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## **Humiliation and Rationality in International Relations.**

### **The Role of Humiliation in North Korea, Rwanda, Somalia, Germany, and the Global Village**

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#### **Abstract**

To what extent are human beings rational? This is the question this article addresses by examining North Korea, Rwanda/Burundi, Somalia, Germany, and the so-called global village. It is argued that feelings of humiliation are potent forces that limit decision making to short-term rationality, and furthermore entice actors to severely reduce the size of their reference group. This article is relevant for national and global decision makers. It is especially interesting for policy strategists tackling the future of the global village. If we follow the logic expounded in this article, the West must be aware of a danger looming from the humiliated poor, or at least from their representatives. In view of the danger that, for example, a new Hitler would present, the West is fortunate that the influence and prestige of Nelson Mandela are so great.

Keywords: Rationality, humiliation, international relations, genocide

# **Humiliation and Rationality in International Relations.**

## **The Role of Humiliation in North Korea, Rwanda, Somalia, Germany, and the Global Village**

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### **Biographical Note**

Evelin Gerda Lindner is a cross-cultural social psychologist (and a physician) with broad international experience. Since 1997 she is a researcher at the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo in the field of conflict theory, where she looks at psychological aspects that play a role in escalating conflict to war (she grew up in a refugee family herself). Please see her academic work on <http://www.uio.no/~evelinl/>. Several articles are currently in the process of being written. Evelin Lindner's doctoral thesis in medicine addresses quality of life in an intercultural context (Egypt and Germany). Her doctoral dissertation in psychology focuses on the psychology of humiliation. She stood as candidate for the European Parliament in 1994. In 1993 she founded the NGO 'Better Global Understanding' in Hamburg, Germany, and organised a festival with 20 000 participants under the motto 'Global Responsibility.' Earlier on she worked as a psychological counsellor in Cairo, Egypt, where she had her private practice, 1987-1991 and from 1984-1987 at the American University in Cairo. From 1974-1984 she studied and worked in New Zealand, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Israel, West Africa, USA, Germany, Norway.

## **Humiliation and Rationality in International Relations.**

### **The Role of Humiliation in North Korea, Rwanda, Somalia, Germany, and the Global Village**

‘The trend toward ever-greater specialization in many areas of intellectual life has led to fragmentation that deprives scholars of the ability to communicate even in closely adjoining fields. The emergence of the rational action paradigm as the inter-lingua of the social sciences is a remarkable exception to this trend. It is the one paradigm that offers the promise of bringing greater theoretical unity across disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, cognitive psychology, moral philosophy and law. The paradigm is also important for efforts to solve pressing social problems, because it provides the theoretic basis for most public policy analysis.’ This is a quotation from the journal *Rationality and Society*.<sup>1</sup>

This article introduces the notion of humiliation and aims at linking it with the concept of rationality. Humiliation is a notion that has intriguing similarities with the concept of rationality insofar as it connects, analogous to the concept of rationality, many aspects of the human condition and many academic disciplines. The concept of humiliation is not only relevant for the form of societal structures, but also for the mode of intergroup and interpersonal relations, and, last but not least, it has to do with emotions and the debate around rationality and emotionality. The concept of humiliation thus connects basic research in psychology, as for example research on the brain and the way human perception and action is processed, with large macro-political analyses that include anthropology, sociology, philosophy and political science.

A research project at the University of Oslo (1997-2001)<sup>2</sup> focuses on humiliation. The starting point for the research on humiliation was the long-standing assumption that the Versailles Accords after World War I inflicted humiliation on Germany to an extent that it ‘triggered’ World War II. Astonishingly, social psychology has not researched the issue of humiliation on a larger scale, although it seems to be extremely relevant, especially if humiliation really does have the capacity to ‘trigger’ world wars in way that war is seen as a ‘rational’ response to humiliation.

The project is entitled *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*.<sup>3</sup> 216 qualitative interviews were carried out, from 1998 to 1999 in Africa (in Hargeisa, capital of ‘Somaliland,’ in Kigali and other places in Rwanda, in Bujumbura, capital of Burundi, in Nairobi in Kenya, and in Cairo in Egypt), and from 1997 to 2000 in Europe (in Oslo in Norway, in Germany, in Geneva, and in Brussels).<sup>4</sup> The topic has been discussed with about 400 researchers working in related fields. The current-state-of-the-art has been mapped, showing that little has been done in this field. A Theory of Humiliation is currently being developed by the author.

What is humiliation? ‘Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will, or in some cases also with your consent,<sup>5</sup> often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless. However, the role of the victim is not necessarily always unambiguous – a victim may feel

humiliated in absence of any humiliating act – as result of a misunderstanding, or as result of personal and cultural differences concerning norms of what respectful treatment ought to entail, - or the ‘victim’ may even invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of a loathsome perpetrator<sup>67</sup> (Lindner, 2000a).

The research on humiliation that provides the framework for this article concentrates on genocide and quasi-genocide in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, looking into the question whether humiliation plays a role. In other words the research attends to what could be called state terrorism. In Rwanda the genocide in 1994 was orchestrated by the government, as was the onslaught on the Issaq in North Somalia in 1988. During the fieldwork in Africa in 1998 and 1999 it became clear that international terrorism may have a similar background in humiliation, and that this may be of even greater relevance to the world community than state terrorism in specific countries. This is because international terrorism concerns the whole planet. Tourists being kidnapped (Luxor in Egypt, or recently the Philippines), bombs planted (New York, or embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam) make the whole world community a target. And the world-wide destructive effect of the virus ‘I love you’ could easily be used by international terrorism in the future.

Since this article aims at linking humiliation and rationality, it has to introduce the notion of rationality at some point. It initiates this by putting the following questions: Are phenomena such as dictatorship, war, genocide, or terrorism rational or irrational? Is the exploitation of the poor ‘rational,’ and are attempts to alleviate poverty irrational? Are they ‘stupid charity’? Or is it the other way round? Is the exploitation of the poor ‘stupid short-sightedness,’ and the alleviation of poverty a ‘rational’ protection of resources? And if humans are profit-maximising beings, what kind of profit are we talking about? Profit for whom and for how long? Is it ‘long-term profit for all’? Or is it ‘short-term profit for all’? Or is it ‘short-term profit for a few only’? Or ‘long-term profit for a few only’? All these questions centre upon one issue: ‘Who is the actor concerned, and to what extent does this actor take into account her own social, environmental and time embeddedness?’

The article is organised in five parts that are preceded by a short overview over the current state-of-the-art. Subsequently the cases of North Korea, Rwanda, Somalia, Germany and the so-called ‘Global Village’ are addressed.

### **Current State-of-the-Art**

The notion of humiliation has not been studied as explicitly as such fields as ‘rationality,’ ‘trauma,’ or ‘stress.’ In many cases the term humiliation is not even differentiated from other concepts. Humiliation and shame, for example, are often used exchangeably, among others by Silvan S. Tomkins (1962–1992), whose work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson. Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate out of altogether nine affects, namely as a combination of shame, disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, 1<sup>st</sup> October 1999; see also Nathanson, 1992; Nathanson, 1987).

The list of publications that explicitly use the term humiliation is comparatively short, and spread over very disparate thematic fields. *The Journal of Primary Prevention* pioneered work on humiliation in 1991 (Klein, 1991), and 1992 (Barrett & Brooks, 1992; Smith, 1992). In 1997 the journal *Social Research* devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation, stimulated by Margalit’s *The Decent Society* (Margalit, 1996). Margalit’s work pertains to the significant literature in philosophy on ‘the politics of recognition,’ claiming that people who are not recognised suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence (see also Honneth, 1997 on related themes). Max Scheler set out these issues in his classic book *Ressentiment* (Scheler, 1961). Also Liah Greenfeld, writing in the field of political science, focuses on resentment and sees it’s dynamics at the heart of nationalism (Greenfeld, 1992; Greenfeld, 1996).

In the field of psychology, Linda Hartling (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (Humiliation Inventory). W. Vogel documents 'unforgivable humiliation' as a core obstacle in couples' treatment (Vogel & Lazare, 1990). Robert L. Hale addresses *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder* (Hale, 1994).<sup>7</sup> James Gilligan, a psychiatrist, suggests that humiliation creates violence (Gilligan, 1996), while Scheff and Retzinger extended their work from shame and rage to violence and Holocaust, and studied the part played by 'humiliated fury' (Scheff 1997, 11).

William Ian Miller wrote a book entitled *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence*,<sup>8</sup> where he links humiliation to honour as understood in *The Iliad* or Icelandic sagas and explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Cohen and Nisbett also examine an honour-based notion of humiliation (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

Humiliation has furthermore been addressed in such fields as love, sex and social attractiveness,<sup>9</sup> depression,<sup>10</sup> society and identity formation,<sup>11</sup> sports,<sup>12</sup> and serial murder.<sup>13</sup> A few examples from history, literature and film illustrate humiliation.<sup>14</sup>

Also relevant for the analysis of humiliation at the macro level is work on international relations,<sup>15</sup> as well as war and violence.<sup>16</sup> *Bloody Revenge* by Scheff,<sup>17</sup> and *Roots of Evil* by Staub,<sup>18</sup> are grand works that analyse emotions within their sociological environment in an integrative way, thus addressing also humiliation, though not as the only variable.

Regarding rationality, it is a field that economics, in particular, that uses as a set of assumptions about the psychology of actors that is advocated in Rational Actor Theory. This is the psychology of rational choice, utilitarianism and profit maximisation. The theory of rational action originates in its purest form 'in the classical economics of Adam Smith, and claims that human behaviour can best be understood by assuming *individuals pursue their self-interest, subject to information and opportunity costs*' (Monroe, 1991, preface x, italics added).

Rational Choice and Rational Actor Theory are hotly contested fields. In 1998, the Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam, in collaboration with the Department of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University, started a research program that aims to evaluate Rational Choice Theory'<sup>19</sup> 'The dominant conception of rational choice in the social sciences, especially within the discipline of economics, is that of instrumental rationality. Rationality, on this view, is an instrumental, individualist, subjective, forward looking (or consequentialist) and maximizing notion. Rationality, on this view, is not about ends, but only about means; it is purely instrumental. A choice is rational to the extent it serves to satisfy one's preferences. One cannot criticize the content of one's preferences for being irrational; only choices can be rational or irrational.'<sup>20</sup>

Rational Actor Theory as developed by Anthony Downs in his classical publication *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Downs, 1957) is critically discussed in *The Economic Approach to Politics*, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe (Monroe, 1991). Questions that are examined there are: 'How appropriate is the market metaphor for politics?'<sup>21</sup> Do people actually pursue goals?<sup>22</sup> Does collective political welfare emerge from the individual pursuit of self-interest?<sup>23</sup> Is political behavior best understood by assuming political agents act primarily in the pursuit of individual self-interest?<sup>24</sup> Is self-interest the same as utility maximization?<sup>25</sup> Do real people make decisions the way the theory postulates?<sup>26</sup> Do political acts and decisions emanate from a conscious calculus?<sup>27</sup> What is the importance of choice and identity for political behavior?<sup>28</sup> Can political calculus be put into cost/benefit terms?<sup>29</sup> Does use of the Rational Actor Theory limit our understanding of political action by ignoring the political role of values and institutions?'<sup>30</sup> (ix).

## Humiliation, Rationality, and Adam Smith's Condition of Information

Psychological research, especially the current research presented here, addresses the interplay between rationality and feelings of humiliation that are typically followed by resentment. Young Palestinians or Indians, for example, who carry out suicide bomb attacks in order to defend their cause seem to cast aside 'profit maximising behaviour' together with their own lives. Is this behaviour explicable in terms of h rationality?

Robert Wicklund, social psychologist, wrote in a personal letter (15th May 1997) about 'the over-sensitivity of people (and/or groups) who lack, at least momentarily, a basis of security.' Wicklund explains: 'I am thinking of various heterogeneous sources who point to people whose sense of identity, pride, etc. has recently or chronically been injured. Such insecurity then produces a sensitivity to criticism, or to further assaults on pride or identity, and depending on which source you read, the effect can be the person's (group's) becoming self-aggrandizing, proselytizing, arrogant and strident, non-apologetic, and transparently self-esteem-building (see for example Fulbright, 1966; Geyer, 1997; Gollwitzer, Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982; Ranaulf, 1964). One thesis, pertinent to the above literature, is that a body of people that needs and flaunts a national identity is doing so out of weakness. This implies that countries that are not so ostentatious with their identities would also be less likely to respond to external sources of Humiliation conversations in terms of aggression.'

This article tries to examine Wicklund's propositions with reference to Rational Actor Theory by looking at North Korea, Rwanda/Burundi, Somalia, Germany, and at the so-called global village. The paper positions itself within the discussion of rational choice by differentiating two kinds of rational choice, namely rational choice with *full* information and rational choice without *full* information (see Adam Smith's condition of information). This dichotomy is being related to the distinction between a balanced state of mind and a humiliated state of mind. In cases where an actor has a balanced state of mind, the actor will be able to make use of all the 'information' that is available to that person. However, when actor's state of mind is affected by strong feelings of humiliation or by 'humiliated fury' – a condition that encompasses stress, fear and aggression – then it is much more likely that such actors will be unable to take cognisance of important data that have a bearing upon their situation. Circumstances of humiliation may produce the psychological condition described by Wicklund, meaning that actors in this condition are liable to make choices whose rationality is limited, short-sighted and exclusive.

Values and preferences are, initially at least, excluded from the discussion in order to see how far Rational Choice Theory can carry us on its own. As has been seen, Rational Choice Theory is to be discussed in two versions, namely with and without *full* information. Full information may be defined as knowledge of both the short-term and the long-term consequences of a person's actions both upon herself and upon all the individuals, groups, social relationships and institutions on which she is dependent. By full information is meant that actors have information about their dependence on the social and environmental conditions in which they are embedded. Actors may be designated as 'not fully informed' if they either lack the above-mentioned information, or are not able, psychologically, to give it cognitive room and priority.

This article will argue that people in a balanced psychological state who are able to use *full* information in their deliberations will engage in behaviour that is not only 'rational' but also has the characteristics of 'ethical,' 'altruistic,' 'cooperative' behaviour. By contrast, a humiliated state of mind operating on the basis of less than full information will lead to actions that are both 'irrational' and possess the characteristics of 'unethical,' 'selfish' and 'uncooperative' behaviour. Extreme examples of this behaviour include genocide and cruel exploitation. Such atrocities can only be interpreted as 'rational' by a humiliated mind that operates within a limited cognitive and emotional field, a mind that closes itself up against

‘full information.’ However, third party observers from Western societies who situate themselves within a human rights framework and who are aware of the destructive long-term consequences of atrocities perceive such behaviour as both ‘immoral’ and ‘irrational.’ For example, atrocities frequently fail to provide for the long-term welfare of the perpetrators. Worse, perpetrating atrocities may even lead to the physical destruction of the perpetrators and their followers themselves, as demonstrated by the fate of Hitler’s Germany and the Rwandese ‘genocidaires.’ These assumptions are simple but powerful and provide a tool for penetrating the deep logic of the framework of rational choice, firstly, in a number of societies that have undergone intense episodes of oppression and, secondly, in an envisaged pattern of future social relationships that I am labelling ‘the global village.’ The paper will address, in turn, the cases of North Korea, then Rwanda/Burundi, Somalia, Germany, and, finally, the global village. As mentioned above, Rwanda/Burundi and Somalia, together with Germany, were studied during intensive fieldwork in the framework of the research project on humiliation (1997-2001).

### **The case of North Korea**

In his book entitled *Rogue Regimes* (Tanter, 1998), Raymond Tanter draws attention to the apparently irrational behaviour of the dictatorial leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-Il. Here is a key passage: ‘North Korea has suffered from floods and a devastating rice famine. But Kim Jong-Il has used his country’s resources to build a monumental skyscraper. This misallocation of resources suggests that his concern with personal aggrandizement might be at the expense of the people of North Korea. While Pyongyang’s long time rival, Seoul, was sending shipments of rice to alleviate the starvation in the North, Kim Jong-Il sent saboteurs to infiltrate the South. He has commented, “No one can figure me out, especially the Americans ... but it is they who are confused.” He is correct. When you bite the hand that feeds you, it appears to be inexplicable.’

Tanter continues: ‘Not since the Ethiopian famine of the 1980s, has the world seen such horrors as the scenes in North Korea during the 1990s. In a rare, and perhaps desperate move, the Stalinist-like North Korean regime allowed Western reporters to document the suffering and starvation that had rocked its population. Floods and famine have wiped out much of this small country’s crops, leaving millions of faces hollow and blank. Photographers panned over live bodies that looked like corpses. Pictures of babies with swollen stomachs circulated around the world, tugging at hearts and consciences. Though this image alone was horrifying, the civilized world suspected that Kim Jong-Il hid even more appalling and gruesome scenes...’

Tanter concludes: ‘Because Pyongyang siphons off humanitarian assistance for the military before rationing it out to the population, the international community struggles with the following dilemma. Should we save the lives of millions of North Koreans at the risk of strengthening the military regime that threatens 37,000 American soldiers and millions of South Koreans? To anticipate the conclusion of Chapter Seven, the regime needs to be contained, but the North Korean population needs to be saved. At issue is how to contain a puzzling leader like Kim Jong-Il and embrace his starving population’ (Tanter 1998, 3).

How can the behaviour of the North Korean regime be explained in terms of Rational Choice Theory? North Korea does not accept Western values. North Korea advocates the ideology of Juche (self-reliance) that is said to be embodied in the national leader. The U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports<sup>31</sup> state that in North Korea human rights violations are ‘normal’: ‘According to defector sources, the regime continued summary executions of political prisoners, political opponents, repatriated defectors, and others (reportedly including military officers suspected of plotting against Kim Jong Il). The Criminal Law makes the death penalty mandatory for activities “in collusion with imperialists” aimed at “suppressing

the national liberation struggle.” Some prisoners are sentenced to death for such ill-defined “crimes” as “ideological divergence,” “opposing socialism,” and other “counterrevolutionary crimes” (U.S.Department of State, 1996, 2).

‘This situation is further complicated by the continued deterioration of North Korea's economy, as underscored by six years of declining economic growth averaging about negative five percent annually... Official U.S. analysts estimate that North Korean industry is operating at less than 20 percent of capacity’ (Manning, 1997).

To echo Tanter, why does North Korea, a ‘rogue regime,’ commit a very high proportion of its GNP to military outlays rather than to providing welfare services and other human rights to its citizens? Is such behaviour ‘rational’?

The following answer may be proposed: North Korean decision-making can only be considered ‘rational’ if attention is restricted to short-term goals, specifically, the desire to harm those whom the regime defines as its enemies. However, an obvious question arises: Is it ‘rational’ for the regime to take actions which, while seeming to advance the short-term goals just mentioned, also have the effect of hastening the collapse of the North Korean regime while imposing great hardships upon ordinary North Koreans?

Tanter<sup>32</sup> argues that Pyongyang thinks short-term because of fear. According to him, the North Korean power elite is so preoccupied with the daily struggle for survival that it has no time, energy or spare ‘thinking capacity’ to look beyond those pressing issues. He points out, that, ironically, the actions taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to hold onto political power increase the likelihood of its ultimate defeat. A sensible long-term strategy would be – as he sees it – to increase welfare provision for the Korean people. However, this would contradict the Juche ideology to which Kim Jong-Il is strongly wedded ideologically.

In attempting to find a deep structure in the case of North Korea and its rational profit maximising behaviour, the overarching questions, already enumerated above, present themselves as follows: If humans are profit-maximising beings, what kind of profit are we talking about? The key issues are: *Profit for whom and for how long?* Is it ‘long-term profit for all’? Or is it ‘short-term profit for me only’? Other alternatives are ‘short-term profit for all’ and ‘long-term profit for me only.’ To put it another way, ‘who is the actor, and to what extent does this actor take into account her own social, environmental and time embeddedness?’ Table 1 tries to summarise these points in a model that will subsequently be applied to Rwanda, Germany and the global village.

TABLE ONE  
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PROFIT IN NORTH KOREA

	<b>Short-term</b>	<b>long-term</b>
<b>Profit for all</b>	(1) The North Korean leaders promise well-being to all (North Koreans) for being loyal to their leader and his Juche ideology; this is ‘reinforced’ by occasional increases in food rations.	(3) Sustainable social and environmental development would mean the implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all.
<b>Profit for me</b>	(2) However, what the North Korean leaders in fact seem to seek is securing short-term survival for themselves only.	(4) Would be achieved by pursuing (3).

Table 1: Short-term and long-term profit in North Korea



### **The case of Rwanda**

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has been widely reported and is well known.<sup>33</sup> ‘The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was the execution of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus by Hutu-supremacists in the name of Hutu superiority. It took place at a pace three times that of the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews’ (Clark, 2000, 1). Clark writes: ‘This genocide I find to be, with no hyperbole, perhaps the single worst, most immoral, tragic, and horrific event of human history; for a few reasons. First, the genocide was committed not by a military elite but by the populace at large, using crude weapons (mostly machetes...). Second, the international community (read: the United States and Western Europe) did almost nothing to stop it, despite repeated warnings. Third, the size and rapidity of the genocide was astounding. Fourth, it was the archetype of genocide, nothing motivated the killers besides a hate that had accumulated over the centuries’ (1). How did this hatred develop? It may be hypothesised that it stems from a painful historical experience of humiliation. Rwanda and Burundi look back on over two thousand years during which complex kingdoms with multiple hierarchies developed. There exist several versions of mythical history, among them one that later was used to justify the genocide. It relates that the majority (about 85%) of the population, the Hutu, stereotyped as small broadly-built agriculturalists, arrived ‘first,’ and that tall cattle herders, the Tutsi, (about 14% of the population) migrated to Rwanda later. It is said that the Tutsi managed to ensure that most social status was accorded to cattle-rearing, and they ruled the country as kings on this basis. Though this suggests a deep division, in fact, the society developed a highly sophisticated common language, and a common set of religious and philosophical beliefs,<sup>34</sup> indicating a kind of co-existence, and not a propensity to genocidal episodes.

Rwanda became a German colony in 1899 but was taken over by the Belgians in 1919 as a mandate territory of the League of Nations. During the 1920s the European colonists adopted and emphasised the above introduced ‘Hamitic hypothesis,’ meaning that the Tutsi were a superior, ‘Caucasoid’ race from North-Eastern Africa responsible for all signs of true civilization in ‘black’ Africa.<sup>35</sup> For a long period the colonialists sided with the Tutsi, and educated them to be leaders. A few years before the Belgians left Rwanda, however, some of the colonists began to favour Hutu, putting members of this group into senior administrative positions.<sup>36</sup> In other words, colonialists initially supported and rigidified a hierarchy of ‘worthy’ Tutsi as opposed to ‘unworthy’ Hutu, only to reverse this situation later. In this way, they created conditions under which the latent resentment of the humiliated ‘underdog’ could find expression in acts of counter-humiliation against the old ruling group, the Tutsi.<sup>37</sup>

Rwanda became independent in 1962. Already in 1961 a Hutu-led government had proclaimed a republic and ended the former Tutsi-monarchy. In 1967, after a seven-year civil war some 20,000 Tutsi had been killed and more than 300,000 had been forced to flee abroad. Second-generation exiles later formed the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990. The Hutu, fearing the return of Tutsi rule, began the systematic wholesale massacre of those Tutsi who had remained inside Rwanda, and of those moderate Hutu who opposed this slaughter. The invasion from Uganda increased levels of anger and fear, especially fear of future domination by the Tutsi. The genocidal attack upon the Tutsi was not, in general, an outburst of popular fury but a bureaucratically organised campaign directed by the Hutu government.<sup>38</sup>

A Rwandese intellectual who does not want to be named, related to the researcher on 24<sup>th</sup> January 1999 in Kigali that he believes that the Belgian colonisers ‘imported’ a much starker humiliation than had existed before: ‘Belgians suffer from severe divisions since a long time, this is known. When Belgium was our colonial master, the French speaking Belgians, the Walloons, were the ‘topdogs,’ and the Flemish speaking Belgians were the humiliated ‘underdogs.’ This has been somewhat turned upside down today since the Flemish are economically more successful than their French speaking compatriots. In any case, they projected their deep division onto Rwanda. They ‘imported’ their psychological map and their feelings. The topdogs identified with the Tutsi and the underdogs with the Hutu.’

The Rwandan interlocutor continued his account: ‘Before the advent of the colonisers the hierarchical structures that existed in Rwanda were highly interwoven, there were nothing like two clear-cut camps. My father, for example, gave cows to others in order to ally himself with them, but he also was the receiver of cows from a family who was superior to him. There was peaceful co-existence and to a certain extent reciprocal relations of mutual protection between protectors and protected, patrons and patronised. The Belgians introduced something new and destructive, namely a clear bifurcation and feelings of worthiness and unworthiness.’

This account was given by a man who clearly has a Tutsi identity and his view was supported by other Tutsi voices, who believe that the bifurcation between Tutsi and Hutu should be de-emphasised. Some Hutu representatives, on the other hand, oppose this view and wish to remind their former Tutsi masters that Hutu may not have regarded them as such benevolent patrons after all. A struggle to control the interpretation of the country’s history is currently under way in Rwanda. Having this caveat in mind Table 2 tries to summarise a possible view of the dynamics of humiliation and counter-humiliation in Rwanda, a view that builds on the assumption that relations between Hutu and Tutsi were more peaceful and less tainted by acts and feelings of humiliation before the advent of colonisers than after their intrusion.

TABLE TWO  
THE DYNAMICS OF HUMILIATION IN RWANDA

	<b>Pre-colonial times</b>	<b>Colonial times</b>	<b>Post-colonial times</b>
<b>‘Topdogs’</b>	Tutsi	Tutsi / French speaking Belgians	Tutsi (former topdog, then harassed, subjected to acts of humiliation and genocide)
<b>Degree of humiliation and counter-humiliation</b>	↓ weak humiliation: hierarchy with a high degree of mutually accepted patronage	↓ strong humiliation, including violence: ‘worthy’ beings were differentiated from ‘unworthy’ beings	↑ maximum counter- humiliation: genocide
<b>‘Underdogs’</b>	Hutu	Hutu / Flemish speaking Belgians	Hutu (former underdog, politically now the topdog, emotionally still suffering from former humiliations)

Table 2: The dynamics of humiliation in Rwanda

If this analysis is correct, and the researcher’s fieldwork in Rwanda and Burundi seems to support this, then it may be concluded that their past history of suffering humiliation led those in power in Rwanda to be guided by short-term rationality. This form of rationality led the

Hutu regime to mastermind the genocides directed against the Tutsi. Furthermore, the dynamics of humiliation fostered a form of rationality that underestimated the actor's social embeddedness within a larger, global context. In the case of Rwanda the humiliated 'underdogs' who had gained power were not able to include the former 'topdogs' in their range of sympathies and societal structures.

Humiliation seems to set in motion strong feelings, including a deep fear of being humiliated again after having escaped it. The result can be destructive for all; Rwanda as a whole certainly did not gain any long-term social, economic or political viability through the genocide. Destroying a Tutsi elite (plus moderate Hutu opponents to the genocide) has most probably been as damaging to Rwanda as the destruction of Jewish intelligence was to Germany. And even the members of the Hutu government who perpetrated the genocide would certainly find themselves in a much better situation today, if they had peacefully accepted into their midst the Tutsi refugees who wanted to return home, and if they had positively integrated those Tutsi who lived within Rwanda.

TABLE THREE  
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PROFIT IN RWANDA

	<b>short-term</b>	<b>long-term</b>
<b>Profit for all</b>	(1) The Hutu extremist government in Rwanda promised land, dignity and general well-being to all (Hutu), for being loyal to their leaders' genocidal ideology and for enacting it.	(3) Sustainable social and environmental development would have meant the implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all (Hutu and Tutsi).
<b>Profit for me</b>	(2) In 1994, the Hutu extremist government in Rwanda was so caught up in the dynamics of humiliation that the penalisation of 'them' as opposed to 'us' seemed the only option. The government orchestrated a genocide, was ousted, and the perpetrators are now in prison or on the run.	(4) Would have been achieved by taking care of (3).

Table 3: Short-term and long-term profit in Rwanda

## **The case of Somalia**

Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and a common ancestor, the Samaal.<sup>39</sup> Seventy five percent of the Somali population are traditionally pastoral nomadic clans (Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye). The agricultural Digil and Rahanwayn constitute only about 20 percent of the population.<sup>40</sup> During colonial times the North of Somalia was the 'British Protectorate of Somaliland,' while a large part of the rest of the country was 'Italian Trust Territory of Somalia.'<sup>41</sup>

An Australian humanitarian aid worker confirmed in an interview (29<sup>th</sup> November 1998) that he even today feels the effects of a very equal colonial relationship in the North of Somalia (largely the land of the Issaq clan): 'The North of Somalia was a British protectorate: There was respect for the Somalis, there was a kind of equal relationship. When England gave away the Ogaden [or Haud, a semi-desert which England gave to Ethiopia against the promises they had given the Somalis], the Somalis were very angry: "You are our friends (!) how can you betray us!" And also the British officers were annoyed with London, who just gave the Haud away as a kind of normal bargaining chip. So, there was a kind of partnership [between the Somalis and British].'<sup>42</sup> In other words, the Northerners, mainly Issaq, profited to a certain extent from their colonial past, during which their elite learned English and maintained a spirit of un-subjugated pride, unlike the Southern Somali population who learned Italian and was influenced by colonial culture more.

After independence, the North and the South united. The Northerners brought two important 'advantages' into this 'marriage': Firstly their English was much more useful in a modern world than Italian, and secondly they perceived themselves as superior, among others for their diligence and their cosmopolitan past as traders and livestock exporters. Their Southern brothers perceived them, accordingly, as arrogant and humiliating.

After independence in 1960, Somalia lived through a few years of political democracy (1960-1969). Democracy, however, was increasingly perceived as anarchic, a fact that allowed a dictatorial 'saviour' to seize power. President Mohammed Siad Barre from the Southern Marehan sub-clan assumed power and tried to create a more centralised political order. He gave people new hope by lifting up the economy. Subsequently he set out to fulfil Somalia's dream of unification and attempted to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia in 1978.<sup>43</sup> He failed, and Somalia's defeat was a considerable humiliation that undermined Barre's political position. He attempted to preserve his power by finding scapegoats. In particular, he put the blame upon the Northerners, at first the Majerteen and later the Issaq people. 'You Issaq, you are so arrogant,' a Somali woman (who wants to stay anonymous) reported to the researcher during the fieldwork (1998): she met the dictator when she pleaded for her imprisoned family members. She confirmed that she believes that the dictator – himself without formal education, but gifted with a sharp mind – must have suffered personal humiliation at the hands of Issaq who were more educated than him.

The dictator subsequently unleashed the military against the Issaq population with quasi-genocidal results. Issaqs were potential suspects everywhere, in the South they lost their jobs, they were detained, some executed, and subsequently their main cities fell pray to bloody destruction. The biggest blow hit Hargeisa, the capital of the North, when it was bombed and destroyed in 1988. (These atrocities are being labelled 'quasi-genocide,' since Issaq were not systematically exterminated, different to Rwanda, where even 'half-blood' were potential targets for extermination, and because until the end there were Issaq ministers, something that would not have been thinkable in Rwanda.<sup>44</sup>)

When the Barre regime collapsed in 1991, Somalia became stateless, and still is. The Somali clans reclaimed their traditional independence and fragmented what was once the Somali state. The Issaq in the North managed to pacify their region, and proclaimed their own state, ‘Somaliland.’ ‘Somaliland’ is not recognised by the international community or by other Somali leaders. In the rest of Somalia faction fighting between the clans during the 1990s resulted in a great deal of bloodshed with many atrocities being carried out on all sides.

Table 4 and Table 5 try to summarise the development of the cycle of humiliation, and the effect of humiliation on rational long-term thinking in Somalia.

TABLE FOUR  
THE DYNAMICS OF HUMILIATION IN SOMALIA

	<b>Pre-colonial times</b>	<b>Colonial and post-colonial times</b>	<b>Post-colonial times</b>
<b>‘Topdogs’</b>	numerous egalitarian nomadic clans, none of them topdog or underdog	Issaq clan in the North of Somalia / English Protectorate in the North of Somalia	Issaq clan (also Majerteen clan, former topdogs, then harassed, and subjected to acts of humiliation and quasi-genocide)
<b>Degree of humiliation and counter-humiliation</b>	↔ egalitarian relations between the major clans, no common state exists	↓ strong humiliation, English speaking diligent Issaq were perceived as arrogant by Southerners in the new state of Somalia that comprised the North and the South	↑ maximum counter-humiliation: quasi-genocide
<b>‘Underdogs’</b>	numerous egalitarian nomadic clans, none of them topdog or underdog	Somali clans in the South, among others the Marehan, dictator Siad Barre’s sub-clan / Italian colonial rule in the South of Somalia	Dictator Siad Barre, former underdog (Southern Marehan clan member, no formal education, politically now the topdog, emotionally still suffering from former humiliations)

Table 4: The dynamics of humiliation in Somalia

TABLE FIVE  
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PROFIT IN SOMALIA

	<b>short-term</b>	<b>long-term</b>
<b>Profit for all</b>	(1) The dictator Siad Barre promised land, dignity and general well-being to all Somalis (except most of the Issaq/Majerteen) for being loyal to their leaders' quasi-genocidal ideology. Barre started out his career by giving Somalia short-lived economic 'upswing' by building roads and creating jobs; later he 'distributed' Issaq property to others, for example, Ogadenis.	(3) Sustainable social and environmental development would have meant the implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all Somalis.
<b>Profit for me</b>	(2) In the 1980s, especially 1988, dictator Siad Barre was so caught up in the dynamics of humiliation that the penalisation of 'them' as opposed to 'us' seemed the only options. He orchestrated a quasi-genocide, was ousted in 1991, and died in exile.	(4) Would have been achieved by taking care of (3).

Table 5: Short-term and long-term profit in Somalia

### The case of Germany

The pattern of German history is more widely known than Rwandan or Somali history. Germany is a late-comer within European countries. France, England, Spain, Portugal, all of these states looked already back on a long national history when Germany was created as a state in 1871. Being a newcomer, Germany started to compare itself with the rest, and became aware of the fact that the others were far ahead, for example in acquiring colonies. However, the young national enthusiasm that existed at the outset of World War I was thoroughly destroyed by the defeat and the ensuing humiliating Versailles Accords. Germany was now a pariah in Europe, and not what it had wished, an important and respected player.

Hitler grew up in Austria, with a harsh father and a loving mother (Bullock, 1991). In his *Mein Kampf* (Hitler, 1999) Hitler elaborates on his father's authoritarian behaviour and how he, as a young boy resisted humiliation and stubbornly insisted on carrying out his dreams of becoming a painter. He writes about his father: '...the old man began the relentless enforcement of his authority' (Hitler, 1999, 9). Hitler then dedicates the subsequent part of *Mein Kampf* to his suffering from the humiliating position Germans had in Austria, and describes how Czech influence tried to 'eradicate' German influence, 'only a handful of Germans in the Reich had the slightest conception of the eternal and merciless struggle for the German language, German schools, and a German way of life' (10). Humiliation did not end for Hitler here; he participated in World War I on the German side and experienced its humiliating defeat. Already in Austria he had 'detected' the 'super-humiliator,' which was in his eyes the 'Weltjudentum.' He suspected Jews of planning to dominate the world and relegate proud Germany, together with all other nations, to a humiliating slave role.

Table 6 and Table 7 try to summarise the development of the cycle of humiliation, and the effect humiliation may have had on rational long-term thinking in Germany. It seems that the feelings of humiliation and the apprehension of future humiliation clouded Hitler's long-term rationality to the extent that he saw only one solution, namely the extinction of the feared

humiliator. However, he started out, as did Siad Barre later in Somalia, with buying his people's hearts by setting in motion a short-lived economic upswing. With skilled propaganda techniques, later so chillingly duplicated in Somalia, Rwanda and other places, he then tied his people up in the bifurcated discourse of 'we' or 'them' that made an enemy of every dissenter. When the end came, not long before committing suicide, he judged that the Germans had not lived up to his expectations, and that they therefore deserved to be destroyed.

TABLE SIX  
THE DYNAMICS OF HUMILIATION IN GERMANY

	<b>Beginning of colonial times</b>	<b>Before and after World War I</b>	<b>Before and during World War II</b>
<b>'Topdogs'</b>	Europe with England, France, Spain, Portugal as growing colonial powers	Allies winning World War I	Jews (perceived by Hitler as wanting to dominate the world as global 'super-humiliators')
<b>Degree of humiliation and counter-humiliation</b>	↓ weak humiliation perceived in Germany in the process of its national awaking	↓ strong humiliation, including violence: 'worthy' beings are differentiated from 'unworthy' beings	↑ maximum counter-humiliation: Holocaust
<b>'Underdogs'</b>	Germany realising that it was hanging behind, e.g. concerning possession of colonies	Germany humiliated in Europe after lost World War I (Hitler humiliated in Austria as a boy by his father; his beloved Germans humiliated in Austria by Czech 'influence')	Hitler (former underdog, now politically a topdog, but feeling triple humiliation (at least): by his father, by Czech influence in Austria, and by German defeat in World War I)

Table 6: The dynamics of humiliation in Germany

TABLE SEVEN  
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PROFIT IN GERMANY

	<b>Short-term</b>	<b>Long-term</b>
<b>Profit for all</b>	(1) Hitler promised ‘Lebensraum,’ land, dignity, and general well-being to all ‘Aryans’ for being loyal and fulfilling their leader’s vision of them as superior. Hitler started out by giving Germany a short-lived ‘Aufschwung’ [‘upswing’] by building roads and creating jobs; later he ‘distributed’ Jewish property to ‘Aryans.’	(3) Sustainable social and environmental development would have meant the implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all (citizens of Europe and the world).
<b>Profit for me</b>	(2) Hitler was so caught up in the dynamics of humiliation that penalising ‘them’ as opposed to ‘us’ seemed the only options. He orchestrated a Holocaust against an imagined ‘super-humiliator,’ the Jews; he was defeated, and committed suicide.	(4) Would have been achieved by taking care of (3).

Table 7: Short-term and long-term profit in Germany

### **The case of the global village**

‘Each year, about twelve million children die before their fifth birthdays, about half of them from causes associated with malnutrition. This is a silent holocaust, repeated year after year. Malnutrition leads to death, illness, and significantly reduced quality of life for hundreds of millions of children, adolescents, and adults. People should not have to suffer from malnutrition. More than that, people have a *right* to not be malnourished, as a matter of law. Since people have the human right to food and nutrition, nation-states and the governments that represent them have obligations to assure that the right is realized’ (Kent, 2000, 7).

George Kent addresses a problem that is extremely important for humankind, but, he asserts, notoriously underreported and thus largely evading public awareness. Media eagerly report on dramatic accidents in which one or two children die, but it seems that the death of twelve million children per year is accepted as ‘normal.’ Maybe people entertain an un-reflected belief that modernity and globalisation are there to solve this problem. Reality, however, proves the opposite; this is his message.

Mary Robinson (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) agrees. She writes in November 1999: ‘Economic, social and cultural rights are every bit as important as civil and political rights’ (Robinson, 1999, p. 1<sup>45</sup>). Robinson describes the widening gap of inequality and explains that the growth in real per-capita income, in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 1995, was only 28 dollars. The overall gap between the richest 20 percent doubled between 1940 and 1990. For example, in 1976 Switzerland was 52 times richer than Mozambique; in 1997, it was 508 times richer.

There is a wide range of literature addressing this problem within the framework of globalisation. Hurrell and Woods, for example, examine how and why liberals ignore or downplay inequality (Hurrell & Woods, 1995).<sup>46</sup> Globalisation is played out on the background of the ending of the Cold War that had introduced a strong bifurcated discourse in which each side tried to proclaim its own pride, honour and dignity and humiliate its opponent. In the end this struggle was decided by the demise of one side, leaving behind deep scars produced by decades of attempts to humiliate the enemy and its representatives around the world.



The old bifurcation disappeared, however, only to introduce a new one, namely the gap between rich and poor. Table 8 and Table 9 try to summarise how a new cycle of humiliation and resentment is set in motion in a world where modern technology is advertised to people who understand they have human rights (including economic rights) and at the same time painfully recognise that they cannot afford even the basics of life. In other words, poverty humiliates, especially when one is aware of the injustice entailed in it.

TABLE EIGHT  
THE DYNAMICS OF HUMILIATION IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

	<b>Before Cold War</b>	<b>Ending of Cold War</b>	<b>Present globalisation</b>	<b>Future</b>
<b>'Topdogs'</b>	The world contained a multitude of relations or non-relations, some topdogs (imperial and colonial mega-structures) and many underdogs	The West / 'capitalism'	The rich / the West or North	The rich / the West or North
<b>Degree of humiliation and counter-humiliation</b>	↓↔→ a world with a multitude of egalitarian or hierarchical relations, or non-relations	↓ strong humiliation, including violence: 'worthy' ideologies and their representatives are differentiated from 'unworthy' ideologies and their representatives	↓ strong humiliation, including violence: 'worthy' beings appear to be differentiated from 'unworthy' beings, a process that is thrown into a particularly stark light by the introduction of human rights	↑ maximum counter-humiliation: increasing anti-Western backlash, e.g. terrorism
<b>'Underdogs'</b>	Some top- and many underdogs	The Soviet Union / 'communism'	The poor / the non-West or non-North	The poor / the non-West or non-North

Table 8: The dynamics of humiliation in the global village

TABLE NINE  
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PROFIT IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

	<b>short-term</b>	<b>long-term</b>
<b>Profit for all</b>	(1) The 'rich' and the 'West' promise that all may achieve Western standards of living as it is shaped today.	(3) Sustainable social and environmental development would mean the implementation of all aspects of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights) for all (humanity).
<b>Profit for me</b>	(2) The 'rich' and the 'West' aim at the globalisation of free market structures without environmental and social considerations.	(4) Would be achieved by making sure that (3) is taken seriously by all.

Table 9: Short-term and long-term profit in the global village

The researcher's fieldwork in Africa (1998-1999) and her time as a psychological counsellor in Egypt (1984-1991) provided her with extensive material supporting the view that one of the most humiliating devices the West and the rich are currently inflicting on the rest of the world is teaching human rights (including economic rights), advertising democracy and Western luxury, doing everything to create a yearning for these goods and ideals, and at the same time letting oppressive regimes perpetrate atrocities (as in Rwanda) and increase the gap between rich and poor.

Poverty, if chosen voluntarily, as an idealist may do, or interpreted as God's will or nature's order, may not cause feelings of humiliation. However, poverty, understood as the violation of human rights, of one's inner core of dignity as a human being, is extremely humiliating. The former foreign minister of Norway, Thorvald Stoltenberg, widely experienced in international conflicts situations, related in a speech (Stoltenberg, 2000) that he already in 1956 as a young man felt that the West should not make promises it could not keep. He was in Hungary and painfully realised that the West would not risk World War III by supporting an Hungarian uprising by more than mere words. He added that he today meets extremely cynical people who have lost all hope in humanity, for example citizens of Srebrenica in Bosnia, who expected to be protected in supposedly 'safe' areas and were bitterly disappointed.

### **Conclusion**

This article addresses the question whether humans are rational profit-maximising beings and how the concept of humiliation may be related to rationality, and it does this by looking at North Korea, Rwanda/Burundi, Somalia, Germany, and at the so-called global village. It seems that fear and feelings of humiliation, including both the fear of being humiliated again in the future and also the desire for revenge, are potent forces that limit decision making to short-term rationality. Furthermore, fear and humiliation seem to lead actors to reduce the size of their reference groups, discounting the societal and global networks in which they are embedded and upon which they ultimately depend.

Leaders such as Siad Barre or Hitler translated their personal humiliation into national humiliation, and established strong bonds of feelings with their followers. The point of 'no return' seems to be reached as soon as a whole population is locked up in a societal structure where 'they' have to be exterminated in order to let 'us' survive in dignity. As soon as this stage is arrived at, dissenters are made silent and all forces are being concentrated on the task at hand, namely to eradicate 'them.'

TABLE TEN  
RATIONALITY WITH OR WITHOUT FULL INFORMATION

<b>Rationality under conditions of</b>	
<b>full information</b> (provided by globalisation in its capacity as a 'full informer,' and fathomable by a balanced mind):	<b>limited information</b> (caused by unavailability of information, or by humiliation - 'humiliated fury' as an intense combination of stress, fear and aggression):
Actors who have a balanced state of mind are able to take into account all available knowledge of the long-term consequences of their actions, including information about their dependence on the social and environmental conditions they are embedded in. In a globalising world that 'informs' its citizens in an unprecedented way of the extent of its interconnectedness, such actors will behave in a way that otherwise is labelled 'normative,' 'ethical,' 'altruistic,' 'cooperative.'	Actors who are psychologically impaired are unable to give cognitive room and priority to available information and will therefore not live under conditions of full information. Atrocities may be committed and perceived by such actors and explained as the 'only rational way out.' They will present atrocities in a 'rational' language of 'health' or 'hygiene,' in which it is 'painful,' but 'necessary,' to apply 'vaccinations' against evil.

Table 10: Rationality with or without full information

Table 10 tries to make atrocities 'fathomable.' (This is very different from seeking to justify them or be 'understanding.') In former times, as long as the world was fragmented and lived in what Hobbes calls 'the state of nature' (Hobbes, 1951) atrocities may have entailed more instrumental rationality than today. This is expressed for example in International Relations Theory, where Classical and Structural Realism saw the world as being guided by 'anarchy' - anarchy meaning the 'state of nature' - with states as only actors, caught in the 'Security Dilemma' and compelled to amass weapons. As long as the world still was fragmented, and not yet a 'global village,' eradicating one's enemies and stealing their wealth, may have had a fair chance to secure the perpetrator in a longer term. A Saddam Hussein calculated in this way when he invaded Kuwait, and the Hutu regime in Rwanda thought along those lines when it meticulously planned the genocide.

However, globalisation diminishes fragmentation and increases interconnectedness. Changes in International Relations Theory reflect the current transition.<sup>47</sup> Liberalism, for example, considers firms, NGOs, and international organisations as being actors alongside with states, and proposes that through cooperation the 'Security Dilemma' may be overcome.<sup>48</sup> This means also that in today's interconnected world atrocities have a greater chance to lead to a severe backlash: one may be ostracised or even physically destroyed, as the genocidal elites in Hitler Germany, Somalia, Rwanda and other places give prove of. Admittedly, there are 'pockets' of Hobbsian 'anarchy' still prevailing today (bemoaned as 'double standards' by human rights activists, meaning that the powerful still violate human rights while criticising the weak for the same violations). But the force of the global human rights movement is growing, Apartheid has been toppled, topics such as personal landmines or debt relief have been addressed, and the adoption of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court on 17th July 1998 opens up a new chapter for international criminal justice.

In other words, 'instrumental rationality' has changed content since the advent of 'globalisation,' taken that globalisation is understood as the arrival of international human rights activists, and of information technology that detects atrocities that were hidden before.

Before the advent of the global village's interconnectedness atrocities may well have possessed a fair amount of instrumental rationality and were not called atrocities, but 'rational and necessary measures.' After the advent of global interconnectedness, what was 'rational' before is increasingly labelled 'atrocities.'

This may lead to the conclusion that rational choice in a globalising world may need no more than 'full information' in order to become ethical. This would also mean that Adam Smith's condition of 'information' has acquired unprecedented significance through the development of technology that allows humankind to see the whole 'global village.' No generation before has had such a *full* picture of the world, such an all-encompassing horizon.<sup>49</sup> It is not important whether we understand every detail of global warming, or the genocide in Rwanda, it is important that we see a round object turn before every news programme, understand that this is all humankind's home, and feel the effects of global warming or see the plight of refugees.

Never before has the entire globe been included within humankind's vision and horizon. Humankind always had a fragmented view of the world. Globalisation, if defined as showing us the whole web of which we saw only parts before, is thus a revolution for everybody, a revolution that replaces much of ethics with 'full information.'

Everybody who is psychologically able to grasp the 'information,' and act on the information that the planet earth is an entity that consists of interconnected parts that can only with utmost care be isolated from each other, will act 'cooperatively,' and 'ethically.' Lee D. Ross<sup>50</sup> experiments on 'framing' show how people tend to prefer crude egoism when a situation is labelled 'Wallstreet game,' but that they apply 'ethical' cooperation, in case the same situation is labelled 'community game.' This shows that people who feel that they not only are responsible for their own faring, but also embedded into a community, will prefer cooperation.<sup>51</sup>

Thus globalisation acts as agent bringing 'full information,' showing us that we in fact live in one community, the 'global village.' With this newly-arrived 'full information,' we are able to apply what we already know about community life. When Lee D. Ross leads negotiations where people are locked into bitter confrontation, he usually asks, 'What kind of world do you want for your grandchildren?'<sup>52</sup> According to Ross this question has the powerful effect of orienting opponents' minds towards long-term cooperation rather than short-sighted self-interest.

Thus it may be concluded that globalisation 'informs' humankind more 'fully' than ever before. 'Wise' and 'holy' people may have known this at all times in history. Now, it is not necessary anymore to have special wisdom, but simply to have a balanced mind, undistorted by the effects of humiliation. This article claims, that today it is not any more a lack of full information which causes people to have limited 'horizons.' Under the conditions of a 'global village' the only people left 'suffering' from 'limited horizons' will be those who are emotionally caught in circles of humiliation, resentment and revenge.

This article is relevant for national and global decision makers. It is especially interesting for policy strategists tackling the future of what we call the global village. If we follow the logic explained in this article, then the West must be aware of a danger looming from the humiliated poor, or at least from their representatives. Fortunately for the West, the feelings of humiliation among the poor have not yet found its Hitler. It would be disastrous if such a leader created a global following among the humiliated by arguing, for example, that the human rights' rhetoric of the rich was merely a hypocritical device to divert attention from the fact that the divide between rich and poor is greater than before.

But leaders may emanate, given that the gap between rich and poor gets worse and especially those in the middle segment, who still enjoy a fair amount of wealth and security, must fear to join the very poor soon. Such leaders may rise, for example, from within rich

countries like the United States, or from other countries, such as China, India, Russia, Iran, or Iraq. Also already established people such as Usama Bin Laden<sup>53</sup> or Hamas leaders may have the potential to draw larger followings. Finally leaders such as Swami Agnivesh,<sup>54</sup> though committed to peace today, may feel 'pushed' to confrontation instead of co-operation.

In view of the danger that a new Hitler would present, the West is fortunate that the influence and prestige of Nelson Mandela are so great. Mandela made the step from being a terrorist (short-term rationality for the good of only his reference group) to being a peace maker (long-term rationality for all humanity). Mandela has filled three of the roles that William Ury identifies for Homo Negotiator (Ury, 1999). He is a *bridge-builder* helping to prevent further violent conflict, a *healer* binding the wounds of humiliation, and a *witness* to the suffering of apartheid's victims who include himself (see Lindner, 2000b).

This article tries to contribute to the task of strengthening influences such as coming from a Nelson Mandela, who succeeded to respond to humiliation in a way that corresponds with a long-term rationality for all humankind.

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.sagepub.co.uk/frame.html?http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journals/details/j0054.html>.

<sup>2</sup> See project description on [www.uio.no/~evelinl](http://www.uio.no/~evelinl). The project is supported by the Norwegian Research Council and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am grateful for their support, and would also like to thank the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo for hosting it. I extend my warmest thanks to all my informants in and from Africa, many of whom survive under the most difficult life circumstances. I hope that at some point in the future I will be able to give back at least a fraction of all the support I received from them!

<sup>3</sup> For article written so long, see Lindner, 1996; Lindner, 1998; Lindner, 1999a; Lindner, 1999b; Lindner, 1999c; Lindner, 2000c; Lindner, 2000d; Lindner, 2000e; Lindner, 2000f; Lindner, 2000g; Lindner, 2000h; Lindner, 2000i; Lindner, 2000j; Lindner, 2000k; Lindner, 2000l; Lindner, 2000m; Lindner, 2000a; Lindner, 2000n; Lindner, 2000o; Lindner, 2000p; Lindner, 2000q; Lindner, 2000b; Lindner, 2000r; Lindner, 2001a; Lindner, 2001b; Lindner, 2001c; Lindner, 2001d; Lindner, 2001e; Lindner, 2001f; Lindner, 2001g.

<sup>4</sup> The title of the project indicates that three groups had to be interviewed, namely both conflict parties in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, and representatives of third intervening parties. These three groups stand in a relationship that in its minimum version is triangular. In case of more than two opponents, as is the case in most conflicts, it acquires more than three corners.

Both in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi representatives of the 'opponents' and the 'third party' were interviewed. The following categories of people were included:

- Survivors of genocide were included, i.e. people belonging to the group that was targeted for genocide. In Somalia this was the Issaq tribe, in Rwanda the Tutsi, in Burundi also the Hutu. The group of survivors consists of two parts, namely those who survived because they were not in the country when the genocide happened - some of them returned after the genocide - and those who survived the ongoing onslaught inside the country.
- Freedom fighters (only men) were interviewed. In Somalia these were the SNM (Somali National Movement) fighters who fought the troops sent by the central government in Mogadishu; in Rwanda these were the former Tutsi refugees who formed an army, the RFP (Rwandese Patriotic Front), and attacked Rwanda from the north in order to oust the Hutu government which carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; in Burundi these were also Hutu rebels.
- Many Somali warlords have their retreat in Kenya, and some were interviewed there.
- Politicians were included, among them people who were in power already before the genocide and whom survivors secretly suspected of having been collaborators or at least silent supporters of perpetrators.
- Somali and Rwandan/Burundian academicians were interviewed, who study the situation of their countries.
- Representatives of national non-governmental organisations who work locally with development, peace and reconciliation were included.
- Third parties were interviewed, namely representatives of United Nations organisations and international non-governmental organisations who work with emergency relief, long-term development, peace, and reconciliation.
- Egyptian diplomats in the foreign ministry who deal with Somalia were included; Egypt is a heavy weight in the OAU.



- African psychiatrists in Kenya who deal with trauma, and forensic psychiatry were included. In Kenya many nationals from Somalia and also Rwanda/Burundi have sought refuge, both in refugee camps, but also on the basis of private arrangements.
- Those who have not yet been interviewed are masterminds of genocide in Rwanda, those who have planned the genocide. Many of them are said to be in hiding in Kenya, and other parts of Africa, or in Brussels and other parts of Europe, or in the States and Canada. Some are in the prisons in Rwanda and in Arusha, Tanzania.

<sup>5</sup> See Stoller's work on sado-masochism (Stoller, 1991).

<sup>6</sup> Margalit defines humiliation as the 'rejection of persons of the Family of Man,' as injury of self-respect, or, more specific, as failure of respect, combined with loss of control (Margalit, 1996). His position is disputed, however, for example by Quinton, who argues that self-respect 'has nothing much to do with humiliation' (Quinton, 1997, 87).

<sup>7</sup> See also Lehmann, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998.

<sup>8</sup> The theme of this book is 'that we are more familiar with the culture of honor than we may like to admit. This familiarity partially explains why stories of revenge play so well, whether read as the *Iliad*, an Icelandic saga, *Hamlet*, many novels, or seen as so many gangland, intergalactic, horror, or Clint Eastwood movies. Honor is not our official ideology, but its ethic survives in pockets of most all our lives. In some ethnic (sub)cultures it still is the official ideology, or at least so we are told about the cultures of some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, and so on. And even among the suburban middle class the honor ethic is lived in high school or in the competitive rat race of certain professional cultures' (Miller, 1993, 9).

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Baumeister, 1986; Baumeister, 1997; Baumeister, Wotman, & Stillwell, 1993, Brossat, 1995, Gilbert, 1997, Proulx et al., 1994, Vogel & Lazare, 1990.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Brown, Harris, & Hepworth, 1995, Miller, 1988.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Ignatieff, 1997, Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000, Markus, Kitayama, & Heimann, in Higgins & Kruglanski, 1996, Silver et al., 1986, Wood et al., 1994.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Hardman et al., 1996.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Hale, 1994, Lehmann, 1995, Schlesinger, 1998.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Peters, 1993, Stadtwald, 1992, Toles, 1995, Zender, 1994.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Cviic, 1993, Luo, 1993, Midiohouan, 1991, Steinberg, 1991a; Steinberg, 1991b; Steinberg, 1996, Urban, in Prins, 1990.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Masson, 1996, Vachon, 1993, Znakov, 1989; Znakov, 1990.

<sup>17</sup> Scheff, 1990; see also Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 1988; Scheff, in Kemper, 1990; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 1997.

<sup>18</sup> Staub, 1989, see also Staub, 1996; Staub, 1988; Staub, 1990; Staub, 1993.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.hum.uva.nl/~racoco/index.html>, retrieved 20.5.2000.

<sup>20</sup> Quoted from chapter 1 of the project description: 'Assumptions of a theory,' 1. See also Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Boer, 1997; Kielmansegg, 1999; Cohn, 1987; Weede & Muller, 1998; Suzumura, 1983; Alexander, 1942; Bazerman & Neale, 1993; Lindner, 1995; Lehmann, 1995.

<sup>21</sup> Almond, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991; Margolis, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>22</sup> Eckstein, in Monroe, 1991; Larana, Johnston, & Gusfield, 1994.

<sup>23</sup> Whitehead, in Monroe, 1991; Scalia, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>24</sup> Downs, in Monroe, 1991; Petracca, in Monroe, 2000; Margolis, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>25</sup> Whitehead, in Monroe, 1991; Noll & Weingast, in Monroe, 1991; Kavka, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>26</sup> Kavka, in Monroe, 1991; Rosenberg, in Monroe, 1991; Wittman, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>27</sup> Johnston, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>28</sup> Johnston, in Monroe, 1991; Crozier, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991; Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>29</sup> Petracca, in Monroe, 2000; Scalia, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>30</sup> Johnston, in Monroe, 1991; Downs, in Monroe, 1991; Noll & Weingast, in Monroe, 1991; Grafstein, in Monroe, 1991; Ferejohn, in Monroe, 1991; Margolis, in Monroe, 1991.

<sup>31</sup> 1993, 1994, 1995 see on [gopher://gopher.state.gov](http://gopher://gopher.state.gov)

<sup>32</sup> Tanter, 1998, chapter 1 and 7, where he addresses North Korean 'muddling through' strategy.

<sup>33</sup> This overview over the case of Rwanda is based on the author's fieldwork in Rwanda (1999, 47 interviews), Burundi (1999, 41 interviews) and Kenya (1999, 62 interviews), and on available statistics and literature.

<sup>34</sup> See Des Forges 1999, also on <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/>.

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<sup>35</sup> 'Tutsi have longer faces, their ladies are beautiful, they have long nails, they come from Arab countries, they are a mixture of Arab and white blood, therefore nearer to the whites than other Africans, they are almost relatives of the whites.' For colonial perspectives, see, for example, Logiest 1982.

<sup>36</sup> Guy Logiest was the last Belgian colonel before independence and he helped implement Hutu power in Rwanda during 1959. He describes his time in Africa in his book *Mission au Rwanda. Un blanc dans la bagarre Hutu-Tutsi* Logiest, 1982.

<sup>37</sup> See the account of the Rwandan Embassy in Washington, <http://www.rwandemb.org/info/geninfo.htm>: 'In 1935 the Belgian colonial administration introduced a discriminatory national identification on the basis of ethnicity. Banyarwanda who possessed ten or more cows were registered as Batutsi whereas those with less were registered as Bahutu. At first, the Belgian authorities, for political and practical reasons, favoured the king and his chiefs, who were mostly a Batutsi ruling elite. When the demand for independence began, mainly by a political party - Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) - formed by people from the mentioned ruling elite, the Belgian authorities hastily nurtured another party called PARMEHUTU that was founded on a sectarian ethnic ideology. Under the Belgian supervision, the first massacres of Batutsi at the hands of PARMEHUTU occurred in 1959. With Belgian connivance, PARMEHUTU abolished the monarchy amidst widespread violence. On July 1st, 1962 Belgium granted formal political independence to Rwanda' (capitalisation in original).

<sup>38</sup> See for example Lindner, 2001d, 23.

<sup>39</sup> See for example Ioan M. Lewis 1957, 1961, 1965, 1994.

<sup>40</sup> A minority exists which is not included in the six clan-families, among them occupationally specialised caste-like groups (whose daughters are not considered as being eligible for marriage by the six clan-families).

<sup>41</sup> This overview over the case of Somalia is based on the author's fieldwork in Somalia (1998, 50 interviews) and Kenya (1999, 62 interviews), and available statistics and literature, such as on Ameen Jan's briefing (1996) *Peacebuilding in Somalia*, <http://www.ipacademy.inter.net/somalia2.htm>, which was initiated by the International Peace Academy in New York. This briefing was based on a field visit to Nairobi and Mogadishu from 11 to 25 March 1996, an IPA Policy Forum entitled 'Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Legacies of the International Intervention' held in New York on 23 April 1996, and on over 60 interviews conducted in the U.S., Kenya and Somalia between November 1995 and April 1996.

<sup>42</sup> Concerning the historic facts, see for example Mazrui 1986. Many people I talked to in the North of Somalia, namely self-proclaimed Somaliland (1998), were proud of the 'equal' colonial relationship with the British, see for an intense illustration Hanley 1971.

<sup>43</sup> The colonial powers split the Somali people five ways. There was during the colonial period a British Somaliland, an Italian Somaliland and a French Somaliland. A section of the Somali people was also absorbed separately into Kenya under British colonial rule. The fifth component became the Ogaden, a section of Ethiopia. The dream of independence for the Somali was in part a dream of reunification. Two of the components were indeed reunited at independence - former Italian Somaliland and former British Somaliland coalesced into the new Republic of Somalia. But neither Kenya nor Ethiopia were prepared to relinquish those areas of their colonial boundaries which were inhabited by ethnic Somali. As for French Somaliland, this became the separate independent Republic of Djibouti. 'Most other African countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification' (Mazrui, 1986, 69-71).

<sup>44</sup> Report by a United Nations employee who does not wish to be named, December 1998, Hargeisa.

<sup>45</sup> Robinson continues: 'But the record on securing these rights is poor. In many parts of the world the right to basic living conditions, to food, to basic health care and to education are denied on a massive scale. The intention was there from the start that these rights would be secured. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were designed in 1845 to provide stability in international finances and to assist the poorest countries to put their economies on a par with those in the developed world. It hasn't worked out that way. The richer countries have benefited over the past 50 years from the role played by the IMF, the World Bank and recently the WTO, and some middle income countries and a handful of developing countries have seen their wealth and human development indicators draw close to those of industrialised countries.'

<sup>46</sup> See early work by Veblen, 1899; Veblen, 1965; Veblen, 1970; Smith, 1988, chapters 2 and 3; Smith, 1990, chapter 5. See furthermore Albrow, 1997; Cutler, 1995; Dillon, 1998; Featherstone, 1990; Friedman, 2000; Giddens, 2000; Gill, 1995; Hochschild, 1998; Hochschild, 1983; Hurrell & Woods, 1995; Huysmans, 1995; Pasha, 1996; Saurin, 1996.

<sup>47</sup> See for example Woods, 1996.

<sup>48</sup> Beverly Crawford at the Sommerakademie für Frieden und Konfliktforschung, Loccum, Germany, 20th-25th July 1997. See also Lindner, 2000n.

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<sup>49</sup> See Husserl's notion of 'horizon,' especially 'external horizon in noema' (Husserl, Edmund, 1991). Dagfinn Føllesdal (1996) gives the example of the floor that we all expect when stepping into a room, without ever thematising this anticipation (Føllesdal, 1996). Kant also used the notion of horizon, and states that the horizon can change: Preliminary judgements may be wrong, says Kant in his writings about prejudice. Kant explains that, for example, a religious person would see a miracle where a 'rationalistic' person would not see a miracle.

<sup>50</sup> Ross is a professor of psychology at Stanford University and is a principal investigator (and co-founder) of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN). The author or co-author of four books and scores of chapter and journal articles, he was elected in 1993 to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Ross' seminal research on attributional biases and other shortcomings in human inference exerted a major impact not only within social psychology but also in the emerging field of judgment and decision-making.

<sup>51</sup> Ross carried out important experiments showing the effect of 'framing.' He asked players to play the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. One group of players was told that they would be playing a game called a 'Community Game.' Another group was told that they were going to play a 'Wallstreet Game.' Players who thought that they played a community game tended to cooperate, players who thought they were playing a Wallstreet game tended to defect. Although the structure of the game was identical, in both cases the Prisoner's Dilemma structure, the mere difference in the label had a profound effect upon whether or not players cooperated (Ross & Samuels, 1993).

<sup>52</sup> Lee D. Ross at the Sommerakademie Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 11. - 16 July 1999, in Clemenswerth, Germany.

<sup>53</sup> On 7th August 1998, bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. In the Nairobi bombing alone, more than 200 were killed and thousands injured. The U.S. suspected dissident Saudi extremist Usama bin Laden.

<sup>54</sup> Swami Agnivesh is a highly influential Indian holy man. He is the president of the Bonded Labour Liberation Front and a prominent Arya Samaj leader in India. He abhors the destructive conflict running through his country's politics and urges the Indian 'government and all political parties, scientists, labour and socio-religious organisations to wage a united battle against starvation, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, bonded labour and other social evils' (see The Indian Express, 1998).

However, in 1998 this man, dedicated to peace, congratulated Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for conducting a series of nuclear tests. He approved of the tests because, in his view, they showed that India would not bow down before the 'nuclear blackmail' of foreign countries like America.