanded version, "Subjugating, abasing, instrumentalizing, or putting down human beings is illegitimate and labeled *humiliation*, whereby humiliation means the *illicit violation of equal dignity*." This sentence feels morally "right" for human rights advocates in the twenty-first century.

This sentence contains three parts, (a) "subjugation," (b) "human beings," and (c) "illegitimacy." What we see here is a fascinating core discourse, one that underpins many debates, not only the one carried out here, on historical development, but also on such topics as communism, democracy, and capitalism. The three elements of this sentence express *common sense* categories as discussed in Smedslund's earlier mentioned work on *Psycho-Logic*.

By varying the last element (c), we can build another sentence, namely "subjugating people is legitimate." What we have unearthed, like archaeologists, is a sentence that was accepted as morally "right" throughout the past 10,000 years in most societies. Where this sentence is accepted, the use of the word humiliation does not entail any connotation of violation. This sentence is still widely spoken and heard, but it is rapidly losing legitimacy today.

We can also manipulate the second element (b) of the sentence, "human beings," replacing it, for example, with the word "nature," producing two sentences: (1) "subjugating nature is legitimate" and (2) "subjugating nature is illegitimate." The first sentence, "Subjugating nature is legitimate" dictated eons of human thought and action. The newer version of this sentence, "subjugating nature is illegitimate," lies at the core of modern talk about sustainability. "Subjugating nature is illegitimate" is the human rights ideal applied to the biosphere. One may call it the *biosphere rights ideal*.

Finally, we can manipulate the first element of the sentence and ask whether the practice of "putting down" and "subjugating" has always been known to humankind.

Perhaps it was, albeit at varying degrees of proficiency. Language was, perhaps, the first application of the idea that something can be put down; after all, we *subject* nature to our linguistic labels. The Latin root of the word *sub-ject* reveals it: *ject* stems from *jacere*, *to throw*, and *sub* means *under*. Chimpanzees know how to use tools, fashioning twigs to gather larvae out of tree holes. They can, in other words, instrumentalize nature for their own advantage, albeit in an extremely restricted manner. Admittedly, early Homo sapiens were not very proficient tool-users either, compared to modern humans. Early attempts to subjugate nature were, therefore, remarkably modest. With time, however, humankind excelled at the "trade" of subjugation.

We can conclude that at the core of the notion of humiliation we find the *theoretical possibility* that something can be put, pushed, or held down. Once human beings conceived of this theoretical possibility, they *transformed* it into manifold practices. Initially, only abiotic nature was put and held down. Later the idea was *expanded* to include the domestication of animals. Lastly, *human beings* were held down.

Using traffic as a metaphor to illustrate the historic evolution of the concept and practice of humiliation and human rights, we see that as long as there is ample space, everybody moves along without taking much notice of the other drivers. Under conditions of abundance, hunters and gatherers enjoy pristine pride. In early agricultural empires with denser populations, however, the powerful usurped the right to pass first. Honor dictates that big vehicles drive through first at a crossroad, while the smaller ones wait in due reverence. A master regards it as legitimate to push out the smaller ones, who accept this treatment as divinely ordained order. Occasionally somebody attempts to acquire a larger vehicle. If he succeeds, he is the new master with all the rights of a master, since revolutions topple the masters, but not the system. However, apart from the threat of revolution, a threat that requires constant attention from the masters, this system renders a certain extent of public stability, calm and order.

At some point, around the time the word humiliation began to connote violation, a discussion arose about (to stay with the metaphor) managing traffic more effectively by using traffic lights. Dignity means that every driver, irrespective of the size of the vehicle, has the same rights before the new traffic lights. The size of the vehicle, its color and price, do not affect the driver's status or rights.

Table 2 integrates my analysis of humiliation into Ury's *simplified depiction of history*.

"A Simplified Depiction of History" with Humiliation Added

	Simple hunter-gatherers I	Complex agriculturists II	Knowledge Society III
Type of society and period in human history	Pride	Honor	Dignity
The application of the idea that something can be put down, instrumentalized, or subjugated	Humankind undertakes its first tentative attempts of applying the idea of subjugation and, by making tools, instrumentalizes nature.	Humankind expands the practice of subjugation on to human beings; some human beings, slaves and underlings, are transformed into "tools" at the hands of others, the masters.	Humankind turns against the practice of ranking human beings into lesser and higher beings, and declares the practices of the past ten thousand years to be illegitimate.
The evolution of the sentence of humiliation	The subjugation (of nature) >	and of human beings (no longer only nature) >	is defined as illegitimate (no longer as legitimate).

Table 2: "A simplified depiction of history" with humiliation added

Let me transpose this analysis of human history onto the graphics presented in Figure 1. The horizontal line in the center represents pristine pride. This line is not meant to convey that all human beings are equal, if by equal we mean identical. It does, however, convey a worldview that condemns the hierarchical ranking of the differences among human beings in terms of worth and value. This horizontal line depicts the core principle of the egalitarian hunter and gatherer communities that reigned for the first ninety percent of human history. The horizontal line at the top represents the master in the old honor cultures; the line at the bottom represents the underlings in those cultures. With these elements in place, we can visualize the human rights revolution as an attempt to collapse the top and bottom lines back into the central line, which in modern terms, represents equal dignity and humility. The entire diagram underscores the invitation currently being issued by human rights advocates to both masters and underlings to join in shared humility and equal humanity.

The Historic Transition to Human Rights

Master in the old honor order (arrogation)		Top of the scale
New human rights order of humility		Line of pristine pride and equal dignity
Underling/ in the old honor order (humiliation)		Bottom of the scale

Figure 2: The historic transition to human rights

Don't! The legitimacy of the vertical scale of human worthiness disappears

Nils Alte, another Falstad prisoner, recalled that he was ordered by the SS guards to lie straight on the floor with his arms at his sides. He was dragged down a flight of concrete stairs so that his head bumped on each step until blood poured from his head. He was then commanded to crawl back up the stairs and lick up his own blood. He said: "It was not so much the physical pain that was excruciating, as bad as it was; it was the humiliation, the degradation, which was the worst" (personal communication, 2002).

An earthquake or a volcanic eruption may cause terrible devastation and immense suffering. Victims of these natural disasters often lose family members, shelter and their most precious belongings. These tragedies, however, can be overcome with mutual encouragement and group solidarity.

A much deeper suffering, however, occurs when corrupt officials siphon off the resources earmarked for rebuilding, leaving the victims to languish in the mud of provisory camps. The victims' sense of humiliation may become overwhelming in such situations.

In the course of my fieldwork, I heard people describe many times the fact that overpowering feelings of humiliation, helplessness and betrayal take a huge emotional toll.[65] The initial natural disaster and the physical pain no longer lies at the core of this suffering. When people arrogate privileges and resources, victims feel violated and humiliated in the very core of their humanity. As Nils Alte asserts, it is not physical pain or loss of family members and belongings that cause the worst suffering – humiliation is what hurts most.

Knut Gjørtz, another former Falstad prisoner, told about stumbling early one morning over a very young German soldier in the basement of the Falstad building. The German,

who could not have been more than 19 years old, was crying, shaking his head, and repeating "We are all crazy! We are all crazy!" When the soldier saw the Norwegian prisoner, he put his forefinger to his lips to indicate that he should not tell anyone what he saw. The next day, the same young German was back to beating prisoners just as his comrades did.

This young soldier clearly felt trapped in a world in which it was legitimate to divide humans in higher and lesser beings. Internally, he suffered conflict over this external legitimacy, but he was not courageous enough to step out and oppose it. He felt obliged to abide by the rules of the honor system. During the day this young man did his "noble" duty to humiliate prisoners – but at night he decried his own deeds.[66]

Nazi propaganda was replete with maxims that told Germans that they were worth more than others and that it was their holy duty to "remind" those "*Unter*menschen" of their place far *down* on the scale of human worth. It wasn't just Jews who suffered. Poles, for example, were put into one of three categories. Class I Poles were "eminently suitable" for Germanization, Class II were thought "capable" of Germanization and Class III were "unsuitables."

Figure 3 illustrates the opposing moral landscapes between which the German soldier was caught.

Figure 3: The legitimacy of the vertical scale of human worthiness

The worldview of honor, or the old order of honor, is a rather collective concept. The worldview that is based on the notion of dignity is a concept that rather emphasizes individualism. The ideas of human rights themselves are not new; belief in the equal dignity of all humans was present in Christianity, Islam, and many other early philosophies. What is new is the widespread acceptance of these ideals. We live today in the midst of a historic transition that our forefathers would have found almost unfathomable. Ideas and moral sentiments which were marginal for millennia have

gained unprecedented importance. Ideas that previously lingered at the periphery of the human condition currently have moved onto the center stage and define the essence of humanity, impacting an increasing number of hearts and minds worldwide.

Dignity is untouchable! Human rights render humiliation illicit

The first paragraph of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, reads: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."

This Article does not imply that there are no differences between people. People may have different skin colors, different genders, different religious creeds, and different ethnic backgrounds. However, all human beings, solely by being human possess the same level of worth and value. *Nobody* is a *lesser* being, *nobody* is a *higher* being. Nobody is allowed to humiliate and degrade others.

Today, human rights can no longer be viewed as simply another intellectual concept. Human rights ideals elicit *gut feelings of the undueliness of humiliation* when people are treated as *lesser* beings. Human rights ideals introduce a new form of feelings of humiliation that was not present at any prior point in human history. Human rights link dignity and humiliation in new ways. Thus, human rights introduce feelings, feelings of humiliation, when dignity is being degraded.

Why humiliation is more hurtful in the context of human rights

In human rights-based societies humiliation becomes more hurtful and a more important topic for research. This is because the *four* basic kinds of humiliation known to honor cultures become conflated into *One* kind of humiliation when viewed through a human rights lens.

Humiliation in honor societies – we may call it *honor humiliation* – can be categorized in four variants (see Table 3).[67] A master uses *conquest humiliation* to subjugate formerly equal neighbors into a position of inferiority. When the hierarchy is in place, the master uses *reinforcement humiliation* to keep it in place. The latter may range from seating orders and bowing rules to brutal measures such as customary beatings or killings. A third form of humiliation, *relegation humiliation*, is used to push an already low-ranking underling even further down. *Exclusion humiliation* means excluding victims altogether, exiling or even killing them.[68]

The first three forms of *honor humiliation* keep human beings within the human community, only the last excludes them. In the beginning of a conquest people may shout, "Rather dead than slave!" yet the large empires of human history would not have existed if people held consistently to this rallying cry. Smaller peoples were swallowed up into larger empires and the conquered usually did not choose death and commit suicide. Cultural traits even flourished on their adaptation to lower status – covert sabotage of the masters was cultivated, special kinds of humor emerged. Czech *good*

soldier Schweik (a figure created by Jaroslav Hasek, 1983-1923) epitomizes subtle resistance. Marvelous Egyptian humor stems from the millennia of oppression at the hands of the Greeks, Romans, Arabs, French and British. Because of their humor, the Egyptians are known as the "Czechs" of the Middle East. The first three types of *honor humiliation* may even have had a number of positive, prosocial effects, albeit painful for the people who had to endure them. What underlings lost in freedom and self-expression, they may have gained in self-control, a precondition for peaceful conflict resolution. However, the fourth type of honor humiliation – *exclusion humiliation* – is entirely different. Being excluded from one's *in-group,* exiled, called *vermin* or *pest* brings no benefits whatsoever to the victim.

Human rights turn all four types of humiliation into the latter one because all human rights violations exclude victims from humanity. This situation produces intense pain and suffering because losing one's dignity means being excluded from the family of humankind altogether. I call this type of humiliation *human rights humiliation* or *dignity humiliation*; it is a deeply destructive and devastating experience that attacks a person at their core. It is from this viewpoint that practices of humiliation that used to be considered "normal," such as beating and "breaking the will," acquire medical labels such as that of *victimhood* or *trauma*.[69]

Table 3 depicts humiliation as practiced in hierarchical honor societies as opposed to the understanding of humiliation in a human rights context.

Four Variants of Humiliation

	Honor humiliation	Human rights dignity humiliation
Conquest humiliation: When a strong power reduces the relative autonomy of rivals, previously regarded as equals, and forces them into a position of long-term subordination. Creation of hierarchy or addition of a new upper tier within a hierarchical order.	X	–
Relegation humiliation: When an individual or group is forcefully pushed downwards within an existing status hierarchy.	X	–
Reinforcement humiliation: Routine abuse of inferiors in order to maintain the perception that they are, indeed, inferior.	X	–
Exclusion humiliation: When an individual or group is forcefully ejected from society, for example through banishment, exile or physical extermination.	X	X

Table 3: Four variants of humiliation (adapted from Smith, 2001, p. 543)

Where we are in our journey from the old honor order to the new dignity order

We who live in the first years of the 21st century in the Western world don't spend much time reflecting on the changes that began 300 or 250 years ago and their profound significance. For many of us, the validity of the human rights stance is self-evident. The abolition of the legitimacy of humiliation is something most of us consider, if we consider it at all, as a long-accomplished historic fact. The problems associated with violations of human rights ideals are something that need attention in Africa, we believe, or India, or other far-flung places. The only time we remember that billions of human beings still struggle for the faintest shred of human dignity is when we hear horror stories about atrocities occurring on the other side of the globe. We may vaguely remember that slavery was abolished in many countries less than 150 years ago. We probably know that Apartheid was overthrown only recently. We may even be aware that the practice of bonded labor is still accepted in many cultures today. (We have, of course, heard about carpets, or shoes, or garments that are made by enslaved children in some poor country.) We have read accounts of honor killings. Yet, we persist in believing that all this does not concern our lives as Western citizens directly.

We are often blind to the fact that the transition from a hierarchical culture to one based on equal human dignity is still going on even in the midst of Western societies. We are still undergoing major changes even in our own core personalities. This transition permeates our bodies, minds, and hearts, and influences the body, mind, and heart of every single person on this planet. In India this process is starker, in the United States and Europe it is played out in more subtle ways. In all cases it creates significant disjunctures and discomforts.

Can you honestly say that you no longer believe that it is the "nature" of women to take out the garbage? I'm not asking for your official or politically correct answer. I'm asking how you feel in the core of your being. How do you feel about asking a man to change the baby's diapers? Do you believe, when nobody's looking, that a good wife is a wife who "voluntarily" cleans the kitchen after her husband has been generous enough to grill meat for guests? Do you consider it "normal" for the husband to assume the driver's seat of the family car? Does it strike you as normal to see the naked bodies of women served up for publicity, media coverage or to sell new automobiles? Does any part of you believe that prostitution and pornography are "legitimate" uses of human bodies? Does it feel appropriate for employers to humiliate subordinates to increase profit and shareholder value? Isn't it necessary occasionally to teach someone a lesson? Do you ever get tired of listening to underlings lamenting and wish they'd just accept the way things are? I will come back to these questions later.

I believe that it is, indeed, necessary to "humble" dictators and tyrants and teach them "lessons." However, the important new point introduced by human rights ideals is that this should be done without humiliation. Lakoff and Johnson allude to this when they describe the *Nurturant Parent model* of rearing children that combines firmness with respect. They write:

> Nurturant Parent morality is not, in itself, overly permissive. Just as letting children do whatever they want is not good for them, so helping other people to do whatever they please is likewise not proper nurturance. There are limits to what other people should be allowed to do, and genuine nurturance involves setting boundaries and expecting others to act responsibly (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 316).

To summarize, we live in cultures that are in the midst of a massive transition from the old honor code to codes based on equal human dignity. We all are involved in this transition, either welcoming it or resisting it – and always being confused by it. It is a difficult transition even for the most fervent human rights enthusiast because it is easy to lose orientation. The old maxims still sound so "right." For example, is it so bad to sometimes hit a child? And what about the treatment of criminals? Shouldn't women be careful not to lose their "femininity"? We have not yet developed new proverbs and sayings that sound equally "right." The new world is not yet born, while the old world is slowly dying.

Stand up! How humiliation may also elicit defiance

Admittedly, humiliation may sometimes generate shame, guilt or humility in its victims. All these reactions can be highly prosocial. Humiliation is not, however, the best way to elicit these prosocial emotions. Careful instruction, guidance and respectful humbling are much more effective and much less likely to generate the more probable result of humiliation, namely outraged defiance and violent retaliation. Humiliation and shame, although closely related, are not the same experience. A person can feel humiliated without experiencing a shred of shame. One of the best examples is New York City's reaction after September, 11. The terrorists sent a message of humiliation and reaped, not American shame – but defiance. I paraphrase what I hear from my American friends:

> Why should America be ashamed? America bails out the rest of the world in times of need. America rescued Europe twice – 1944 from Nazi Germany and 1917 in World War I. We always try to do good and bring freedom to the rest of the world. We do not conquer, invade or enslave others. Would you rather live in a world that is dominated by China or Saudi Arabia? We are the most powerful country on the planet because of the unique industriousness of our brave people!

My American friends describe how their forefathers left their homes in the old world where they were ill-treated and struggled to build a better world in America. "We Americans cannot understand why they should accept being ill-treated," they say, and announce that any attempt to shame them will fail. They will not be broken by terrorists, no matter how many buildings are destroyed, no matter how many American lives are lost.

> We will draw upon the unique strength and solidarity of our forefathers. People who envy our power and might should work harder, get their act together and be willing to face insurmountable odds as our forefathers did. Instead of taking the easy road, pointing fingers at us and trying to humiliate us, people should sweep their own doorsteps.

The American response should deter anybody who believes in using humiliation for prosocial causes in an age of human rights. Victims of acts of humiliation are very likely to stand up in staunch resistance instead of reacting with shame. In the old honor code, the difference between humbling and humiliating was rather insignificant because sheer

force was the arbiter. Within the honor code, humiliation works. The winner becomes the master and the loser is expected to accept lowliness as "honorable medicine." In traditional mindsets of honor, Iraqis and coalition forces (or, for that matter, the Arab world and the West) could be expected to try putting each other down as efficiently as possible, not shying away from outright humiliation to negotiate who will be the master and who the underling in the future.

In a human rights context, however, humbling and humiliating must be differentiated with great care. Within a human rights context the aim cannot be to create underlings. The aim is to arrive at communities of dignified upright citizens in democratic states where everybody has a free voice and humbly bows only to law, not to might. The vision of dignified citizens is not served by forcing people to accept superior power as having inherent value or by treating people in such a way that they turn simmering anger inwards and get depressed or outwards into the violence of sabotage, guerilla warfare, terrorism, or open revolution.

Be aware of changes! All aspects of life are affected by the call for equal dignity

The human rights revolution is both a passive recipient of the shape imposed upon it by its historic and contemporary context and an active force that shapes its historic and contemporary environment. Many conceptual shifts mark this movement. In the following paragraphs, I will touch upon a few of these concepts: *victimhood, trauma* and *conflict, objectivity*, and *consciousness*, terms which derive new meaning from the notion of humiliation, a practice that loses the validity it once had, becoming illegitimate in a human rights context.

New definitions clash with old definitions! How conflict, victimhood and trauma draw on the notion of undue humiliation

V*ictimhood* and *trauma* only apply when victims become consciously aware that they have suffered victimhood and trauma. Individuals often have to make long mental and emotional journeys from *honor humiliation* to human-rights steered *dignity humiliation* to define themselves as victims.

The common case of the social worker who wants to save a woman from being beaten by her husband comes to mind.[70] The social worker defines the woman as a victim. However, the woman claims that her husband beats her to prove how much he loves her. Virtually every social worker has experienced the deep frustration of this experience. As we discussed earlier, there were times in human history when wife-beating was considered necessary to keep disobedient wives in line. The wife's pain felt was defined as "good" for her and for the overall social order.

In other words, people who are under the control of a dominant group, even if this domination is hurtful, may not see themselves as *traumatized victims*. They may even define themselves as "*protected children*." Many of Saddam Hussein's followers bought into his self-definition as a benevolent patron. Deutsch (2002) writes:

The socially privileged, typically, assume that they have the right to control the interactions in their relationship with members of subordinated groups. Challenging this assumption can be risky for a subordinate and, as a consequence, they usually go unchallenged. The repeated, everyday experience of being treated as an inferior produces a public image of being an inferior, which may be internalized as an image of self-inferiority. In the socially privileged, in contrast, such interactions will produce a public image of superiority and a corresponding self-image. Such non-egalitarian everyday interactions between the socially dominant and the oppressed help to keep the system of oppression in place by the public images and self-images they produce and perpetuate (Deutsch, 2002, p.16).[71]

As repeatedly stated, human rights has enshrined the idea that every human being has an inner core of dignity that ought not be humiliated In that way *dignity humiliation* is posited at the very core of victimhood and trauma inflicted by human beings on their fellows. As mentioned earlier, the situation is very different in the case of earthquakes and other natural disasters. In those situations there is no perpetrator, so the aspect of humiliation is missing (unless one believes in God wishing to humiliate his sinful followers.) Victimhood and trauma are less intense in natural disasters than when the same pain is flowing from fellow human beings, particularly when this happens in the framework of human rights. The backdrop for this is that the phenomenon of humiliation is deeply relational.

It's midnight and my husband is snoring so loudly that I am astonished that anybody in the house can sleep. However, since I know that he does not intend to hurt anybody, I am not angry. His snoring is like a natural disaster. It is distressing, but nobody's fault. If, on the other hand, our neighbors take to playing loud music they know we do not like, we will feel personally insulted. If they happen to chose Bavarian folk music, which they know we despise, we might even feel bullied. Even though their noise cannot rival my husband's snoring, it infuriates me. I am consumed by rage against these stupid neighbors (adapted from an account by a client; see for work on the *controllability dimension*, Allred, 1999, Averill, 1982, Averill, 1993).

Another example: The first question asked about the 2003 blackout in North America was "Was it terrorism?" The relief was almost palpable when it became clear that there was no terrorism involved. The hardship was identical, but it was easier to bear when people knew that the inconvenience was not the result of another terrorist "message of humiliation."

When people suffer at the hands other human beings, they have in principle four choices. She may define this suffering (1) as a kind of natural disaster (being beaten by a disturbed or drunk person, for example), or (2) she may accept it as "prosocial honorable lesson" or "prosocial humbling" (as discussed earlier, being beaten, in honor contexts, is often seen as equivalent to having surgery or a vaccination that "hurts but must be endured"), or (3) she may not accept it as "prosocial honorable lesson" (being beaten as slight of honor that calls for humiliation-for-humiliation), or (4) she might see it as an illegitimate humiliation of dignity (being beaten as violation of dignity that ought to be

opposed in a dignified Mandela-like fashion). Only in the third and fourth case does a person look at herself as traumatized victim.

How does this dynamic play out in the context of conflict? As long as I accept being beaten as prosocial honorable lesson, there is *concord* between me and my dominators. The word *concord* stems from Latin *cum* which means *with* and *cord* which means *heart*. *Concord* means that our *hearts* are *with* each other.

The word *conflict*, however, comes from verb *flectere*, to *bend*, to *curve*. Thus, I define being beaten as a violation only in a the situation I see as *bent, curved* and *convoluted* instead of *smooth* and *straight*. In conflict, *discord* displaces *concord* and may lead to *confrontation*. The word *confrontation* entails the Latin word *frons* which means *forehead*. In *confrontation*, *foreheads* are placed *against* each other, in opposition. Thus, the term *conflict*, similar to the terms *victimhood*, and *trauma*, is dependent on the particular framing of reality adopted by the players and the overall social mindset within which the incident occurs. Deutsch (2002) explains:

> Discontent and the sense of injustice may be latent rather than manifest in a subordinated group. Neither the consciousness of oneself as victimized or disadvantaged nor the consciousness of being a member of a class of disadvantaged may exist psychologically. If this be the case, consciousness-raising tactics are necessary precursors to the developing of group cohesion and social organization. The diversity of consciousness-raising tactics have been illustrated by the variety of techniques employed in recent years by women's liberation groups and black power groups. They range from quasi-therapeutic group discussion meetings through mass meetings and demonstrations to dramatic confrontations of those in high-power groups. It is likely that a positive consciousness of one's disadvantaged identity is most aroused when one sees someone, who is considered to be similar to oneself, explicitly attacked or disadvantaged and sees him resist successfully or overcome the attack; his resistance reveals simultaneously the wound and its cure (Deutsch, 2002, p. 31).

Every psychotherapist has seen divorce cases that evolve in this way: For years, a woman tries to make her husband understand that he must respect her dignity, while he thinks she merely is a little "sensitive" or "hysterical." For long periods she suffers from psychosomatic symptoms and depression, seemingly supporting his views. When she finally files for divorce, he is surprised and hurt, while she tells him that she has talked to him for years, in vain. The woman probably does not call her private uprising "conflict." If her husband were to understand her and apologize for being slow to embrace the ideal of equal dignity, there would be no conflict. If asked, she might say the man created the conflict by his loyalty to the old order that says that a quiet woman is a good and happy woman. As long as she was quiet, he did not see any need for change and was reluctant to "bend" to fit new worldviews. Both sides experience irreconcilable types of humiliation – honor humiliation on the part of the husband, and dignity humiliation on the part of his wife.

The person who has learned to consider herself a victim when she experiences undue humiliation at the hands of other people also has three options. (1) She may turn her rage inwards and become depressed and apathetic (this would be the depressed wife suffering from psychosomatic symptoms. In that case the conflict is almost invisible (Sayler, 2004). If, however, this person chooses to turn her rage outwards, we have outcomes 2) Hitler and 3) Mandela. Hitler

attempted to redress humiliation by inflicting humiliation on the supposed humiliators, achieving nothing but another spiral in the cycle of humiliation. Mandela facilitated the birth of a new social order based on respect for individual dignity. Central to his effort was the inclusion of the humiliator, the white upper class, as co-protectors of human rights. In other words, Mandela solved the "conflict" by peacefully but firmly making de Clerck and his followers (in the case of the couple this would be the unwilling husband) understand that the old order was dying. The only way the formerly privileged could "bend" this conflict into *concord* and *convergence* was by relinquishing their outdated framings of reality. Mandela attempted to attain humility without humiliation.

In Iraq, there will be *convergence* only if the Arab World frames the situation as *liberation*. *Conflict* will ensue as soon as the Arab World frames the military action as *humiliating invasion*. In this event, conflict may remain invisible and be lived out as depression and apathy on the part of Iraqis and Arab citizens and those who identify with them (1). However, simmering rage may also lead to Hitler-like reactions, such as terrorism against the West (2), or (3) Mandela-like or Gandhi-like outcomes if such leaders are available. This is what people mean when they speak of winning not just the war, but also the peace.

Even truth is being humbled! Epistemology is affected by the idea of equal dignity[72]

The human rights revolution aims at dismantling the vertical gradient that creates masters and underlings. Human rights advocates are not satisfied by merely replacing the old master with a new one. Yet, in many cases, this was exactly what happened in the first round of human rights revolutions. The French Revolution led to new hierarchical structures in spite of its motto of egalité. The institutions that promote and protect equal dignity evolved only gradually.

Epistemology (the study of systems of thinking) is one of many fields affected. Modernist thought has roots in the enlightenment (the rise of human thought from the "dark" or "medieval" ages), characterized by new methods of logic (Descartes, Locke, Kant), empiricism (Bacon) and, the emerging scientific method (Newton). The Enlightenment was a revolution, an uprising of individual rationality against "all forms of totalitarianism – royal and religious" (Gergen, 2000a, p. 2). The old master, *faith in God-chosen sovereign rulers and their opinions*, was replaced by a new master, *faith in experts as guardians of reason*.

Yet, enlightenment soon faced another challenge. Particularly subversive is the claim that all human beings are equal in their capacity to engage in rational activity. Within this claim hid the seeds for a second revolution, undermining the victories of the earlier one. The insistence in blanket equality meant the *experts* had to yield to the *common man* (and, soon the common *man* had to make room on equal terms for his *female* equivalent). As Serge Moscovici (1997) puts it, "…at the beginning, people took an interest in the biases of social knowledge and compared 'experts' with 'novices,' leaning on the distinction between 'truth' and 'mere opinion.' Now, the notion of collective and social representations presupposes that all people are 'rational,' that they are rational because they are social, and so on" (Moscovici, 1997, p. 2).

Objectivity is a hotly disputed subject within this debate. The ideal of objectivity promises the possibility of a world untouched by human subjectivity. In former times

God was expected to talk to kings and priests. After the enlightenment, nature – the *untouched world* – was expected to talk to the *objective* researcher, who used scientific methods to *listen* to the voice of the *untouched world* and describe it as it is, *uncontaminated* by subjectivity. Yet, there are problems with *scientific methods measuring the untouched world*. As Max Planck once remarked, "Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of Nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we are trying to solve" (in Kaku, 2005, p. 158).

However, "social scientists are exhorted to eschew subjectivity and make sure that their work is 'objective'" (Patton, 1990, 479). The conventional means for controlling subjectivity and maintaining objectivity are the methods of quantitative social science: distance from the setting and people being studied, formal operationalism and quantitative measurement manipulation of isolated variables, and experimental designs.

Yet, the ways in which measures are constructed in psychological tests, questionnaires, cost-benefit indicators, and routine management information systems are no less open to the intrusion of the evaluator's biases than making observations in the field or asking questions in interviews. Numbers do not protect against bias; they merely disguise it (p. 480). Patton draws on Michael Scriven's[73] discussion of objectivity and subjectivity in educational research, praising it as a major "contribution in the struggle to detach the notions of objectivity and subjectivity from their traditionally narrow associations with quantitative and qualitative methodology, respectively" (p. 480).

The previously mentioned work of Jan Smedslund is also relevant to this heated debate. Smedslund was among the first to warn psychologists against trying to appear *scientific* by mistaking *scientifically looking* methods for sound science when core rules are blatantly apparent and studying "infinite objects" would be silly. This book must be read within the context created by the debate surrounding concepts such as logical positivism and social constructivism (or social constructionism). As discussed in the introduction, the epistemological basis for this book is the *reflective equilibrium*.

Some daring social scientists, at the forefront of development, have taken up the ball from Max Planck. *Quantum social science* is being proposed to solve the mind-body problem that represents a serious difficulty for all branches of social science and their basic ontological and epistemological assumptions. "We know we have experience from, well, experience itself, but there is no apparent way to reconcile this fact with modern science. By rights it seems consciousness should not exist, and as such neither should meaning, which presupposes consciousness (Wendt, 2005, p. 10). Wendt suggests that a quantum connection, justifying a "participatory epistemology" in social inquiry, would give additional force to critiques of the subject-object distinction, such as post-modernists or feminists. "Human beings are in effect 'walking wave particle dualities,' not classical material objects" (Wendt, 2005, p. 7, see also Chalmers, 1996, Jahn and Dunne, 1997).

False consciousness! How elites may encourage underlings to rise

A French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), explained that the French revolution was inspired, not by those languishing at the bottom of the social scale, but by individuals within the elite camp who were exposed to new ideas. Seven hundred years ago in France, the land was divided among a small number of families, who had absolute

right over the soil and ruled over the inhabitants. The right of governing descended by inheritance from generation to generation. Force was the only means by which man could act on man [sic, in Tocqueville] and landed property was the sole source of power. Soon, however, the power of the clergy began to increase. The clergy opened its ranks to all classes, to the poor and the rich, the commoner and the noble. Through the church, a bright young man who was born poor could become a priest, working and talking with nobles, consulting with and even rising above kings.

The relationships between men [sic, in Tocqueville] grew more complicated and varied as society became more stable and civilized. The need for civil laws was felt and the ministers of law rose from the obscurity of the tribunals to appear at the court of the monarch, by the side of the feudal barons clothed in ermine and mail (Tocqueville, 2003). According to Tocqueville, it was the energy of the emerging clergy that fueled the revolution, not the discontent of the oppressed masses.

Marx and Engels were not poor workers either. Their social backgrounds were closer to that of the exploiters they despised than to those humiliated souls they aimed to save. The founders of Communism thus promoted the demise of their own castes. Marx and Engels created the notion of *false consciousness* as part of traditional Marxist philosophy. This concept explains the failure of workers to rebel against a reality that oppresses them.

The notion of *false consciousness* signals how change may proceed in a disorderly manner, with some parties far ahead and others far behind and describes how those far ahead and those still behind can polarize into loggerhead positions that create violence and mayhem. In hindsight, Marx and his successors might agree that the violent uprisings they endorsed, uprisings that entailed the humiliation of the humiliators, was much less effective than the implementation of the Western welfare state that lifted underlings up without putting apparatchiks into the master's seat. Marx's recipe led to sustained hierarchy with the former elites being killed or deeply humiliated and apparatchiks as new masters. Russian Bolsheviks, for example, denied the right to vote to "reactionaries" and "exploiters" – their former masters – in the name of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," who were the new masters.

Today, the human rights revolution, as well, is often the province of privileged people from the rich West. Knowingly or not, these idealistic individuals promote the limiting of their own privileges, since human rights call for enabling living conditions for all and oppose the exploitation the planet's resources for the benefits of a few. This often brings them in conflict with their own elite group. May-be, most members of top elites, except the few revolutionaries, are too engaged with their wealth to feel compassion and empathy for those who suffer at the bottom, while those at the bottom may have no energy left for clearly perceiving and analyzing their own wretched situation. Those members of the elite who are disenchanted and have the resources and the time, may be the first to both perceive dissonances and devise strategies for remedy. Thus third parties, often stemming from elite segments of society, played and still play a central role in pushing for change.

To return to our traffic metaphor, communism thought to remedy the imbalance between large and small vehicles by mandating that everybody drive the same vehicle. This order was to be supervised by apparatchiks. Unfortunately, these apparatchiks could not resist the temptation to get bigger vehicles for themselves and push the smaller ones

aside, letting the experiment fell back into the very power pyramid it originally wished to abolish.

The modern, socially responsible, state seems to be most effective in assuring and protecting the equal dignity of its citizens. Democracy attempts to give a voice to everybody, not merely to selected subgroups of people. Democratic decision making is meant to extend inclusive self determination to *we, all of us*; it is *freedom under the law that protects equal dignity*. Thus, the term *false consciousness*, introduced by third parties, signals *impatience* with change that indeed evolves, but more slowly and more radical, not by replacing the master, but by dismantling the master-slave gradient.

It is Nelson Mandela, who most recently managed such a transition in South Africa. He channeled *false consciousness*, both on the side of humiliators and humiliatees, into a system that aims at *including everybody*.

To conclude this section, humiliation that was "honorable medicine" in the old order becomes painful violation in the new order of human rights ideals. The new mindset deeply contradicts the old one and dangerous frictions and confrontations develop. Impatience may intensify such confrontations and bring mayhem. All aspects of life are affected by this transition. In Part II of the book, it will be discussed in more depth why and how this transition unfolds.

Don't misunderstand! Different approaches to humiliation are synchronic

There has been an evolution of the practice of humiliation and the way people react to it in the course of human history. However, this evolution has not been smooth or one-directional. Even today there are communities whose members describe themselves as hunters and gatherers and many others in which the traditional honor society is still alive and well. What I described earlier as a sequential development is not necessarily so, and furthermore, it is also synchronic. I personally know a number of countries quite well that are hospitable to very egalitarian thinking, albeit in different ways, such as Norway and Somalia. I am also familiar with countries that rely quite heavily on hierarchical societal structures to order social relationships. Germany, France, Egypt, Rwanda, and Burundi, are just a few examples.

Geert H. Hofstede identified four dimensions of culture (he later added a fifth). His first dimension is *power distance* – "the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede and Bond, 1984, p. 419). In research conducted with IBM employees around the world, Hofstede discovered that in some countries, the company maintained a low power distance, in others, a high one. In high power distance countries, the organization is centralized, with many levels of hierarchy. Employees at the lower levels tend to have low levels of professional qualification. These high power distance cultures have a high vertical scale, as do Mexico, South Korea, or India.

Countries with low power distance featured decentralized organizational structures with flat hierarchies, and highly qualified employees at every level. Examples are the USA and the Scandinavian countries, cultures we recognize as being rooted in human rights ideals. Respect for the dignity of their citizens is enshrined in their legal bodies. (There is, however, no reason to believe that these societies are homogenous in their

equal rights development. Even within societies that take it for granted that they are based on human rights, considerable remnants of the old honor order linger on. Likewise, societies such as Pakistan, Egypt, Mexico, supposedly adhering to the old collective honor code, evidence a great deal of *diffusion*, meaning that cultural realms are in contact with and learn from one other. Again, the historic development is also synchronic, even within each community.)

The process is even more confounded within the minds and hearts of individuals. The staunchest feminist may give her car key to her husband because she believes he can protect the family better than she can. When the doorbell rings unexpectedly in the middle of the night, she might send her husband to the door. Many a woman, even in the supposedly enlightened West, mistrusts here own opinions because she has been taught that women cannot think clearly. Such a Western woman, supposedly so "liberated," may be astonished at her Somali sister who, newly arrived in the West, displays more courageous "feminism" than she would ever dare to. Different mindsets exist side by side in the *global village*, in the same society and even in the same mind.

No rankings! Equal dignity can be ascribed to stages

Scholars who advocate human rights do not wish to seem to be *looking down* on people.[74] Therefore, some of them find the historic process described here unacceptable. They reject the very word *evolution* and the notion of *historic stages*. They attempt to describe human history not as development, but as diverse endeavors by human beings all engaged in creating equally valuable and worthy social and societal systems. They attempt to give equal dignity to all human experiments, particularly to groups previously branded as "primitive," "barbaric" or in other ways "aberrant." I agree with the goal; however I believe there is an easier way of avoiding arrogance when we discuss human history and diversity. We can simply resist the temptation to rank the various stages hierarchically, beginning from a position that says they are all equally valuable responses to different circumstances.

Hunter and gatherer lifestyles were evolved under circumstances of *abundance*, whereas agriculture was an attempt to expand the pie of resources through *intensification* when abundance had turned to limitation. Modern societies, in turn, are deeply influenced by the coming-into-being of *One single global village*, which posits yet another novel set of circumstances to humankind. In each case, humanity coped and copes creatively, each time within another set of limitations, using the pre-existing toolkit and expanding on it. The identification of stages is not to be confused with the arrogant view that the last stage is the best. It may simply be the best under current circumstances.

Each stage benefited from being familiar with the physical and mental toolkit that came before. Under circumstances of abundance, small egalitarian communities could roam the planet without dominating nature or fellow human beings. However, as soon as resources began to be limited, formerly insignificant experiments with the practice of putting down – pre-adaptations – were developed into a new way of life. This new way of life – agriculture and hierarchical societies – attempted to intensify recourses by dominating and domesticating nature, animals and fellow human beings.

Around 250 years ago another deep transition emerged, again building on the formerly available physical and mental toolkit, but rejecting the use of certain tools. "Old" egalitarian ideals, that had lain somewhat dormant, were rediscovered. Human rights advocates reject the application of the *tool of putting down* on humans, and wish to limit the exploitation of nature. This latest transition has not yet permeated the entire globe, neither as vision nor as practice; however, the new ideals are seeping in everywhere.

Earlier I stated that it is an ideological decision whether or not to apply a vertical scale to human worthiness so as to draw up a hierarchical gradient. The same pertains to human history. Human communities and societies – both present and throughout history – do not need to be ranked hierarchically. I certainly do not intend to rank them. However, the wish to abstain from ranking does not force us to relinquish describing differences, even systematic differences that build on each other. It is not necessary to abandon analysis of stepwise discourses just to avoid rankings. Differences, even differences that can be narrated as steps or stages, may be posited as equal in worth and value.

Summary

To conclude, I tried to demonstrate in this chapter how rankings of human worth and value evolved throughout human history. Such rankings and the debate about their legitimacy or illegitimacy form important parts of human worldviews, both diachronically throughout history and synchronically in contemporary times. The present is characterized by a transition to a new order that squarely contradicts previously existing norms. The phenomenon of humiliation as hurtful act inhabits the center of the new worldview. Therefore, this phenomenon calls for exceptional and innovative attention.

Related reading

The view that humiliation may be a particularly *forceful phenomenon* is supported by the research of, for example, Suzanne M. Retzinger (1991) and Thomas J. Scheff and Retzinger (1991),[75] who studied shame and humiliation in marital quarrels. They show that the suffering caused by humiliation is highly significant and that the bitterest divisions have their roots in shame and humiliation. Also W. Vogel and Lazare (1990) document *unforgivable humiliation* as a very serious obstacle in couples' treatment.[76] Robert L. Hale (1994) addresses *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder*,[77] and Francisco Gomes de Matos (2002) its role in *communication*.[78] Humiliation has also been studied in such fields as *love*, *sex* and *social attractiveness*,[79] *depression*,[80] *society* and *identity formation*,[81] *sports*,[82] *history*, *literature* and *film*.[83]

Scheff and Retzinger extended their work on *violence* and *Holocaust* and studied the part played by *humiliated fury* (Scheff 1997, p. 11) in escalating conflict between individuals and nations (Scheff, 1988; Scheff, 1990a; Scheff, 1990b; Scheff, 1997a[84]). Also psychiatrist James Gilligan (1996) focuses on *humiliation as a cause for violence*, in his book *Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and How to Treat It*.[85] Vamik D. Volkan[86] and Joseph Montville[87] carry out important work on *psycho-political analysis* of *intergroup*

conflict and its *traumatic effects*,[88] as does Blema S. Steinberg (1996).[89] Furthermore, Ervin Staub's work is highly significant; he is a great name in *peace psychology*.[90] The *Journal of Primary Prevention* devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation in 1991,[91] 1992,[92] and 1999,[93] as did the journal *Social Research* in 1997, stimulated by *The Decent Society* by Margalit (1996).[94]

The discussion of *democracy* and *capitalism* cannot be expanded upon here. However, certain recent insights may be mentioned. David Ricardo, 1817, is credited with what is commonly called *comparative advantage*, the idea that two parties can benefit from trade even if one of them is better at producing everything than the other. Furthermore, it was long discussed that self determination cannot be based on majority voting because this would outlaw the aspirations of the minorities who voted the other way; "mob rule and emasculation of the wise" would reign. Vilfredo Pareto, 1906, resolved this issue by defining as *Pareto efficient* any decision which results in perceived betterment but does not result in anybody else being worse off, in their own estimation; democratic institutions tend to exploit this optimal through decisions which avoid harm to others. Robert M. Solow, 1957, used growth accounting mathematics to analyze historical GDP data and identified the overwhelming importance of total factor *productivity*, namely *technological innovation* or *know how*, in securing growth and not variables such as capital and labor input.

Read furthermore on the *cognitive appraisal theory of emotions*,[95] on *human history*,[96] the *development of self-awareness* in the course of history,[97] on *game theory*,[98] on the *information age*,[99] on *cognitive dissonance*,[100] on the *obsolescence of honor*,[101] on the *cultural shaping of emotions*,[102] on the *science* of *conflict*,[103] on *power and conflict*,[104] on *resistance* and *rebellion*,[105] on *objectivity*,[106] on *false consciousness*,[107] on *World Revolutionary Elites*,[108] how *new ideas* (including human rights ideas) are carried forward in an *inhomogeneous* manner,[109] the *acceptance of human rights*,[110] and on *cultural diffusion*.[111]

Chapter 3: Globalization and Humiliation[112]

Virtually every news program in the world starts with a turning globe, constantly reminding viewers that we are all inhabitants of planet Earth. None of our ancestors had this view. The astronaut's gaze back at our great blue home is unique and unprecedented in human history. This perspective seduces, invites and pushes us to become aware of the fact that we live on *One tiny planet* in a vast universe, and, increasingly, are moving into *One single global village*. If we imagine the world in three dimensions, *globalization* is played out along the horizontal dimension – the human world is pulled together both in reality and in our minds (this *coming-together* is what I define as *globalization*). This process pokes holes in the fences and frontiers that used to keep opposing groups safely separated. This merging is not always blissful. Feelings between players who are forced to live more closely gain intensity when misunderstandings arise or expectations are disappointed. Feelings of humiliation can be more swiftly elicited than ever before.

*G*lobalization* is not the first historic incidence of *unification.* The creation of larger units is not new. Big empires have formed from smaller units. The Roman Empire, for example, was huge. But, one element in our current global situation is profoundly new – human beings are, for the first time in history, in the process of *consciously* understanding that planet Earth is small, limited, vulnerable, and not expandable.

In the past, empires were held together by strong centers that ruled over underlings through fear and seduction. They saw themselves in opposition to the rest of the world that was not yet conquered or not worth conquering. For most of human history, the outer boundaries of the human world were fluid. Like early hunters and gatherers who may have thought that they had unlimited "free" space, early conquerors thought that somewhere there were unlimited numbers of underlings to subjugate. Empires did not run out of opportunities to expand, to conquer more; there were no limits in their imagination.

In contrast, today's *global village* is held together, not by brute force, but by our growing awareness *of the minuteness of the globe and of our interdependence*. "We may have all come on different ships, but we're in the same boat now," said Martin Luther King.

Earth was never anything but a tiny planet in a vast universe. It is not the planet that has changed. Humankind has just arrived (or is in the process at arriving) at a deeper understanding of its reality. We came to this understanding through the help of a long tradition of tool-making that ultimately led to spaceships, airplanes and telephone cables – technologies that revolutionized our perspectives on the world. We are able to take pictures from space, airplanes shrink distances between the continents, and communication technology makes networks such as the Internet possible.

The facts and imageries produced by these technologies profoundly affect relations between *us* and *them*. They affect relations between "*us* Americans" and "*you*

Europeans," between "*us* Americans" and "*you* Russians," as much as "*us* Americans" and "*you* Chinese." The term *global village* indicates that a unifying process is taking place; *One single* large unit is forming where once there were several smaller, formerly separated units. The rifts that used to separate *us* from *them* are affected by this unifying drive of *globalization*. *In-groups* and *out-groups* coalesce into *One single in-group*. There are no longer several *villages*, but *One single global village*.

Imagery, of course, precedes reality. A *global village* of happy neighbors is far from being a reality. Several recent debates in anthropology and related disciplines receded from this emerging reality of integrated societies or cultures towards a vision of a more fragmented, paradoxical and ambiguous world. The currently bustling academic industry around the idea of globalization (see Featherstone (Ed.), 1990, for an early, influential contribution) represents an empirically oriented take on these issues, focusing on the largely technology-driven processes that contribute to increasing contact across boundaries and the diminished importance of space. This focus on unbounded processes rather than isolated communities has contributed to a reconceptualization of the social world in which flux, movement and change are the rule, not the exception (Strathern, 1991, Hannerz, 1992, Lash and Urry, 1994) (Eriksen, 2001).

No history lesson helps us, because the notion of *One global village* turns the whole of humanity into *One single in-group* on *One tiny planet*, something that never occurred before. Humanity's task at this crucial juncture is to study the potentially *benign* and *malign* results of this new reality and find ways to strengthen the *benign* tendencies and mitigate and marginalize the *malign* ones.

Are you one of us? Globalization can elicit new feelings of humiliation

Central to the future of *globalization* is the fact that human beings have a tendency to differentiate *in-group*s from *out-groups*, *us* from *them*, and moral *inclusion* from moral *exclusion*. Bluntly, there are two kinds of morals, an "*inside* moral" and an "*outside* moral." What *my* people deserve is not the same as what *your* people deserve. The reach of morals is also called the *scope of justice*. Coleman (2000) says: "Individuals or groups within our moral boundaries are seen as deserving of the same fair, moral treatment as we deserve. Individuals or groups outside these boundaries are seen as undeserving of this same treatment" (Coleman, 2000, p. 118).

A wealth of social-psychological research relates to the phenomenon of *in* and *out-group* categorizations. *Social identity theory*, a hotly discussed field, examines phenomena of *us* versus *them*. The famous Robbers' Cave experiment by Muzafer Sherif[113] involved boys in a summer camp. The boys were split into two groups and asked to engage in competitive activities with conflicting goals (for example, zero sum games such as football). Inter-group hostility evolved astonishingly fast, almost automatically.

One may want to assume that only children, with their relative immaturity, react in a such a highly competitive manner. However, experiments by Tzeng and Jackson (1994) confirm that the same dynamics hold for adults.[114] Even worse, this splitting tendency is so strong that not even conflicting goals are needed to establish the in-group/out-group dichotomy. Schoolboys were arbitrarily assigned to one of two groups, given money and

asked to distribute it to everybody. Astonishingly, they favored their *in-group* even under such minimal circumstances. This tendency is called the *minimal group paradigm*. You get a blue patch on your shoulder, by mere arbitrary choice of the experiment's organizer, without any deeper meaning or rationale, and I get a yellow one, and almost automatically you begin favoring all those with blue patches and I do the same with all those with yellow patches. Is this automatic, even involuntary, gut-reaction in any way rational, effective, or instrumental for humans? Whose interests are expressed? Is it to protect against our awareness that we are mortal, as *terror management theory* indicates? Or has it purely pragmatic reasons?

A Somali nomad might explain to the social psychologists that in a dangerous environment it would be suicidal to not be part of a strong *in-group*. Many Somalis owe their lives to clan-affiliation. When fleeing, they can count on clan-members they never met for help wherever they go. Many who live on Somali soil are kept alive by the funds coming in from the Somali Diaspora in Canada, USA, Australia, Sweden and all around the globe. Somali clan affiliation is their health insurance, their old age security, and their emergency reserve. It is like the roof over their heads.

In such circumstances, can there ever be *cooperation* across clan lines? Are boundaries, dividing lines, divisions, rifts and gaps cast in stone, part of the hardwiring of the human brain? Does it help to bring people together? Does contact render cooperation? Do exchange programs work? And does the coming-together of humankind into *One village* yield friendship and trust?

The so-called *contact hypothesis* presents the "belief that interaction between individuals belonging to different groups will reduce ethnic prejudice and inter-group tension" (Ryan, 1995, p. 131). Interaction, Ryan explains, can come through trade, business, trade unions, professional meetings, sports and the like. But, we have to wonder if mere interaction can actually bring about harmonious cooperation in situations that are less well-defined than a sports event. In Yugoslavia and Rwanda neighbors, even spouses, from different clans were transformed into deadly enemies.

Ryan agrees that greater contact alone will not build peace. Research shows that contact only improves attitudes when that contact is intimate, pleasant, between equals, socially supported, and in pursuit of common goals. Absent those conditions, increased contact may lead to increased hostility.[115]

Research indicates that the only remedies for humanity's *splitting tendency* are common super-ordinate goals that are attainable and determined by common consent among equals. Three conditions must thus be fulfilled to allow the citizens of the *global village* to cooperate across fault lines. We must (1) identify with *common super-ordinate goals* that are (2) *realistically reachable.* The third condition is that *social inequality must be avoided* in the process.

First requirement for cooperation: common super-ordinate goals

In *Creating Super-Ordinate Goals* Michael Harris Bond, a cross-cultural psychologist based in Hong Kong, writes:

> Social polarizations may be transcended through groups' and their members' uniting successfully around a common purpose or goal (Sherif and Cantril, 1947). This might involve local tasks such as constructing community facilities. Community service projects, especially if involving younger students from various ethnic groups serving members of various other ethnic groups, may be especially effective in building trust and good-will across group lines.... National tasks, such as protecting the shared environment or indeed, fighting off an invader, will accomplish the same unification. Social capital will then develop out of the experience of working together and subsequently out of shared pride in the ongoing benefit from the actual accomplishments themselves (Bond, 1998).

The increasing understanding of the vulnerability of our planet represents an incentive to *global citizens* to identify with the common super-ordinate goal of safeguarding our fragile common home. The rising awareness of the planet's tiny size and fragile biosphere coalesces with processes of *globalization* to provide an experience that binds people together and pushes for cooperation. *Globalization*, understood in this way, could be said to represent a *benign* trend that furthers global cooperation. Furthermore, *globalization* may operate in an even more *benign way* by making people *humble* before these newly identified goals. The majority of lay people, at least until very recently, were not very enlightened about the nature of the universe. According to our everyday experience, the Earth is flat with small variations for hills or mountains. It is difficult to understand that the Earth is spherical. Previously, proofs were difficult to obtain. In contrast, very recently, virtually everybody on the globe is exposed to the pictures from space of a revolving Earth-ball.

When many still thought the earth was flat, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473- 1543) developed the heliocentric model, with its shocking implication that the Earth is not the center of the universe. This humbling view was accepted as scientific standard only in the 1660s, more than 100 years after Copernicus' death. The church rejected Copernicus' model until the 1800s, waiting for supportive evidence to be produced by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630). Even learned clerics required 300 years to adapt to a new framing of their worldview.

The revolutionary and humbling effect of our recent insight about the size and fragility of Earth is described by Charles Kingsley (1819-1875), professor of modern history at Cambridge. "Inductive Physical Science, which helped more than all to break up the superstitions of the Ancien Regime…set man face to face with the facts of the universe" (Kingsley, 2003).

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) added more humbling lessons, telling us that Homo sapiens is just another animal, one that is not even in control of himself. Dreams and hypnosis indicate life in our souls that we know next to nothing about. We may not be as "sapiens" [wise, judicious] and certainly not as mighty as we once thought. Ironically, the human toolkit, meant to heighten human standing, ultimately humbles it. Telescopes dissipate the message that haughtiness on the part of Homo sapiens is misplaced. It is unsettling for any intelligent being to ponder whether Homo sapiens is chosen by God or merely lost in space. Anyone who thinks along such lines, even with the tiniest shred of doubt, is about to lose faith in fixed order. Masters are not sure anymore whether *up* is really their divinely ordained place; underlings questions

whether they are divinely ordained to remain down. The thought that planet Earth may be better off without humans may not be the most humbling. Perhaps we will die out like the Dinosaurs, and the world will sigh with relief. All aspects of *globalization* that highlight humanity's insignificance and vulnerability humble us, make us more cautious, less prone to *proud subjugation* and *mindless violation*.

A friend, a veterinarian who works in Scandinavia, told me the following (in October 2002):

Recently, I heard a talk at a conference about artificial insemination. The American speaker explained that his research showed that bulls produce a higher quality semen when it is procured with an artificial vagina rather than through the use electro-ejaculation, whereby the bull receives a small electroshock to trigger ejaculation. The drawback with the artificial vagina is that the bull has to be trained to use it.

After the talk, the American speaker and his colleagues explained that they would continue with electro-ejaculation. I was flabbergasted. First, the speaker explains that using an artificial vagina renders better results and then he declares that he recommends the inferior method. I asked him if he knew that electro-ejaculation was banned in Norway and Sweden for ethical reasons. The speaker and his people replied: 'We are free to do what we want!'"

At this point, the friend who told me this story almost shouted, "This is the freedom of the fool who cuts off the branch on which he sits. How can foolishness be freedom? These people are so blinded by their arrogance in regard to nature that they do not recognize that a little humility would serve their interests much better! These people humiliate their animals and in my eyes also themselves."

Another friend, an official of a global organization, commented when he heard the story:

Now you understand why the world is so furious at the United States for their lack of commitment in multilateral agreements. Global climate, it seems, does not interest them. Only the American climate matters. They behave as if God has secretly promised them another planet when this one is used up. It is as if they have already decided that they will not share this divine invitation to a new globe because they believe they alone are chosen by God. The only hopes we have are those sensible Americans who see that America needs humility. It is obscene how they contribute to wasting our biosphere's resources! They behave as if it is virtuous to get rich and powerful by stealing common goods!

This new humility sabotages fixed order and makes arrogance an outdated stance. The Scandinavian veterinarian has heard the message, his American colleagues have not. They haughtily believe that "freedom" means power over the limitations of nature. The new humility reinforces the many little processes that coalesce in globalization; it transforms acts intended as acts of confident subjugation into overconfident violation.

We may conclude that the emergence of new common super-ordinate goals powered by the facts and imageries of the vulnerability of planet Earth comprise a *benign* tendency

in globalization. However, there is a problem that can turn *malignant*. The humility that is required to tackle the newly detected super-ordinate goals – though propelled by processes of globalization – does not emerge simultaneously in all hearts and minds. Wherever humility is wanting, feelings of humiliation heat up on all sides. Isolationist Americans, accused of haughtiness, may feel insulted, humiliated when others point fingers at them, and those who do the finger-pointing feel insulted, humiliated and enraged by the American definition of "freedom." Since feelings of humiliation undermine cooperation, the acquisition of this new humility can be said to introduce *malign* or at least *detrimental* tendencies that have to be mitigated if cooperation is to be attained.

Second requirement: common super-ordinate goals must be attainable

Samuel L. Gaertner, John F. Dovidio and others (1993, 1999) stipulate that an environment that rests on a win-win situation may be expected to lend itself to cooperation, while zero sum circumstances may increase the likelihood of divisions between people. As I mentioned earlier, Ury (1999) describes the global information society as a culture in which the pie of resources is expandable. Unlike land, knowledge – ideas, new thoughts, and novel inventions – has no limits. Agriculturalists depend on land, forcing them to adopt win-lose games. Modern information bearers, on the other side, find themselves in win-win situations; there is always another innovation out there waiting to be invented. The innovative ideas that power modern technologies that in turn power *globalization* also render a *benign* win-win push towards cooperation.

We can, therefore, assume that the second requirement for cooperation – *attainability* – exists as a benign tendency in today's world. It would seem beneficial to strengthen these *benign* tendencies and encourage even more creativity.

Third requirement: super-ordinate goals must be combined with conditions of equality

Social psychology emphasizes equality (which I prefer to call equal dignity) as a precondition for cooperation because inequality generates ill feelings. Wilkinson et al. (1996, 1998) discovered that social inequality deteriorates the quality of social bonds, producing psychosocial stress for all, particularly those of lower status.

In The Dictionary of Geography (Mayhew, 1997) defines deprivation as "lacking in provision of desired objects or aims," and explains:

Within the less developed countries deprivation may be acute; the necessities of life such as water, housing, or food may be lacking. Within the developed world basic provisions may be supplied but, in comparison with the better-off, the poor and the old may well feel a sense of deprivation. This introduces the concept of *relative deprivation* which entails comparison and is usually defined in subjective terms…The idea of a *cycle of deprivation* refers to the transmission of deprivation from one generation to the next through family behaviors, values, and practices. This idea has been extensively debated and discussed.

As long as people live far apart with little information about one another, they remain unaware of inequalities. Those who have less are not aware that they are deprived. Under such conditions, *relative deprivation* may go undetected. To recognize *relative deprivation*, people must move closer. The more opportunities to compare themselves with others, the more existing inequalities will be acknowledged. An oasis dweller in the Egyptian desert who gets access to television for the first time and watches American soap operas is taking a crash course in comparison. What may have been *absolute deprivation* before, becomes *relative deprivation* with the help of such technology.

As discussed before, as long as those who have less believe that inequality is a natural phenomenon, divinely ordained, they may not develop ill feelings. People will accept relative deprivation if they see it as legitimate. *Cycles of deprivation* become entrenched when those who have less develop cultures to explain certain aspects of their situation as *honorable assets*. It is only when such justifications are undermined – as they are by the human rights message – that people begin to question inequality and may move to protect their self-esteem and identity by attributing their lowly circumstances to powerful enemies who oppress them (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973) Deutsch (2002) summarizes:

> An individual's conception of what is he and others are entitled to is determined by at least five major kinds of influence: (1) the ideologies and myths about justice that are dominant and officially supported in the society, (2) the amount of exposure to ideologies and myths that conflict with those that are officially supported and are supportive of larger claims for the oppressed, (3) experienced changes in satisfactions-dissatisfactions, (4) knowledge of what others who are viewed as comparable are getting, and (5) perceptions of the bargaining power of the oppressed and oppressors (Deutsch, 2002, p. 25).

Globalization – the coming together of all humankind – provides new opportunities for comparison, turning *absolute* into *relative deprivation*. Coupled with the message of human rights, which deems relative deprivation illegitimate, the situation is one that removes all possible justifications for inequality and elicits rage and anger.

In the language of *human rights humiliation*, it is humiliating to be shown the amenities of modern life in Western soap operas and to be invited into the family of equal human beings, while simultaneously being deprived of those very amenities. Ill feelings, including feelings of humiliation, must be expected to increase in such circumstances.

Globalization makes humiliation more relevant than ever before. Since humiliation tends to produce division, not cooperation, its effects must be mitigated if cooperation is to be achieved.

In summary, *globalization*, by creating super-ordinate goals that are realistically attainable and that can be tackled in team spirit is *benign*. Indeed, *globalization* may be thought of as a process that provides humankind with common super-ordinate goals and through them, the hope that demarcation lines between hostile groups can be transcended.

However, equal dignity must be nurtured to prevent emerging feelings of humiliation from turning these *benign* tendencies *malign*.

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You are an enemy! How outdated out-group language can humiliate

In the *global village*, all concepts, ideas, and feelings formerly attached to *out-group* categorizations lose their validity. When there is only *One in-group* left, there can be no *out-group*. *Out-group* notions now "hang in thin air" without their former basis in reality. When a tree dies, it no longer bears fruit. People may need time to grasp this, but they cannot escape this new reality.

Words such as *enemies*, *wars*, and *soldiers* (as well as the already mentioned word *they,* as opposed to *us*) stem from times when the population of the globe lived in many separate *villages*. Under the new circumstances *we* are citizens of *One* village, with no imperial *enemies* threatening from *outside*. There is, indeed, no *outside*. Likewise there is no *they* anymore; there is only *us*. The only sentence that fits the reality of any village, including the *global village*, is, *"We are all neighbors; some of us are good neighbors, some are bad neighbors, and in order to safeguard social peace we need police [no longer soldiers to defend against enemies in wars]."*

A village comprises good and bad neighbors, while enemies traditionally have their place outside of the village's boundaries, as have soldiers and wars. A village enjoys peace when all inhabitants get along without resorting to violence. The suggestion that there might be *outsiders* risks splitting a village in two. For a *global village* that strives for unity, this would be a step backwards.

Recently, we witnessed the results of this slow historic transition away from the word *enemy*, replaced by the word *terrorist*. *Terrorists* are *inner enemies*, *very bad neighbors*, the only subgroup of *enemy* that can exist *inside*.[116]

Words such as *war* and *soldier* are equally anachronistic. The only language that fits the new situation is the language of policing, because safeguarding social peace within a village calls for police, not soldiers. The traditional notion of the *soldier* is slowly changing to connote *peace keepers* and *peace enforcers*.[117] The *soldier*/warrior who left home to reap national and personal glory, fame, and triumph, is becoming obsolete.

In Rwanda, I heard vivid descriptions of old-time aristocratic warriors sitting together in the evenings, chanting their *names of glory* – the number of *enemies* he has killed. A modern member of a peace keeping force would be reprimanded if he or she boasted of having caused the death of so many fellow human beings. Books such as *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics*, are markers of new times (Shriver, 1995).[118]

It is important to learn that the use of outdated language may have humiliating effects. Friends from different parts of the non-Western world, among them those who supported the American government when it went to war against Iraq, regularly write to me. I summarize and paraphrase their reactions at the period around April 2003:

I agree that Iraq must be liberated. But saying Saddam Hussein has to be removed because he threatens the civilized free world is obscene. Does this mean that there is a "civilized" world and "uncivilized" world? Does it mean that Iraqis are uncivilized? Or are Indonesians uncivilized? Are only Americans civilized? America is a baby among the great civilizations! Iraq is the successor of Mesopotamia, home of some of the world's greatest civilizations!

If Saddam only threatened the uncivilized world, would he be allowed to stay in power and freely kill uncivilized people? What is this nonsense about the free world? Everybody is free who has a passport from a rich country. A person from a rich country, even the most awful sloth and parasite, is free. But, all those poor creatures who are born in a poor country, are not free. They are restricted. They may work a hundred times harder than any rich person, but they are not free. Rich countries call them illegal immigrants and send them back home, deeply humiliated.

If President Bush wants to win the hearts and minds of the uncivilized and un-free of this world he should never say that dictators threaten the free civilized world! They threaten the whole world! Period! He should never talk about waging *war*! Even not *just war*! Policing is the word that describes what needs to be done. And, he would NEVER pray: 'May God continue to bless America!' Instead, he would say: "May God continue to bless America and the whole World!" America is only blessed if the entire planet is blessed!

As my friends' comments indicate, p*olicing* can be just or unjust, but it is never *war*. Policing is *just*, at least from the point of view of a human rights framework, when the related institutions are democratically legitimized and targets only criminals. It is *unjust*, when the police force is dominated by an elite who uses it to subjugate competitors. Much of Western war-language is anachronistic and humiliating, particularly in the ears of all those who subscribe to the human rights vision of equal dignity for all. It feels obscene. It violates decency and mocks the courage that inspires these *missions*. The same endeavor, if framed in police language – saying that *criminals* are to be *brought to justice* (not *killed* or *flushed out*) and that *hostages* (including *enemy soldiers*) have to be *freed* - would meet more acceptance.

The *globalization* process described here proceeds even in the face of resistance. Conservatives around the world may insist, for example, that bad people deserve to be called *enemy*. This word, and related words such as *war* and *soldier,* will not disappear because some soft-hearted dreamers wish it. These words are losing their meaning because they no longer describe reality. The tree dies and bears no more fruit.

The emergency is over! Globalization brings humiliation to the fore

I suggest there are four logics at the core of the human condition:

(1)   The question of whether and to what extent resources are expandable (*game theory,* as developed by the discipline of philosophy),
(2)   The question of whether the *security dilemma* is weaker or stronger (*international relations theory*, developed by political science),
(3)   The question as to what extent long-term or short-term horizons dominate (as described in many academic disciplines, among others *cross-cultural psychology*), and
(4)   The question of how the human capacity to tighten or loosen fault lines of identification is calibrated (*social identity theory*, developed by social psychology).

Game theory is well-known and does not need a lengthy explanation here. It is almost common knowledge that win-win situations are more benign than win-lose situations. As discussed before, the global knowledge society offers a win-win environment (Ury, 1999). This state-of-affairs provides a rather benign base-line.

The other three logics will be discussed in a little more detail in the following paragraphs.

The security dilemma

The term security dilemma is described by international relations theory as follows: "I have to amass power, because I am scared. When I amass weapons, you get scared. You amass weapons, I get more scared."[119] Thus an arms race and finally war are triggered. In such contexts, even the most "benign" sovereigns are compelled to be belligerent because they are victims of the security dilemma.

The security dilemma forces bloody competition to emerge out of mutual distrust, even as nobody is interested in going to war in the first place. The threat of preemption with preemption is the ultimate and seemingly inevitable outcome of the traditional security dilemma. The term "security dilemma" was coined by John Herz, 1950, to explain why states that have no intention to harm one another may still end up in competition and war. Its very essence is one of tragedy. The security dilemma has been expanded upon by many authors (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985, see also Betts (Ed.), 2005). Jack Snyder's definition of the security dilemma, where one state *requires* the insecurity of another (Snyder, 1985, see also Snyder and Walters (Eds.), 1999) has been labeled by Alan Collins as a *state-induced* security dilemma (Collins, 2004).

As long as humanity lived in many separate *villages*, the danger from outside attackers indeed was great. From Vikings to Huns, raiders forced villagers to build walls and fortresses to protect themselves and their settlements. This happened so frequently during the past thousands of years because raiding – along with the intensification of agriculture – was a way to increase resources. Semi-deserts such as in Somalia, ill-suited to agriculture, saw pastoralist warriors emerge. Mobile and "free" Somali warriors commonly looked down on farmers and routinely raided them.

Classical and structural realism, two early international relations theories, saw the security dilemma as unavoidable. Yet, history indicates that the dilemma is indeed amenable to being increased or decreased. It has been found, for example, that a culture of male prowess is often produced in response to a strong security dilemma – a development that tends to make the dilemma even worse. Crawford (1997) explains, "Before World War I there was a 'Cult of the Offensive' in Germany, a 'Cult of Militarism,' a 'cult of having to hit before being attacked;' this increased the problem."

The security dilemma can be weakened by involving many members of society in policy and decision-making. The dilemma also grows more benign as villages become more interdependent and begin to communicate in ways that make it easier to discern the motives of the other - when trust is built between the residents of different villages. Its logic totally disappears, however, when there is only One village.

In summary, as long as there are plenty of resources and villages are far enough apart so as to remain unaware of each other, there is no problem. However, when villages are geographically close enough for mutual raiding, but psychologically too far away to build good communication and trust, leaders became trapped in the security dilemma and had no choice but to invest in arms. As these villages coalesce into One village the problem disappears again. The security dilemma poses grave problems only as long as villages stay in a medium distance, too close for geopolitical security and too far for human security.

Trust is a very strange phenomenon. Usually, I do not expect my neighbor to get a canon and shoot at me. I trust that he will not attack me, at least not suddenly. I am convinced that we can solve normal neighborhood problems peacefully because I meet my neighbor often and exchange words with him. He seems interested in his garden and his children and not in attacking me. Even if problems occur, I have police, mediators, ombudsmen, and other alternative to solve the problem without resorting to violence.

However, what if people live close enough to me so that I am aware of them, but remain unable to speak their language or understand their motives and have no access to commonly-accepted mechanisms to redress grievances? I may want to get myself a little gun for my bedroom. The people in the other village would then get themselves somewhat larger weapons to protect themselves from me. I would respond accordingly. Our lives would soon be consumed by fear and preparations for defense, a defense that each side would misunderstand as aggressive posturing on the part of the other.

As long as a village continuously has to be prepared for sudden attack, the security dilemma dominates. Fortresses will be built, village walls will be reinforced, weapons will be stored, men will train to fight, and mothers will teach their sons to suppress their feelings. Men will become fighting machines and call this condition "honorable."

The security dilemma is called a dilemma because, under the conditions that reigned for 10,000 years, there was no way to escape it. The only solution is to resolve the fear that is at its basis. The coming together of the world into One *global village* has the potential to remove that fear and the lack of redress mechanisms that creates anarchy between villages. This is a profoundly benign effect of globalization.

The time horizon

Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961) have developed a six-dimensional system for categorizing cultures. One of their dimensions addresses the orientation towards the flow of time – the future, the past and the present. In a culture that emphasizes the past, innovation is difficult, while future-oriented societies welcome it. The authors relate the story of an American and a Bahraini meeting at a restaurant where they find a sign saying that the kitchen will be closed for the coming six months. The American reacts with anger but the Bahraini says: "We have lived without this kitchen for thousands of years, we will survive the next six months without it!"

Many examples can be drawn from daily life. Alabama, previously among the poorest states in the United States, has benefited greatly from the long time horizon promulgated by David Bronner, who manages the Alabama's teacher retirement fund. Over the past

years he invested the teacher's contributions to the fund so as to secure long-term revenue and protect teacher pensions. The economy of Alabama has profited from these investments. On a German television program (April 2, 2003[120]) about the sad state of German pension security, Bronner explained that politicians, with their short time horizon, have to be kept out of the business of caring for long-term goals such as pensions, perhaps unconsciously putting his finger on a problem with the democratic model. It is in the best interests of the electorate to elect politicians who care for the long-term future of society. However, politicians are often adverse to putting forward difficult long-term plans that risk short-term defeat at the polls. This paradox creates the common situation in which politicians misinform the electorate about its own long-term interests. Only a strong, educated, and well-informed electorate can withstand this dangerous trap in-built in democracy.

A long future time horizon seems to be more beneficial for human kind than a short one. An entrepreneur, who cuts down the trees of the rain forest, the lungs of the globe, has the short-term interest of earning money. He should also, however, be aware that it is in his long-term interest that his grandchildren should find a world worth living in.

Players in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may have a short-term interest in retaliation, but they need to bear in mind that they all share a long-term interest in building a world that provides peace and welfare to their children. Many conflicts "dissolve" as soon as people switch to long future time horizons.

Constituent groups normally look to their leaders to address problems and crises in a timely fashion. However, many of the social, economic, and political problems leaders face today are complex matters where information is scarce or contradictory, requiring considerable time for effective analysis, planning, and implementation. Furthermore, these problems typically occur in a context which includes many problems – which may or may not be related – demanding attention. Thus, leaders are often driven to (and rewarded for) suggesting quick solutions that insufficiently address the root causes of the problem (Welsh and Coleman, 2002) (Coleman, 2003, p. 16).

In conclusion:

- Long-term orientations, projected into the future, provide common ground and are more *benign* than short-term orientations or orientations projected into the past.
- The technological advances that coalesce with and drive *globalization*, may represent a push towards such *benign* long-term orientations because they help bring long-term processes to public awareness – research on climate is an example.
- Democracy, with its in-built short-term political horizon, is only *benign* as long as a strong civil society counteracts short-term outlooks and safeguards long-term future orientations.

Social identity

Social identity as defined in Table 4 shows how humiliation can create rifts within social relationships at all levels when people get closer and support human rights. Angry outbursts of feelings of humiliation can be so devastating that they lead to violence even

in cases where everything else is in place to produce cooperation. Humiliation can introduce devastatingly *malign* elements into otherwise *benign* processes.

Four logics

Table 4 displays the four basic *logics* that may have guided the development of *cultures* of *pride* (1), *honor* (2), and *dignity* (3), and (4) the manner in which each type of culture deals with humiliation. The table is based on the understanding that, about 10,000 years ago, human communities based on *pristine pride* confronted a dramatic alteration in the core *logics* that define human lives – suddenly abundant pies turned into fixed ones. Humanity responded with a completely new moral ethos and emotional coinage, namely the *honor coinage* that legitimizes the vertical scale of human value and worth. Present changes are inspiring the development of yet another, completely new and initially disruptive ethos and emotional coinage, that of *equal dignity*. As the post-modern knowledge society transforms the fixed pie into an expandable pie, the "second round" of *globalization* invites humankind into *One single in-group*. The *security dilemma* weakens and long-term thinking becomes the norm. This development delegitimizes practices of *putting and holding down*.

The Human Condition

		The Time Horizon		Social Identity	
		Short, or long past	**Long future**	**Respect**	**humiliation**
The Pie	**Fixed**	(2)			(2)
	Expandable		(1,3)	(1,3)	
The Security Dilemma	**Strong**	(2)			(2)
	Weak		(1,3)	(1,3)	

Table 4: The Human condition (adapted from Lindner, 2001h, p. 439)

In 2001, I wrote:

> The most benign scenario is a combination of weak Security Dilemma, expandable pie, long time horizon, and an atmosphere of respect. Conversely, the worst scenario brings together a short time horizon, positioned in an environment that represents a fixed pie of resources, combined with a strong Security Dilemma, within which individuals or groups are exposed to humiliating assaults. As already mentioned, feelings of humiliation and their consequences may be so strong that they override and undermine otherwise 'benign' scenarios, in a downward spiral. This model of the human condition may be instrumental to analyzing social change over long time stretches and in different world regions, as well as aid future strategy planning for governments and international organizations. It indicates that the destructive nature of the dynamics of humiliation becomes the more visible the more the other parameters veer to the benign side (Lindner, 2001h, p. 439).

Clashes of humiliation

It is likely that we may in the near future experience, not *clashes of civilizations*,[121] but c*lashes of humiliation*.

The idea of a *clash of civilizations* assumes that *villages* have developed at considerable distances from one another and that cultural difference has a firm basis in "real" differences in the belief systems of the various cultures. To state this as simply as possible, one culture is seen as adapted to the mountains, others to the lives of fishermen, and still others to the needs of traders. "Cultures" are regarded as "containers" with more-or-less opaque walls. A small allowance for "diffusion" may be made, meaning that cultures are in contact with each other and learn from each other, but this does not alter their basic natures as isolated "containers."[122] Post-modern thought uses this view as its foundation, postulating that different cultures are fundamentally impenetrable, unknowable, and enigmatic to one another (Lindner, 2000d, p. 12). As long as we hold this view, there is little we can do in ease cultures clash, except protect ourselves by building walls, fences, and defense armor. We may seek to respect diversity and respect difference and hope to minimize potential hostility from "other" cultures. Respect, however, has its limits. When others shoot at us, we are likely to start shooting back.

I propose that the picture is both more complex and more hopeful, with culture differences being much more relational than the diffusion hypothesis[123] and post-modern thought conceives them to be. Perhaps culture differences are not set-in-stone realities, but reactions to re-actions to perceived hostility from others. It's very possible that they are nothing more than *devices* used when relations go sour, allowing one side to justify its actions and decisions.

During my fieldwork in 1998 and 1999 in Somalia and Rwanda I saw this dynamic in action. Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, and devotion to Islam, however, the colonial powers had split the Somalian territory into five different regions. When Somalia became independent in 1960, many people dreamed of a united Somalia. As one observer said:

> Most other African countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification (Mazrui, 1986, 71).[124]

Today Somalia is a deeply divided country, war-torn for more than a decade, full of bitterness and suffering. Self-proclaimed "Somaliland" in the North is not recognized by the international community or by other Somali leaders. In Somaliland I was beleaguered by Somalilanders who urged me to promote their dream of being an internationally recognized independent republic. They argued that they had been humiliated to such a degree by former dictator Siad Barre and his allies, Somali clans from the south, that they no longer can be part of a united Somalia. They insisted that the "cultural differences" between them and the other Somalis were too significant. Feelings of humiliation inspired the Somalilanders to create a cultural rift based on a new culture, one they can call their own. Thus, feelings of humiliation on the side of the Somalilanders made them create a

cultural rift and a new culture, namely the culture of Somalilanders. Where there was a dream of unification before, and the notion that "we all are brothers," suddenly there are no brothers anymore, but the wish to be apart. Culture difference, and deep rifts justified by this difference, can thus be constructed in response to humiliation.

For centuries, a Tutsi minority ruled both Rwanda and Burundi. The Hutu majority had been the humiliated victim for just as long, incorporated into an intricate hierarchical culture under a Tutsi aristocracy who perceived themselves as caring patrons of their Hutu underlings. The Hutu majority started moving towards power in 1959, still under Belgian colonial rule. After independence the Hutu majority gained dominance in Rwanda (Tutsis maintained powered in neighboring Burundi). Under the Hutus, in Rwanda, the former elite suffered constant humiliation, and those who fled the country as refugees where not much better off.

Soon after my arrival in Rwanda in 1999, I was struck by the fact that the country has no commonly-accepted history. People with a strong Tutsi background maintain that their centuries-old minority rule benefited the country. The Tutsi, they say, would never have perpetrated genocide as the Hutus did. The Hutus, in contrast, insist that Tutsi rule was never benevolent – the Tutsi elite just imagines benevolence to justify domination. The Hutus, feeling humiliated, thus create a "culture" – including a history – of their own. They do not want to be part of a culture defined by their dominators.

The conflicts in Rwanda and Somali can be described more accurately as *clashes of humiliation* than as *clashes between cultures*. Countless other examples show how easily feelings of humiliation can lead to divisions. (Using the examples of Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liah Greenfeld suggests that resentment plays a central role in nation building [Greenfeld, 1992; Greenfeld, 1996].[125]) People say, "I do not want to be part of a people and a culture that humiliates me and violates my dignity. I choose to shape a separate identity – personal, cultural or national."

Humiliation, which generates resentment, helps create and rifts and difference, cultural or national. The danger of this occurring is perhaps most pernicious when there has been a dream of unity. Somalia had a dream of unity, Rwanda still has. The *global village* has a dream of unity. Protest against humiliation may express itself through the formation of separate cultures within the *global village*, helping destroy the dream.

In summary, I suggest that:

- *Globalization* entails a *benign* push towards a *weaker* security dilemma and an *expandable* size of the pie and the "retreat" of these two *logics* into the background gives social identity a chance to come to the fore.
- In an environment with a strong *security dilemma*, everybody is afraid that outsiders will attack with even more armory, and will therefore expand their defense; and this fear will overrule the rest of possible choices and force people into strong tribal loyalties and deep demarcation lines.
- When the *security dilemma* weakens with increasing global interdependence, we may expect less tribal loyalties based on this dilemma, and more tribal loyalties caused by processes of humiliation.

Come in! Globalization can dignify women[126]

How did the idea that women should become more active in public life enter modern Western thought? Two hundred years ago such ideas were unthinkable for the majority of men and women. What happened? Are women stronger today? If so, why?

The domestic and the public sphere

I define the traditional roles of men and women by renaming what is usually called the *domestic* sphere, the *inside* sphere and what is usually called the *public* sphere, the *outside* sphere. Women are traditionally responsible for inside maintenance, while men are traditionally responsible for the outside and for guarding the frontier between inside and outside, keeping the inside safe. Women are traditionally expected to maintain a household, to wash and clean, to repair what is broken, to plan for long-term maintenance costs, to consider the interdependence necessary to keep a household going. The same principle applies to the social inside sphere – a woman is expected to care for the well-being of the people around her, to maintain emotional and social life, to create harmony and console the distressed, to maintain social cohesion.

The traditional man is expected to go out, to reach for the unknown, to be daring in conquering the unfamiliar, to risk his life to defend the inside sphere. A German saying asserts: "Der Mann geht hinaus in das feindliche Leben" or "The man is to go out into hostile life." Fairy tales tell of heroes who face a series of increasingly difficult tasks in far away universes to prepare to marry the princess and rule and protect his people.

Arne, a Norwegian, came to me because he did not know what to do with Maria, his new Mexican wife.

> When I met Maria nine months ago she was an energetic young woman, beautiful and radiant, working in a shop. We fell in love and quickly decided to marry. I was more than happy.
>
> But, the day after our wedding, Maria quit her job and started waiting for me to come home. She passed her days making our flat cozy and watching TV. When I came home in the evening, tired and worn out from work, she expects life to start. She had waited for me all day. I, on the other hand, am exhausted.

When Arne asked her why she had given up her job without discussing it with him, she was deeply insulted. He said:

> We hardly speak with each other now. She says she feels humiliated in her womanhood because I do not want to provide for her. She accuses me of wanting a woman who does both the man's work and the woman's work. I have tried to explain that I would be happy to provide for her if she really needed anything. But, I do not want a wife who has no life on her own. Our marriage is falling apart.

Maria is firmly anchored in a world where males are sent *out* and females stay *in* and care for the home. Females in most societies throughout history were asked to nurture the next generation, while males were put to the task of protecting the present generation. For long stretches of the past, males were responsible for short-term emergency and women for long-term maintenance. In some parts of Africa, this gendered "division of labor" can be observed in particularly pure forms. Men proudly hold themselves ready for war in coffee houses, while women humbly care for crops and children. A community under the trance of the security dilemma had little choice but to construct its culture this way. It is more conducive to survival to let males "do the dying;" they are "redundant" at an earlier age, seen from the point of population politics.

Emergency trumps maintenance

As soon as a community decided to use males for defense, male dominance was almost inevitable – because emergency trumps maintenance. Even our bodies follow this protocol. When we are in danger, adrenaline pours into the blood stream and pushes the maintenance tasks of the body into the background. However, there is a price to pay. The body breaks down under conditions of constant emergency when essential maintenance is too-long neglected. Heart attacks – the typical emergency trouble shooter disease – result. Similarly, a world under the grip of the necessity of continuous male prowess is bound to live in constant danger of collapse, too. Such a setting is potentially malign.

"Male" emergency tasks are not holistic. They are characterized by the sword cutting through and the axe destroying the enemy, both highly efficient operations, even when this efficiency means destroying an intricate network. Historically, males covered distances unidirectionally on a horse or a ship, or with an airplane or rocket. Males opened new horizons. This male action bore valuable fruit, leading eventually to modern technology. However, it also created long-term problems, since this mindset tends to overlook the fragile interdependence of physical laws and the need to maintain balance.

Emergency, fear, stress, and the need to send people out to defend borders, ebbs and wanes with the strength of the security dilemma – significantly abating when the security dilemma dissolves. The coming-into-being of one single village takes away continuous emergency and stress, and instead makes room to proper maintenance.

Globalization could save the world from "cardiac failure." It lessens the need for a culture of male dominance – a culture that neglects proper maintenance – that characterized humanity almost everywhere on the globe for the past 10,000 years. In the *global village*, females and males alike can concentrate on maintenance and cautiously planned exploration of new horizons, rather than emergency. Both females and males have an opportunity to become mature adults; women can stop huddling under male protection like children; males can release undue self-confidence.

No bias

Women and men are not irreconcilably different by nature, although there are undoubtedly hormonal and physical differences between the two sexes. It is possible for a

woman to step into a male role and vice versa. When I talk about female or male roles, I refer to a set of culturally determined *recipes* or *prescriptions* or *templates*. I see those roles as sets of *how-to-do* and *how-to-be* rules, assimilated from birth by every individual. Men did not only operate as warriors, explorers or discoverers, but as farmers and tradesmen, as well. In trade, men combined "male" and "female" skills, going out into the unknown to find new products and clients, then nurturing and maintaining these new trade connections.

Women are not better people than men. Nor are men better than women. The two gender role templates offer tools for both construction and destruction. There happens to be right now an urgent need for the more "female" holistic thinking on the ecological and on the social level. We need more "female"-oriented individuals – people who understand biological cycles and are willing to work for social peace. But we also need the "male" skill of unidirectional thinking, a tool essential to innovation.

Furthermore, there is one traditionally "feminine" role – the *cleaning* role (see work on *Purity and Danger* by Douglas, 1984a, Douglas, 1984b) that has proven extremely destructive. At the simplest level, cleaning is often ecologically inappropriate – when women wash clothes white with heavily polluting agents, for example. At the social level, cleaning can degenerate into damage, destruction and even atrocities, as it does when a group dedicates itself to ethnic *cleansing*, for example. The metaphor that something needs to be *thrown out* from *inside* into an imagined *outside* can justify environmental and social atrocities.[127] The German army tried to deny its involvement in ethnic cleansing during World War II, perhaps on the basis of a belief that it was not "male" enough work for soldiers. Killing defenseless people smacks of "female" cleaning, not the kind of activity that wins soldiers medals for bravery. The killing of Jews in concentration camps was equated with having to eradicate "dirt" or "pests," an unavoidable but unpleasant feminine task.

Women agreed

Ahmed, from a middle class family in Cairo, came to me as a client because he felt burdened by his responsibility to care for his five older sisters. Traditionally, it is the task of the son to step into his father's shoes as protector of the family. As a psychologist, I witnessed many cases in which this arrangement was extremely successful. Foreign wives, married to Egyptians, suffered many disadvantages, one of them being that they had no family to intervene in family disputes. Western parents and siblings regard such problems as "private problems." But in Egypt, a system of family mediation is often very effective in resolving family disruptions. However, Ahmed explained:

> Can you imagine how difficult it is for me to take care of five sisters? One is married in Turkey and another lives in the United States. It is my job to mediate in marriage quarrels. I spend more time and money than I can afford on this. I am so worn out that I sometimes do nothing but watch television for hours. This can't continue. When I was small, I was taught I had to be tough because I was a male and would have to take care of a large family. I had to be fearless because I needed to die for the family in war, if necessary. I had to learn to be tough much earlier than others, because all my

sisters are older and I had to match them as fast as possible. My mother was extremely hard with me. She allowed me no time for play because of the great responsibilities ahead.

Being the protector of the family means you are treated with deference. My father wanted to eat with the family, but my mother insisted he eat first, with his son. When he finished, my mother and her daughters would eat what was left. It was my mother who wished to mark his primacy, not he himself. I have abolished this practice; I eat with my wife and children. I always get the best piece of meat, though.

Ahmed's story illustrates how care and protection combine in the male role and how his primacy is linked to his responsibility to handle emergencies. It also highlights the fact that this order is often enforced by women and that male supremacy is anchored in reality as long as the *security dilemma* forces emergencies onto humankind. Since males are sent out to die and since emergency trumps maintenance, the male sphere trumps the female. However, as mentioned earlier, an overdose of emergency leads society to neglect "female" maintenance tasks and easily leads to social "vascular disease." Only the weakening of the *security dilemma* can change this state of affairs.

The global village as a One single inside sphere

Historically, a woman could move relatively freely inside her house, or her village, but she could not venture outside her village walls, where all kinds of dangers, from plunderers to bandits, lurked. Globalization, or the coming-together of humankind, slowly dissolves village walls, increasing the inside sphere available to women.

This development is bound to create an ever-increasing demand for traditional "female" services, and indeed, this is what we observe. Negotiation is called for, instead of military attack, mediation instead of dictatorial order, and social maintenance through an intricate network of courts, lawyers and police, instead of a unidirectional system of sheer military force.

Good maintenance work is currently in the process of acquiring a higher status virtually in all segments of society. Management courses nowadays try to train managers to understand the importance of "soft" human factors such as motivation, job satisfaction, cooperation abilities, and creative problem-solving. Well-balanced "female-type" cooperation is advocated today on all levels, from small companies to the United Nations, while the army-like "male" hierarchical order is considered out-of-date. Wild-West-pioneering-style is appropriate for films, but not anymore for real life. Traditional female role characteristics are gaining ground on a global scale.

However, cultural change is not quick or homogenous. The male sphere has dominated the female for centuries, acquiring in that time a tenacity of its own. Male supremacy may lose its anchoring in reality as the *security dilemma* weakens, but cultures are slow to follow suit. Yet, women no longer cheer men in uniform; many no longer feel protected by supreme males. They feel humiliated by men and women who adhere to the old order of male supremacy, by those who do not yet understand that change is inevitable in this world of changing *logics*.

To conclude this section:

- *Globalization* plays a central role in the gender debate because globalization undermines traditional gender roles and the need to prioritize male tasks.
- *Globalization* widens the traditional female *inside* sphere and narrows the traditional male public sphere, thus diminishing the need for men to be constantly alert for emergency threats from *outside*.
- Humanity benefits because continuous focusing on emergency tasks leads to neglect of maintenance and risks collapse.
- *Globalization* entails *benign* tendencies for humankind, both for women and men and for gender role descriptions. The sluggishness of change, however, the slowness with which some players grasp new realities introduces malign influences. Newly empowered women feel humiliated by expressions of old-fashioned male dominance. Emerging feelings of humiliation tempt some women to erect a "female culture" apart from the "male culture," substituting demarcation lines *born out of the security dilemma* with demarcation lines *born out of humiliation*.

Global society can concentrate on *inside* maintenance tasks and discontinue its focus on *outside* emergencies that demand the sacrifice of male lives. However, *malign* influences, largely connected with the phenomenon of humiliation, threaten to undermine otherwise *benign* tendencies. Use of outdated terminologies, for example, may elicit feelings of humiliation. Feelings of humiliation are furthermore elicited when promises are made that are not kept, or at least not fast enough; human rights advocacy, for example, figures large as promise – yet betrayed. Feelings of humiliation are triggered when transitions towards new concepts are unstable, slow and inhomogeneous, putting old and new ideas at loggerheads.

The following chapter will discuss how humanity might envision the structure of the future *global village*.

Related reading

Kurt Danziger (1990) and his classic book *Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research*[128] may be mentioned, and, for example, Kenneth J. Gergen (1999) with articles such as "Agency – Social Construction and Relational Action."[129] A. P. Craig (1999) in "What Is It That One Knows When One Knows 'Psychology?',"[130] advocates a "continuous interplay between stories and science because, in this way, we are better able to account for and configure who we are and how to live" (Abstract). See also Stam and Egger (1997) "On the Possibilities of a Narrative psychology" in *Paul Ricoeur and Narrative.*[131] Paul Ricoeur is indeed listened to, not least in Rwanda. His article, "Le pardon peut-il guerir? [Can pardon heal?]" (Ricoeur, 1995), has been reprinted in the Rwandan journal *Dialogue, Revue d'information et de réflexion* where his article serves as the opening article in the journal's special issue *Two Years After the Genocide.*

Read furthermore on the *globalization of world politics*,[132] *scope of justice* and *moral exclusion*,[133] on *social identity theory*,[134] on *terror management theory*,[135] on *stereotyping*,[136] on *outgroup contact*,[137] on *social cohesion*,[138] how to find out that the Earth's surface is *curved*,[139] since when *experts know* that the Earth's surface indeed is curved,[140] on who promoted a *flat-Earth model*,[141] on the ecological dangers threatening planet Earth,[142] on how *win-win situations bring people together*,[143] on *relative deprivation* and *causal attribution*,[144] on *sacrifice* and when it is deemed worth it,[145] on *genocide* and *ethnic cleansing*,[146] on *game theory in relation to political theory*,[147] on the *security dilemma*,[148] on the *diffusion hypothesis*,[149] on *gender and space*,[150] on *division of labor*,[151] on *female revolt*,[152] on the *relationship between social construction and biological facts* as, for example, with regard to *gender differences*,[153] *causes* of *war* and *violence*,[154] on *ethnic conflict*,[155] on *masculinity, violence,* and *war*,[156] on *genes, hormones* and *violence*,[157] on *citizen-soldiers* versus *manly warriors*,[158] on *militarism from a feminist point of view*,[159] and on *modern management and leadership* that considers "soft factors."[160]

Egalization and Humiliation[161]

Egalization and humiliation permeate our daily lives perhaps even more fully than *globalization*. *Globalization* is powered by technology and our use of it, *egalization* by our day-to-day moral sentiments and moral decisions. *Egalization* is about our relations with others and ourselves, whether we deem it right to look *up* or *down* on others and ourselves or believe we should treat all with equal respect. *Egalization* is about whether we use fear as the "glue" for coercive hierarchies or prefer to live in creative networks held together by mutual respect.

What would you do if you had a nasty neighbor who let his dog use your doorstep as an outhouse. You probably would not call him an enemy – at least, not seriously. You would never go to war against your neighbor. If you did, your neighbors would call the police. You would, instead, try to speak to your neighbor, invite a mediator in, or go to the police. You would do these things because you and your neighbor live within a so-called *social contract*.

Global democracy or global dictatorship? The wrong sheriff can humiliate

The *social contract* has been discussed by many, among them Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in *Leviathan* (Hobbes, 1651), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762) [162] became a textbook for the French Revolution and influenced the history of the entire Western world. Rousseau writes that all men [sic], though born free and equal, regard the state as a contract in which individuals, rather than surrendering their natural rights, agree to have them protected. He argues that individuals find their true being and freedom through submission to the *general will* of the community. In *Emile, or on Education* (1762) Rousseau wrote:

Since before choosing a king a people is a people, what made it a people, except the social contract? The social contract is therefore the foundation of all civil society, and it is in the nature of this act that we must seek the nature of the society formed by it. (Rousseau, 1762b, paragraph 1647).

The same line of reasoning finds a place in various other disciplines. Political philosophy uses terms such as *collectivism* and *individualism*. Collectivism and individualism are best balanced in the *social contract* that we call *social democracy*. All discussion on democracy and capitalism and how they could be calibrated focus on versions of social contracts and which ones are most beneficial.

We need social contracts to counteract the *anarchic state of nature*. The collapse of law and order after the 2003 Iraq war shows the extent to which *anarchy* can occur. Somalia, after exiling dictator Siad Barre in 1991, remained lawless for more than a decade, and in many ways still is. Colombia currently has only one objective, instituting "Order! Order! Order!" and the "Rule of Law!" to stem rampant social *chaos* (says Francisco Santos, Colombian Vice President, on May 12, 2003[163]).

However, is Rousseau's idea of the social contract really feasible? If so, what kind of social contract do we need? In *Leviathan* (1651/1962), Hobbes describes *life under conditions of anarchy* as "continual fear, and danger of violent death" where "the life of man [sic]" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes, 1651/1962). Hobbes characterizes the *state of nature* as an utterly lawless state of affairs that cannot be remedied by a social contract that is merely agreed upon by its users. In Hobbes's view only unlimited political authority, preferably *absolute monarchy*, is strong enough. Citizens should voluntarily bow to a strong hand.

John Locke (1690) had doubts. Absolute monarchs are just human beings with all their weaknesses. Ultimate political authority, according to Locke, resides in the *will of the majority*. This majority entrusts political power to governmental officials, under the condition that they work for the common good and can be removed if they violate the pubic trust.

To use traffic metaphor, the *anarchy* of the *state of nature* poses a problem. Under conditions of *anarchy*, big vehicles push the small ones out of the way at every crossroad. Small vehicles hardly have a chance and there is much upheaval and continuous fighting.

Hobbes argues for an *absolute authority* to decide how traffic should be regulated and to enforce these rules. He believes that only a very strong hand is able to control the usurpers of power who undermine calm and order. Locke, on the other hand, trusts the majority to decide all this collectively. The *majority* has the power to decide on a super-ordinate set of rule that bind everyone, weak and strong. An abusive traffic police chief could be replaced by the vote of the majority.

Here we have two models for maintaining law and order in the *global village* of the future*, the solutions presented by Hobbes or Locke. One solution recommends *subjugation through an absolute world ruler*, the other recommends *global democracy*. Hobbes reflections suggest a *global village* with a top-down pyramid of power, while Locke proposes a *global village* of equal citizens. Both solutions may guarantee stability and order. If Hobbes's strongman uses a sufficient amount of force, no underling would dare break the law or instigate revolution. There will be quiet, either out of fear or out of lazy contentment. Saddam Hussein's draconian rule provided a certain degree of stability

and order, even if his citizens lived in constant fear. Locke's majority vote, carried out sensibly by a citizenry that is not too unruly, will also produce calm. Both a draconian honor code and a successfully applied dignity code are capable of producing the desired result.

Thorvald Stoltenberg, eminent Norwegian politician, explained (2000) the responses his friends in Eastern Europe provide when he asks them why they voluntarily elect people from the old communist times. They say that if they have the choice between order and democracy, they choose order. If they have the choice between the free market and jobs, they choose jobs. According to Stoltenberg, it is "useless to try to convince them that in the long run it will be better for them to opt for real democracy…" (Stoltenberg, 2000).

How will our future *global village* be structured? This master question contains many sub-questions, such as: Is there a chance that the United Nations might be supported by all in common humility? Or will there be an *elite* ruling from the top? Will today's global champion – the United States – continue to be the only superpower, relegating the rest to a kind of "second league?" Will the human rights message be heard that calls for a combination of *egalization* and *globalization*? Emotions run high when these questions are addressed.

If Hobbes could go on TV and promote his ideas of an absolute ruler, the world might acquiesce to his solution and the United States might be the most obvious candidate. However, it appears that Locke's views have won. Even the United States would not want to fill the role of absolute world subjugator, at least not as long as its people continue to believe in human rights and equal dignity. This means that the only solution is a *global village* shaped according to Locke's views, a *global village* of democratically determined super-ordinate structures that guarantee equal dignity.

Such global super-ordinate structures are at least rudimentarily present through the United Nations, but confidence in these rudimentary structures can easily be shaken. If the United Nations institutions, for example, are understood to be partisan, to be lackeys of the United States, if Kofi Annan is seen as employee of the United States government or any other state's government, for that matter, there is a problem.

Democracy and democratically-anchored capitalism mean traffic lights and rules selected by majority vote. The democratic ideal is that every driver, independent of the size of the vehicle, has the same right to pass at each traffic light. Large and small vehicles (capitalism allows for such differences) all have to stop for the red light and to start driving when the light turns green (equal dignity despite of differences). This system is managed by officials who can be replaced with majority vote where every single person, the driver of a Rolls Royce as well as the pedestrian, has a say (democracy). During the current period of transition, when the envisaged super-ordinate roof of rules and institutions is not yet securely in place at a global level, many ask whether those with large vehicles are genuinely willing to give up their "freedom" in deference to rules set by all. When a large vehicle forces another off the road, doubts arise about the future of the *global village*.

Western film illustrates this process as well as our much-used traffic metaphor. The story line for most Western films is simple. Gangsters terrorize the city with different gangs vying for power and control. Raw might, brutality and gun power, as well as promises of wealth and riches, determine who is at the top at any given moment. There is

no peace and quiet for the ordinary citizen. All are drawn into this power play. Then the sheriff arrives to represent the interest of common citizens against their tormentors. He symbolizes an impartial super-ordinate force that protects all citizens against brutal power. He does not yearn for personal glory. Prior to his arrival, each gang had a name. There was the gang of Bloody Jim, Dirty Harry, or Vicious Jack, each calling the other *enemy* and terrorizing everybody else with promises and threats. After the sheriff's victory, there are only *citizens* and *criminals*. Bloody Jim and Dirty Harry are *criminal*s, sitting in prison, with the hope of being rehabilitated into humbled citizens. The common interest has won. The sheriff's victory creates *One single city*, or *One single state*, huddling under *One single roof* of the law and order built by the citizens. Those who used to have ambitions of becoming gang bosses are asked to abandon their dreams and support the sheriff. Even the best intentioned liberator is asked to invest in the sheriff's efforts instead of behaving like Robin Hood. Nobody *defends* himself alone anymore; everybody has to help the sheriff defend and secure everybody.

The sheriff fights in the name of *law and order*, the principle of the state which has the monopoly on the use of force. In the past, citizens were forced and humiliated by state might and brutality. In modern times, citizens voluntarily extend genuine humility to such super-ordinate institutions because they understand the benefit and because the state is democratically legitimized.

In our vision of the *global village*, former *villages* – brutal Iraq and arrogant/benevolent America – coalesce into *One village* under the roof of the super-ordinate structure of international law and United Nations institutions. Saddam Hussein is a *criminal* to be brought to prison like any other criminal. The world's citizens are protected by "sheriff" Kofi Annan. Nobody acts to defend herself unilaterally. Everybody helps the sheriff. If the super-ordinate institution of the sheriff is too weak to cope, it is strengthened. Nobody ridicules and humiliates this institution when it needs support. Nobody bails out, selfishly focusing on their own business. If there is dissent, it is resolved under the common roof, lest the door be opened to anachronistic warlordism. In such a world, *my* security is *common* security.

With this dream in the background, doubts arise when the richest citizens go their own ways. Do they, after all, intend to implement a draconian world rule à la Hobbes? Why don't they help the sheriff do his job and get their own people to implement the law? Will the outcome be global humiliation?

To summarize this section:

- If the United Nations institutions walk in Locke's footsteps, they could one day develop into something akin to a democratically legitimated global government.
- Hobbes, on the other side, would perhaps suggest that the United States (as the only current superpower) hold the rest of the world down in an iron grip as an absolute power, and that the world voluntarily agrees so as to escape anarchy.
- At present, Locke seems to have won the competition, in theory, but not always in practice. Worries and uncertainties as to the future structure of the *global village* represent *malign* elements in a situation where strong political commitments towards global super-ordinate structures anchored in human rights would have *benign* effects.

In the following section, I look more closely into the worries and uncertainties about *egalization* that trouble virtually everybody in the *global village*. Among the most pressing difficulties at the current stage of transition is uncertainty about the real motives behind the rhetoric of our current world leaders.

Which *global village*? Is the invitation serious?

As I have explained, I use the word *egalization* to differentiate it from the word equality because the main point is not equality,[164] but equal dignity. The term *egalization* avoids claiming that there are no differences between people. *Egality* can coexist with functional hierarchy that regards all participants as possessing equal dignity; *egality* cannot coexist with hierarchy that defines some people as *more valuable* than others.

A *global village* of top dogs and underdogs, of hierarchies that essentialize ranking orders would represent the Hobbsian vision. *Globalization* combined with *egalization*, however, represents the vision of a *global village* of equal dignity for all à la Locke.

At this historic turning point one pressing question about egality, dignity and respect underlies every human encounter. The question is: "Do you believe in a world of ranked human worth and value, a world of top dogs and underdogs, or do you believe in a world of equal dignity?" This question simmers in the background when a wife asks her husband about his definition of love, when a tourist meets his host, or when politicians and business persons meet their counterparts in other countries. It certainly forms the background when heads of governments meet their "friends" and "enemies."

You, and every other citizen of the globe, are categorized according to your rank within the world order and how you deal with it. As a traveling American, European or Japanese politician or business man, you are scrutinized and asked: "Are you planning to dominate the *global village* and treat the rest arrogantly as *lesser* beings?" "Or do you take the human rights ideals seriously, are you really humble?" "Do you include us in the decision making process or are you trying to exploit us for your own gain?" "Do you really understand the enabling environment that human rights promise us or are your promises just hypocritical and cynical talk?"

Since the two visions lie extremely close together, it is sometimes necessary to use "magnifying glasses" to determine where a person or group stands. The pilot of the plane is the boss in the air, and it can be difficult to determine whether he thinks that his passengers are *lesser* beings, or *equal* in dignity and worth. It is only the *way in which he gives orders* and the *framing of his words* that reveal his true vision. The actions of the world's top-dogs are currently scrutinized for this very reason, particularly by those of lesser resources.

In the upcoming section, we'll describe what the two different visions might look if implemented.

Globalization without egalization

In the Hobbsian vision, frontiers and fault lines would be reinstated in new ways to divide the *global village* into hierarchical layers. Formerly independent cultures would be forced

into a world where one absolute ruler trumps the rest. The West, the Arab World, China, Russia, would not coalesce with equal dignity into one single entity. The West would be at the top, subjugating the others, with the old honor order serving as blueprint. Subjugation would be promoted as "honorable medicine."

This vision of a hierarchical *global village* would entail a certain amount of in-fighting, as individuals would struggle to become members of the superpower elite, or at the regional or local level, member of the local hierarchy. Local hierarchies would serve as mandarins for the global top-dog, keeping the global hierarchy in place. This was the traditional strategy in empires – rulers associated themselves with intermediary classes of aids who had an interest in keeping this order in place because they profited from exploiting underlings. Often these aids were formerly independent local lords subjugated by a stronger centralized force. The *global village* would comprise local tyrants allied with a global ruler to exploit the rest. The global superpower would support the local rulers, and vice versa, and regional conflicts would be manipulated and fanned to the elite's advantage. The systematic humiliation of underlings would be seen as a necessary strategy to maintain the system. Many underlings would feel humiliated, while rulers would emphasize their benevolence. Rulers would feel humiliated in turn by lack of reverence from underlings (although some masters would merely laugh at the ignorance of their slaves). Even more importantly, humiliation would be employed for the age-old power-keeping strategy of divide and conquer, which works best when the fear of humiliation is used as an "active agent." The strategy has been used by a ruling parties since time immemorial, a strategy that pitches two subordinate parties at each others' throats by telling each of them that the other is about to humiliate him. The third party reaps the victory when others are exhausted.

A *global village* built with a hierarchical pyramid of power, for example as protectorate of Saudi Arabian traditionalists, would have to endure humiliation in a multitude of ways. If a Zbigniew Brzezinski became president of the United States and were asked to become an absolute world ruler, he would subjugate the rest of the world in an iron grip and use humiliation both directly and indirectly, to divide and conquer (he is proud of having brought down the Soviet Union with such a strategy, see Le Nouvel Observateur, 1998).

Yet, all this doesn't have to happen. Many people within the United States are deeply committed to human rights ideals. After all, the American Declaration of Independence is part of the precious legacy of human rights. Even an American Zbigniew Brzezinski voices his commitment to human rights or would face critics within America, if he attempted world dictatorship. There is reason to believe that an American triumph would ultimately entail the triumph of human rights.

Globalization combined with egalization? Human rights ideals may intensify feelings of humiliation

In the dignity and human rights vision for the future, world frontiers would slowly be removed to form *One unified global village with equal dignity for all*. In other words, the West, the Arab World, China, Russia, or whatever labels we may use for the world's former villages would join into a kind of federal order, for example built on the principle

of subsidiarity and thus retaining local decision making and identities at the maximum. Or they would choose to integrate more, like California, Ohio, and New Hampshire in the US, or Bavaria and Lower Saxony in Germany. They may even begin to resemble different sections of a vast global city. In the new *global village*, formerly separate spheres would acquire a new, different, less political, more cultural significance. Separate villages, retaining their identities, or even strengthening their local identities, would coalesce under a single institutional umbrella. Following the principle of subsidiarity, global problems would be solved globally and local problems locally. Global identity would embed local identity and diversity in a context of equal dignity.

We can observe many processes of coalescence, both historic and current. The United States of America went through such a historic process and Europe is currently undergoing one. EU,[165] ASEAN,[166] MERCOSUR,[167] NAFTA,[168] APEC,[169] these are all examples of processes in which certain elements of sovereignty are placed at a higher level than the local one and are slowly and carefully transferred to commonly accepted super-ordinate structures. The *global village*, with its United Nations institutions, is the highest level super-ordinate entity ever formed.

In a *global village* of top dogs dominating underdogs, the masters at the top would feel humiliated by the occasional "lack of gratitude" from their underlings. In contrast, during the transition toward a *global village* based on human rights, many more groups feel humiliated, not least due to the clash of old and new world views. In such a *global village*, the aim is to empower citizens to create a world of equal chances and enabling environments for all. Local and global tyrants are regarded as illegitimate and humbled.

What do you mean "The problem with rhetoric?"

The human rights version of the *global village* is the one which Western elites and individual advocates and organizations officially support. Human rights ideals are held to be morally right; they feel correct at a gut level for many. Open adherents to the old ranking order are disappearing. White supremacy received a death blow when Apartheid fell. This does not mean that everybody is "converted" – it just means that white people who want the old order back have to express this desire privately, even secretly. South Africa began its transition very recently and there are still quite a number of white South Africans around who believe in their supremacy and feel humiliated by accusations that the Apartheid rule was cruel and heartless, pointing to the fact that black South Africans had a much better life than their brothers and sisters in the rest of Africa. Their gut feeling does not link a sense of injustice to white supremacy. They experience themselves as benevolent patrons. However, this line of argument currently goes "underground."

Official public discourse is no longer dominated by a vocabulary of supremacy. The language of the old honor code is obsolete. Honor killings, until not long ago accepted as cultural traits, are now seen as violations. The Indian caste system, once "respected" as cultural idiosyncrasy, is now condemned as "Indian Apartheid."[170] The Indian government is not converted yet and many Indians may agree with white South Africans that "Apartheid" is acceptable and benevolent. Yet, the fact that the term "Indian Apartheid" could emerge as the topic of a large international conference announces the change.

Acceptance of the human rights message is not limited to the world's elites (who in my conceptualization encompass most citizens of the Western world, including many who consider themselves financially burdened), who broadcast the human rights message. The broad majority of have-nots around the world feel attracted to the message as well and would like to participate in the quality of life the West enjoys. The disadvantaged yearn for clean water, shelter, food and a future for their children. Today's buzzwords include sustainability, peace, security, stability, freedom, empowerment, and so forth. If we were to live by these words, the transition to a world anchored in human rights would be complete.

However, despite the rhetoric, the gap between rich and poor widens, and the have-nots watch elites overindulge in luxury goods. Does this mean that our revered buzzwords are empty rhetoric? The problem with these words is that they have two potential meanings, one within the context of the Hobbsian vision of the *global village*, and another completely different meaning within the concept of the human rights vision. They can be used by tyrants to secure their grip on underlings. Tyrants may call for "freedom" for their interest groups to "secure" a pseudo-"democratic" system to provide "stability," "peace," and "empowerment" to their constituency. Human rights advocates, on the other hand, hear the very same buzzwords as calls to extend to all humankind, not only to the elites. In short, words are treacherous. Only deeds show the actual scope of justice such words describe.

Feelings of humiliation emerge in this clash of rhetoric and reality and the struggle between two visions of the *global village* and its sub-units. Underlings feel humiliated by oppressors and by people who raise hopes they do not fulfill. The West broadcasts the message of human rights while maintaining the opposite reality. Human rights are understood as an invitation to the world's disadvantaged to join the West but when poor suitors from far-flung countries want to move in and get "married" to the rich, they are thrown out. Boats filled with people who seek the promise of equal dignity are turned back, negotiators who try to achieve fair global rules and regulations are blocked. This gap between human rights rhetoric and human rights reality is a source of disappointment, frustration, and feelings of betrayal and humiliation. Those who want human rights ideals to become realities are frustrated and feel insulted and humiliated by double-standards. On the other hand, those who use human rights vocabulary to hide their desire for supremacy feel humiliated because they reckon that they deserve to be recognized as benevolent patrons.

Elites are often blind to the feelings of humiliation they elicit, thereby aggravating the problem. Marie Antoinette is a telling example. Coleman (2000) describes the propensity of the powerful to be blind to the feelings of humiliation they cause in underlings until those feelings reach boiling points. High power holders and members of high-power groups (HPGs) often underestimate the power of low power holders and members of low-power groups (LPGs). Additionally, they usually attempt to dominate the relationship, to use pressure tactics, to offer few concessions, to have high aspirations and to use contentious tactics… In light of their unreflective tendency to dominate, it becomes critical for members of HPGs to be aware of the likelihood that they will elicit resistance and alienation (from members of LPGs with whom they are in conflict) through using illegitimate techniques, inappropriate sanctions, or influence that is considered excessive for the situation (Deutsch, 1973). The costs to the HPG include ill will and the need to be

continuously vigilant and mobilized to prevent retaliation by the LPG (Coleman, 2000, p. 125). What Coleman pinpoints here is the possibility that *humiliated fury* (Scheff, 1997b, p. 11) may accumulate in those with lesser power, a humiliated fury that very well may explode, especially when there is "nothing to lose" anymore, when human life may not count much, even one's own.

Edna Adan is the former wife of late President of "Somaliland," Mohammad Haji Ibrahim Egal.[171] I interviewed her on December 3, 1998 in Hargeisa, Somaliland. She had the following message to the *global village*:

> The international community encourages dictators and oppressors. Without mentioning names, there are dictators who have millions and billions of dollars in banks. Those billions of dollars were not generated through a salary or a reward from the people they governed. Those billions came from the money that belongs to the people that was given by the international community.

> The international community should act intelligently, fairly and honestly and stop allowing oppressors to accumulate so much of the people's money. They should not give oppressors arms, they should not give them money and they should not help them remain in the power. Because it is the international world that maintains dictators in power. The bombs that were thrown on my people in Somaliland, were not manufactured by Siad Barre. They came from all corners of the world; they were American, Pakistani, Egyptian, Chinese, Russian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav. Anybody who made arms, who made tanks, who made ammunition and sold it or gave it to Siad Barre, helped him oppress his own people.

> Where was the international community when that power was being used against the weak? It should have said 'no,' it should have stopped the in-flow of arms to Somalia. It should have prevented the slaughter of the civilians.

Edna Adan concluded that an international community with double standards is humiliating:

> I think the international world has different standards. It preaches human rights, and fairness and so on, in literature! In Europe! But when that humiliation, that aggression, that hurt, takes place in a poor, remote, developing country like Somaliland, no one wants to be bothered. Let them stew in their own juice!

> These are divided standards, unfair standards... It is a humiliation! The international community is to blame. I hope you have very strong cupboards in which to lock up your conscience! Because all the civilians who died here died from bombs that were manufactured by people in the developed countries.

Edna Adan's message resembles many I heard from Iraq, summarized below:

First you feed Saddam Hussein and then you bomb us to free us from him? What kind of liberation is this? What kind of help? First you push us into the ditch and then you try to pull us out? When we were in the ditch, we survived as best as we could. But now, when you try to pull us out, we drown! Don't you see the hypocrisy?

Don't you see how counterproductive you are? Whoever buys weapons from you will later be bombed! What kind of world are you creating? You are like a visitor who congratulates himself for giving the cancer patient pralines while withholding real medicine! How humiliating! You should apologize that you ever supported Saddam! Promise you will never support dictators again! And keep your promise!

We have already noted that both the elite and the underdogs feel humiliated in today's human rights environment. However, those individuals who genuinely want to promote human rights in a non-dominating and non-coercive fashion also suffer feelings of humiliation. Many in the rich West are fervently working for human rights and feel deeply humiliated when their motives are doubted by those they wish to help rise. They feel that their efforts are ridiculed, minimized, devalued, humiliated, compounding their frustration at seeing elites use human rights language to advance ulterior goals and make any authentic struggle for human rights more difficult.

During my fieldwork in Africa, I interviewed 26 third party representatives who were working with Somalia, 54 third party representatives operating on Rwanda and Burundi, and 30 third party representatives addressing Africa in general. (These "third parties" were in most cases Western representatives of humanitarian organizations.) Many had entered into this life with very high ideals and felt deeply hurt, misunderstood and humiliated when accused by African critics of merely wanting some fun and excitement at the expense of suffering people. Some had descended into cynicism and disillusionment and seemed ashamed of their earlier ideals. They felt squeezed between superiors who did not live up to the official ideals and aid recipients who did not appreciate their efforts.

Maren (1997) wrote a book that everybody in the field seemed to have read, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity* (Maren, 1997), which described these dynamics. Genuine ideals of equal dignity crumbled under the weight of suspicion from recipients and malpractice on the part of their own super-ordinates.

We conclude this section with this summary:

- If conservative circles (Saudi traditionalists, for example) were to win control over the *global village*, two types of humiliated victims would emerge – those who would feel humiliated because they would not buy into this world view, and those masters expecting underlings to feel grateful.
- In a *global village* that is on its way to human rights and caught in the midst of this transition, at least three groups of people feel victimized by humiliation – tradionalists who feel that their domination is a blessing, human rights adherents who feel humiliated when they see human rights terminologies misused, and individuals who genuinely fight for human rights and feel humiliated by suspicion as to their motives.

Keep protesting! The human rights revolution is continuous

Human rights give a voice to those at the bottom of the pyramid of power. This is in principle nothing new. Human history has always seen revolts by dissatisfied underlings who saw a chance of a better life. What is special about the human rights movement is that it preaches the *demise of tyrants*, as well as the *demise of oppressive systems*. Formerly, underlings toppled elites only to replace them with new elites, keeping the hierarchy in place. The rhetoric of equality would be used by revolutionaries and "freedom fighters" until they had grabbed the rulers' seats. Even the Russian revolution ended this way and may well be the "natural" course of revolutions if nothing intervenes.

However, this course is hampered nowadays by *globalization*, or more precisely, by global *technology* that makes such hypocrisy more difficult. I suggest that the technology of mobility and communication that first brought people closer is also a vehicle for the first continuous revolution in human history, the human rights revolution. RAWA, www.rawa.org, was founded by Afghan women who went out with cameras hidden under their burkhas, taking pictures and publishing them on the Internet. American women and human rights advocates became aware of this site, forged a coalition and contributed their resources. [172] In 1998, Kofi Annan said:

> Information technology has empowered civil society to be the true guardians of democracy and good governance everywhere. Oppressors cannot hide inside their borders any longer. A strong civil society, bound together across all borders with the help of modern communications, will not let them. In a sense, it has been the new superpower – the people determined to promote better standards of life in larger freedom"[173]

The human rights revolution is supported by increasing global interdependence. As groups emerge that cut across interest, they blur the stark division lines of hierarchy. These groups bring many different kinds of coalitions into play on many different issues. The ideal of one human family promotes human rights as well. As discussed before, there are *inside* and *outside language*s. Similarly, there are *inside* and *outside ethics* (see Coleman, 2000, p. 118). *Outside ethics* lose their anchoring in reality when *outside spheres* wane, leaving only *inside ethics*. Human rights could thus be understood, at least partly, as the global application of *inside ethics,* now extended to the *inside* of the *global village*. In many cultures, inside ethics traditionally entail justifications for hierarchical societal structures and routine humiliation. However, they usually do this in a much less oppressive manner than *outside ethics*. Thus, the waning of *outside ethics* and the survival of *inside ethics*, even if condoning vertical rankings of human worth and value, could be regarded as favorable to the human rights revolution. (I will return to this point.)

Human rights may never be fully "reachable," they may have to be striven for in a continuous manner; and, indeed, global networks enable people to do this. It would be a revolution that is kept in motion by and only as long as those who find themselves disadvantaged incessantly protest (and have the material and technological means to do so) whenever hierarchies rigidify.

Even in those regions of the world that supposedly have "established" a democratic national culture based on human rights, it was and still is not easy to create and maintain this. It seems to be rather "normal" for elites to keep trying to maintain control and power (via control of media, for example, or coercion). It is not always self-evident for elites and the groups they represent to surrender power even when they lose the political support of the majority. The human rights revolution may thus be unique in human history insofar as it represents the first permanent revolution.

We are being cooked! The transition may proceed both too fast and too slowly

Why do feelings of humiliation intensify when human rights ideals are heard? Aren't human rights supposed to bring happiness and well-being? The unexpected answer to these questions is that the human rights revolution may not be homogeneous enough. The transition from the old honor order to a new order based on human rights is not proceeding in a consistent way; it moves too fast and too slowly simultaneously. Different populations develop mindsets that nurture human rights ideals at different speeds. Those who are ahead can become impatient with those who are more sluggish.

In 1971, the Aswan Dam was completed in the South of Egypt. A huge new lake, Lake Nasser, formed behind the dam over the next few years. In 1985, I met an Egyptian anthropologist who did research in the wind beaten desert around Lake Nasser. She studied the proud Bedouin tribes who have roamed these vast stretches since time immemorial. She told me the following story:

> One day I visited the tribesmen deep in the desert, far away from the world we know. I had visited them before. We went through their lengthy and ancient greeting rituals. Then, I was told their hottest news – the Nile was behaving strangely. The water was not receding anymore; instead it was forming a kind of lake.
>
> I told them this was to be expected; it was nothing to be astonished about. It was merely the new Lake Nasser. The Nile would never go back to its former bed again, at least not as long as the dam stood.
>
> I never should have said that! The reaction was amazing! Anger and pity!
>
> The wise old men of the tribe told me I was much too young to judge such phenomena and had better curb my tongue. Of course the Nile would go back to its former shape; it was just a matter of time! How could I be foolish enough to believe that nature would change just like that!
>
> There I was, reprimanded by wise men who knew "better," confronted with age-old wisdom! I understood that I was young and immature; still, I was sure that I was right. Their judgment was based on a "database" that was simply too narrow. Their age-old wisdom did not protect them against profound misjudgments. I just left. What should I have done?

This story reminds me of the recipe for cooking a frog. If Mr. Frog were suddenly dropped in a pan of boiling water, he would immediately jump out. But if he is placed in a saucepan of comfortably warm water that heats up very slowly, he will not notice that he is being cooked. Sometimes the moderate speed of change masks its significance. The Bedouins were like frogs; they were being "cooked" without knowing it. The process of change was slow enough to fool them about how dramatic it was, yet powerful enough to "kill" them as a culture. If change had occurred much faster, in a matter of days or weeks, it would have been so unsettling that the Bedouins would have sought help and explanations from a wider world. But the process took months and years, so Bedouin thinking remained within its age-old frames of understanding, frames that were now so unsuitable that they were more-or-less "deadly" – waiting for the Nile to go back to its former bed was just not a viable alternative. If the change had occurred even more slowly, over many centuries, generations of Bedouins would have adapted without being alarmed at all. The process was too slow to be identified for what it was and too fast to be treated with familiar tools.

Why don't you listen? What was accepted is humiliating now

In the twenty-first century, we live in a period of transition that resembles Mr. Frog's experience. The human rights transition unfolds in very slow motion so that old practices are still kept in place and defended by some, while others work for change. This confrontation is bound to raise the temperature, but very slowly, its detrimental effects are easily overlooked until it is too late.

Eleanor had just emerged from a very unhappy marriage when she came to my clinic. For years, she had tried to explain to her husband that she wished him to respect her dignity. He viewed her as an object to be used, she told me, as if being a wife meant that she had sold her body to him and had to be at his disposal at his whim. She cried a lot.

> For years, I told Bob that I am a human being, not a doll. If he wants sex 'without problems,' why doesn't he just masturbate? I feel he uses me as a kind of sperm toilet and feel humiliated. Yet, sex is not the only problem. When I express an opinion, he just laughs as if I have no brains. My words do not count. Everything I think or say is a joke to him. I am not a human being in his eyes. He does not see me as worthy as he is."

After years of agonizing, Eleanor filed for divorce. She had talked to Bob, had bought books for him to read, and had even dragged Bob to a marriage counselor. She finally concluded that he simply could not understand. Bob was shocked and appalled when he realized that his wife was about to leave him. At first he thought it was a joke. But slowly it dawned on him that it was not. He had noticed that she was not happy, but in his eyes she was merely a little "hysterical." He came to my clinic in a rage, shouting:

> My wife is treacherous! Why didn't she tell me she was unhappy? We had such a good life together! There is no need for this upheaval! There is enough conflict in this

world, we don't need more! I put up with her hysteria! But this divorce goes too far! She wants to castrate me.

Bob did not recognize fast enough that his wife embraced a concept of human worth that was deeply different from his. Since he did not identify the deep gap between them, he could not adapt to it in any appropriate manner to save the marriage. He was raised in the old order, in which a man felt it was his right to use the body of his wife. Bob was proud of not beating her. In his eyes this was proof that he was a modern man. Using her body for sex was not a violation in his eyes. His blindness seems "banal" rather than "evil," a banality that gave Hannah Arendt (1963) her title *Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report On The Banality Of Evil*.[174]

Bob misattributed Eleanor's unease as an insignificant medical or psychological problem that did not concern him, overlooking danger signs until it was too late. Bob's wife is like the rising Lake Nasser. Like the Bedouins, he expected her to go back "where she belonged."

Our teachers tell us we are being humiliated – then humiliates us more

The emotional temperature is bound to rise when people learn that their wretched existence is not divine fate, but a violation of their dignity, perpetrated on them by the rich who hypocritically preach human rights.

Agnes came to my clinic one lovely spring-morning. She had been raped by her psychiatrist, not just once, but regularly. However, this was not her main problem. Her deepest anxieties stemmed from the fact that she had acquiesced to this for years.

She recounted her story:

My father abused me for the first time on my twelfth birthday. Partly, I was proud and flattered, but I also felt ashamed. He told me that I was a lady now and this was part of being a lady. I was not to tell anyone, it was our little secret. A child has to obey her father, he explained to me. I was torn.

He abused me until I left home when I was 18. My mother never interfered, although I think she knew. When I started my studies at university, I did not recognize that I had been abused. I did not see myself as a victim. Then I read a book written by a woman who had lived through very similar experiences. She put clear words to what had been fuzzy feelings, unclear views, obscure inklings, and vague perceptions. It was amazing, so many of my problems suddenly had a meaning. The puzzle of my existence fell into place.

I knew I needed therapy. I decided to see a psychiatrist in the neighborhood where I lived. He confirmed that I had been abused and my dignity had been violated. The fact that I had internalized this abuse as some kind of compliment had covered up the wounds so that I could not see them. The psychiatrist opened my eyes to the wretchedness of my adolescent years.

He had a carpet in a drawer that he would pull out at the end of each session and put on the floor. He explained that I had to regain a healthy relationship with my body and that this intercourse was part of the therapy. I believed him. It took me years to question his behavior. Years that passed in agony. I had problems sleeping, concentrating, and trusting people. I had no friends, no support group. My studies suffered. I needed help and regularly went to my psychiatrist. I took a long time for me to understand that he abused me like my father had done, or worse. My father framed his abuse as a compliment, the psychiatrist as treatment. What was worse? I think the psychiatrist violated me more, because he knew that I needed help and still he inflicted himself on me.

The realization that the psychiatrist abused me was devastating. Nobody can expect that a child can stand up against her father, particularly when her mother does not help her. I could excuse my victim status as my father's fault and not mine. However, going to this psychiatrist was my free choice. Nobody forced me to consult him. How could I fall for his disgusting explanations? My whole self is in tatters. I had slowly learned, with the help of this psychiatrist, to be proud of myself. Now I detest myself more than ever before. I cannot stop dreaming cutting him to pieces, slowly, so that he feels the pain he has inflicted on me.

The story of Agnes resembles the story of our present world community. Let us listen in as Mustafa reflects:

We, the poor of the world hear that poverty is a humiliating violation of our human rights and dignity. We learn that we deserve enabling environments that empower us as human beings. We know how these enabling circumstances should look – access to clean water, health care, a flat, work, a refrigerator, a television set, and, one day, a car, vacation, and university studies for our children. All this is what our local elites and the people of the rich West have. Western tourists and soap operas are an ample source of information for us.

However, our reality, our poverty, gets worse. We are told that our humanity is debased, and then it is debased even more. This is perpetrated by the same people, those from the rich West, who say that they stand for human rights. In our eyes the West is worse than the worst hypocrite. This is the ultimate betrayal."

Stephan Feuchtwang, who is doing a four-year study into how people grieve, wrote me on November 13, 2002, "I am intrigued by two of your contentions. One is that breeches of the promise of human rights create severe humiliation. Why not a sense of betrayal and hypocrisy, which is not the same as humiliation?"
I replied:

Absolutely, as far as I can judge, there is a deep sense of betrayal and hypocrisy. But then emerges the next question that those who feel thus ask: 'Why do these people preach empty human rights rhetoric to us? Is it in order to fool us about their wishes to stay at the top and continue exploiting us?'

The motive sensed behind the betrayal is arrogance and the wish to stay at the top. This then is felt to be humiliating.

Feuchtwang responded with an observation that impacted me: "to recognise humanity hypocritically and betray the promise humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed" (Feuchtwang, November 14, 2002, in a personal note).

Graham Dyson, a professional mediator from South Africa, points out that in his country (and elsewhere) it was not simply a matter of human rights denied. "Apartheid and its predecessors were a question of *humanness* denied. This may or may not be the same thing as *human rights*" (personal communication).

Figure 4 illustrates how the curve of feelings humiliation is currently linked to the curve of awareness of human rights ideals. Awareness of human rights rises, however, reality lags behind, and feelings of humiliation fill the gap.[175]

The Curve of Feelings of Humiliation

(1) Curve of awareness of human rights
(2) Curve of feelings of humiliation
(3) Curve of social change towards implementation of human rights

Figure 4: The curve of feelings of humiliation

Morton Deutsch wrote in 2002 on the problem of *rising expectations*:

Many social scientists, before and after Tocqueville, have written insightfully about the "revolution of rising expectations" to explain the paradox that social discontent and even revolutionary activity is more likely to occur after social conditions have improved, when there is rising hope, not bleak despair.

The explanation generally follows two major lines. First, improvement of social conditions increases aspirations by increasing what is perceived to be possible to attain. Demand may increase at a faster rate than the actual gains received, with a resulting increase in relative deprivation and in the sense of injustice. The increased discontent is most likely to occur if the gains are discontinued or reversed after the initial gains have heightened further expectations.

The second explanation of the effects of gains is that, the increase is not uniform in all areas in which the victimized are disadvantaged. Improvement in one area, such as education, only makes one more sensitive to the injustice one is experiencing in other areas such as employment, police protection, and housing. Many social scientists have advanced the proposition that status-disequilibrium (such that there are differences in one's relative statuses in income, education, social prestige, and the like) is a source of tension and discontent. Thus, a very
effective way of enhancing the sense of injustice of the victimized is to increase their education and little else (Deutsch, 2002, p. 27-28).

I am torn apart! How people can get caught in between

You may remember the story of the German soldier who beat prisoners during the day and cried at night. This story illustrates one of the most painful effects of the current transition from the old honor code to the new human rights code. People who are caught in between suffer in the most unfathomable way. The worst fate is to be forced or seduced into being a *hero* in the honor order, only to be branded a *perpetrator* in the order of equal dignity. This is perhaps the most difficult humiliation to overcome.
   A young Tutsi, who I'll call Charles, was in Kigali during the 1994 genocide. I talked to him in 1999. [176] He told me how a Hutu friend hid him in his house. Whenever Hutu militia came to search the house for Tutsi, Charles crawled into a hole in a rubbish heap in the garden. There he stood – only his nose poking out, covered by a plastic sheet – for hours, until the soldiers went away. This procedure continued for weeks, ultimately saving his life. During the same period Charles's Hutu friend had to participate in killing Tutsi outside in the streets, to keep from being killed himself. He participated in the atrocities perpetrated against Tutsi like any other *genocidaire*. Charles' entire family was killed, in the most gruesome ways. (Charles later learned that his 90-year-old grandmother was locked in a room with hungry dogs who ate her.)
   This story entails grandeur and horror, kindness and atrocity – all embodied in the same person, Charles's friend. Like the German soldier, Charles's friend was torn. Both were incarcerated in a reality where Tutsi/Jews were not merely to be killed, but to be "brought down," humiliated to a degree that they would never be able to raise their heads

again. Both adhered privately to a very different framing of the social scenery. The German soldier cried, the more courageous young Hutu hid his Tutsi friend.

I have spoken with several people, in Germany and in Rwanda, who say that the worst suffering, the most painful form of humiliation, is being forced to become a perpetrator because you are too weak to resist, too much of a coward to say no and face death.

In Kenya I heard stories of Hutu *genocidaires* who were in hiding and needed psychotherapy because they could not eat without seeing the small fingers of children on their plates. Instead of facing punishment, they became "insane." Many Hutus had been forced to kill their own families, their Tutsi spouses and Tutsi-looking children, to show their allegiance to the Hutu-cause. The International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000) confirms: "Hutu women married to Tutsi men were sometimes compelled to murder their Tutsi children to demonstrate their commitment to Hutu Power. The effect on these mothers is also beyond imagining" (The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 16, paragraph 4).

When the genocide ended and the Hutu government was ousted from power, these people found themselves in a devastating place: Their families had died at their own hands and they had lost all honor, pride and self-respect. They were humiliated, not only once, but on many levels and continuously. First, they had been coerced into becoming perpetrators and the fact that they did not prefer death to succumbing to this pressure was deeply humiliating. Secondly, after the demise of the Hutu government and the world's moral outcry against the genocide, they were humiliated almost daily for being Hutu, part of the category of *genocidaires*. Those who had killed family members seem to want to cry out, consciously, or through psychotic symptoms, "I did not want to kill my family, I was forced! I was told that it was the right thing to do! I wish I were the one dead and not them! I was weak! I deserve to be loathed as a *genocidaire*!"

To summarize and conclude this section and the entire chapter:

- The *global village* could be structured as a strictly hierarchical entity with absolute rulers at the top and underlings at the bottom. In such a case *globalization* would do *without egalization*. Or the *global village* could be administered as a democratic entity where all citizens enjoy equal dignity, wedding *globalization* to *egalization*. The latter is the current official vision.
- *Egalization* is a process that is linked to the human rights revolution, which perhaps represents the first continuous revolution in human history, a revolution that is, however, advancing in an inhomogeneous manner that causes feelings – particularly feelings of humiliation – to run high.
- Conflict may surface because of shifts in the balance (or imbalance) of power between disputants or because of ambiguity about relative power caused by changing circumstances (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). This can trigger a deep sense of uncertainty and confusion over rank and power and can motivate two types of aggressive behavior: actions by those previously low in power to claim their rights and actions by those previously high in power to protect their status (Coleman, 2003, p. 14).

- The most upsetting humiliation occurs when human rights are promised but withheld, making human rights advocacy appear to be empty rhetoric.
- Words like *sustainability*, *peace*, *security*, *stability*, *freedom*, and *empowerment* are treacherous, because they are usable by all sides and with opposing meanings.
- The fact that humankind currently lives in the midst of a revolutionary transition is obscured by its slowness, with those who lag behind inclined to hang on to old paradigms. Confrontations between adherents of the old and new order arise, feelings heat up, cooperation is hampered, and trust fails.
- The human rights revolution itself is in danger.

We may conclude that the fact that the human rights revolution proceeds over many generations in a fragmented and inhomogeneous way – too fast and too slow at the same time – introduces a *malign* aspect into the project of marrying *globalization* with *egalization*. At the same time, the vision of an *egalized global village*, once the transition is successfully mastered by every party, is profoundly *benign*.

Related reading

Read more on *social justice* and the *social contract*,[177] *collectivism*,[178] and *individualism*,[179] on the *anarchy* of the "*state of nature*,"[180] on *restrictive* and *permissive* approaches to moral dilemmas that can get into loggerhead positions,[181] on the *universality of human rights*,[182] on *realizing human rights*,[183] and on a *new gut feeling* and *A New Global Consensus on Helping the Poorest of the Poor*,[184] on *social evolution* and *world systems*,[185] on *subsidiarity*,[186] and *forms of identity*.[187]

PART II: HOW HUMILIATION OPERATES IN THE WORLD

Chapter 4: Misunderstandings and Humiliation

(Debbie: - Misunderstandings and miscommunications are fertile breeding grounds for feelings of humiliation. As they did in Baghdad, these can spark or further inflame conflicts.)

Many scenarios can be played out with humiliation as the core element. In Lindner (Lindner, 2000m) and Lindner (Lindner, 2000n), I outlined 16 scenarios, eight pertaining to the person who inflicts humiliation, and eight to the person who suffers humiliation. The first scenario is entitled "If you humiliate me, I humiliate you!" It is explained with the following vignette: "I hate my wife! She treats me badly and humiliates me every day. I want to humiliate her; to see her suffer. I have a plan and I will carry it out when I see a chance." The first eight cases describe how and why one person might set out to humiliate another person, and an additional eight cases address the situation from the victim's perspective. Each scenario is analyzed through a series of questions. For example, does the humiliator harbor a desire to humiliate? Or is the problem one of misunderstanding?

Misunderstanding and humiliation is the topic of this chapter,[188] a topic I chose because it is less often explored than more flamboyant occurrences such as in torture, genocide, or oppression. Everybody understands that torturers aim to humiliate their victims. I could recount innumerable gruesome stories from my investigations in Rwanda, Somalia, and from German history. However, we have all been sufficiently horrified by outrageous stories of atrocities and injustices. The only contribution I could make would be to increase the revulsion. I feel it would be more beneficial for the reader to reflect on cases of humiliation that are not as readily accessible and not as frequently focused upon, but surprisingly relevant.

Misunderstandings that lead to feelings of humiliation on the global stage usually occur as unintended side-effects. The situations addressed in this chapter relate to the *spirit* of human rights, to the so-called *attribution error*, and to *cross-cultural* misunderstandings.

Different interpretations of the spirit of human rights can humiliate

> When you speak of human rights, you lack passion and caring. To you human rights are dry and abstract concepts. You talk about institutions and theoretical rights. I understand human rights as warm and caring invitations into the family of humanity. Your coldness and aloofness bothers me and your lack of caring humiliates humanity.

This vignette illustrates the fact that the concept of human rights may be interpreted in different ways. Alain Badiou (2001)[189] explains the difference between the *Kantian* interpretation of human rights as abstract principle and the *Lévinasian* interpretation, which emphasizes that human rights also mean care and respect for the other. Human

rights are often supported by human rights *promoters* who speak in the *first* sense. Their message, however, is understood in the *second* sense by those most impacted by the human rights revolution. The incompatibility between the message that is sent and the message that is heard creates a potential for feelings of humiliation on all sides. A particularly sore point, full of ambiguity, is the notion of dignity.

Kantian or Lévinasian? Positive or negative rights?

The first sentence in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." This sentence seems to be straightforward; however, the notion of dignity is ambiguous, open to both the Kantian and Lévinasian interpretations. There is a Lévinasian connection to equality hidden in the notion of equal dignity. The notion of equal dignity is a Lévinasian "Trojan horse" that "sneaks" into the Kantian view. The "Trojan" connection is implicated in the human rights stipulation that equal chances and enabling environments for all are necessary to protect human dignity. When human rights are defined in this way, Lévinasian "caring for the other" is on the table.

The Kantian version could be simplified as follows: "Equal dignity means that, although you are poor, you can have full dignity. In order to have dignity you need a societal framework that gives you political rights, such as the right of free speech. In other words, you can be poor and at the same time dignified and happy." The Lévinasian version, again simplified, would go as follows: "You are poor and live under circumstances that violate human dignity. To insure your dignity, you need to be supported by an enabling environment that gives you the chance to work yourself into a more dignified quality of life."

Relevant here is the discussion of so-called negative and positive ("welfare") rights. Negative rights have at their core the right to be free of violence. Negative rights constitute a non-aggression compact. Positive rights, on the other hand, are rights to food, clothing, shelter, and meaningful experiences. They entail the Lévinasian caring aspect.

There is a problem with positive rights when they are framed as forced egalitarianism. Who will provide the food, clothing, shelter and meaningful experiences and how should they be allocated? What about cars, villas and luxury items that some people consider essential to a meaningful life? Who is to distribute such luxury and from where should it be taken? And what happens when one person buys a Ferrari? Does not this mean, in a positive rights framework where everybody is entitled to equal conditions, that everybody has a right to own a Ferrari? And what about charity? What about inequalities in beauty and intelligence? Positive rights, if framed as forced egalitarianism, are unrealistic and unrealizable. They portend a nightmare of indistinguishable, interchangeable human beings. Therefore, the argument is often made that only negative rights are legitimate.

Positive rights may need to be framed differently – as the basic human right to enjoy enabling circumstances. Positive rights can be defined not as rights to be overindulged, but as rights that give self-help has a chance. We do not usually withhold care from our children for fear that they will expect to be nurtured forever. Parents see their input as enabling their children to stand on their own feet when they become adults. A certain amount of nurturing is necessary to protect a child's dignity. In international relations,

positive rights mean aid is useful and must be combined with fair global trade rules and embedded in good local and global governance, all this enabling people to step out of poverty.

As already mentioned, "individuals or groups within our moral boundaries are seen as deserving of the same fair, moral treatment as we deserve. Individuals or groups outside these boundaries are seen as undeserving of this same treatment" (Coleman, 2000, p. 118). Coleman's words indicate that there are different "gut feelings" as to what *we* need to live dignified lives, as opposed to what *they* deserve. Interestingly, what we conceive to be "necessary for us and our loved ones" often involves caring. Ross and Iost (1999) carried out experiments on equity[190] to see whether people like to share equally or not. They found that the myth that everybody, if given the chance, would seize as many resources as possible is inaccurate. Ross and Iost found a strong tendency to share equally *within in-groups*, but not *with out-groups*. The Lévinasian view of human rights is thus surprisingly close to norms that preserve the cohesion of the social fabric within any group, indicating that human rights represent inside ethics of the *global village*.

Globalization as Lévinasian force

The process of globalization, in moving towards one single in-group, slowly expands the circle of that we feel in our gut is *us* to include all humankind, and even animals and abiotic nature. In the beginning of the human rights era mainly political rights were equated with human rights.[191] An increasing number of aspects of human rights have since been recognized (apart from civil and political rights, also economic, social and cultural rights) and they are applied to ever wider categories of people, as well as to more of biotic and abiotic nature. It was not long ago that honor killings were "respected" as cultural idiosyncrasies, beyond the jurisdiction of human rights workers. As mentioned earlier, the Indian caste system was branded as "Indian Apartheid" in 2001.[192] The most recent addition to the list of human rights are economic rights. Only very recently have people begun to experience a gut resonance with the idea that poverty is a violation of a person's basic human rights (Pogge, 2002).

We are just beginning to understand that animals have rights. Whales, dolphins and laboratory animals are increasingly regarded as part of us, deserving dignity. The Earth with its biosphere is currently being "dignified" as well, even being named as a living being – "Gaia." Please read Sir James George Frazer (1854-1941), Professor of Social Anthropology at Liverpool University, who wrote about historic practices and consider whether his account causes gut feelings of revulsion in you, rather than the joy they produced just a few hundred years ago:

In the midsummer fires formerly kindled on the Place de Grève at Paris it was the custom to burn a basket, barrel, or sack full of live cats, which was hung from a tall mast in the midst of the bonfire; sometimes a fox was burned. The people collected the embers and ashes of the fire and took them home, believing that they brought good luck. The French kings often witnessed these spectacles and even lit the bonfire with their own hands. In 1648 Louis the Fourteenth, crowned with a wreath of roses and carrying a bunch of roses in his hand, kindled the fire, danced at it and partook of the

banquet afterwards in the town hall. But this was the last occasion when a monarch presided at the midsummer bonfire in Paris. At Metz midsummer fires were lighted with great pomp on the esplanade, and a dozen cats, enclosed in wicker cages, were burned alive in them, to the amusement of the people. Similarly at Gap, in the department of the High Alps, cats used to be roasted over the midsummer bonfire. In Russia a white cock was sometimes burned in the midsummer bonfire; in Meissen or Thuringia a horse's head used to be thrown into it. Sometimes animals are burned in the spring bonfires. In the Vosges cats were burned on Shrove Tuesday; in Alsace they were thrown into the Easter bonfire. In the department of the Ardennes cats were flung into the bonfires kindled on the first Sunday in Lent; sometimes, by a refinement of cruelty, they were hung over the fire from the end of a pole and roasted alive. 'The cat, which represented the devil, could never suffer enough.' While the creatures were perishing in the flames, the shepherds guarded their flocks and forced them to leap over the fire, esteeming this an infallible means of preserving them from disease and witchcraft. We have seen that squirrels were sometimes burned in the Easter fire (Frazer, 1922, Chapter 64).

As Sir Frazier's vignette brings home, we increasingly include animals in our circle of empathy. Organizations such as *Animals Angels* protect and help stranded animals or supervise animal transports to ensure dignified treatment. The habit of eating animals, as well, is increasingly eschewed; vegetarianism is on the rise. (Spaceship Enterprise and other media products have managed to introduce even extraterrestrials into human hearts, showing that we are capable of welcoming the entire universe.)

As long as people lived in isolated villages, with the next valley several horseback days away, there was little opportunity to develop warm inclusive feelings for people outside one's immediate vicinity. The situation changes, however, when people get closer. Then even love stories may emerge. Although we can not literally enter into a love relationship with the rest of the *global village*'s inhabitants (or extraterrestrials for that matter), their coming closer makes them relevant to us as people – we compare ourselves to them, strive for their recognition and feel humiliated when they do not respect us. As discussed earlier, globalization turns *absolute* deprivation into *relative* deprivation and Lévinasian human rights turn *debilitating relative deprivation* into a *violation of human dignity*.

Globalization as love story

My experience is that the coming-into-being of the *global village* is a love story that carries the risk of all love stories – it can turn into hatred when betrayed and can be destroyed by rash reactions that may later be regretted.

Elites are typically admired, loved and envied, and the rich West is not excluded from this phenomenon. What the French court was to Europe, the West is to the *global village*. Copies of the castle of Versailles can be found everywhere in Europe, copies of the Western style of life over the entire earth's surface. Elites are often quite uninformed about the masses, but the masses always know what the elite are up to. Elites do not realize to what extent their admirers know them, imitate them, emulate their life style,

and try to participate in it. Americans are not known as great travelers – there are members of the Congress who have no passports and Americans are notorious for being vague about world geography. However, Somali desert nomads listen attentively to BBC radio every day. Afghans in remote valleys know when a plane crashes in Alaska.

Only admiration would motivate so many to pay huge amounts of money to be smuggled into the "castle," the "court," of the rich West. America and the entire West is admired and yearned for; they receive declarations of love every day. The recipients of this admiration are not fully aware of this love, however. They tend to believe in a world of independent nation states and assume that everybody is consumed by their own internal affairs. They do not understand that they are the centre of world attention.

Through their media, the rich send Western soap operas around the world that show the poor what life is like inside the palace and how paradise can be experienced on Earth. Then they invite the poor in, as equals, through the message of human rights. The message is heard much more often and much more literally than the rich realize. To say it succinctly, the West sends out powerful love declarations, without realizing that people will actually happily respond, hoping to move in and get "married."

Penniless suitors are unwelcome

Confronted with uninvited penniless suitors – asylum seekers who are willing to swim through shark-infested seas or climb barbed wire fences – the West is astounded and frightened. We in the West often send our suitors away, demonstrating that our messages of love are not to be taken literally. This can generate ugly emotion on the part of the rejected invitees. Their love has been betrayed and they feel treated as lesser beings, not as the equals our human rights messages had led them to believe. As we know, feelings of humiliation may explode in acts of humiliation.

When Lévinasian interpretations of human rights as caring find fertile ground, an additional source of misunderstanding arises. Care is defined differently in collective communities than in our Western individualistic societies. Westerners do not understand the degree to which they are charged with responsibility for giving care to the collectivistic rest of the world.

Annegret came to me because she could not stand her Egyptian husband "squandering" their hard-earned money on his brother. She said:

> I love my husband's family. When I arrived from Europe as his wife, I was welcomed so warmly that I never looked back and never got homesick. However, my brother-in-law has financial problems and often sends his wife and children to stay with us. I am not opposed to helping family, but this goes too far. Once, one of his girls liked a picture on our wall and my husband gave it to her. I was shocked and furious, but he told me that it was his duty to open his home to his family and to share everything with them.
>
> My husband accuses me of being heartless and says I disrespect family duties. He explains that in Egypt the family is the only welfare security net. He tells me that the

state provides privileges in the West that give their citizens the illusion of self-reliance and thinks I should shed this illusion of individual independence.

I hear his words, but I do not understand his concept of caring. I feel my brother-in-law abuses me and my husband and violates our dignity with his demands. I don't think he has the right to feel humiliated by my lack of caring. I am afraid all this will end in divorce!

Annegret's story shows that the Lévinasian view of human rights carries the seeds of another round of misunderstandings. How far must care go? How much of a right do the poor have to be supported by the rich? What does it mean to declare humankind *One family*? Annegret found a way to save her marriage, using her network of European relationships to find a suitable position for her brother-in-law. He can support his family now, without having to send his children to stay with relatives. The feelings of anger and frustration have healed, replaced by of agency and pride. The marriage is growing again.

To summarize, global closeness, high expectations and mutual misunderstanding combined with stress and frustration can generate violent reactions to the West's perceived lack of caring and tendency to inflict humiliation. These mechanisms are rarely understood by Westerners, who instead of extending enabling care, rebuke the victims for seeking help.

Right-wing political movements in many European countries call for curtailing immigration by shutting national borders. Australia recently receives media attention for its tough immigration policies. Such political processes are indicators of the emotional problems entailed in the shrinking of the planet and the feelings triggered by proximity.

Yet, while enabling care is still insufficient, it is increasing. The notion of sovereignty is weakening, making it easier to free people from the grips of dictators. The international community still doesn't do enough, however, to prevent abuse of power, to develop well-organized ways of dismantling tyrants and to ensure equal opportunity for all in the global market place.

The 2003 Iraq war illustrates the transition from a Kantian to a Lévinasian interpretation of human rights. During the war and discussions preceding it, there was a vacillation among various justifications for the war. Was it to be a war to dismantle Saddam Hussein's regime? Or was the aim only to disarm the regime? Why was disarmament so important? Was it because the Saddam regime killed and tortured its own people or because it might threaten the West? Is it right to support dictators and sell them weapons in the first place? What about global justice? What about sovereignty? Is it a violation of international law to invade other countries and preemptively "take out" regimes?

Different world views drive these questions. In a world of several villages, sovereignty is untouchable, analogous to the old idea that parents have the right to do what they want with their children. Men could beat and rape their wives because these activities occurred within an "untouchable" private sphere. Individuals faced police intervention only when they threatened their neighbors. In contrast, in the single village, national sovereignties are transformed into neighborhood relations subject to common policing.

Some among my American friends adhere to the older philosophy. Their thinking went as follows:

Americans are rich not because we were given help, but because we are industrious! Why are we expected to distribute our wealth to lazy people? Human rights mean democratic institutions and a free press, not the right to lifelong support.

People who envy our riches should emulate our democratic institutions and our industry. If they want tyrants to govern them, it's their problem. If they do not opt for democracy and freedom, it is their own fault if they lag behind.

They accuse us of humiliating them by being arrogant and imperialistic. We find those complaints shameless and humiliating! America has no obligation to "free" Iraqis! The only good reason for us to go to war in Iraq is that Saddam Hussein may be a threat to America. Period. We have a right to defend ourselves!

Other American friends took the second stance:

Parents do not have the right to mistreat their children, nor should husbands abuse their wives. Society has to step in! Neighbors have to send in police, even if the husband protests and feels insulted and humiliated, even if he is no threat to outsiders. In the same vein, we have to step in and depose tyrants like Saddam, even if he has no weapons of mass destruction. We owe it to his people to liberate them!

The latter version is the current mainstream interpretation of the 2003 Iraq war in the United States. Gut feelings about national sovereignty are veering towards the sentiment that tyrants cannot be allowed to abuse their people. And, without a doubt, these gut feelings are shared world-wide. The global dissent about whether the 2003 Iraq war was "good" or "bad" does not focus on the notion that tyrants ought to go. The dissent addresses the necessity of *war* to bring tyrants down. Questions arise such as, "Could we have brought this tyrant down without bombs? Why couldn't the international community, the United Nations, police this problem? Why did the richest world players have to do this job almost alone, insisting that it had to be done their way? Should there not be a democratically legitimized world police? What about creating enabling circumstances for the poor? Is it sufficient to give them 'freedom'? Where are decent sustainable global arrangements?"

As we can see, the current international debate is more concerned with the quality of policing than the need for those activities. There is a wide-spread gut feeling that tyrants who abuse their own people have no legitimacy, even if they do not threaten outsiders. The focus of the discussion is how world policing ought best be done and whether the problem could not have been prevented. This state of global discussion marks the degree to which the *global village* indeed is framed as *global village* by its citizens.

The disappointment

Imagine there are no traffic lights. Drivers of small vehicles wait at crossroads until the larger, more powerful vehicles have passed. Then, the owners of the larger vehicles endorse a declaration that all are now one family with equal rights, calling for traffic lights to be installed and insisting that nobody should be treated as lesser because they drive a small vehicle.

There is great joy among those with smaller vehicles. They have admired the big vehicles and envied their owners. Some of the young owners of small vehicles used to fix them up to seem bigger, they even stole big cars. Now they are invited to be equals! They feel elevated, honored, respected, and loved. Finally, their admiration for the powerful has been recognized.

However, most of the drivers of big cars disregard the new traffic lights, continuing their old practices. Great disappointment erupts among those with smaller vehicles – hopes have been created and betrayed, humiliating subjugation has been outlawed and is practiced anyhow. Some begin destroying traffic lights. The owners of larger vehicles react with dismay when faced with such "vandalism;" they preached love and get hatred. They are unaware of how much attention and yearning they have attracted, to what extent they raised hopes they were unprepared to fulfill. The two sides begin to call one another "enemy." It takes generations for the situation to cool down, for both sides to recognize that it misperceived the situation and over-reacted.

Michelle Fine (2002) conducted research with poor and working class youth in California. These youngsters attended schools that suffer from structural disrepair, high rates of uncertified teachers, high teacher turnover and inadequate books and instructional materials. Fine argues:

> …such schools accomplish more than simple "reproduction" of class and race/ethnic inequities … The evidence suggests that these schools not only systematically under-educate poor and working class youth, and youth of color, but they convert pride into shame, a yearning for quality education into anger, and they channel active civic engagement into social cynicism and alienation (Fine et al., 2002, Abstract).[193]

We conclude that mutually "misunderstood" definitions of human rights elicit feelings of humiliation that are central to the new grievances of the *global village*. If it is true that "we always hurt the ones we love," then the coming-into-being of the *global village* is bound to increase such over-heated feelings, at least initially, until humankind has learned to cope. Impoverished foreigners who admire Western riches and want to participate in them feel humiliated by Western contempt for them. We, in the West, in turn, feel humiliated by their lack of thankfulness and recognition for our helpfulness.

My collateral damage is your evil intention! The attribution error can humiliate

It is too simple to describe opposing *camps* as inherently *different*. Similarities and common ground often turn out to be greater than expected. We overlook these similarities at humanity's peril.

Currently, the world contains many *camps*; Israelis are pitched against Palestinians in the Middle East, Tamils and Singhalese in Sri Lanka, Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. On the global level," Western" values are often seen to be irreconcilable with "non-Western" values. Usually such controversies are regarded as head-on oppositions. However, research in social psychology suggests that many apparent divisions are based on underlying agreements on values, a congruence that is almost systematically underestimated.

Human beings suffer from *bias*. *In-group* and *out-group* differentiations lead to serious *biases* in perceptions and judgments; and these tendencies are intensified when violent and armed confrontations increase stress. Barriers to conflict resolution may not *be inherently* insurmountable, but only *appear* insurmountable due to psychological limitations suffered by the involved parties.

Ross and Ward (1995) worked intensively on such barriers, [194] for example, on *reactive devaluation*. [195] Reactive devaluation means that any proposition for compromise that is put forward by an *adversary* is rejected, regardless of its contents, while the *own* group's arguments are regarded by its members with sympathy, merely because they come from within the group.

Phenomena such as *essentialization* and the so-called *fundamental attribution error* are central as well. The *fundamental attribution error* can cause rifts and create feelings of humiliation in opposing camps that otherwise would not be there.[196] The *attribution error* could be described as humans having the tendency to believe that their successes are theirs, while their failures are due to adverse circumstances. In the spirit of the *attribution error* this evaluation is turned into its opposite when *others* are judged. *Others'* successes are perceived as due to favorable circumstances, while only their failures are *theirs*.

Bias is basic to human perceptions and conceptualizations and central to creating feelings of humiliation. We can observe examples everywhere. We see them in the current Middle East conflict, the conflict in Sri Lanka, in the 2003 Iraq war, and in the global *war on terrorism*. The attribution error is almost always linked to humiliation. We merely have to listen to any spokesperson's statement about the appalling behavior of *others* to understand how this link works. These spokespersons deplore an act of violence committed by the *other* side as "atrocity perpetrated in cold blood," implying that the *other* side's evil aim is to target innocent civilians. The world is called upon to witness, deplore and condemn such acts as deliberate acts of humiliation, as transgressions of acceptable limits, as transgressions that cause the utmost suffering and merit the utmost retaliation. The message to the world emphasizes the fact that this is a struggle with an opponent who hates *us* to kill innocent group members in *cold* blood. It is this transgression that lights the fire of passionate feelings of humiliation. It is the burning question of why *we* are victims of *unexplainably evil* hatred emanating from *others*, a hatred that goes so far that it transgresses accepted rules of conflict. When civilians are dying, it is felt that the essence of Jewishness, the essence of Palestinian identity, is the

object of hatred, an unexplainable evil hatred, directed at one's inner core, deeply humiliating. "Look, how we are victimized by deep humiliation that cannot go unanswered, you must understand that we have to retaliate!" is the message transmitted to the world by both sides. At the same time, each side confirms that civilian casualties that may have been caused by one's own actions to the other side are unintended and unavoidable "side effects" and *collateral damage*, something the *other* ought to understand and excuse. The Israelis insist their soldiers do their utmost to protect civilians. Palestinians, the Israelis say, use their own compatriots as shields, something that again proves their moral worthlessness and evil. The Palestinian side explains that suicide bombers do not target civilians, but that as oppressed occupants they have no other weapons than their own bodies.

The international community, recently emerged as an important player in its capacity as third party, is implored to understand, acknowledge and recognize the degree of victimization and humiliation each side has to suffer. The international community, however, is exhausted, urging these opponents to make peace and let the rest of the world get on with the business of living. Bewildered, members of the international community begin to ask: "Don't these adversaries see that all human beings basically want to live in peace and quiet, have some reasonable quality of life and offer their children a future? Don't they see that their distorted mutual perceptions are their biggest enemy? Why don't they change their perceptions?"

"Eastern" versus "Western" values

The *global village* is being torn apart by regional conflicts. The "West" is perceived as lacking ethics by many in the "non-West." Anybody traveling in the "non-West" soon sees that, under the admiration and yearning for Western quality of life, there brews a host of ill-feelings. The West, in non-Western eyes, does not sufficiently care for the elderly or for children, has an appalling high divorce rate and shows little genuine compassion and insufficient social cohesion. The West in turn targets the non-West in similar ways. In Western eyes, non-Western women are abused, individual freedom choked, and self-expression curtailed.

However, the West and the non-West, have more in common than is apparent at first glance. Both value social cohesion highly. For my doctoral dissertation in social-psychological medicine (Lindner, 1994) I compared Germany and Egypt and what these two countries regard as core priorities for good quality of life. All yearn for social cohesion balanced with individual freedom. In the "West," rifts to social cohesion such as divorce, or lack of compassion, are deeply regretted as unwanted side effects, a price to be paid for the transition towards more personal freedom, authenticity and flexibility. In the same vein, non-Westerners value individual freedom, and regret any need to curtail it as a sad side effect, as price to be paid for social cohesion.

The attribution error turns what are regrettable side effects when occurring in our own group into the other's essence when occurring in their camp, while commonalities – such as universality of the appreciation of social cohesion that must be balanced with individual freedom – are underplayed.

Lee Ross wrote, in a personal message to me on October 8, 2001:

The invidious comparison, of course, involves the perception that while we are sincere and objective in our actions and analyses, and the costs we inflict on others are an undesirable side effect of inevitable, virtuous, or necessary actions, 'they' are either insincere or misguided, and they have no concern (or even rejoice in) such costs to others. I think discussion of this asymmetry is very much worth emphasizing.

One of the frequently highlighted aspects in the "West" versus "non-West" confrontation is the status of women. Again, there are similar tendencies on both sides. Christian fundamentalists, for example, have patriarchal leanings and wish their women to stay home, resembling Islamic fundamentalists, who see restrictions for women as a price to be paid for social cohesion, rather than as an attack on women. At the same time, moderates on all sides try to open space for women. Sayyid, 1997, therefore criticizes the use of the term fundamentalism for Islamism. (I use the term fundamentalist, like the word extremist, to designate someone who essentializes difference – in Western and in non-Western contexts – and who opposes moderates who prefer to emphasize common ground.)

It is an oversimplification to believe that practices such as veiling in the "non-West" are but proof of oppression. I have met many women who moved towards increased seclusion and restriction, both in Christian and in Muslim contexts. I know Christian women who converted to Islam and took the veil, because it expressed the respect and self-respect they had yearned for all their lives. These women were often unusually sincere and intelligent.

Gabriele was a German girl who moved to Cairo and converted to fundamentalist Islam. She took the veil. She rejoiced:

Finally, I feel respected! Finally, I feel I am something more than this female body on the front page of all the magazines. Finally, I feel I am a person with a mind and not just a half-naked doll adorning every kiosk in every Western city! How I am disgusted at this sell-out of the female body, this besmirching of female dignity wherever you turn in the "West"! I am so glad that I have the veil to signal that I have dignity and deserve respect! The veil is a nuisance, I know, but how glad I am to pay this price!

It is the *attribution error* that turns the limitation of women's freedom either into an *evil essence* or into a *necessary sacrifice*, depending on the standpoint of the person who judges. (I, personally, am among the severest critics of the restriction of women but, I have empathy for why Christian and Muslim fundamentalists are drawn to such views. However, I personally believe that to remedy perceived disrespect for women by restricting them is inappropriate and counterproductive.) The issue of female status is a global one. The West is not entirely free of oppression of women but is quick to criticize the non-Western world for its oppressions. This gives non-Westerners the impression that the West operates by a double standard.

Western human rights activists acknowledge such shortcomings when they occur but explain them as *regrettable inadequacies* in a world that has not yet evolved to a point at which old *Realpolitik* can be set aside. They hope that the struggle for more human rights will soon form a world of global justice. Non-Westerners, on the other side, may turn the

argumentation around and, in the spirit of the *attribution error*, deem shortcomings as *essence* and not as *short-term side effects that may be overcome*.

Let's not forget, however, how much common ground we share. As I will emphasize further down, the significant fault line does not run between the "West" and the "non-West," but between fundamentalists and moderates, in all camps. Fundamentalists, throughout the world, have much in common, as do moderates. More so, both, fundamentalists and moderates, typically have in common that they care for the well-being of the individual within a collective; they differ only on the calibrating of space they think collectivistic versus individualistic approaches ought to receive for that purpose.

Humiliation enters the scene through the self-righteousness that results from the *attribution error*. Each party feels that it is entitled to "help" the other party understand right and wrong, producing often unintended, humiliating effects, because the other side thinks just as self-righteously. When this kind of humiliation occurs, it flows from misunderstanding – misunderstanding oneself, the other, and reality – rooted in the common human tendency to see oneself in a more forgiving light than the other.

Feelings of humiliation stemming from such misunderstanding, wherever they emerge, are typically compounded by the problem that the West preaches human rights, while being blind to the fact that violations of these very rights may create feelings of humiliation in the victims of such violations. This blindness partly stems from another human weakness, namely the belief in a *just world* that tends to *blame the victim*. The belief in a *just world* gives the more privileged in the global community an "alibi" to be blind to the sufferings of the less privileged, because "everybody deserves what he gets."

The situation is aggravated when wealthy individuals, blind to the injustice and obscenity of poverty, fail to recognize how much they contribute to the suffering of the poor by promoting human rights without seeing through that what they promote becomes reality. On the part of the recipients of empty promises, *double standards* quickly become *double humiliation*.

East German versus West German "culture"

The privileged of the planet need to recognize that expressions of discontent are often transparent reactions to perceived humiliation – not unfathomable and opaque actions of unexplainable evil. Terrorism, for example, may in many instances be a response to humiliation and not an expression of evil essence. I will come back to this point later, but for the moment suffice it to say that this is very good news because feelings of humiliation are much easier to "heal" than "unexplainable evil essence."

Germany after reunification is an example. The Berlin Wall fell in late 1989. East Germans declared "Wir sind ein Volk! [We are one people!]" and danced with West Germans in the streets of Berlin. West and East Germans were reunited. This should have been the beginning of a blissful intra-cultural communication among this One people. However, things did not develop very well. "I Want My Wall Back!" was the message broadcast on T-shirts only a few years after re-unification. Jandt (1995) writes:

The irony of unification is that it has produced an Eastern identity that decades of Communist propaganda failed to achieve. Products made in the East sector are experiencing a revival as a way to assert a separate identity… The invisible wall that now exists will take generations to fall because the redevelopment of a homogeneous society takes time" (Jandt, 1995, p. 272).

"I Want My Wall Back!" How could such sentiment gain popularity? How could Eastern-made products, so recently despised, become desirable markers for a new Eastern cultural identity? Many people, especially in Eastern Europe, would claim that East Germans have enjoyed a very favorable situation since reunification. Their rich compatriots have helped them, a privilege other East Europeans were denied. Why are East Germans not more satisfied with their current situation?[197] Why do West Germans complain? Shouldn't the West Germans welcome a chance to help their fellow Germans, disadvantaged for so many decades? Why are differences which were played *down* when the Wall came down, now played *up*? Why has cultural separation become the key topic?

It is commonly argued that the reason for the surprising split between East and West Germans is the existence of an unexpected cultural difference, a cultural difference that developed during the years of separation. Jandt (1995) reports the words of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, "We have drifted much further apart than we thought" (Jandt, 1995, p. 267). This is certainly one way of viewing the situation, but not the only possible interpretation. Cultural differences may be of much more recent origin, and humiliation may play a central role. The perceived "arrogance" of "Wessies" may be responsible, at least partly, for *cultural difference*. Humiliation may have the power to create, maintain, and deepen cultural differences, even where (or, *particularly* where) there is a strong willingness to be *One* culture. West German "help" may have humiliated its recipients by demanding an admission of cultural, moral, and personal bankruptcy, in other words, the abandonment of pride.

The *attribution error* of which "Wessies" are accused is that while they attribute their own failures in life to unfavorable circumstances, they do not make the same allowance for East Germans. They attribute any East German failure to some "stupidity" inherent in East Germans. East Germans explain,[198] almost apologetically, that they did their best to survive in the former DDR environment and find it humiliating to be expected to confess to "inherent stupidity" in exchange for the help the donors know East Germans cannot do without. To be locked in a situation of degradation, to be pushed to self-degradation by need, fulfils the definition of humiliation.

The East Germans could respond along lines such as:

We are worth something, our lives in the former DDR were not useless! We would, in fact, be happy if we could do without your help! And, by the way, your help is not as fantastic as you think after all! Be honest, don't you profit from helping us? Perhaps we would actually prefer to live in a dignified way behind the Wall, than be humiliated without it! We have a valuable and distinct East German culture, which we are proud of! We know, for example, what loyalty is, unlike you![199]

East German unease has increased during the past few years. The PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) is the successor to the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei

Deutschlands), the old communist party of the DDR. West Germans assumed that the PDS (the "red socks" or "roten Socken" as the conservative CDU called them) would wither away in a rich and unified Germany. But the unexpected happened. In several East German *Länder* the PDS has actually grown.[200] The PDS, the savior of East German identity, was five times stronger in Saxony in 1998 than in Germany as a whole and the *Erststimmen* [direct votes] increased by about ten percent between 1994 and 1998. Many East Germans who vote for the PDS make clear that they do not want communism back, but they do want their self-respect back.[201] The West German side reacts to this "rift digging" by East Germans with a mixture of astonishment and disgust. However, some try to understand. Sociologist Dietmar Wittich (2000)[202] says:

> German unity was enacted as an enforcement of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany] system. The chance to create something common of the two very different societies, to link their special features has been wasted. As the West Germans to this day continue one-sidedly interpreting the history of the GDR [German Democratic Republic, or East Germany] according to their prejudices, redefining biographies, they remain alien in the East and keep reproducing the relative autonomy of the GDR society. This lack of desire to learn on the part of the West German elites is fascinating me because in the competition of the systems the victory of the West, of parliamentary democracy and market economy resulted from the very fact that this system proved to be more capable of learning. Paradoxically, in the moment of victory this society, in particular its elite, lost its ability to learn (Wittich, 2000, p. 1).

Thus, what appears at first to West Germans as unfathomable" ill-will on the East German side is actually an understandable reaction against humiliation. Both overlook that we all yearn for respect. West Germans do not understand that their casual display of power may be offensive, and East Germans misinterpret this "accidental" blindness as essentially evil intention.

Response to humiliation or evil essence?

If we reflect on "Eastern" – especially Islamic – values versus "Western" values, we find a similar dynamic. The rich West exhibits blindness to the fact that its casual display of power may indeed have offensive effects. In the non-Western camp, on the other hand, we see an essentialization, the belief that Western power play proves evil intentions.

   In reality all sides are in astonishing concord, both within Germany and between the Islamic world and the West. Just look at people like bin Laden. They speak softly. They present themselves as holy ascetics, not power-hungry bullies. They provide an image of brave victims who defend themselves in spite of all hardship. Whether they are authentic and believe what they preach, I do not know. However, as far as I can judge, many of their followers are attracted by this display of humility. When I lived in Egypt, I became familiar with the emotional yearnings of this region. The impression these leaders give is that they stand for a justice that is higher than the material world. (As made clear earlier, *understanding* is a word that must be differentiated. *Fathoming* terror does not mean

condoning it. This paragraph is not to be read as condoning terrorism, but rather as an attempt to understand what underlies it.)

Human rights advocates and Islamic fundamentalists share a sense of suffering from a world they perceive as unjust and obscenely materialistic, combined with a vision of how to remedy this sad state of affairs. Western human rights activists and Islamic fundamentalists both believe the world needs improvement. The difference lies in how the two groups define justice and in their choice of remedies. Western human rights promoters see the way out of their disquiet in the ideals they draw from their social and cultural environment, namely human rights ideals. The Osama bin Ladens grew up in another kind of world and were exposed to a different set of solutions. Islam and Arab history provide scripts for heroic martyrdom (see, for example, Saladin). Not all cultural contexts on the globe have martyrdom on offer. Confucianism in China, for example, does not provide people with a dream of an afterlife that rewards holy warriors for martyrdom. The Arab world also has a tradition of "noble warriors." Afghans and Yemenites (this is Osama bin Laden's family background) are "noble warriors," as are Somalis. After several years of research on Somalia, I am familiar with people who are proud they never were subjugated. Somalis say they do not experience humiliation, because "a man would rather die than accept humiliation."

Osama bin Laden and his followers can rely on several cultural "scripts" for bravery and martyrdom. In addition, there may be a personal history of humiliation in the biography of bin Laden, a biography that makes him want to sacrifice lives in order to avenge humiliation. Thus he may have a personal tendency to structure a situation in terms of humiliation. This tendency may have been amplified by those Americans bin Laden was in touch with during the course of his life. He may have had contact with Americans who did fall into the cliché of arrogant Yankees. And since feelings of Arab humiliation at the hands of Western supremacy simmer in the background of the Arab soul since decades, compounded by frustration caused by economic difficulties, there is ample "fuel" for narratives of humiliation that people like bin Laden can instrumentalize.

However, terrorism is not easy to carry out. It is not easy to give one's life in suicide bombings. It requires courage. It may be crucial for the West to acknowledge this courage. The President of the United States, George W. Bush, was adamant that the "Iraqi enemy" is not "honorable." The "Iraqi enemy" engaged in "false surrenders," their soldiers slipped into civil cloths only to continue fighting as "guerilla" forces, and finally, they planned for "cowardly" suicide attacks. The attribution of cowardice, in the spirit of the attribution error, may have devastating consequences. Even the staunchest Realpolitician must admit that in the asymmetric situation that characterizes current world affairs, guerilla warfare and terrorism are superior forces. Suicide bombers are the ultimate weapon. No army can control the minds of every passer-by.

It is inherently impossible to win a war on terror with conventional weapons. Admittedly, missiles send powerful messages. Yet, the recipients may not "understand" those messages in the intended way. They may not see them as inducements to humility, but rather as humiliation, reason to react with enraged defiance. Using ever more conventional weapons could mean the eradication of humankind, rather than its rescue. The only way to win this war is to gain trust and turn enmity into neighborliness. The hearts and minds of the masses must be won to take away their incentive to resonate with those few humiliation entrepreneurs who instigate and organize terror. When the masses

turn away from the few terrorist leaders, they can safely be policed, without fear that every dead or captured terrorist will be replaced with a new one within minutes.

In an asymmetric situation, when one side fights with the ultimate weapon – the feelings of humiliated masses willing to support or even become suicide bombers – to label them "dishonorable" is a sure way to lose. The only way towards mutual respect is to acknowledge courage, on all sides. Acknowledging courage does not mean condoning suicide bombing. On the contrary, it is the first step to halting it. The attribution error "hides" common ground." In reality, all are "courageous," nobody is a "coward."

We may conclude that feelings of humiliation arise when I hear you misattributing my intentions. As long as communities live far away from each other and do not know about other communities misreading them, there is no problem. Everybody feels comfortable white-washing their in-group and blackening all out-groups. However, this becomes problematic when people learn how biased others' judgments about them are.

Japan currently lends itself to illustrating this point. If Japan were isolated from the world – as it was when its Tokugawa Shoguns closed it to the outside – Japanese current "inner affairs" would not be known to anybody else. However, in an interdependent world, in 2005, modifications in Japanese school textbooks ("in order to make our children proud of Japan") trigger enraged mass demonstrations in China and Korea, who feel that Japan tries to "gloss over its past." Floyd Rudmin explains what happens (personal message, April 11, 2005): "It is the humiliation of history. Japan's neighbors are now furious because Japan has again tried to gloss over its history of humiliating its neighbors, but Japan in turns finds it humiliating that it alone is required to continually account for and atone for its historical past."

It is humiliating to learn about evaluations that place me in a less than advantageous light, particularly when I feel that those who levy such judgments lack any moral authority to do so. Thus, the attribution error, or the human tendency to treat out-groups less leniently than in-groups, lends itself to eliciting feelings of humiliation in those out-groups who are on their way to becoming part of the in-group. The coming-into-being of the *global village*, the merging of out-groups into One in-group, confronts people with humiliating and unwelcome out-group biases that in former times they never would have known. Only when the transition towards One in-group has been successfully completed can misreadings and confrontations of this kind be expected to wane.

Sorry! Cross-cultural misunderstandings can humiliate

Humiliation can be perpetrated by mistake. This is particularly relevant on the inter-cultural level, where communication is more prone to produce ambiguities than is communication between individuals with the same cultural background. It is essential to know how to behave when unintended humiliation occurs – or risk the possibility of setting unnecessary cycles of humiliation in motion.

Arrogant carelessness can humiliate

A German or French citizen may perceive it as humiliating to be addressed with Du or tu instead of Sie or vous. A foreigner with an English background, who is used to a simple "you," is unable to fathom the humiliation entailed in the wrong form of address in parts of Europe. A police officer in France or Germany, for example, may use Du or tu with criminals to humiliate them. Thus, a foreigner may humiliate a German or French citizen inadvertently simply by being uninformed. An anonymous reviewer of this text, from America, reacted with the following remark (2002) to the Du and Sie problem[203]: "I would hope that most French and German individuals who are called tu or Du by an obvious foreigner would realize that it's an imperfect command of the language and would not feel humiliated."

This reviewer's hope may meet with sympathy from offended Europeans – however, it may not. His trust that he will be excused could be labeled arrogant and humiliating. What would this reviewer feel if he were entertaining a German intellectual and placed the American flag proudly in the guest room, as a welcome greeting, only to have the visitor put the flag into the waste basket? Would the reviewer "understand" this? Or would he feel that his national pride had been trampled? The Hitler legacy has besmirched national symbols, especially for German intellectuals, who may find it intolerable to have any of such symbols, from any nation, in a room. Even understanding this, the American host might still feel irritated, thinking that his German visitor should have taken time to collect some information about Americans. Would it really be sufficient for the visitor to say: "Oh, I didn't know you felt so deeply about your flag! Why make such a fuss, I just didn't know! I am a foreigner!"

Cosmopolitan liberal Americans would perhaps react calmly and explain that the flag is the premier symbol of their nation. Those who identify most with their flag may not be so lenient. They may feel deeply humiliated and ridiculed, first by the visitor's throwing their flag into the waste basket, then the visitor's self-righteousness reaction when informed of his faux pas.

Ignorance may have humiliating effects, especially when it is understood to mean: "your culture is so unimportant to me that I do not need to be informed, it is your responsibility to excuse my ignorance." The guest's refusal to empathize with the host gives rise to feelings of humiliation. It is not sufficient to merely hope that ignorance will be excused. Expecting excuse for ignorance too lightly, after having been informed of a faux pas, may create the very humiliation that the faux pas itself did not yet cause.

Unwarranted confidence can humiliate

There are a host of seminars and handbooks offering to train individuals to operate in intercultural settings. Thousands of business persons prepare for transactions in other countries by trying to learn what they should do and avoid. They learn long lists of "shoulds"and "should-nots" – in some places they should not show the underside of their feet, in others they must refrain from patting children on their heads, in yet others they must be careful not to step on banknotes, and so forth. These seminars aim at minimizing cross-cultural misunderstandings. However, in many cases they may even create them. We now see situations such as the one in which a Japanese bank director reaches out to shake hands with his French counterpart – having learned that this is the French way to

behave – while the French bank person only bows and keeps his hands back – because he has learned that this is what his Japanese counterpart expects. Both have learned the other's way and have switched the incompatibility. This "accidental misunderstanding" can easily be remedied and both may laugh and feel respected by the other's willingness to adapt to his customs. However, misunderstanding is not always so easily detectable.

During the seven years I worked in Egypt as a clinical psychologist and counselor with a European background, I saw countless cases of unintentional humiliation. I caution people against drawing too much confidence from *How-to-Do in X-Land* handbooks or seminars. Many who had relied on such "intercultural training" arrived as clients at my door, shaken by what they called "culture shock." The training handbooks or seminars, which compare "their" behavior to "ours," often damage the cause more than promote it. What such handbooks or seminars should teach is humility, self-control strategies, and the ability to tolerate insecurity and fear. It is impossible to learn everything about another culture, especially in one brief training course. Imagine your own homeland and how many seminars would have to be drawn up to cover the whole cultural richness: as an American citizen you know compatriots with backgrounds in Quaker culture, others are "cowboys." People in the countryside react differently than people in cosmopolitan cities, one valley may be very different from its nearest neighbor, and so forth. You probably do not really understand your parents, your spouse, your children, and sometimes you wonder about yourself. In short, it is an illusion to believe you ever could learn enough to behave perfectly with all these people at all times.

The illusion of knowing everything is not particularly dangerous as long as one moves in one's own culture, among people who mutually define each other as "us." Under such circumstances, differences are covered by a deep underlying feeling of unity. This commitment to unity makes the illusion of complete mutual understanding viable and perhaps even helpful. However, when you visit "them" the situation is profoundly different. It is not so much "their" cultural codes that you have to learn; after all you don't know all the details of the cultural diversity in your own culture and do fine. You need to learn how to negotiate the relationship between "us" and "them." Here is where the potential for mutual humiliation looms largest. My decades of experience taught me that it is vital that we unlearn the illusion of possible control and practice feeling comfortable without it. Difficult as it may be, detaching from this illusion even helps us at home, where even our children may belong to another "culture."

Humble dialogue is the solution

Egalization is of central significance in cross-cultural encounters. Questions about egalization permeate meetings between "cultures" at any level. As discussed earlier, a love story is being played out, with the rest of the world enamored of the freedom and quality of life the West offers. Like all love affairs in their early stages, this one entails a high level of fear, emotional sensitivity and insecurity.

It is not necessary to learn others' cultural codes by heart. What is crucial, however, is to learn to ask questions in a way that signals respect for everybody's dignity and to react with respect when informed of a mistake. Ignorance is no faux pas but arrogance is. Ignorance can be the starting point for enriching relationships, asking questions can

express interest, respect and recognition and elicit enthusiastic explanations. We may travel through the world and ask questions, respectful questions, humbly admitting our ignorance, and people will open up to us, enjoying our interest. Our blunders and our subsequent apology may deepen our relationships.

However, if we travel through the world comprehensively informed about all cultural codes, and sour our relationships through arrogance, we can do great harm. We may not even notice this dynamic, until we find ourselves sabotaged or even hated. This was typically the case with those Western clients who came to me suffering from "culture shock."

Around 1950, a Belgian national (we'll call him Robert) owned a big farm in Mexico. He was proud of his good relations with his Mexican workers, independent people who held their honor dear. One day the workers' foreman, Manuel, asked Robert for a loan. The Belgian felt honored by this unusual trust and granted the loan, which the foreman promised to pay back in three months.

Several months passed and the Belgian was approached by another Mexican who warned him, "Be careful, the foreman is going to kill you!"
The Belgian, astonished, asked, "Why? We have a very good relationship! I even gave him a loan!"

The Mexican explained: "The foreman cannot repay the loan in time and cannot bear to appear untrustworthy. This would be too humiliating to him. He has to kill you."

The Belgian burst out: "Why doesn't Manuel just talk to me? I am no monster!"

The reply was, "His honor does not allow him to do that."

This story, told to me by one of his friends, unfolds in three phases: The victim of humiliation, the Mexican foreman, knows that he will feel humiliated by not being able to repay the loan on time. The Belgian, however, does not even know that he is perceived as a potential humiliator. Without the help of a benevolent "culture translator," Robert would not have survived. His aptitude at building constructive relationships with his workers saved his life. A more oppressive and arrogant master would not have received a warning and would probably have died as a result of his cultural ineptitude.

Your very life may depend on being humble when you meet people from other cultures. It pays to keep a cautious inner distance and tolerate not having ready-made interpretations of what is going on. It is crucial to be able to endure feelings of fear and insecurity that accompany such uncertainty. It is essential to learn to ask questions with respect. David R. Matsumoto describes this masterly (Matsumoto, Hee Yoo, and LeRoux, 2005).

Finally, it is important to understand the dynamics of humiliation caused by power differences - including the power differences in the *global village* – so you can be sensitive to the problems surrounding processes of *egalization*. If you are a member of the world's elite you must understand that you are scrutinized carefully by the less privileged who are afraid that you will exploit your superiority. Even the mere suspicion

that you may operate by double standards can easily cause feelings of humiliation. On the other side, if you are a member of the world's less privileged it would pay to try to understand that some elites may indeed be benevolent and feel humiliated by your suspicion. Both should be prepared to say "sorry, I did not know that I humiliated you."

The traffic metaphor may be useful here again. Feelings of humiliation may arise when people are not informed about the idiosyncrasies of the way vehicles are built in the neighboring regions. Green vehicles may represent an insult in one quarter, but not in another. However, this will not be the most significant source for feelings of humiliation.

Imagine crossroads with traffic lights and police making sure that they are respected. Police vehicles have sirens that allow them to pass first in emergencies. Yet, people are not sure whether the police are defending the impartiality of the traffic rules or just using their sirens to highjack the system. People feel humiliated when they suspect the police of using their sirens for own advantage, while the police feel humiliated by this suspicion. Both scrutinize the other's behavior anxiously.

To summarize and conclude this chapter, misunderstandings and miscommunications are fertile breeding grounds for feelings of humiliation. Usually, this problem is not very serious. However, in the current transition period of humankind coming together it may be extremely relevant. "Misunderstandings" about the meaning and spirit of human rights, for example, may lead to deep disappointments and feelings of humiliation on all sides, as do the "misunderstandings" that occur when I realize how deep a bias emanates from other communities against me. Bias against out-groups in favor of one's in-group serves the in-group because it increases its cohesion. However, when out-groups wish to merge into *One single in-group* and they meet remnants of *out-group bias* against them, this can have profoundly humiliating effects. Common cross-cultural misunderstandings cannot really be remedied by *How-to-Do in X-Land* handbooks or seminars. The best remedy is the willingness to use lack of knowledge constructively to build dignified relationships and to respectfully maintain relationships while acknowledging that they are made more difficult by worries about *egalization*.

Related reading

Cross-cultural psychology must be considered in studies of cross-cultural humiliation.[204] Linda Hartling (1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (*Humiliation Inventory*)[205] where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring *being teased, bullied, scorned, excluded, laughed at, put down, ridiculed, harassed, discounted, embarrassed, cruelly criticized, treated as invisible, discounted as a person, made to feel small or insignificant, unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service, called names or referred to in derogatory terms*, or viewed by others as *inadequate*, or *incompetent*. The questions probe the extent to which respondents had felt harmed by such incidents throughout life, and how much they feared such incidents.

Read furthermore on *human rights and poverty*,[206] on *negative and positive rights*,[207] on *dignity of animals*,[208] on *vegetarianism that is on the increase*,[209] on the *fundamental attribution error*,[210] and on the belief in a *just world*,[211] as well as on *intercultural sensitivity*.[212]

Love, Help and Humiliation

We are used to thinking that where there is humiliation, there are humiliators. We are accustomed to believing that for humiliation to occur there must be – somewhere – a "bad" person who humiliates others. However, situations of humiliation may also occur when only one party labels it as such. For example, help and love can humiliate.

In such cases, we may find benevolent helpers on one side, no evil perpetrators at all; yet, the help and love they extend may cause feelings of humiliation in the recipients. Only *one* participant identifies this event as *humiliation*, the *other* labels it *help* or *love*. The following vignette may illustrate the case of help and humiliation.

> I have cancer. I have no money for medicine. You come to help me. You bring me chocolate. You feel good. I appreciate your good intentions. However, don't you see that I need medicine? Don't you see that you serve your own interests more than mine by bringing me chocolate? You have proved to yourself and your friends that you are a helpful human being.
>
> But what about me? You buy yourself a good conscience and I pay the price. I feel painfully humiliated by your blindness and ignorance. I am bitter. I understand you do not know better. You are naïve and well-intentioned, but to me, you seem either stupid or evil. A little more effort to understand my situation would really help! And by the way, how much money did you earn with these pesticides that caused my cancer?

Humiliation is an emotional experience that depends upon the relation between at least two parties. It cannot be described through the reactions of one individual or one party. The question which poses itself explicitly is: "If I want to help others, but my arrogant way of behaving humiliates those I want to help, do I then commit a humiliating act?" From my point of view, I do not commit a humiliating act; from the perceiver's point of view I do commit such an act.

Laura came to me for counseling because she could not stand her mother-in-law. She said:

> My mother-in-law says she wants the best for her son and his family. She gives us gifts and arranges a lot of things. Whatever she deems lacking in the house, she orders. She has the key to the house and walks in and out at will. She defines what is good for us and then she does that "good." My husband is very glad about that.
>
> When I beg him to take the key back, he gets angry. He rebukes me for being ungrateful. I tell him that my opinions, my taste, my way of prioritizing things, are made void and irrelevant by his mother's intrusions. I am a kind of decorative doll in the house. He thinks I am oversensitive and hysterical.
>
> We have children. I cannot just leave. Her 'gifts' surround me and make me feel alien in my own home. I do not want my children to grow up spoiled by this woman! She invades me and annihilates me and my children with her overflowing "good-will." I am profoundly humiliated, everyday, and nobody recognizes it!

The case of Laura is relevant in situations involving humanitarian aid, peace keeping, or peace enforcing. The helpers struggle with the possibility that their actions may humiliate those they want to help. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War* is the telling title of a book that addresses these traps (Mary B. Anderson, 1999).

The difficulty entailed in dynamics of humiliation that are set in motion by help and love is that the "perpetrator" is blind to this dynamic. In torture, the perpetrator intends to humiliate the victim. Both, perpetrator and victim, agree that torture is about humiliation. Both are aware of this dynamic; there is no dissonance in perception. In cases of failing help and love, dissonance is at the core of the feelings of humiliation that are elicited. Help and love are not torture. Helpers and lovers are not torturers. Both, helper and helped, lover and loved, agree on this definition. When the recipient experiences help and love as humiliating, there is deep dissonance, deep disagreement, and a profound breakdown of mutual understanding. There is no shared identity, no shared experience, and no consensus.

The alleged "perpetrators" may overlook this rift and live in an illusionary world, convinced that good intentions are all that is needed to secure real helpfulness in help and real lovingness in love. The "beneficiaries" will feel humiliated by this blind conviction. Some might "overdo it" and mistrust and reject even those helpers who make every effort to adapt their help and support to the recipients' needs. Whatever is the backdrop, "helpers" and "lovers" typically react with surprise and shock over the lack of gratitude and appreciation they encounter. They may develop feelings of humiliation, too, emphasizing their effort and their benign intentions and seeing the lack of recognition as an evil attempt to besmirch and humiliate them. A cycle of humiliation may thus be put in motion by help and love.

Your love does not reach me! Lack of attunement humiliates

Genuinely helpful help and genuinely loving love should consider such elements of humanness as the *need to belong*, *intersubjectivity*, *communication*, *friendship*, *community*, *love,* and *social integration.*

The *need to belong* seems to be characteristic of *humanness*. Helping, friendship, community, love are all different forms of belonging. Good *communication,* basic to any successful human endeavor, is founded on *intersubjectivity*, which means that we live in each others' minds and look at ourselves empathically through the eyes of others. Scheff (2003) commends the idea of *pendulation*, through which "we swing back and forth between our own point of view and that of the other" (Levine, 1997, in Scheff, 2003, p. 10). "It is this back and forth movement between subjective and intersubjective consciousness that allows us the potential for understanding each other" (Scheff, 2003a, p. 10).

Successful *pendulation* can produce *solidarity* and *social integration*; without it, we have *alienation* and *lack* of social integration. Scheff reminds us that solidarity and alienation are useful concepts for the analysis for large groups or whole societies, as well as for interpersonal and love relationships. When Scheff analyzes love, he introduces three elements, *attunement, attachment*, and *attraction* (including *sexual attraction*).

Attachment and sexual attraction are primarily physical processes, comparatively uncomplicated, constant and universal over time and in different cultures. Attunement – the cultural, cognitive and emotional basis for love – however, entails numerous dimensions and implications and varies depending on the individuals, social classes, cultures and historical epochs involved. To Scheff, attunement is a sense of oneness, mutual understanding, empathic resonance, and shared awareness. Attunement means connectedness between people, often "effortless understanding, and understanding that one is understood" (Scheff, 2003a, p. 9). Good attunement is achieved when *pendulation* is successful, when *intersubjectivity* is lived to its full potential.

Solomon (1981, 1994) identifies *shared identity* as the central feature of attunement and love:

> …love [is] shared identity, a redefinition of self which no amount of sex or fun or time together will add up to….Two people in a society with an extraordinary sense of individual identity mutually fantasize, verbalize and act their way into a relationship that can no longer be understood as a mere conjunction of the two but only as a complex ONE (Solomon 1981, p. xxx; 1994, p. 235).

When pendulation succeeds, the result is a relationship of interdependency. Interdependent love is a secure bond, not dependent and engulfed, and not independent and isolated. Healthy love cannot develop when pendulation is absent. The broken heart that occurs after infatuation, for example, lacks pendulation – it is self-absorbed and isolated. Engulfed love, in which one person gives up her self for another, produces no secure bond, just dependency (expected from a wife in traditional marriage).

Marshall Rosenberg (1999) holds workshops on *non-violent communication*. He suggests that maintaining empathic connectedness is the first priority in personal relationships. Scheff reports:

> In Rosenberg's workshops, this question often arises in parent-child relationships, when a mother or father complains about a child's behavior. For example, a mother may repeat a dialogue between her and her son about getting his homework done before watching TV or playing electronic games. Rosenberg begins by explaining that the child has a need for autonomy, for being his own person, as well as a need for remaining connected with the parent.

> This idea seems to be lost on the parent. She will ask: "So how do I get him to do the homework?" The parent seems to have the idea that what is involved is a test of wills, and that the way to go is to have a stronger will than the child. Rosenberg then goes on to explain that the parent needs to show that empathic connectedness is more important to her than getting the homework done. That is, that she respects the child's need for autonomy" (Scheff, 2003a, p. 13).

The recipients of "fake" or "false" help and love – in which true connectedness is missing – even if it is well-intended, may feel humiliated. When the recipients' thoughts and needs are not taken into account, the recipients are put into an inferior position. To be put into an inferior position against one's will is nothing else but humiliating.

Eve recounts:

My first husband treated me very badly. My body was an object to be walked over. My new husband puts a lot of effort into making our relationship a success. He prepares candle light dinners, works for hours to give me orgasms and is altogether unstoppable. The problem is that neither man knows how to listen to me and build a relationship. My first husband was not even interested in a real relationship, but the second one thinks it is sufficient to "invest" certain "efforts" in me, irrespective of whether I resonate with them or not. Sometimes a little gesture gives me more of an orgasm than several hours of bed gymnastics; a small snack may do as much as a candle light dinner. The problem is that there is no attunement. I tell him that his one-sided actions neglect me and humiliate me because they treat me like a product of his imagination and not as an independent human being. He only gets irritated that I do not recognize his unrelenting, loving efforts.

These stories indicate that Scheff's definitions of full love are inscribed in a human rights frame. As Scheff himself notes, in the old traditional honor order no husband was required to build a mutually shared identity with his wife. It was her job to buy into his identity and live in what Scheff calls engulfed love. Rosenberg encounters parents who still believe that "what is involved is a test of wills, and that the way to go is to have a stronger will than the child." In the old order, subjugation was the name of the game; help and love were associated with the stick rather than with mutually shared identity or pendulation. Egalization ideals are new to many and must be learned from scratch. They represent skills that have not yet been incorporated as culturally transmitted knowledge. Old recipes vie with new ones, different definitions of help and love elicit humiliating "misunderstandings" and the confusion is great.

To conclude this section, helpers and lovers carry responsibilities to design their efforts in ways that do not "walk over" recipients, humiliating them. Healthy love is *interdependent*, and not independent and *isolated*. Recipients, on the other side, need to remember that healthy love is not dependent and engulfed, either. Both parties in love or help relationships may go too far, either by "walking over" the other, or by allowing the other to "walk over" them. The first case was addressed in this section; the second case will be addressed in the following section.

You pretend to love me but you rape me! Allowing oneself to be seduced into false love humiliates

Alice, an educated and intelligent European woman, came to me as a client in 1991 when her marriage collapsed. She said:

I met Robert ten years ago. He is 18 years older than me. I had just come out of a relationship with an abusive man who could not endure an intelligent woman. I yearned for kindness, for not being hurt several times a day. I was touched and happy when Robert said he needed me. My former husband never said such things; he only said I was old and ugly. Robert lifted me up! I was ready to give Robert everything, I

was happy to find somebody who loved me, someone who did not feel threatened by my education and intelligence.

Robert lived and worked in Indonesia and I moved there to join him. He was separated from his wife back in Europe and he told me the laws in his home country would not allow him to get a divorce. However, he said, he considered me his wife now. I accepted. I preferred a happy unmarried relationship to a painful marriage. When I arrived in Indonesia, I was full of plans, wanting to do research, get another degree, and have a family.

But none of that happened. I am ten years older now and I have nothing. I wasted all these years on this man. And, I did not even recognize that I was wasting my time. Whenever I wanted to realize one of my goals, there was an existential crisis in his life. He had problems with his job, problems with his family; we lived in emergencies. I hardly ever relaxed. I was always busy helping him with his problems, hoping that we would start "our" life as soon as the current crisis passed. It never started!

I tried to be optimistic! When I felt that I was not optimistic enough, I felt guilty for not loving him enough. My mother had taught me that a good woman devoted her life to her man. This is what I did, and it made me feel good! Now I get nauseated thinking about it! Robert hid behind those emergencies, used them to avoid real commitment to me. He was not really interested in my needs, my dreams, and my happiness. He needed my presence, yes, he enjoyed me being near him. I was a nice object in his apartment and objects do not have needs.

I feel ashamed of myself. I humiliated myself in front of the Alice who once thought highly of herself. I feel exploited by Robert; he manipulated me into helping him and sacrificing my life for him. I feel that he raped me, a slow humiliating rape, which I allowed. Robert raped me and made me believe it was love.

The case of Alice may be placed within the same theoretical framework as the *Hitlerzeit* [*Hitler's era*].[213] Many of Germany's *kleine Leute*, the *little people*, were "raped" by Hitler, seduced and humiliated. Germany is currently undergoing a period of "working through" the *Nazizeit* [*Nazi period*]. *Zeitzeugen* [*witnesses of history*] are interviewed "before they die," in documentaries and on TV talk shows. People who had been almost completely silent for more than 50 years reflect more openly, unearthing their memories. The *Unfähigkeit zu trauern* [*the inability to mourn*],[214] described by Mitscherlich (1982) for 50 years may have had its origins in an inability to talk. The only ones who always had a voice, though faint, where those few *Unverbesserliche* [*those who cannot be reformed*], who at the far right of the political spectrum continued to broadcast Nazi ideals after World War II, as well as a few critical intellectuals with historical interests. Now however, more than fifty years after the *Zusammenbruch* [*collapse*] of Hitler's Germany, the *little people* are beginning to reflect, destroying the wall of silence that had led many to believe those times had been forgotten.

Hitler held one of his manipulative speeches on the Bückeberg, a hill near Hamelin, the city of the *pied piper*. The most popular versions of this tale derive from the poem by

Robert Browning and the fairy tale by the Brothers Grimm. "In pretty much all versions, rats infest Hamelin and the town hires a traveling rat catcher to exterminate them. When he does so, the king, mayor, or whoever decides not to pay him, so he extracts his revenge by spiriting away the town's children."[215] On July 22, 2003, a German colleague, Friedrich Flachsbart, wrote to me, "In Hamelin the piper was humiliated and thus transformed from a rat catcher to a child catcher. This has always been a prominent imagery in my mind. My grandfather was on the Bückeberg and there he saw the real rat catcher [Hitler]."[216]

During my stays in Germany I immerse myself in this discourse, particularly focusing on the elder generations. When I prepared my project on humiliation in 1994 and started my research in 1997, the term humiliation had little meaning for most people. By 2000 and 2001, the whole German nation seemed to be talking about nothing else. I heard people who had always avoided talking about World War II before say things that shocked, surprised and moved me. Clearly, that era has not been forgotten, although shrouded in silence for half a century. Even small details are remembered and discussed, both in private conversations and on television documentaries. The torment is still fresh and vivid, and details emerge in a multi-facetedness as if the war ended only yesterday.

I collect impressions that illuminate questions pertaining to competing interpretations of German behavior, questions such as, "How did Hitler manage to incite a whole population to follow him?" As Alan Jacobs (1995) puts it:

Why do people join political, religious, professional, or social movements, of whatever size, and surrender so completely, giving up, in the extreme, everything; their fortunes, their, critical thinking, their political freedom, their friends, families, even their own lives? What causes people to create a system or perhaps merely follow a system that creates Auschwitz, the Lubianka, the killing fields of Cambodia…? (Jacobs, 1995, p. 1).

Several rival views have emerged. Goldhagen sees the Germans as thoroughly complicitous (Goldhagen, 1996). According to this writer, because of their antipathy and indifference to the victims of Nazism, the Germans were willing, even eager, to "do their part." Another analysis is offered by Norbert Elias (1996), who argues that Hitler used his skills as a propagandist to build up the resentment of ordinary Germans and directed the aggressive energy fermented by humiliation against Germany's neighbors and against the Jews (Elias, 1996). Theodor Adorno (1950)[217] focuses on the authoritarian personality whose principal characteristic is obedience and blind adherence to orders, irrespective of their moral contents. Alice Miller (1983) highlights yet another facet in her writings on child rearing practices that create personalities predisposed to develop into perpetrators. Another notion claims the Germans were "ignorant dupes, guilty mainly of shutting their eyes to unpleasant realities that they could readily have discerned if they had been willing to look."[218] Finally, Ervin Staub (1989), in his book *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*, concentrates on group dynamics and highlights the important role of bystanders and the disastrous effect of them failing to stand up. Among others, in Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000p, I offer a view,[219] which links *social identity theory* with its emphasis on the group with a more *individual-based* analysis. This view suggests ordinary Germans were ideal targets for seduction by Hitler.

They went along with him, enthusiastically, although in many cases with ambivalence, because of his flattering message about themselves and Germany's future.

Germany's little people, previously victims of routine humiliation, felt elevated by Hitler for the first time in their history. Hitler offered the little people, who had never been taken seriously, an elite identity and a clear sense of direction. He even arranged for symphony orchestra music to be played in factories, giving the little people a sense of greatness[220] and ennobled them by including them in the elite Germanic Aryan race with an important national mission. Many among the aristocracy in Germany opposed Hitler, calling him "the demon"[221] because of his talent for getting the little people's emotions burning for him. Those among the aristocracy who collaborated with Hitler felt shamefully humiliated: they were forced to work with "the demon," because he controlled the feelings of the nation. The masses – busy with daily survival – had paid less attention to the details of the national humiliation inflicted by the Versailles Treaty after World War I than the aristocracy did, but Hitler "explained" the situation to them and gave them a leading role to play.

The little people were also caught up in the other social dynamics Hitler created. It was attractive to share the passions of the group, to be swept up in its enthusiasm. At the same time, it was disagreeable, and increasingly dangerous, to remain isolated from group feeling (to say nothing of the dangers of active opposition). The interpretation proposed here sees the masses not as *willing executioners* but as *willing partners in seduction*. After the seduction, however, they were betrayed and abandoned to a terrible fate by a once-beloved parent or lover. There was no alternative to realizing that they had been "raped." It took the nation decades to overcome the shock and admit the "rape."

To summarize, when there is no *pendulation*, there is a problem. Alice went for engulfed and dependent love, as did the little people in Germany. Both gave up large parts of their independent selves to immerse themselves in the loved person's world. Robert and Hitler saw themselves as providers of love and salvation. However, they brought destruction. Alice was caught in the old definition of love that insists a woman give up herself for her "man." The little people in Germany were led into engulfed love by their lack of experience with "seduction" at a national level. The end was harsh, for all.

Alice and Germany's *little people* gave their "souls" for their lovers. Both had to realize, at the end, that their lovers had not extended genuinely caring love. Their lovers were isolated people, living in secluded hallucinatory worlds, within which they defined love and help on their own terms and without pendulation. Robert and Hitler ignored the fact that reality did not conform to their hallucinations and misjudged what would be good for the well-being of those they supposedly loved, bringing humiliation to all. Alice and the *little people* had reason to feel betrayed by their lovers and ashamed at the "stupidity" with which they allowed themselves to be used. Robert and Hitler felt humiliated by the lack of thankfulness they encountered. As mentioned before, Hitler, before his death, concluded that Germany deserved to be destroyed.

The lesson here is that providers of love and help, as well as recipients, have a responsibility to engage in active *attunement* and *pendulation*. Providers need to make sure that what they provide is meeting its goals, while recipients must verify whether providers are willing and capable of pendulation.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami spoke of the humiliation and "rape" felt in the Arab world:

> Arabs feel humiliated. Notwithstanding the clear differences between the conditions of the Israeli-Palestinian situation and the Iraqi threat, Arab leaders and the "Arab Street" have always wanted to see the international community, through the UN Security Council, impose tough resolutions on Israel. And now they are being "raped," as the Arab media puts it, by America into acquiescing to precisely such a resolution against an Arab state at a time when Israel is allowed a free hand in suppressing the Palestinian Intifadah" (Ben-Ami, 2003).

Do no harm! Aid can support peace – or war

The Hefter Center at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, called for participants for the Wisconsin Institute 19th Annual Conference in 2003 with the following text:

> Failed and failing states pose perhaps the most dangerous threat to the security of the U.S. and the world community, as well as the millions of inhabitants of those states. However, the international community has not found a reliable way to build sustainable peace and development in many of the world's neediest areas... [222] The keynote speaker is Mary B. Anderson (1999), author of the book *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War.*

When I came to Africa in 1998, my motivation to do research was suspect. I encountered the following complaints:

> First you colonize us. Then you leave us with a so-called democratic state that is alien to us. After that you watch us getting dictatorial leaders. Then you give them weapons to kill half of us. Finally you come along to "measure" our suffering and claim that this will help us!? Are you crazy?"

How was I to react? Was I to feel humiliated by such aggressive insults hurled at my perfectly benevolent intentions? Should I merely shrug my shoulders and label these critics as oversensitive people, clinging to old injuries instead of getting their act together and rising from their lamentable condition? Who was to blame? What is helpful research? How should it be designed to be of benefit and not contribute to humiliation? I tried to listen more.

> You Westerners get a kick out of our problems. You have everything back home, you live in luxury, and you are blind to that. You think you're suffering when you can't take a shower or have to wait for the bus for more than two hours! Your four-wheel drive cars cover our people with dust! You enjoy being a king in our country, but you're just average at home! All you want is to have fun, get a good salary, write empty reports to your organization back home or publish some articles, so you can continue this fraud. You are a hypocrite! You know that we need help – how glad

we'd be not to need it! It would be great if you'd really listen to us, not just to the greedy ones among us who exploit your arrogant stupidity for their own good! We feel deeply humiliated by your arrogant and self-congratulating help! (Taken from an interview with an African intellectual, January 2, 1999, in Kenya; however this view was typical of African intellectuals).

After many years of failed aid programs, many observers agree that it is primarily the donors' responsibility to ensure that their help meets the needs of the recipients. The recipients are judged "right" in feeling humiliated by ill-considered help. In Africa, I continuously met descriptions of UN or NGO activities that came close to parody (but containing elements of truth):

You helpers come along, build wells (or some other installations or services liable to be ecologically unsound or unmanageable in the longer run), create a few short-term jobs for chauffeurs, secretaries and security personnel, and then you disappear again!"

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni sarcastically described as "dangerous tourism" what UN personnel do when driving around, for example in Congo, and watching from their cars – without intervening – as people are being killed fifty meters away.[223] Thorvald Stoltenberg, eminent Norwegian politician and former UN Special Representative in the former Yugoslavia, expressed his dismay at the gap between a rhetoric of support and a reality of disappointment and the devastating consequences. He explained how he was exposed to this first in 1956 in Hungary, when the West encouraged protesters. Stoltenberg knew very well that the West would not risk a world war to help these people. The most recent terrible example he experienced was Srebrenica (Stoltenberg, 2000).

Does this mean that helpers are always responsible when help fails or is insufficient? Are helpers "wrong" when help goes wrong? No. Help may be well-intentioned and well-designed, but meet recipients who show insufficient appreciation for the effort of the helper. In that case the helper's actions would have to be evaluated as "right," while the blame would go to the recipients. Before starting my field work in Somalia in 1998, I talked with NGO personnel who had worked with Somali refugees. They told me that they would not support me in emphasizing Somali victimhood:

These people are arrogant and unappreciative. You should have seen their behavior in the refugee camps! They regard help as their right and are extremely pushy, unreasonable and choosy. They cheat us helpers wherever they can. They accuse us of humiliation. But if you want to speak to the people who are really being humiliated, then speak to us, the helpers!

What are we to do in such a situation? Who is "right"? Perhaps this question is inappropriate. Perhaps, for research, it is important to describe the interplay, the complexity of accusations and counter-accusations. What is the role of research and science in this case? Sam Engelstad, the UN's Chief of Humanitarian Affairs (and on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in Mogadishu in 1994), wrote to me[224]:

During my time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent.

Engelstad added that "Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us."

The background for Engelstad's remarks was the launching of *Operation Restore Hope* (by the *Unified Task Force, UNITAF*), on December 9, 1992, by the United States, as a response to the failure of the first United Nations operation *UNOSOM*. However, *UNITAF* also failed, as did *UNOSOM II*. Especially, the hunt for Somali General Aidid was widely seen as undermining UN impartiality and turning the UN and the US into targets of Somali mistrust and revenge. In 1993 an angry crowd dragged a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia. The offer of help to an impoverished and ravaged country, Somalia, was greeted by "disrespect" and "lack of thankfulness," with acts of humiliation perpetrated against the helpers.

On New Year's Eve 1998, I interviewed a Somali warlord (Osman Ato, a former ally of General Aidid), one of many Somali voices who insisted that the *UNOSOM* operation was a humiliation. This was especially true, he maintained, when a house in which respected elders were meeting was attacked and bombed. He felt even more humiliated by the cynical and humiliating justification for the bombing – that this meetinghouse was a headquarters. He argued that "when the Americans feel humiliated because their soldiers' bodies were shown in the streets, they should ask themselves why this happened. They should be aware of the fact that killing elders, for example, is a deep humiliation in Somali society." The helicopters, the bombing, all this, he maintained, were acts of humiliation that united Somalis against the UN. Osman Ato's views illustrated that he, a warlord and an "organizer of violence," thinks in terms of humiliation and "counter humiliation." Many Somalis united with him under the banner of "necessary" humiliation-for-humiliation.

An American, who reviewed the foregoing paragraph, reacted as follows (2002)[225]:

For a Somali warlord to attribute the killing of US peacekeepers and the desecration of the body of one of them to the humiliation of some Somali elders being killed by American bombing (although there is no reason to think that the Americans knew that the people in the house were "respected elders") is obviously a more moral-sounding explanation than hatred, bloodlust, or a demonstration of power. Here the problem of researcher bias arises: a more neutral interviewer might have asked this man why the attack on the Americans had been preceded by the killing of dozen or so Pakistani peacekeepers, who presumably had nothing to do with those elders, were fellow Moslems, had not in any way been colonial oppressors of Somalia, etc.

This comment leads us directly to the cycle of humiliation. First, the American reviewer assumes that ignorance protects people from being taken as humiliators (*they* should assume that *we* did not know and that it was an embarrassing mistake) without realizing that such "misunderstandings" very often lie at the heart of cycles of humiliation. The American reviewer, with his remarks, is party to a potential cycle of humiliation instead of maintaining neutrality. By expecting that ignorance protects against eliciting humiliation, the reviewer clearly is "wrong."

However, the reviewer is also "right." A warlord may indeed cover up power-lust by using *humiliation rhetoric*. Ato may or may not be using humiliation to shield ulterior motives, however. The situation could represent a mixture – perhaps he sometimes feels genuinely humiliated and sometimes he merely uses the humiliation argument to his political advantage. We do not know. What we know, and what a researcher has to report, is that he uses the humiliation argument, genuinely or not. An impartial researcher must recount this, nothing more and nothing less. A researcher cannot discount a person's claims to feeling humiliated. The reviewer is "wrong" in expecting that the Somali view should not be reported just because it does not correspond to American views. The interviewer (in this case the author of this book) indeed did ask Osman Ato and others about the killing of Pakistani troops. This questioning failed, however, to fulfill the American reviewer's expectation that it open up Somali self-criticism and counter their feelings of humiliation, authentic or not.

Hassan A. Keynan (former UNESCO secretary general in Somalia) explained the difference between *authentic feelings of humiliation* and the use of *rhetoric of humiliation* (in an interview on August 25, 2000, in Oslo):

> On a personal level people's experiences are always authentic. But, with regard to all Somali groups, particularly those with their own political agendas, and in any other society similar to Somalis, rhetoric of humiliation and human rights is used to score political points.
>
> People use political rhetoric – including humiliation and violation of human rights, aspects the Western world gives most attention to – to attract the ears of Westerners. This manipulation will be greater if the researcher is a novice and does not know anything about the society.
>
> General political rhetoric and political manipulation is used even in the most democratic societies, in the most stable and economically better-off countries, but its use in war-torn societies assumes particular poignancy. A researcher striving for objectivity must try very hard to discriminate what is authentic and what is political rhetoric aimed at achieving a political end. I think that is the most important point. This is not an easy job. But, I think, if the person is aware of that then he or she will take it into consideration, factoring it into the methodology of the research.

In the North of Somalia, the message was clear. Somalis, upon independence in 1960, had a dream of unity, of supporting, loving, and helping each other as brothers and sisters. However, the result was destruction. The Somalis of the North were bombed to rubble by their brothers from the South; they were killed and humiliated in a quasi-

genocide in 1988. After that experience, they no longer wanted to unite with their Southern brothers. They wanted their own independent state, "Somaliland" (Somaliland is not recognized by the international community or by other Somali leaders, who bitterly resent this secession). Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan (this is not his real name, November 19, 1998, in Hargeisa) stated: "Independence of Somaliland is the result of humiliation by the South."

I filmed many of the interviews I conducted in the North of Somalia. When I showed fragments of these interviews to Somalis from the South, they reacted with passionate anger. Some Southerners bitterly complained, "These people from the North, they humiliated others before, but this they do not tell you! They behaved arrogantly and humiliated us!" (conversation in December 1999, the interlocutor does not want to be named). The Somali dream of mutual support and unity descended into mayhem. In the South of Somalia the "secession" of the North was seen as an insult, while people in the North felt that they should never have united with the South after independence, or at least should have better secured their interests in a united Somalia.

What is reality? Did the Somalis from the North lie when they professed to feel humiliated by the South? Who humiliated whom? Who is "right? This book is not about distributing blame. This book aims at "helping" the world through impartial science and unearthing processes of humiliation, in whatever form. Readers' replies, such as the one from the American reviewer, are part of these processes and should be included in the research.

Yet, even though this book aims at "helping" the world by doing good science, it may be drawn into cycles of humiliation and, unintentionally and inadvertently, have humiliating effects on some readers, who then may lash out against it. The American reviewer draws *science* into this cycle of humiliation by condemning as "unscientific" reports of views that are unwelcome to the American party in the conflict. He asks research to represent only one side, despite the need for impartiality to end cycles of humiliation. However, cycles of humiliation can be broken only if data are collected from all sides, without censorship, and initially without regard to "authenticity." It is only in a second step that authenticity should be discussed.

Perhaps it is prudent for an accused party, instead of discounting feelings of humiliation professed by the opponent, to consider that they may be authentic, perhaps even "justified." It is prudent for two reasons: First, if professed feelings of humiliation are authentic, even if produced by propaganda, flatly discounting them will only inflame the situation. Second, if these feelings indeed are authentic, if not "justified," they may be healed by understanding and apologies. Free-floating self-feeding psychopathic "blood-lust" is much more difficult to tackle than humiliation which is relational and can be mitigated within relations. "Bloodlust" should therefore be the last "diagnosis" we turn to.

Earlier, I introduced Laura and her problems with her mother-in-law. I did not mention then that Laura's mother-in-law also consulted me. She was enraged:

> I do whatever I can for Laura and the children. I am sacrificing my life for them! My son is very happy with my caring help. But his wife does nothing but sabotage me! She asks me to understand her. But what about her trying to understand me? Her soul is black and she is evil!

Laura cried. Mother, I do appreciate your efforts. I am not evil! I do try to understand you! If we continue with this war, the children will grow up in hell! Can't you try to see my point of view? What would you have done if your mother-in-law dominated your life? Please try to see me! Then you would see that I am not evil! I want you and me and the whole family to have good relations! Do not call me evil!

If a cycle of humiliation occurred in Somalia and Somalis truly felt humiliated (whether incited by propaganda or authentically) and responded by inflicting humiliation upon dead American bodies, then we have a situation that cries out for analysis. It would be a scientific and political mistake to suppress reports of humiliation because they may entail unauthentic propaganda.

The latest turn of this cycle of humiliation seems eerily relevant today. Anti-Western terrorism in Egypt (for example Luxor, 1997,) and the 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, have filled the media. September 11, 2001, or the attack on the discotheque in Bali in 2002, could be seen as further incidents on this list. Fear of terrorist attacks, kidnappings and bombings has limited the freedom of Western travelers. Not even humanitarian workers are safe from kidnap incidents, like the one that occurred in Somalia in April 1998.[226] The 2003 attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad showed that nobody is safe from the overflow of cycles of humiliation and their use by terrorists.

The humiliating ending of the UN operation in Somalia had profound effects at the global multilateral level for which another country in agony, Rwanda, paid a high price. When the genocide started in Rwanda in 1994, the international community left Rwandans to slaughter each other because nobody wanted a "second Somalia." [227] This is more shocking when we realize that as few as 5000 troops may have saved almost a million lives:

A modern force of 5,000 troops... sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war… (Feil, 1998, 3, quoted from The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 10, paragraph 9).

What is good help? Action research

We are learning that if we want to help, if we want to give a gift of love, we must first ask whether and how this help, or love, is welcome. Helping, loving, caring, liberating, setting free are all services that, if linked to arrogance, may be perceived as humiliating. Active *pendulation*, a sophisticated realization of *intersubjectivity*, and a successful effort at *attunement* are at the core of genuine help and love. Help and love are only successful if carried out in a spirit of humility, from equal to equal, and not in a top-down manner.

The buzzwords *empowering* and *enabling* have a place here. Would-be helpers have a responsibility to empower and enable recipients to voice their views. Merely empowering would not be enough. The *little people* in Germany had been empowered only a short while earlier and used their newly won power to elect a hallucinating seducer, Hitler. Many, especially women with their newly gained suffrage, were not yet *enabled* to make informed choices.

Gergen advocates *participatory action research*, particularly in cross-cultural settings. In the chapter "Sensitivity to the Influences of Diverse Cultural Traditions" in the book *Toward a Cultural Constructionist Psychology*, Gergen writes:

> To assist in this effort new methodologies have emerged attempting to dismantle research hierarchies, and replace the traditional autonomy of the researcher (an invitation to cultural blindness) with more collaborative forms of inquiry. Perhaps the most visible form of collaborative research is that of participatory action research (see for example Reason (Ed.), 1994, in Gergen and Gergen, 2000).

Wherever I went in Africa (1998 and 1999) the *War-torn Societies Project in Somalia*,[228] received praise for being different from many projects sponsored by aid agencies. The *War-torn Societies Project* concentrated on *action research*[229] and attempted to work with the communities concerned to develop an agenda for development, enabling and empowering people and transforming them from *recipients* into *co-actors*. Empowerment heals humiliation; and research requires pendulation – intellectual and psychological – between the *incoming helpers' perceptions or ideologies of what people need as aid* and the *support that local people really need*. This tailor-made approach seems to be successful primarily because it is non-humiliating.

To conclude this chapter, we realize that the definition of love and care is deeply inscribed in a human rights based approach to relationships. Respecting equal dignity and avoiding top-down communication is at the core, for example, of Scheff's presentation of "good" love. In traditional honor contexts, this view is not shared or used. As Scheff remarks, the traditional view of love is that the husband dominates and the wife subjects herself. Attunement, pendulation, sophisticated realization of intersubjectivity are all very new "methods" of loving, caring and helping, not yet widely known and understood. Families, societies and the international community are struggling with the transition.

To summarize Part II, this part addressed how the phenomenon of humiliation is brought to the fore by *globalization*, how the notion of humiliation is posited at the core of *egalization*, and how *misunderstandings*, *love*, and *help* can provide fertile breeding grounds for dynamics of humiliation that furthermore may be pursued in an *addictive* fashion. The dynamics of humiliation introduce *malign* elements into otherwise *benign* contexts. Both *globalization* and *egalization* may be regarded as basically *benign* processes that need careful protection to save international and national communities from being pulled into *malign* cycles of humiliation.

Misunderstandings, *love* and *help* need particular attention because only one side defines an incident as humiliating, while the other is either ignorant (in the case of misunderstandings), or sure of good intentions (in the case of love and help). The one-sided labeling of a situation as humiliating may elicit fierce protests and hot feelings of humiliation from the other side, setting in motion destructive cycles of humiliation. Even

science and research, hoping to be "helpful" to humankind, may be drawn into the spirals of humiliation that emerge. Misunderstandings can be avoided only when all parties are empowered and enabled to participate in a process of mutual *pendulation.*

Part III will address the strategies with which cycles of humiliation may be prevented or mitigated.

Related reading

Read more on how *help can humiliate,*[230] on the *need to belong* as a characteristic of *humanness,*[231] on *attachment,*[232] on the *relational* nature of our social environment,[233] on *empowerment* and *good governance,*[234] on the *suffering* of *humanitarian helpers* out in the field,[235] on *truth* and *method,*[236] and on *action research.*[237]

Chapter 5: The Many Ways Humiliation Has Played a Role in International Conflict

After Germany's defeat in 1945, care was taken not to repeat the humiliation of 1918. Instead of facing draconian demands for reparations, Germany was given help to rebuild its industrial economy and was brought into NATO and the European Community (now the European Union). The clear intention was to avoid a third world war against Germany with all the horrible costs that would entail' (Lindner, 2000a, 2).

The Marshall Plan was central to preventing a renewed humiliation. Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirmed this when he spoke at Harvard University 5th June 1972 at the commemoration of George Marshall's speech 25 years earlier (Brandt, 1999). Brandt's speech was entitled: '1945 Different Than 1918.'

Willy Brandt, with his own talent for making historic speeches, declared: '...Victories, too, can be bitter, especially if they carry the seed for future conflicts as in 1918, when the war was won, and peace was lost for want of reason on the part of the winners and the losers, through stubborn mistrust on the one side, through resentment of the humiliated on the other... George Marshall and others agreed that victory did not relieve his country of its responsibility. The United States did not for a moment claim that responsibility for itself, it shared it with its allies...With his plan George Marshall roused Europe's stifled self-confidence. He gave many citizens of the old continent a concrete stimulus to bring down from the stars the vision of a Europe united in lasting peace... the Marshall Plan was productive proof that America needs a self-confident Europe capable of forming a common political will... it waits for Europe to grow into an equal partner with whom it can share the burden of responsibility for world affairs...1947 marked the beginning of the Cold War, not because of, but in spite of the Marshall Plan.'

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	The Treaty of Versailles humiliated a defeated Germany and – together with economic hardship – prepared Germany for Hitler.
Consequences of humiliation	• World War and Holocaust. • As a consequence, all Germans acquired the reputation of being 'willing executioners' who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	The Marshall Plan provided Germany with new dignity, and instead of an excluded pariah, Germany is a member of NATO and EU.

Table 5: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the international level

The two world wars thus seem to support the proposition that humiliation may lead to war, Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism. At the turn of the millennium those very issues are still all very high on the world's political agenda. In recent years,

genocide has occurred in Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia, atrocities have been committed in East-Timor and many other places.

To take Rwanda, Jason Clark writes about the genocide in 1994: 'The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was the execution of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu by Hutu-supremacists in the name of Hutu superiority. It took place at a pace three times that of the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews. This genocide I find to be, with no hyperbole, perhaps the single worst, most immoral, tragic, and horrific event of human history; for a few reasons. First, the genocide was committed not by a military elite but by the populace at large, using crude weapons (mostly machetes). Second, the international community (read: the United States and Western Europe) did almost nothing to stop it, despite repeated warnings. Third, the size and rapidity of the genocide was astounding. Fourth, it was the archetype of genocide, nothing motivated the killers besides a hate that had accumulated over the centuries' (Clark, 2000, 1).

Rwanda could be added to the list of sad examples illustrating the dynamics of humiliation. Table 6 proposes a possible version of these dynamics, this time not between states, as in the case of Germany, but within a single state.

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	Extremist members of the Hutu ruling class – Hutu being the former 'underlings' in the traditional Tutsi kingdom of Rwanda – feared the return of past humiliation if their former Tutsi masters were to regain influence.
Consequences of humiliation	• Genocide. • As a consequence, all Hutu acquired the reputation of 'genocidaires' who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 6: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the national level

Examples are not restricted to the national or international level; the global multilateral level is equally affected. In 1993 an angry crowd dragged a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia.[238] On New Year's Eve 1998 I interviewed a Somali warlord (Osman Ato, a former ally of General Aidid) who was just one of many Somali voices who insisted that in the eyes of many Somalis (and others) the UNOSOM operation was a big humiliation. This was especially true, he maintained, when a house was attacked and bombed where respected elders had a meeting. He felt even more humiliated, he was adamant, by the cynical and humiliating justification that was given for the bombing, namely that this meetinghouse was supposedly a headquarters. He argued strongly that 'when the Americans feel humiliated because their soldiers' bodies were shown in the streets, they should ask themselves why this happened. They should be aware of the fact that killing elders, for example, is a deep humiliation in Somali society.' The helicopters, the bombing, all this, he maintained, were acts of humiliation that united

Somalis against the UN. Osman Ato's views illustrated that he, a warlord, and himself an 'organiser of violence,' fervently thinks in terms of humiliation and 'counter-humiliation,' as do wide circles of the Somali people, who united together with him under the banner of 'necessary' counter-humiliation.

But not only Osman Ato saw humiliation at work. Even some of the most earnest, humane and well willing helpers on the American side felt uneasy. Sam Engelstad, UN's Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, and, on several occasions Acting Humanitarian Coordinator in Mogadishu in 1994, wrote[239]: 'During my own time in Somalia in 1994, humiliation was never far from the surface. Indeed, it pretty much suffused the relationship between members of the UN community and the general Somali population. In the day-to-day interaction between the Somalis and UN relief workers like ourselves, it enveloped our work like a grey cloud. Yet, the process was not well understood, and rarely intended to be malevolent.' Engelstad adds that 'Among the political and administrative leadership of the UN mission, however, humiliation and its consequences were far better understood and were frequently used as policy tools. Regardless of intent, it was pernicious and offensive to many of us.'

A cycle of humiliation was put in motion in Somalia, see Table 7: First the Somalis felt humiliated, and then they responded by inflicting humiliation upon dead American bodies. The latter phase of this cycle is still relevant today to any traveller, especially from the rich world, as incidents of kidnappings and bombings show, which limit the freedom to move internationally because of fear of terrorist attacks. Not even humanitarian workers such as Red Cross and Red Crescent staff are safe from kidnap incidents, such as the one that occurred in Somalia in April 1998.[240] Anti-Western terrorism in Egypt (for example Luxor, 1997), or the 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, are further examples that have filled the media. The recent kidnap drama on the Philippines may also serve as an instance; an American hostage was 'worth' much more than hostages with other passports, namely claims of ten million dollars and the release of prisoners in the United States (1st September 2000, ARD 'Tagesschau,' Germany).

The humiliating ending of the UN operation in Somalia had profound effects at the global multilateral level, as this quote illustrates: 'The international community's intervention in Somalia has become synonymous with the prevailing mood in many quarters against international intervention in far-flung civil conflicts, against the broadening of peacekeeping into "nation-building" operations, and against the United Nations in general' (Jan, 1996, 1).

Rwanda paid a high price for this 'mood against international intervention': When the genocide started in Rwanda in 1994 the international community left Rwandans to slaughter each other, because nobody wanted a 'second Somalia.'[241] This is the more shocking since as few as 5000 troops could have saved almost a million lives: 'A modern force of 5,000 troops... sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war…' (Feil, 1998, 3, quoted from The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 2000, chapter 10, paragraph 9).

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE GLOBAL, MULTILATERAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	Somalis felt humiliated by certain operations that were part of an international intervention that was intended to help Somalis.
Consequences of humiliation	• Somalis killed UN peacekeepers, and publicly humiliated the dead bodies of U.S. pilots. Also today, especially Western tourists are at risk of being kidnapped or even killed in some world regions. • As a consequence, people in need in some world regions have acquired the reputation of being unthankful recipients who do not deserve sympathy or help. The international community, for example, hesitated to protect Rwandans against genocide.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 7: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the global, multilateral level

Similar dynamics of humiliation may be diagnosed at the intercultural level. As discussed above, Western psychology is ethno-centric. I will relate a story that reinforced my interest in studying this topic; it also connects to the first part of Sam Engelstad's quote. I learned to understand how Western psychology may be inadequate within the framework of other cultures, and may have a humiliating effect, though unintended, upon these other cultures.

I would like to recount one exemplary story, representative for a larger number of examples, in order to illustrate how the situation became obvious to me: I remember how disturbing it was to see how some of my Western colleagues 'humiliated' their Egyptian clients without noticing it, even believing that their actions were for their clients' 'best.' A Western colleague, for example, advised young Egyptian girls who sought her advice because they suffered from problematic family situations, to get their own apartment in order to 'cut the umbilical cord' and, 'by God, get on their own feet!' My Western therapist-colleague was unwilling to understand, when I explained, that in most Egyptian contexts it would be quite harmful for a young girl to move into her own flat, that she rather should move to her grandmother, aunt, or some other relative. My colleague defended her approach and explained to me that she felt that the Egyptian population was disadvantaged because they 'had not yet had the chance' to learn enough about the Western way of life, and were 'deprived' of relevant Western knowledge about how healthy people should behave. When the girls in question did not actually move to a flat of their own, the therapist drew the conclusion that the girls 'did not wish to get better.' The therapist told the girls that they were 'wasting the therapist's time,' and should 'come back when they were serious.'

This example may tentatively be systematised in Table 8 and thus provide an example for the dynamics of humiliation at the intercultural level:

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE INTERCULTURAL LEVEL	
Humiliation	Some instances of 'helpful' intervention by Western counsellors were not well enough adapted to Egyptian culture. What was intended as help proved to be humiliating in its effects.
Consequences of humiliation	• Some Egyptian clients stopped accepting 'help' from their Western helpers. • As a consequence, these Egyptian clients acquired the reputation of being unthankful recipients who do not deserve sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 8: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the intercultural level

Finally, the interpersonal level shall be briefly touched upon in this enumeration of illustrative examples of the dynamics of humiliation. On the basis of many years of international experience, I suggest that it is a universal human experience to feel terrible if put down and humiliated. I believe that humiliation is especially salient if your love is being rejected in the very act of humiliation; even worse, if the wish to be loved back is being denied at the same time.

I had a client whose mother-in-law enjoyed saying, in front of the whole family, with disgust in her voice: 'And you want to be part of our family? Who do you think you are?' My client reported to me what she felt when confronted with this behaviour for the first time: 'I was deeply shocked and petrified; I felt cold, could hardly breath, and I was unable to answer.' She came to me because she felt that she was not addicted to alcohol or cigarettes: much worse, she was caught in her own pain. She could not distance herself, could not develop any leisure interests or relaxing hobbies. Her entire life was consumed by her relationship with her in-laws, a relationship that was filled with a continuous flow of incidents of humiliation and counter-humiliation, sometimes minute, sometimes overwhelmingly vicious; she could not stop being obsessed with imagining all kinds of revenge. After her husband's death her in-laws tried to trick her out of her inheritance and she was locked in bitter court-cases with them for many years. She repeatedly became so desperate that she did 'stupid' things as she called it – for example writing 'hysterical' letters, or starting to shout at her adversaries in the court room – behaviour that did not earn her the respect she wished to receive from the judge, her lawyer and others involved in the case.

AN EXAMPLE OF HUMILIATION AT THE FAMILY LEVEL	
Humiliation	My client is being humiliated by her in-laws.
Consequences of humiliation	• My client is obsessed by dreams of revenge. She occasionally gets 'crazy,' writes 'hysterical' letters, or shouts at her adversaries. • As a consequence, she acquired the reputation of not deserving sympathy or help.
Reconciliation	Yet to be fully achieved.

Table 9: An example of humiliation and its aftermath at the intercultural level

These exemplary snapshots indicating the relevance of the dynamics of humiliation are intended to give the reader a taste of what humiliation may entail, and where to find it. Further down in the text some of these examples, especially those at the macro-level, will be examined in more detail.

Tentatively, one may conclude, from the list of examples presented, that the war-torn first half of the twentieth century in Europe suggests that humiliation can lead to war, to Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, while the second half of the century indicates that the same proposition may be true in other parts of the world as well. Furthermore, the examples presented give a taste of the wide range of consequences flowing from humiliation. Incidents of humiliation may lead to extreme reactions such as massacres, but may also be relevant in the more subtle undermining of, for example, intercultural relations. Moreover, these examples make it, perhaps, clearer how humiliation may be played out at all levels, affecting relations between individuals as well as groups.

In other words, these introductory remarks highlight incidents and processes that invite the hypothesis that deeply damaging experiences of humiliation may be a major cause of the widespread occurrence of the break-down of relations around the world, leading to outcomes ranging from hidden animosity to open violence such as war, genocide, terrorism and kidnapping. The characteristics of humiliation merit detailed investigation. If people feel humiliated, they may strike back when they can, and this may lead not only to extreme outcomes such as war and violence, but also to more muted consequences, such as the hampering of constructive relations, strategies and conflict solutions that otherwise would be attainable.

Chapter 6: Humiliation's Role in Torture

Nowadays torture is widely rejected. This was not always so. To various extents and for a long time, cruel punishment was a normal part of social life. Torture has an extended history of being enshrined in law. Inquisition comes to mind – in the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church tortured people and this was regarded not only as legal but also as divinely sanctioned since the primary stated goal was to save souls – the torturers would spray their torture tools with holy water. Early Greek and Roman law stipulated that only slaves could be tortured. Yet, freemen were subjected to torture in cases of treason – through treason a freeman forfeited his status at the top of the pyramid of power and became "eligible" for torture. In no other period of history has torture been used more than under Queen Elizabeth of England. Leonard A. Parry (1975) explains, how you could find yourself trapped hanging in a cage in a public place on display for a slow death for a variety of crimes, and how you could be taken down and quartered right before your death. As Greek and Roman freemen, lords and high officials were usually spared by Elizabeth, and treason was regarded as one of the worst crimes.

You deserve being pushed down: Torture is embedded into the world of ranked honor

Typically, the elites, those who legitimized torture, tended to avoid torturing their equals. Inferiors were more "eligible," as were traitors, those who were perceived to have lost the status of equals through treason. Thus, the fact that torture was a legal and normal part of societies' dealings with their subjects for long periods of humankind's past is deeply embedded into the world of ranked honor. Even today, corporal punishment is widely accepted, even by victims. The 2005 WHO report on domestic violence informs us that many women, even today, believe that being beaten by their husbands is normal. 76% of women in Ethiopia believe that a husband is justified to beat his wife if she disobeys him. * Lora Heizy

Nobody deserves being pushed down: Human rights turn torture into the worst humiliation and humiliation into the worst torture

In a human-rights framework all humans are entitled to enjoy equal dignity. The implication is that nobody is regarded as inferior any more and thus nobody is "eligible" for torture any longer. Torture acquires the taste of utter obscenity in human-rights contexts, where equal dignity for all human beings forms the new core and essence of humanity, of what it means to be a human being. Torturing people, humiliating people, turns into the deep and hurtful, totally illegitimate lowering of the essence of humanity, no longer a lowering of honor along a legitimate scale. Torture in a moral universe of human rights causes more qualms than are connected to torturing equals in a world of ranked honor; it triggers a profound moral disgust as to the desecration of the core of humanity. Humiliating people acquires a new significance, it moves to the core of torture.

Torture is "torture" no longer because of the physical pain inflicted but because of the humiliation involved. Humiliating people is now worse than physical torture; it hurts more than physical pain, precisely because equal dignity has become the essence of humanity. Making people commit or endure undignified treatment now demeans and soils both, perpetrators and victims. No longer are perpetrators "higher" beings, who are entitled to push inferiors down further and no longer are underlings deserving of such treatment. Human rights turn torture into the worst humiliation – because humiliation violates the inviolable equality of dignity for all human beings – and humiliation into the worst torture.

Southern Honor: The view on torture is in transition

Since the current historic period is marked by the transition from the old normative universe of ranked honor to the new human-rights ethics of equal dignity, we find those in our midst who feel comfortable in the old world view, as opposed to those who react with disgust and repulsion to the same practices, with yet others in between, those who are caught in amalgams of both views that intrinsically are self-contradictory. And we find two related definitions of torture, torture seen as an ethically sound technique in appropriate situations and utterly useful tool to obtain information – this is one pole of the spectrum – and, on the other side, torture is seen as neither.

A transition is per definition in motion and not static. Therefore, in tact with human rights ideals gaining weight, honor strategies all over the world move out of the category of "natural" or "heroic" into the category of "repulsive." Human rights rhetoric, when it is exposed to merely cover up for ranked honor, acquires the accusatory label of "double standard." Increasingly, also animals and nature are "dignified" and many forms of human consumption that were formerly accepted as "normal" are perceived, by human-rights defenders, as repulsive "torture." Future generations will most probably regard our currently living generations as profoundly barbaric and insensitive, due to our blindness as to how we still treat people, animals and nature as inferior and their "torture" as "normal."

Currently, ranked honor is still a strong inspiration in two realms, firstly in certain world regions, and secondly, at macro levels, for example, in international relations, at the level of powerful international elites dealing with each other. Honor typically plays a stronger role in foreign policy matters, in armed services and diplomatic staffs, than among the lower echelons of average citizens. Thus, a passion to retain a state's "honorable" preeminence, as Donald Kagan (1998) proposes, applies in today's world no less than it did earlier, even though "national honor" is partly concealed by human rights rhetoric and no longer invoked as openly as in the past.

The current administration (2005) of the United States of America is deeply embedded into the *Southern Honor* that historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown (1982) describes in his book with the same title. Social psychologists Nisbett and Cohen (1996) explains the psychology of violence in the culture of honor in the south. David Hackett Fischer (1989) argues that Southerners "strongly supported every American war no matter what it was about or who it was against" (p. 843). Southern inclination toward the "warrior ethic" embraces certain elements, according to Wyatt-Brown (2005), namely "that the world

should recognize a state's high distinction; a dread of humiliation if that claim is not provided sufficient respect; a yearning for renown; and, finally, a compulsion for revenge when, in issues of both personal leadership calculations and in collective or national terms, repute for one or another virtue and self-justified power is repudiated" (Wyatt-Brown, 2005, p. 2).

Conceptualizations such as "'they' want to break our will, but 'we' won't let it happen", or "'they' are cowards," or "*the* enemy" are embedded in gut feelings imbued with masculine norms of honor that thrive on contests of "strength," on "keeping the upper hand" and on avoiding appearing to be a "wimp," or a "sissy," in other words, avoiding to appear "female." In such a context, humiliating "*the* enemy" is felt to be legitimate, especially when this enemy does not act "manly" and thus is seen to forfeit the status as an equal in honor. Terrorists are "unlawful" in this frame of mind because they "hide behind civilians" and are thus "cowards," regardless of how courageous their performance is considered by those who see it as legitimate struggle within an asymmetric context. "Unlawful combatants," in a way, commit treason against traditional honor norms and they thus are seen become "free" to be tortured. The introduction of the category of "unlawful combatants" informs us that *Southern Honor*, though no longer openly invoked, is still permeating certain policies in the United States of America.

Does torturing "enemies" protect us?

The argument that torture is necessary in order to gain information that can protect against terrorist acts – if it ever was valid – grows increasingly more invalid in tact with the human rights revolution gaining mainstream acceptance. This is particularly the case when this torture is applied by people who otherwise advocate human rights. As explained earlier, torturing people is intrinsically incompatible with human rights ideals of equal dignity, and thus employing it while preaching human rights doubly undermines the credibility of the perpetrators – firstly through the incompatibility itself and secondly through the perpatrators' shocking blindness to the inconsistency in their own stance. As to the validity of confessions obtained through torture, most authorities on interrogation agree that torture and lesser forms of physical coercion succeed in producing confessions. However, the problem is that these confessions are not necessarily true. The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, for example, may have done little to further American intelligence; Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a C.I.D. agent (the Army's Criminal Investigation Division), told Seymour M. Hersh (2004) that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is invariably counterproductive. "They'll tell you what you want to hear, truth or no truth … You don't get righteous information" (p. 5).

In a BBC World Hardtalk interview (with Jon Sopel on 7th September 2004), Clive Stafford-Smith, lawyer for detainees at Guantanamo Bay, thus made the case that torture is not only morally wrong, but also "stupid": "you get bad information and you incense the world." He claims that "we have to keep our system civilized, because otherwise we will have more 9/11s, not less." Clearly, Stafford-Smith is not alone with this opinion. Whether his perception reflects American intentions correct or not, Abdelbari Atwan, editor of Al Quds al-Arabi, a London-based Arabic daily newspaper, certainly mirrors the opinion of many in the Arab world when he writes, "The torture is not the work of a few

American soldiers. It is the result of an official American culture that deliberately insults and humiliates Muslims." Yet, not only "the world" is incensed. Dana Priest (2005) writes about alleged secret CIA prisons that allow for harsher treatment of prisoners, and reports that "the debate over the wisdom of the program continues among CIA officers, some of whom also argue that the secrecy surrounding the program is not sustainable," and she reports an intelligence official saying, "It's just a horrible burden" (p. 4).

As to the widely known Abu Ghraib scandal of 2004, acts of humiliation were perpetrated, where detainees were being made to stand naked, with women's underwear over the head, while being laughed at by guards, including female guards, and sometimes photographed in this position. The administration's initial response was to say that the president was shocked and disgusted by the photographs. The word "torture" was avoided, though. The prisoners had possibly been the objects of "abuse," eventually of "humiliation," that was the most to be admitted. Susan Sontag (2004) reports on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld saying at a press conference, "My impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe technically is different from torture. And therefore I'm not going to address the 'torture' word" (p. 2).

Again, we see *Southern Honor* at work. In a moral world of ranked honor, humiliation may be seen as less significant than physical torture. However, in a world of equal dignity for all human beings, humiliation is at the center of torture. It is the very core wound that torture can possibly inflict. Humiliation is worse than physical pain, because equal dignity for all has gained core significance.

Torturers are like you and me

The famous Milgram (1974) experiments are a powerful demonstration of the fact that we all are in danger to become torturers if put under appropriate pressure. Average American citizens were willing to give hurtful electric shocks to other people, merely because the researchers in the laboratory, where the experiments were carried out, told them so.

Martha K. Huggins (2002), tried to get "under the skin" of *Violence Workers* and she points out that neither the Greek nor the Brazilian torturers who were included in her study were sadistic or mentally unbalanced from the start. On the contrary, the regime selected "normal" men and then shaped them. The "banality of their resulting evil" was made vivid during an interview Huggins and her colleagues had with Jorge, a former Brazilian prison operative. His murder toll for each year was about eighty. Huggins asked if that meant he had personally killed eighty people.

> "Oh, no," he replied, "eighty incidents. I am counting a whole family just once!" He then left the interview room only to return soon with one of his paintings and poems as gifts to each of our female researchers. These presents were meant to reassure us that he was not a brutal monster but a sensitive, creative person who just happened to have had an interlude of murdering men, women, and children (Huggins, 2002, p. 237).

The way selected men were shaped into torturers was done through desensitizing and bestowing honor on them. It began with entry into a special elite unit, in the Greek case the Kentron Ekpedeyssis Stratiotikis (KESA). Huggins reports how the inclusion in a

torture unit "automatically enhanced these soldiers' status. They wore distinctive uniforms, held rank over other soldiers with comparable tenure, and enjoyed privileges and resources not usually available to their peers. Being a KESA soldier was an honor" (Huggins, 2002, p. 239).

However, before this honor could be enjoyed, the recruit underwent intensive hazing. For weeks, recruits were humiliated and brutalized. ".. such violent treatment desensitized men to pain and suffering, promoted total obedience to authority, engendered acceptance of the system's ideology, and energized their resolve to destroy designated enemies of the state. Hazing also gave a personal reality to the kind of violence that would be acceptable in the recruit's later career (Huggins, 2002, p. 239).

Torture Survivors: Treating a Terrible Assault on Human Dignity

Sepp Graessner (Ed.) (2001), edited a book entitled *At the Side of Torture Survivors: Treating a Terrible Assault on Human Dignity*.

> One prisoner wrote: "The blows don't just strike your body; they strike much more at your soul, your spirit, your reason. Pain and emotion bore their way through the entire body until they reach your soul, your ego. The torment is not merely perceived, it penetrates consciousness, it is apprehended. You want to scream. The screams come from the gut and push through to the throat, but they are held back by reason, self-consciousness, pride, so that you nearly suffocate. It is a struggle between body and soul, a struggle between body and spirit" (Graessner, 2001, p. 13).

Graessner explains how enduring torture requires a kind of mental peak performance and how this leads victims to cover their experiences with deep silence even after the torture is over. "Even if the physical scars should heal at some point, the psychic wounds will remain for life in the absence of outside help and treatment. Victims often suffer from intense depression, and they are often pursued by nightmares and anxieties. Amnesia, agitation, delusions, feelings of powerlessness, a constant shift between aggressive overreaction and apathy are among the victims' observable attributes" (Graessner, 2001, p. 13).

In my interviews with torture victims (for example in Somaliland in 1998, or later in Israel, with a Holocaust survivor), I learned that humiliation is a complex phenomenon of acts and feelings that can occur without shame being involved. As in the case of Nelson Mandela, people who face humiliating treatment may sternly reject feeling humiliated or ashamed. And even when they feel humiliated, victims of torture and maltreatment recount that part of their success in being resilient was not to feel ashamed while indeed feeling humiliated.

Concluding reflections

Currently, we live in a world where people are pitted against each other in deep moral indignation. At one extreme pole we have those who are permeated by gut feelings of

ranked honor. They are morally indignated by what they see as despicable "sissy" fear of a strong hand among human rights defenders. A Saddam Hussein certainly had no qualms when subduing his fellow citizens with brutality. Zimbabwe; Myanmar; North Korea – the list of extreme examples can be prolonged. However, vicious corporal punishment is not just part of extreme settings. It is still normal around the world and part of many penalizations that are either legal or perceived as justified.

Human rights advocates are morally enraged by what they perceive as their adversaries' abominable insensitivity to the concept of equal dignity for all that they feel is utterly humiliated by the "strong hand" that they deem to be "torture." Thus, both sides use much energy on trying to mobilize the world community for what they consider the "right" moral indignation.

I propose that merely wallowing in moral indignation, engaging in rolling eyes and competing for "who manages to feel more indignated than our opponents" does not advance humankind much. Moral indignation needs to be harnessed so as to lead to constructive outcomes. The situation would gain from being freed from finger pointing and deep sighs. All sides may be served by engaging in more humility.

Let me differentiate three groups. Firstly, human rights defenders are well advised to be thankful that they are not facing situations that coerce them into becoming perpetrators. Humility as to human weakness could help calm feelings of indignation that are too hot to be constructive. Nobody knows how he or she would react if pushed into inescapable dilemmas. The famous Milgram experiment ought to invoke humility.

Secondly, those, on the other side, those who are feeling that ranked honor is ruling the world, or ought to be ruling the world, are advised to acknowledge that this is no longer the case and that honor strategies backfire when placed in human rights contexts. Honor strategies simply no longer work in the old ways in a world that has tasted human rights ideals. Old predictions fail. In a world without human rights ideals torture and humiliation may have had a certain chance to "work" within the confines of their goals. Yet, if torture and humiliation ever "worked," it surely fails as soon as people have been exposed to human rights ideals. No longer does torture and humiliation safely transform people into humble underlings, who subserviently and reliably "cooperate."

Thirdly, those people who engage in human rights rhetoric, while employing honor strategies on the ground, may need to recognize that this is an intrinsically self-contradictory strategy that may be so unsuccessful as to be called suicidal. People of *Southern Honor* are among those to stand "in the middle" – strong feelings of honor survive under a cover of a selection of human rights ideals that seem compatible, for example the ideal of "freedom."

Rebecca Lemov (2005b) wrote a book on American interrogation techniques and how they have been studied and developed "scientifically." In an article in the Los Angeles Times, Lemov (2005) reports on a recently declassified document from Nov. 27, 2002, which lists techniques such as "the use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours' within a 24-hour period, as well as the forced shaving of body parts" (Lemov, 2005, p. 1). Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who indeed does advocate human rights and "freedom," added a handwritten comment: "However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours? D.R." (Lemov, 2005, p. 1).

There is a problem with standing "in between." Human rights ideals have at their core the call for equal dignity for all and the abandonment of ranked honor. Representatives of

Southern Honor do not detect this intrinsic incompatibility. This incompatibility, however, is what is bound to destroy both, their honor strategies and their embryonic human rights ideals. Equal dignity is destroyed by ranking human worthiness, and ranked honor is destroyed by ideals of equal dignity. One cannot jump over a crevasse and try to hover in the middle. One has to make the jump in its entirety. In old times the honor side of the crevasse was universally regarded as morally sound, in recent times, the equal dignity side acquires moral weight. It is not possible to have one leg on each side.

As solution, I propose to no longer enlist throngs of morally enraged people on all sides who find satisfaction in the group cohesion that can be reaped from strong shared emotions. The solution is rather to calmly reflect and help humankind make the transition constructively. It is important to acknowledge that moral emotions of indignation and contempt can be strong and that we currently live in a world where these emotions are fed by with contradictory ideals of ranked honor or ideals of equal dignity. The problem is that we cannot live in a world of both. We cannot hover in the middle of a crevasse. It would be like living in a world where left-side and right-side driving are both practiced at the same time. The mere incompatibly would cause the collapse of the country. One has to decide. Either we stay on one side of the crevasse, or jump to the other. Either we all drive on the right side or all on the left side. Currently, humankind manages this transition miserably. Yet, merely fueling moral indignation falls too short. We need to manage the transition in an atmosphere of mutual respect. Applying humiliation in a dignity context, is equal to humiliating the humanity of all, victims and perpetrators.

Chapter 7: Addiction to Humiliation

(Debbie: There are people who thrive on humiliation. They are addicted to feelings of humiliation, provoke them systematically and perpetrate acts of humiliation to "avenge" the humiliation they feel they have suffered. War and genocide may result when such personalities gain power and tap into a reservoir of frustration and humiliation among potential followers.)

My brother is addicted to humiliation; he is a "professional" victim of humiliation. I was my mother's favorite and my poor brother was systematically degraded and humiliated by her. Now, as an adult, he perpetuates his victim status: if he is not humiliated, he imagines it or provokes it. To provoke them, he has let down and humiliated his wife, children and friends, they are the real victims today; however, when they protest, he accuses them of being the perpetrators.

People who meet him for the first time are taken in by his talent to depict himself as a pitiable victim who heroically stands up against all evil in the world. Many make the mistake of trusting and loving him. They buy into his victim heroism. They end up doubly hurt and humiliated, first let down by him and then accused of having humiliated him.

He maneuvers people into an imagined position as a perpetrator of humiliation. His satisfaction is when he can lament to the world about what a pitiable victim of humiliation he is. To get there, he damages and destroys the lives of his family and friends and his own.

Two processes of humiliation are intertwined in this vignette. The speaker explains how his brother inadvertently provokes and imagines being the victim of humiliation to get recognition for a suffering that occurred earlier in his life and probably was never sufficiently acknowledged and healed. Overtly, his brother asks for pity, compassion, support and admiration for his heroic defiance of evil. Covertly, however, he cannot escape his feelings of being humiliated and constructs pretexts that enable him to reconstruct those painful experiences. He needs to have his suffering acknowledged. In this *addiction to humiliation* a second process of humiliation is set in motion through which third parties get hurt and doubly humiliated. Family and friends are first let down and treated in a humiliating manner then publicized as evil humiliators when they protest. One person's addiction to humiliation causes suffering to many.

Reber (1995) informs us in *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology* that "an individual is said to have developed dependence on a drug or other substance when there is a strong, compelling desire to continue taking it." Non-drugs such as gambling, eating disorders, compulsive shopping, workaholism and co-dependency are often foci of addictive responses. In all cases, the core of the addiction is its compelling and intense nature. Smokers, for example, know that their habit represents a health hazard to themselves and others, but they go to great lengths to "protect" their habit. Otherwise perfectly "rational"

people distort facts, deny evidence, and lie to themselves and others. Feelings of humiliation may be as significant and consuming as any form of addiction or dependence.

Barbara came to my clinic, describing herself as a "nervous wrack." She was a commoner who had married into an aristocratic family. Her mother-in-law had not approved of the marriage and did not hesitate to say publicly, in front of the whole family, "*You* want to be part of our family? Who do you think *you* are?" Barbara told me that when she was confronted with this behavior for the first time: "I was deeply shocked and petrified; I felt cold, could hardly breath, and I was unable to answer."

Barbara came to me because she felt trapped in her own pain. After her husband's death, her in-laws tried to trick her out of her inheritance and she was locked in bitter court cases for many years. She became so desperate that she did "stupid" things as she called it – for example, writing "hysterical" letters or shouting at her adversaries in the court room – behavior that did not earn her the respect she wished from the judge, her lawyer and others involved in the case. She could not distance herself, could not develop any leisure interests or relaxing hobbies. Her entire life was consumed by her relationship with her in-laws, a relationship that was filled with a continuous flow of incidents of humiliation and counter-humiliation, sometimes minute, sometimes overtly vicious. She was obsessed with imagining all kinds of revenge. Suffering humiliation and responding with humiliation had become an all-consuming lifestyle.

Usually the notion of humiliation elicits associations with pitiable victims who deserve support and help. I could present innumerable incidents that underpin this notion. However, this would not contribute to much new thinking. Virtually everybody is aware that victims of humiliating treatment – survivors of genocide, torture and crime or the disadvantaged around the world – are in need of support, which they seldom get. This chapter will focus on more provocative thoughts instead that unsettle the usual classification of victim/perpetrator.

How rejection-sensitive men thrive on humiliation

Mischel and De Smet (2000) describe the "automatic reaction of anger and abusiveness readily triggered in rejection-sensitive men who are quick to perceive it [rejection] from a romantic partner even if it has not occurred" (Mischel and De Smet, 2000, p. 259). The authors explain that:

> …this maladaptive reaction pattern of uncontrolled hostility may be essentially reflexive, by-passing conscious control and preventing purposeful self-intervention effort. In such a case, the person applies encodings even if they do not fit and maintains them regardless of contradictory evidence. The ironic and often tragic result is that the outcome the man most fears and expects – rejection by the romantic partner is precipitated by his own behavior in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Mischel and De Smet, 2000, p. 259).

"You always hurt the ones you love" is a saying that Mischel and De Smet remind us of (p. 263), indicating the common wisdom, which insists that:

…the interdependence coming from interpersonal closeness creates the very situation where emotions are strong and the tendency to react impulsively in hurtful, damaging ways is greatest. Although people may attempt to control the hot, emotional responses that intensify conflict and damage relationships, they often find that their good intentions are not enough to refrain from blowing up, making personal attacks, or otherwise doing things they later regret" (Mischel & De Smet, 2000, pp. 263-264).

Mischel and De Smet teach that in *rejection-sensitive* men the obsessive aspect of addiction forms the basis of their emotional life. They are "hooked on" situations of debasement where they can feel humiliated. We may want to discount this scenario as marginal, since it applies only to the minority of men who believe they are neglected, not taken seriously, belittled, and humiliated even when they are not, and lash out in retaliation. However, these dynamics may be relevant in all contexts where groups are struggling to rise from lowliness.

In his book *The Ethics of Memory*, Margalit (2002) suggests that it is not only the experience of moral emotions like humiliation that motivates aggressive behavior, but also the memory of such emotions. He writes that the memory of a humiliating event can be akin to re-living it. "Margalit proposes that, under certain conditions, individuals can become attached, or even addicted, to the emotion, thus serving as a constant source of retaliatory action" (Goldman and Coleman, 2005, p. 15, Margalit, 2002b).

Angela told me the following story (August 2002 in New York):

 I work in an office with Samuel, or Sam. He is an office clerk and a black American. I do not know how to handle him. He does not do any useful work. He is hooked on a weird kind of slave identity. He looks at us white colleagues with eyes veering to the side in angry suspicion all the time. He never looks directly at us, but through us with an air of anger that signals "I know you, you white racist bastards." Whenever we make the slightest mistake, even mistakes that have nothing to do with him, he feels vindicated and tells us that this proves we are all racists.

He constantly fabricates connections that are not there. It is as if he has a magnifying glass and continuously searches for "evidence" for being the victim of racism. This is his full-time occupation. When we remind him that there is work to be done, we are racists. He brags that he cannot be laid off because then he would let hell loose and accuse the employer of racism!

We do his work and avoid him as much as possible. What else shall we do? This guy reads all available books about slavery and knows all the big names of protesters against slavery. He dreams himself into a world where he is a big hero. He "resists" wherever he sees a chance to "resist" and does not realize that he makes a fool out of himself. He speaks with his black *brothers* and *sisters* on the phone all the time; with solemn voices they *share* the *shit* and *humiliation* they endure. (Or, more precisely, he speaks with brothers *about* sisters, who are either 'hotties' or not; *sisters* are mere sexual prey for him. He and his *brothers* treat their *sisters* in an even more humiliating way than they themselves are being treated by whites!)

Brothers and *sisters*, I ask myself, and who are the *parents*? I assume the *parents* are the "evil" whites? Are there no adult black Americans? Sam and his friends seem like small *children* who do not want to grow up. I am no racist – I am Hispanic myself and know what discrimination means – and I understand that there is racism in America. But this guy turns the maintenance of victimhood into his core identity. His life is like a film. He has the role of the heroic victim and we are the evil humiliators, whether reality agrees with his script or not. He invests all his energy into this, he is hooked and will never get anywhere in life if he continues.

I hope, one day, he will understand and regret. In reality, he turns *us* into victims of *his* abuse everyday and *he* should apologize! It is *he* who humiliates and victimizes *us*! There are many sensible black Americans; I hope they speak out against the humiliation entrepreneurship perpetrated by some of these *brothers*!"

Such dynamics are relevant at the global level, as well. As Mischel and De Smet indicate, increasing closeness is difficult to handle, it can foster friendship and even love, however, it can also foster hatred, and love is often followed by hatred or accompanied with ambivalence as in the case of *rejection-sensitive* males.

We conclude this section by suggesting that the coming together of humankind is likely to increase situations characterized by *hot* feelings and *hot* reactions. The coming together of humankind, by increasing the chances for people forming closer relationships across the globe, is bound to increase the *hot* and obsessive aspects in the emotional worlds of its participants.

A European businessman laments:

I trusted my Egyptian business partners, but they betrayed me. *They* say that *I* betrayed them. I don't really know what they mean or who is right. In any case, I am furious. I am consumed by rage. Day and night I think about how I can get back at these people. I wish those times back when each country was more or less autonomous. This new requirement to be "international" is terrible. Everybody tries to go international! I am disgusted by that. Please bring me back the good old world where we could stay among *us*!

Can one love a spring knife? How the Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder may entail humiliation

The *Passive-Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder (PAPD)* may have at its core addiction to humiliation. A Health Encyclopedia[242] defines PAPD as follows, "Passive resistance to demands for social and occupational performance beginning in early adulthood." According to the PAPD "The cause of this disorder is unknown. Biological or genetic factors do not appear to play a role."

Eckleberry (2000) explains that the passive aggressive personality disorder

…was first introduced in a U.S. War Department technical bulletin in 1945. The term was coined by wartime psychiatrists who found themselves dealing with reluctant and

uncooperative soldiers who followed orders with chronic, veiled hostility and smoldering resentment. Their style was a mixture of passive resistance and grumbling compliance (Eckleberry, 2000, p. 5).

Eckleberry (2000) describes the way anger is expressed by people with *PAPD*:

> They may have temper tantrums that release pent-up aggression; if their victim is aggressive in response – so much the better. That response is then used to vindicate the initial attack. Anger expressed by commission is usually justified by laudable motives, e.g. concern for the well-being of the victim. The expression of the anger is dictated by the desire to wound while concealing the intention to wound – even the existence of the anger. This is not to spare the feelings of the victim but to wound them more effectively. The intent is to provoke counter anger with such subtlety that the victim blames himself and believes his anger is not justified. That way, people with PAPD can assume the role of innocent victim (Eckleberry, 2000, p. 5).

Eckleberry, a clinical social worker in mental health with a special focus on addiction and personality disorders, goes on to explain:

> …individuals with PAPD do not frequently seek treatment for relationship issues as they consistently blame others for the problems they have. Even if they do come in for treatment for a marital or parent and child problem, they will uniformly demand that the treatment providers 'fix' the other person or persons who are at fault for the problems within the relationship" (p. 7).

> They stall, complain, oppose, forget, and feel cheated by life. They experience life as dark and unpleasurable. To these individuals, thwarting the expectations of others is a victory even if they sabotage their own lives. They are difficult, angry and needy. They see compliance as submission, and submission as humiliation" (p. 5).

> The classic passive-aggressive transference pattern is to comply (sort of) with the therapeutic recommendation, and then to declare triumphantly that it was a very poor suggestion and failed miserably. These individuals are programmed to ask for help and then both to defy it and to suffer from it. Clients with PAPD expect to be injured by a negligent and cruel caregiver" (Eckleberry, 2000, p. 7).

Emmanuel came to my clinic because he was deeply disappointed and hurt by his former partner, Clara. He told me:

> Clara had a sad childhood. Her parents were missionaries and to obey their divine call to convert Indians in the Brazilian rain forest to Christianity, they gave Clara to a children's home run by their religious organization. Clara was three. She was not reunited with her parents until five years later. She waited for them for years, enduring terrible loneliness.

When her parents came back, she felt estranged from them. She never trusted them again. I believe she was deeply enraged by her parents' abandonment. Clara never worked through her feelings; she never went to therapy. Instead, she keeps re-enacting her early fate. When I met her, she was deeply distressed because of her husband, who she said was aggressive. I listened for hours to her tales. I was very patient, admiring her heroic stance against her abusive husband.

She left him quite abruptly, carrying only two suitcases, and moved into my flat. We lived together for six years, while I waited for her to get her act together. She had big plans. She wanted to become a writer and earn millions with bestsellers. I was her secretary and helped her where I could. My own work suffered and my life increasingly turned around hers. After all, she was the genius, not me!

After six years, I became impatient. I felt that my help merely went up in smoke and nothing substantial came out of it. I had gradually come to understand that her genius was not all that brilliant. She had told me about the grand scope of her life experiences and cultural and linguistic knowledge that she supposedly commanded; however, the more I learned about her, the more I understood that she boasted. More precisely, she did not boast, she believed in her grandness. She merely overlooked reality. She saw herself as a victim who is too noble for the world but heroically stands up anyway. When we first met, she impressed me with all her talk about languages, science and culture. I was not as educated as she was. But six years were enough for me to catch up. And I slowly understood that she exploited my ignorance.

I continued to be calm and kind, but I did not worship her anymore. I did not stop trying to help her, but I did not want to support empty dreams. I wanted her to see reality but she couldn't do this. She quickly found herself a new "Emmanuel." She did the same with me that she had done with her former husband. I became the villain who supposedly victimized and humiliated her, and her new partner patiently listened to her complaints. One afternoon she went out, as if she wanted to buy some small thing, but she never came back. She left all her things behind and moved in with the new man. All our friends were drawn into this story. According to her, I was an aggressive humiliator who belligerently kept her things from her (although she never came to get them) and she was the poor humiliatee who heroically withstood my onslaughts.

I am more than enraged, but also sad, and shocked, and very displeased with myself. I never should have been drawn into all this. I was case number four, I think, when I look back on her life. Four times she has attracted men with her "heroic helplessness." The first man listened to her complaints with regard to her parents; the following three were presented with sad stories about the abuse she supposedly suffered at the hands of her former partners. Every new partner was charmed by her grand personality and her vows to have a great future. Every man was inferior to her in education and life experience and dedicated his life to her great goals. After a few years each of them got exhausted, and she interpreted this as evil and left abruptly for the next round of the

same game. Our help was not only not appreciated, it was scorned. She was the heroic victim.

I now understand her poor husband who was my predecessor. I sometimes want to phone him and apologize for believing her stories about him. He, like me, was pushed into a corner until he could not take it anymore. And I assisted in this crime! I am disgusted, both at her and at myself.

I have thought a lot about her and me since she elected me to play the role of the most recent baddie in her life. I feel utterly abused by her, but there is no way to make her understand that. She does not see how she re-enacts her childhood. When she leaves, it is abruptly, with a suitcase or a little bag, exactly like when she was a child and was brought into the children's home by her father. She seems addicted to this script.

Her ultimate audience is her friends, not her partners. She wants to demonstrate to the world that she is a legitimate victim. Her parents never had any understanding for their daughter's feelings of abandonment. I met them before they died and I can confirm that. They never acknowledged any guilt or showed any empathy with her. On the contrary, they humiliated her – and I witnessed that several times – for her "weakness." It is as if she wants to nail them, finally, as perpetrators. And since they are unwilling – now dead – she takes substitutes, partners. First she exposes these partners to empty promises, and then, when they get impatient, she has achieved her goal: they are perpetrators. Her game is to produce humiliators. Her victory is to be able to point her finger at someone who does evil to her. She does not see that she creates this evil.

Her reality is not that of "normal" people. Her goal is not the well-being of herself and others. What pains me is that I am blamed as nasty humiliator by her, in front of her friends, but I am a victim. All the rest is irrelevant, all her dreams and plans are merely instrumental to this underlying project. And many of my friends are deluded by her game.

If she were to become interested in politics or lead a religious group, she would make fine people follow her into collective suicide. Like Hitler, she would round up supposed humiliators, enlist everybody to heroically stand up against them, and at the end those "helpers" would be accused of failing. Hitler said at his end of his life that Germany deserved to be destroyed because Germans had not fulfilled his ideals! I wonder how the Germans felt when they learned that!

Emmanuel's story shows that psychiatric labels may not be required to understand the dynamic of addition to humiliation. People described with the *PAPD* label are obsessed with provoking others into giving them the opportunity to appear as heroic victims of humiliation. Perhaps *PAPD* is caused by biological factors not yet detected by research. Perhaps it describes people who compensate for early experiences of humiliation in rigid ways. They are not interested in changing their predicament; the satisfaction is already entirely theirs.[243]

PAPD personality profiles are relatively harmless if well-controlled within a society that does not let them rise to positions of power. However, what happens if they achieve positions that give them the power and influence to forge entire group fantasies in their vein? Lindner (among others, in Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000p) analyzed the cases of Hitler, the Somalian dictator Siad Barre, and the Hutu extremist elite that instigated the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. They all ended ousted or dead, leaving behind disaster without seeming remorse. Did they sincerely believe in their own propaganda that killing their "enemies" (Jews, Isaaq, or Tutsi) was a "rational" plan that would make their countries prosperous? Genocide turned out to be a suicidal path for themselves and their followers. Their addiction to humiliation was lethal for millions.

If such individuals gain power, destruction may be unlimited, since these people do not regard suffering as failure. On the contrary, suffering brings them satisfaction; victimhood is sought, not avoided. A central force in this complex psychical landscape may be that the perpetrators of such strategies suffered humiliation in childhood and were not acknowledged as victims. They may seek this recognition throughout their lives.

Israel W. Charny, 1997, proposes to include "A Personality Disorder of Excessive Power Strivings" in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV* (*DSM-IV*). He insists that the *DSM-IV* does not address conditions in which a person harms *others*. The author posits that a political leader ought to be deemed disturbed when he defines a target population as "undeserving," "inferior,'' or "enemies of the people," forces a murderous population transfer; calls on followers or coerces them to commit mass murder-suicide; or is prepared to send people who oppose him to psychiatric hospitals, work camps, concentration camps, and killing fields (Siegel, 1997, p. 1).

Another label related to this cluster of symptoms is *repetition compulsion.* The concept of the *wounded self* is linked to *malignant narcissism, narcissistic rage*, and to what has been called *sadistic personality disorder.* Jerrold Post, psychiatric expert on Saddam Hussein, suggests that the Iraqi dictator suffered from a childhood trauma of rejection by his mother, and that his *wounded self* turned him into a murderous tyrant. Post identifies *malignant narcissism* as a vicious outburst of a *wounded self*. Scheff (2002) stipulates that tyrants such as Hitler suffer from three symptoms: first, *unacknowledged shame*; second, a *master obsession* (in the case of Hitler, the belief that Jews plan to conquer the world and had to be preemptively eliminated); and third, *isolation* from very early age (in the case of Hitler from the age of six). [244]

To summarize this section, psychiatry addresses *malignant* tendencies that are linked with the phenomenon of humiliation. Victims attempt to attain acknowledgment for their victimhood by victimizing others, manipulating them into the perpetrator role. In this process, humiliation is played out on numerous levels and is almost obsessively pursued. What is usually regarded as "rational self-interest" is not the prevailing goal in these individuals who, like drug addicts, are more concerned with getting their "fix" than with the welfare of themselves or others. If such pathologies occur at the leadership level of larger communities, mayhem may result. It is essential for larger communities to be aware of these psychic disorders in order to be in a better position to contain them.

I "cleanse" myself from my admiration for you by humiliating and killing you

Joseph, a young intellectual from a Hutu background, told me the following about the history and "meaning" of the unspeakable acts of humiliation perpetrated during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (the interview took place in December 1998 in Africa):

> During colonial times Tutsi children were sent to special schools where they learned to rule. The colonialists' theory of Tutsi origin indicated that they had longer faces, their women were beautiful with long nails, and that they came from Arab countries. The whites thought that Tutsi were a mixture of Arab and white blood, therefore nearer to the whites, close relatives of whites [this view is also called the *Hamitic hypothesis*]. When Tutsi were admitted to college, they were prepared to be in power, while Hutu entered Catholic seminars to become teachers and priests. There were also some Hutu intellectuals, but the path to power was blocked for them. In short: rulers = Tutsi, servants = Hutu.
>
> The concept of humiliation is therefore related to tradition and culture: Tutsi are convinced that they are "born to rule," they cannot imagine how they can survive without being in power" (adapted from Lindner, 2001h, p. 183).

Later, Rwandan history turned the hierarchy of Tutsi-rulers and Hutu-servants equation upside down. Hutu were helped into the ruling seats by their Belgian colonizers shortly before independence, July 1, 1962.[245] Many of the deposed Tutsi left for exile, others stayed on within Rwandan borders as a routinely humiliated minority. The Tutsi elite-minority was humiliated presumably to counter something of the past that lived on, their elite reputation. Tutsi women, for example, were still sought-after trophies for wealthy Hutu men. I heard frequently (in 1999) that a Hutu man who gets rich "buys a house, gets a Mercedes, and marries a Tutsi woman" (Lindner, 2001h, p. 351). A certain extent of habitual Hutu admiration for Tutsi superiority lived on after the Tutsi had been deposed.

   Before traveling to Rwanda, I was told that I should not ask whether a person was of Hutu or Tutsi origin. I was to proceed indirectly, keeping in mind that ethnic labels such as Hutu and Tutsi are under dispute. I was unofficially informed, however, that hundreds of years of subservience had marked Hutu body language, giving people of Hutu background a tendency to bow humbly, whereas Tutsi stood upright, proudly, sometimes even haughtily. Thus, despite of their political demise, Tutsi elitisms seemed to have survived, not only in the former elite's minds, but – and this is more remarkable – even in the minds of the former underlings. Hutu rulers harbored deep fear of a Tutsi return from exile. Otherwise, there would have been no need to design the 1994 genocide to prevent returning Tutsis from ever again humiliating Hutus. The newly-gained Hutu power must have felt very fragile. Although the Tutsi had lost most of their real power, memories of their past domination lived on in the minds of their former underlings/now rulers, compelling them to humiliate and kill their former masters.

   This leads to the (at first glance) counterintuitive insight that perpetrators may be *weak*. Lindner (among others, in Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000p) analyzed the experiential worlds of Hitler, Barre and the Rwandan elite, finding that they did not always look *down* on those they exterminated. Interestingly, at some point in their

biographies, they looked *up* to them. The Jews, the Isaaq, and the Tutsi were regarded as *elites* – intelligent, diligent, and superior – and therefore as potential dangerous humiliators whose plans to humiliate in the future "had" to be averted. In a later chapter, I will return to the hypothesis that perpetrators may feel inferior to their victims. Instead of *strong* perpetrators and *weak* victims, we may find *weak* perpetrators.

In Rwanda I was frequently told that Hutu allegedly harbor an *inferiority complex* towards their former masters. Something as unexpected as *admiration* may thus be the inspiration for the "evil" mixture of "cleansing" atrocities. *Admiration* is something underlings may feel the need to "cleanse" themselves of by putting down the targets of this admiration. Being in power may not be sufficient when the inner life lags behind. Recently risen underlings may need to cleanse themselves of both their former masters and their admiration for them.

Figure 1 may thus be adapted to produce Figure 5. It may not be long-established elites that are the cruelest, but newly risen underlings who attempt to "cleanse" themselves of elite-admiration by killing the former elite, who is now a minority, but feared as former and future elite.

Genocidal "Cleansing"

Newly risen underlings attempt to "cleanse" themselves of elite admiration	Top of the scale
Humility	Line of equal dignity
Former elites, now deposed, are being humiliated even further	Bottom of the scale

Figure 5: Genocidal "cleansing"

The international community must marginalize leaders with these tendencies. Even democracy does not protect against them. They may find ways to incite followers within democratic settings, as Hitler did. People with profiles such as those presented here may lead whole continents into the abyss. It is essential that they be prevented from gaining power. At the same time, care must be taken to dignify the masses that otherwise may serve as "fodder" for the *narratives of humiliation* these leaders weave so expertly.

Zimbabwean *Green Bombers* are trained to attack the opposition through so-called "state-sponsored" violence. Three young boys who escaped to Johannesburg told the sad tale of how they broke into farms, destroyed fences, let the livestock loose, burned down

houses, beat people with sticks and axes, and raped young girls. They were promised jobs, money, land and a dignified future, but "instead they were given alcohol, drugs and orders" (April 17, 2003, on BBCWorld news). The commentator called for African neighbors to intervene, criticizing the strategy of quiet diplomacy, which was not working.

To conclude this section, genocidal obsessions with "cleansing" may be motivated by *admiration* for the victims of this cleansing. Newly-risen underlings may suffer from fragile psychological structures weakened by remnants of admiration for their former elites.[246] These weak individuals attempt to "cleanse" themselves with almost addictive obsession. To humiliate the former elite not merely into powerlessness but into the abyss "frees" the perpetrators of their own esteem for this very elite. When larger populations are drawn into this plot, tragedy may unfold.

Bloody shoes! Childhood experiences may create humiliation addicts

Early childhood neglect and humiliation may lead people to perpetrate acts of humiliation inadvertently, through mere *affective blindness*. Perry relates a gruesome story that testifies to the severity of the potential effects of childhood humiliation. It is a story of *affective blindness*:

> A fifteen year old boy sees some fancy sneakers he wants. Another child is wearing them – so he pulls a gun and demands them. The younger child, at gunpoint, takes off his shoes and surrenders them. The fifteen year old puts the gun to the child's head, smiles and pulls the trigger.

> When he is arrested, the officers are chilled by his apparent lack of remorse. Asked whether, if he could turn back the clock, would he do anything differently, he thinks and replies, "I would have cleaned my shoes."

> His "bloody shoes" led to his arrest. He exhibits regret for being caught, an intellectual, cognitive response. But remorse – an affect – is absent. He feels no connection to the pain of his victim. Neglected and humiliated by his primary caretakers when he was young, this fifteen-year-old murderer is, literally, emotionally retarded. The part of his brain which would have allowed him to feel connected to other human beings – empathy – did not develop. He has affective blindness. Just as the retarded child lacks the capacity to understand abstract cognitive concepts, this young murderer lacks the capacity to be connected to other human beings in a healthy way. Experience, or rather lack of critical experiences, resulted in this affective blindness – this emotional retardation (Perry, 1997, p. 128).

George is the son of a British soldier who fought courageously in World War II and was highly decorated. When his father came back from the war, he drank and neglected his family. George was in his late fifties when came to me, suffering from panic attacks. George explained:

My mother was alone with the children during the war. I was the smallest. There was no time for friendliness or warmth. When my father came back there was mostly quarrelling between my parents. I am emotionally undernourished, I think. I learned from my father a tough attitude toward weakness. I believe he could not cope with his war trauma and put on a hard face. I seem to have done the same. I was profoundly alone, lonely, left alone, by my caretakers. I maintained this loneliness later by myself.

By being tough and cynical, I forestalled any warmth that might have reached me. All the women I met, for example, left me because they could not take my constant urge to denigrate them. I am cynical and sarcastic about every shred of warm feeling. At the same time I was a sex maniac. As if something in me wanted to get via my skin what I could not get via my soul. This mixture of sex addiction to women, whom I continuously besmirched with my words and actions, drove women away. No wonder.

I feel that I was destroyed as a child. Nobody taught me to heal my wounds. Worse, I did not even know that I had wounds. Being emotionally neglected felt normal for me. I did not know anything else. Over the past five years I have come to understand that I am a deeply damaged person. Like a baby I have to learn everything about warmth and nurturing and love from scratch. The only thing I know, the only semblance of love that ever reached me, was sexual addiction. I could masturbate without break for hours while watching porno films showing the rape of women. The more humiliating the rape, the more satisfactory for me.

I am sorry that I damaged so many women. Some tried to teach me love. None succeeded. I destroyed a number of them. You could say that indirectly I am a victim of the Second World War and its emotional destruction of my caretakers. These women are indirectly victims of this war, too.

George's story shows that neglected children, emotionally "undernourished," may suffer from affective blindness and later be caught in addiction to humiliation. This emotional neglect may occur as an "accident," as in George's case through the harshness of a war context. Elliott Leyton, anthropologist and author of widely known books on serial murder and genocide, underlines the harsh long-term effects of war (on CBC National, March 25, 2003):

I've spent years living in war zones – in Northern Ireland, where Protestants and Catholics have been tearing each other apart for decades, and where nasty boys ran at me with Molotov Cocktails; in Rwanda, where a ruthless Hutu regime exterminated the Tutsi minority, and where we stood in churches stacked floor to ceiling with the bodies of women and children hacked to death with machetes through the eyes; and in Israel, where Christians, Jews and Muslims are joined together in an Unholy Trinity of Hatred, Racism and Murder, and where we were bombed in a fruit market by an enterprising Holy Warrior. Unless you've personally experienced such horror, I hope you'll be cautious about urging it on others.

What's this latest adventure in Iraq *about* anyway? We've all heard the usual theories: Perhaps it's all about controlling the supplies of Iraqi oil and gas; or it's all about some inevitable Christian death struggle with Islam; or it's all about young Bush¹s Oedipal need to do better than his father; or it's a Jewish plot; or it's evil militant Capitalism out to make some big bucks; or it's about the elimination of an evil dictator; or it's just an elaborate field testing programme for the USA's latest smart bombing Brit-busting military hardware; or it's about punishing Iraqis for what a handful of Saudis did in 9/11?

Who knows? And are any of these reasons enough to justify the human misery – the personal grief, the economic and social chaos, the traumatization of yet another generation of children – that comes with a war?

We know quite a bit about the suffering war leaves in its wake. Everybody loses in a war. Wars kill tens of thousands, and this mass death in turn kills all happiness and hope for the victims' loved ones.

But those who die in war are only the first victims of a much deeper process. The best modern scholarship makes it clear that a major war desensitizes us all to violence, and in so brutalizing us, raises the postwar murder rates for many years. Moreover, most wars generate enough suffering, killing, maiming and hatred to keep us killing, maiming, and hating for generations. Again, the fog of lies that surrounds all wars squanders the credibility of even honorable governments and abandons us to a new generation of cynics who will do nothing if a legitimate call to action is sounded.

And finally, such wars legitimize for decades the deep ethnic, religious and political hatreds from which our ancestors fled, and that we Canadians have been lucky enough to avoid (Elliott Leyton, March, 25, 2003, on CBC National radio).

The 2003 Iraq war was set against the backdrop of decades of cruelty perpetrated by Saddam Hussein on his own people. Many young Iraqis have never experienced anything but oppression and violence. Iraqi citizens are still waiting for the peaceful and nurturing experiences that allow personal dignity and growth. Other countries have endured tyrants just as cruel as Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, history has witnessed many cultures – not of cruelty, but of emotional neglect – particularly cultures based on staunch patriarchal honor-based warrior codes. Alice Miller (1983) told a wide audience how leading pedagogues in the period that lead up to the two World Wars taught that *breaking the will of the child* was essential for childrearing.

Countries such as Somalia provide other examples. Somalia, with its semi-desert, which offers extremely difficult living circumstances to wandering nomads, developed unforgiving "warriorhood." This harsh and proud culture fed years of civil unrest, hunger, and death. First came decades of brutal dictatorship by Siad Barre. Even after Barre fell in 1991, Somalia has been unable to achieve peace. "Muusa Bihi Cabdi (Somaliland's Interior Minister until 1995) is a man in his fifties, a tough man with a life experience that hardly any Western man or woman could have survived. He explained to me (December 1998 in Hargeisa) how he learned to be "tough" as a small child. A former nomad who

trained to survive in one of the harshest environments of the world, he learned by the time he was six years old to never really sleep, to always be alert to danger, and to discern the traces of dangerous animals and "enemy" clans. He left the desert, became a MIG airplane bombardier and studied in Russia. In the Ogaden war in 1978, he participated in the bombing of Ethiopia. Russia abandoned Somalia during this war and sided with Ethiopia, inflicting a humiliating defeat on Somalia. Somalia was subsequently supported by the United States and Bihi attended a military academy in that country. When his Isaaq clan was threatened with eradication in the 1980s, he joined the guerrilla forces and became a commander, responsible for the lives and deaths of many. Later he became a minister in the government of "Somaliland." I asked him what he would change if he could live again. He replied that he would change everything, especially his "training to be tough and always ready to fight":

> I was always in war, tribal war; looting each others' camels. I was raised in terror; I was six years old when I saw the first person being killed; when I joined the army, there was always fighting, and I saw a lot of my friends being killed. If I could live again: not all these wars! (Lindner, 2001g, p. 149).

We may summarize this chapter by noting that there are people who *thrive on humiliation*. They are addicted to feelings of humiliation, provoke them systematically and perpetrate acts of humiliation to "avenge" the humiliation they feel they have suffered. War and genocide may result when such personalities gain power and tap into a reservoir of frustration and humiliation among potential followers.

The genocidal obsession with "cleansing" may represent another facet of *addiction to humiliation*, insofar as unwelcome elite admiration is "cleansed" away into the abyss along with the formerly elite victims.

Finally, cultures of *affective blindness* may entail practices of humiliation that become self-perpetuating cultural obsessions. In order to contain them, the wider community needs to become more aware of the dynamics that underlie such malign tendencies.

Related reading

Research on *mobbing and bullying* touches upon the phenomenon of humiliation and should therefore be included.[247] This research leads over to the field of *prejudice and stigmatization*,[248] which in turn draws on research on *trauma* and *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder PTSD*,[249] *aggression*,[250] *stress*,[251] and last but not least *emotions*.[252]

Read furthermore more on *PAPD*,[253] on the *repetition compulsion*,[254] on *narcissistic rage*,[255] on the *sadistic personality disorder*,[256] on *Hitler's psychology*,[257] on the *neurobiology of emotional development*,[258] on *early neglect of a child and brain dysfunction*,[259] on *psychoneuroimmunology*,[260] and on how *victims* become *perpetrators*.[261]

Chapter 8: Ways to Avoid or Defuse Humiliation

What You Can Contribute

In former times the *little people* had little to say. The *mob*, the *masses*, or the *crowds* were not worth listening to. In our history books, the players are usually the *rulers*. *Rebels* and *revolutionaries* might have been mentioned, but received little space. The *media* or *public opinion* are absent. This has changed dramatically in recent times. The individual is among the most influential new forces in the *global village*. The voice of every person has more potential impact today than ever before. Everybody can, if determined, develop into a Mandela or a Hitler. Individuals can contribute to *peace*, like Mandela, or transform themselves into *weapons of mass destruction*, like Hitler.

Both Mandela and Hitler understood the strength of the feelings stirred up by humiliation and appealed to the deepest wishes of their audiences. However, they used their understanding in different ways. The German nation felt "soiled" by the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler gave the Germans a disastrous strategy for restoring their national honor. The black population of South Africa felt cheated and deprived by Apartheid. Mandela gave the people of South African an ambitious strategy for gaining their human rights. In South Africa, the humiliators and the humiliated sat down together and planned a society in which "both black and white" could be "assured of their inalienable right to human dignity."[262]

There are many differences between Hitler and Mandela, beginning with the fact that they responded to different kinds of humiliation. Norbert Elias (1996) has argued that what hurt Germany most after the military defeat in 1918 was the damage done to the sense of nationhood. It was a matter of collective honor, felt most keenly by the old political class but permeating throughout the society.[263] Hitler led a huge effort to put the German nation in a position where it could deliver thunderbolts against enemies, rivals and scapegoats. In South Africa humiliation was a matter of human rights denied. As Mandela put it, the solution was for "ordinary South Africans …[to] produce an actual South African reality that will reinforce humanity's belief in justice."[264] A further difference is that Mandela's approach resonated with the spirit of *ubuntu*, a traditional philosophy, a way of life and state of "being," a code of principles for living together and a strategy for conflict resolution. *Ubuntu* is a way of living together in community in an atmosphere of shared humility. Desmond Tutu's (1999) work of the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* drew on *ubuntu*. Hitler, on the other hand, did not fall back on Christian equivalents to *ubuntu*. He based his approach on a philosophy of honor and idolization of strength and potency. Hitler's message to Germany was "either you are strong and deserve to win and rule the world or you are weak and deserve to be crushed."

The most disastrous difference is that Hitler's road led to war, Mandela's to peace. For Hitler, the anguish of German humiliation was a source of destructive energy to be *directed against* targets chosen by the Führer. For Mandela, the task was to *dissipate* the destructive energy engendered by bitterness, to concentrate on implementing human rights rather than victimizing enemies.

As the examples of Hitler and Mandela show, when dealing with humiliation the stakes are high. The twentieth century was fundamentally influenced by Hitler. If the

twenty-first century is to be shaped by the example of Mandela, humiliation's role in human relations must be better understood so we can avoid its most negative effects.[265]

How can a person strive for a Mandela mindset? What does that mindset entail? What can we learn from Mandela? How do we attain his maturity, balanced calm and measured sense of direction, even in the face of grave adversity? The following sections attempt to answer those questions.

Detach! Weak ties can further social peace

Mandela's example seems almost unattainable to most of us. One place to start in your search for personal maturity and social peace is to foster the ability to form *weaker ties* as opposed to too *close* and too *hot* ties – within yourself, with others, and with the world in general.

The Taliban attracted world attention when soldiers blew up two enormous Buddhist statues, dating to the third or early fourth century and sculpted from a cliff overlooking Bamian. The Taliban's aim was a "superior Islam" in Afghanistan.[266]

This sad tale illustrates the futility of linking representations too closely to what one believes them to represent. Did the Bamian Buddha statues represent insults to pure Islam? Or, did they not rather represent precious human cultural heritage? The Taliban were intensely attached to the first interpretation, unable to differentiate contents from representation and unable to loosen their interpretation of the linkage between the two. They were unable to allow complexity and uncertainty in their world.

The word *representation* combines the Latin *prae* and *esse* with the prefix *re*. *Praeesse* means *to be*. The word *praesens* is the present participle of *praeesse* and means *to be present*. The prefix *re* means *back*. The term *representation* thus signifies a marker that points back to something which is present. In short, *representations* and *representatives* are markers for something else. Obviously, destroying markers does not lead to the destruction of the entities to which they point. Hitler's delight in burning books appears absurd because ideas cannot be destroyed by destroying the books that contain them. Criminality is not eradicated by merely killing criminals and victory is not necessarily achieved by killing adversaries. Companies do not kill the managers of competing corporations or the financial ministers of nations with whom they are engaged in trade wars. Imagining too real a linkage between a representation and the real thing reveals a lack of differentiation and understanding that, in the language of linguists, *signifier*s are not fixed, but *sliding*. In other words, the Bamian statues can signify many things – extraordinary handicraft skills, precious cultural heritage, or controversial religious statements. There is no fixed connection between the *signifier* and the *signified*.

People who want to promote social peace might do well to garner the courage to understand that the decision to loosen or tighten links between the representative and the represented or between the signifier and the signified is a personal, ideological one. It might be beneficial for social peace to be aware of the underlying complexity of such linkages.

Robin Cook disagreed with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the necessity of the 2003 Iraq war. However, he did not demand that Blair step down, nor did he plan an assassination. Disagreement can be constrained to the peripheries of identities and

identifications and must not be essentialized. There was no need to destroy Tony Blair politically and/or physically to "send a message." Incidentally, war is a minefield for "messages." The incursion of American tanks into Baghdad was designed as a "show of force to send a powerful message to the Iraqi people and their leaders." We need to learn how to send "powerful messages of courage and resolve" without destruction.

It is beneficial to loosen ties in other realms of life, as well, in the emotional realm, for example. Bond (2002), cross-cultural psychologist at Chinese University of Hong Kong, researched how long emotions are felt by people in different cultures and how this correlates with the level of homicide in each culture. He writes, "…countries populated by persons who experience emotions for greater lengths of time would, on average, commit more homicide" (Bond, 2002, p. 5). Bond's findings indicate that it is advantageous for social peace to forge cultures that promote *shorter* and thus *weaker ties*. Weaker ties to emotions are more supple and flexible, less rigid and obsessive, enabling people to *cool down* faster, to perform calmer evaluations of situations, and to refrain from uncontrolled eruptions into *hot* aggression.

Sometimes it is more important to learn how to forget than to remember. Mandela told how he approached the gate to freedom after 27 years in prison. Walking towards the gate, he instructed himself to leave hatred behind when he stepped into the outside world – otherwise he would spend the rest of his life imprisoned. Hatred binds, and Mandela freed himself. Miroslav Volf,[267] an academician, theologian and native Croatian, writing from his experience as a teacher in Croatia during the war in former Yugoslavia, suggests that forgetting is an active act of *nonremembering* (Volf, 1996). A person who non-remembers, according to Volf, chooses to remember the past, its grievances and humiliations, but to forgive and purposively embrace the former enemy in an act of preservation and transformation. Searching for "roots" may sometimes attach people too tightly to the past, when what we need are stronger ties to our shared future. We must work to strengthen attachments to constructive visions of the future and to weaken ties to destructive visions of the past, particularly to pasts that call for revenge for bygone humiliations. We need to think in layers of identity, with commonalities forming the highest order of identity, and differences the lowest. Universality can contain diversity, but diversity cannot always contain commonality. In other words, world peace requires us to stop giving priority to differences. As long as I believe that my culture is separated from yours by an unbridgeable gulf, we are going to have a problem. Only when I make clear that *my* being different does not threaten *us* as human beings of equal dignity, I can invite *you* to celebrate our diversity together. (Constructing our identities on common ground could mitigate post-modernist fears that promises of cooperation could be used to colonize and humiliate weaker parties.)

Peaceful social relations call for weak and flexible ties with regard to memories, roots, and the past – and for cultural differences and somewhat stronger ties that link us to constructive and common visions of the future. Earth citizens might use the sunflower as a model for constructing their identities – in the middle a large common ground of shared humanity and at the periphery numerous flower petals signifying the diversity of idiosyncratic personal attachments and identifications: I may love Buddhism and cherish this attachment on an equal level with my love for Christianity, or I may hold my love for Asia alongside my attachments to America. When asked, "Who are you?" or "Where are you from?" I could reply, "I am a human being from planet Earth and have a great

number of emotional ties to different geographical regions on this planet, to different people from everywhere, and to different occupational, intellectual and spiritual realms."

Having many *weak ties*, instead of only a few strong ones, seems to work well in social relationships as well. Granovetter (1973) researched whether people find jobs through strong or weak social ties. Surprisingly, and counterintuitively, people found jobs more often through their weaker social ties than through their closer ones. Granovetter forged a *theory of the strength of weak ties*. Granovetter builds on the German differentiation of *Gemeinschaft* versus Tönnies' *Gesellschaft*, explaining that in a *Gemeinschaft* people have strong ties and share norms so thoroughly that little effort is needed to gauge the intentions of others. Such settings do not allow for much individual autonomy and are easily disrupted by even minimal dissent. Granovetter suggests having many weak ties to a number of other people – Tönnies' *Gesellschaft* – provides more individual autonomy. People with many weaker ties can live up to the expectations of several others in different places and at different times, preserve an inner core of self and protect certain inner attitudes.[268]

Robert came to me as a client because he was unhappy in his work. He had sacrificed 25 years to his company and had always been extremely loyal. Now, older employees like him were being bullied out to cut costs.

> I have put my soul into the company – I *was* the company – and how does it company thank me? My loyalty is trampled on! My whole life's sacrifice is thrown away. I am so enraged I could set the factory on fire! The more I think about it, the more upset I get. The only solace is my brother-in-law. He has an acquaintance, who has another acquaintance, and they just started a new enterprise and might need me as a consultant. When I imagine an interesting future with this company, I feel better. But, I get upset again whenever I remember what my old company did to me.

Humiliation in the past captures Robert's attention obsessively and only paying attention to a better future releases him. Weak ties in his social environment open the door to that future. On the global level, knowledge, an expandable resource, and weak international ties may help protect people from clinging in malign ways to local narratives of humiliation of the past.

Christoph came to me because he felt the obligations his parents put on him were too burdensome:

> My family comes originally from Silesia. After World War II, Silesia (along with other areas, such as Pomerania and East Prussia) was ceded to Poland. Germans had lived there for more than 1,000 years, but they were thrown out of their houses virtually overnight. Millions of Germans lost their homes and their land. More than 10 million people were displaced, my parents among them.

> The suffering that these people had to endure has never really been acknowledged; it was taboo to cry, presumably, because Germany deserved punishment for Hitler. Very recently Günter Grass (2002)[269] wrote a novel that gives this tragedy some voice.

My parents live this agony everyday, even now, more than half a century later. They are depressed and furious, sometimes more depressed, sometimes more furious. My mother was fifteen years old when the Second World War ended and she was thrown out of her home. She could take only what she could carry; the poor thing tried to carry her bed. She had nothing to do with Hitler. Why should she lose her home and not even be allowed to cry? My parents are not the only ones who are deeply enraged. Millions were uprooted, and they have children. Many grew up like me, as a so-called "refugee-children," both in West Germany and what once was the DDR. We grew up immersed in this history that often was hidden as if it was a great shame. My parents even suppressed their Silesian dialect.

One of the saddest moments for my parents was the 1989 reunification of Germany. It represented the most unbelievable humiliation to them. German Chancellor Kohl used the reunification as an opening to "sell out" my parents' homeland. Until 1989, there was no official agreement that Silesia should go to Poland. My parents hoped it would come back to Germany in their lifetime. The most grotesque humiliation for my parents is that the former DDR is now called "East Germany." It is forgotten that Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia should still be East Germany in their view.

My parents expect me to do something about it. If I lived hundreds of years ago, I might gather soldiers and try to re-conquer Silesia from the Poles and bring it back into Germany. I continuously disappoint my parents by telling them that I see no need in military action to get back their farm. I do not want to be a farmer! My resource is knowledge and I am a global citizen. I live in a completely different world; my world is not their world!

I try to tell my parents that the European Union makes borders more permeable and less important. Poland is now part of the European Union and one day there will be a world passport – then national borders will be as insignificant as the borders between California and Oregon. I love my parents and many aspects of the culture they taught me. I am sad that the Silesian dialect and traditions will die out with my parents and their generation. But I see no need to spill blood for cultural or national borders! My home is planet Earth!

To summarize, flexible and weak ties to one's emotions and past and to a great number of fellow beings seem to be advantageous for social peace. Robert Jay Lifton calls this kind of personality the flexible *protean self* (Lifton, 1999). Conversely, being tightly integrated into few and homogenous social bonds, rigidly attached to identities of difference that foreclose common ground appears less propitious for the peaceful maintenance of social cohesion. It is the task of all players in the *global village* to forge stronger ties to common ground and a constructive future and weaken and marginalize those ties that obsessively link up with painful pasts.

Social identity that furthers social peace could be envisaged as layered like a sunflower. The core is a person's feeling of belonging to humankind. At the periphery, in a loose fashion, are multiple diverse cultural identities. Thus, in the same individual or

group, a strong identity of global human unity may combine with comparably weaker ties to local cultural diversity, enabling diversity to flourish in an inclusive way.

Grow up! How to develop maturity, wisdom and humility

How does *maturity* and *wisdom* come about? How did Mandela acquire his unique mixture of *humility* and *pride*? Perhaps there is no recipe, but we can learn from other's experience.

Alistair Little, a former Ulster Loyalist terrorist who murdered a Catholic man on behalf of the Ulster Volunteer Force in Northern Ireland when he was 17, explained his *maturation process* extremely well. [270] He served twelve years in prison and renounced violence. He describes the first significant turning point in his life when he was fourteen and attended his first funeral. A friend of his father's had been killed by the *enemy*. He heard people saying "and where are *our* boys?" or "where are *our* men when we need them?" He made a vow that he would volunteer as soon as he was old enough. When he subsequently was sent out to kill an *enemy,* he felt a strong sense of belonging, comradeship, and moral certitude. Alistair Little describes his emotional response to the fear he sensed in his community, how it touched him that his people felt so unprotected. The *enemy* was not a human being to him, he explains, therefore it was easy to kill. During the first six months in prison he felt good, because he was among comrades, proud to have stood up against the IRA.

When Bobby Sands died, Alistair reached another turning point. (One of the most traumatic episodes in the history of Northern Ireland was the 1981 hunger strike staged by jailed members of the outlawed Irish Republican Army after they were stripped of their special status as political prisoners. The strike soon turned into a battle of wills with the new British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. When the leader of the hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, died, it brought Northern Ireland to the brink of civil war.)

Alistair Little describes sitting in a prison car and hearing others laughing about the death of Bobby Sands. He got very angry, astounded by his reaction – he defended his *enemy* who would have shot him if he had had the chance.

This was the moment, he explains, when he recognized that had re-humanized his enemy. He had developed empathy for the other side. Later, he explains, he became disillusioned with some of his own people, realizing they could be hypocritical – always calling for the sons of other people to volunteer, not wanting to sacrifice their own offspring. The same people would distance themselves from those who had volunteered, those who had done the "dirty" job they encouraged them to do, and that had helped their political ends. Slowly, over the course of years, he came to understood that he may have contributed to the problem.

He concludes that he does not feel entitled to forgiveness. In any case, he adds, nobody could offer forgiveness, except the murdered person himself. He describes vividly how any peace process is bound to "fracture" communities, families, brothers, sons and fathers, along a fault line that separates those who support the peace process and those who do not, a phenomenon that makes the peace more dangerous than the war.

Early on, Little felt compelled to devote his life to the plight of his people, to "teach" the *enemy* that he could not perpetrate humiliation and murder without cost. As he

matured, he disengaged from this *hot* attachment, acquired a larger horizon and *cooled down*. He regrets what he has done and maintains that his degree of maturity – he calls it *tolerance* – is now greater than that of many of his friends. He can, for example, tolerate the shortcomings of the peace process. Many of his friends get enraged by details they perceive as unacceptably humiliating, "compelling" them to want to call the peace process off, he reports. He understands that his greatest contribution is to help *cool* the situation, not heat it up further. He has disengaged from "automatic" identification with history's fault lines and can help build a new contract to replace the old misunderstood and soured one. He has learned to dismantle mechanisms that facilitate atrocities.

Albert Bandura did important work on how aggression may be learned (or unlearned) and on *moral disengagement*. He addresses this issue in his recent article *Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities* (Bandura, 1999), and earlier in his chapter on *Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement* (Bandura, 1990), where he highlights all mechanisms that make it "easier" to perpetrate atrocities or accept their occurrence, such as *obscuring causal agency*, *blaming and devaluating the targets*, *moral justification of counterterrorist measures*, *public intimidation and judgments of retaliatory violence*, *euphemistic labeling*, *disregard for, or distortion of, consequences*.

With Staub (1989), who calls for bystanders to get *involved*, Bandura asks every individual in the global community to avoid those mechanisms that make it "easier" to perpetrate atrocities or watch them with indifference.

Take humble control! It takes a bird's eye perspective to live sensibly and calmly

What is the core of *maturity*, *wisdom* and *humility*? How can an individual achieve these virtues? I developed the following approach during my years as a clinical psychologist and counselor in Egypt.

Figure 8: Birds' eye perspective on me

Figure 8 depicts three aspects of the self. When I am placed in a new situation, I begin by designing a strategy to accomplish the task at hand, using the part of me that is equivalent to the government of a country or the administration of a city. This is (1) the *I, who governs*. That strategy usually entails a phase of research: *I, the one who governs*, sends out another part of me - (2) the *I, who does research*. When this research is carried out

satisfactorily, (1) devises a sound strategy for action and sends (3) the *I, who acts* into the skirmish. Of course, this illustration is extremely simplified and the process is never that linear, however, as a model it may be useful.

> Elvira was newly-married to an Egyptian man. She came to me as a client because her husband accused her of being "unclean." She was furious – she washed herself thoroughly every day and took pride in her grooming. The marriage was almost finished before it had begun because she felt so mistreated, humiliated. She was ready to run away from her husband and Egypt.

> After she calmed down, Elvira was able to hear my suggestion that she might not have all the information she needed to understand what was going on in her marriage. She agreed to put her rage aside until she learned more. She went to her Egyptian friends and carefully asked what her husband might mean by the word *unclean*. She learned Egyptian women remove hair from their entire bodies – face, arms, legs, pubic area – and they do so in order to be *clean*. Washing was not enough. She also learned – to her astonishment – that an Egyptian husband (at least in certain segments of Egyptian society) may feel justified in leaving his wife if she were not to remove her body hair. Now she had the information she needed to understand her husband's reactions much better. She had done her research.

> It took Elvira several weeks to devise a strategy that pleased her. She decided to wait for a holiday with her husband to explain to him that a cultural difference was hurting their relationship. During the holiday, she described her concept of cleanliness, emphasizing that she did not want to hurt or disrespect him by not following his concept of cleanliness. Then she put forth her proposal. For a trial period of three months, she would let her hair be removed and see how she liked it. If she found she couldn't adjust to hairlessness, it would be his turn to try for three months to live with her standards.

> Her plan worked – the marriage was saved. The problem of body hair was secondary. What was important was to keep the channels of communication open between the two. Warmth, respect and love began to flow again.

From Elvira's experience we can learn the benefits of increasing the "distance" between (1), (2), and (3) and strengthening the bird's eye capabilities of (1). The first thing Elvira did was to calm down and interrupt the short-circuiting that occurred between (3) and (2). She had to learn to be patient and to tolerate uncertainty while she collected more information. Thus she was able to gather valid information that gave the situation an entirely new coloration. Subsequently, she did not rush to action but planned her approach to her husband carefully, including in her plan respect and warmth. She did not shout and scream and accuse her husband, but talked calmly and lovingly with him. And she differentiated – she stopped equating his cultural bias with lack of love. By being willing to grow, she saved her marriage, increased the respect she enjoyed in her social environment and gained great confidence in her conflict resolution capabilities. The next

time she visited her family back in Europe, she applied the same method, as if her family was another culture. Not surprisingly, her relationship with her family improved as well.

Earlier, we discussed the phenomenon of *pendulation*. Elvira turned careful pendulation into her main activity; pendulation between the different agencies within her self and pendulation between these agencies and her social environment. Figure 9 illustrates her case.


Figure 9: Birds' eye perspective on me and you

Elvira had learned to introduce a *transcending element* or a *personal manager,* a *self-governor,* or an *inner super-parent figure* (1) who overlooks the situation from an elevated perspective and builds bridges both within herself and to others. These bridges enabled her to successfully pendulate. She asked her husband, "What do you mean?" in a way that showed respect and warmth; not in an abrupt and offensive manner. Her next step was to differentiate carefully between what her husband may have wanted to say and what she understood him to say. Then she proposed solutions, again with a respectful and warm attitude. Elvira managed to forge a dialogue where there had been several, almost autistic monologues. Steinar Kvale (1996) writes, "The conversation …involves a basic mode of constituting knowledge; and the human world is a conversational reality" (Kvale, 1996, p. 37).

When I arrived in Somalia, I found that the standard Western interview style did not render valid results (Lindner, 2001a). My coming to Africa as a Western researcher and trying to apply Western "science" resembled yet another act of colonial domination and elicited defiance instead of truth. The best I could expect was for my interview partners to say what they thought I wanted to hear. I became more aware of the extent to which discourse is shaped by – and shapes – power relations. I had to find a way using the tools of humility and humbleness that Robert Merton (1949) described so well in his chapter on *Science and Democratic Social Structure*. I had to exercise humility not only towards the topic and research carried out by other researchers, but towards my interview partners – also called informants – who knew more about the topic than I. Gergen (1997) addresses similar processes when he says:

My commitment to social psychological inquiry has now exceeded three decades; the commitment has been a passionate one throughout. However, the nature of this

passion – the sense of the inquiry and its significance – has changed substantially over this period. The 'message' of the discipline, as it initially kindled my excitement, now seems deeply mistaken – in certain respects even injurious to the society (Gergen, 1997b, p. 1).

After two weeks of "classical" interviewing in Somaliland, I changed my methodology and entered into dialogue with these people who knew so much about the subject I was studying – the feelings, especially those of humiliation, that emerge in the context of genocide. They were the *experts* on this subject. I had to become more aware of the social relations I formed as a researcher. In order to begin this new dialogue, I had to be authentic. Taylor (1990) writes about *The Ethics of Authenticity*. I had to restructure relations both within myself and with my interlocutors, building them in a more authentic, egalitarian and respectful frame.

Although Elvira changed her behavior, she did not lose her spontaneity or authenticity. She merely elevated her entire demeanor to a higher level of control by implementing a *personal manager* (1) and by learning to wait and bear uncertainty while circling between (1), (2), and (3). She was no longer tossed about by her emotions like a little child who knows no response but a tantrum (3). But, she did not overdo it by implementing the *personal manager* as a tyrannical dictator. Rather, she allowed (1), (2), and (3) to form a team within her self, with no one component acting as a cruel tyrant coldly subduing the rest. The entire process could be described as giving life to the *reflective equilibrium* or *hermeneutic circle* that was discussed earlier, creating ever more fertile grounds for sound action. The fact that the process entailed warmth, care, and respect between (1), (2), and (3), subsequently also created warmth, care, and respect in Elvira's social environment.

What I call the *personal manager* is akin to the *third factor* proposed by Eileen Borris (2000). She describes a *third factor* as an element of strength and faith that can be labeled in a variety of ways, such as closeness to divinity, appreciation of compassion, or faith in shared humanity. *Mindfulness*, a Buddhist concept, carries similar connotations. Victor Frankl's concept of *self-observation* in the framework of *logotherapy* is related, as well. *Self-remembering*, as advocated by Gurdjieff, is a similar concept, as is *being awake*, a concept from transpersonal psychology that has related implications. In a more general way, Erving Goffman, an "ethnographer of the self," has described how people negotiate and validate identities in face-to-face meetings and establish "frames" within which they evaluate the meaning of their encounters. It requires courage to do what Elvira did. It is much easier to stick to fixed ideas than to jump into a sea of uncertainty. It would have been simpler for Elvira to place her husband into a preconceived category. But, she had the courage to let herself float, opening up for new perspectives and creative possibilities.

Elvira has grown up, transformed into a courageous adult who takes charge and steps out of victimhood as a forceful agent. Her new approach entails humility, warmth, and respect, all of which she uses to form links to herself and fellow human beings and to sustain these relationships in spite of conflicts, misunderstandings and differing views. Being an adult person means having a *self-government* that treats both self and others with calm respect and warmth.

Learn how to communicate! Functioning in a global community of equal dignity

The emergence of the *One large family* of humankind under the roof of *global village institutions* introduces new challenges to every individual's abilities to function. Or, to be more precise, existing challenges – those generated by life in our current father- and motherlands – are amplified. The *size of the family*, so-to-speak, keeps increasing – the extended family of hunters and gatherers becomes the tribe, then to the nation, and finally the global community. In a hunter gatherer band, everybody knows everybody quite well; however, a state is quite ignorant of the "children" to which it delivers its services. Cities, urban centers, nations, the *global village* – all these family-like entities are so large and impersonal that they easily introduce anomy, loneliness and depression. Therefore, under *globalization*, every individual needs to acquire more communication skills. Everybody must learn to function as a diplomat, mediator, messenger, envoy, and conflict solver on the national and international parquet. A lot of learning is necessary to enable global community to live in dialogue and not be stuck in estranging monologues.

Andrew came to me because he was lonely.

I grew up in a huge traditional family. You were never alone. You were included whether you wanted to be or not. It was difficult to be on your own. You were known to everybody as son of x and grandson of y. You had your place. But now I live alone in an urban center. My social life is no longer automatic. I have to make an effort. I have to talk to people and attract them to me when I want company. This is something I never learned how to do, not even in my professional life. I had a very stable job, where everything was formalized. I was the boss of x and the subordinate of y. But now I am retired, suddenly thrown into a completely unstructured and lonesome life. It depends entirely on my initiative whether I wither of loneliness or not.

How do I make friends? I have never had friends in the sense of people who just enjoyed my company. The people I called my friends were attached to my job or to my late wife. I have no skills that enable me to make friends on my own. I am used to structured hierarchical relationships with duties and rights. I know that real friendship should be equal but I have never lived in an equal relationship. I am either too arrogant or too subservient. Nobody likes to be with me.

I get my pension from a state organization and not from my son. Everything is more anonymous and when you are a social illiterate like me, you are lost. I feel like a child that never grew up, I still need father and mother to give me structure. However, they are gone and my family is dispersed.

Andrew was aware of the need to learn new communication skills. However, many people merely descend in depression and anomy, without reflecting on the fact that they may lack knowledge in communication. They may misinterpret their condition as a psychological problem, while it in reality it is much simpler, it is a lack of expertise in communication in a changing world. Old communication styles are not sufficient anymore. They are based on each individual *having her place* and being included more or less automatically. In the new world, *belonging* requires individual proactive action.

Reaching out to the neighbor and creating a relationship that provides the sense of belonging requires skills that our forefathers rarely needed. Humility is a precondition of these new skills. Nobody likes to be bullied. Arrogance makes no friends. Nor does slavish subservience. Since real friendship is a voluntary relationship, force doesn't work. Warmth, loyalty, solidarity, mutual recognition, dialogue, humble acknowledgement of equal dignity, this is friendship. People who have these skills will have friends and feel that they *belong* on this planet; those who can't will be alone. These new skills are embedded within the processes of *globalization* and *egalization*.

Stand upright! Prevent feelings of humiliation from seeping in

Nelson Mandela evidently withstood being invaded by feelings of humiliation, in spite of many attempts to humiliate and break him. As a result he is admired and revered as a wise man and hero. In the following illustrative quote, Mandela describes his arrival as a political prisoner on Robben Island. In the process, he "demonstrated a rare talent for conflict management. Meeting the raw brutality of the guards with human dignity, he built a relation of respect" (Heffermehl in Mandela, 2001, p. 35).

> Two officers entered the room. The less senior of the two was a captain whose name was Gericke. From the start, we could see that he was intent on manhandling us. The captain pointed to Aaron Molete, the youngest of the four of us and a very mild and gentle person, and said, "Why is your hair so long?" Aaron said nothing. The captain shouted, "I am talking to you! Why is your hair so long? It is against regulations. Your hair should have been cut. Why is it long ..." and then he paused and turned to look at me, and said, "... like this boy's?" pointing at me.

> I began to speak: "Now look here, the length of our hair is determined by the regulations..." Before I could finish he shouted in disbelief: "Never talk to me that way, boy!" and began to advance. I was frightened; it is not a pleasant sensation to know that someone is about to hit you and you are unable to defend yourself. When he was just a few feet from me, I said, as firmly as I could, "If you so much as lay a hand on me, I will take you to the highest court in the land and when I finish with you, you will be as poor as a church mouse." The moment I began speaking, he paused, and by the end of my speech he was staring at me with astonishment. I was a
> bit surprised myself. I had been afraid, and spoke not from courage but out of a kind of bravado. At such times, one must put up a bold front despite what one feels inside. "Where's your ticket?" he asked and I handed it to him. I could see he was nervous. "What's your name?" he said. I nodded my head towards the ticket and said, "It is written there." He said, "How long are you in for?" I said again, gesturing towards the ticket, "It is written there." He looked down and said, "Five years! You are in for five years and you are so arrogant! Do you know what it means to serve five years?" I said, "That is my business. I am ready to serve five years but I am not prepared to be bullied. You must act within the law."

No one had informed him who we were, or that we were political prisoners, or that I was a lawyer. I had not noticed it myself, but the other officer, a tall, quiet man, had vanished during our confrontation; I later discovered that he was Colonel Steyn, the commanding officer of Robben Island. The captain then left, much quieter than he had entered.

Nelson Mandela applied a kind of "minimal justice" approach. He did not endlessly lament Apartheid and or argue that it should be dismantled, but demanded justice in a respectful minimal way. After ascending to power, Mandela retained his style of careful measured moderation. He did not bow when he was a disempowered victim and he did not humiliate his former masters when in power.

In Senegal, the *Tostan-UNICEF program* employs a participatory approach based on dialogue to help end female genital cutting. *Participatory approach* means that those who support the practice are not confronted in an alienating way, but respectfully invited into a dialogue on new awareness. The Imam of Salémata praised this participatory approach: "The Tostan approach is the best way to proceed, contrary to the approach of the Government which almost created a reaction of resistance and defiance. Dialogue is more effective than force" (Dia, 2003, p. 1). Prior to the implementation of the Tostan-Unicef program, people who practiced FGC were imprisoned, which filled the prisons and did nothing to change the practice.

To summarize this section, it is beneficial, in situations of humiliation, to avoid hot feelings of humiliation and violent reactions. The best approach is to confront humiliating situations with measured calls for justice combined with dignifying and respectful behavior towards the humiliators, making it easier for them to step aside without losing face. Remember that Mandela transformed his prison guards into friends.

Start with cooperation! Extend your hand in reciprocal altruism

Matt Ridley (1996) asks: Is Homo sapiens instinctively an *antisocial* or a *prosocial* animal? Game theorists, whose discipline embraces both biology and sociology, have an answer: populations of people who help others, but refuse to help people who cheat, are more stable than populations in which kindness is unconditional or cheating is the norm. Cooperating is the most intelligently selfish strategy people can employ (when they are involved in long-term relationships with others, meet repeatedly, and know that they may depend on each other in the future). In other words, the most evolutionarily stable strategy over the long run is a version of *tit-for-tat*, or as in the German proverb "Wie du mir, so ich dir" ["as you to me, so I to you"]. The rule is simple: Do not help unconditionally, do not cheat, help those who reciprocate. Robert Axelrod (1981/1984) explored computer models of the iterated *Prisoner's Dilemma* game (which gives two players the chance to cooperate or betray one another) and formalized the *evolutionary tit-for-tat* strategy. Axelrod's key finding is that the *evolutionary tit-for-tat* strategy – also known as reciprocal altruism – is remarkably successful and defeats all other strategies, increasing the benefits of cooperation over time and protecting participants from predators. In *Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations*, Morton Deutsch stipulates that "cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition" (Deutsch, 1973, p. 367).

The important point is that the *Prisoner's Dilemma* game must be repeated many times to begin to yield prosocial results, probably because people are more tempted to cheat when they know they will never see one other again and are more likely to cooperate when cheating is costly. Peter Singer (1999), who describes himself as a "Darwinian Left," suggests that, in creating a more peaceful world, we need to set up situations in which people experience long-term relationships in which they do better by cooperating than by exploiting one another. Singer's world resembles a situation in which *Prisoner's Dilemma* is played repeatedly to produce prosocial results. G*lobalization* encourages formerly *separate* entities to join *One single unit of interdependent relationships*. It is no longer strategically intelligent to hide behind thick emotional walls, isolated out of fear of being cheated. Entering altruistic and cooperative relationships is the better strategy, even though you may occasionally encounter predators.

Clara came to me for help overcoming a sense of inner emptiness. She had a very destructive relationship with her father and later with a number of other men. Her early attempts to launch an academic career met with failure. She said:

> I was so hurt and humiliated that I retreated from men and the academic life. I formed my own business, where I was totally in control. Rather than marry a peer, I involved myself with foreign men who had no legal papers and used them like house slaves. Again, I was totally in control. I found ways to protect myself against even the slightest possibility of being rejected or humiliated. I was in control and could preemptively put down everybody around me. From this little tiny spot I raged against the rest of the world. I lived like this for twenty years.

> Now I feel as if I'm suffocating. I feel like an alcoholic who at first is pleased that all worries can be subdued by alcohol, only later discovering the grave side effects. Or

like people who retreat into sects after being traumatized by life, only to find that their life energy is being sucked away. I am not alive anymore. I am dried out. My controlled life has made me crumple like a dried apple.

When I meet men who are my peers, I behave like a dog. I want their attention, but I am afraid of their rejection and humiliation and angry for their past negative responses. I oscillate between yearning for their recognition, fearing them, and peeing on their legs. Understandably, they do not like my behavior and give me exactly what I fear.

Clara recognized that her angry stereotyping closed off the possibility of good relationships with men and academics. She learned to put her bad experiences aside and rediscovered what she called her innocence, her desire to share humanity on an equal footing with others. She overcame her urge to control others. She began to offer others her deep desire to share humanity with them irrespective of the danger of rejection. She transformed herself from a cynic into a loving person. To her surprise, the world became a much nicer place. Her relationships became much warmer, nourishing her emotional hunger. She learned that humble cooperation and sharing breeds cooperation and sharing, while stingy cynicism breeds stingy cynicism.

Helfferich (1993) writes:

For bats, baboons, or barons, cooperating is the most intelligently selfish thing you can do when cheating has swift and obvious costs. From this, Ridley and Low conclude that environmentalism needs healthy cynicism about human motivation. Provide some adequate incentive for cooperating in the work of saving the world, and people will cooperate to save it. Tit-for-tat on a grand scale could mean taxing gas-guzzling cars or boycotting tropical forest wood products. It could mean government preference in selecting contractors that use recycled materials or low-pollution vehicles. It certainly would mean accepting some very natural aspects of human nature (Helfferich, 1993, p. 1).

Evolutionary biology has been criticized for *fundamentalist arrogance* and for believing it has a "hotline" to understanding evolved human nature. However, the findings from evolutionary biology resonate with wisdom from other fields. Even business relations can be discussed from a standpoint of intelligent cooperation. Nelder (1996) explains:

When we find business viewing its activities in a purely materialistic fashion, and exploiting the environment, bear in mind that we are part of that environment. The successful business of the future will reverse that relationship, moving away from what Jewish theologian Martin Buber calls the "I-It" relationship to an "I-Thou" relationship based on mutual respect. Businesses who value their relationships with their customers will be able to hang onto them, and those who don't, won't. The smart company will hear negative feedback from its environment (including its customers) and respond to it symbiotically (Nelder, 1996, p. 10).

Nelder draws on *phenomenology, a* discipline that studies the relationship between human beings, emphasizing the importance of genuine, honest dialogue. Martin Buber (1944) developed a *philosophy of dialogue* that views human existence in two fundamentally different kinds of relationships – *I-It* and *I-Thou*. An *I-It* relationship is the normal everyday relation of a human being towards the things surrounding her. Fellow human beings may also be treated as Its, from a distance, as parts of the environment. An *I-Thou* relationship, however, is one into which a human being enters with her innermost and whole being, yielding genuine encounters and dialogues. *I-Thou* meetings are in Buber's eyes reflections of the human meeting with God.

As discussed earlier, Emmanuel Lévinas has also worked on dialogue and caring. Lévinas's first magnum opus, *Totality and Infinity* (Lévinas, 1961) analyzes the *face-to-face* relationship with *the other*, the fellow human being. S*tarting with cooperation* is a good strategy for arriving at genuine dialogue and full *I-Thou, face-to-face* in a sustainable society. Buber's conviction that every full human meeting is an encounter with God introduces a spiritual meaning to human existence, a meaning that many sorely need. I mentioned earlier that *terror management theory* stipulates that our awareness of our mortality instills a dread that we try to counteract by various means. Viewing human relations as mutually validating and spiritually fulfilling may be one of the most effective of those means. In modern individualistic societies, extended family bonds are no longer as strong as before. Individuals often feel a lack of meaning in their lives. I had a number of clients – famous personalities – who bemoaned their empty lives. The applause of huge audiences did not fill their lives with meaning.

Anne came to me because she had no friends. "I am not sure whether it is a problem," she told me. "But, I feel as if something is missing. I have never experienced friendship, even not as a child. I was always a loner. Can I change this?" Anne indeed changed her behavior and years later reported:

I learned as a child to protect myself against exploitation and to approach other people with suspicion. I always withheld myself and waited for people to prove themselves. I waited and waited, and most people just disappeared from my life. I literally spent my life waiting for other people to prove themselves.

Now I approach people with an open mind. I give them all the attention and warmth I feel. When somebody disappoints me, I do not make a fuss, I just retreat. But, I am seldom disappointed. Most people become good acquaintances or even friends. I have learned to appreciate and enjoy contact, dialogue, conversation, sharing, and being together with others. I enjoy giving my friends support, recognition, and appreciation. I am no longer like an accountant who constantly makes emotional calculations and weighs how much others owe me. You would not believe the results! The world has changed. Suddenly it is full of nice people who take pleasure in my company. Before, the world was cold. I warmed it, and people around me responded in kind.

I never rationally calculated that it would be to my advantage to be more forthcoming. I learned by trial and error. However, I believe, children should learn at school that they must actively contribute with warmth and caring if they want a warm world. Waiting for others to come forward is simply not good enough.

We all need to hear that the world needs us, that our contribution is worthwhile, that our lives have a purpose. It is not enough to just function, get by. Even the greatest riches can not fill an empty life. I give purpose and meaning to those around me by telling them how much I appreciate them. I am amazed by this priceless resource that everybody owns, the capacity to give meaning, life, and purpose to others, to validate and anchor others in this life. In return, others validate and anchor me.

In my former life I thought everybody lived his or her life independently of me, now I know that I am part of others' lives, that I am needed to validate them and that I need them to validate me. I now live in a network of mutual validations, full of warmth and respect – and, of course, occasional constructive criticism. I feel at home on the planet. Before, I was like an alien!

I would tell today's children, 'Immerse yourselves in the pleasures of being part of something bigger, the sharing, and the mutual support that we are all meant to give one another. Let go of your little self, you are not the center of the world. Step down from egocentric arrogance and join the world of human beings with all their faults, weaknesses, strengths, and desires for warmth, recognition and acknowledgement. There are people who protect themselves to death.

If you want to contribute to long-term social justice and peace, let your very first approach to other people be cooperation. Be nice, do not try to win at the expense of others, and avoid unnecessary conflict. Learn to enjoy human contact for its own sake. For Martin Buber, meeting a fellow human being in a real dialogue is a reflection of the human meeting with God. Even if you are an atheist, you can subscribe to this view and make the world a better place by taking pleasure in the quasi-divine nature of human relationships. You can call your religion *philia*, which means "love between friends" in Greek. When you detect somebody cheating, stop cooperating – but do it in a measured way, without over-reaction. Discourage predators. Be prepared to forgive to restore cooperation. Be clear, simple and emphatic to avoid misunderstandings. Show humility; avoid haughty arrogance as well as submissive subservience. Recognize that all human beings share fundamental existential similarities, among them the need for validation and recognition. Extend your hand.

Creativity can be a Trojan horse for equal dignity

As mentioned earlier, Robert M. Solow (1957) used *growth accounting* mathematics to analyze historical GDP data and found that *technological innovation* and *know-how* were much more important in growth than such variables as capital and labor input. New ideas are urgently needed – not just for growth – but for the long-term sustainability of the Earth. Creativity is essential to our future and that of our children.

However, creativity is an extremely tricky phenomenon. It cannot be forced. It must be elicited with care. It is often spontaneous, not easily planned. You can force yourself as hard as you want; the best ideas will still most probably come when you relax in the

bathtub. Creativity cannot be increased by oppressing people. Oppressed underlings may very well develop a creativity of their own, but it probably won't benefit the oppressor. More likely it will work to sabotage the oppressor's aims. A corporate manager in a company or a mother who wants her children to succeed in life needs to extend respect to employees/children and open spaces of relaxation and freedom.

Creativity and creative self-realization represent *pragmatic* calls for equal dignity. Being treated as somebody of equal dignity, as somebody whose views have weight, opens space for creativity. People are much more creative when they feel well-treated than they are when they experience humiliating lowliness. The old practice of ranking human worth resembles Chinese foot binding. Both incapacitate, at least partially. Women with bound feet were reduced to the status of dependent and helpless toys. Likewise, underlings in coercive hierarchies are usually forced into artificial incapacitation, with their right arms – their sword arms – bound metaphorically behind their backs. Only master elites can use a sword. Masters are, in fact, compelled to use the sword, prohibited from any expression of vulnerability or dependence, metaphorically operating as if they have their left arms bound behind their backs. Both elites and underlings, then, function with only one arm. Masters – since they must disconnect from their vulnerability – easily develop a false sense of control and a distorted view of reality. Underlings – barred from developing a comprehensive sense of control – are caught in helplessness and dependency. Deutsch (2002), describes how oppressors and oppressed depend on one another and points out the advantages of leaving these distorted selves behind:

> If we were to examine the oppressors psychologically – the child abusers, the husbands who batter their wives, brutal bosses, and political tyrants – I believe that we would find that the oppressors need the oppressed. Their need to control and dominate the other, their intolerance of the autonomy of the other, makes them dependent upon having vulnerable, weaker others for the definition of their own power. Their own deep sense of vulnerability (anxieties about helplessness and impotence, guilt about forbidden desires and rage, self-hatred for vulnerability) leads to strong needs both to deny one's vulnerability (by projection of one's anxieties, guilt and contempt onto others who are more vulnerable) and to have the
> power to control those who are vulnerable or can be made to be more vulnerable. The oppressor needs to be able to make demands, which are arbitrary and unreasonable so that the obedience of the oppressed is due to the oppressor's power and not to the agreement of the oppressed (Deutsch, 2002, p. 20).

Deutsch quotes Lichtenberg (1990) who suggests that dominators must withdraw from processes of domination and re-own and resolve their feelings of vulnerability, guilt, self-hatred, rage and terror, and undo the projection of these feelings onto the oppressed:

> Psychologists, in their roles as psychotherapists, marriage counselors, organizational consultants, and educators have a role to play in demystifying the psychological processes involved in the dominators. So too, I believe do the oppressed, by not accepting their distorted roles in the distorted relationship of the oppressor and the oppressed" (Deutsch, 2002, p. 35-36).

The call for creativity and self-realization can be understood as a down-to-earth and pragmatic push towards *egalization*. In the early twenty-first century the world finds itself in transition from an ancient *culture of coercion* to a *culture of creativity*, though still in its infancy. In a culture of coercion, underlings are punished simply for being underlings. In contrast, the culture of creativity regards everybody as being fundamentally equal, interdependent, a potential resource. The key to releasing that resource is persuasion and the basis for persuasion is respect for equal dignity.[271] Cultures today fill less of a preserving function than formerly, acquiring instead a propelling role. Everywhere there is movement towards innovation, towards the creation of new ideas, new theories, new products, and new lifestyles. In the past, change occurred in spite of the efforts of established power elites to stop it, while today the established elites seem to thrive on a culture of change. Established elites used to preserve their power by preserving the status quo, now they expect innovation to preserve it.

The effects of the current transition towards a *culture of creativity* are visible everywhere and permeate all our daily lives, locally and globally. Old people today are "younger" than old people a generation ago, and today's young people do not resemble their age groups of a century ago. Creativity, ideas, innovation, curiosity, flexibility, adaptability – all terms that describe children – are indispensable tools for adults in a rapidly changing world. The ability to adapt swiftly is needed as global mobility increases intercultural contacts. Rapid technological development requires continuous mastering of new challenges. Innovation requires creativity and creativity requires new human skills. A person or a group of people who want to be innovative and creative need to be curious, searching, questioning, playing, and comfortable with error. Terms such as *growing young* in the service of better *custom-tailoring* capture aspects of a constant *pendulation* movement that includes checking the situation, adapting perceptions, deciding what to do, acting, and beginning again to check and exploring. *Custom-tailoring* describes the effort to interlink abstract concepts (theories, world-views) with "reality" in ever more dynamic, flexible and differentiated ways. *Custom-tailoring* is another term for *reflective equilibrium*, which means going in circles, again and again, to arrive at ever denser understanding. The term *growing young* or *childlikeness* describes sets of skills that include curiosity and playfulness, both necessary to improved custom-tailoring. Curiosity and playfulness are skills which children have and adults tend to lose. Ashley Montagu described similar processes in his book *Growing Young* (Montagu, 1981).

Childlike curiosity and creativity – playing in the forest, turning over stones, building huts from twigs and leaves – lead to differentiated *custom-tailoring*. To build a theory or a mechanical tool, to adapt an instrument to its task, one needs to study the situation very carefully and generate as many creative potential solutions as possible. *Childlike* play is an effective way to stimulate quality in data collection and idea generation. Perhaps, our current transition is nothing but another leap to a new level of the *growing young* tendency that characterized Homo sapiens from the outset.

In the corporate sector, openness to change, flexibility, and creativity, or *growing young* have been elevated to the status of "official" agendas. Training, learning, openness, flexibility, malleability, asking questions – all natural skills for children – are taught in seminars to prepare modern managers for work in a global world. Terms like

rigid system, secure knowledge, fixed identity, are old-fashioned. Adaptability, not rigidity, is valued in a rapidly changing environment. Small units are more effective than huge inflexible organizations, too. In the language of economics: Profit in a market economy is secured only if the clients' needs and wishes are taken seriously and satisfied, when the right niches for products are found (or created). And since the world is globalizing, this extends to the global market place.

From this perspective, it is possible that capitalism won out over socialism because (and only as long as) it recognizes and responds more quickly to "reality." The rigid planning strategies of socialist systems preferred wishful thinking over "reality." Or, in the language of *humiliation* and *putting down*, rigid planning hoped to *humble* reality and ended up fighting an impossible fight against the "empirical world." Capitalism understands that no theory or plan can "tie down" "reality," that only constant "running up and down" the slope between practice and theory (from clients' needs to the drawing board of products) produces profit. Again, the term *reflective equilibrium* would cover this circular movement.

Childlikeness does not mean abandoning adulthood. It means developing a skilled *personal manager* that allows the self to climb theoretical and abstract heights while simultaneously being able to go back down into the valleys, to play there, to get new input. This new input can then be taken up again, not to badly constructed towers of rigid theory, but to theories which have stronger ties with empirical data. The heights don't even have to have the grandeur of old-fashioned "unified theories." They can consist of highly pragmatic ideas, *short-range* or *medium-range theories*.

Gorbachev is said to have told the East German head of state Erich Honnecker, when Honnecker refused to open the DDR to reform and Glasnost at the end of the 1980s: "Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben" ["Life punishes those who come too late"]. In a personal conversation a citizen of the former DDR told me (1995 in Leipzig):

> In the DDR everything was decided for us. We did not have to think for ourselves. After the *Wende* [literally *turn*, meaning the reunification of Germany in 1989], suddenly we were our own masters and organizers, no longer the disempowered subjects of the state. This was difficult for many and still is. Freedom requires great courage. You easily freeze in fear and cling to the next-best preconceived ideas without properly investigating the ground. What you need is courage, and good self-management to be playful to collect information and develop ideas and simultaneously be decisive in implementing them.

Democracy is an arrangement with in-built mechanisms to insure that the overall system stays flexible. One of its primary aims is to *custom-tailor* its mechanics to its "users," its citizens. *Sustainability* is another term that emphasizes *custom-tailored* long-term linkages between theory and practice.

As an individual, you can contribute much to the emergence of a global world of peace. You can identify stressful situations and avoid tunnel vision, keeping your mind cool so you can think and act sensibly. You can avoid intense and rigid attachments to your own emotions and to other people and you can strive to develop the maturity and wisdom of a Nelson Mandela. You can develop a strong *personal manager agency* that introduces a higher degree of control into your life. With this control you can improve

your communication skills, withstand being humiliated, learn enjoy human contact for itself, and promote creativity in yourself and others.

Although it would be nice, we do not need to love everybody or distribute Ferraris to all. However, we must avoid pushing the planet over the edge. Everybody can contribute to this minimum requirement. The first step is to cool down and help others cool down to achieve more measured and mature serenity. It is especially important for those who feel victimized to learn to think coolly and measuredly. Victims carry an enormous responsibility since their anger can make the *global village* explode.

It is inherently impossible to overcome terrorism with conventional weapons or higher walls. Missiles and bombs meant to convey humbling messages are likely to be perceived as messages of humiliation, evoking violent defiance rather than humility. There is only one solution – we must build a *global village* of at least *supportable* neighborhoods, if not *good* neighborhoods. The United States (the world's only superpower) and the rest of the world's nations can build that decent *global village* by supporting *decent* United Nations institutions. In an interdependent world, *my security and welfare always depends on everybody's security and welfare.*

Related reading

Read more about *ubuntu*,[272] on the *dynamics of willpower*,[273] on *resilience in the face of humiliation*,[274] on *sliding signifiers*,[275] on *necessary losses* and how to *forget*,[276] on the *theory of the strength of weak ties*,[277] on *tolerance*,[278] on *new forms of identity* such as the *protean self*,[279] on *multiple identities*,[280] on *dialogue*,[281] on *discourse* and how it is shaped by and shapes *power relations*,[282] on *humility* as to *Science and Democratic Social Structure*,[283] on how interview partners can be considered as *experts*,[284] on *the ethics of authenticity*,[285] on the *third factor*,[286] on the Buddhist concept of *mindfulness*,[287] on Victor Frankl's concept of *self-observation* in the framework of *logotherapy*,[288] on *self-remembering*,[289] on *being awake*,[290] on Erving Goffman's *frames*,[291] on the *origin of virtue*,[292] on *game theory* that has *expanded into biology and sociology*,[293] on *evolutionary tit-for-tat strategy*,[294] on "*Darwinian Lefts*,"[295] on *arguments against evolutionary psychology*,[296] on *I-It* and *I-Thou* relations,[297] on the *aggregate production function*,[298] on *creativity*,[299] and on *growing young*.[300]

What Victims Can Contribute

We usually believe victims are *poor, pitiable creatures* who need psychological or pharmaceutical "crutches." That is undoubtedly true in many cases. However, this book calls for victims to empower themselves, to do their utmost to leave behind any self-perpetuating victim identities and assume a central responsibility for common peace, order and welfare.

Adolf Hitler, as a person, was in many ways a victim. He felt Germany had been victimized by its neighbors and by Jewish plots. The consequence was war and Holocaust. Nelson Mandela had innumerable reasons to feel victimized. However, he did not bring war and genocide to Africa. On the contrary, he took responsibility and was the

driving force in inviting the ruling elite to step aside. Mandela, although a victim, is *no poor creature.* He was and still is the compelling *force in constructive change.* In other words, the "fuel" for violence that lies at the heart of victimhood can – and must be – channeled in *prosocial* ways. Warriors-for-change – or warriors-for-peace – may be too angry and divisive to promote their very goals; wise tailors-for-change such as Nelson Mandela are needed to reach *integrative solutions.*[301]

Hitler or Mandela? How humiliation can lead to the Mandela path

In Egypt, I had Palestinian clients who suffered from depression because they felt they should help their suffering families in Palestine, instead of studying in Cairo and preparing for a happy life. In the wake of September 11, I recall some of the cases.[302]
    Farida, a young woman, not yet twenty years old, had a compelling story:

> My father wants me to study, get married, and have a normal life. But I cannot smile and laugh and think of happy things, when my aunts and uncles, my nieces and other family members face suffering in Palestine. Their suffering is a heavy burden on me. I feel it in my body. Sometimes I cannot sleep.

> I know Palestinians my age, who do not care. They go to the discotheque and dance – they even drink alcohol. I think this is disgusting. Our people are suffering and we should stand by them. If we cannot help them directly, we should at least not mock them by living immoral lives, or be heartless and forget them altogether. I feel I have no right to enjoy life as long as my people suffer.

> I respect my father and I try to obey him and concentrate on my studies. If it were not for him, I would go to my homeland, get married, have as many sons as possible, and educate them in the right spirit. I would be overjoyed to have a martyr as a son, a son who sacrifices his life for his people.

> I feel that suicide bombers are heroes, because it is hard to give your life. I want to give my life. I want to do something. I cannot just sit here in Cairo and watch my people suffer and be humiliated. I feel humiliated in their place, and feel that I humiliate them more by not helping them. I feel so powerless, so heavy; sometimes I can hardly walk.[303]

Farida's involvement and sincerity were intense, pure, deep and selfless. I was reminded of the sincere young students who had been my clients in Germany some years earlier. I remember a young German woman – she was nineteen years old and had bulimia – let me call her Rita.[304] Rita's words, translated from German, follow:

> I am appalled by the violence in the world, the destruction of the environment, and the lack of sincerity around me. I am a good student, a very good one. But, I cannot live in a world where men play around with the world, with women, and nature, and bring

suffering on all of us. Men want to show off their muscles and virility, that is all they want, and the rest of the world is their victim. This makes me choke.

I am so nauseated that I do not want to eat. And sometimes I do not eat for a long time. As long as I manage to refrain from eating, I feel pure, ascetic, as if I can escape the pollution around me by saying "no." But then I get very hungry, and I start eating and because I eat too much, I have to force myself to vomit. This in turn makes me feel extremely guilty, because I waste valuable resources. Here I am, I say to myself, eating too much and vomiting, while millions of people do not have enough to eat. They live lives of humiliation and I add to it by my waste! I am caught in this cycle. What can I do? I want to do something, but I don't know what! I feel so powerless and heavy!

These two young women were very similar. Both were intelligent, with IQs considerably above average, with a bright future ahead, but they could not digest the violence, neglect, thoughtlessness and humiliation they perceived around them. They were strong women, with an acute awareness of justice, whose strength was wasted because they saw no constructive action. The Palestinian woman found solace in dreaming about sacrificing her life as the mother of sons who gave their lives to defend their people. The German woman had no such vision; however, she thought that asceticism was a solution, an asceticism that threatened to destroy her health.[305]

I had some male Palestinian students as clients as well, and they dreamt of giving their lives for Palestine in violent resistance. They condemned, as Farida did, those among their male friends who chose to "forget" their people's suffering, enjoying life by feasting and drinking. None of these young clients was driven by any "will to power" or inherent "hatred." They were driven by despair. They suffered from empathy, a "noble" suffering. However, they suffered also from short-sighted, impatient and counter-productive strategies to relieve their empathic suffering, similar to the alcoholic who believes that alcohol solves any problems.

In other words, their starting point, empathy for others' sufferings – a *noble*, *sincere*, and *valuable* suffering – contrasted starkly with their *destructive* strategies for action, destructive for these young people, as well as for the social fabric of a world of non-violence. I was very aware that these bright young people were vulnerable to being recruited by leaders who could use their empathy for acts of destruction.

Two British citizens carried out a suicide attack on April 30, 2003, at the Mike's Place pub on the Tel Aviv promenade. Asif Muhammad Hanif succeeded in blowing himself up. Omar Khan Sharif had a fault in his explosive device, failed in his suicide attempt, and fled the scene (reported on http://www.mfa.gov.il/ on April 30, 2003). These two British citizens had lived most of their lives far from the Middle East; but they were drawn in, like Farida and her friends.

I tried to support Farida's strengths and discussed with her how she could contribute to a more just world after finishing her studies. I talked about peaceful strategies and tried to help her understand that these would be more beneficial to her people and the entire world than giving birth to suicide bombers. She was caught in a complicated conflict that drew on an incongruous web of sources, from the adherence and violation of honor and dignity codes. In an honor context, "doing nothing" is to appear "weak," while showing "strength" and readiness to defend oneself with violence means being "strong." As long

as all actors adhere to this code, there is no complication; raw might wins and all agree with the outcome. Farida's desire to produce sons as "weapons" has its place within such a code, as have Israeli military muscles. However, the situation grows far more complicated and hurtful when the participants and the audience – or parts of the audience – no longer agree on the ground rules. Nowadays, many people see violent demonstrations of strength as violations of dignity codes, unethical and immoral. Thus, adherence to the old code produces violations of the new one, deepening wounds instead of resolving the situation.

I tried to explain this to Farida. However, first I had to be sure that she had worked through her inner urge to produce violence. I had to make sure that she was "free" to become a Mandela, not caught in *addiction to humiliation* à la Hitler. I will explain this in the following sections.

Up or equal? Rising from lowliness requires special awareness

As discussed earlier, history is full of instances in which humiliation has been used systematically as a device to keep oppressive hierarchies in place.

Acceptance

Responses of victims of humiliation vary greatly. As previously discussed, victims of routine humiliation may accept their inferior position, understanding it as God's will or nature's order, in the vein of Galtung's (1996) notion of "penetration," and Seligman's (1975) idea of learned helplessness. Others may use the belief in a just world or the mechanism of blaming the victim and decide that those at the bottom of the hierarchy – themselves included – deserve their fate because they caused it by their own inborn and/or self-inflicted shortcomings. Others may be forced or bribed into subservience by their humiliators. Those who fill the middle ranks may defend their position by bowing towards their superiors and humiliating their inferiors, reminiscent of the description of the authoritarian personality described by Adorno et al. (1950).

Admiration

Throughout history, underlings nurtured admiration for elites and tried to "take part" in the lives of elites by *imitation*. Most of the time, elites could not be imitated directly (primarily because access to castles and mansions was limited) so underlings developed nebulous images of elite life to imitate. Elites usually regard underlings' pathetic attempts to climb the ladder of status with mild and pitying smiles.

The world is still full of examples of this phenomenon. In the USA, the wealthy build villas that represent, according to the French, embarrassingly overdone replicas of houses dating to the time when France was the epitome of culture par excellence. Meanwhile, the French have difficulty keeping Anglicisms out of their language and "fast food" out of their culture, showing that the master/underling relationship goes both ways.

Admiration turns sour

In a setting where equal dignity is the goal, the sight of underlings "licking the feet" of masters becomes obscene. Those who do the licking are often not aware of how ridiculous they appear. In the United States, Europe and much of the Arab world, local reproductions of furniture that resemble the furnishings in French royal palaces are very popular. Even more tellingly, most international hotels display some sort of such furniture. However, one may ask if this style does not give testimony to past oppression. Shouldn't it be shunned? Egyptian admiration for French styles in furniture betrays admiration for the former French colonial master. Centuries after the French masters left, the colonialist's style is still imitated. This imitation extends to other Western imports which are imitated without regard to whether they are suitable or not, while local style is despised. In Egypt, architects such as the late Hassan Fathy have long suffered rejection for trying to revive old Egyptian architecture that is both functional for the local climate and aesthetically pleasing. While rich Americans ordered Fathy's styles for their villas in New Mexico, Egypt rejected him because he promoted a style of "underling" origin, mud brick and limestone. Recently, perhaps through American influence, Hassan Fathy is increasingly regarded as the prophet he deserves to be. This willingness of the subaltern to suffer for elite status destroys valuable cultural diversity that could enrich the world as local style is abandoned for less suitable replacements that promise doubtful "elite participation."

When respect is lacking: Depression, sabotage or atrocity

When egality is the "name of the game," it is humiliating to be an underling, and it is even more humiliating to be caught in subaltern imitation, see Figure 6. In books widely read in Africa, Frantz Fanon (1963, 1986) described his struggle to become a respected part of the colonial master elite; he tried to become "French." Fanon explains how he eventually recognized that the elite he so venerated would never accept him as *one of us*. Imitating the master is not an effective way for underlings to elevate themselves, producing at best the master's mildly contemptuous smile. It is humiliating to be laughed at by elites whose respect one yearns for, making those candidates ashamed of ever having admired these elites. Rejected love and admiration burns hot.

Elite Admiration Turns into Humiliation
Elite admiration is seen as
respectable (honor context)   humiliating (dignity context)

Elite

Equal dignity

Elite admira-
tion and
imitation

Unease over
elite
admiration

Figure 6: Elite admiration turns into humiliation

When feelings of humiliation emerge, they produce consequences. Feelings of humiliation may elicit depression which could be described as rage turned inwards, or they can lead to rage turned outwards, the desire to retaliate with aggressive humiliation-for-humiliation. When victims are weak, without sufficient resources, this urge for humiliation-for-humiliation may express itself in subtle ways – in sabotage, for example. When victims have more resource, retaliation for humiliation may take the form of more overt acts of aggression, from throwing stones to guerrilla activities or open violence and terrorism, or, as in Rwanda, even genocide against the former masters. These dynamics may unfold in both synchronic and diachronic stages, from underlings' humble subservience to depressed apathy and violent uprisings. These stages may co-exist in society and in the individual psyche. Rising underlings may admire the elite they attack and at the same time feel ashamed of admiring them. This dynamic is what allowed Hutu men in Rwanda to marry Tutsi women as "trophies," then kill their wives in the 1994 genocide.

A sequence of steps unfold when masters and underlings encounter the human rights message. Lowliness is no longer acceptable and elite admiration turns sour. The resulting rage may be held covert, or become overt. If rage is lived out overtly, it may be poured into violence that ranges from acts of sabotage to genocide.

Be aware of the "inferiority complex"! Victims may become extreme perpetrators

I believe that shame for elite admiration in underlings merits particular attention. It may explain why we find such extreme cruelty and humiliation inflicted when risen underlings take revenge. I discussed this earlier, in the chapter on addiction to humiliation. The term *ethnic cleansing* may refer to more than "cleansing" and eradicating another *ethnic group,* it may also describe the rising underlings' need to cleanse and eradicate their own

elite admiration. The obsession with eradicating even the babies in the wombs of their mothers, to wipe out every trace of the formerly admired elite, may have to do with shame over elite admiration. For long-standing elites, oppression of underlings may be "sufficient," excessively humiliating and killing them "not worth the bother." But former underlings – risen to power – often seem obsessed with "total cleansing" and may perpetrate extreme forms of atrocities, humiliation and genocide on the former elite.

Hitler (1999) in *Mein Kampf*,[306] describes in length which political personalities he found admirable in Austria, many of them Jews. Reading his text it becomes obvious that he admired Jews, at least at a very early point in his life. Later, he attempted to wipe out every Jewish trace and perhaps also his admiration for them. Knowing their talent and aptitude, he was convinced that they had the capacity to dominate the world, if not prevented. He tried to exterminate a world elite which he feared because he admired their competence.

In Rwanda, the former elite were Tutsi and those who used to bow in deference were Hutu. The Rwandan genocide may have represented both an attempt to "cleanse" Rwanda from the former Tutsi elite and also from Hutu elite admiration. Indeed, people often used the term inferiority complex when discussing the Hutu *genocidaires*. In psychology the term *inferiority complex* is connected with Alfred Adler (1870-1937), a psychiatrist born in Vienna.[307] The so-called "inferiority complex" in Rwanda may be an example of what happens when underlings rise to power and are confronted with the effects of their own former acceptance of their lowly state and their admiration for the elites. Scheff (2003) explains that "the concept of an inferiority complex can be seen as a formulation about chronic low self-esteem, i.e., chronic 'embarrassment'" (Scheff, 2003b, p. 17).

Valuable objects that symbolize this shame are often destroyed along with the human targets of this "complex." The French revolution saw furniture, statues, art objects, and entire castles vandalized. The world over, history tells similar tales (Mayer, 2000). Typically, however, the next generation – no longer subject to an "inferiority complex" – regrets the destruction. Valuable objects are painstakingly dug out of rubble heaps, repaired and returned to the palaces, which are then turned into museums. In such museums, the formerly shameful evidence of elite admiration is freed of its shame and presented for everybody's admiration.

John Ogbu (1978, 1991) found among black Americans a tendency to reject education as way out of poverty. Excelling in the educational system, a symbol of white domination, smells too much of "licking the masters' feet." However, as seen in the other examples, this conceptual linkage is a fallacy. Education has merits that are independent of its original implementers.[308]

It seems crucial for underlings and those who feel their dignity violated to be aware of the traps entailed in rising from victimhood. Extreme emotional reactions must be expected. Extreme atrocities may sometimes seem to be the "right answer." If the world is to survive the surge of uprisings that characterizes the globe in the wake of the human rights revolution, these atrocities must be avoided. Awareness of the underlying dynamics may be helpful. Creating this awareness is what victims can contribute.

These actions and reactions characterize almost all cases in which underlings seek to rise to power. The diachronic and synchronic transitions from subservience through admiration and ambitious imitation to humiliation and protest, is relevant for:

- Women as they rise out of humiliating subjugation by males and patriarchal structures.
- Blacks as they struggle out of a humiliating position in relation to whites.
- The poor as they try to cope with the increasing gap between themselves and the rich.
- Promoters of rationality as defined as a long-term holistic approach, as they rise against representatives of rationality defined as short-sighted instrumentalization.
- Advocates of nature who struggle against the short-sighted instrumentalization of nature.

In all cases feelings of humiliation may be expressed in violent and destructive confrontations that compound a difficult transition with avoidable secondary problems. People who wish for social peace, locally and globally, are well-advised to be aware of the pitfalls of the "inferiority complex" that complicate transitions that might otherwise proceed smoothly.

Marion, a young feminist, reflected on her love for technology:

I love everything technical – small machines, big machines, gadgets, everything. I love cars, airplanes, rockets. I would like to buy a really fancy car. I could not admit this to myself until recently because technology is associated with maleness. I am a feminist and think most men need to be reformed. They need to learn how to communicate, they need to learn about their feelings, but first and foremost they need to learn respect for women as equal human beings.

For a long time I thought of technical gadgets as symbols of the "enemy camp." Just think of car expositions. What do you see? Half-naked girls are paid to throw their breasts about in front of these cars to attract men! Are these car-producing companies blind? Don't they realize that this is deeply insulting for women who want to buy these cars?

The typical male definition of female beauty is deeply disrespectful and humiliating to women. I recently got an email – I do not know who the author is – which describes female beauty in a way I feel comfortable with:

> The beauty of a woman is not in the clothes she wears,
> The figure she carries, or the way she combs her hair.
> The beauty of a woman must be seen from her eyes,
> Because that is the doorway to her heart,
> The place where love resides.
> The beauty of a woman is not in a facial mole,
> But true beauty in a woman is reflected in her soul.
> It is the caring that she lovingly gives,
> The passion that she shows.
> The beauty of a woman
> With passing years – only grows.

Many males see women as decorative objects (mind you I am not against decoration, beautiful cloths or fancy jewelry, but against taking decoration as the essence of

femaleness). This humiliation permeates our lives and sours everything that has to do with femaleness and maleness for me. Sometimes I would like to throw stones at these nicely exhibited cars in these flashy expositions! Or I revel in dreams of scratching these symbols of male arrogance with a knife! I dream of crashing the roofs of these fancy exposition halls on the heads of all these men who abuse women as objects and selling-dolls for their cars!

But, I have decided to make an effort to get over of all these hurt feelings and allow myself to be fascinated by technology. Why should I kill the whole man when I despise the arrogant thoughts and feelings he carries in his head? It is the male mindset I want to see go, and this I do not attain by killing males.

For about a year, I've tried to differentiate between the merits of technology and the fact that men developed it to sell it to men. I want to "conquer" this technology for me, for women. I thank men for developing it, but now I want to be part of the game.

Marion's message shows that victims can contribute to healing their problems with elite admiration. Victims can learn to differentiate. Admiration for elite excellence – be it in art or technology – can be detached from calls for elites to step down. Elites in the process of being deposed do not have to be killed and their art objects do not have to be despised and destroyed. Masters can be invited to descend to the level of equal dignity, and underlings rise to the level of equal dignity, without an excess of mayhem.

Transitions are difficult enough in themselves. They benefit from being unburdened of psychological problems that can be solved benignly. Underlings, those who feel victimized by dominating masters, have considerable leverage to limit destruction during such transitions. Nelson Mandela did not unleash unnecessary violence on the descending white masters and he did not bully them out of the country or destroy their symbols. Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, sadly enough, seems to perpetrate transgressions on the former white masters that are more likely to hurt his country's interests than benefit them.

Step outside of the master-slave dyad! Act autonomously

Underlings on the rise, those who feel victimized by oppressive masters, often are caught in patterns of reaction and fail to focus on action.

James came to me as a client because he was caught in obsessively responding to his boss:

My boss is a bully and exploiter. Humiliating people comes naturally to him. I wish the economic situation were better and I could find a new job. I fear my health will break down. I cannot stop thinking about my boss, what he says and does. He dominates my feelings and everything I do. I despise him, yet I allow him to invade my entire life. I am not free, I am his slave. He's just a bad boss, why should I give my life for him? It is enough that I see him during work, why should he sneak into my dreams, too? I want to liberate the energy caught up in this relationship for more constructive activities!

James learned to become an actor, rather than a reactor, but it took him a long time. At the end, his boss turned out to be a frightened and shy person who asked James for help. It was James who had blown up the image of his boss and turned him into an oversized monster. The more James was able to feel, think and act independently within the confines of his circumstances, the more the "monster" shrank. He never became a nice boss, but he became a tolerable boss. The most important point was that James learned to protect his integrity and dignity even under less than perfect circumstances. Toward the conclusion of his counseling, James reported:

> I told my boss that certain ways of giving orders are counterproductive and that he should learn more about modern management methods. I said it calmly and nicely. He looked at me, astonished, and – you're not going to believe this – he thanked me for the advice! I felt really strange. There was this old man, lonely and bitter, much more insecure than I, and for years he had been my monster! I will never like him, but, somehow, I must have convinced him to come down from the tyrant's throne!

Like James, most victims benefit from removing themselves from the master-slave dyad, from ceasing their constant reacting to the master's actions and definitions, and from learning to act autonomously. Nelson Mandela did not allow his tormentors to take the lead and turn him into a re-actor. The last step that Mandela so successfully negotiated was to teach his master elite that change was necessary and unavoidable, both normatively and practically, and that a peaceful transition was preferable to violence and war. Deutsch (2002) concludes:

> By his persistent public refusal to be humiliated or to feel humiliated, Mandela rejected the distorted, self-debilitating relationship that the oppressor sought to impose upon him. Doing so, enhanced his leadership among his fellow political prisoners and the respect he was accorded by the less sadistic guards and wardens of the prison (Deutsch, 2002, p. 39).

Avoid extremism! Moderates have to intervene

Years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda still carries physical and psychological scars. When I did my fieldwork in Rwanda in 1999, a strange rigid emptiness, a kind of frozen sadness on many faces betrayed that mayhem had ripped the society apart. Even close friends refused to talk to each other about their nightmares. Women told me that they would only realize that their closest friend had been raped when she asked to be accompanied to take a HIV test.

In Rwanda, extremists won over moderates. Hutu moderates tried to prevent the genocide, Hutu extremists instigated it. Subsequently, Hutu moderates were killed along with the Tutsi. Hutu extremists – and this seems to be a characteristic of extremism the world over – had a tendency to transgress formerly respected boundaries in their quest for revenge. Long-established masters, on the other hand, may stop short of certain atrocities. This may be caused, as discussed earlier, by rising underlings becoming extremists in

their obsession to "cleanse" themselves from their *underling mindset* or "inferiority complex."

Public rape as transgression of traditional limits

One of the most gruesome examples of humiliation as a weapon is public rape in war, perpetrated in such places as Somalia, Rwanda, or South Eastern Europe. Rape, when used as a weapon of war, is systematically used and carried out "efficiently" humiliating not only the raped victim, but also the family and the social group to which the victim belongs. This humiliation is so devastating that it indeed might thoroughly weaken the enemy.[309] Interestingly, employing public rape as a "weapon" seems to be a new tactic.

Asha Ahmed, Information/Dissemination Officer at Somalia Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, explained to me on January 11, 1999, in Nairobi, that the ICRC invited historians from all Somali clans to do research which resulted in the Spared from the Spear booklet.[310] This booklet shows that women and children traditionally were "spared from the spear" and that Somali war code explicitly protects civilians against warrior onslaughts. Women were not to be touched. Women embodied bonds between clans, moving freely, even in wartime. Asha Ahmed pointed out:

> When you look at this booklet, the *Geneva Convention* is all in there! At first the *Geneva Convention* was like Latin to the Somalis! But the Geneva rules are theirs already! Usually, women were not touched; consider the ancient practice of blood feud. Rape may have happened in the chaos of war, but not planned in the way it is today. Today it is orchestrated in order to 'send a message to the enemy.'"[311]

Former Somali Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh confirmed the "novelty" of public rape and its reverberations in an interview on January 9, 1999, in Nairobi, see also Lindner, 2000o:

> There is one thing which never was part of traditional quarrelling between clans, and this is rape, especially mass rape in front of the family. This is new. It happened for the first time when Siad Barre's dictatorial regime sent soldiers to annihilate us. Soldiers raped our women in front of their husbands and families.

> We Somalis are united through our common ethnic background; we speak one language, and are all Muslims. Why are we divided today? Humiliation through rape and its consequences divides us. The traditional methods of reconciliation are too weak for this. It will take at least one generation to digest these humiliations sufficiently to be able to sit together again…believe me, humiliation, as I told you before, was not known to the Somali before Siad Barre came to power! It is a "tradition" that young men of one clan steal camels from another clan, and sometimes a man gets killed. But women were never touched, never. There might have been a rare case when a girl was alone in the semi-desert guarding her animals, and a young man having spent a long time in the desert lost control and tried to rape her. She would

resist violently, and at the end the solution would perhaps be that he had to marry her. But mass rape, especially rape in front of the family, this never happened before, this is new! (Lindner, 2000o, p. 343).

Human Rights Watch (1996) confirms the systematic application of rape. In attacks on Tutsis before 1994, women and children were generally spared, but during the genocide – particularly in its later stages – all Tutsis were targeted, regardless of sex or age. After mid-May 1994, the leaders of the genocide called on killers not to spare women and children. The widespread incidence of rape accompanied the increase in overall violence against groups previously immune from attack. "Rape was a strategy," said Bernadette Muhimakazi, a Rwandan women's rights activist. "They chose to rape. There were no mistakes. During this genocide, everything was organized. Traditionally it is not the custom to kill women and children, but this was done everywhere too." Other Rwandans characterized the violence against women as: "the humiliation of women;" or "the disfigurement of women, to make them undesirable;" or "total disrespect for the worth of women" (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 41).).

It seems that new forms of atrocities have been employed in recent ethnic cleansings, genocides and quasi-genocides. Traditional confines have been transgressed. This phenomenon may be related to the fact that these atrocities were perpetrated by rising underlings and not by long-established elites. A desire looms large to hurt more – and more deeply – than ever before in history. Rising underlings would benefit from heightening awareness of these dynamics. Leaders with a biography of personal victimization by humiliation may want to show responsibility by stepping back when they feel that they notice a desire within themselves to inflict "more hurt."

Third parties, as well, should be aware of the dangers and intervene. A surgeon does not operate on his own child, a police man or a judge goes "off the case" when too involved. A Hitler, a Milosevic, a Saddam Hussein, to name only a few "heroic victims," should never have been allowed to *get on the job*. In the future, candidates with similar profiles have to be identified much earlier to prevent them from highjacking entire countries and continents with their obsessions. If these leaders are called upon to reflect on themselves and their responsibilities; perhaps they will retreat from leadership and learn to work with their obsessions and their victimhood in more constructive ways.

Afterlife as arena

Humiliated underlings may be tempted to flee beyond Earth when they do not get what they yearn for – recognition, dignity, respect, and worthiness. Fleeing into visions of worthiness extended by God in the afterlife is sometimes a way out of humiliation. During the years I spent in Egypt, I observed that an increasing number of people turned to Islam and, within Islam, to more conservative forms. Egypt in its recent history went from colonialism to communism and nationalism. No ism brought the sought-after respect and welfare. The Pharaonic past of Egyptian grandeur remains eerily far away.

Egypt is in a poor shape, a beggar on the world stage, kept alive by American funding. Most young people do not know if they will ever have the means to found and maintain a family. Islam is the latest "candidate" to create hope for a better life within Egypt and to

make the country a more respected international player. Egyptians, especially in the Nile Delta, are pragmatic people who have no "natural" tendency to become zealots, but when there is little hope for a dignified life on Earth, they turn to the afterlife for consolation.

What we call "pragmatic values" appear to be the values of those who feel respected, while "afterlife values," or "beyond Earth values," are at least partly embraced in a response to frustration, deprivation and humiliation. Following this idea through to its logical conclusion, the current pragmatic "Western values" represent the "default" only for people who have a chance to live full, dignified lives, while "afterlife values" represent an emergency adaptation. An increasing afterlife orientation would appear to signal that people are being pushed into a corner.

Every religion – Islam, Christianity, even Buddhism – lends itself to use as a refuge beyond Earth and death. This can happen in either benign or malign ways. Singhalese Buddhists, for example, promote a specific and, they say, purer and more authentic version of Buddhism. Long before recent suicide missions in the Middle East, Tamil leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran "designed" innumerable suicide operations. The afterlife can offer limitless promises, balanced by equally limitless atrocities on Earth.

Clearly, also altruism, care, and love can be promoted by an afterlife orientation. The problem is that the afterlife, by definition, is remote from direct verification. Do divine forces really appreciate suicide bombings and will they indeed extend the sought-after dignity after death and beyond Earth? The answer is always provided by mere human beings, prone to the biases and failings of human beings. Promises of a dignified afterlife are easily manipulated by earthly motives. Even though anchoring oneself in fundamentalism beyond Earth and earthly death may bring great serenity and solace, it may also turn life on Earth into something not worth living.

Those who feel victimized would benefit from some critical thinking about their afterworld orientations. Life on Earth may be destroyed unnecessarily for the sake of life beyond Earth. Is this really what we want?

Extremists and moderates

The defining characteristic of moderates is that they are capable of rising above the level of opposing sub-groups to perceive all players as fellow participants in *One single larger in-group*. David Kimche, former Deputy Director of Mossad, and Riad Malki, former spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, are two moderates who build bridges over the deep gulf between both parties. "At a time of political stalemate and continued violence, why have two former enemies decided to join forces and fight for peace with words? …Considering that 20 years ago the two were bitter enemies, how can they make peace now when their leaders can't, and do they see any chance for the Middle East roadmap?"[312]

Extremists are those most mired in humiliation, both as feelings and retaliating acts, and they deepen the rifts of hatred instead of healing humiliation. Armed conflicts are usually embedded within an angry atmosphere of "We have to stand united against the enemy, we have to protect ourselves, and if you do not agree with us, you are our enemy." This sentence would be interpreted by extremists to mean, "We have to eliminate the enemy." In contrast, a moderate would say, "We protect ourselves best by

working towards a larger we in a constructive manner to include among us those we today call enemies." These interpretations usually compete, with the more "hot" and emotional interpretation usually being more extremist and promising fast redemption for painful feelings. Moderation is much more difficult to "sell" and needs the support of a larger group of people to gain weight and credibility.

A shining example of a moderate is Nelson Mandela. He succeeded in transforming his feelings of humiliation after 27 years of prison into a constructive contribution to social and societal change. He distanced himself from his own urge for revenge. However, a Mandela is seldom available. Moderation may then be best provided by third parties who are not involved in the conflict and committed to safeguarding social cohesion in a respectful manner and without humiliating any participant. The involved opponents' feelings are often too hot to be moderate, at least during conflict peaks. Sometimes an overpowering force of moderates may be needed, especially when opponents were allowed to become extremist leaders of political movements.

Mature, moderate, responsible people are called upon to invite young, intelligent people to follow the example of a Nelson Mandela, and not to follow promoters of terror who have translated empathy with the suffering of the oppressed into an urge to retaliate with violence. Moderates of all camps and third parties carry the responsibility for curbing extremism, inviting their representatives back into the camp of moderation, of patient change, and long-term solutions.

Once a situation has been overrun by extremists and their polarizing language, moderates face almost insurmountable problems. Moderate Hutu were killed by extremist Hutus in the 1994 genocide. Extremist tyrants usually eliminate critics from their own camp first. Moderates in such a dilemma have only one option, to gather as many allies as possible from the global third party, the international community, to give weight to moderate positions, to help dampen extremist language and to forge alliances of moderates across all opposing camps.[313] The coming-into-being of the *global village* facilitates this process as it becomes increasingly apparent that it is in everybody's interest to extinguish extremist fires wherever they burn, before they engulf the whole *global village*.

For a third party such as the international community, promoting moderation means supporting and advocating leaders such as a Mandela. It means collecting and broadcasting moderate traditions and ancient wisdoms from the opponents' cultures. And finally, it means continuously emphasizing our children's future, a future that nobody wishes to be bloody and violent. These crucial elements give weight to moderation and have the potential to outweigh extremist voices.

The protection of my people is best secured by working for global social sustainability, not against any enemies. As Muriel Lester said: "War is as outmoded as cannibalism, chattel slavery, blood feuds, and dueling, an insult to God and humanity..." All third parties who wish for social peace in the *global village* are called upon to promote moderation and maturity in the face of the hot feelings that tempt people to lash out against "enemies" instead of working for the social cohesion of humankind as a whole.

We may conclude that the important fault lines in conflicts are not those that separate Israelis from Palestinians, Hutus from Tutsis, Singhalese from Tamils, or Americans from the rest of the world. There is only one important fault line – the division between

extremists and moderates in all camps. If extremists gain access to power, they will polarize and deepen whatever rifts they can feed on. Social peace, locally and globally, is only secured if moderates outweigh extremists. It is important for victims of oppression and humiliation who rise up to be aware of the dangers entailed in extremism. Extremist stances do not heal, they exacerbate the problem. It is essential for victims to avoid being drawn into extremist camps. This is what victims can do for a peaceful world.

Victims are not always humble. They may need to learn humility

Masters, when asked to step down, often portray themselves as victims of humiliation. However, in human rights contexts they have to learn humility instead of nurturing a victim identity. Although many Somalis perceive themselves as victims, for example, many among them still have to learn humility. Somalia has never been part of any major empire, probably because Somali nomads are known to be proud, stubborn, unruly and fickle. Their pastoral democracy built on equality, as described by Lewis (1961), did not produce a strong hierarchical ranking order that conquerors could easily instrumentalize and dominate.[314] In other words, Somalis are difficult to humiliate; they are too proud. They are proud, for example, of the fact that they did not bow to colonization in the same way others did in Africa (they kept their Islamic faith unlike neighboring Kenya, for example.)

   Yet, there is a dark side to this pride. Somalis may not always understand the humility that is necessary for effective cooperation. Local warlordism, for example, undermines attempts to create functioning "traffic rules" that protect all citizens. Somali warriors – who follow the proverb "a man deserves to be killed, not humiliated" – may have problems with these "traffic lights." They may interpret red lights as an attempt to humiliate them. They may vow to choose victory or death instead of bowing in humility. Every man may want to fight his way through at every single traffic light. The weakest ones are pushed to the wall and there is no peace and calm for anybody. This is a fair description of what happened in Somalia after the demise of Dictator Siad Barre. Other regions are, to a certain extent, similar, not least proud Afghanistan. Many mountainous or sparse regions, difficult to subjugate by former empires, preserve a degree of pristine pride that makes it difficult for them to integrate into a new world system where humility is important.

   Resisting humiliation is not everything, learning humility is equally important!

What masters can contribute to smooth transitions

Why was the French aristocracy – but not the English – humiliated and killed? Today's elites who do not want to be victimized may want to learn from the English experience.

   A French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), went to the United States (1831-1832), to study "democracy." After returning, he wrote his *La Démocratie en Amérique* (volume I in 1835 and volume II in 1840). He points out that in England the elites made sure that the poor enjoyed the privilege of exemption from taxation, while in France this was the privilege of the rich. Charles Kingsley (1819 – 1875), professor of

modern history at Cambridge, confirms that England was the forerunner of the very ideas that later felled the French elites.

> England was the mother of every movement which undermined, and at last destroyed, the Ancien Regime. From England went forth those political theories which, transmitted from America to France, became the principles of the French Revolution. From England went forth the philosophy of Locke, with all its immense results. It is noteworthy, that when Voltaire tries to persuade people, in a certain famous passage, that philosophers do not care to trouble the world – of the ten names to whom he does honor, seven names are English. "It is," he says, "neither Montaigne, nor Locke, nor Boyle, nor Spinoza, nor Hobbes, nor Lord Shaftesbury, nor Mr. Collins, nor Mr. Toland, nor Fludd, nor Baker, who have carried the torch of discord into their countries." It is worth notice that, not only are the majority of these names English, but they belong to the former half of the eighteenth century; and indeed, to the latter half of the seventeenth (Kingsley, 2003).

German history is often used as another example of peaceful change. Bismarck is credited with sparing Germany a bloody revolution by providing potential revolutionaries with the beginnings of a social welfare state.

Elites can contribute greatly to constructive social change without bloodletting, violence and aggression and they often do so. A mindset of humility is what elites may have to adopt to bring such change about. However, elites are often blind to the reality surrounding them. Masters routinely subscribe to the notion of a *just world* and are lulled by the veneration they often receive from their underlings. They believe their underlings "love" them and are like children to them. Self-satisfied elites may wait until simmering rage from discontented underlings overruns them (like the frogs that get cooked in the Mr. Frog story). When protest and violence erupt, masters are often shocked and surprised. Widespread astonishment at recent terrorist attacks illustrates the degree to which global elites were blind to the successful humiliation entrepreneurship through which some extremists were able to create and influence a considerable pool of followers.

When protest and violence erupt, elites may feel humiliated. A cycle of humiliation is thus set in motion. Both masters and victims would be well-advised –instead of cycling through humiliation – to look for ways to help underlings ascend towards equal dignity, combined with a constructive descent of masters towards precisely the same equal dignity, without anybody being humiliated in the process.

To summarize this chapter, we see that underlings who come to power may become the most fearsome perpetrators, perhaps even more cruel then long-standing masters. Masters may debase to suppress, former underlings may debase to exterminate. The fury accompanying feelings of humiliation contains an enormous force and energy which can be used in constructive or destructive ways. Underlings, those who feel victimized, and those who identify with them, have to take great care when unlocking feelings of humiliation, the potential "nuclear bomb of emotions."

Moderates like Mandela can curb the hot feelings of extremists and forge alliances of moderates above and across fault lines. Mandela managed to wake up the white ruling class in South Africa to the fact that they had to step down before it was too late. In South Africa it was the victim who was the driving force, not the master. Since the rage and

fury that feelings of humiliation are capable of engendering is felt by the victims and those who identify with them, it is the victims and those who help them who are perhaps most responsible for making the process of change a constructive one.

Related reading

Read on *problem solving*,[315] *moderation*,[316] on *Hawks, Doves, and Owls* (Colin Powell as exemplary "owl"),[317] on *religion* and *violence*,[318] or on *non-violence*.[319] See also, approximately 3,500 pages long, and published in six volumes, William T. Vollmann, 2003, and his grand opus *Rising Up and Rising Down*.[320]

What the United States of America Can Contribute

> I decided long ago
> Never to walk in anyone's shadows
> If I fail, If I succeed
> At least I lived as I believed
> No matter what they take from me
> They can't take away my dignity[321]

This chapter is written in recognition of a historic fact – the United States of America is the only superpower left the globe. Who are the citizens of this country? What can they do to maintain the *security of our loved ones* and the *future of our children*? Two stories might help us understand the mindset that is in many ways characteristic of America.

In 1981, I visited a little town in Minnesota, in the Middle of the United States, where many Norwegians have settled. I accompanied a Norwegian friend, Ragnar, who was visiting his Uncle Thor. Thor had immigrated to the United States about seventy years earlier. He was now 86 years old. Ragnar had never met him before. We arrived at the house and rang the door bell. A woman opened, clearly the wife of the old man. She greeted us very kindly and led us to the room where her husband was lying, very frail and near death in a hospital bed. Oxygen bottles, cables and tubes were everywhere around his bed. We carefully approached the bed, afraid to awaken or disturb the old man. Suddenly, there came a deep voice from the bed: "You didn't want me!" This was all. There was no more talk. "You didn't want me!" was all he said to us. No "hello" and no "good bye."

We left his room, almost in shock, needing his wife to explain what had happened. She told us Thor had left Norway with one of his elder brothers when he was sixteen. In Norway the eldest son inherits the farm. Younger sons get nothing. Before finding oil, Norway was a very poor country and those without a farm had few prospects. This made Thor feel very unwelcome and he was bitter all his life. His American wife, who had kept in touch with his family back in Norway, was the one who had invited us to visit him before he died. However, his bitterness lay too deep. There was no closure for him.

Many American clients came to me when I worked as a clinical psychologist and counselor in Egypt. I was stricken by the frequency of sad family biographies that in some way or another resembled Thor's. Those who had left their homes to immigrate to America were not always the happiest people. Many fled – they fled from intolerance, from suppression, from ill-treatment, from humiliation. The biggest legacy for many American citizens is the suffering of their forefathers. Like adopted children, who often grapple with the question of why their biological parents had rejected them, American identity seems to grapple with questions of why their forefathers were rejected by their motherlands.

In Egypt, I had an American colleague, a psychologist who worked with Egyptian students, including two young women around twenty years old from wealthy family backgrounds. These two had problems with their parents, who were very strict. My colleague advised these girls to move out of their parents' homes into their own

apartments. They had to "cut the umbilical cord" and "get on their own feet" he told them. If they were not willing to do that, they were "wasting" his and their own time.

I was astonished. In Egypt, a girl cannot just move out and live alone without dishonoring both herself and her family. She could move in with her grandmother or a sympathetic aunt or some other member of the large Egyptian family. In Egypt, alliances within families are often drawn upon to solve problems. The counselor could easily have encouraged his clients to make use of a traditional conflict resolution system that is available in almost all Egyptian families. However, he was adamant that the girls had to get their own apartments. He said, "These poor things here in Egypt have not had the chance to learn the American way of life. We have to teach them independence. They have to become strong individuals. We in America have paid a high price for freedom. These girls have to learn it, too!"

These two vignettes might begin to convey the suffering that lies accumulated in the collective historic memory of the people of the United States, along with a legacy of heroic prevailing. The United States is not just "another country;" it is a country with a specific history and a particular ethos.[322] It is important to understand the cognitive and emotional mindset of Americans and invite them as key players in the task of building a socially and economically sustainable *global village*.

Prevent misreadings! The United States and surgical strikes

The aftermath of September 11, including the 2003 war in Iraq and its repercussions, overshadow the lives of virtually everybody on the globe. The "fall-out" is global and local, public and private. It ranges from shaky oil prices and an anxious international business community to children fearfully asking about war. The world is divided about how to solve these crises, but there seems to be two basic strategies on the table. Let me label them somewhat starkly: first, there is the *decisive strikes strategy* (favored by America and her allies) and secondly, there is the *cautious containment strategy* (favored by much of the rest of the world). Interestingly, we find both strategies in both politics and medicine, with the two fields lending imagery and metaphors to one another. Health is the super-ordinate goal that connects both fields – one concerned with healthy people, the other with healthy societies.

Supreme courage

Lynn Payer (1988) wrote a book entitled *Medicine and Culture: Varieties of Treatment in the United States, England, West Germany, and France*.[323] The interesting point is that in the US the dose of medication prescribed is usually much higher than in Europe, often considerably higher. Surgical interventions also tend to be more aggressive in the United States. It seems that Americans expect themselves to be tougher, more courageous and decisive in fighting disease than the rest of the world's population.

I recently saw the film "The Lost Battalion," produced in 2001, depicting the extraordinary courage shown by an American battalion towards the end of World War I, in 1918. The film's message is that the courage displayed by this battalion was

unparalleled. This film hails American defiance in the face of almost impossible odds and highlights the ethos of extraordinary American solidarity bound together in courage. German evil and French weakness serve as the backdrop against which American heroism shines. The film illustrates the above-described cultural differences, not in the field of medicine, but in the field of war. Other cultures may value wisdom, or long-term planning; America prides itself on "ingenuity" and "sheer will." Let us listen to actor Sam Elliott narrating the story of an American railroad, the Union Pacific:

> A great land, destined to become a great nation, built on ingenuity and sheer will, strengthened by new ideas and new technologies, and powered by the 48,000 men and women of Union Pacific, providing the building blocks of our nation..."[324]

Americans touched base with their sense of extraordinary courage, sheer will, and heroism after September 11, 2001. Many Americans are deeply moved by the vision of standing together in defiance of evil adversity, as heroic as the legacy their forefathers left them. I paraphrase and summarize what I heard from my clients about this legacy:

> Our forefathers did not emigrate to the United States because they needed a casual summer outing. They escaped from places in which they were unwelcome, misunderstood or even humiliated. By extraordinary bravery and perseverance they built a better world, a world that has become the target of global envy; envy entailing both negative and positive connotations. Anti-Americanism is the negative fall-out of this envy, while imitating America is its positive aspect. Both reactions confirm American pre-eminence. Our forefathers were once humiliated and victimized, but they prevailed. When we are humiliated and victimized now, we will prevail again. We regard those around the world who are able to appreciate our achievements as our friends, those who can't are weak souls or enemies.

Strikes or preventive strengthening

Courage and heroism are wonderful human achievements, but they must be invested in action that is not counterproductive. This may be the problem that lies at the very core of the recent international rift over Iraq, a rift, as it may characterize future fall-outs, merits closer attention. Let me follow the medical line of thought. There are two basic strategies in the field of health. The classical school often places the emphasis on *fighting the enemy of cancer or microbes by surgical or pharmaceutical strikes*. Alternative schools of medicine highlight the more preventive approach of *strengthening the entire body system to make disease less likely to find fertile ground*.

Comparing these differences in approach to the 2002/3 Iraq crisis produces some interesting observations. Fighting the enemy with courageous strikes (including preemptive strikes) and standing together courageously against the enemy, this feels right to the American gut, it feels congruent with its national ethos. This resembles the classical medicine approach. Cautious containment combined with balancing and strengthening sustainable global interdependence is what feels "right" in "old" Europe

(and other regions). The latter approach equates with alternative and preventive health mindsets.

It is necessary to insert a small disclaimer here. Many Americans stand on the European side of the divide. When the term "America" is used in this text, it is meant to point at a certain tendency among some, not all Americans. The same holds for the use of the term "Europe."

The attribution error

It is remarkable to observe how the same problem cluster (Saddam Hussein, dictatorial regime, weapons, UN resolutions, elapsed time, and so forth) can lead to such stark differences and deeply divergent visceral reactions in Europe and in the United States. What was seen as a *war of necessity* in the United States was seen as *war of choice* in Europe. In the spirit of the attribution error, many Europeans deny Americans' altruistic feelings and ideals. Americans are assumed to have only arrogant and selfish economic (for example, oil) interests in Iraq. The same bias colors American interpretation of Europe's motives. The American belief is that France, Germany, and Russia have strong economic ties with Iraq and wish, out of arrogant and selfish economic interests, to close the door on the Iraqi chance to be liberated from an evil dictator. All sides are convinced they are altruistic – selfish egocentrism is to be found exclusively in the other camp.

Newt Gingrich, Republican and Former Speaker of the House of Representatives, explained in an interview[325] his amazement that some people preferred to do nothing about dictators such as Saddam Hussein, a threat to America and the world for the past decade or more. He described as himself as flabbergasted that some people, instead of uniting forces behind America and respecting America's sense of vulnerability and need for defensive action, would stall. Clearly, crowds get it wrong sometimes, he stated, indicating that the European public got it wrong. Those who appeased Hitler were wrong. America, with a track record of liberating and not conquering, is a trustworthy partner. It was doubly hurtful to encounter such a lack of understanding among allies. France, he suggested, tried hideously to grab the historic opportunity to build a position of counter-power to the United States.

The French may well have replied:

To accuse us of wanting to do nothing is grossly insulting! Of course, we agree that something should be done. We just don't approve of your methods. We believe they are counterproductive to our shared goals. You call Jacques Chirac a power player à la de Gaulle, but is it possible that we French have learned the lesson of human rights and equal dignity? We believe that, although you pledge to protect rights and dignity, you violate them with your actions. Why do you believe you have such a fine track record? Remember all the dictators around the world you have supported! In any case, your behavior should stand on its own feet – your record does not get better by pointing out that others behave worse!

America stands for *decisive strikes* and France for *cautious containment* and both suspect the other of selfish power goals. Indeed, the two strategies mean different things in

different contexts. Both strategies can be inscribed in a human rights set of mind or in a world seen as a brutal Hobbsian jungle. Even though virtually every player in the world currently speaks of protecting humanity and human rights, many suspect the *other* player of following a hidden Hobbsian agenda. *Decisive strikes* may be employed to save human rights in a policing fashion, they can also serve to gain and maintain superiority above law. Likewise, *cautious containment* can be used to safeguard human rights, but it can also be part of a cynical power game. There is a tendency, in the current world, to see *oneself* securely placed in the field of human rights, dignity and welfare, and judge *others* as indulging in evil power games. Being "misunderstood" by the other creates deep feelings of hurt, bitterness and humiliation.

Not all strikes strike well

The probability is that all players agree in principle that a good balance between *strikes against disease* and *strengthening the system to withstand disease* is needed to achieve lasting peace. The two strategies are mutually supportive, not mutually exclusive. When I studied medicine in the 1980s, debates were waging between proponents of the two approaches. We learned, however, that patients benefit most when both strategies are used, supporting one another. In the global arena, building a sustainable world based on human rights would be equivalent to the preventive *strengthening* approach. Dissuading, isolating and marginalizing extremists – such as terrorists – would correspond to *strikes*. The current disagreement seems to focus on how the two should be calibrated.

Let me use the case of gastric ulcer. Until recently it was unknown that a microbe, helicobacter pylori, contributes to the development of gastric ulcers. Many people still believe that gastritis and gastric ulcers have an entirely psychosomatic genesis, stress. Traditionally, apart from psychotherapy, all kinds of treatments were on offer. However, none really helped; some of these old-fashioned "strikes" may even have worsened the condition. Three treatment paths could be described: Path 1a) involved delivering old-fashioned "strikes" against gastritis, which may sometimes have worsened the symptoms. Path 1b) is the modern strategy of "striking" with a high dose of a suitable antibiotic mix, which we know today has good chances of healing the condition. In other words, there are two kinds of "strikes," those that are beneficial (1b) and those that may even be counterproductive (1a). Even though all strikes may be courageous, not all are productive. One must strike the right target with the right tool or bullet. When there is uncertainty about which strike is appropriate, it is wise to take the strengthening approach (2), while planning for (1b).

European hesitation confirms American suspicions that Europeans are not capable of being decisive and courageous and that Americans are the world's most visionary and strong-minded leaders. Americans are good surgeons so-to-speak, and Europeans are weaklings who cannot stand the sight of blood. From the European point of view, American strategies risk being counterproductive – the wrong strikes at the wrong time – exacerbating the disease instead of healing it. In short, Americans see their strategy as path (1b) while "old" Europeans categorize American strategy as representing path (1a).

How the bullet is administered

Once we decide upon the right bullet (or the appropriate strike) we must administer it in the appropriate way. Here we find a difference between medicine and politics. Bacteria cannot feel humiliated and take revenge, but people can and do. A bullet in the hands of a policeman is a very different form of "treatment" than the same bullet in the hands of a self-appointed bodyguard. Medical treatment administered by a patronizing bully of a doctor may be rejected by the patient, whereas it may do good if offered by a wise and dignifying healer.

Humiliating arrogance

From the European point of view (a view shared by the Arab world), Americans, particularly their hawks, appear arrogant rather than benevolent. American hawks and many average Americans are steeped in the identity of heroism, based on their background as offspring of *victims of the old world*, who courageously left and *built a better world*. France, in particular, is perceived as arrogant in the United States, deserving of being put down in response. Thomas Donnelly, from the *American Enterprise Institute* remarked that the quick American-British victory in Iraq effectively "humiliated" arrogant French President Jacques Chirac (April 11, 2003[326]).

Once again, the question arises – who is right. Are American hawks arrogant or benevolent? Should Europeans and Arabs work harder to see the benevolence of American motives and forget their allegations of arrogance? Should Americans try harder to explain themselves? Perhaps the only thing that can be agreed upon is that all sides have a problem with miscommunication. The attribution error runs rampant. Perhaps, in a first step, all sides could accept that their inner belief in their own high ideals is not automatically transmitted to the rest of the world. Even if such an inner conviction is self-evident from *inside*, it can be read as arrogance from *outside*, causing a problem. Such misreadings, when they happen, easily acquire the status of hard facts; people start believing in them. The more people believe in such interpretations, the more these interpretations fuel the very antagonism – including terrorism – that all want to avoid. Under these circumstances, any *bravery* and *courage* invested in either *strikes* or *containment* is counterproductive, wasted. Any strategy that might be beneficial will probably be rejected.

To conclude this section, misreadings have to be addressed, avoided and prevented, if we hope to "to make the peace worth the war" as British Prime Minister Blair phrased it. All parties need to do more explaining.

This chapter is entitled "What the United States of America can contribute." This section suggests that the United States could begin by reflecting on its cultural heritage and how September 11, 2001 evoked some of its strongest national feelings. American history taught harsh lessons, producing in Americans a tendency to link courage with decisive *strikes* and to regard strikes as necessary to defend high ideals such as freedom and human rights. However, such linkages are not necessarily benign. *Prevention* and *containment* may be just as courageous – and sometimes more appropriate.

We can probably all agree that the appropriate approach is to tailor strategies to situations, assuring that the suitable strategy is implemented for the intended goal. Sometimes, courage is better invested in prevention and containment, and sometimes in strikes. Sometimes strikes are necessary to defend ideals and sometimes prevention and containment will get the job done more easily and with less loss of life. Strikes, if decided upon, must be productive and not counterproductive. What is counterproductive for global peace, in any case, is automatically misreading one another's motives. Such misreadings may stir up feelings of humiliation on a global scale.

Children, madmen, criminals, enemies, or subhumans? Which interpretation fits terrorists best?

The Twin Towers of the World Trade Center collapsed in September 2001. They were hit by two planes piloted by a few men who shook the world. They sent America into mourning and outrage and war planes into Afghanistan and Iraq. They inspired new laws to eliminate terrorism. Nobody wants mad people flying into their neighborhoods and crashing into their homes. Here comes the big question: Are terrorists really *mad*? To answer this question we have to ask: What is madness? Is it about hormones that get out of control? Are terrorists psychiatric patients? Should they be locked up in psychiatric wards?

The honest answer to all those questions would seem to be "no." If we truly considered terrorists insane, we would not need new laws and criminal courts. Such institutions are not provided for mad people, but for *criminals*. A criminal breaks the law, supposedly out of contempt for law and order. For criminals we need prisons, not psychiatric hospitals. The world today wages war on terrorists. War is usually *war* waged on *enemies*. Yet, enemies usually are viewed as neither mad nor as criminals who disrespect law and order. Enemies are another whole category. *Enemies* clearheadedly oppose *us*. They oppose *us* together with *our* laws, and they mean it, cold-bloodedly! Their minds are not clouded, neither by hormonal nor by moral dysfunction. They want to force another moral on *us*. Enemies are arrogant opponents who will win the battle if we do not stand up and respond in kind by fighting back.

So, we have three explanations – the *mad* terrorist, the one of the *criminal* terrorist, and the *enemy* terrorist. Which is correct? Or useful? We have to be careful, because we cannot use all of them. A mad person cannot be a criminal or an enemy, because mad people are not in control of their own actions. A criminal is not mad, because criminals are in control of their actions – we put them in prison and not a hospital and hope for their moral restitution. Common discourse informs us that enemies are neither mad nor criminal, because they are very much in control and clearheadedly object to our laws. Enemies attempt to put themselves above our laws and substitute theirs for ours. Enemies try to put us down, our system, our beliefs, our entire being. We must stand up against them and respond in kind, with war, because otherwise they will eradicate us. These are usually our common-sense categories.

Madmen or misguided children

If we use the mad person framing, the men who flew the planes that destroyed the Twin Towers were poor disturbed souls. If we choose to perceive these men as mad, we can look upon them with pity and go about daily duties undisturbed. We may want to give some funding for research of psychiatric conditions and pay for the better protection of potential targets. In a graphic depiction of us and them, they would be pitiable individuals far below us. The category of mad people is linked to the category of children, those who are not yet mature, but may evolve with help. We glance down on these mad people or immature children with a mixture of mercy and horror, as we would when our children ruined a neighbor's car or injured a neighbor's family members, bringing expensive lawsuits on us.

   Misguided children can cause a lot of trouble before we begin to question our worldviews. Children are supposed to learn and learning is an inherently unstable process. We all know the pitfalls this fragile process entails and we remain calm when confronted with sad stories of misbehaving children. We know that every generation is shocked by the one that follows. There is something normal about "mad" children. Madness and "mad" children do not shake our world; these things will be with us until the end of time.

Criminals

Even if the suicide bombers were madmen or misguided children, our rage and degree of unsettledness would demand more. After all, these attackers were adults with a certain degree of education, able to understand their actions and motives. The fact that *we* responded with new laws indicate that *they* were, in fact, *criminals*. Yet, why do we wage *war*? Is it because destroying the Twin Towers is an attack on *our* essence, more than merely the breaking of laws?

        If we were to make a graphic showing *us* in comparison to criminals, we would draw the super-ordinate structures of state institutions as an umbrella of law covering *us* as well as *them*. Then we would place us as exemplary law-abiding individuals directly under this umbrella, and those we deem to be criminals beneath us to indicate they have not reached our level of moral integrity. This design puts us in a position to look down on them. *Conservatives* (or at least those who are called *conservative* in the United States of America) look down with moral disgust, while *liberals* (those who are called *liberal* in the United States of America) look down with compassion. Conservatives might say: "*We* draw a stark line separating us from those criminals beneath *us* because we believe that *they* are fundamentally different from *us*, they have an evil essence." Liberals might respond: "*We* draw a permeable line between *us* and *them*, since we perceive *them* as misguided children who could be lifted up to our level of integrity if therapeutic efforts were exerted."

        Liberals use the category of *children* who can learn. Conservatives insist criminals have forfeited such "excuses." In both cases *we* place ourselves at some kind of moral height and gaze *down* on what we call *criminals*. Lakoff explains that mainstream conservatism is grounded on a Strict Father model, whereas mainstream liberalism is

based on a Nurturant Parent model. Since each family model includes its own morality, political liberalism and conservatism express different views of morality and organize the culturally shared metaphors for morality in different ways, giving priority to certain metaphors and downplaying others (Lakoff, 1996, p. 312).

Enemies

Enemies try to put themselves *above our* norms and replace them with their own. They want to install themselves *above us*, and we have to fight to *put them down*. It is a struggle for survival, spiritual, existential, all-encompassing. It is either *them* or *us*. This mapping of the world is usually shared by liberals and conservatives. However, conservatives tend to feed *criminals* into the category of *enemies*. From the conservative perspective, criminals attack the very structure of law and order. Liberals, however, believe that *criminals* suffer from some deprivation, not a chemical aberration in the brain that causes "madness," but a social disadvantage that, if remedied, would transform criminals into at least supportable neighbors, perhaps even into good neighbors.
   We can conclude that there are only two real possibilities – the *child*, and the *enemy*. The category of the child is rooted in the view of the human being as inherently willing to work under a super-ordinate structure of law and order and live peacefully with one's neighbors. *Liberals* tend to see criminals as resembling misguided children who were inhibited by some kind of environmental shortcoming, shortcomings – and this is important – that are open to improvement. Liberals define social responsibility as the community's task to shape environments that do not damage individuals so they become criminals. *Conservatives*, on the other hand, tend to expand the category of the *enemy*. They see it as their responsibility to "clean" the social fabric from destructive "elements," to "flush them out." They feel that people who have reached a certain age are no longer children and ought to be accountable for their misdeeds.

Subhumans

We have too often chosen to view other humans as "offal," "pests," "cockroaches," or "aberrations." These were the labels given to the victims of genocides and the Holocaust, in Hitler's Germany, in Rwanda and other places. There seems to be a consensus in most parts of the world to refrain from dehumanization, from here on. We do not want to give much space to this topic here. Yet, we cannot totally omit it. If we are to avoid these strategies, however, we have to understand their inner workings.
   Offal must be *cleaned* away. Terms such as "ethnic cleansing" reveal this thinking. The *offal* label also indicates our wish to keep these people far *away*. *Mad* people and criminals as well have often been locked up away from our sight. In former times, when there was still empty space, criminals were even sent into exile – to Australia for example, creating a geographical distance that satisfied the psychological need. We also desire psychological space with *enemies* – we want them to stay away. To dehumanize and kill people as offal, however, is to introduce a very particular distance, a conceptual distance. The word *enemy* allows for respect – there are stories of enemies who admire

each other – but respect vanishes when dehumanization appears. The abysmal conceptual divide that is created by dehumanization is not something for which Western civilization is willing to make room. Opinions are divided on capital punishment for criminals precisely because we are not sure humans have the right to decide whether other humans deserve to live.

The child paradigm fits best

To me, the two paradigms – that of the enemy and that of the child – represent the old and the new visions. I define old visions as those that developed *before* the emergence of the imagery and reality of the *global village*. New visions accept a *global village* within which all citizens enjoy human rights and respect for their inalienable inner core of dignity. In *Realism and Idealism in International Relations Theory*, Marshall (1999) writes:

> The Realist assumption of man as a self-serving, power-maximizing, calculating actor operating in an anarchical environment of potentially violent aggression stands in stark contrast to Idealist visions of an altruistic, reasoning, and cooperative humankind striving diligently to progress beyond the confines of their own ignorance and parochialism (Marshall, 1999, p. 62).

This line of thinking leads us to link the *Realist* vision to the *enemy* paradigm and the *Idealist* conceptualization to the *child* paradigm. The *child* paradigm implies closeness and relation in most societies and cultural subgroups. The *child* paradigm is inherently relational, even if children are misguided and need improvement – our children are part of *us*. *Enemies,* on the other hand, are always distant. They are outside the social network and the cultural consensus that defines *us*. In other words, conservatives who champion the *enemy* paradigm believe they live in a world of *many villages* of *us*-versus-*them*, while liberals place themselves in a world of *One village* of *us*.

Us, or we against them? What kind of global village do we want? Who is right? Conservatives or liberals? Or, more precisely, which world do we want to create for the future? Why is it essential to rephrase these queries in such ways? Because the question "who is right?" indicates that there is some kind of neutral "truth" out there and we have to behave in accordance with it. But, we are not just *observers*, we are also *creators* who shape the truth by the way we interact with our environment.

Imagine you see your new love in the street warmly hugging somebody else. You walk towards them and stage a big scene of jealousy, disappointment and betrayal. Your love turns on you, disgusted and asks: "Why don't you ask who this person is? This is my dear cousin! It's obvious you don't trust me. We're through." This little example illustrates how you can destroy an acceptable situation by perceiving it as unacceptable. You, the perceiver, can strengthen or destroy a social fabric by your way of perceiving it. In the same way we can create a world of *enemies*, where there are *none*, just by expecting them to be there.

Rosenthal's expectation effect is the phenomenon in which a researcher's tacit hypothesis or expectations can influence the responses they get. Teachers' expectations

can improve the actual academic performance of students; where they expect success, they create and find it and where they expect failure, they also create and find it.

There is has been much research in this field, for example the illuminating work by Lee D. Ross at Stanford about the role of the *situation* and of *framing*. When you tell students that a task is difficult, they may experience those predicted difficulties. When you explain to them, however, that the same task usually is quite easily accomplished, they do it with ease. When you ask students to play a game in which they have the choice to cooperate or to cheat (*Prisoner's Dilemma* game) and you tell them that this is a *community game*, they will cooperate; they will cheat when you define the same game as a *Wall Street game*. Deutsch (1973) lays out what he calls *Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations*. This law says that "characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship." In short, "cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition" (Deutsch, 1973, p. 367).

In other words, your reality is shaped by what you believe – not completely, of course, but to a very large degree. We lock reality in with our expectations and framings.

Maria came to me as a client because she felt utterly worthless. She recounted:

I come from a family with a fundamentalist Christian orientation. When I was a small child, I tried everything to fit in. When I was five, six, and seven years old, I prayed more than an hour every day. When I was nine, I started to study the Bible intensely. Unfortunately, this was the beginning of the end. I developed "religious doubts." I asked questions such as, "Why do all those people in the world who by mere chance have not heard about Jesus have to go to hell? It's not their fault. This is unfair!" I did not want to be part of what I felt were degrading ways of dealing with God. In my social environment, God was somebody who can be bribed, who needs to be given attention so he doesn't get angry like a jealous lover. I wanted a more ennobled and meaningful religion, not just a cover for human stupidities and projections. In a way I was much more religious and more sincere than my family.

My family was shocked but they knew what to do. I had to pray more. God would send me answers, if He deemed me worth His attention. I prayed and prayed everyday, until I was about twelve years old, but my doubts only grew. I could not help it and I did not want to pretend. After all, religion is about sincerity. After many years of strife, at the age of about twelve or thirteen, still lacking answers that could bring me into my family's religious world, I had to conclude that God did not consider me worthy of His attention.

My family did not understand that I tried my very best, that I prayed for hours, that I was completely sincere and honest. They thought I was evil. They decided that I, out of some kind of malevolent deliberation, had decided to reject God – even though I felt rejected by Him! They could have helped me, supported me, and consoled me in my loneliness. Instead they deepened the rift. I learned that I was not part of God's world, and, since my family was part of God's world, I was excluded from my family. I learned that I was condemned by God, not worth His attention, an evil enemy of religion, exiled from my family. Everyday I tried to reject this death sentence, but it

continuously seeped into my soul, until today. My self-esteem is rock bottom. According to the "true" teachings of my family, there is no hope for me even after death. By calling me an *evil enemy*, my parents turned me into an *enemy*, while I yearned for nothing but to be a *part of my family*!

For years I did not talk to my family and when I did, I was aggressive. I was so disappointed with them. They created their *enemy*. They felt vindicated in their judgment. But *they* had done it to me and themselves! I only wanted to be united with them!

In answering our earlier question "who is right, the conservatives, or the liberals?" we might conclude that in a world in which humankind is *One family* or *One village*, liberals are more "right," and in a world of *many villages* conservatives are more "right." If we wish to bring about a world of *One village*, framing it in the liberal way is more useful, because expectancy helps create reality. The basic question then becomes "do we want to continue merging into *One single village*?" Conservatives who believe we should continue this path might adjust their thinking. More realistically, though, we may have no choice since the world is growing more independent every day, whether we welcome it or not.

Perhaps we should rephrase the question even further, to read: "what *kind* of *One village* do we want? A village with an abyss between *haves* and *have-nots*, or a village with a more equal distribution of opportunities?" We may expect liberals to opt for the latter version and conservatives perhaps for the first. A conservative would maybe paint the following picture: "Terrorists are enemies who question my values. *We*, the haves, rightly defend our freedom by waging war on *them*. *They* place themselves outside of law and order." Liberals may say, "It is possible *they*, the terrorists, do not really oppose our values in any way. Perhaps all they want is to join us in our privileges, to feel respected and dignified? That makes them neither enemies, nor criminals, mad people, nor children, but adolescents who want to be part of the adult world and use short-sighted violence to voice to their frustration." Marshall writes about *Realist's* and *Idealist's* images of human nature: "The Realists see no way out of the present mess except to keep the wolves at bay with sticks and fences; the Idealists see a light at the end of the tunnel but have no clear vision of how to get there from here" (Marshall, 1999, p. 62).

As reported earlier, Lee Ross and his colleagues carried out interesting experiments.[327] Contrary to the assumption that it is the "nature" of human beings to grab as many resources as possible, these experiments show that people are willing to share resources equally. However, those who have more tend to justify this inequality. Human beings want a fair world, however, fairness in the future is judged differently from fairness in the past. We define fairness as equal sharing as long as the sharing lies in the future; however, when we have accumulated more than others, we tend to believe we deserve it. *Loss aversion,* the tendency of people to dislike losses significantly more than the like gains, plays into these psychological preferences – we don't mind sharing equally in the future, but we do not like to lose what we have. These psychological phenomena strengthen conservative stances, leading people to evaluate those who want another distribution of resources as aggressors. These mechanisms even draw poor American citizens, who have not much more than an American passport and the *American Dream* to

lose, into the conservative camp. External attack strengthens a conservative mindset even further. The foreign pilots who flew into the twin towers managed to unite an overwhelming majority of American citizens in the conservative camp.

At this point, it is tempting to predict that the *global village* is destined to become a pyramid with the privileged few at the top and the poor, dreams shattered, at the bottom – *us* against *them* again. This perception of the world, though, would only help create a world of fear, insecurity and mistrust, a world, where the citizens of the *global village*, would be divided in new *separate villages*. The only immediate solution is for *us conservatives* to expand our love for America to include the *whole planet* and enlarge the pie of resources so that nobody has to fight for a share. If we were to achieve that, conservatism would begin to blend with liberalism; the current delineation between the two philosophies would no longer make sense.

Why do they hate us? The role of humiliation

"America exports its fear and meets the humiliation of the Arab world. The historic memory of America is perhaps too short, in the Arab world perhaps too long, particularly in Iraq," says Dominique Moisi, Deputy Director of the *Institut Francais des Relations Internationales*.[328] Moisi's words describe the world after September 11, 2001, when the United States felt an unprecedented vulnerability.

In 2000, Kenneth Waltz ridiculed the idea that the United States has substantial enemies. "Never in modern history has a country been as secure as we are now," he said. "We have to invent threats. We have to dramatize them just to justify spending on defense." Waltz claimed that the American media exaggerated the strength of China and other supposed adversaries. "Who's threatening us?" he asked. "North Korea? Iraq? They're not threatening us. The Chinese know they cannot invade Taiwan." He explained why the media perpetuate such ideas, "The American media report whatever American policy officials tell them" (March 28, 2000[329]).

I disagree with Waltz, proposing that the United States, and the rest of the West, have been much more threatened for a much longer period of time than we want to believe. Paradoxically, however, the West is also much less threatened than many of us believe. Let me explain.

Resentment of power that is too casually displayed

My international experience and research on humiliation has found widespread simmering rage. In 2000, in an article entitled *What Every Negotiator Ought To Know: Understanding Humiliation*, I wrote:

> Fortunately for the West, human rights-humiliation in the Third World has not yet found its Hitler. It would be disastrous if such a leader created a global following among the humiliated by arguing, for example, that the West's human rights' rhetoric was merely a hypocritical device to divert attention from the fact that the divide between rich and poor is greater than before. In view of the danger that a new Hitler

would present, the West is fortunate that the influence and prestige of Nelson Mandela are so great (Lindner, 2000v, p. 19).

There were clear signs of imminent threat prior to September 11, 2001. The 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, and the attack on a US battle ship in Yemen are but a few examples. The attacks of September 11 could be regarded as the tip of the iceberg, the result of years of covert rage, a response perhaps to *resentment of power too casually displayed*, not only this displayed by the United States, but by the entire West. The United States has ignored for years accusations that it engages in double standards and arrogance. The United States can be proud of its achievements and can rightly dismiss some criticism as envy. However, even feelings based on misunderstandings are valid and can lead to devastating consequences. Even if the bin Ladens of this world misunderstand America, their hatred is real.

At the very least, the United States has an *image problem.* This problem briefly diminished after September 11, when a wave of sympathy and compassion was extended to the United States. However, subsequent American attempts to make the world a safer place seem to have had counterproductive effects on the hearts and minds of the rest of the world. In the second part of 2003, the BBC polled 11,000 people in the UK, France, Russia, Indonesia, South Korea, Jordan, Australia, Canada, Israel, Brazil and the US about their views and opinions on America. The poll posed a range of questions, about general attitudes towards America and US President George Bush, and about America's foreign policy, military power, cultural influences and economic might. The results do not look encouraging for America. Even the most critical appraisals indicate that America and the "rest of the world" are deeply divided. Much of the "rest of the world" believes the opposite of what Americans hope and trust. The "rest" feels that American economic power makes their country poorer, that American economic policies should not be copied, that America is a greater threat than Iran, China, or Russia (only Al Qaeda is considered more dangerous than the United States.) The "rest" believes that American military might makes the world into a more dangerous place.[330] This image problem had been recognized before 9/11:

> The White House announced it would create a permanent Office of Global Communications to enhance America's image around the world. At the same time, the House of Representatives approved spending $225 million on cultural and information programs abroad, mostly targeting Muslim countries, to correct what Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill., called a 'cacophony of hate and misinformation' about the United States. (Hale, 2002, p. 2).

The images of the falling Twin Towers symbolize the hatred that exists for America in many parts of the world. However, they did not even begin to embody the mayhem we may expect in the future if we don't respond appropriately to this hatred. Millions could die. A few planes crashed into nuclear plants would have devastating impact. Vast landscapes could be turned into deserts. Every human being on the planet can be transformed into a weapon of mass destruction if he or she sets her mind to it.

Global admiration. America has already won the war

How can I then suggest that the danger is at the same time much less? Because there is also a great admiration for America and the West to be found around the world. There is a great yearning among the less privileged to become members of *One single family* of humankind. Many among the poor and marginalized ache to be invited into dignified lives. America and the entire West are seen as shining examples of the *good life*. A good life includes a job, a home, a television set, a refrigerator, perhaps a car, old age security, health insurance, and good education for the children, in sum, a dignified life. All this seems "normal" in the West, but it is far from normal for the majority of the world's population.

   Western tourists travel to exotic places to enjoy the kindness and services of the local poor. Most tourists do not reflect on the feelings these poor may develop when they see travelers dangling their cameras in front of their full stomachs. This is not superficial envy. It is not an egocentric materialistic urge to steal from the rich. This it is a deep yearning for a life of dignity, the reason the human rights message of equal dignity for all has won the hearts and minds of so many. This is why so many are so deeply disillusioned.

Fear of humiliation. The victory can be gambled away

Two human tendencies – *blindness* and *fear of further humiliation* – threaten efforts to bring the love story between the West and the "rest of the world" to a happy conclusion. Blindness is a typical – and very understandable – characteristic of master elites. Many of us in the West travel the world and meet the poor only as servants in our hotel or as venders of cultural artifacts. They smile at us. They treat us well. They do not tell us what they feel inside. If they were to tell us, it would sound as such, "How come that you can pay an air ticket and a hotel room in this hotel? For this money I could maintain my family for a whole year! How come that your children go to school and university, while my children toil? You bring us human rights, but at the same time protect your markets against our products! What do you expect us to feel towards you? Don't you see that your wealth forces us to smile because we depend on you? Don't you see how we humiliate ourselves by smiling at you as if everything is fine? Don't you see that we are not on equal footing and that our smiles cannot possibly be born out of 'free' choice?"

   From the American point of view it is noble to free other cultures from oppression, to champion civil and political human rights. Americans expect citizens around the world to be industrious and use their new-found freedom to create wealth. However, there are also cultural, social and economic human rights that stipulate that more has to be done. Experts like Philippe Legrain (2002) call upon the World Trade Association to work for all aspects of human rights, not just political ones. The term *enabling environment* means more than freedom from political oppression; it also means fair global rules. The lack of Western enthusiasm for fair global rules disappoints those who hear the human rights message. One of the buzzwords is *agrarian subsidies* in the US and in the EU: The amount of subsidy a cow in Europe and America receives per day – US $ 2.5 per head –

is more than twice the average daily income of a small farmer in the rest of the world, or more than the average earnings of half of the population of the world. Such obscene statistics makes the "ugly American" and "ugly" European look like the perpetrator of humiliating double standards. Blindness on the American and European sides exacerbates the problem.

Blindness can be cured. However, a second element recently added to the blend of emotions in America – fear of yet another humiliation – counteracts attempts to be more clear-sighted. The urgency of emergency, the need stand up to defend loved ones and country from *them*, draws attention away from the more basic task – the building of long-term trust among all citizens of the planet.

This situation is aggravated when leaders are anchored in the old honor code. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) examine an honor-based notion of humiliation as it is lived in the South of the United States (see their book *Culture Of Honor: The Psychology Of Violence In The South*). They tell us that George W. Bush is widely respected in his home state of Texas because he is seen as having "character," as understood in the southern concept of honor. In frontier times this concept was appropriate, even laudable. However, in a *global village*, it may not always work to everyone's benefit. What is "character" in Texan eyes may be misunderstood as arrogance in other regions of the world. Talent for strong leadership is a wonderful gift. However, leaders can err.

Sir Andrew Green, Former British Ambassador to Syria, explained that Syria currently is the target for humiliation by America, even though "Syria is not in the business of being humiliated by America." [331] From the American point of view, speaking to Syria about weapons of mass destruction and criticizing Syria for supporting terrorism and failing to cooperate with the United States is just "candid" language intended to humble, not humiliate. However, humbling does not always generate humility. When perceived as humiliation, it may elicit defiance. Humiliating Syria may further inflame feelings of humiliation in the Arab world and create the very threat it aims to protect against. "An overconfident America could push too far, with potentially catastrophic consequences," said another commentator.

Walter Isaacson, author of *Benjamin Franklin: An American Life* (Isaacson, 2003a), explained in an interview: "Well, you know, Franklin once did his list of virtues – the virtues that a good tradesman, a diplomat was supposed to have. He was so proud of them, he showed them around to a friend. And the friend was a Quaker, and said 'You missed one.' And he said, 'What's that?' ... 'Humility. You're a little bit too proud. You need to put humility on your list.' And Franklin said, 'I was never perfect at acquiring the virtue of humility, but I was good at acquiring the pretense of it. I could fake it very well.' And that's what it really took, because if you acquire the pretense of humility, it's almost like having real humility because you scale yourself back. I think that he felt very strongly in foreign policy in this world, that you needed to at least show some humility, especially when you were strong. And I know that President Bush said that over and over again during his campaign. I think now that, after the war in Iraq, and the problems we've had with France, what Franklin would do now is show a little bit more humility and help repair the breach" (Isaacson, 2003).

One global us! American security hinges on global security

Perhaps the most significant lesson of September 11 is the lesson of interdependence. In an interdependent world, freedom and security for every single nation, including the United States, hinge on global security and freedom. *Under circumstances of interdependence, self-interest equals common interest.*
The Commission on Human Security was established in 2001 and is co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. It aims at developing the concept of human security and proposing a concrete program of action for the international community. The *Concept of Human Security* is explained as follows:[332]

> In parallel with rapid globalization, trans-national issues such as infectious diseases and environmental problems have spread all over the world and frequent regional conflicts and economic factors have given rise to a serious issue of involuntary movement of people such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

> It is therefore necessary, in addition to the concept of traditional national security, to strengthen a framework in order to protect and empower individuals and their communities and to protect the potential of each individual, focusing on viewpoints of individuals, to overcome serious and wide-ranged direct threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity.

Humiliation is counterproductive in an interdependent world in which everybody lives in a glass house. Dividing the world into enemies and friends becomes a deadly luxury. It is necessary to turn everyone into a *good – or at least supportable – neighbor*. Rifts have to be mitigated, never deepened. People who feel humiliated are under stress, which can be a stimulating force as long as it does not surpass a certain level. An overdose of stress, however, is damaging for the individual and for the social environment in which the individual lives. Stress leads to what is often called *tunnel vision* and diminishes the ability to act as a good advocate of one's own and others' interests. Any good police person, judge or physician hands over the task at hand to colleagues when he or she becomes emotionally too involved and "over motivated." A good surgeon prefers not to operate on his own child.
   The United States has been deeply shocked by September 11, 2001. Fear of future mayhem and humiliation knocks at the door. There is no escape from the trauma. In many parts of the world people are used to this situation, but the United States was long "protected" by two oceans. For people in the United States global threat is new and extremely stressful. It would be wise to take a deep breath, to take time out, to meditate, to cool down. Others, colleagues and supporters, can step in and help "operate on the child." Nobody who is "over-motivated" likes to wait in the background while others do the job, but it may be the best thing to do. Perhaps it is time to turn to the international community, represented by the United Nations, to relieve the United States of too emotive tasks.
   From the American point of view, inspections did not work in Iraq, sanctions had not worked for more than a decade; the international community failed to live up to its tasks. The United States had to step in and rescue the weak United Nations from itself. But,

maybe the task is to strengthen our international police force, rather than override it for its failures?

Humanity has succeeded in pacifying increasingly large areas. Cities once needed protective walls. Travelers had to be prepared for marauding bandits. Then, the walls were moved back to protect entire nations. NATO, like equivalent organizations around the world, has pushed the "city walls" back even further. When will we be ready to include the entire globe under the protection of *a single police force*? When will we feel safe in strengthening the existing multilateral institutions so that they can *arrest tyrants* for *crimes against humanity?*

When police forces are overwhelmed, there are two choices. Either each citizen takes up arms, in self-defense, or each citizen helps strengthen the police force. The first seems to be a historic step backwards, the latter a historic leap forward, both locally and globally. When police forces are undermanned and incapable of doing their jobs, the individual citizen does not say, "The police are failing." Instead, this citizen says, "We have failed to give the police sufficient resources." The United States might choose to say: "We have failed to give the UN the necessary support and resources." Whenever the United Nations fail, their members fail them, nobody can avoid this responsibility, including the United States.

United Nations resolutions are not "self-executing;" the political will of members is required to implement them, said Shashi Tharoor, UN Undersecretary of State, on April 15, 2003.[333] The current United Nations institutions certainly fall short of perfection. Churchill is quoted to have said "Democracy is the worst system devised by the wit of man, except for all the others." The same may well apply to current United Nations institutions that could be seen as forerunners for democratic institutions for the *global village*.

The United States, having experienced rejection and criticism from around the world, may not wish to accept jointly determined super-ordinate institutions. Norway did not want to join the European *Union* because Norwegians had experienced that *union* meant *domination*. The Norwegian *union* with Sweden, dissolved in 1905, was perceived as national humiliation. However, Norway may one day become a member of the European Union, and it is already a fervent member of the *global village*.

Action is necessary if we are going to achieve a stable and sustainable world order. Prevention, containment, investment in sustainability – all these activities are forms of action. Action is not limited to post-hoc damage control. Trust has to be built, global trust, and this requires the most arduous action of all. The world needs for the United States to invest its great abilities for courageous action into a special kind of internationalism of mutual trust and equal dignity. Charles Kupchan (2002) wrote a book entitled *The End of the American Era.* He predicts[334] that the United States will one day become tired of hearing "Yankee go home" and will retreat into isolationism. He suggests that the United States is well advised to give others more political space, move aside a bit, and let the world grow at its own pace for a while.

I suggest that it is time the United States adopt a new form of internationalism, internationalism married to multilateralism, rather than internationalism combined with unilateralism. *Global* security – not just American security – must be maintained. Indeed, *American security hinges on global security*. There is no exclusive American security without inclusive global security. The United States is invited to abandon *American war*

on terror, and join a *global policing endeavor against those who perpetrate terror acts,* working *for* a sustainable future for the *entire planet*.

Apologies from the world! What the world can do for America

Anti-American language and shouts of "Yankee go home" are humiliating to citizens of the United States. Such language throws all American citizens into one category – that of the "ugly American" – and does very little to facilitate open, honest communication. Even the most open and concerned US citizen is bound to feel a little frightened and defensive when he or she is subjected to a barrage of hostility that he or she may understand intellectually but can not completely comprehend at an emotional level.

Reconciliation between America and the rest of the world is crucial if the *global village* is to enjoy peace and prosperity for all its citizens. The United States has the power to facilitate or retard the development of our global society as a culture that nurtures the rights and potentials of all its citizens. We need the people and the government of the United States to work with the rest, not against it, as we go about the business of building a sustainable *global village*.

I have spoken with many Americans and have observed that their response to verbal attack is very much like that of other people – they retreat or look for a way to fight back. I've watched some of my most globally-minded American friends become overwhelmed by the enormity of the hostility their country faces today. I've seen them withdraw from social groups in which they represent the hated minority. I've heard them begin to recite old, defensive stories about the atrocities their ancestors faced, the fact that they had to flee the old world because there was no place for them there, the fact that they fought hard to build a new world, that they deserve to be treated with admiration, respect and gratitude, rather than resentment, suspicion and hostility. Fellow Americans know these stories, however, for the rest of the world, Americans dwelling on their victim identity sounds very strange. But, the fact that these American victim stories sound disconnected to the outside world does not mean that they have no importance. "Why are we hated?" is a lament that has been part of the American psyche since the very beginning.

I believe that the world owes it to itself, to the United States, and to our shared future, to find a way to help America and Americans release their fear and bitterness and join the rest as whole-hearted, full partners. In my search for a way to achieve this seemingly impossible aim, I engaged an American friend in a dialogue about how her countrymen feel about the hostility they've encountered since 911. Like many Americans, this friend understands that the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq were ugly and unproductive in the eyes of many. Like many of her countrymen, she is looking for a better way. And, like many of her countrymen, she feels hurt and bewildered by the sheer intensity of the hostility currently directed at her homeland by the other nations of the world.

The following paragraphs are adapted from our ongoing conversation:

Evelin: How do you feel, Kathleen, about talking about America's place in the world with a person who is not an American?

Kathleen: I feel frightened and cautious. I'm very wary, worried that you want to trick me and attack me when my guard is down. I can't believe that anyone really cares what Americans feel and think. They care about what our President does. They care about what our major industries do. But, they are too busy telling us how wrong we are to listen to our people. Since the invasion of Iraq, it's become popular to assume all Americans are evil.

Evelin: How do you feel about the invasion of Iraq?

Kathleen: I cannot speak for everyone in the United States. This is a very diverse country, Evelin. There are people who are belligerent and aggressive and others – like my own mother – who watched the invasion on television with tears in their eyes. I feel we made a grave mistake and I know many, many other people who agree with me.

Evelin: A mistake? Do you believe there is something else the United States should have done in Iraq?

Kathleen: I don't know. I can't believe that Iraq was ever much of a threat. It's a very poor country, struggling to survive. I know you say we should have depended more upon the UN, but…the UN has never really proved itself.

Evelin: The UN could be strengthened.

Kathleen: Americans don't really trust the UN. We don't trust anybody very much. If you think about it, the world hasn't given us much reason to trust. The American experience of the world has not been very pleasant. During the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, you used our continent as a dumping ground, a place to send your undesirables. During the twentieth century, you dragged us into two horrific world wars. The UN is a nice place to talk theory, but it's all talk. Americans have not seen any evidence that the rest of the world really wants peace. To the contrary, we've seen quite a bit of evidence that war and hatred is a way of life in most parts of the world.

Evelin: Evidence? What kind of evidence?

Kathleen: Almost everybody who lives in the US does so because there was no place else in the world that would take them in. We are a country of exiles – people whose ancestors were not wanted anywhere else. My own great-grandparents came here because they were starving in Ireland. They were being systematically starved to death by their British masters.

Evelin: But, that was a long time ago, Kathleen.

Kathleen: People in Bosnia fight over things that happened a thousand years ago. My family history in America goes back only one hundred years. Why should Americans have shorter memories than everyone else? Are you suggesting that we should be more forgiving, more rational, more generous, more perfect than other people? The world has

given America nothing but its cast-offs, its wars, its problems. But, the world seems to expect the United States to be able to adjust immediately to its problems.

Evelin: Kathleen, Americans have taken plenty from the world. Haven't you heard the statistics about how much of the world's resources are consumed by Americans?

Kathleen: Yes, I've heard them. Americans make up something like ten percent of the world's population and use 80 percent of its resources.

Evelin: Doesn't that bother you, Kathleen? Can't you see that there are many people who resent this statistic?

Kathleen: Of course, it bothers me. I would like very much for everyone in the world to have everything they need. I can't understand why they don't spend more time getting what they need and less time finding fault with the US. I work hard, Evelin. I work at least 12 hours a day. Does everyone in the world do that? I don't see how they could – or they wouldn't have so much free time to think about how much they hate Americans. I don't understand why people don't use their talents and brains and work to get what they want. It's a little hard for me to understand how the people of the world can feel justified doing the terrible things they have done to my countrymen and then expect them to turn around and send money, food, whatever else is needed to make things right.

Evelin: Don't you feel your country could do more to help the poor of the world?

Kathleen: Yes, I think we could do much more. I recently read a book that showed that most Americans say they are more than willing to share what they have with the poor countries of the world. Most Americans, in fact, believe that their country is giving huge amounts away in foreign aid. The author of this book, however, says that we are being told a lie – the US government gives almost nothing to fight poverty in foreign countries.

Evelin: How does that make you feel?

Kathleen: I don't know how everybody feels, but I feel betrayed. I thought I could trust my government to do what it said it was doing.

Evelin: So, you feel betrayed by the world and now you feel betrayed by your own country?

Kathleen: That sounds a little melodramatic, but I suppose it's an accurate description of how I feel. All Americans know that their forefathers were not wanted, not considered good enough, by the rest of the world. Sit in any social group in America and sooner or later, someone will tell a story about what happened to his grandfather before he came to the United States. We have Armenians and Jews who are alive because their grandfathers just barely escaped extermination. We have Russians who fled the Tsars. We have Italians and Germans and Greeks whose ancestors were starving in Europe. We have people from all over the world who were not wanted because their religion is wrong…or

they supported the loser in a national contest for power…or their home was located in a war zone. I'm not talking about a minority of our population, Evelin. I'm talking about almost EVERYBODY.

Evelin: You are right. I can see why you feel frightened and insecure. Would you like the world to apologize?

Kathleen: That's ridiculous. How can the world be expected to apologize to a nation that calls itself the world's only superpower?

Evelin: Just answer this – would it make you feel better to know that the world understood the pain that drove your ancestors to North America?

Kathleen: They'll never understand – because they don't WANT to understand. They're having too much fun telling us how evil we are. Who could they hate if they apologized?

Evelin: Would you even be willing to listen to an apology?

Kathleen: I suppose it would be the polite thing to do. But, I really don't want to listen. It seems like a waste of time.

Evelin: Do you know your language sounds very arrogant and angry?

Kathleen: I don't mean to sound angry. I am very bewildered and very afraid. I don't know many evil people in my country, but the world is telling me that everyone I love is evil. Why can't the world understand that everything in our history taught us that we have to take care of ourselves? Nothing has happened to change that.

Evelin: I will ask you again, would you be willing to listen to our apology?

Kathleen: Go ahead…it'll be good for a laugh if nothing else.

Evelin: Kathleen, I thought we agreed that we would work together to try to heal the rift between us. I am willing to do my part. Your part is to open your heart and your ears and listen. Will you try?

Kathleen: I will try. But, I can't promise anything. There's been too many insults… did I ever tell you about the little old lady – a friend of my mother's – who was physically ejected from a restaurant in France, simply for the crime of being an American? This woman is OLD, Evelin, and helpless. She has done nothing wrong and she was very hurt. She has never hurt anyone in her life.

Evelin: What you are doing now is "competing for pain." It happens all the time when people are in conflict – neither party can hear the other because it is trying so hard to make sure the other knows how much it has suffered.

Kathleen: Competing for pain? The US will never win that competition. No matter what happened to our ancestors, most of us have it pretty good today.

Evelin: Yes, you have it pretty good. But, you still feel isolated, alone and unwelcome in the world. I am going to try to help you overcome those feelings.

Kathleen: Give it a whirl. It can't hurt.

Evelin: We, the non-Americans of the world, apologize to you Americans for the hardship and rejection your forefathers suffered. We see that you are still afraid of us today…

Kathleen: Yes, we are. Because we never know when you'll turn against us…no matter what we do, it's never right.

Evelin: Kathleen, I thought you promised to listen.

Kathleen: I'm sorry. Go on.

Evelin: You huddle in your country because the rest of the world seems so alien and hostile. You feel that you must either retreat or dominate. Looking at us as equals seems scary. We would like to apologize for every little incident that contributed to your painful isolation. And, we would like to invite you to become part of us.

Kathleen: Are you serious? After all those years of "Yankee Go Home," you're seriously inviting us to hang around?

Evelin: That's the point, Kathleen. Now, listen. We see how you reject what the world agrees upon. We see how your administration refuses to sign important moratoriums and protocols to protect the globe. It is as if you discount ideas that are not yours because you distrust them.

Kathleen: I KNEW it. Pretty soon, you're going to start in with a whole litany of things we have done wrong. This is just the beginning.

Evelin: No, I'm trying to tell you how we struggle to understand and explain your reluctance to trust. As difficult as it is, we do want to understand why your President rebuffed the Kyoto Protocol that would at least begin to help protect the world from the effects of global warming.

Kathleen: I'm glad you understand. Many Americans don't. Many of us feel very ashamed and defensive about that.

Evelin: We thank you for bailing out Europe during and after the first and second world wars. We are sorry that we so often behave like ungrateful children. When you act, we

accuse you of acting and when you do not act, we accuse you of non-action. You can never do it right. We apologize for our inconsistency.

Kathleen: You can say that again. We're damned if we do and double damned if we don't.

Evelin: Are we making any progress here?

Kathleen: Yes, I'm listening. Part of me feels very good – warm, glad. The other part, though, wants to cling to all the old hurt. As a nation, I guess you could say we're addicted to our pain. It feels familiar.

Evelin: If we're getting somewhere, I'll continue. Are you still listening?

Kathleen: Yes. You know I am.

Evelin: We apologize for our envy. It's not easy to acknowledge our powerlessness in comparison with your strength. We applaud your wish to bring a better life to the rest of the world. You have a big heart. You like to act, while the rest of us are prone to sit around wringing our hands. We admire you for this trait, too. There are huge problems to be solved – global terrorism, poverty and an endangered biosphere. We need you in our midst and in action, engaged as much in long-term strengthening and prevention as in the short-term strikes you seem to prefer.

Kathleen: It would be nice to know we had someone to turn to in times of trouble. It would be good to know that your feelings for us are friendly. But, what do we have to give up? Do we have to become just like you? Do we have to start taking orders from you or join you in worrying every problem to death instead of getting it fixed?

Evelin: No. I'm saying we admire your courage and optimism, but wish you'd tone it down a little, listen a little to what other countries have to say.

Kathleen: We'll listen – but that doesn't mean we have to agree, does it?

Evelin: No, nobody agrees all the time. But it would be nice if you'd stop leaping into action when the rest of the world is begging you to be patient.

Kathleen: That would be nice, wouldn't it? It would be even nicer if we could feel that it is safe to be patient.

Evelin: We understand that right now you are finding it hard to find safety in patience. We know that until recently you were protected by two big oceans. But please, let September 11 teach you the lesson of global interdependence, a lesson that makes helping others humbly without humiliation more important than ever before. Let us together evoke the spirit of the Marshall Plan and the Mandela path. We promise to try to do the same with our national identities. Please learn to love planet Earth as much as you love

America. Please accept our apologies and let them sink deep into your souls. Perhaps then you will be able to adopt the entire planet as your homeland.

Kathleen: What you say sounds lovely. A beautiful ideal – the whole planet as our homeland. Wouldn't it be wonderful to live in such a world? Where do we start? Let's not waste a minute – there are many messes to fix.

Evelin: Slow down, America. You can start by letting us help you in you most bitter hour, the aftermath of September 11. You can let us see that you are afraid, vulnerable and enraged. You can know that we understand how debased and humiliated your country feels. People in trauma need recovery. They need support and care. Let us give you that care. People under stress are not always the best representatives of their own interests. Let us help you. Put down your arms and join the *global village*.

Kathleen: Thank you, Evelin. I appreciate your sincerity and intelligence. You have taken the first step and I acknowledge you for it.

The in-depth regeneration of relationships that the world needs now probably cannot be achieved with a single apology. It can be achieved, however, if we are all willing to take very small steps toward reconciliation. We can't expect the softening to be automatic. It has taken a long time for the estrangement between the United States and the rest of the world to reach the point at which it is today and we cannot expect it to disappear overnight. But, every time an individual feels heard and acknowledged the process of healing moves to a new level.

    As the process progresses, we may begin to find pleasure in replacing the shopworn, destructive "I know we did this, but you did something even worse" with new, constructive conversations. We may be shocked to discover that our former debates have begun to resemble Martin Buber's "I-Thou" conversations.

    There may come a day when we – all the citizens of the world – will feel safe promising to refrain from minimizing one another's suffering, from playing and re-playing the hurts we might once have sustained at the other's hand, to understand that we are all victims and perpetrators because we all suffer from the human condition.

Related reading

Read more on *America and its legacy*,[335] the *Rosenthal's expectation effect*,[336] on the role of the *situation* and *framing*,[337] on *loss aversion*,[338] on *preventing deadly conflict, avoiding war* and *the cost of conflict*,[339] *human rights* and *conflict prevention*,[340] on *conflict transformation*,[341] on *global human security*,[342] on *negative* versus *positive peace*,[343] on *American vulnerability*,[344] on the *Internationalization of Human Rights*,[345] the *Commission on Human Security*,[346] on *illiberal democracy*,[347] on what the *World Trade Organization* can do for *globalization*,[348] on the *United Nations* and *the United States*,[349] and on the *Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*.[350]

What the United Nations Can Contribute

Staub (1989) argued that the significant element in the atrocities perpetrated by Hitler's Germany was that bystanders stood idly *by* instead of standing *up* and getting *involved*. What can the *international community* contribute to the resolution of today's crises? What can *bystanders* bring to the world peace? The answer to that question may be that the international community can stand *up* and forge a relevant *global civil society* and help build *sound global institutions* that pacify the globe. Since the United Nations is the only body for global institutions, it seems sensible to reform and strengthen it. The United Nations may be embryonic, but we do not cut down a tree because it is still too small to provide shade.

Calm down, no stress! How bystanders can stand up

Christianson (1984) explained that when people feel threatened, they experience a *significant narrowing of consciousness*, focusing only on the central perceptual details. When people are traumatized, this narrowing of consciousness sometimes evolves into amnesia for parts or all of the experience. Students of trauma repeatedly note that during conditions of high arousal "explicit memory" may fail. The individual is left in a state of "speechless terror," lacking words to describe what has happened (van der Kolk and Kadish, 1987, p. 6). Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) researched the processes of willpower that enable people to execute their intentions. They described two closely interacting systems – one *hot, the other cool,* as follows:

> The cool system is a "know" system: it is cognitive, complex, contemplative, slow, rational, strategic, integrated, coherent, and emotionally neutral. It is the basis of self-regulation and self-control. In contrast, the hot one is a "go" system: emotional, simple, reflexive, fast. The hot system develops early in life and is dominant in the first few years. It is accentuated by stress, whether in the immediate situation or from chronic stress. It is tuned biologically to be responsive to innate releasing stimuli, both negative and positive, that elicit automatic, aversive, fear-and-flight reactions, or appetitive and sexual approach reactions. Impulsive and reflexive, the hot system is the basis of emotionality, fears as well as passions; it undermines rational attempts at self-control (Mischel and De Smet, 2000, p. 261).

Peter Coleman describes how our *hot short-term coping system* may be detrimental to our long-term self-interest:

> Many of the coping mechanisms that act to protect and insulate individuals and communities from the psychological damage and stress of protracted trauma (such as denial, suppression, projection, justification, etc.) impair their capacity to process information and function effectively (Lazarus, 1985). Thus, the ability to make sound, rational decisions regarding a conflict (such as cost/benefit assessments and a

thorough consideration of alternatives and consequences) is adversely affected by the need to cope with the perceived threats associated with the conflict (through a denial of costs, glorification of violent strategies, and dehumanization of the other) (Coleman, 2003, p. 17).

All this means that people exposed to traumatic stress are not at their best in terms of balanced thinking and rational protection of their own interest. They are beset with a narrowing of consciousness, speechless terror and failing memory. Stress, fatigue, and strain can undermine an individual's self-control, increasing the likelihood that she will lash out in counterproductive ways. However, all these factors can be counterbalanced with sufficient personal *maturity*. Mature individuals recognize their limitations under stress and engage in and train for *cooling*.

Parents know that their children may appear to be quite calm and grown-up at times. However, under pressure they may suddenly regress and act very "immature." Competent parents know how to assist their children without belittling them, using *cooling* strategies to restore a more adult posture. Mischel and De Smet (2000) write on *cooling*:

Between six and eighteen months of age, infants begin to learn to regulate their emotions. Six-month-olds approached by a stranger tend to cope with their fear and anxiety by averting their eyes and "fussing." Twelve- and eighteen-month-olds, on the other hand, use other strategies, such as self-distraction and self-soothing, to deal with an anxiety-producing stranger. These more sophisticated cooling strategies allow children to effectively cope with their hot fear and anxiety reactions. Because conflict elicits similar fight-or-flight emotional responses, self-distraction, self-calming, and other cooling strategies are equally important skills for adults (Mischel and De Smet, 2000, p. 268).

I spoke with American Muslims during the summer of 2003. Here is a summary of what I heard:

American feelings after 9/11 run hot. In some people this malignly combines with their training in "assertiveness" and a lawyer's style of debate. Lawyers learn to win debates; they become indignation entrepreneurs, scoring points at the other party's expense. Many Americans seem to have become indignation entrepreneurs since 9/11.

When combative conversational styles are used in the absence of arbiters, the effects can be devastating, rendering the social atmosphere aggressive and unsafe. Common ground is not sought; indignation is the goal. If confrontational kinds of discourse are acted out in the presence of judges and arbiters, or as rituals, they may be harmless, even fascinating. Some television programs – the BBCWorld's Hard Talk, for example – are built around confrontational discourse styles. But, in these situations, the adversarial atmosphere is not meant to crush the opponent. The set-up resembles a game. In contrast, the rifts caused by unabated indignation entrepreneurship are deep, both within American society and within the *global village*. Indignation entrepreneurs can abuse and taunt *out-group* members to score points. Victims of such abuse feel insulted and humiliated, making the emergence of a functioning global in-group that much more difficult. Thus, current American

nervousness, combined with lawyer-type "assertiveness," can make the world less safe, both nationally and internationally.

Third parties - parents, therapists, or the wider community, including the international community and the United Nations – can support the cooling down process. The first task for third parties is to extend empathy, compassion and understanding to all members of all affected sub-groups. Mischel and De Smet (2000) propose as *cooling* strategies taking time-out, better self-regulatory strategies, improved stress management, reframing goals, and third party intervention. I view current world politics as *hot* reactions that would very much benefit from *cooling down*. The participants may be too involved to do that, therefore third parties have the responsibility to speak up. Third parties include all who have *matured* as did Nelson Mandela, who have renounced extremism and embraced moderation.

Robin is a police man. He came to a colleague of mine because his wife had been raped, an act of vengeance against him. He was so enraged that he literally was "out of his mind." He shouted and screamed:

> They won't let me work this case! They say I am not calm enough! They say I can't handle it! It was my wife who was assaulted! My wife!!! Can you imagine? And they take the case away from me? What shall I do – just sit around and wait for this guy to show up again? How shall I protect my wife? My colleagues are good guys, top-notch! But how can I trust them to protect my wife? Can you imagine how humiliating it is not to be able to protect one's own wife against rape?

Robin is not "on the case," because he can not be trusted to be in control of himself. He is so "hot" that he is ready to find any culprit and "beat the shit out of him." He has no inner distance. Inner distancing from the debilitating turmoil of trauma and the resulting urge for revenge, however, is necessary for effective reflection and action. Inner distance is either an effect of great personal strength and immense maturity, or the result of *self-cooling* training, or of third-party *cooling* strategies. Robin was helped by short-term counseling, which brought him back to "normal." This cannot be as easily achieved, however, for those who live in regions of protracted conflict and who are caught in continuous cycles of violence, unremitting stress and chronic trauma. They have hardly any chance to live emotional and mental lives that others would call "normal." People under conditions of continuous trauma need comprehensive on-going support. Providing "emergency help" when emergency is the norm and preparing people for a normality that does not exist is – apart from insulting – extremely ineffective.

The Middle East, vast stretches of Africa, and several countries in Asia and South America all suffer from continuous stress and strain; help from outside is urgently needed. To help the *global village* develop a strong social fabric, it may be beneficial for bystanders to attend to *maturation* in people who are caught in feelings of humiliation and drawn towards self-destructive depression or other-destructive violent retaliation, both at the micro and macro level. Effective *cooling* is a precondition. At present, such *cooling* is happening "by chance," unsystematically. Perhaps this process can be hastened by systematic attention from the international community.

People who are *too hot* need to take themselves *off the case* or be taken *off the case* by their peers. They should not be put into leadership positions. Bystanders have to protect

the world against "hot" leaders bringing mayhem. United Nations institutions such as the *World Court* and *International Criminal Court* are instruments that have become available recently to help protect the world from overheated leaders.

Narcissistic rage! How bystanders can take despots *off the job*

There are leaders, however, who are more than just overheated. They may be caught in cycles of humiliation from childhood on, perhaps obsessed with humiliation. As discussed earlier, Jerrold Post worked on the profile of Saddam Hussein and identifies *malignant narcissism* as a destructive outflow of a *wounded self*. Sigmund Karterud, a Norwegian psychiatrist, specializes in *malignant narcissism* and the *urge for revenge*. He suggests that those areas of the self that regulate self-esteem are damaged in such patients, creating a *vulnerable* but *grandiose self*. Karterud describes the *grandiose self* as being full of ambitions, grandiosity, uniqueness, assertiveness, perfection, and "mirror-hunger." According to Karterud, humiliation leads to a partial fragmentation of the self and activates the *grandiose self* in some people. The grandiose self, once activated, reacts with *narcissistic rage* and perpetrates revenge in order to restore itself. Karterud reports a higher propensity for narcissistic rage among individuals with personality structures of paranoid, antisocial, borderline and narcissistic type. Malignant narcissism personality traits include, according to Karterud (2001):

- Grandiose sense of self-importance
- Preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, etc.
- Sense of entitlement
- Interpersonal exploitativeness
- Unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating
- between extremes of idealization and devaluation
- Lack of empathy
- Lack of remorse
- Failure to conform to social norms
- Deceitfulness
- Reckless disregard for safety of self and others
- Distrustful and reluctant to confide in others
- Unforgiving of insults, injuries, or slights
- Inappropriate intense anger which leads quickly to counterattack (Karterud, 2001).

Karterud recommends a process of psychotherapy for such patients, a process that ultimately leads to the mourning of past hurt. This psychotherapy should be empathic, patients need to know they are understood and cared for. Furthermore, the idealizing self-needs have to be activated to enable the patient to experience trust, confidence, and the possibility of leaning on someone greater than self. Finally, repressed emotions have to be liberated, and a process of mourning initiated.

   Figure 7 depicts how the three-line graphic used earlier to show a historical, social, cultural and collective process toward egalization can be adapted for use with individuals.

To promote healing, the therapist helps the client's grandiose self descend from arrogating superiority while guiding the wounded self as it rises, acquiring human dignity. When the fragments of the self are integrated at the line of humility, the client can become a full human being with maturity and patience, love warmth, and generosity.

The Healing of the Wounded/Grandiose Self

|	
Grandiose self *Self that arrogates superiority*	Top of the scale
Humility	Line of equal dignity
Wounded and *humiliated self*	Bottom of the scale

Figure 7: The healing of the wounded/grandiose self

The international community, the United Nations, and bystanders in general cannot carry out therapy with tyrants such as Saddam Hussein. However, they can contribute to the strengthening of international institutions, such as the *International Criminal Court*, so they can persecute tyrants around the world for crimes against humanity. When such despots are in custody, they can be treated within the realm of international law like any national prisoner who receives psychiatric help, if needed.

Furthermore, global and local bystanders can *recognize* malignant narcissism personality traits and *prevent* individuals with those traits from entering into leadership positions. People with these traits require therapy, not leadership tasks. Bystanders who are aware of this phenomenon can contribute by campaigning for more public awareness and for mitigating the malign influences emanating from people with these traits.

The German electorate was not enlightened when it allowed Adolf Hitler – a man who was called "the demon" [351] by people who knew him – to gain power. German women, just empowered to vote, abandoned their power, supporting the Nazis despite their regressive views on women. Just six weeks after Hitler took power, in a speech entitled *German Women* (March 18, 1933[352]), Joseph Goebbels laid out what his party intended to do to change the role of women in society, to go backwards. German women gave sad testimony to the miserable fate of people who could have been players but remained idle bystanders and subservient underlings. This is a path the international community, the United Nations, and bystanders should avoid.

Twenty-to-two, women and men! Coercion and respect can be combined

How can cycles of humiliation among conflict partners be contained by third parties without inflicting even more humiliation on them?

Colin Powell, former United States Secretary of State, recommended a *power strategy* in military conflict. He wanted something like five times as many forces on his side as in the opponent's camp. Donald Rumsfeld, United States Defense Secretary, represents a more mobile, flexible and inexpensive approach. The fast course of the 2003 Iraq war seems to have vindicated Rumsfeld's approach. However, the two strategies are not as different as they may appear. They share the element of overpowering – for Powell it is *overpowering with numbers*, for Rumsfeld, *overpowering with speed and the element of surprise*. I agree that coercion and overpowering may be necessary to ensure local and global peace. But this *overpowering coercion should be wedded to respect*.

I was amazed at the low rate of crime and unrest in Cairo, a metropolis of approximately ten to fifteen million people. A high degree of *social control* is part of Egyptian culture. I frequently witnessed incidents such as the following situation, which gave testimony to this social control, many times:

An accident occurs in the street in the middle of overcrowded Cairo. The two drivers get out of their cars and angrily survey the damage. They shout and jump at each others necks. They scream, they shove and hit one another.

Around this scene, in the street, in coffee houses, in shops, people pay attention, their faces reflecting seriousness, urgency, respect and involvement. About ten to twenty men, usually young and strong, slowly approach the two men. They stand in two groups of five to ten men each, with each group assuming responsibility for one of the opponents, restraining and talking to him. The restraint used is enough so that neither opponent can hit or hurt the other, but he can still shout and scream and make brief attacking lunges.

Each group speaks with the man, to which it has assigned itself, talking calmly and with respect. They show him that they understand the urgency which forces a man to behave in such a dramatic manner (a person who is *outside* him/herself is almost holy in Egypt). The "facilitators" try to understand the nature of the conflict and propose various compromises to resolve it. They do not focus unduly on the rational side of the conflict, they rather constantly grant respect to the fact that the opponents are psychologically overburdened and that the rupture of social peace has to be healed.

After ten or fifteen minutes the opponents begin to calm down. If it's appropriate, they agree on a compromise. If necessary, some facilitators promise to act as witnesses and/or enforcers of the compromises. The conflict is over. The opponents leave. The facilitators go back to their previous occupations without a lot of fanfare. Patching up conflicts is routine.

The conflict resolution and containment street scenes that I witnessed usually included a ratio of twenty-to-two ratio, or at least ten-to-two. We note that as many as 20 physically

powerful men may be required to *cool* and *pacify* two clashing opponents. If this scenario is a blueprint for conflict resolution, resources for the prevention, containment, and resolution of conflicts around the world need to be increased. *Overpowering* numbers of blue helmets/global police persons with a credible *overpowering* mandate and well-devised *overpowering* strategies are required. The Powell and Rumsfeld approaches need to be intelligently combined.

In many regions – the so-called *failing states* – the absence of good police forces must be remedied. In other regions it is the highjacking of police forces by elite interests that has to be addressed. Resources invested in prevention and containment are well spent; they prevent the much higher investments that are necessary post-mayhem.

The international community can develop wells of creative ideas based on the twenty-to-two ratio blueprint. Why is it that hundreds of thousands of soldiers are available, but not hundreds of thousands of inspectors? Or, what about human shields preventing atrocities? What if hundreds of thousands of people from all over the world insisted on coming to Burma or Zimbabwe, just to visit? Many doctors dedicate their vacations to working in destitute regions, why can't more people to this? Social control, if carried out in the spirit of human rights, works through a combination of outnumbering, overpowering and respect.

In the final part of his book *Getting to Peace*, William Ury (1999) suggests ten roles for Homo negotiator: the provider, the teacher, the bridge-builder, the mediator, the arbiter, the equalizer, the healer, the witness, the referee and the peacekeeper. It is interesting to observe how the Egyptian approach combines elements of coercion and respect from traditionally male and female roles. The scene combines "female" talking, understanding, empathy, perspective-taking and healing on one side, and a "male" potential for overpowering, coercion, force, violence and aggression on the other. "Male" strength and moderated counter-aggression restrain the fighters. "Female" awareness of the cohesion of the social fabric creates an atmosphere in which the fighters feel they are being taken seriously. To combine the "male" aspect of force with "female" empathy could be the modern recipe of conflict resolution. The old "male" strategy of using destructive force is not appropriate in an interdependent modern *global village*, but the "male" ability to use restraining force continues to be an important tool.

Today's men and women are invited to share roles – men to use more of the traditional "female" role characteristics and women to become more "visible." Formerly, visibility was connected to the man guarding the frontiers of the *outside*, just as clothes protect and hide the *inside* from *outside* viewers. There is an Egyptian saying, "The woman is the neck and the man the head; the woman turns the neck wherever she wants." In other words, Egyptian women feel that they create relevant content *inside* the home which is presented to the *outside* by their men. With the disappearance of an *outside* sphere in a *global village*, this "division of labor" loses its significance, letting women and men alike dwell both *inside*, in intimate privacy, and to appear visibly *outside*.

UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme urges the strengthening of the "female" aspect in conflict resolution efforts. The list of potential female contributions is a long one (adapted from Lindner, 1999d): using multi-track, "track II" and citizen-based diplomacy; installing early warning institutions; rethinking the notion of state sovereignty; setting up projects to study and understand the history of potential conflict areas, collecting this information and making it available to decision makers; using

psychology on a macro-level, taking identity as a bridge; keeping communication going between warring parties; talking behind the scenes; including people besides the warlords in peace negotiations; developing conflict-resolution teams with less hierarchy and more creativity; setting up mediation teams; installing "truth commissions;" allowing warring parties to feel the world community's care, respect and concern; taking opponents in a conflict out of their usual environment; taking the adversaries' personal feelings and emotions seriously; recognizing the importance of human dignity; introducing sustainable long-term approaches on the social and ecological level; progressing from spending aid-money after a disaster to allocating resources to prevent it; and so on.

According to the *Culture of Peace Programme* and conflict resolution experts around the world, these "female" efforts must be combined with a certain amount of "male" coercion to achieve peace. The term *social control* expresses the combination of both aspects. On the national level, police and prisons represent some of the coercive aspects (incidentally more effective if the average citizen does not carry weapons), while institutions like lawyers, courts and rehabilitation programs have the potential to fulfill the role of social caring and healing. Such a *culture of peace*, merging formerly separate "male" and "female" role descriptions, contains cycles of humiliation among conflict parties without humiliating them.

To summarize, the *global village* embodies *One single inside* sphere. The traditional "male" role of *going out*, fighting the enemy and conquering the unknown – unidimensional, unilateral and more short-sighted – loses significance when there is no *outside*. Men, as travelers and explorers, were responsible for this development. Maintaining social cohesion in an *inside* sphere means complex, relational, multilateral, foresighted, integrative and holistic strategies such as mediation, alternative dispute resolution and police deployment (for example peacekeeping forces) instead of traditional military combat. *Subsidiarity*, *quality* (and not quantity) of life, *culture of peace* – all these are keywords and concepts which stem from traditional "female" role descriptions, showing how much the new strategies are, conceptually, "female" approaches. Thus, *globalization* opens space for women and "female" strategies.

Twenty-to-two, or at least ten-to-two, is the ratio needed to contain hot feelings according to traditional Egyptian experience. The young men in the Cairo scene did not need to exert brute force because they greatly outnumbered the two quarrelers, which enabled them to combine coercion and respect. Respect alone would not suffice nor would coercion through sheer force of numbers. The international community, the United Nations, and bystanders in general need to strive for a combination of the two, respect and coercion.

On April 17, 2003, Kofi Annan explained that he does not want a subordinate role for the United Nations in Iraq and that he rejects the idea of the UN taking on a task it cannot fulfill. In other words, Annan wants resources and a strong mandate to avoid an UN failure caused by member states withholding support. He says, in short, that you should not send out a boy with a stick to kill a lion, then lament the boy's ineptitude. Maybe, a stronger UN, and a stronger UN mandate would have prevented the attack on the UN in Baghdad on August 19, 2003.[353]

Respect the individual! Recognition has to be carefully placed[354]

When we speak about intercultural communication we assume that there are *different cultures* or that there is primary *culture difference*, and that culture difference ought to be respected. But where does *culture difference* come from?

I do not dispute that cultural differences should be respected. I share the stance that ethnocentrism and disrespect for cultural diversity must be overcome. But, how can we judge a situation in which tyrants say to their victims: "*Our* culture is to punish disobedient underlings and you better accept punishment because you are part of *our* culture! *Our* culture is hierarchical and you belong at the bottom." Usually masters add, "We are benevolent and our underlings love us and thank us for our efforts to care for them."

Some underlings may agree with their masters and enjoy their patronage. Others will protest vehemently. They may even insist: "*Our* culture is quite different; we are not part of our oppressors' culture!" These underlings will then turn to the international community and ask for *respect and protection of their culture* under the banner of human rights. Their masters will also turn to the international community, calling for *respect for their culture*, meaning their desire to force their underlings to accept oppression. Oppressed *minorities* fighting for *their* culture are usually former *underlings*. (As long as underlings are utterly powerless, they are voiceless. It requires a certain amount of resources and ideological support to acquire the label of *minority* and the voice to call for *respect for our culture*.)

Thus, intricate configurations of oppressors and victims unfold in front of the eyes of third party observers. Women may be victims of oppression perpetrated by their families who are victims of oppression perpetrated by their national rulers who are victims of oppression perpetrated by other states. The victims will claim to have *different cultures* and ask third parties to recognize and respect this, while the oppressors will vehemently urge third parties to keep quiet and not interfere in what they regard as *their culture*. In Gellner's work *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), the central argument is that culture can be a tactic, an instrument, not a primary cause of conflict. According to Gellner, the social chasms of early industrialism brought national cultures and nationalism to the fore. The way to address such conflicts, says Gellner, is to focus not on the culture, but the socioeconomic circumstances that gave rise to it

We'll end this section by asking, "In conflicts between members of different cultures, where should recognition and respect be placed – with the other culture or the other person?" Third parties, who adhere to human rights values must recognize, acknowledge and respect the other person, not her membership in another culture. Every individual has her own personal dignity. The other *culture* may be a cause of *pride* or a *cause* or a *product of humiliation*. Intercultural communication must include an analysis of power relations and probe whether past incidents of humiliation may be the source of supposed *culture difference*. If this is so, respect and recognition entail an obligation to heal this humiliation. *Respecting culture difference* for its own sake may compound past humiliations by adding further humiliation.

Stop voluntary self-humiliation! How bystanders can help preserve cultural diversity

Walk into any international hotel in the poorer parts of the world and you will find that indigenous dishes and drinks are hardly available, or if they are, then in some kind of weak imitation, supposedly adapted to the "Western" taste. Ask in Cairo, in international hotels, whether you can get the drinks sold just outside in the street. You will get an embarrassed look and be told that you can only have international drinks in the hotel. Ask for traditional food in Sri Lanka, people will respond with shame for their delicious heritage, believing that Western visitors cannot be served poor-mans' products in an expensive international hotel. A British friend who was born in Sri Lanka more than fifty years ago told me:

> The last time I went to Sri Lanka, I noticed that the hotel's employees prepared a delicious coconut dish I loved as a child in the kitchen, for themselves, but not for the guests! I made a deal with them and they brought their food to my table in secret, as if it was a crime! They are about to lose their indigenous cuisine out of self-inflicted humiliation!

In the Azores, nine islands in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, there are still some wonderful old houses, hand-built from the local volcanic stones, some even decorated with the wood from stranded ships. As the islands grow richer, these homes are disappearing, replaced by houses with concrete slabs considered higher status. Western technology has a quasi-religious rank on the islands. In 1919, I visited a local home and saw a microwave oven in the middle of the sitting room, decorated like an altar with porcelain figures inside. The microwave oven was not in use; it was a shrine. The owners were saving money to tear down their wonderful stone house and replace it with a concrete "box."

A good Egyptian friend filled his Western "container" home with pitiful imitations of Western furniture, Louis XIV or XV styles. He and his family were accustomed to squatting, but he packed the new house with chairs and fauteuils which nobody ever sat on. The only purpose of this furniture was to cater to and impress the Western guest. The new house had a modern kitchen, but no courtyard, where his Egyptian family used to cook their communal meals. The family had no alternative but to huddle in the small, windowless corridor on their carpets to recapture some of the life they were used to living, misplaced in their fine new house. To witness this "voluntary self-humiliation" literally broke my heart. (Incidentally, squatting is a very beneficial exercise, from the anatomical point of view. In recent years gynecologists have admitted that giving birth in bed is convenient for the attending doctor, but not the best position for the woman. Defecating and giving birth are both aided by squatting, as is the overall flexibility of the body. Chairs are not made to promote human health. They produce stiff people with back problems. Admittedly, stiffened Westerners after a certain age cannot enjoy squatting, but coming generations should not be forced into the same straight-jacket. In this respect, Western "civilization" does a disservice to itself in a self-humiliating way, without being aware of it. Chairs are like thrones, they give status, the *chair*-man, after all, leads the

meeting. However, as soon as everybody is sitting on chairs, we are left with nothing but back pain.)

In 1999, I participated in several fieldtrips in Rwanda with the UNDP and with international and national NGOs. These trips became a series of informal focus groups in which I discussed the topic of humiliation whenever possible. I monitored not only other people's feelings of humiliation, but mine as well. I shared my shock and humiliation at the way shelter programs were designed and built so that water had to be fetched from far-away sources, with the homes too far from the fields. To me, these "villages" represented the flagrant humiliation of humanity through an uninformed admiration of outdated concepts of "modernity." The design of these artificial "villages," corrugated iron sheets on huts set in a military layout, reminded me of the same anti-human philosophy that inspired the *Plattenbauten* (ugly tower blocks) architecture in the socialist East, which today are regarded as a shame by almost everyone, West or East. Obsessive rectangularity and military uniformity is an obsolete concept and few in the West are proud of having ever admired it. The socialist belief that uniformity (from clothing style to architectural design) would heal past humiliation and promote equal dignity commits the same mistake it aims to remedy.

Difference, a term that is essential to diversity, can and must exist independently of ranking and untouched by humiliating pecking hierarchies. Uniformity, meant to promote equality, destroys diversity and introduces a new kind of humiliation, because the loss of diversity is not a small loss. Human beings are diverse and individual human identity seems to depend, at least partially, on diversity markers. Uniformity ignores this human need, relegating human beings to the status of robots, machines or animals. Those who are forced to live in uniform rectangular blocks or "rabbit boxes," feel humiliated and abased to the level of rabbits, a reaction inadvertently "proven" by the architects who would never live in the blocks they design. I hope that international organizations, accustomed to responding to emergencies and developmental needs, will plan better for the future. Arguments that rectangular military uniformity is efficient and practicable and that poor refugees or returnees should be happy with what they get are not good enough. How is a helpless person, struggling to heal and build a new life, to be expected to improve if her basic individuality is removed and humiliated into helpless uniformity?

Subaltern elite admiration – the slavish copying of elite lifestyles (outdated concepts of elite lifestyles, at that) – easily progresses into what I call *voluntary self-humiliation*. Yet, as discussed earlier, the opposite extreme – the blind rejection of whatever elites do, the obsessive humiliation and killing of elites or former elites, and the destruction of elite lifestyle symbols – is at least as wrong-headed. We must step outside of the master-slave dyad and evaluate the lifestyles of the elite in a more detached manner. If found to be functional and constructive, elite products and habits may be adopted, if not, not.

Help the United Nations! How the international community can build a global roof

The tasks waiting for the international community are daunting, requiring the world to stand together and build sound global institutions to secure social and ecological sustainability. Ten million children under the age of five die each year, the majority from preventable diseases and malnutrition (from the website of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2001). An estimated 1.2 billion people worldwide, half of them children, survive on less than $1 per day. Around 40 million children each year are not registered at birth, depriving them of a nationality and a legal name. Children in 87 countries live among 60 million land mines, with as many as 10,000 per year injured or killed by these mines. More than 300,000 youths and girls, many younger than 20 years old, currently serve as child soldiers around the world. Many girl soldiers are forced into sexual slavery.

UNHCR reports (2001) that between 1994 and 1999, the United Nations requested $13.5 billion in emergency relief funding, much of it for children. It received less than $9 billion. It reports that AIDS has killed more than 3.8 million children and orphaned another 13 million. In 1998, donor countries allocated $300 million to combat AIDS, although an estimated $3 billion was needed. If developed countries were to meet an agreed aid target of 0.7 percent of their gross national product, an extra $100 billion would be available to help the world's poorest nations (see for a recent publication *The End of Poverty* by Jeffrey Sachs, 2005).

However, there is much to celebrate. During the 1990s, United Nations global conferences[355] emphasized the relationship between the three main goals of the UN Charter: *peace, development* and *human rights*. The global human rights movement is growing. *Apartheid* has been toppled and problems such as *personnel landmines* and *debt relief* are being addressed. Dictators around the world are bound to pay attention to Chile's General Augusto Pinochet apprehension in London and Slobodan Milosevic's trial in The Hague (even though he has not yet been joined by colleagues, such as Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic). Tyrants who abuse human rights, who fancy themselves above the law, are learning that they can no longer trust national sovereignty to prevent interference from these emerging global super-ordinate institutional structures.

The glass is only half full, yes, and many people, on all sides of the political spectrum, wring their hands and cry that the glass is half empty. Humanity has engaged in *nation building* for ages and *global village building* is still a very young endeavor. The fact that even at the national states are failing does not mean that all is lost. Historically, socioeconomic needs have been met at village, tribe, or clan levels. Building sensible state institutions is a tedious process that can stagnate in what John Stewart Mill in the nineteenth century called *ramshackle states*, or what Robert Jackson (1990) describes as *quasi-states* (Jackson, 1990). We currently live in a *ramshackle global village*. In many ways we face the anarchic world that Robert Kaplan (1994) describes in *The Coming Anarchy* (Kaplan, 1994), where overpopulation, resource scarcity, crime, and disease compound cultural and ethnic differences create a chaotic, anarchic world. Yet, all these conditions do not justify abandoning efforts to build *more sturdy local and global institutional structures* built on the *subsidiarity* principle that gives room to *celebrate diversity*. *Good governance* and *transparency* are only two of many buzzwords that illuminate what has to be achieved.

I believe that optimism, patience and long-term thinking are the only choices we have, even when tempted by pessimism. Optimistic patients get well quicker and die in fewer numbers. Optimism saves what can be saved. Pessimism loses what could perhaps be saved. It is not a good strategy for a doctor to display overt pessimism; the patient might die, while optimism would have kept him alive. Pessimism drains energy and depletes the gram of force that could have saved the situation. We must nourish those elements that

promote optimism. We cannot naively overlook all those elements that bolster pessimism but we must not allow them to define our view of the future.

Perhaps there is such a thing as 100% neutrality – somewhere, theoretically – but in real life scientists have the leeway to highlight certain aspects more than others. In making this choice, we scientists have an extremely important voice. We do not only describe the world, we also shape it. Any personal psychological leanings towards gloom and depression should be secondary to the strategy of constructive optimism.

Some daring social scientists, at the forefront of development, have taken up the ball from quantum mechanics and try to develop a *quantum social science* that builds on a participatory epistemology. Alexander Wendt highlights that everybody, scholars included, must become aware of their ethical responsibilities as soon as they see themselves as irreducible participants in the super-organism that is world politics. Only in the classical Newtonian worldview can scholars place themselves *outside* and pretend not to influence the world with their measurements and descriptions. "But with those responsibilities comes a capacity for collective self-consciousness that is otherwise largely missing in day-today international life, and as such is a basis for reflexivity and progressive change" (Wendt, 2005, p. 59).

The conservative Lord Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary 1989-1995, was in office during the first Gulf War. On April 28, 2003,[356] he spoke about the state of the world after the 2003 Iraq war. Hurd, who had just returned from a tour through the Arab world, reported that the populations there were in a state of *sullen humiliation*. Not the governments – they are rather US-friendly – but the people in the streets. Hurd refers to the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak saying that US policy is stimulating the bin Laden phenomenon rather than counteracting it. There is the *wounded giant* on one side, Hurd explains, erupting in energy since September 11, no longer isolationist but imperialist. On the other side, Arab populations are enwrapped in gloomy humiliation as Americans roam their region. Arab citizens want to travel and study in US universities, but they do not want Americans masters. Before the war, Hurd publicly said that it was "wrong and unwise" to start it, because, even though the war might be won in six days, the peace may not be secured in six months.

Hurd's observations are confirmed by others. Shibley Telhami (2002) writes:

Today militancy in the Middle East is fueled …by a pervasive sense of humiliation and helplessness in the region. This collective feeling is driven by a sense that people remain helpless in affecting the most vital aspects of their lives, and it is exacerbated by pictures of Palestinian humiliation. There is much disgust with states and with international organizations (Telhami, 2003a, p. 1[357]).

Asked about the role of the United Nations, Hurd made the point that military might is good at destruction, but not well-adapted to construction. He adds that America is a country that wants to construct and it will recognize that it needs the United Nations.[358] Perhaps Hurd's message could be projected into the future. *Global village building* requires support from all world states and citizens for a new global world order, enacted through the United Nations. Perhaps one day we will have a global passport and a global welfare net. Perhaps one day tribal and national identities will be secondary to the core identity of global citizenship everywhere on the globe. The principle of *subsidiarity* could

be the blueprint for organizing global power structures, and building personal identities with shared humanity at the core and cultural diversity at the periphery. There will be no need for *enemies*; all will be *neighbors* – "good" as well as "bad" neighbors.

Democratically legitimated police, aided by a global culture of responsible social control and respect, will keep "bad neighbors" in check. A "roof" of super-ordinate global institutions, democratically legitimated, will protect global citizens in the same way democratically legitimated nation states at present attempt to guard the interests of their national citizenry. A *decent global village* could be built, following Margalit's call (1996) for a decent society.

Perhaps part of the explanation for "old Europe" apparent harboring of dissenting basic moral gut feelings may be found in deep differences in juridical culture. The English-influenced sphere of the world (England, USA, Canada, Australia, etc.) adheres to an *adversarial* style, while in other parts of the world an *inquisitory* style is followed. Sir Ludovic Kennedy, who has devoted his life to fighting for the release of innocent convicts, wants the *adversarial* court system in England replaced. He says:

> Current practice creates a 'pseudo-dramatic atmosphere' and is an 'invitation to corruption … because it's a battle between two sides and each wants to win, it's not a search for the truth. The counsel always feel they have to score points over their opponents whether it's relevant to the issue or not" (Kennedy, 2003).[359]

The *search for truth* instead of the *attempt to win* may provide a more appropriate strategy for shaping the future world, at least when we aim at long-term sustainability: Winning in disputes is not sufficient – verdicts and solutions must also be "true" in a wider context and contribute to a more sustainable world, both socially and ecologically. A beneficial approach is "constructive controversy" or what Aristotle called "deliberate discourse," meaning discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of proposed actions aiming at synthesizing novel solutions embedded in creative problem solving. Combative styles such as "concurrence seeking," or "debate" are less helpful (Johnson, Johnson, and Tjosvold, 2000, p. 66).

To conclude this chapter, around the year 1757, a new meaning of the word *humiliation* emerged, along with a new vision of a *social contract*, based on human rights and the idea of equal dignity. This created and still creates what the language of political science calls *expectation gap,* which encourage *grievances* to emerge. The situation is acerbated by widespread *state failure*, and the preeminence of *short-term interest* that highjacks institutional structures that are meant to protect the common good. In this book's language this means that newly-recognized feelings of humiliation lead to anomie, depression, and simmering rage.

Rising underlings may become humiliation entrepreneurs and use feelings of sullen humiliation brewing in the masses to mobilize collective violent action such as terror or even genocide. Elites react with oppression. Cycles of humiliation destroy the social fabric of communities around the world. The international community, the global bystander, carries a responsibility for counteraction, for building a global *culture of peace* enshrined in global institutional structures that ensure a *decent* and *dignified* life for all.

Related reading

Mass violence[360] and *deadly conflict* are topics that have been widely studied; thousands of publications are to be found that cover a wide range of conflicts, from *interpersonal* to *intergroup* and *international conflict*.[361] The search word *terrorism* renders thousands of hits in databases.[362] Instead of presenting large lists of publications at this point I would like to mention some of those that had particular significance for this research project on humiliation. A pioneer of conflict studies in social psychology was Morton Deutsch,[363] the founder of the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) at Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.[364] Also Herbert C. Kelman was among the first to work in this field.[365] Note that Ervin Staub, the author of the *Roots of Evil* (1989), at the Psychology Department at the University of Massachusetts, is starting a new Ph.D. concentration in *The Psychology Of Peace And The Prevention Of Violence*.

Lee D. Ross, principal investigator and co-founder of the *Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN)*, addresses psychological barriers to conflict resolution.[366] William Ury, Director of the *Project on Preventing War at Harvard University*, and co-author of *Getting to Yes*,[367] and author of *Getting to Peace*[368] focuses in his anthropological work on conflict. Monty Marshall, founding director of the *Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR)* program at the *Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM),* University of Maryland, wrote a seminal book on protracted conflict and the hypothesis of *diffusion of insecurity* (Marshall, 1999). Bar-On and Nadler (1999) call for more attention to be given to conflicts in contexts of power asymmetry.[369]

In the past years innumerable university departments and institutes have been created that carry in their names terms that address conflict and peace. I was in touch with many institutions, centers, departments, and programs, among others with UNESCO's *Culture of Peace* Programme (www.unesco.org/cpp/),[370] as well as with the Eastern Mennonite University, EMU, Harrisonburg, with Howard Zehr,[371] Hizkias Assefa,[372] and Ronald S. Kraybill,[373] and the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, in Sweden. In Norway the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO, the first peace research institute ever founded), the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), as well as the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, are central to the international discourse on conflict and peace. See also Amitai Etzioni's *Communitarian Network* with its *responsive communitarian* philosophy articulated as "a middle way between the politics of radical individualism and excessive statism."[374]

Read more about *arousal* and *amnesia*,[375] about *implicit memory*,[376] on *calming down* and *anger management*,[377] on *post-traumatic growth*,[378] on *leadership*,[379] on whether Hitler indeed was *democratically elected* or not,[380] on *multi-track diplomacy*,[381] on *uprooted people*,[382] on the *Middle East, democracy* and *Islam*,[383] on how to *aid democracies*,[384] on *International Law of Human Dignity*,[385] on *United Nations reform* and *World Federalism*,[386] on *We the Peoples*,[387] on how *bystanders* can stop standing *by* and stand *up*,[388] and on *learned optimism*.[389]

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Give us meaning! We crave great narratives

Human beings need narratives that anchor us in the world. Religion often provides such narratives, as do family legends, and clan and national myths. These stories tell us where we come from and where we are going. Such guiding narratives are so important that people are willing to die for them. Serbs risked their lives and waged war from within a narrative that circles around feelings attached to a battle about 700 years ago. In the Arab world, history that reaches hundreds of years back is as close as daily events and can define life and death decisions. Suicide bombers give their lives for a meaning that reaches beyond their existence on Earth.

Modern secular Western science does not usually provide us with equivalent long-term narratives and explanations about life's meanings. Concepts such as *democracy, communism, capitalism, modernity, post-modernity* or *information age* do not tell us where we come from, where we are going and what our true significance is. Physicists currently have several narratives on offer, all a mixture of "sure" knowledge and so-called "educated hunches." They are still looking for a grand unifying narrative (unifying theory) that links the sub-narratives (theories of subsets of forces). Social science wrestles with the question of whether man is aggressive by nature, a question that holds great importance as we begin to realize our responsibility for managing our home planet.

In this book, concepts such *democracy, communism, capitalism, modernism, postmodernism, modern information age* are treated as *epiphenomena*, *side effect*s of deeper *logics*, which are inscribed in a timeframe that reaches back more than 10,000 years. Psychological mindsets and emotions, such as *pride, honor, dignity, humiliation, and humility*, are regarded as dependent on and intertwined with these *logics*. Emotions are not viewed as timeless or history-independent. On the contrary, the way emotions are felt by each individual is interdependent with the overall worldview of the community within which the individual lives. People sometimes react with *humiliated fury* when put down but they may also accept subjugation as "honorable medicine." Underlings even create *cultures of subservience* and transmit them to their children. And humiliation sometimes elicits genuine humility and acts as a source of *civilized* behavior (Norbert Elias).

What about four logics? How we may narrate the story of the human condition

Four *logics* are stipulated in this book, as described in Table 4. These logics are determined by: (1) the nature of the pie of resources, whether it is expandable (win-win, win-lose, see Ury, 1999); (2) the strength or weakness of the security dilemma; (3) the length of a culture's time-horizon and (4) social identity or how a culture responds to the question of equal dignity.

Homo sapiens – the species that must live within these logics – is a "hostage" on Earth, a passive victim. But, Homo sapiens is also an actor and shaper of the world.

Homo sapiens is, above all, a social animal with an huge and innate urge for meaning. Furthermore, Homo sapiens is extremely curious and very good at making tools and finding solutions.

Let us try to put Homo sapiens into the four *logics* and make the narrative work. Some 30,000 years ago, anatomically modern humans started colonizing Africa and the rest of the world (except for the Americas which came later.) Population geneticists believe that the ancestral human population was very small – a mere 2,000 breeding individuals, an estimate based on strong archaeological and genetic evidence. It seems plausible that these early people saw the planet as unlimited. For 90% of human history, our species was never disappointed by mother Earth. New valleys of abundance could be found by simply wandering a bit further. The game was a gracious win-win, because the cake of resources could always be expanded. The *security dilemma* was insignificant, because there was plenty of "untouched" abundance, so there was no need to conquer and raid others. The archaeological record shows few crushed skulls or other signs of organized homicide from that period. Under circumstances of abundance, cultures and psychologies of pristine pride – in which members trust and expect to be provided for and in which the idea of subjugating other human beings is non-existent – are feasible.

However, the party had to end. Asia, Europe, America and Australia could be populated only once. At some point, there were no more "empty" valleys to populate. The Earth has limits. This is a fact. The area that was populated began to grow crowded. Although early Homo sapiens probably was not aware that the Earth is limited, indirectly, the growing population felt the consequences of this reality. The anthropological term for this is *circumscription*, meaning that resources have begun to be inadequate. More and more people, more and more often, met circumstances that were not characterized by abundance. We could call this juncture in human history the first "round of *globalization*." Merely by wandering about, Homo sapiens had managed to populate the entire planet, at least its habitable areas.

Humankind, however, stood up to the challenge of circumscription. Somehow, some people found novel alternative methods to increase faltering resources. They used ideas and skills they were already familiar with, primarily tool-making, and put those skills to new uses. *Intensification,* or agriculture, was the new game. In this new game, nature, animals, and fellow human beings were instrumentalized and exploited. Hierarchical honor societies were built, with masters routinely humiliating underlings, a practice which was seen as legitimate, a sign of *civilization*. Underlings accepted their status as "honorable medicine." Honor resembles pristine pride, only it operates in a ranked order of human worth and value. There is abundant archeological proof of this historic development. The pyramids of Gizeh are just one example of this proof, an impressive one though.

Under these win-lose conditions, raiding neighboring *villages* became an acceptable a method for increasing resources. The *security dilemma* and a culture of *male dominance* emerged. In other words, the new set of rules made Homo sapiens more "aggressive." Wars were fought by empires, and raids became ingrained as continuous activities in the cultures and identities particularly of mobile people in areas unsuitable for agriculture. Somali warriors are feared. Mongols were fierce. Furthermore, raiding introduced short time horizons. Archaeological evidence of organized homicide during the past 10,000 years is abundant.

Today, we find ourselves at the end of the second party, at the beginning of the second "round of *globalization*." There are no "new" continents whose populations can be conquered and exploited. This time, humanity is not only indirectly affected by the limitations of our planet, this time we are consciously aware of it. Pictures from space of planet Earth can not be ignored or forgotten. Modern technology powers the current round of *globalization*, creating a *single global village* whether we want it or not and eliciting a vision of a future *global village* of equal dignity for all.

The *security dilemma* characterizes a world of several *villages*, but its basis in reality disappears when there is only *One village*. This is good news. Humankind can relax in the hope that *One village* will render a more *benign* reality. Male courage is no longer needed to defend the village's walls, traditional male *wars* and *soldiers* lose their anchoring in reality. Again, humankind can hope for a more *benign* future. And since knowledge is a more *expandable* resource than the geographical surface of the Earth, the world regains some of the friendly win-win character that it had among hunters and gatherers. Again, humankind can relax, devoting itself to *maintaining* and *policing* the *global village*. The past 10,000 years were ferocious, but we may be sailing into more *benign* times.

Yet there are problems which, if not mitigated, may sour these *benign* prospects. The Earth is on the verge of reaching its ultimate limit. Keeping underlings down is becoming increasingly difficult. The future of the *global village* hangs in the balance. Will it be a village where every citizen has equal dignity? Or will it be a pyramid of power with small elites exploiting the rest?

What about two transitions? We may narrate the current historic juncture

The possibility of a *benign* future is complicated by the fact that the current transition towards a *single global village* actually consists of two transitions proceeding at different speeds, see Table 5. Modern technology powers *globalization* but *egalization* lags behind. Through new awareness of the limits to the planet's biosphere, humility and *egalization* creep in, but so slowly that we cannot be sure that the *global village* will develop into a world of equal dignity. Humankind may choose to make hierarchical rankings of human dignity legitimate, a deeply troubling possibility for those who value human rights.

Transitions Pertaining to Globalization and Egalization

	Past		**Future**
Globalization	*Many* villages	⇨	*One* village
Egalization	Hierarchical rankings of	⇨	Equal dignity
	human worth and value	⇨	or
	(honor)		Hierarchical rankings

Table 10: Transitions pertaining to globalization and egalization

If we imagine the world as a container with a height and a width, *globalization* addresses the horizontal dimension, the shrinking width. *Egalization*, on the other hand, concerns the vertical dimension, reminiscent of Hofstede's power distance.

Egalization would mean that the container would no longer be a tall one, with masters at the top and underlings at the bottom; instead, we would have a flat container with everybody at about the same height of equal dignity. *Globalization* and *egalization*, together, describe a shrinking of our "world," both horizontally and vertically. *Globalization* occurs "automatically," propelled by technology, but *egalization* requires an ideological decision. *Globalization* can very well occur without *egalization*. This is precisely what appears to be happening when we consider that the gap between the rich at the top and the poor at the bottom is currently growing, both locally and globally. *Globalization* without *egalization* is a story of the container getting narrower and higher.

Globalization moves us from the arrogant belief that the planet has an infinite biosphere to be exploited and that there are always more *villages* to conquer and subjugate to the humble realization that Homo sapiens inhabits O*ne single global village* on a tiny planet. The second transition, *egalization*, pits those who believe that humiliation is an "honorable duty" against those who see it as a violation of dignity. Both transitions push away from arrogance toward humility – a great source of hope. However, when the transition does not occur smoothly, especially in situations that place different worldviews in opposition, humankind experiences great stress. Feelings that elites typically overlook for too long, only to panic when it is too late, heat to the boiling point. The transition is too slow to put us on guard and too fast for safety. It permeates international relations, our relationships with our friends and family, and even how we feel about ourselves.

Who are the Hitlers, Bin Ladens and Saddam Husseins?

Humiliation may be one of the greatest dangers humankind must confront as it journeys through the transitions to globalization and egalization. Feelings of humiliation with their potentially violent outbursts can scuttle all *benign* tendencies. When people feel victimized by humiliation, they may create new rifts in the *global village*. When they see no way to remedy humiliation in this life, people may seek it through martyrdom in an afterlife, making the *global village* a very dangerous place. Cycles of humiliation can tear our world apart.

Osama bin Laden was a master humiliator. The downing of the Twin Towers broadcast a message of devastating humiliation that captured the world's attention.

Bin Laden's name has been joined by the name of Saddam Hussein. He was another rogue, who people feared was planning to humiliate the Western world as cruelly as bin Laden did, or worse. The *war on terror* expanded to include *war in Iraq*. The humiliated victims of September 11 sent a message to the perpetrators that they did not intend to succumb, that they were (and are) set on resistance.

Many ask, "Why do we find ourselves smothered in violence, war, and terror, and fear of it, when the only thing we yearn for is peace?" As I said earlier, some scholars and experts identify deprivation and poverty as the main causes of such violence. However, deprivation, poverty, low status, and marginalization, do not automatically elicit feelings

of suffering and yearnings for retaliation. A religious person may join a monastery, proud of his poverty. Low status may be explained as God's will or as just punishment for sins perpetrated in an earlier life. Not all minorities feel oppressed. Poverty may motivate a person to work hard. Parents may sacrifice to give their children an education and a better life, celebrating every small step forward. Allegiance to the *American Dream* keeps many of the poor in the United States from rebelling.

Are terrorists driven, then, by pure unexplainable pathological evil? In that case there is hardly any hope for humankind since terrorism can never be controlled by traditional means. Drying out financial resources and access to weapons may help. However, terrorists do not need weapons, they can highjack planes with only minimal weaponry and their minds cannot be controlled by any military or police defense. Worse, sending military "messages" may lead to furious defiance, instead of peace-loving humility. Perhaps we should ask what transforms deprivation into unbearable suffering and triggers the urge to retaliate with violence. As we know, even where grievances lead to suffering, the probability is high that depression and apathy, rather than highly organized terrorism, will result. What kind of deprivation generates the urge toward violent retaliation and under what conditions is this retaliation carried out in an organized way?

More than frustration – feelings of humiliation may be the missing link

I am convinced that feelings of humiliation are more likely than other forms of deprivation to generate the urge toward violent retaliation. All that is necessary to organize terrorist acts are leaders who channel the sufferings of followers into a joint project of retaliation. Hitler incited the entire German population to undo the humiliation Germany suffered after World War I through the Treaties of Versailles. He also engaged Germany in "preventive" extermination of the World Jewry he feared was set to dominate and humiliate the world. In Rwanda, Hutus perpetrated the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis to undo past humiliation and prevent future humiliations.

Humiliation seems to be the catalyst that turns grievances into *nuclear bombs of emotions*. As noted before, poverty or abuse do not unavoidably trigger violence. On the contrary, living under harsh circumstances may lead to apathy, depression, or exhausted submission. They may even produce heroism, as the emergence of a Nelson Mandela proves. Yet, as soon as sufferings are translated into overarching narratives of illegitimate humiliation that must be responded to by humiliation-for-humiliation (something Mandela avoided), the desire for retaliation is on the table. Victims may yearn for and plan acts of humiliation against perceived humiliators (real or imagined) and they may become ruthless perpetrators.

I feel humiliated and get angry! How feelings of humiliation occur and the consequences they produce

Based on many years of research on humiliation, I would suggest that feelings of humiliation come about when deprivation is perceived as an illegitimate imposition of lowering or degradation that cannot be explained in constructive terms. All human beings

basically yearn for recognition and respect. When they perceive that recognition and respect are withdrawn or denied they may feel humiliation, the strongest force for creating rifts and destroying relationships. It doesn't matter whether this withdrawal of recognition is real or the result of a misunderstanding. The desire for recognition unites us human beings and can serve as a platform for contact and cooperation. I do not believe that ethnic, religious, cultural differences or conflicts of interests alone can create rifts. Conflicts of interests can, in fact, lead to creative cooperation and problem solving and diversity can be a source of mutual enrichment. However, cooperation and diversity are possible and enriching only within relationships characterized by respect. When respect and recognition fail, those who feel victimized are prone to highlight differences to "justify" rifts caused by humiliation. *Clashes of civilizations* are not the problem, but *clashes of humiliations*.[390]

We live in a world that elicits humiliation

We – members of communities around the world today – do not live in contexts that encourage people to accept inequality and deprivation as God's will or as natural order or as punishment for past failings. We live in a world that invites humankind into the embrace of the human rights message. This message is understood as an invitation to a dignified quality of life for all. Poverty, under this new paradigm, is no longer fate or bad luck or "my own fault;" poverty acquires the status of a violation of human rights, perpetrated by the rich on the poor. Disabling environments are no longer accepted, but seen as massive acts of humiliation. Thus, human rights ideals introduce a new link between poverty and humiliation. The disadvantaged of the world hear the invitation, but they fear that the invitation is not genuine. They feel humiliated by suspected hypocrisy, double standards, and unilateralism emanating from the world's elites. Confronted with such accusations, elites feel humiliated by what they perceive as ingratitude.

The terror attacks of the September 11, 2001 indicate that the entire world community is caught in cycles of humiliation. Men such as Osama bin Laden would find no followers if there were not a pool of feelings of humiliation, feelings that are so intense that young intelligent men are willing to sacrifice promising futures to follow such leaders in suicide attacks. The rich and powerful West has long been blind to the fact that its superiority may have humiliating effects on those who are less privileged and that neglecting this phenomenon may be dangerous, especially when the West simultaneously teaches the ideals of human rights, ideals that heighten feelings of humiliation.

The tasks facing us in the coming years

The *United Nations Millennium Declaration* of September 2000 calls the world to unite to achieve the following tasks:

- eradication of extreme poverty and hunger
- improvement in maternal health
- achievement of universal primary education

- control of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
- promotion gender equality and the empowerment of women
- promotion of environmental sustainability
- reduction of child mortality
- creation of a global partnership for development

The *World Summit on Sustainable Development* (also known as the *WSSD*, *Earth Summit III* or *Rio +10*) which took place from August 26 – September 4, 2002, in Johannesburg, South Africa, lists the following *successes*:

By 2015, agreements are set to

- halve the number of people living without clean water and sanitation
- reduce the loss of biodiversity
- restore depleted fish stocks
- reduce infant mortality rate and the prevalence of HIV

No concrete targets or tangible goals, however, were set for numerous other issues. The Summit *disappointments* concern:

- renewable energy
- phasing out agricultural subsidies
- good governance
- corporate responsibility

Many voices, academic and political, call for fair global trade. According to Sergio Cobo:

> People who live in rich countries account for only 20 per cent of the world's population, yet they get most of the fruits from globalisation. The world's poor, who count for 80 per cent, receive nothing. Is this really the type of globalisation we want? Let's globalise the struggle; let's globalise hope. We want to make trade work for all." [391]

Websites devoted to the promotion of fair trade include*: Fairtrade Foundation, Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Oxfam's fair trade site.*[392] Philippe Legrain, in his book *Open World: The Truth About Globalisation* (Legrain, 2002) delineates the responsibility that has to be shouldered by the *World Trade Organization* to create fairer global trade and Juliette Bennett, 2001, writes on the role of multinationals in conflict zones in promoting regional stability. Jeffrey Sachs explains, how world poverty can be ended (Sachs, 2005).

We live in a *World Risk Society* (Beck, 2000)[393] and we must tackle it constructively. Fortunately, we also live in an *Information Age*,[394] in which knowledge and creativity are available to save us.[395] With this creativity we may manage to build a *global village* with fair rules (Legrain, 2002) and *good* and *transparent governance*.

How the roadmap to the new world order might look

Is there another planet to move to after divorce?

The first step to a sustainable *global village* is the acknowledgement of new realities. Global interdependence is an inescapable component of those new realities. Global terror, new computer and biological viruses, global climate change all bring this fact dramatically home. These are *problems without passports,* as Kofi Annan is reported to have said.

Old concepts of *Realpolitik* are no longer appropriate and undermine constructive change. Everybody on the globe is "married" to everybody else *and there will be no possibility of moving out of the neighborhood if we divorce*. In many societies, married people who fall out with one another can get a divorce. If, after many rounds of humiliation and humiliation-for-humiliation they hate one another's guts, they can move in different neighborhoods and never see each other again. However, this is not possible for humankind in a *global village*. The maximum distance people can create under such circumstances is that of *neighbors*. The United States cannot move to another planet when it has enough of China. Nor have people who fear terror or climate collapse an alternative galaxy to call home. The only solution is to strive for a *good neighborhood* – or at least *supportable neighborhood* – a neighborhood that remains livable even in the event of a divorce.

The obligatory aim for humankind is to prepare for minimum damage in worst case scenarios. This world will never be a place where everybody loves and forgives everybody else. We certainly all hope for a world that takes maximal strides towards constructive social and ecological futures, yet, humankind does not have to reach its highest dreams to survive. We must simply avoid pushing the planet over the edge, both socially and ecologically. This is the mandatory minimum requirement.

In many countries parents increasingly receive joint custody for their children after divorce.[396] Humankind has *joint custody for the planet* – irrespective of any interpersonal or international falling out. For divorcing parents joint custody is only one among several alternatives – a family judge may decide for it or against it. However for humankind this arrangement is compulsory. Our global challenges – from fair trade to pollution control and disease containment – must be tackled even in the face of mutual antipathy. Societies that understand that couples will have to continue living as good neighbors and parents after divorce will prepare their citizens in profoundly new ways for marriage and cohabitation. They cannot merely hope for the best, allowing lovers to throw themselves blindly into hot passion and high mutual expectations. Society has to be more *proactive* and insert some *sensible security valves*.[397] They must forge new cultures and interaction skills. They must encourage a new type of calm maturity that allows individuals to enjoy the richness of human contact in a the-glass-is-half-full fashion, rather than immaturely smashing the glass whenever it appears to be half empty. Many in the corporate sector understand this and are aware of the negative effects private problems can have on corporate interests. Some companies offer family courses to teach communication skills and prevent the breakdown of families.

In the same vein, it is in the interest of humankind, for the sake of a sustainable future of the *global village*, to be better prepared for the maintenance of good international neighborhood relations. The call for the promotion of a *culture of peace* (UNESCO) is no rosy idea, no dream; it is the *Realpolitik* for the future. If humankind fails this new *Realpolitik*, unprecedented mayhem may befall us. The downing of the Twin Towers could very well be the first taste of unimaginable disasters.

On April 1, 2003, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said he fears that 100 Osama bin Ladens will emerge as a result of the Iraq war. Subsequent attacks in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the Middle East and threats in Kenya tend to substantiate this dire prediction. The attack on the UN in Baghdad on August 19, 2003 lends credence to Harlan Ullman's fear that Iraq will become a "surrogate battlefield" for Islamic Jihad-entrepreneurs against the West and that the bin Ladens and their successors may create a theocracy based on Saudi oil and Pakistani nuclear power.[398] It is not sufficient to round up a few individual terrorists. We must also work to diminish the widespread feelings of humiliation that provide the background for terrorist action.

Clients often see psychotherapists because they want to get rid of a problem – smoking, alcohol, or some other obsession. They expect the therapist to "cut out" this problem like a surgeon. However, in many cases the superficial problem is only an expression of an underlying imbalance and the entire personality must be considered and restructured to effect a cure. Likewise, we cannot hope to save the world by surgically removing a few terrorists from the flesh of humankind.

We cannot afford to fuel the fires of local and global family fallings out and "divorces." Overheated calls for revenge have no place in such a limited space as the *global village*.[399] Constructive neighborhood relations must remain possible however deep the rifts. Psychologists, sociologists, teachers, and others trained in relationships should be enlisted by global society to teach better *communication skills*, especially cross-cultural skills. Learning and teaching these skills is a new, but paramount, local and global task.[400] The global community of scientists also has a central responsibility.[401]

The world must *calm down*. Every individual must strive for a degree of detachment that makes sensible reflection and action possible. Taking time-out, improving self-regulatory strategies and stress management and reframing goals are essential skills (Mischel and De Smet, 2000). Global society must also provide efficient third-party intervention to promote composure when potentially destructive emotions are aroused. Every individual needs a *personal manager* to help the self sustain uncertainty, avert the urge to jump to premature conclusions or rigid attachments, and maintain respectful and warm relationships with self and others. N*ew communication skills* that embrace the Buberian dialogical *I-Thou* relationship and the Lévinasian caring for *the other* can be learned once individuals have the self-control and composure of a personal manager. In effective communication, the interlocutors achieve good attunement with one another (see Scheff, 2003a). This can be done through effective *pendulation* between different parts of the self, with others, and the world in general.

Mandela's approach to justice is the only path adapted to a viable future for the *global village*. Mandela focuses on constructive solutions for the future instead of being caught in bitterness over past humiliation.[402] Glass-half-full thinking, decency over justice, avoiding the acts and feelings of humiliation – these are all aspects of the new need to be proactive and train for constructive "divorce" in case love fails.

We must remember that misunderstandings and help can lead to feelings of humiliation even in the absence of the intention to humiliate, setting in motion bitter cycles of humiliation. It is essential for helpers to understand that even the most well-intentioned display of help may elicit feelings of humiliation.

There is currently an upsurge of literature on forgiveness and reconciliation. However, forgiveness is complex and reconciliation may sometimes be too much to ask and not always necessary. A Tutsi genocide survivor told me (1999 in Kigali), "I cannot forgive the killers of my mother. That would arrogate a right that only she has. What I can do is curb my urge for revenge and contribute my share to make sure my children will live in a friendlier world."[403]

The Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, established by Helen Bamber in Britain, deals with 5,500 new cases every year. An excerpt from a report on the 1999 Forgiveness Conference, recalls the following incident from Bamber's work:

> One man, whose story Helen Bamber described movingly, had been forced to witness his own son's execution, and to applaud. He had also been badly tortured himself. He did not talk of forgiveness, but neither did he seek revenge. He felt anger, extreme grief and a lack of purpose in his life. 'The battle he had been prepared for had been lost. How do you help a man who has suffered this kind of loss and abuse, to grieve appropriately?' What he needed was validation and recognition. He was able to talk about his son, to re-live his relationship with his son and to make him present enough that he was finally able to release him and symbolically bury him (Simon Bowen, 1999, *The Forgiveness Conference*, October 18, 1999, The Findhorn Foundation[404]).

Third party intervention

The human rights movement has been called in this book the *first continuous revolution in human history* because new underlings are constantly on the rise. Masters (dictators and other supremacists) are asked to step down from their illegitimate positions of superiority and underlings (the poor, low castes and underlings in general) are encouraged to view themselves as illegitimately humiliated and entitled to rise. Both, former masters and former underlings are invited to meet at the line of equal dignity and humility. Feelings of humiliation – the "fuel" that drives this continuous revolution – might be thought of as the "red thread" that binds all *rising underlings* together, be they *the colonized, people of color, women or, advocates for nature, feelings, creativity,* or *individual freedom.* Fragmented movements of underlings would benefit from greater awareness of what they share and what binds them together – the experience of humiliation.[405]

As hope-inducing as the *continuous human rights revolution* may be, minefields loom large ahead. Deutsch (2002) writes:

> … any attempt to end long-enduring oppressive relations will have to address the psychodynamic issues which lead people to resist changing unhappy but familiar relationships. Some of the anxieties and fears that have to be addressed for the oppressed and oppressor are listed below:

1. Both feel anxious in the face of the unknown. They believe that they will be foolish, humiliated, or helpless, in a new unclear relationship;
2. Both fear the guilt and self-contempt for their roles in maintaining the oppressive relationship;
3. The oppressed fears that their rage will be unleashed; the oppressor is in terror of this rage;
4. Both fear punishment, if they change; the oppressed from the oppressor, the oppressor from the oppressed and other oppressors; and,
5. Both anticipate loss from the change: the oppressed will lose their sense of moral superiority and the excuses of victimhood; the oppressor will lose the respect and material benefits associated with being more powerful (Deutsch, 2002, p. 21-22).

Underlings, rising towards equal dignity, may not understand that humiliating their former masters is as much a violation as the humiliation they once had to endure. During the process of change, care must be taken to discourage rising underlings from surpassing the line of humility. Former masters and former underlings should be encouraged to meet at the line of humility. Whereas in former times masters were replaced by revolting underlings and hierarchy was kept unchanged, the new strategy is to dismantle both tyranny and the oppressive hierarchy which produces tyranny.

Feelings of humiliation emerging around the world can ironically be interpreted as a success of human rights teachings because feelings of humiliation are sharpened when ideals do not correspond to reality. These heightened feelings of humiliation, however, have profound effects on people, as I observed in my clients and during my social psychological research. Human rights advocates need to be aware that these intensified feelings of humiliation represent the *nuclear bomb of feelings* and work diligently to teach individuals and groups dignified ways out of humiliation. The international community's aim must be to prevent dynamics of humiliation from occurring and contain those that are in motion. Humiliating people has to be avoided, at all levels, at the family, organizational, national and international level. At the national and global level it is particularly essential to "dry out" the waters in which despotic humiliation entrepreneurs swim who spread global terror. As an Arab friend told me (May 1, 2003), "Why do you first feed dictators, sell them arms, [406] and then you bomb us to liberate us? Stop feeding dictators in the first place! Why is global trade still not fair and poverty abject in so many world regions? Invest in a fairer world and not in dictators that you first nurture in and then bomb out!"

Global village building

Global village building is not an affair to be left to laissez faire strategies or appeasement. It requires firm and courageous resolve. The question, however, is which kind of firm and courageous resolve is necessary. Courageous action can be invested into global institution building, containment and policing, or it can be invested into self-appointed law enforcement aiming to protect ones own family and interests only. The first application of courage is the one fitting in a global interdependent world, the second one is appropriate in an unsafe frontier region at pre-global times.

Wars that employ surgical strikes to liberate peoples from tyrants certainly have laudable advantages. *Surgical strikes* surely are preferable to *carpet bombing* because they attend to the problem in a more tailor-made fashion. Yet, even in surgery, surgeons who strike risk failure. Human encounter with the world has to become even more tailor-made than that. Prevention, for example, is preferable to post-hoc intervention. Prevention of disease can make surgery superfluous. However, even when prevention fails, instead of striking, surgeons often go about with painstaking meticulousness. Surgery is most of the time not the hit and run remedy as which it sometimes is portrayed. Even *surgical strikes* can go wrong, to minimize damage, better than on *surgical strikes* we may want to bet on *surgical art*.

Building sustainable *global village* institutions is tedious. It is a long haul operation that requires meticulous *surgical art*. For a constructive future for the *global village* it is not anymore practical to round up *friends* and *enemies* for short-term operations. It is not useful to ask "are you with us or against us" because this insinuates that there is space for *enemies* or those against *us* in *our* neighborhood. Humankind huddling on a tiny planet does not have this option, as difficult as it may be to let go of familiar *friends/enemy* notions. What is needed, are super-ordinate global institutional structures that include all.

There will always be unpleasant people around on the globe, and dangerously disturbed or psychotic individuals will never go away. Yet, the maximal negative label we may apply to such people is *bad neighbors* and not *enemies*. *Bad neighbors* have to be attended to by police, courts, or psychiatry. Only in this way the damage done by such individuals can be limited. The majority of the global community has to be protected from being drawn into stand-offs steered by antisocial personalities.

Courageous fighting and decisive resolve – these virtues have to be invested in fighting *for* global social and ecological sustainability and not *against* enemies. There is a right of self-defense; however, self-defense by merely *striking back* is counterproductive. As long as self-defense is not inclusive of all opponents and satisfies all sides, it represents not self-*defense*, but self-*damage*. This is inescapable reality on a limited, interdependent globe, at least for those who listen to the human rights message and wish for a pacified *global village*.

Security, stability, freedom, peace, these words have an old and a new meaning. The old meaning advocates the infliction of humiliation, the new meaning the abstaining from humiliation. Only the new meaning is adapted to new realities of *globalization* embracing *egalization*. Furthermore, for global *security, stability, freedom,* and *peace* it is not sufficient anymore to wait for the possible *arrival* of problems, it is mandatory to envisage and work for *preventing*[407] their arrival. It is, for example, not enough to foresee that China may become a graver threat to United States interests in the coming years than Russia and prepare for defense *against* this threat. It is not sufficient to ally with Russia and overlook its human rights violations in Chechnya so as to counterbalance the Chinese menace. This is just not good enough. It was – perhaps – good enough in the old world, yet, if it ever was, it is no longer.

In the new world of global interdependence, it is indispensable to include everybody into a neighborhood – nobody can escape from it in any case – in at least a minimal constructive way. Old *enmity* is no longer an option. Protecting *against* is no longer on the table. Fighting *for* inclusive neighborhood is the only choice there is. *Everybody's*

security hinges on everybody else's security. Global terror has brought this home to everybody.

The core approach to a new *inclusive world order* is to implement the rule of law at the global level. Present United Nations institutions are the beginnings of such super-ordinate roofs of law for the entire *global village*.[408] *Might-is-right* muscle power loses significance when interdependence increasingly dictates the terms. One of Tony Blair's closest foreign political allies has warned that Britain and America may regret unleashing the "law of the jungle" in international relations when China becomes the dominant world power later this century. The Labour prime minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark, told the Guardian that Washington and its allies had created a dangerous precedent by going to war without a UN resolution. She said:

> This is a century which is going to see China emerge as the largest economy, and usually with economic power comes military clout… In the world we are constructing, we want to know [that the system] will work whoever is the biggest and the most powerful… It would be very easy for a country like New Zealand to make excuses and think of justifications for what its friends were doing, but we would have to be mindful that we were creating precedents for others also to exit from multilateral decision making. I don't want precedents set, regardless of who is seen as the biggest kid on the block."

Helen Clark said the damage to the UN must be repaired to prevent a return to 19th century style anarchy in international relations, leaving countries like New Zealand at the mercy of the great powers.

> New Zealand has always argued for the rights of small states… We saw the UN as a fresh start for a world trying to work out its problems together rather than a return to a 19th world where the great powers carved it up… Who wants to go back to the jungle? The multilateral system had been damaged by the rifts over Iraq, but countries were now redoubling their efforts to cooperate in the Doha round of global trade talks (Denny and Freedland, 2003).

As important as global rule of law may be, humankind's efforts must reach beyond it. Mere *justice* is inadequate, *decency* has to be achieved (Margalit, 1996). Avishai Margalit (1996) wrote *The Decent Society*, in which he calls for institutions that do no longer humiliate citizens – just societies no longer suffice, the goal should be decent societies that transcend humiliation. *Decency* reigns when dignity for all is made possible. *Decency* calls for a joint effort to attain the goals of the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* of September 2000. Margalit's call for *decency* is essential if we are to prevent neighborhood deterioration and keep the globe from slipping over the edge.

Roadmap of Transition from the Old to the New World Order

	Old Honor Order	New Dignity Order
Archi-tecture	• We observe many *villages* (not *One single global village*) based on a hierarchical honor code that legitimizes humiliation as a strategy (ranking of human worthiness). • Feelings of humiliation are "locked" by the honor code (ranking human worthiness is legitimate) • We see the world as divided into *friends* and *enemies*, *in-* and *outgroups* (because there are many *villages*), *higher* and *lesser* beings (because ranking human worthiness is legitimate).	• We observe *One single global village* (*globalization*) based on a code of equal dignity that de-legitimizes humiliation (*egalization* of human worthiness) • Feelings of humiliation are being "unlocked" by the human rights message (stratification of human worthiness is illegitimate). • We see *One single* global family, *One single ingroup* (*globalization*), within which feelings get hotter, especially when equal dignity (*egalization*) is seen to be violated.
Toolbox for strategy	• Humiliating others may at times protect my self-interest, both *inside* and *outside* my group. • Protecting freedom and security *against* adversaries is feasible, since walls, bulwarks and war indeed may protect me. Furthermore, "empty" regions such as Australia still are available to send enemies into exile; moreover, global environmental interconnectedness is still limited.	• Humbling tyrants serves my self-interest only if it is done without humiliation. Bullies are not to be met by *war*, but by *policing*, and they are not *enemies*, but *misguided family members* or *bad neighbors*. Words such as *enemy* and *war* are obsolete in the new order. Defending the old honor order is increasingly self-defeating. In the corporate world, humiliation as tool to increase effectiveness of team work is increasingly counterproductive. • Freedom and security are only feasible *together with* everybody else because even my next-door neighbor may turn his body into a missile or environmental hazard if I do not secure our relationship by ways of mutual trust. Freedom and security furthermore hinge on the achievement of global dignity through attaining the goals of the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* of September 2000.

Table 11: Roadmap of transition from the old to the new world order

This book presents a novel perspective on the human condition and issues an invitation to the reader to join in with own research. The questions asked are not "who is right or who is wrong?" but "what is beneficial?" or, "how can humankind tailor-make solutions for new circumstances?" or, "which social tendencies should we strengthen and which should we allow to go by the wayside?"

The central question of our times is whether the deplorable state of the *global village is* an expression of the *essence* of *globalization* or a *side effect* that can be remedied? My position is that this obscene condition is a *side effect.* The problem may be that *unifying tendencies* transgress *national borders in a way* that hampers *egalization.* The building of global institutions to curb Hobbesian anarchy lags. There may be a *benign future* ahead for the *global village,* if we manage to *steer clear* of the *malignancies* threatening in the short term. Those threats are linked to the phenomenon of humiliation. If not curbed, the dynamics of humiliation could undermine all the benign tendencies. Our hope lies in the fact that many countries have learned to tame their internal tendencies toward Hobbesian anarchy, in the process creating models that can be followed at the global level. That model operates from the benign belief in *One single interdependent in-group.* That belief on the global level must be linked with a worldwide commitment to overcoming the lack of *egalization that* humiliates humanity. To capitalize on the benign tendencies of the *global village*, we must call for a *Moratorium on Humiliation.* [409]

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[1] See Ullman and Wade, 1996, on the political/military strategy of *shock and awe* going back to Sun Tzu, the warrior-philosopher of ancient China.

[2] Compare also Ullman and Wade, 1996, and the case of Japan in 1945 and its suicidal resistance, a resistance that was "halted" by the nuclear bombs' "shock and awe."

[3] Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirmed this when he spoke at Harvard University June 5, 1972, at the commemoration of George Marshall's speech 25 years earlier (Brandt, 1999). Brandt's speech was entitled: *1945 Different Than 1918*. Willy Brandt declared: "Victories, too, can be bitter, especially if they carry the seed for future conflicts as in 1918, when the war was won, and peace was lost for want of reason on the part of the winners and the losers, through stubborn mistrust on the one side, through resentment of the humiliated on the other... George Marshall and others agreed that victory did not relieve his country of its responsibility. The United States did not for a moment claim that responsibility for itself, it shared it with its allies...With his plan George Marshall roused Europe's stifled self-confidence. He gave many citizens of the old continent a concrete stimulus to bring down from the stars the vision of a Europe united in lasting peace... the Marshall Plan was productive proof that America needs a self-confident Europe capable of forming a common political will... it waits for Europe to grow into an equal partner with whom it can share the burden of responsibility for world affairs...1947 marked the beginning of the Cold War, not because of, but in spite of the Marshall Plan."
There is a controversial discussion as to the "real" motives behind the implementation of the Marshall Pan, pertaining to geopolitical situation with the Soviet Union, for example, and as to the "real" economic impact of the Marshall Plan. This discussion will not be deepened here. Instead, the aspect is highlighted that the Marshall Plan, indeed, as Willy Brandt pointed out, roused self-confidence and respect.

[4] See for Lindner's publications, Lindner, 2005d, Lindner, 2005b, Lindner, 2005c, Lindner, 2005a, Hudnall and Lindner, 2004, Lindner, 2004c, Lindner, 2004d, Lindner, 2004b, Lindner, 2004a, Lindner, 2003c, Lindner, 2003b, Lindner, 2003a, Lindner, 2003e, Lindner, 2003d, Lindner, 2002f, Lindner, 2002g, Lindner, 2002h, Lindner, 2002b, Lindner, 2002a, Lindner, 2002c, Lindner, 2002d, Lindner, 2001f, Lindner, 2001d, Lindner, 2001b, Lindner, 2001c, Lindner, 2001g, Lindner, 2001j, Lindner, 2001k, Lindner, 2001i, Lindner, 2001e, Lindner, 2001a, Lindner, 2000q, Lindner, 2000w, Lindner, 2000i, Lindner, 2000j, Lindner, 2000k, Lindner, 2000x, Lindner, 2000e, Lindner, 2000d, Lindner, 2000c, Lindner, 2000v, Lindner, 2000u, Lindner, 2000g, Lindner, 2000h, Lindner, 2000f, Lindner, 2000l, Lindner, 2000r, Lindner, 2000a, Lindner, 2000b, Lindner, 2000t, Lindner, 2000o, Lindner, 2000n, Lindner, 1999b, Lindner, 1999c, Lindner, 1999a, Lindner, 1999d, Lindner, 1998.

[5] See www.coexistence.net; see also Weiner (Ed.), 1998.

[6] Marshall McLuhan is credited with having coined the phrase "*global village*" in 1959, after borrowing it from Wyndham Lewis; the term appeared in *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, McLuhan, 1962).

[7] Celebrate Humanity campaign 2002, see http://www.olympic.org/. The italic emphasis is added.

[8] See for his publications, for example, Føllesdal, 1988, and Føllesdal, 1996b.

[9] Føllesdal, 1996a, in a presentation at Det Norske Vitenskaps-Akademi (Norwegian Academy of Science), January 30, 1996.

[10] Or at least a method to settle disagreement; this was the position to which Rawls later retreated, a move that is not shared by Føllesdal.

[11] See also Smedslund, 1997, and Smedslund, 1998.

[12] "Even though ordinary words have very variable meanings, they also have a stable core meaning, and many partly overlapping words may also refer to the same core meaning. In summary, it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language… A formulation of such a system can only approximate some of the psychologically relevant features of ordinary language and must necessarily ignore others. However, one may envisage successively more complex scientific language, including an ever higher number of psychologically important distinctions" (Smedslund 1988, p. 5).

[13] I thank Dagfinn Føllesdal for helping me to draw up these questions in 1996.

[14] Quoted from http://www.fni.no/christ.htm.

[15] I thank Reidar Ommundsen and Finn Tschudi for kindly helping me to get access to psychological theories on emotion, especially as developed by Tomkins and Nathanson. Silvan S. Tomkins, 1962, developed one of the most interesting theories of the human being and emotions; see his four volumes of *Affect Imagery and Consciousness*. See also Virginia Demos (Ed.), 1995, and *Exploring Affect*, a book that eases the otherwise difficult access to Tomkins' thinking. Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on script, shame, and pride. Abelson, 1976 addresses the issue from the cognitive perspective, compared to Tomkins personality-psychological perspective.

[16] Trejo (1999) summarizes the masterly and servant self consciously as follows, "MASTERY SELF CONSCIOUSNESS, the mindframe of the Ruler, brings the demand and the fear to daily life, as a stimulus for progress. But the Master does not progress, otherwise, he wouldn't be the Master! His job is to fight and retain Mastery, never thanking anyone, never deferring to anyone, just retaining this Mastery, without any further development. So, all development belongs to the Servant Class. SERVANT SELF CONSCIOUSNESS not only evolves new technologies and sciences to serve the Master, but also endures its own private hells and torments, so that philosophy itself ferments, and not just technology. The Servant has all the ideas and inventions in the workplace, but at home in his or her hearth, the Servant comes up with philosophical justifications for his or her position" (Trejo, 1999, capitalization in original).

[17] *Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil,* by Scheler, 1912, published in English under the title *Ressentiment*, Scheler, 1961. See also Liah Greenfeld, who suggests that ressentiment plays a central role in nation building (Greenfeld, 1992, Greenfeld, 1996).

[18] *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haß*, by Scheler, 1913, published in English under the title *The Nature of Sympathy*, Scheler, 1954.

[19] It was Dagfinn Føllesdal, later Thomas Cushman, editor of Human Rights Review, and Reidar Ommundsen, who drew my attention to Scheler and Honneth.

[20] See, for example, Crozier, 1997, Henig, 1991, Martel (Ed.), 1999, or Overy, 1998.

[21] See for an overview, for example, Brewer and Crano, 1994, Brown, 1986, Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, 1998, Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, and Stephenson (Eds.), 1997, Hogan, Johnson, and Briggs (Eds.), 1997, Hogg and Vaughan, 1995.

[22] Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on *script*, shame, and pride (Nathanson, 1987, Nathanson, 1992, Nathanson, 1996). Scripts are "the structures within which we store scenes;" they are "sets of rules for the ordering of information about SARS" (Stimulus-Affect-Response Sequences) (Nathanson, 1996). See for work on scripts also Eric Berne, 1972, with his book *What Do You Say After You Say Hello?* that illuminates script theory from the clinical perspective.

[23] See related texts in Burr, 1995, Danziger, 1990, Edwards and Potter, 1992, Edwards, 1999, Campos, Ramos, and Bernal, 1999, Billig et al., 1988, Edwards, 1988, Gee, 1999, Shotter and Gergen (Eds.), 1989, Gergen, 1965, Gergen, 1973, Gergen, 1982, Gergen and Gergen, 1986, Gergen and Gergen, 1988, Gergen, 1994, Gergen, 1997a, Gergen, 1999, Gergen, 2000b, Ibanez, 1991, Mead, 1934, Middleton and Edwards (Eds.), 1990, Moscovici, 1976, Moscovici, 1985, Moscovici, 1998, van Rappard, 1997, Potter and Edwards, 1999, Rorty, 1991, Sampson, 1978, Sampson, 1991, Shotter, 1993, Spence, 1982, Vygotsky, 1978, Wetherell and Potter, 1998, Woofitt, 1992; and see for emotions in this context Lutz, 1988, and Tavris, 1989.

[24] "Complexity theory is a new interdisciplinary approach to understanding dynamic processes involving the interaction of many actors. A primary methodology of complexity theory is agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling involves specifying how individual agents (such as people, nations, or

organizations) interact with each other and with their environment. Computer simulation is then used to discover the emergent properties of the model, and thereby gain insights into dynamic processes that would be too difficult to model with standard mathematical techniques" (quoted from Robert Axelrod's website http://www-personal.umich.edu/~axe/PS793_W03.htm).

[25] See, for example, Harvey, 1990.

[26] See, for example, Brown, 1997, Brown, 1994. Also Argyle writes extensively about social relations (Argyle and Henderson, 1990, Argyle and Cook, 1976, Argyle, 1994, Furnham and Argyle (Eds.), 1981, Argyle and Colman, 1995, Argyle, Collett, and Furnham, 1995, Argyle, 1992, Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, Argyle, 1974, Humphrey and Argyle, 1962, Argyle, Furnham, and Graham, 1981). I thank Ragnvald Kalleberg for introducing me to this literature. See furthermore Ettin, Fidler, and Cohen (Eds.), 1995, or Lichbach, 1998. A vast amount of literature can be drawn upon.

[27] For example, Forsyth, 1999.

[28] "Using such rubrics as socially-shared cognition, distributed cognition, and contextualized cognition, investigators are focusing on cognition as an interpersonal as well as an intrapersonal process. Without negating the importance of information processing at the individual level, social psychologists (as well as developmental and organizational psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and educational researchers) are exploring the implications of viewing cognition as a fundamentally social activity." (Thompson, Levine, and Messick (Eds.), 1999, Introduction). See also Augoustinos and Walker, 1995, Higgins, 1992, Hinsz, Tindale, and Vollrath, 1997, Levine, Resnick, and Higgins, 1993, Nye and Brower, 1996, Resnick, Levine, and Teasley (Eds.), 1991, Thompson and Fine, 1999.

[29] Group analysis, self psychology, and modern hermeneutics all examine the group. Among the numerous approaches to the investigation of the group, even a group self has been stipulated. Kohut (1976) introduced the concept of a group self as follows: "It will have become obvious to those who are familiar with my recent work that I am suggesting, as a potentially fruitful approach to a complex problem, that we posit the existence of a certain psychological configuration with regard to the group – let us call it the 'group self' – which is analogous to the self of the individual. We are then in a position to observe the group self as it is formed, as it is held together, as it oscillates between fragmentation and reintegration, etc. – all in analogy to phenomena of individual psychology to which we have comparatively easy access in the clinical (psychoanalytic) situation" (Kohut, 1976a, p. 206).

[30] See, for example, Hechter and Horne (Eds.), 2003.

[31] See, for example, Gladwell, 2000.

[32] *Imagined Communities*, by Benedict Anderson, 1991. See also Berger and Luckmann, 1966.

[33] *Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process*, by Lumsden and Wilson, 1981. See also for a more recent evaluation *Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science*, edited by Robert Aunger (Ed.), 2000. See furthermore classics such as Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (Eds.), 1992.

[34] The idea of the hermeneutic circle was introduced by Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911), a philosopher and literary historian who is generally recognized as the 'father' of the modern hermeneutic enterprise in the social and human sciences. "Dilthey argued that the human world was sufficiently different from the natural world that special methods were required for its study. Hermeneutics, the deliberate and systematic methodology of interpretation, was the approach Dilthey proposed for studying and understanding the human world" (Tappan, 2000, Abstract). Dilthey's intellectual biographer H. P. Rickman explains, "We cannot pinpoint the precise meaning of a word unless we read it in its context, i.e. the sentence or paragraph in which it occurs. But how can we know what the sentence means unless we have first understood the individual words? Logically there is no escape from this absence of priority; in practice we solve the problem by a kind of mental shuttlecock movement' (Rickman, 1979, p. 130).

[35] Julius Paltiel relates this story in a documentary film, *Skygger fra Falstad*, 2002, by Frida Jørstad Krüger.

[36] Read René Girard's work on *scapegoating* (Girard, 1982, Girard, 1986, Girard, 1977).

[37] Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Brussels, February 26, 1997.

[38] Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Kigali, September 9, 1995.

[39] Latin circum = around, scribere = to write, circumscription means limitation, enclosure, or confinement. The terms territorial or social circumscription address limitations in these respective areas.

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[40] Greek holo = entire; whole, cene = recent.

[41] I owe this reference to Dennis Smith.

[42] Deutsch (2002, p. 10) writes about the basic ways by which high power groups can keep low power groups low: "control over the instruments of systematic terror and of their use; control over the state which establishes and enforces the laws, rules and procedures which regulate the social institutions of the society; control over the institutions (such as the family, school church, and media) which socialize and indoctrinate people (such as the family, school, church, and the media) to accept the power inequalities; and interactive power in which there are repeated individual behaviors by those who are more powerful which confirm the subordinate status of those in low power. In addition, there are the self-fulfilling prophecies in which the behavior of the oppressed, resulting from their oppression are used by the oppressor to justify the oppression; and the distorted relation between the oppressor and the oppressed."

[43] The following three paragraphs are adapted from Lindner, 2002b, p. 142.

[44] This paragraph is adapted from Lindner, 2000j, p. 3.

[45] *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and The Roots of Violence*, by Miller, 1983.

[46] Nisbett and Cohen, 1996.

[47] See other evidence relating to blood feuds in Boehm, 1984, Malcolm, 1998, and Rodina, 1999. I owe these references to Adam Jones.

[48] See, for example Johansen, 1982, Weatherford, 1988, Weatherford, 1991, for a discussion of the constructive contributions from Native Indians in North America. I thank Jacqueline Wasilewski for having drawn my attention to this literature.

[49] See, in particular, the work of Carneiro, 1988.

[50] See the classic work of Simone de Beauvoir, 1953, *The Second Sex*. According to Beauvoir, women are "not born, but made."

[51] See Marcel Mauss, 1950, *Sociologie et Anthropologie*; Claude Lévi-Strauss, 1957, "Reciprocity, the essence of social life?"; and Lévi-Strauss, 1968, *Les Structures Élementaires de la Parenté*. I was confronted with this practice during my fieldwork in Somalia in 1998, where the exchange of women between clans was widely regarded as the last step on the way to solve the current divisions. See Lindner, 2001c.

[52] There is a sea of literature to be drawn upon that addresses just war. Walzer, 1992 is a classic. See also Norman, 1995.

[53] Morton Deutsch (2002) writes on *oppression* and identifies five types of *injustices* that are involved in oppression (p. 4): *distributive injustice, procedural injustice, retributive injustice, moral exclusion,* and *cultural imperialism. Distributive* injustice addresses four types of capital, *consumption, investment, skill,* and *social* (Perrucci and Wysong, 1999). Deutsch (2002) continues (p. 16), "The oppressors use "history," "the law of nature," "the will of God," "science," "the criteria of art," and "language" as well as the social institutions of society to legitimize their superiority and to ignore or minimize the identity of the oppressed." For the *psychology of oppression*, see Fanon, 1986, and also Bulhan, 1985. Paulo Freire is another important name to be mentioned in this context, see, for example, Freire, 1970. See also Sidanius and Pratto, 1999.

[54] Harvey, 1999, has used the term *civilized oppression* to characterize the everyday processes of oppression in normal life. Civilized oppression "is embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutions and rules, and the collective consequences of following those rules. It refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions which are supported by the media and cultural stereotypes as well as by the structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms" (Young, 1990, p. 41, I quote from Deutsch, 2002).

[55] See Seligman, 1975, Abela and Seligman, 2000, and also Peterson and Maier, 1993, among many others.

[56] See, for example, Guha and Spivak (Eds.), 1988.

[57] Apart from Adorno et al., 1950, see related literature, for example, in Altemeyer, 1988, Altemeyer, 1981, among many others.

[58] Kelman and Hamilton, 1989. See also Blass, 1991, and Blass (Ed.), 2000.

[59] See Smith, 2000 forthcoming. There is a sea of literature available on Norbert Elias.

[60] See also Braithwaite's work on shame, reintegration, and modernity, Braithwaite, 1989, Braithwaite, 1993. See furthermore Keltner, 1995, and Keltner, Young, and Buswell, 1997.

[61] See, for example, Gilbert and Andrews (Eds.), 1998, Gilbert, 2000, Morrison and Gilbert, 2001, Gilbert and Miles (Eds.), 2002; see also Hartling et al., 2000.

[62] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2002 explains, "The human development index (HDI) is a simple summary measure of three dimensions of the human development concept: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a decent standard of living ... Thus it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income to allow a broader view of a country's development than using income alone, which is too often equated with well-being. Since the creation of the HDI in 1990 three supplementary indices have been developed to highlight particular aspects of human development: the human poverty index (HPI), gender-related development index (GDI) and gender empowerment measure (GEM)."

[63] Miller, 1993, p. 175, italics in original.

[64] See Lyons, 1978. I thank Barnett Pearce for making me aware of Lyons's book. I thank Jon Elster for making me aware that the "birth of the self" began much earlier, with Michel de Montaigne, 1575, in his Essays. See furthermore, Bloom, 1999.

[65] See Lindner, 2001b.

[66] Cognitive dissonance could be the appropriate term to be applied to the situation of the crying soldier.

[67] See Smith, 2001, whom I thank for coining the words conquest/relegation/reinforcement/inclusion humiliation.

[68] See Lindner, 2000h, p. 8.

[69] See Lindner, 2001b.

[70] *Power and control wheel*: Domestic violence consists of physical, sexual, psychological, and/or emotional abuse.

[71] See also Harvey, 1999.

[72] This section is adapted from Lindner, 2000k.

[73] See, for example, Scriven, 1967, and Scriven, 1972.

[74] Rostow's linear theory of development is criticized in this line (Rostow, 1960). I thank Roger van Zwanenburg for making me aware of Rostow's work.

[75] Suzanne M. Retzinger, 1991, and Thomas J. Scheff and Retzinger, 1991.

[76] Vogel and Lazare, 1990. See also Anatol Rapoport (1997), who writes that "... the most intense feelings experienced by human beings are probably those engendered by conflict and by love" (Rapoport, 1997, xxi).

[77] Hale, 1994. See also Lehmann, 1995, Schlesinger, 1998.

[78] Gomes de Matos, 2002.

[79] See, for example, Baumeister, Wotman, and Stillwell, 1993, Brossat, 1995, Gilbert, 1997, Proulx et al., 1994.

[80] See, for example, Brown, Harris, and Hepworth, 1995, Miller, 1988. Kendler et al., 2003, document that humiliating events that directly devalue an individual in a core role were strongly linked to risk for depressive episodes. I thank Linda Hartling for this reference.

[81] See, for example, Ignatieff, 1997, Markus, Kitayama, and Heimann, 1996, Silver et al., 1986, Wood et al., 1994.

[82] See, for example, Hardman et al., 1996.

[83] See, for example, Peters, 1993, Stadtwald, 1992, Toles, 1995, Zender, 1994.

[84] See also Masson, 1996, Vachon, 1993, Znakov, 1990.

[85] Gilligan, 1996.

[86] See, for example, Volkan, 1988, Volkan, 1992, Volkan, 1994, Volkan and Harris, 1995, Volkan, 1997, Volkan, 2004.

[87] See, for example, Montville, 1993, Volkan, Demetrios, and Montville (Eds.), 1990, Montville, 1990.

[88] Together with their colleagues at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction of the University of Virginia (Harris, 1993, Harris, 1994, Stein and Apprey, 1990, Stein and Apprey, 1985, Apprey, 1994, and Ross, 1993b, Ross, 1995b).

[89] Steinberg, 1991a, Steinberg, 1991b, Steinberg, 1996.

[90] See Staub, 1989, Staub, 1990, Staub, 1993, and Staub, 1996. See for more literature on psychological approaches to the field of international relations that consider humiliation, for example, Cviic, 1993, Luo, 1993, Midiohouan, 1991, Urban, 1990.

[91] Klein, 1991. See for further work Broom and Klein, 1999, Klein, 1992a.

[92] Barrett and Brooks, 1992, Klein, 1992b, Smith, 1992.

[93] Hartling and Luchetta, 1999.

[94] Margalit, 1996, see also Frankfurt, 1997, Honneth, 1997, Lukes, 1997, Mack, 1997, Margalit, 1997, Pettit, 1997, Quinton, 1997, Ripstein, 1997, Oksenberg Rorty, 1997, Schick, 1997.

[95] Co*gnitive appraisal theory of emotions* indicates that victims evaluate and react to harm on the basis of questions such as "Who is responsible?" "Is there a justification for what happened?" "Were norms violated?" (see, for example, Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, and Clore & Ortony, 2000).

[96] Read, among many others, Diamond, 1997, Fromkin, 1999, Kennedy, 1987, McNeill, 1997, McNeill, 1982.

[97] Apart from Lyons, 1978, see also work on the development of self-awareness over longer stretches of history. See classic, albeit controversial work by Julian Jaynes, 1990, and more recent views, such as by Robert Karl Kretz, 2000.

[98] Game theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with strategic problems that relate to politics, commerce, warfare and – more recently – biology and sociology. Game theory is a study of how to mathematically determine the best strategy for given conditions in order to optimize the outcome. "Games" that use these theories are, for example, the Prisoner's Dilemma. Among the most well-known expressions of game theory are terms such as zero sum game. Game theory was formally developed as part of economic theory by Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, in their classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.

[99] See on the information age, the work by Manuel Castells, Castells, 1996, Castells, 1997b, Castells, 1997a.

[100] Festinger, 1957, did path breaking work on dissonance.

[101] Berger, 1970, wrote an article "On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor." See also Charles Taylor, 1993, and his description of the paradigm shift from honor to dignity and recognition. According to Taylor, social hierarchies are the basis for honor and the collapse of these hierarchies is the precondition of honor's transmutation into dignity and recognition. The Enlightenment emphasizes the equality of every human person and the abolition not just of social hierarchies but of the concept of honor. I thank Eric van Grasdorff for making me aware of Taylor's work.

[102] Markus and Kitayama (1994) describe the cultural shaping of emotions as collective reality or core cultural ideas. They analyze the subjective reality of societies as flowing from their socio-economic environment and institutional structures and examine how aspects of individual emotionality relate to this subjective reality.[102] Translated into the terms used in this book, the notion of humiliation is a core cultural idea that is deeply embedded into historic social and societal changes. See furthermore Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997 and Harré (Ed.), 1986. Coleman (2003, p. 25) explains, that "some scholars contend that extreme reactions seen in many conflicts are primarily based in emotional responses (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). However, until recently researchers have paid little attention to the role that emotions play in conflict (Barry and Oliver, 1996)." However, Coleman recognizes that emotions and rationality cannot be divided. He states that "In effect, the overall distinction between emotionality and rationality may be rather dubious when it comes to intractable conflicts, where they are often inseparable. Here, indignation, rage, and righteousness are reasons enough for retributive action. This is the essential dimension of human suffering and pain, of blood and sorrow, which in large part defines the domain of intractable conflict" (Coleman, 2003, p. 25).

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[103] Moore, 1996, identifies five *kinds of conflict* (p. 60): *Relationship conflicts* (strong emotions, misperceptions or stereotypes, poor communication or miscommunication, repetitive negative behavior), *data conflicts* (lack of information, misinformation, different views on what is relevant, different interpretations of data, different assessment procedures), *interest conflicts* (perceived or actual competition over substantive [content] interests, procedural interests, psychological interests), *structural conflicts* (destructive patterns of behavior or interaction, unequal control, ownership, or distribution of resources, unequal power and authority, geographical, physical, or environmental factors that hinder cooperation, time constraints), *value conflicts* (different criteria for evaluating ideas or behavior, exclusive intrinsically valuable goals, different ways of life, ideology, or religion). Fry and Björkvist (Eds.), 1997, focus on conflict and violence from a cross-cultural perspective. According to them, conflict is not tantamount with aggression, but can be addressed in different ways: denying its very existence, negotiating a mutually desirable solution, compromising, threatening verbally, attacking physically, and appealing to a third party. Conflict strategies include: contending (high concern for one's own outcomes and low concern for other's outcomes), problem solving (high concern for both one's own and other's outcomes), yielding (low concern for one's own and high concern for other's outcomes) and avoiding (low concern for one's own and other's outcomes). Fry and Björkvist conclude that some cultures tend to favor one set of strategies, while others prefer another set of strategies. I thank Elizabeth Scheper for making me aware of the work carried out by these Fry and Björkvist. Read furthermore, among others, Schellenberg, 1982, and Fisk and Schellenberg, 2000.

[104] Political scientists P. Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, were among the first to address *power and conflict* in their article "The Two Faces of Power" that is placed within the context of the civil rights movement in the USA of the nineteen sixties. See also Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma, 1973, or Keltner and Robinson, 1996, who tested the hypothesis that within social disputes those partisans representing the status quo perceive their conflict less accurately than those seeking change, and that partisans seeking change typically are stereotyped as extremists.

[105] See Gurr, 1970, Gurr, 1993b, or Wink, 1992.

[106] Egon G. Guba tells the story of the discourse within which objectivity figures centrally: "Objectivity assumes a single reality to which the story or evaluation must be isomorphic; it is in this sense a one-perspective criterion. It assumes that an agent can deal with an objective (or another person) in a non-reactive and non-interactive way. It is an absolute criterion way" (Guba, 1981, p. 76). See also, for example, Guba, 1978, Guba, 1981, Guba and Lincoln, 1981, Guba and Lincoln, 1988, Lincoln and Guba, 1985.

[107] Read, among many others, Augoustinos, 1999, or Jost and Banaji, 1994.

[108] Lasswell and Lerner (Eds.), 1965. I thank Dennis Smith for this reference.

[109] Everett Rogers, 1962, describes how new ideas are carried forward by *innovators*, who convince *early adopters*, who in turn influence *early majorities* and may slide into loggerhead positions with *laggards*. I thank Barnett Pearce for making me aware of this literature.

[110] They are therefore met with the wrath of others in their elite group. Jim Lobe (2003), writes about the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think tank close to the Bush administration, targeting NGOs for their alleged "efforts to constrain U.S. freedom of action in international affairs and influence the behaviour of corporations abroad" (Lobe, 2003, p. 1). However, consider Schulz and Robinson, 2001, and their argument that human rights advocacy is in the interest of all Americans.

[111] See, for example, Triandis, 1997, for *Cultural and Social Behavior*.

[112] Parts of this section are adapted from Lindner, 2002e.

[113] Sherif and Sherif, 1966 and Sherif et al., 1988, within the context of *realistic group conflict theory*.

[114] *Effects of Contact, Conflict, and Social Identity on Interethnic Group Hostilities*, by Tzeng and Jackson, 1994.

[115] Adapted from http://www.intractableconflict.org/docs/appendix_6.jsp.

[116] See *Faces of the Enemy* by Keen, 1986. I thank Gordon Fellman for this reference.

[117] See for *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors*, Snyder, 2000.

[118] I thank Morton Deutsch for this reference.

[119] Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, July, 20-25, 1997.

[120] ARD, Das Märchen von den sicheren Renten.

[121] Huntington, 1996.

[122] See Triandis, 1997, for *Cultural and Social Behavior*.

[123] meaning that cultural realms are in contact with each other and learn from each other.

[124] "There was during the colonial period a British Somaliland, an Italian Somaliland, and a French Somaliland. A section of the Somali people was also absorbed separately into Kenya under British colonial rule. The fifth component became the Ogaden, a section of Ethiopia. The dream of independence for the Somali was in part a dream of reunification" (Mazrui, 1986, p. 71).

[125] Read on the *dynamics of secession*, also Hechter, 1992.

[126] This section is adapted from Lindner, 1999d.

[127] Barrington Moore (2000) explains that people persecute those whom they perceive as polluting due to their "impure" religious, political, or economic ideas (Moore, Jr., 2000).

[128] Danziger, 1990.

[129] Gergen, 1999.

[130] Craig, 1999.

[131] Stam and Egger, 1997.

[132] Read, for example, Baylis and Smith (Eds.), 1997.

[133] Susan Opotow (1995) defines the *scope of justice* as "a psychological boundary for fairness . . . within which concerns with justice and moral rules govern our conduct" (Opotow, 1995, p. 347). See furthermore, among many others, LeVine and Campbell, 1971. "Moral exclusion refers to: Who is and is not entitled to fair outcomes and fair treatment by inclusion or lack of inclusion in one's moral community? Albert Schweitzer included all living creatures in his moral community, and some Buddhists include all of nature. Most of us define a more limited moral community" (Deutsch, 2002, p. 10).

[134] Tajfel's (1981) *social identity theory* proposes that the social part of our identity derives from the groups to which we belong. He suggests that we, by favoring attributes of our own groups over those of outgroups, acquire a positive sense of who we are and an understanding of how we should act toward ingroup and outgroup members. See Tajfel, 1981, Tajfel, Fraser, and Jaspars, 1984, Tajfel and Turner, 1986. See for more literature, for example, Billig, 1976, Billig, 1987, Billig et al., 1988, Billig, 1991, Billig, 1995, Billig, 1996, Howitt and Billig, 1989, and Tajfel (Ed.), 1978, Tajfel et al., 1971, Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel and Minority Rights Group, 1978, Tajfel, Fraser, and Jaspars, 1984, Turner, 1982.

[135] *Terror Management theory* (TMT, see Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 1991, Greenberg et al., 1995, Arndt et al., 1999, Goldenberg et al., 2001) originates from the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (Becker, 1962, Becker, 1973). Becker describes humans as "unique from other creatures in that through highly developed intellectual abilities, we are cognizant of the inevitability of our demise, yet we maintain an enduring instinct for self-preservation. According to Becker (1973), the result of this conflict is paralyzing terror unless methods are utilized to manage this predicament. TMT contends that our species uses the same advanced cognitive abilities that afford the awareness of unavoidable death to create and participate in culture as a means of managing this existential terror" (quoted from http://web.uccs.edu/gwarnica/tmt_research.htm).

[136] See, among many others, Campbell, 1967.

[137] "Personal values are related to integrative behavioral orientations. Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995, found that readiness for outgroup social contact was connected positively to his value domains of universalism and self-direction, but negatively to tradition, security, and conformity for the dominant Jewish group, but to the value domain of achievement for the subordinate Arab group in Israel. This finding suggests that the motives regulating outgroup contact differ depending on the group's position in the social hierarchy…Few studies have been done relating personality to integrative orientations across group lines. One suggestive finding comes from the work on attitudes towards global culture done by Fong, 1996. He found that self-ratings on adjectival personality measures of openness and assertiveness positively predicted endorsements of this general constellation of attitudes, including the integrative facets of humanism, global welfare, and

gender equality. Again, the important role of openness to experience found in the section on divisive orientations is underscored by its reappearance in this section…People high on concern for others in particular and empathy in general show lower social dominance orientations, as do those high on Katz and Hass, 1988, Humanitarian-Egalitarian scale (Pratto et al., 1994). Lower SDO scores may be taken as a preference for lesser inequality among social groups, a probable unifying social feature in social groups (Wilkinson, 1996)" (Bond, 1998, I quote from a personal message from the author, where he attached the text of this paper). As to the ills flowing from inequality, see also Wilkinson, Kawachi, and Kennedy, 1998. See furthermore Pettigrew, 1998.

[138] Morton Deutsch (2002) stipulates that groups become *cohesive* by formulating and working together on issues that are *specific*, *immediate*, and *realizable* (Deutsch, 2002, see also Deutsch, 1973). See also Hechter, 1990, on the *emergence of cooperative solidarity* and Gaertner et al., 1994, on the *reduction* of *intergroup bias*. Colletta and Cullen, 2000, provide a definition of social cohesion that combines the absence and presence of certain features; the absence of latent conflict (absence of inequalities, tensions, disparities or polarizations), and the presence of redundant relations bridging social divisions and institutions of conflict management (functioning democracy with independent judiciary and media). I thank Elizabeth Scheper for making me aware of this literature.

[139] Not everybody was clever enough to figure out that the Earth's surface is curved from observing a lunar eclipse. A lunar eclipse occurs when, in the course of their regular orbits, the Moon, Earth and Sun happen to line up in a nearly straight line. The Earth casts a shadow on the Moon, which darkens because the Earth blocks the light from the Sun.

[140] Contrary to the lay-person, experts did know that the Earth is a sphere. The sphericity of Earth was known to the Greeks long before 300 B.C. When we read Aristotle's (384-322 B.C.) summary of old knowledge we understand that he was aware that the Earth is round. Not only did ancient and medieval astronomers know the shape of the Earth, they also knew the approximate size of the Earth. Eratosthenes was the head librarian at the famous Library of Alexandria, and his excellent and famous measurement of Earth's circumference dates from 250 B.C. or so, long before Ptolemy's time. Augustine of Hippo (354-430), a famous Christian church father, knew that the Earth is round, not flat, too. And in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the prolific medieval Christian theologian, teaches that the spherical shape of the Earth can be empirically demonstrated.

[141] A flat-Earth model was promoted by personalities such as the African Lactantius (AD 245–325), a professional rhetorician, who converted to Christianity and rejected all Greek philosophy, including the spherical Earth-model. Church fathers condemned this as heresy, yet, in the Renaissance his writings were unearthed again, because of his good Latin, and thus his flat-Earth view was revived. There was also Cosmas Indicopleustes, a sixth century Eastern Greek Christian, who suggested a flat Earth stretched out beneath the heavens that consisted of a rectangular vaulted arch. Also his work was rejected by the church fathers.

[142] Read, for example, Mitchell, 1991, *World on Fire*. However, the amount of available literature is overwhelming.

[143] See, for example, Gaertner et al., 1994, Dovidio and Gaertner, 1993, Gaertner and Dovidio, 1999, Gaertner et al., 1999, Gaertner, Sedikides, and Graetz, 1999.

[144] Apart from Heider, 1958, Kelley, 1973, and Walker and Pettigrew, 1984, see also Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan, 1999, Crosby, Muehrer, and Loewenstein, 1986, Fine et al., 2002, or Leach, Snider, and Iyer, 2002, just to name a few out of a large body of literature. Runciman, 1966, differentiates egoistic and fraternal deprivation. Egoistical deprivation arises when an individual feels disadvantaged relative to other individuals; fraternal deprivation occurs when a person feels his group is disadvantaged in relation to another group. Colletta and Cullen, 2000, make the argument that private investment increases social cohesion. However, this claim may be questioned. I thank Elizabeth E. Scheper for making me aware of this literature and the counter-argument. Investment may also lead to the opposite of social cohesion, particularly when investment creates inequalities that are perceived as illegitimate. In that case, investment could even lead to feelings of humiliation and resentment.

[145] See, for example Berger, 1976, *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change.*

[146] The literature on *genocide* and *ethnic cleansing* is vast. See, for example, Alvarez, 2001, Hassner, 1997.

[147] See, for example, Barley, 1991, Bell and Coplans, 1976, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992, Gert (Ed.), 1991, Hampton, 1986, Jehn and Weigelt, 1999, Morrow, 1994, O'Neill, 2001, Ordeshook, 1986, Rapoport (Ed.), 1974, Rapoport, 1960, Rapoport and Chammah, 1970, Ridley, 1996, Schmidtz, 1991, Tsebelis, 1990.

[148] See, among many others, Jervis, 1976, Jervis, 1978, Roe, 1999, Roe, 2000, Posen, 1993.

[149] meaning that cultural realms are in contact with each other and learn from each other.

[150] Read on *gender and space*, for example, Massey, 1994, Rose, 1993, Spain, 1992. I thank Nick Prior for making me aware of this literature.

[151] Read, for example, Durkheim, 1993.

[152] Read, among many others, for example, Chafetz, Dworkin, and Swanson, 1986.

[153] Clearly, the intertwined relationship between social construction and biological facts (and their construction) requires a more thorough discussion. Yet, it would take too much space here. See for masculine domination as patriarchy and male power, for example, *Men in the Public Eye: The Construction and Deconstruction of Public Men and Public Patriarchies* (Hearn, 1992).

[154] Read, among many others, Evera, 1999, Kagan, 1995; read on *scarcity* and violence, Homer-Dixon, 1999, and on *greed* and violence, Collier and Hoeffler, 2001.

[155] See, for example, Chirot and Seligman (Eds.), 2001, Crawford, 1998a, Crawford, 1998b, Esman, 1994, Gurr, 1993a, Kelman, 1997, LeVine and Campbell, 1972, Rotberg, 1996, Williams and Rhenisch, 1977.

[156] See, for example, Allen, 1992, Breines, Connell, and Eide (Eds.), 2000, Brittan, 1989, Brod (Ed.), 1987, Connell, 1997, Connell, 1995, Connell, 1996, Goldstein, 2001, Hanmer, Hester, Kelly, and Radford (Eds.), 1996, Hooper, 2001, Kimmel, 1997, Kimmel, 2000, Kimmel, 1996, Messner, 1997, Morgan, 1992, Walby, 1990, Whitehead, 2002, Wrangham and Peterson, 1996, Zalewski and Parpat (Eds.), 1998. See also *The Men's Studies Bibliography* at <http://www.xyonline.net/mensbiblio/>.

[157] See, for example, Bernhardt, 1997, Caspi et al., 2002, Clark and Grunstein, 2000, Fuller and Thompson, 2003, Hamer and Copeland, 2000). The rate of men with two Y chromosomes as compared to one, which is normal, has been found to be nineteen times higher in prison than in the normal population (Hamer and Copeland, 2000). There is furthermore the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene to be considered, located on the X chromosome; genetic deficiencies in MAOA activity have been linked with aggression in mice and in humans. Then there is the gene to compose nitric oxide; when this gene was removed in mice, they became extremely aggressive. In nearly every experiment involving aggression, serotonin, dopamine, or norepinephrine are found to be related to increased aggression; high testosterone levels combined with low serotonin levels seem to be particularly salient.

[158] See, for example, Snyder, 2000.

[159] Militarism has been examined from a feminist point of view in, for example, *Women and War* (Elshtain, 1995). Jean Elshtain examines how the myths of *man* as *just warrior* and *woman* as *beautiful soul* are undermined by the reality of female bellicosity and sacrificial male love, as well as the moral imperatives of just wars. Cynthia Enloe investigates international politics and reveals the crucial role of women in implementing governmental foreign policies (Enloe, 1990, Enloe, 2000). International relations as a mirror to masculinity have been discussed, for example, by J. Ann Tickner. She examines the meaning of global security through a gender-sensitive lens (Tickner, 1992). V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan describe both women's roles in world politics and the impact of world politics on women's roles (Peterson, 1992a, Peterson and Runyan, 1993, Peterson, 1992b).

[160] See, for example, the work by Heifetz and Linsky, 2002. Heifetz distinguishes between *adaptive* and *technical* leadership problems, and cautions that a basic error in leadership is to treat adaptive problems as technical problems. He states that "Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behaviour" (Heifetz, 1994, p. 22). I thank Virginia Swain for making me aware of Heifetz's work.

[161] This section is partly adapted from Lindner, 2002e.

[162] *Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique*, by Rousseau, 1762.

[163] With Mike Embley in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program.

[164] Space does not permit a discussion of the nuances of concepts such as equality, equity, or egalitarianism.

[165] Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom possible new entrants: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia.

[166] Association of South East Asian Nations Brunei Darussalam, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

[167] The Latin American common market.

[168] North American Free Trade Agreement.

[169] Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation - Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong-China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United States, Vietnam.

[170] "*World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*" in Durban, South Africa, August 31 - September 7, 2001. Read on *intolerance* in Noël, 1994.

[171] Egal also served as Somalia's Prime Minister from 1967, during the latter period of Somalia's democratic era.

[172] See also MoveOn, www.moveon.org/.

[173] Press Release SG/SM/6638 14 July 1998, retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980714.sgsm6638.html, see also http://www.undp.org/cso/.

[174] Arendt, 1963.

[175] See also Davies famous J-Curve; Davies, 1969, Davies, 1962, see also Boudon, 1986.

[176] Adapted from Lindner, 2001h.

[177] Other relevant political philosophers are William Godwin (1756-1836) with his *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (Godwin, 1793), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) with his text *The Philosophy of Right* [*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*] (Hegel, 1821), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) with his analysis *On Liberty* (Mill, 1859), Thomas Hill Green's (1836-1882) *Lectures On The Principles Of Political Obligation* (Green, 1895), Friedrich August von Hayek's (1899-1992) *Constitution of Liberty* (Hayek, 1960), and John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971), to mention but a representative few of the best known. One of the most recent writings that I referred to several times already is Avishai Margalit (Margalit, 1997, Margalit, 1996, Margalit, 2002a), who stipulates that justice is not sufficient. He calls for decency, which means refraining from humiliation.

[178] The subordination of the individual's life under the roof of a common super-ordinate order is called *collectivism* in political philosophy. We read on http://www.britannica.com about *collectivism* that it "has found varying degrees of expression in the 20th century in such movements as socialism, communism, and fascism. The least collectivist of these is social democracy, which seeks to reduce the inequities of unrestrained capitalism by government regulation, redistribution of income, and varying degrees of planning and public ownership."

[179] *Collectivism* is posited in contrast to *individualism*. Http://www.britannica.com describes that individualism is a "political and social philosophy that places high value on the freedom of the individual and generally stresses the self-directed, self-contained, and comparatively unrestrained individual or ego. The French political commentator Alexis de Tocqueville, who coined the word, described it in terms of a kind of moderate selfishness, disposing human beings to be concerned only with their own small circle of family and friends."

[180] We read about the *anarchy* of the "state of nature" in Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), as well as in the second part of John Locke's (1632-1704) *Two Treatises of Government* (Locke, 1690), and in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762).

[181] See, for example, Marks, 2002.

[182] Read, for example, Tharoor, 2000. Asian values, for example, are often depicted as opposing Western human rights values on the grounds that the latter are nothing more than yet another form of imperial domination, nothing more than a deceitful attempt by the West to usurp the throne. Mohamad Mahathir, the Malaysian Prime Minister, is one of the advocators of this view. One of the most salient arguments in this

line is the criticism that human rights conditionality puts poor countries at a disadvantage and is hypocritically meant to protect Western business interests. See for a deeper discussion, for example Donald J. Puchala (1995) on *The Ethics of Globalism*: "A version of the contest between moral relativism and moral universalism is being played out in the human rights forums of the United Nations. It generated great heat at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993, where representatives of a number of African, Asian, and some Middle Eastern governments directly challenged the universality of the tenets of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These dissenters argued that the world organization's human rights regime is not universal because moral universality is impossible in a culturally diverse world. The Declaration, they claimed, is Western in philosophical content, and enforcing it in their countries constitutes outside interference. For their part, Western governments stood steadfastly behind moral universalism. They attributed unsavory political motives to their non-Western detractors and argued that what was true and universal when the Declaration was signed in 1948 remained true and universal in 1993" (Puchala, 1995, p. 8).

[183] Read, among many others, Korey, 1993, and Power and Allison (Eds.), 2000.

[184] Read Sachs, 2000, Sachs, 2005.

[185] See classics such as Polanyi, 1944, and later Collins, 1999, Collins and Makowsky, 1993, Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997, Friedman, 1982, Wagar, 1992, Taylor, 1996, Hall (Ed.), 2000, Wagar, 1992, Taylor, 1996, Hall (Ed.), 2000. See, among many others, Wendt, 2003. See also Wasilewski, 2002. See furthermore Ray and Anderson, 2000.

[186] The European Union uses the principle of *subsidiarity* as central structuring principle. The principle of subsidiarity could be regarded as the application of short-, medium, and long-range theory within the political arena. The principle of subsidiarity states that problems are best solved in the subsystem where they arise; subsystems resolve their conflicts without involving higher authority. Whatever solution is adopted, the subsystem is responsible for it.

[187] Castells, 1997b, Singer, 1987.

[188] See also Lindner, 2000m, and Lindner, 2000p.

[189] Badiou, 2001. I thank Bjørn Flatås for pointing the work of Badiou out to me.

[190] *Fairness Norms and the Potential for Mutual Agreements Involving Majority and Minority Groups*, by Ross and Iost, 1999.

[191] See, for example, http://www.hri.ca/.

[192] "World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance" in Durban, South Africa, August 31 - September 7, 2001.

[193] See also Schwebel, 2003.

[194] *Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution*, by Ross and Ward, 1995.

[195] *Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution*, by Ross, 1995a.

[196] There are other effects that should be mentioned, such as the false polarization effect, see, for example, Ross and Ward, 1996. This effect makes people systematically underestimate common ground.

[197] Another "unification," Hong Kong returning to China, has been addressed by Brewer, 1999a, Fu et al., 1999, Hong, Abrams, and Ng, 1999, Hong et al., 1999.

[198] The sources for this statement are provided by the author's network of family relations, but also by close monitoring of the media; for example, in political talk shows this topic "creeps in" and presents itself in its various shades of mutual understanding and misunderstanding that hovers between participants from the former East and West.

[199] This uttering is condensed from accounts from 12 encounters and media coverage. Mummendey describes general expectations towards East Germans also in her research: "In general, East Germans were expected to consider their status position as inferior compared to West Germans" (Mummendey et al., 1999). See also Billig for "everyday thinking," discourse and society, ideology and opinions Billig, 1995, Billig, 1976, Billig et al., 1988, Billig, 1991, Billig, 1996, Howitt and Billig, 1989.

[200] In Sachsen [Saxony], for example, the PDS collected 14,3 % votes for their candidates (so-called "Erststimmen"), and 16,5 % votes for their party (so-called "Zweitstimmen") in 1994. The elections in 1998 showed a remarkable increase: 24,5 % of the voters gave their Erststimme to PDS candidates, and

22,2 % gave their Zweitstimme to the party. By comparison, the average strength of the PDS in Germany as a whole is minimal. Here the PDS reached a negligible 4,9 % of the Erststimmen, and 5,1% Zweitstimmen in 1998.

[201] See a social identity approach to understanding party identification in Greene, 1999.

[202] See also Reindl and Wittich, 1995, Hinrichs and Wittich, 1994.

[203] I would like to express my thanks for this comment.

[204] See, example the work of Michael Harris Bond that has been already mentioned. I can only present a small selection of important books and some articles, Bond, 1997, Bond, 1998, Bond (Ed.), 1996, Bond (Ed.), 1988, Bond, 1996, Smith and Bond, 1999, Bond, Leung, and Schwartz, 1992, Bond and Chan, 1995. Bond co-authored many publication with Geert Hofstede, see, for example, Hofstede, 1980, Hofstede, 1983, Hofstede and Bond, 1984, Hofstede and Bond, 1988, Hofstede et al., 1989, Hofstede, 1991, Hofstede, Bond, and Luk, 1993, Hofstede, 1993, Hofstede, 1996a, Hofstede, 1996b, Hofstede, 1998. Harry Charalambos Triandis is an important name as well, see, for example, Triandis and Triandis, 1962, Triandis, 1971, Triandis, 1980, Triandis, 1990, Triandis, 1995, Triandis, 1997, Triandis and Singelis, 1998, Schwartz, 1994. Richard W. Brislin is another very relevant name, see, for example Brislin, 1993, Cushner and Brislin, 1996, Brislin and Yoshida, 1994, Brislin and Tomoko Yoshida (Eds.), 2000, Landis and Brislin, 1983.

[205] Hartling and Luchetta, 1999. See also Hartling and Baker Miller, 2004, Hartling et al., 2000.

[206] See, for example, Pogge, 2002, or Amartya Kumar Sen's work, such as in Drèze and Sen, 1989, Sen and World Institute for Development Economics Research., 1987. There is a large body of literature. The *Right to Development* as a human right is central. "The United Nations Development Programme is orienting its work on the basis of the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986. In 1998 the UNDP published a policy document on Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Human Development (UNDP 1998). Similarly, the United Nations Population Fund issued a document on UNFPA: A Focus on Population and Human Rights, and the World Bank published Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank. Under the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) launched by Secretary General Kofi Annan, all UN agencies are called upon to adopt the human rights approach. Thus, WANAHR and the other nutrition rights advocacy organizations have benefited from a movement not entirely of their own making" (Kent, 2000, p. 9). See also Collier et al., 2003, Ekins and Max-Neef (Eds.), 1992, Max-Neef, Elizade, and Hopenhayn, 1991, Robinson, 1999, or Sagasti and Alcalde, 1999, Sen, 1999, Stiglitz and Squire, 1998, or Wolfenson, 1999.

[207] See, for example, Block, 1990, pp. 122-126. Again, there is a large body of publications to draw upon.

[208] See numerous organizations, such as http://www.helpinganimals.com/a.html.

[209] "More and more people are switching to a vegetarian diet for a variety of reasons…As vegetarianism rises the change is reflected in the consumer world as well. Both Burger King and McDonalds now offer veggie burgers in addition to their traditional meat fare. Shops specializing in vegetarian-friendly products have sprung up all over. Maryland-based Pangea (http://pangeaveg.com/) offers everything from eco-friendly soaps to official Doc Marten and Birkenstock footwear specially made in 'fake' leather. Internet based shops such as http://shop.opalcat.com/ offer whole sections of vegetarian, animal rights, and anti-fur designs alongside typical humorous shirts and geeky mugs" (Fernie, 2002). See also Barovick, 2000, or Reaves, 2003.

[210] Reber, 1995, "A general theoretical perspective in social psychology concerned with the issue of social perception. The act of attribution is one in which a person ascribes or imputes a characteristic (or trait, emotion or motive, etc.) to oneself or to another person. Thus, the term represents not so much a formal theory but a general approach to social psychology and personality theory in which behavior is analyzed in the light of this concept." See also Heider, 1958, Kelley, 1973, as well as Pettigrew, 1979, or Hewstone, 1990.

[211] The *just world view* is a general belief that assumes that those with unfortunate outcomes deserve what they receive. There is a large body of literature to draw upon, see, for example, Lerner, 1980, Daugherty and Esper, 1998, and Figley, 1998, among many others. Bandura, 1990, works on the mechanism of *blaming the victim*.

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[212] According to Milton Bennett's model of *intercultural sensitivity*, people move through six stages of awareness as they experience other cultures: denial, defense, minimization of differences, acceptance, adaptation and, finally, integration (Bennett, 1993). See also Bennett, 1998, and Bennett, 1996. See on *Crosscultural political psychology* furthermore Renshon and Duckitt (Eds.), 2000. See also Wasilewski, 2001, and recent work by Matsumoto, Hee Yoo, and LeRoux, 2005. See, furthermore, the work by Adair Linn Nagata, Nagata, 1998, Nagata, 2005, Nagata, 2004, Nagata, 2003, Nagata, 2000.

[213] The following discussion of Hitler's Germany is adapted from Lindner, 2000s.

[214] Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich, 1982.

[215] Quoted from http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/mpiedpiper.html.

[216] Translated by the author from "In Hameln war der Spielmann gedemütigt worden und so wurde er vom Rattenfänger zum Kinderfänger. Oft habe ich dies Bild vor Augen gehabt. Mein Opa war auf dem Bückeberg und hat dort einmal den richtigen Rattenfänger vor Augen gehabt."

[217] See Adorno et al., 1950.

[218] Lee D. Ross, Stanford University, in a personal message May 6, 2000.

[219] *Were Ordinary Germans Hitler's "Willing Executioners"? Or Were They Victims of Humiliating Seduction and Abandonment? The Case of Germany and Somalia*, by Lindner, 2000s.

[220] I owe this detail to Odd-Bjørn Fure and Jorunn Sem Fure.

[221] According to a testimonial, which I received during fieldwork in Germany from members of the aristocracy on August 3, 1999.

[222] Quoted from the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, UWM Peace Studies Program, and UWM Center for International Education, 2003.

[223] Discussed on May 14, 2003, in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program, by the Rwandan Foreign Minister Charles Murigande.

[224] Personal communication from Sam Engelstad on September 28, 1999, quoted with his permission.

[225] I thank the reviewer for his remark.

[226] Eight Red Cross and Red Crescent staff were kidnapped at the airport in Mogadishu North. See further down my interviews with hostages, among others the head of the group, Ola Skuterud from the Norwegian Red Cross, as well as with the chief negotiator of the Red Cross.

[227] See for example O'Halloran, 1995.

[228] See http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/index.htm.

[229] See literature about Action research in the ejournal Action Research International, http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/gcm/ar/ari/arihome.html, and Atweh, Kemmis, and Weeks, 1998, Boyarsky and Murphy, 1998, Carson and Sumara, 1997, Greenwood and Levin, 1998, Gustavsen, 1998, Kalleberg, 1989, Marrow, 1964, McNiff, 1992, Neal, Watts, and Calhoun 1995, Reason (Ed.), 1994, Reason and Rowan, 1985, Reason, 1988, Srivastva and Cooperrider, 1990, Stringer, 1999, Torbert, 1991, Whyte, 1991, Zuber-Skerritt, 1991.

[230] Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen write about the humiliating aspect of help-receiving in the mid-1970's, see their current work at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/kgergen1/text7.html. I owe this reference to Michael Bond. See also Rosen, 1983. It would be interesting to examine whether trade advances peace, as opposed to aid, because it does not entail humiliation, see for trade and conflict Oneal and Russett, 1999, Morrow, 1999, and Hegre, 2000.

[231] See, for example, Baumeister and Leary, 2000.

[232] See, for example, Fisher, 1992. There is a vast body of literature to draw upon. See also Bowlby, 1969.

[233] See, among many others, the work being done at the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute, Wellesley College , by Jordan, Walker, and Hartling (Eds.), 2004, Hartling, 2003, Jordan and Hartling, 2002, Hartling and Sparks, 2000, Hartling and Ly, 2000.

[234] See the discussion at organizations as for example the World Bank, where currently become buzzwords after the failure of "helping" developing countries with financial and/or technical assistance. See, for example, Stiglitz, 1998.

235 See also Maren, 1997.

236 Gadamer, 1989, discusses *truth and method*. See also Spence's account of *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth* (Spence, 1982).

237 See literature about action research in the ejournal Action Research International, http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/gcm/ar/ari/arihome.html, and Atweh, Kemmis, and Weeks, 1998, Boyarsky and Murphy, 1998, Carson and Sumara, 1997, Greenwood and Levin, 1998, Gustavsen, 1998, Kalleberg, 1989, Marrow, 1964, McNiff, 1992, Mills, 2000, , Reason (Ed.), 1994, Reason and Rowan, 1985, Reason, 1988, Srivastva and Cooperrider, 1990, Stringer, 1999, Torbert, 1991, Whyte, 1991, Zuber-Skerritt, 1991.

238 On 9th December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), or Operation Restore Hope, was launched in Somalia by the United States, as a response to the failing of the first United Nations operation UNOSOM. However, UNITAF also came to fail, as did UNOSOM II. Especially, the hunt for Somali General Aidid undermined UN impartiality and turned the UN and the US into targets of Somali mistrust and revenge.

239 Personal communication from Sam Engelstad (28th September 1999), quoted with his permission.

240 Eight Red Cross and Red Crescent staff were kidnapped at the airport in Mogadishu North. On 4th January 1999, in Nairobi, the present author interviewed the head of the group, Ola Skuterud from the Norwegian Red Cross, later also two other hostages as well as the chief negotiator of the Red Cross who brokered their release.

241 See for example O'Halloran, 1995.

242 Retrieved from http://www.austin360.com/shared/health/adam/ency/article/000943.html in May 2002.

243 Read Kelman, 1999a, on the *Role of the Other in Existential Conflicts*.

244 Scheff, 2002, Eilert Sundt Lecture October 24, 2002, University of Oslo.

245 When the Belgians opened the door, the Hutu intellectuals organized a revolution, November 1, 1959, which was completed with independence.

246 See Festinger, 1957, for work on dissonance.

247 See especially Heinz Leymann for work on mobbing, Leymann, 1990, Leymann, 1993, Leymann, 1996, Leymann and Kornbluh, 1989, Leymann and Gustafsson, 1996, as well as Dan Åke Olweus on mobbing and bullying at school, Olweus, 1993, Olweus, 1997. The confusion around the use of the terms mobbing and bullying stems from the fact that these phenomena are addressed differently in different countries. Leymann suggests keeping the word bullying for activities between children and teenagers at school and reserving the word mobbing for adult behavior at workplaces.

248 Edvard E. Jones, 1984, *Social Stigma - The Psychology of Marked Relationships*, is a central book on stigmatization. See also Brewer, 1999b, and Duckitt, 1992.

249 There exists a huge body of research and literature, see, for example, Bremner et al., 1992, Eitinger, 1990, Everly, 1993, Figley, 1989, Gerbode, 2000, Havermans, 1998, Horowitz, Weine, and Jekel, 1995, Kardiner, 1941, Lavik et al., 1999, McCann and Pearlman, 1992b, McCann and Pearlman, 1992a, Nadler and Ben Shushan, 1989, Pearlman, 1998, Pearlman, 1994, Perry, 1994, van der Kolk et al., 1984, van der Kolk, 1994, van der Kolk and Fisler, 2000, van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1989, van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1991, van der Kolk and Kadish, 1987.

250 Berkowitz, the social psychologist who initiated research on the link between *frustration, anger, aggression* and "*cues*," put forward the *Frustration-Aggression hypothesis* (Berkowitz, 1993). See also Berkowitz, 1964, Berkowitz 1964, Berkowitz, 1972, Berkowitz, 1974, Berkowitz, 1978.

251 Standard reading on stress psychology is Richard S. Lazarus, 1966, *Psychological Stress and the Coping Process* and Lazarus and Folkman, 1984, *Stress, Appraisal and Coping*. Stress is not necessarily negative, it may also be a stimulating challenge – and there are individual differences why some people thrive under stress and others break. See, for example, *Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages* by Carver, 1998; *Embodying Psychological Thriving: Physical Thriving in Response to Stress* by Epel, McEwen, and Ickovics, 1998; *Quantitative Assessment of Thriving* by Cohen et al., 1998; *Beyond Recovery From Trauma: Implications for Clinical Practice and Research* by Calhoun and Tedeschi, 1998b; *Exploring Thriving in the Context of Clinical Trauma Theory: Constructivist Self Development Theory* by Saakvitne, Tennen, and Affleck, 1998.

[252] Antonio R. Damasio, 1994, with his book *Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, provides a perspective on the important "constructive" role that emotions play for the process of our decision making; it shows how the traditional view of "heart" versus "head" is obsolete. Daniel Goleman, 1996, in his more widely known book *Emotional Intelligence* relies heavily on Damasio. Goleman gives, among others, a description of the brain activities that lead to post-traumatic stress disorder. The *Handbook of Emotion and Memory* by Christianson (Ed.), 1992, addresses the important interplay between emotions and memory. Humiliation is a process that is deeply embedded in the individual's interdependence with her environment, and therefore relational concepts of mind such as Gibson's ecological psychology of "affordance" are relevant. Gibson "includes environmental considerations in psychological taxonomies" writes de Jong, 1997 (Abstract). M. A. Forrester, 1999, presents a related approach, that he defines as "discursive ethnomethodology," that focuses on "narrativization as process bringing together Foucault's (1972) discourse theory, Gibson's (1979) affordance metaphor and conversation analysis. Also the *sociology of emotions* is relevant; see especially the work of Thomas J. Scheff on emotions such as shame and violence, as well as Keltner and Gross, 1999, and Keltner and Haidt, 1999. Read on the *Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility and Violence*, Beck, 1999a.

[253] Two authoritative psychiatric diagnosis manuals exist; one, the *American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, or DSM, is edited by the American Psychiatric Association. The other, *The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems*, tenth revision (ICD-10), is published by the WHO in Geneva. The American Psychiatric Association, 1994 describes the PAPD essential feature in DSM-IV (p. 733) as a pervasive pattern of negativistic attitudes and passive resistance to demands for adequate performance in social and occupational settings. The World Health Organization, 1994 lists the passive-aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder in Annex 1 of the ICD-10. To be diagnosed with *PAPD* disorder, individuals must meet the general criteria of a personality disorder, at least five of the following: procrastination and delay in completing essential tasks – particularly those that others seek to have completed; unjustified protests that others make unreasonable demands; sulkiness, irritability or argumentativeness when asked to do something that the individual does not want to do; unreasonable criticism or scorn for authority figures; deliberately slow or poor work on unwanted tasks; obstruction of the efforts of others even as these individuals fail to do their share of the work; and avoidance of obligations by claiming to have forgotten them (ICD-10, 1994, pp. 329-330).

[254] *Repetition compulsion*, or the *compulsion to repeat the trauma*, *re-enactment, revictimization*, or *masochism*. Many traumatized people expose themselves, seemingly compulsively, to situations evocative of the original trauma. The link to earlier life experiences is usually not understood. Surprisingly, this *repetition compulsion* has received little systematic exploration since its discovery several decades ago. "Freud thought that the aim of repetition was to gain mastery, but clinical experience has shown that this rarely happens; instead, repetition causes further suffering for the victims or for people in their surroundings" (Kolk, 1989, p. 389).

[255] See for groundwork on narcissism, Kohut, 1976b.

[256] The diagnosis "sadistic personality disorder" has been "quietly" dropped in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) because it was controversial and insufficiently researched. Soraya Seedat, who works with victims in South Africa, explains (in a personal discussion August 11, 1999 at the conference in Hamburg) that she does not think that sadistic personality disorders exists, according to her experience perpetrators may have an "antisocial personality."

[257] See, for example, Erikson, 1963, Gonen, 2000, or Redlich, 1999.

[258] See a classic on *childhood and society*, Erikson, 1950. See furthermore, among others, Schore, 1994, *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: the Neurobiology of Emotional Development.* See also the work by Antonio Damasio and colleagues, Adolphs and Damasio, 2001, Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio, 2000, Damasio, 2000, Damasio, 1994, Damasio, 1999. See also Cacioppo, Berntson, Adolphs, Carter, Davidson, McClintock, McEwen, Meaney, Schacter, Sternberg, Suomi, and Taylor (Eds.), 2002, Davidson, 2000, Panksepp, 1992, Panksepp, 1998, Whalen, 1998.

[259] Perry (1997) explains that early neglect of a child can lead to brain dysfunction, that in turn may cause the neglected individual to commit horrific deeds later in life, such as for example murder, as 'remorseless

violent child, "Very narrow windows - critical periods - exist during which specific sensory experience is required for optimal organization and development of any brain area (e.g., Singer, 1995, Thoenen, 1995). Absent such experience and development, dysfunction is inevitable (e.g., Carlson et al., 1989). When critical periods have been examined in great detail in non-human animals for the primary sensory modalities, similar use-dependent differentiation in development of the brain occurs for the rest of the central nervous system (Cragg, 1967, Cragg, 1969, Cummins and Livesey, 1979). Abnormal micro-environmental cues and atypical patterns of neural activity during critical and sensitive periods can result in malorganization and compromised function in other brain-mediated functions such as empathy, attachment and affect regulation (e.g., Green et al., 1981). Some of the most powerful clinical examples of this are related to lack of "attachment" experiences early in life. The child who has been emotionally neglected or abandoned early in life will exhibit attachment problems which are persistently resistant to any "replacement" experiences including therapy (Carlson et al., 1989). Examples of this include feral children, Spitz's orphans (Spitz and Wolf, 1946), the Romanian orphans (Chisholm et al., 1995) and, sadly, the remorseless, violent child (Ressler, Burgess, and Douglas, 1988, Myers et al., 1995, Mones, 1991, Hickey, 1991, Greenberg, Speltz, and DeKlyen, 1993)" (Perry, 1997, 128).

[260] See for *psychoneuroimmunology*, Albers, Huhman, and Meisel, 2002, Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1993, Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1997, Uchino, 2004.

[261] See, among many others, Sue Grand's work (Grand, 2000) on how victims can become perpetrators.

[262] The quotation is taken from President Mandela's inaugural address, May 10, 1994.

[263] It is important to make distinctions between different elements in the German population. The sense of national dishonor was more acutely felt in 1918 by the aristocracy and military hierarchy. Some of them used their residual power to undermine the Weimar government as far as possible, thus preparing the ground for Hitler, unwittingly.

[264] This quotation is taken from President Mandela's inaugural address, May 10, 1994.

[265] The previous paragraphs on Nelson Mandela and Adolf Hitler are adapted from Lindner, 2000v.

[266] *War on Art: Taliban Took Ax to Culture*, by Watson, 2001.

[267] I thank Amy Williams for making me aware of this author.

[268] See, for example, http://www.analytictech.com/networks/weakties.htm.

[269] *Im Krebsgang: eine Novelle*, by Grass, 2002.

[270] On May 23, 2002, he was interviewed by Tim Sebastian in BBCWorld Hardtalk.

[271] I thank Dennis Smith for these formulations.

[272] The term *ubuntu* is used in parts of Central, Eastern and Southern Africa, yet, similar concepts are found under different names in many other African countries. The philosophy of *ubuntu* can be compared with *Ahimsa* (non-violence) promoted by Gandhi, the Greek doctrine of Agape, and the Christian principle of "do unto others as you would wish them to do unto you". *Ubuntu* has been transmitted orally in innumerable dialects, throughout the continent, through folklore, stories, proverbs and songs. For a discussion of the *Ubuntu* approach implicit in the philosophy of reconciliation, see Tutu, 1999, Battle, 1997. See also Lieberfeld, 1999, Minow, 1998.

[273] *A Hot/Cool System Analysis of Delay of Gratification: Dynamics of Willpower*, by Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999.

[274] Read the autobiography by Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, 1996, or books by Holocaust survivors such as Ruth Minsky Sender, 1996. I thank Ramona Eileen Cuevas for making me aware of Sender's book.

[275] The Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, noted in his *Course in General Linguistics* (1911) that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary (see the parallel French and English text in Saussure, 1993). For example the relationship between the word "tree" and the idea of a tree is arbitrary, because the idea of tree can be signified by other sounds, such as "arbre." Saussure's key contribution was the shift in focus from objects to relations, from object to structure, a shift that defines modernism in a wide range of disciplines. For the French thinker Jacques Lacan, language is what we use to construct the world and ourselves and it is completely inadequate for both those tasks. Nothing is real. Nothing is solid. You are not real. This, according to Lacan, is unbearable and therefore we reject and repress it; we do not dare to understand it. Yet, and this is my point, it might be beneficial for social peace for people to refrain from

clinging to visions of certainty that might not only be imaginary but also at times misleading and dangerous.

[276] Judith Viorst wrote a warm and insightful book on *Necessary Losses. The Loves, Illusions, Dependencies and Impossible Expectations That All of Us Have to Give Up in Order to Grow* (Viorst, 1987). I thank Catherine Peppers for making me aware of this book.

[277] See Granovetter, 1973, and more recent publications such as Granovetter, 2002. Granovetter builds on Coser, 1991 and her theory of autonomy, which in turn is based on the sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel (1858-1918).

[278] See, for example, Walzer, 1997.

[279] Also Giddens (1991) describes the occurrence of and the need for *new personal identities* in the new global context, in *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Giddens, 1991). See also Sennett, 1996, or Millon and Davis, 2000. See furthermore Bauman, 1998, who wrote *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. However, there is a vast amount literature to draw upon. See for classic analyses in *urban sociology* Georg Simmel and his views on metropolitan life and its effects on the psyche. See, furthermore, Singer, 1987, and the work on identity by Castells, 1997b.

[280] See, for example, Brewer, 1999a.

[281] See for literature on *dialogue*, for example, Bakhtin, 1981, Buber, 1944, Wold (Ed.), 1992, Billig, 1998, Campos, 1998, Josephs and Rommetveit, 1998, Hermans, 1999, Prosser, 1978.

[282] Foucault, 1980, Bourdieu, 1977, and Burke, 1998. See for discourse and power in cross-cultural contexts, for example, Bandlamudi, 1999, Bremer, 1996, Clyne, 1994, Crawford, 1999, Gumperz, 1982, MacMartin, 1999, Morgan, 1998a, Morgan, 1998b, Scollon and Scollon, 1981, Sitaram and Prosser, 1998, Valsiner, 1999, Wetherell and Potter, 1998, Wetherell and Potter, 1992, Williams and Chrisman (Eds.), 1994.

[283] Merton, 1949. I owe this reference to Ragnvald Kalleberg, sociologist at Oslo University, and see also chapter 3.3 in Engelstad et al., 1996; see also Engelstad and Kalleberg (Eds.), 1999, Kalleberg, 1989, Kalleberg, 1994.

[284] Beynon, 1984 defines the Ford workers in this way. I owe this reference to Ragnvald Kalleberg.

[285] Taylor, 1990.

[286] Eileen Borris (2000) describes a *third factor* as an element of strength and faith that can be labeled in a variety of ways, such as closeness to divinity, appreciation of compassion, or faith in shared humanity (Borris, 2000).

[287] See, for example Kabat-Zin, 1994. I thank Suee-Chieh Tan for making me aware of this literature.

[288] See Frankl, 1973, Frankl, 1972, Frankl, 1963.

[289] *Self-remembering*, as advocated by Gurdjieff, is a similar concept, see Speeth and Friedlander, 1980.

[290] *Being awake*, a notion in transpersonal psychology has related implications (Tart, 1994). I thank Suee-Chieh Tan for making me aware of the literature with respect to Gurdjieff and Tart.

[291] Erving Goffman, an "ethnographer of the self," has described how people negotiate and validate identities in face-to-face meetings and establish "frames" within which they evaluate the meaning of their encounters. See, for example, Goffman, 1953, Goffman, 1959, Goffman, 1974.

[292] *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation*, Matt Ridley, 1996.

[293] The extension of game theory into biology and sociology is generally attributed to John Maynard-Smith, 1976 (and his concept of the *Evolutionarily Stable Strategy*, or *ESS*) and further expanded by Richard Dawkins, 1976, in *The Selfish Gene,* and Matt Ridley, 1996, in *The Origins Of Virtue*. See also Wright, 1994, and Waal, 1996.

[294] Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, published the article "*The Evolution of Co-operation*," Axelrod, 1984, a book on *The Evolution of Cooperation*.

[295] *A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution and Cooperation,* by Singer, 1999.

[296] Rose and Rose (Eds.), 2000, edited the book *Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments against Evolutionary Psychology*. They are very critical as to what they perceive as fundamentalist arrogance among biologists who believe to have a "hotline" to what human evolved nature is. Even though, of course we actually have

to respect what our biology is, what all living systems biology is, they remind us that there is a richness of experience about how we should live in the world, and that biologists don't have the only route to it. Philosophers, sociologists, economists, novelists and painters are valid sources as well.

[297] *I and Thou*, by Buber, 1944.

[298] *Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function*, by Solow, 1957.

[299] Donald C. Klein, who also writes about humiliation, recently also worked on creativity, see Klein and Morrow, 2001. Clearly, the literature on creativity is vast.

[300] See Montagu, 1981. Already around 1900 scientists pointed at the fact that the human being occupies a special place among animals. The zoologist Otto Storch was probably one of the first to focus on the fact that animals have quite rigid programs of behavior, while human beings use *learning programs*. The Dutch anatomist Louis Bolk (1866-1930) pointed at the fact that the human child is born prematurely and helpless and needs many years of training, while other new-born animals are independent quite fast. Even more, the lack of hair, the nakedness of the adult human being give rise to the thought that the human being always stays at the level of a child, that he never reaches the kind of adulthood a chimpanzee reaches. Louis Bolk proposed the theory that human beings are metamorphically prolonged as a result of a changed hormonal balance. Bolk described several characteristics of the human species influenced by this form of metabolic revision. He called this cluster of characteristics in humans, *neoteny* (a word coined by Kollmann in 1885).

[301] Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994 suggest that *integrative solutions* for problem solving are almost always superior to strategies such as compromise or letting one side win

[302] The following two examples are adapted from Lindner, 2001d.

[303] Farida's predicament resonates with what Toni Morrison describes in her novel *Beloved* (Morrison, 1987), where she describes the killing of a baby so as to protect it from the fate of slavery. I thank Morton Deutsch of making me aware of this novel.

[304] My field of psychological counseling from 1980-1984 was *eating disorders*, and I facilitated therapeutic groups with women with such disorders.

[305] Other young women, as Rita intelligent and promising young pupils and students, may even manage to kill themselves by not eating – the extreme consequence of anorexia nervosa – while others, those who do not induce vomiting, oscillate between asceticism and obesity.

[306] Hitler, 1999.

[307] In 1911 he broke with Freud and investigated the psychology of the individual person.

[308] Ogbu, 1978, Gibson and Ogbu (Eds.), 1991.

[309] The following comment was made to this paragraph (I thank the anonymous reviewer for this remark.): "I think that Lindner uses humiliation as an explanatory construct where it is not the only one, and perhaps not the primary one. For instance, rape proves dominance, masculinity, and brings sexual pleasure, as well as humiliating the victim and her group." Though this remark is correct to a certain extent, the example given here refers to systematically designed rape campaigns with the primary aim to humiliate the male honor of the enemy and the moral of its women, and thus enfeeble the opponent, with all other "gratifications" enumerated in the comment being secondary. It is this systematic application of rape that lately has received increased attention. See a report from the office of the UN high commissioner for human rights from September 2, 2001 stating "that during situations of armed conflict, ethnic or race-based violence, systematic rape, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, sexual abuse, sexual slavery and other grave human rights violations against women of a particular racial group are common" (Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2001, p. 1).

[310] International Committee of the Red Cross Somalia Delegation, 1997.

[311] Incidentally, in regions that practice blood feud, women are untouched, and have to assume all the duties that their males cannot carry out anymore because they have to stay indoors out of fear to be killed. Albania experienced an upsurge of these practices after the downfall of the communist regime that had outlawed them. Thousands of men are currently confined to their own homes, while their women move freely.

[312] Quoted from www.BBCWorld.com, Kimche and Malki talked to Tim Sebastian in BBCWorld Hardtalk on May 22, 2003.

[313] *Quarantine the Aggressor*, said Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1937.

[314] *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn Of Africa*, by Lewis, 1961.

[315] Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994 suggest that *integrative solutions* for problem solving are almost always superior to other strategies, such as compromise or letting one side win.

[316] Read in Feuerverger, 2001, on a Jewish-Palestinian Village in Israel, and read *Reflections of a Radical Moderate* by Richardson, 1996.

[317] Allison, Nye, and Carnesale, 1985, and Nye, 2002.

[318] Read, for example, Appleby, 2000, Juergensmeyer, 1991, Juergensmeyer, 2000.

[319] Read, among many others, Ackerman and Duvall, 2000, Naess, 1958, or King, 1999. 197 methods of nonviolent actions have been differentiated (Sharp, 1971, McCarthy and Sharp, 1997).

[320] I thank Jacqueline Wasilewski for making me aware of Vollmann's opus.

[321] *The Greatest Love of All*, song popularized by Whitney Houston.

[322] See, for example, Lutz and Collins, 1993, and their book *Reading National Geographic*. Lutz and Collins show how the view on other cultures is colored by a wish to validate middle-class American values. I thank Michelle Fine for this reference. See also Stewart and Bennett (Eds.), 1991. See furthermore Katznelson, Kesselman, and Draper, 2002.

[323] Payer, 1988.

[324] On the UP internet site we read, "For the last 140 years, Union Pacific has contributed to the building of a nation. Abraham Lincoln envisioned a transcontinental railroad that would connect America, east to west, contributing to the economic development, stability and security of the nation. And along with the development of a country, came the growth of one of America's most important companies." http://www.uprr.com/newsinfo/ads/.

[325] With Tim Sebastian in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program, March 3, 2003.

[326] In BBCWorld Hardtalk with Tim Sebastian.

[327] See Iost and Ross, 1999.

[328] In a program called *Guerre en Irak*, March 30, 2003, on the French television channel France 2 (translated by the author).

[329] Retrieved from http://www.columbia.edu/cu/pr/00/03/kennethWaltz.html

[330] See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/programmes/wtwta/poll/html/default.stm.

[331] BBCWorld Hardtalk program with Tim Sebastian, April 16, 2003.

[332] See http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2003/2/0214.html.

[333] In BBCWorld Hardtalk with Tim Sebastian.

[334] In a BBCWorld Hardtalk interview with Tim Sebastian, March 18, 2003.

[335] See, for example, Campbell and Fluornoy, 2001, Degler, 1984, Ruggie, 2003.

[336] Mike Bellah writes in http://www.bestyears.com/expectations.html: "During the 1964-1965 school year, Harvard's Robert Rosenthal conducted an experiment in an elementary school to see whether teacher expectations influenced their students' performances. Teachers were told the names of children in their classes who were 'late bloomers,' about to dramatically spurt in their academic learning. In fact, these 'special' children were randomly selected and no smarter than their classmates. At the end of the term, all the students were tested, and the results made an important point. The 'special' children not only performed better in the eyes of their teachers (an expected outcome, the so-called 'halo effect'), but they also scored significantly higher on standardized IQ tests. In other words, teachers' expectations had improved the academic performance of their students. Where they expected success, they found it.

[337] See Ross and Nisbett, 1991, and Ross and Samuels, 1993.

[338] See, among others, Rabin, 1998.

[339] Read, for example, Allison and Owada, 1999, Annan, 1999, Boutros-Ghali et al., 1998, Brown and Rosecrance (Eds.), 1999, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, Carter and Perry, 1999, Feil, 1998, George, 1991b, George, 1991a, Goodpaster, 1996, Greenberg, Barton, and McGuiness,

2000, Hamburg, George, and Ballentine, 1999, Hamburg et al., 1996, Hamburg, 2000, Lund, 1996, Peck, 1998, Stremlau and Sagasti, 1998, Vance and Hamburg, 1997.

[340] Robinson, 2003.

[341] The literature on *conflict transformation* is vast. Read, for example, Hamburg, 1999, Kelman, 1990, Kelman, 1999b, Stern and Druckman (Eds.), 2000. Read on *mindful mediation*, McConnell, 1995.

[342] See, for example, Axworthy, 2001, or Steinbruner, 2000.

[343] *Negative peace* is the absence of direct violence (physical, verbal, and psychological) between individuals, groups, and governments. *Positive peace* is more than the absence of violence; it is the presence of social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of law (see, for example, Smoker, Davies, and Munske (Eds.), 1990, or Barash (Ed.), 1999).

[344] Read, for example, Drell, Sofaer, and Wilson (Eds.), 1999, Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, 1998, Talbott and Chanda (Eds.), 2001. Read on *deterrence failure*, Morgan, 1977, Morgan, 2003.

[345] Read, for example, Forsythe, 2003.

[346] The *Commission on Human Security* was established after a meeting between Mr. Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, and Mrs. Sadako Ogata, former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, in Tokyo in January 2001 in response to Japan's call at the U.N. Millennium Summit in September 2000.
The Commission, co-chaired by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, Special Representative of the Prime Minister for Afghanistan Assistance, and Professor Amartya Sen, Master, Trinity College, Cambridge University, and consisted of 10 other world-renowned experts, aims at developing the concept of human security and proposing a concrete program of action for the international community.

[347] See Zakaria, 2003.

[348] *Open World: The Truth About Globalisation*, by Legrain, 2002. See also Hernando de Soto's work, such as in Soto, 2000, Soto, 1989.

[349] See, for example, Ostrower, 1998.

[350] *The End of the American Era. US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, by Kupchan, 2002.

[351] Reported to me by members of the German aristocracy on August 3, 1999.

[352] Goebbels, 1934.

[353] Edward Mortimer, Adviser to the UN Secretary General, emphasizes the necessity of a stronger mandate in BBCWorld Hardtalk with Tim Sebastian, August 28. 2003.

[354] This section is adapted from Lindner, 2000j.

[355] The 1990s have witnessed a remarkable cycle of world conferences convened by the United Nations. These conferences enabled member states to address some of the major developmental, economic, social and environmental problems of our times. Taken together, the results of these conferences form the UN's Global Agenda.

[356] On BBCWorld in BBC Hardtalk with Jon Sopel.

[357] See also Telhami, 2003b, Zakaria, 2001.

[358] According to Hurd, the significant problem was not so much that the UN did not endorse the war in a new resolution, however, that the strike on Iraq was preemptive.

[359] Many countries operate on the basis of the adversarial system. This system is based on argument and is therefore built upon the antagonistic principle. The judge is passive, a kind of referee who adjudicates on motions and objections, while the jury observes and reaches its verdict. The quest for truth depends upon the outcome of the battle between the two parties involved, one of whom is the State. The public prosecutor is plaintiff for the State and therefore represents one side of the argument. Of course, it is only logical that this structure also influences the phase prior to the trial itself. The preparations for the case are also characterized by the battle between opposing sides, with the emphasis very much on winning the case. Other countries, including the Netherlands, have a less dualistic system. These nations have adopted the so-called 'inquisitory' style of hearing, also known as the continental system. The most important characteristic of this approach is that the judge is active and embarks upon his own independent search for the truth (De Lange and Wabeke, 2003, pp. 383-384).

[360] Numerous theories address the *causation of deadly conflict and mass violence*. Gustave Le Bon (1895) stipulates that individuals turn into "primitive beings" in crowds, and that *crowd behavior* is intellectually inferior and basically lacking civilized reason (Le Bon, 1976, Le Bon, 1896). Later, the twentieth century evolution of sociological theories led to theories such as *breakdown theory*, *resource mobilization theory*, *prospect theory*, and *cultural theory*. *Resource mobilization theory* suggests that violence occurs when groups draw upon their resources and solidarity to pursue their interests (explaining routine collective action such as strikes, yet lacking explanation power for non-routine collective action such as mass violence, see, for example Gamson, 1968, Gamson, 1975 and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001, Tilly, 1978. David A. Snow and colleagues (see McAdam and Snow (Eds.), 1997) have updated *breakdown theory* by integrating *prospect theory*, which claims that individuals make decisions based on rational choice, and *cultural theory*, which introduces the concept of the "quotidian," meaning everyday life that we all take for granted. Social breakdown (a) creates losses which are experienced as deprivations (prospect theory), and (b) diminishes actors' confidence that their accustomed practices will grant a satisfactory future (cultural theory). This overview is adapted from Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002, and Useem, 1998. See, furthermore, the work by Michael Harris Bond and colleagues, such as in Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond, 2005. See, also, Leyton, 1983, Leyton, 1997, Leyton, 1975, Leyton, 2000, Leyton, O'Grady, and Overton, 1992.

[361] See among many other, for example, Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003, Hardin, 1995a, Hardin, 1995b, Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, and Hewstone (Eds.), 1988.

[362] Just to give a few examples, Falk, 1988, Gilbert, 1994, Hoge and Rose, 2001, Kruglanski and Golec, 2005, Reich (Ed.), 1990, and Ross, 1993a. In Stern, 2003, you find a chapter on humiliation.

[363] See, for example, Deutsch and Krauss, 1965, Deutsch, 1973, Deutsch and Hornstein, 1975, Deutsch, 1976, Deutsch, 1994, Deutsch and Coleman (Eds.), 2000.

[364] For an overview over social psychology of conflict see also Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, and Hewstone (Eds.), 1988, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict*.

[365] See, for example, Kelman and Hamilton, 1989, Kelman, 1992, Kelman and Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1965, Kelman, 1997, Kelman, 1999b.

[366] See, for example, Ross and Ward, 1996, Ross and Ward, 1995, Ross, 1995a, Ross and Nisbett, 1991, Ross and Samuels, 1993.

[367] Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991.

[368] Ury, 1999.

[369] Bar-On and Nadler, 1999.

[370] I thank particularly Ingeborg Breines, Director of "Women and a Culture of Peace," for her encouraging support, as well as David Adams whom I met already in 1994, as well as Timothée Ngakoutou, John Aglo, Jacqueline Nzoyihera, and Alpha Oumar Diallo.

[371] See, for example, Zehr, 1990, and Zehr, 2002.

[372] See, for example, Assefa, 1987.

[373] See, for example, Kraybill, 1996.

[374] Quoted from http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/about_us.html, retrieved July 13, 2003. See furthermore, for example, Etzioni, 1991, Etzioni, 1993, or Lukes, 1998, and the quarterly journal *The Responsive Community*.

[375] See, for example, the *Relationship Between Induced Emotional Arousal and Amnesia,* by Christianson, 1984.

[376] While traumatized individuals may be unable to give a coherent narrative of the incident, there may be no interference with implicit memory: "they may 'know' the emotional valence of a stimulus and be aware of associated perceptions, without being able to articulate the reasons for feeling or behaving in a particular way" (van der Kolk and Fisler, 2000, p. 6).

[377] On the American Psychological Association's website we read, "Anger is a completely normal, usually healthy, human emotion. But when it gets out of control and turns destructive, it can lead to problems—problems at work, in your personal relationships, and in the overall quality of your life. And it can make you feel as though you're at the mercy of an unpredictable and powerful emotion. This brochure is meant to

help you understand and control anger" (http://www.apa.org/pubinfo/anger.html). There is a vast literature to draw upon for anger management, as well as numerous self-help programs.

[378] See work on *post-traumatic growth* by Calhoun and Tedeschi, 1998a, Tedeschi, 1999.

[379] Read, among many others, Gardner, 1993, and Hogg, 2001.

[380] It is disputed that Hitler was actually democratically elected. "Critics of democracy often claim that Hitler was democratically elected to power. This is untrue. … Hitler never had more than 37 percent of the popular vote in the honest elections that occurred before he became Chancellor. And the opposition among the 63 percent against him was generally quite strong. Hitler therefore would have never seen the light of day had the German Republic been truly democratic. Unfortunately, its otherwise sound constitution contained a few fatal flaws. The German leaders also had a weak devotion to democracy, and some were actively plotting to overthrow it. Hitler furthermore enjoyed an almost unbroken string of luck in coming to power. He benefited greatly from the Great Depression, the half-senility of the president, the incompetence of his opposition, and the appearance of an unnecessary backroom deal just as the Nazis were starting to lose popular appeal and votes" (Retrieved from http://www.korpios.org/resurgent/L-hitlerdemo.htm in April 2003).

[381] Read on the website of the *Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy*, http://www.imtd.org/about-theory.htm (2002), the following, "The term multi-track diplomacy is based on the original distinction made by Joseph Montville in 1981 between official, governmental actions to resolve conflicts (track one) and unofficial efforts by non- governmental professionals to resolve conflicts within and between states (track two). Later, Louise Diamond coined the phrase "multi-track diplomacy," recognizing that to lump all track two activities under one label did not capture the complexity or breadth of unofficial diplomacy. Ambassador John McDonald then wrote an article expanding track two into four separate tracks: conflict resolution professionals, business, private citizens, and the media. This framework, however, still had the four unofficial tracks operating with the exclusive purpose to affect or change the direction of track one. In 1991, Diamond and McDonald expanded the number of tracks to nine. They added four new tracks: religion, activism, research, training, and education, and philanthropy, or the funding community. More importantly, however, they reorganized the relationship between the various tracks. Instead of putting track one at the top of the hierarchy, with all the "unofficial" tracks poised to change the direction of track one, Diamond and McDonald redesigned the diagram and placed the tracks with each connected to each other in a circle. No one track is more important than the other, and no one track is independent from the others. They operate together as a system. Each track has its own resources, values, and approach, but since they are all linked, they can operate more powerfully when they are coordinated." See Diamond and McDonald, 1996, or Lederach, 1997.

[382] "There are approximately 50 million uprooted people around the world— refugees who have sought safety in another country, and people displaced within their own country. Around half of this displaced population are children. The majority of people flee their homes because of war. In recent decades the proportion of war victims who are civilians rather than combatants has leaped from five percent to more than 90 percent" United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2001).

[383] See, among many, Crossette, 2001, Lewis, 2001, and Takeyh, 2001

[384] See, for example, Carothers, 1999, Linz and Stephan, 1996.

[385] See for example, McDougal, Lasswell, and Cheng, 1980.

[386] See, for example, work carried out by Joseph Preston Baratta, 1995 or Baratta, 1987, see also Annan, 1997, or Zolo, 1997, as well as Saul H. Mendlovitz, director of the *World Order Models Project*, Mendlovitz (Ed.), 1975. A large body of literature can be drawn upon.

[387] Read Annan, 2000, on *We the Peoples*. See also Rosecrance (Ed.), 2001.

[388] See, for example, Sen and Klein, 2003. I thank Morton Deutsch for making me aware of this publication.

[389] Seligman, 1991.

[390] Until the 1960s, *culture and ethnicity* or even *culture and nationhood*, were seen to be almost synonymous. Fredrik Barth (Ed.), 1969, was among the first to make the point that there is no one-to-one relationship between culture and ethnicity; cultural differences are not "real," but socially sanctioned. The controversy between *primordialism* and *instrumentalism* characterized the field for many years, as did the

debate over *essentialism* and *constructivism*. As to the first controversy, *instrumentalism* became the dominant one, see Guibernau and Rex (Eds.), 1995. *Primordialism* in essence regards ethnic identity to be primary and not secondary, with Clifford Geertz, 1973, being one of its representatives. Gellner, 1997, stands for *constructivism*, with Smith, 1991, being placed in between *essentialism* and *constructivism*. This overview has been adapted from Eriksen, 2001.

[391] Retrieved from http://www.foe.co.uk/pubsinfo/infoteam/pressrel/2001/20011102112007.html, which informs of a *Trade Justice Parade* in central London on November 3, 2001, as world governments prepared to travel to Doha, Qatar, for *World Trade Organization* talks.

[392] To be found, for example, on http://www.tve.org/earthreport/archive/doc.cfm?aid=904.

[393] See also Beck, 1999b, Hartling, 2003.

[394] See for work on the information age Castells, 1996, Castells, 1997b, Castells, 1997a. See the following sites for more information on the sociology of cyberspace and issues relating to technoculture, social relations and the internet:

http://www.dc.peachnet.edu/~mnunes/moo.html

http://www.pscw.uva.nl/SOCIOSITE/TOPICS/WebSoc.html

http://eng.hss.cmu.edu/internet/articles.html

http://otal.umd.edu/~rccs/

http://www.unn.ac.uk/corporate/cybersociety/

http://cec.wustl.edu/~cs142/articles.html

http://www.plannet.co.uk/olp/vcity.htm

I thank Nick Prior for these links.

[395] See also Luke and Toulouse (Eds.), 1998, Luke, 1997, Luke, 1989, Luke, 1992, Luke, 1990.

[396] "Joint custody – this can refer to joint legal custody and/or to joint physical custody. Generally, however, people mean joint physical custody when they talk about joint custody. Joint physical custody does not have to mean that the children spend exactly fifty percent of their time with each parent, but it does mean that the children are with each parent for significant amounts of time" (retrieved from http://www.jhlaw.org/faq.html in April 2003).

[397] Relatively low expectations may be the secret of the success of so many *arranged marriages* in non-Western cultural contexts where the extended family is primary and the couple secondary. Egyptian grandparents warn against marrying a person one is in love with (personal conversations, Cairo, Egypt, 1984-1991). The chances are great that this marriage will be unhappy, they say. Expectations are too high and it requires an enormous amount of maturity to tackle the down-turn constructively.

[398] Ullman in an interview on August 20, 2003, in the BBCWorld Hardtalk program with Tim Sebastian.

[399] See books such as Hamburg, 2002 and Mitchell, 1999.

[400] See the sea of literature that promotes skills conducive to a more peaceful world. I could recommend hundreds of publications, and just pick some, for example, Hamburg, 1992, as well as Takanishi and Hamburg, 1997, who write on preparing *adolescents* for a peaceful world, or Schwebel, Maher, and Fagley (Eds.), 1990 who address *cognitive growth over a life span*, or Hendrix, 2001, Hendrix and Hunt, 1997 with their very down to earth guidelines for couples and parents. See also the work done by peace psychology. Note that Ervin Staub, the author of the *Roots of Evil* (1989), at the Psychology Department at the University of Massachusetts, is starting a new Ph.D. concentration in *The Psychology Of Peace And The Prevention Of Violence*. See furthermore the work by a great old lady, Elise Boulding, former secretary general of the *International Peace Research Association*, who says "There are no safe places except as we make them." See her work in Boulding, 1999, Boulding, 1990, Boulding, 2000, Boulding and Brock-Utne, 1989. Or see work by Richard Wagner Christie, Wagner, and Winter (Eds.), 2001, Deutsch, 1993, and Hinde and Parry, 1989. Read on *critical reflection* that has been stipulated as central objective of adult education in the work of Mezirow (Mezirow, 1990, Mezirow, 1991, Mezirow, 2000). Mezirow's work is part of a critical tradition in adult education associated also with Collins and Brookfield as well as Freire, owing its roots to Dewey, and its theoretical base to Habermas on the other.

[401] Read, for example, De Gerrano and Keynan, 1998.

[402] See, for example, Minow, 1998.

[403] In his last book *The Ethics of Memory* (Margalit, 2002a) Margalit, indicates that forgiveness does not require forgetting the wrong done, but that it requires getting beyond certain moral emotions, like humiliation and resentment. Howard Zehr, known worldwide for his pioneering work in transforming our understandings of justice, proposes workable principles and practices for making restorative justice both possible and useful (Zehr, 1990, Zehr, 2002). Miroslav Volf (1996) proposes that the act of forgiveness is active suffering because it means foregoing full retributive justice. We may choose to forgive and embrace, but 'the other' may not. Despite this paradox, we must give ourselves to *the other* and receive *the other* into ourselves. "I must keep the boundaries of my own self firm, offer resistance; otherwise I will be engaged in a self-destructive act of abnegation. At no point in the process may the self deny either the other or itself. The embrace itself depends on success in resisting the vortex of de-differentiation through active or passive assimilation, yet without retreating into self-insulation. In an embrace the identity of the self is both preserved and transformed, and the alterity of the other is both affirmed as alterity and partly received into the ever changing identity of the self" (Volf, p. 143).

[404] Retrieved from http://www.findhorn.org/events/conferences/archives/forgive/bamber.html in April 2003.

[405] I thank Morton Deutsch for this thought, which he communicated to me in a personal conversation in July 2003.

[406] See, for example, Hartung, 1994.

[407] There exists a wide spectrum of literature on early warning. For efforts to collect societal indicators that can serve as alarm signals, see, for example, the *Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR)* program at the *Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM),* University of Maryland

[408] This book is not the place to discuss how exactly such institutions should or could look like and how current national sovereignty may be reconciled with democratically anchored global institutions. These are tasks that will take decades to bring about. This book merely wishes to delineate the path.

[409] Similar to the *Moratorium On Trade In Small Arms*, or the *Moratorium On Commercial Whaling*. Read, for example, Patten and Lindh, 2001.