The Anatomy of Humiliation and Its Relational Character:

The Case of the Victim

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Abstract

The object of this paper is to map the conceptual space of humiliation understood as an emotion and a social process occurring within a network of social relationships. A typology of humiliation is presented that summarises in a systematic way certain aspects of the character of humiliation as inscribed within the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. The research upon which this article is was focused upon an attempt to understand the contribution made by humiliation to the occurrence of genocide and mass violence and, more generally, the relationship between humiliation and culture.

Keywords: Humiliation, emotion, relational scenarios, patterns of interchange

The Anatomy of Humiliation and Its Relational Character

The object of this paper is to map the conceptual space of humiliation understood as an emotion and a social process occurring within a network of social relationships. A typology of humiliation is presented that summarises in a systematic way certain aspects of the character of humiliation as inscribed within the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. The research that forms the basis for this article was focused upon an attempt to understand the contribution made by humiliation to the occurrence of genocide and mass violence and, more generally, the relationship between humiliation and culture. The research project will be explained in more detail further down.

The word humiliation has its roots in the Latin word humus, earth. This entails a spatial orientation, a downward orientation, literally a 'de-gradation.' 'Ned-verdigelse' (Norwegian), 'Er-niedrig-ung' (German) and 'a-baisse-ment' (French) all mean 'de-gradation.' All these words are built on the same spatial, *orientational* metaphor[1] that places itself within a framework of relations. Analysis of the etymology of the word humiliation thus shows that at its core is the sense of a 'downward push.' Building on this analysis the following preliminary working definition of humiliation has been developed in the course of the research: Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will and often in a deeply hurtful way (although in some cases with your consent[2]) in a situation that is much worse, or much 'lower,' than what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding against the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim[3] is forced into passivity, acted upon, and made helpless.[4]

At the centre of this paper is a typology of humiliation. The part of the paper that presents this typology is preceded by three sections: firstly, a section that addresses the social construction of humiliation and also gives an overview over the current state-of-the-art, secondly a short introduction into the ways humiliation may be related to culture, and thirdly a presentation of the

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[1] Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe orientational metaphors as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. Humiliation clearly is 'down.' 'These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept a spatial environment: for example, HAPPY IS UP' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 14, capitalisation in original). If 'up' is happy, then 'down' must be 'unhappy': 'being put down' or humiliated makes unhappy. I thank the anonymous reviewer of this paper (in comments from 10th November 2000) for drawing my attention to Kövecses, 1990, who suggests that 'emotion concepts' have a distinctive metaphorical structure in language, and whose recent work (Kövecses and Szabó, 1996) indicates that emotion metaphors may indeed be culturally universal. See on 'metaphorical representation' also Murphy, 1996.

[2] See Stoller's work on sado-masochism (Stoller, 1991).

[3] The role of the victim is not necessarily always unambiguous, - a victim may feel humiliated in absence of any humiliating act, - as result of a misunderstanding, or as result of personal and cultural differences concerning norms of what respectful treatment ought to entail, - or the 'victim' may even invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of 'loathsome perpetrator.'

[4] Margalit defines humiliation as the 'rejection of persons of the Family of Man,' as injury of self-respect, or, more specific, as failure of respect, combined with loss of control (Margalit, 1996). His position is disputed, however, for example by Quinton, who argues that self-respect 'has nothing much to do with humiliation' (Quinton, 1997, 87). See also Lindner, 2000a.

research project that forms the basis of this article. The article ends with theoretical reflections on social constructionism and its relation to humiliation, as well as propositions for further research and theory-building on humiliation.

The Social Construction of Humiliation

Humiliation is both a process occurring within social relationships and an emotion experienced by individuals or groups.[5] It is clear that relationships and experiences are closely connected. As Kenneth Gergen argues, emotions are 'elements within relational scenarios, actions that gain their intelligibility and necessity from patterns of interchange' (Gergen, 1994, 9). For example, anger or depression may be viewed not as a personal event, but as a constituent of a particular relational dance.[6] It is within this conceptualisation of emotions – and, as will be noted, Gergen is not its only advocate – that humiliation, the topic of this paper, is located.

Emotions play many different roles within contemporary theories of psychology.[7] However, the study of humiliation is especially suited to an approach that emphasises the

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[5] The last point may be hotly debated. Michael Bond, Professor at the Department of Psychology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, writes to the author (1999): 'I believe that you must draw a fundamental distinction between individual humiliation [you humiliated me] versus group [or national] humiliation [you or your group humiliated my group]. This personal/group distinction is important since people may act to avenge different sorts of affront [and create different sorts of affront for others!'

[6] 'Let us first deconstruct the traditional emotional terms - concepts such as anger, love, fear, joy, and the like. That is, let us view such terms as social constructions, and not as indexing differentiated properties of the mind or the cortex. With the aid of such deconstruction we are relieved of the endlessly burdensome search for the signified - that is, the elusive essence of anger, love, and so on. Further, the individualist conception of such terms may be bracketed. This critique also enables us to view the language of emotion, not as a set of terms referring to off-stage properties of the mind, but as performatives. That is, when we say, "I am angry," "I love you," and the like, we are not trying to describe a far off land of the mind, or a state of the neurons. Rather, we are performing in a relationship, and the phrases themselves are only a constituent of more fully embodied actions, including movements of the limbs, vocal intonations, patterns of gaze, and so on' (Gergen, McGarty and Haslam, 1997, 10).

[7] Antonio R. Damasio, 1994, with his book *Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, provides a perspective on the important 'constructive' role that emotions play for the process of decision-making; it shows how the traditional view of 'heart' versus 'head' is obsolete. Daniel Goleman, 1996, in his more widely known book *Emotional Intelligence* relies heavily on Damasio. Goleman gives, among others, a description of the brain activities that lead to post-traumatic stress disorder. The *Handbook of Emotion and Memory* (Christianson, 1992) addresses the important interplay between emotions and memory (with chapters by Bower, Christianson, 1992; Heuer and Rausberg, Christianson, 1992; LeDoux, Christianson, 1992; Leichtman, Ceci, and Ornstein, Christianson, 1992; McGaugh, Christianson, 1992; Nilsson and Archer, Christianson, 1992). Silvan S. Tomkins, 1962, developed theories of the human being and emotions (see his four volumes of *Affect Imagery and Consciousness*; see also Virginia Demos, 1995, editor of *Exploring Affect*, a book that eases the otherwise difficult access to Tomkins' thinking). Donald L. Nathanson builds on Tomkins' work; he writes on script, shame, and pride. Scripts are 'the structures within which we store scenes;' they are 'sets of rules for the ordering of information about SARS' (Stimulus-Affect-Response Sequences) (Nathanson, 1996, 3, see also Nathanson, 1987; Nathanson, 1992). Other writers working on scripts include Eric Berne, 1972, with his book *What Do You Say After You Say Hello?* which illuminates Script Theory from the clinical perspective, Abelson, Carroll and Payne, 1976 (see also Schank and Abelson, 1977) who address the issue from the cognitive perspective, and Tomkins who has already been mentioned and who adopts a personality-psychological perspective. The sociology

individual's interdependence with her environment. Relational concepts of mind such as James J. Gibson's ecological psychology of 'affordance' are relevant. Gibson 'includes environmental considerations in psychological taxonomies' (de Jong, 1997a, abstract).[8] M. A. Forrester, 1999, presents a related approach, labelled 'discursive ethnomethodology,' that focuses on 'narrativization as process bringing together Foucault's (1972) discourse theory, Gibson's (1979) affordance metaphor and conversation analysis. Joseph de Rivera conceptualises the dyad as basic unit of the study of emotion, as does Roy F. Baumeister, and Romano Harré.[9]

A re-examination of the processes and relationships that constitute the dynamics of humiliation is long overdue; this is the position taken by Donald C. Klein in his article 'Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview' (Klein, 1991, 93), part of a special edition of the *Journal of Primary Prevention*: 'The Humiliation Dynamic is a powerful factor in human affairs that has, for a variety of reasons, been overlooked by students of individual and collective behaviour. It is a pervasive and all too often destructive influence in the behavior of individuals, groups, organizations, and nations.'

Some important work has already been done. For example, the just mentioned *Journal of Primary Prevention* pioneered work on humiliation in 1991 (Klein, 1991), and 1992 (Barrett and Brooks, 1992; Smith, 1992). In 1997 the journal *Social Research* devoted a special issue to the topic of humiliation, stimulated by *The Decent Society* (Avishai Margalit, 1996). In an essay entitled 'On Humiliation,' Frederic Schick introduces *The Decent Society* (Schick, 1997, 131, italics in original) with the following words: 'A good society is a *decent* society, and a society that is decent is one whose institutions don't humiliate people… Many people must have thought it, but no philosopher ever proposed it. Philosophers speak of justice instead, a very different ideal.' Related to Margalit's approach is literature in philosophy on 'the politics of recognition,' claiming that people who are not recognized suffer humiliation and that this leads to violence (see also Honneth, 1997 on related themes[10]).

However, despite the work just cited, humiliation has not been studied as widely and explicitly as, for example, such topics as 'shame,' 'trauma,' or 'stress,' which are covered by an uncountable number of publications. Humiliation and shame, for example, are often confounded rather than differentiated; the present author often met the assumption, for example in discussions with colleagues, that humiliation is just a more intense reaction than shame.[11] However, the point

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of emotions is also relevant; see especially the work of sociologist Thomas J. Scheff on violence and emotions such as shame (Scheff, 1988; Scheff, 1990; Scheff, Kemper, 1990; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, Retzinger, and Gordon, 1992; Scheff, 1997a; Scheff, 1997b). I thank Reidar Ommundsen and Finn Tschudi for their extremely helpful comments on aspects of these fields.

[8] Gibson's work is hotly debated. W. Sharrock and Coulter, 1998, acknowledge that the work of James J. Gibson is widely acclaimed to be among the most important contributions to the critique of cognitivist approaches to the study of human visual perception, but question his assessments. See 'Some Remarks on a Relational Concept of Mind' (de Jong, 1997a), and the two subsequent exchanges (Meyering, 1997, de Jong, 1997b).

[9] See Joseph de Rivera and Dahl, 1977; Baumeister, 1986; Baumeister, 1997; Baumeister, Wotman, and Stillwell, 1993; Harré and Secord, 1972; Harré and Lamb, 1986; Harré, Harré, 1986; Harré and Gillet, 1994. I thank the anonymous reviewer of this paper (in comments from 10th November 2000) for drawing my attention to de Rivera and Harré.

[10] Max Scheler set out some of these issues in his classic book *Ressentiment* (Scheler, 1961).

[11] Among others, Silvan S. Tomkins (1962-1992), treats shame and humiliation interchangeably. Tomkins' work is carried further by Donald L. Nathanson, and Nathanson describes humiliation as a combination of three innate affects out of altogether nine affects, namely as a combination of shame,

of the research project that is the larger framework for this article is precisely that humiliation, though in many respects related to shame, deserves to be treated separately, and requires future research and theoretical conceptualisation that differentiates it from other notions.

Humiliation has also not been studied in a systematic and coherent way in the academic community; the list of publications is comparatively short and is spread over very disparate thematic fields including international relations,[12] love, sex and social attractiveness,[13] depression,[14] society and identity formation,[15] sports,[16] serial murder,[17] war and violence.[18] A few examples from writings of history, literature and film also take humiliation as their theme.[19]

Vogel and Lazare document 'unforgivable humiliation' as a core obstacle in the treatment of couples (Vogel and Lazare, 1990). Robert L. Hale addresses *The Role of Humiliation and Embarrassment in Serial Murder* (Hale, 1994).[20] James Gilligan, a psychiatrist, suggests that humiliation creates violence (Gilligan, 1996), while Scheff and Retzinger[21] extended their work from shame and rage to violence and Holocaust, and studied the part played by 'humiliated fury' (Scheff, 1997a, 11). In the field of psychology, Linda Hartling (Hartling and Luchetta, 1999) pioneered a quantitative questionnaire on humiliation (Humiliation Inventory) where a rating from 1 to 5 is employed for questions measuring 'being teased,' 'bullied,' 'scorned,' 'excluded,' 'laughed at,' 'put down,' 'ridiculed,' 'harassed,' 'discounted,' 'embarrassed,' 'cruelly criticized,' 'treated as invisible,' 'discounted as a person,' 'made to feel small or insignificant,' 'unfairly denied access to some activity, opportunity, or service,' 'called names or referred to in derogatory terms,' or viewed by others as 'inadequate,' or 'incompetent.'

William Ian Miller wrote a book entitled *Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence*,[22] where he links humiliation to honour as understood in the Iliad or

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disgust and dissmell (Nathanson in a personal conversation, 1st October1999; see also Nathanson, 1992; Nathanson, 1987). Also Thomas J. Scheff started out with studying shame (Scheff, 1988; Scheff, Kemper, 1990; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, Retzinger, and Gordon, 1992). Tangney and Fischer, 1995, address *The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*; see also Miller and Tangney, 1994 and Tangney, 1990, as well as Gilbert, 1997. See for further literature, Ahmed, Ahmed, 1990; Allan and Goss, 1994; Braithwaite, 1989; Braithwaite, 1993; Campbell, 1994; Fischer, Manstead, and Mosquera, 1999; Heimannsberg and Schmidt, 1993; Miller, 1988; Mindell, 1994; Moore, 1993; Moses, Volkan, Demetrios, and Montville, 1999; Nathanson, 1987; Nathanson, 1992; Peristiany, 1965; Retzinger, 1991; Rosaldo, 1983; Rybak and Brown, 1996; Scheff, 1988; Scheff, Kemper, 1990; Scheff, Retzinger, and Gordon, 1992; Schenk et al., 1995; Steinberg, 1991a; Steinberg, 1991b; Steinberg, 1996; Swartz, 1988; Tangney, 1990; Wikan, 1984; Wong and Cook, 1992.

[12] See, for example, Cviic, 1993; Luo, 1993; Midiohouan, 1991; Steinberg, 1991b; Steinberg, 1991a; Steinberg, 1996; Urban, Prins, 1990.

[13] See, for example, Baumeister, 1986; Baumeister, 1997; Baumeister, Wotman, and Stillwell, 1993; Brossat, 1995; Gilbert, 1997; Proulx et al., 1994.

[14] See, for example, Brown, Harris, and Hepworth, 1995; Miller, 1988.

[15] See, for example, Ignatieff, 1997; Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa, 2000; Markus, Kitayama, and Heimann, Higgins and Kruglanski, 1996; Silver et al., 1986; Wood et al., 1994.

[16] See, for example, Hardman et al., 1996.

[17] See, for example, Hale, 1994; Lehmann, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998.

[18] See, for example, Masson, 1996; Vachon, 1993; Znakov, 1989; Znakov, 1990.

[19] See, for example, Peters, 1993; Stadtwald, 1992; Toles, 1995; Zender, 1994.

[20] See also Lehmann, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998.

[21] Scheff, 1988; Scheff, 1990; Scheff, Kemper, 1990; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 1997a.

[22] The theme of this book is 'that we are more familiar with the culture of honor than we may like to admit. This familiarity partially explains why stories of revenge play so well, whether read as the Iliad, an

Icelandic sagas and explains that these concepts are still very much alive today, despite a common assumption that they are no longer relevant. Cohen and Nisbett also examine an honour-based notion of humiliation (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). The honour to which Cohen and Nisbett refer is the kind that also operates in the more traditional branches of the Mafia or, more generally, in blood feuds, a scenario with which the present author is familiar as a result of working for seven years as a psychological counsellor in Egypt.

Within a blood feud culture it is honourable and perfectly legitimate to 'heal' humiliation by killing a targeted person. The opposite is true in a society where universal human rights are recognised; in this latter case, 'healing' humiliation means restoring the victim's dignity by empathic dialogue, sincere apology, and finally reconciliation. The distinction between honour-based humiliation and human rights-based humiliation is one element of the argument developed in this paper. Analysis of this distinction is part of a broader set of propositions about the relationship between humiliation and culture that have emerged in the research that will be described shortly. Before turning directly to the research, some of these propositions about humiliation and culture will be set out briefly.

Humiliation and Culture

Mary and Kenneth Gergen point out that 'cultural constructionism makes no necessary demands on either theory or research' (Gergen and Gergen, 2000, 9). They continue: 'The aim is not to suppress cultural traditions but to develop, share, and interpenetrate. However, the constructionist orientation to knowledge is itself fragile and potentially endangered as an intelligibility. One inviting mode of inquiry is thus to employ constructionist meta-theoretical premises as the theoretical basis of research. In the same way that a Piagetian researcher will "locate stages of cognitive development" within children, and a Vygotskian will "demonstrate learning within the ZPD[23]," so it is possible for the cultural constructionist to make more palpable the "reality of social construction" through research into cultural life' (9).[24]

The element of culture proved to be very important for the research on humiliation. It was obvious that culture is not an 'independent' (or 'dependent') 'variable.' Culture includes a wide range of manifestations of the human condition. It includes environmental factors: Somalia, for example is in its most parts a vast scarce semi-desert, while Rwanda and Burundi are tiny countries of fertile hilly undulations. It also encompasses history: most Somali clans have a

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Icelandic saga, Hamlet, many novels, or seen as so many gangland, intergalactic, horror, or Clint Eastwood movies. Honor is not our official ideology, but its ethic survives in pockets of most all our lives. In some ethnic (sub)cultures it still is the official ideology, or at least so we are told about the cultures of some urban black males, Mafiosi, Chicano barrios, and so on. And even among the suburban middle class the honor ethic is lived in high school or in the competitive rat race of certain professional cultures' (Miller, 1993, 9).

[23] Zone of Proximal Development.

[24] Gergen refers to an example of such research: 'A superlative instance of such realization is contained in Catherine Lutz's (1988) volume, Unnatural Emotions. Here Lutz demonstrates the culturally constructed character of the emotional vocabulary of the Ifaluk, thus undermining the universalist presumptions of the Western researcher. More importantly, Lutz shows how culturally constituted performances of emotion are linked to the broader societal understandings and institutions within Ifaluk culture. In effect, the work goes much further than universalist critique, by "demonstrating" in great detail the local creation of taken for granted categories and practices of emotion' (9). See Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 1990; Schwartz, White, and Lutz, 1992; Lutz, Holland and Quinn, 1987; Lutz, 1988; Lutz and Collins, 1993.

tradition of being egalitarian aristocratic warriors while Rwanda and Burundi are age-old intricately hierarchical kingdoms. Furthermore, specific cultures are not bounded but are open to neighbouring cultural practices as well as international trends. The definition of culture employed in this paper is, therefore, a fluid one which assumes that – even though cultures sometimes seem to be 'fixed' – they flow in continuous dynamic change, with social groups, communities, social institutions, and societies sometimes moving towards unexpected new forms.

There are at least three ways in which humiliation and culture are related. The first, which will only be discussed briefly here,[25] concerns the impact that the experience of humiliation between groups has upon their respective perceptions of their own cultural identities. It is hypothesised that some aspects of cultural difference are not the result of (for example) diverse environments or other forms of diversity that developed in isolation from each other but, on the contrary, may be understood as a response to humiliation, as a defensive utterance in a discourse of humiliation between groups, both locally and/or globally.[26] The suggestion is made that in certain circumstances people who experience humiliation may construct and deepen cultural difference where there was none or little before. Fieldwork in Rwanda (Hutu versus Tutsi), Somalia (Somaliland versus the rest of Somalia) and Germany (East Germans versus West Germans) suggests that processes of humiliation may influence the shaping of cultural differences between these groups. One implication of this proposed insight is that third parties who wish to show 'respect' for such cultural differences may be perpetuating the conditions of humiliation that created or deepened the difference in the first place.[27]

Secondly, the way humiliation is perceived and handled within societies differs profoundly according to where the societies concerned are to be found on a continuum that stretches between two extreme positions, neither of which may be fully realised in practice. This continuum extends between the following poles: on the one hand, a hierarchical 'honour' society in which personal, dynastic or group 'honour' as determined by position in a rank order is regarded as the highest value and where the universalistic ideal of human rights is absent; and, on the other hand, an egalitarian 'human rights' society in which the legitimate claim of all individuals and groups to be treated with decency and respect is paramount and the assertion of honour on the basis of hierarchical rank regarded as illegitimate. There is insufficient space to develop this last point in detail within the paper,[28] but it expresses an awareness of the significance of a fundamental shift in basic cultural paradigms from 'honour' to 'human rights.' Such a shift transforms the way the experience of humiliation is socially constructed and indicates that humiliation is more likely to be defined as an illegitimate and unacceptable social practice within human rights frameworks.[29]

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[25] Two papers by the present author are devoted to this point, see Lindner, 2000b and Lindner, 2000c.

[26] Bond touches upon this point as follows: 'Not all struggles are about material resources; respect and appreciation communicated across group lines are powerful bonding forces whose withholding or denial can generate intense conflict. Perceived denigration of a group's language, dialect, customs, religion, art, music, dress and traditions can fuel intense defensive reactions and counterattack' (Bond, 1998, 11).

[27] U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, told delegates at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993, where representatives of a number of African, Asian, and some Middle Eastern governments directly challenged the universality of the tenets of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that 'we cannot let cultural relativism become the last refuge of repression' (Puchala, 1995, 4).

[28] In Lindner, 2000d and Lindner, 2000e these points are discussed in more depth.

[29] Bond comments on this point: '… these feelings of unjust treatment are likely to be stronger in cultures with an egalitarian, or individualistic cultural tradition (Hofstede, 1980, chapter 5) where human rights legislation (Humana, 1986) empowers groups as well as individuals. In this light social norms promoting

The fieldwork in Africa showed how the notion of humiliation may be characterised by diametrically different connotations in different cultural contexts. Furthermore, since cultures are open and interpenetrate, the result is a multitude of hybrid or even internally inconsistent variants of acts and feelings of humiliation. More specifically, the 'downward push' was found to be a universal core meaning of humiliation that was as relevant in Africa as much as in Europe. Yet, 'putting down' somebody was not necessarily seen as illegitimate in all places and at all times; it was, for example, regarded as being a perfectly legitimate strategy by all concerned within the extremely hierarchical structures that have traditionally existed in Rwanda and Burundi. Conversely, in the more egalitarian Somalian society, where nomadic pride and independence were paramount, the researcher was assured that humiliation had not occurred, at least not in the past, because 'a man is killed, not humiliated.' Yet, since cultures are open, also Africa is deeply touched by human rights ideals that endow a person with a sense of dignity that 'ought not' to be humiliated; this new notion frequently stands in opposition to traditional practices, particularly to strict ranking orders, a fact that often creates secondary conflicts that, once again, might have humiliating effects.[30]

A third proposition that relates the notion of humiliation with the concept of culture is that at any point along the macro-historical continuum between the honour and human rights poles of the continuum, the specific micro-social actions, gestures and forms of speech which signal or symbolise the process of humiliation are likely to vary between societies. In other words, behaviour and attitudes that have humiliating effects in one cultural context may be insignificant in another; slapping a person with a shoe, for example, may be extremely humiliating in one context (Somalia for example), but not in another.

Seen from this perspective, the study of humiliation entails three things: firstly, the analysis of humiliation as inscribed within a fundamentally relational understanding of the origins, development and workings of culture and culture difference; secondly comparative macro-historical analysis which locates the societies concerned within the larger framework of honour and human rights just outlined; and thirdly, micro-social analysis focused upon the reported experiences of specific individuals selected on account of their location and recent mode of involvement (for example as rape victims or survivors of attempted genocide) in the societies concerned.

The Research Project: Objectives and Methodology

The original objective of the research on which this paper is based was to examine the contribution made by humiliation to creating the conditions for mass violence (including

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diversity and encouraging contact across group lines become countervailing forces against the drift towards group ethnocentrism. We need to begin the tasks of understanding the structure of these social norms (Moghaddam and Studer, Fox and Prillentensky, 1997) and of using information about these norms to predict inter-group behaviors in diverse societies! (Bond, 1998, 11).

[30] Ekelund and Tschudi, 1994, employ Tomkins' Script Theory as an interpretative framework for a phenomenological understanding of abusive men, a perspective focusing on emotional factors, providing an understanding that they find is lacking in the literature. They find two contrasting script structures: 'A hypermasculine Macho script where violence is an instrumental and more or less effective means to dominate women, and a Nuclear script where violence by definition is an ineffective strategy which is related to deep and unresolved problems not necessarily connected to a need to control and dominate women. The authors conclude 'that the results conform best with a Nuclear script interpretation, where the man's relationship to his father seems to be an unresolved and deeply problematic theme' (abstract).

genocide) and to understand the ways in which these conditions hamper efforts at bringing about lasting peace.[31] This objective made Rwanda, Somalia and Hitler's Germany relevant societies for investigation.[32] In pursuing this objective, it became necessary to ask even more basic questions such as: What is humiliation? What happens when people feel humiliated? What is it that they experience as humiliating? Under what conditions are those particular experiences defined as 'humiliating'? What does humiliation lead to? Which particular perceptions of justice, honour, dignity, respect and self-respect are connected with the feeling of being humiliated? How is humiliation perceived and responded to in different cultures? Partial answers to these questions are explored in the typology developed later in this paper.

During the first phase of the research (from 1997 to 1998) the focus was upon collecting literature and getting in touch with knowledgeable people in Norway and around the world, with experts researching on Africa, particularly Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, on international organisations, on Holocaust and genocide, and on social psychology. A network of more than 500 interdisciplinary academic contacts was established – in effect, a 'network of conversation' on the topic of humiliation.

Since the aim of the project was to link micro, meso and macro levels, it was clear that a questionnaire exclusively addressing the individual would not suffice. It became equally evident that it would be premature to rely too heavily upon quantitative methods for the topic of humiliation in its connection with genocide in Africa.[33] An explorative and qualitative approach, including quantitative elements from Cantril's Self-Anchoring Scale, seemed to be the correct methodological strategy.[34] This slightly modified Scheff's part-whole approach, insofar as it

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[31] Some of the questions that informed the research at its outset were: Can humiliation lead to war, to Holocaust, genocide and ethnic cleansing? Can humiliation lead to international terrorism? What role does humiliation play in aggression? What can be done to overcome the violent consequences of humiliation?

[32] The original project description of 1996 was entitled: *The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties*. See www.uio.no/~evelinl. The project is supported by the Norwegian Research Council and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am grateful for their support, and would also like to thank the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo for hosting it. I extend my warmest thanks to all my informants in and from Africa, many of whom survive under the most difficult life circumstances. I hope that at some point in the future I will be able to give back at least a fraction of all the support I received from them.

[33] Hartling's work, for example, seemed to be adequate in the Western cultural setting, within which it was being developed, but when the present research was being carried out there was no grounds for being confident that it could capture the notion of humiliation in other cultures, or that extreme situations such as genocide could be encompassed within it.

[34] Cantril's original version was adapted to the research of humiliation in Africa by introducing 'respect' as well as individual and group level. The question went as follows: There is a ladder from 0 to 10 (IMAGE OF LADDER). Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (POINTING) represents the highest amount of respect for you and the bottom (POINTING) represents the worst possible humiliation for you. Where on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago? And where do you think you will be on the ladder five years from now? Where would you put (name of group, for example Tutsi or Hutu) on the ladder (MOVING FINGER RAPIDLY UP AND DOWN LADDER) at the present time? Where did (name of group) stand five years ago? Just as your best guess, where do you think (name of group) will be on the ladder five years from now?

combined qualitative and quantitative methods from the first stage of the research.[35] The overall strategy was largely based on Grounded Theory, as first developed and presented by Glaser and Strauss, 1967, and incorporated the emphasis on the interactive nature of qualitative research developed in Strauss and Corbin, 1990. As Kvale notes, 'Strauss and Corbin depict a continual interplay among conceptualization, field studies, analyses, and new contacts with the field' (Kvale, 1996, 87). Using Grounded Theory means trying to avoid simply applying existing theories to data (usually interviews, taped and written down), or merely accepting conventional explanations, but instead being as open as possible and developing arguments and categories out of the data, as they emerge.

During the fieldwork in Africa (1998 and 1999),[36] the researcher moved from home to home - spending on average a week or ten days in each place - for almost a year, repeatedly looking for new hosts who would allow the researcher to participate in their lives and learn about their views. The process resembled anthropological and sociological participatory fieldwork to some extent. At the start, in Somalia, the interviews were quite formal and followed the above outlined strategy of combining qualitative and quantitative methodology. Later, the pattern of repeated formal interviews was replaced by a pattern of relationships that increasingly merged to form a network of ongoing communication. These relationships were embedded in a broader social context of reciprocity.[37] The researcher learned through experience that the only methodology that would yield validity and not humiliate the interlocutors was to enter into an authentic dialogue with them and acknowledge them as co-researchers.[38]

Sitting with people, the researcher made notes, or taped the conversations on audio or videotape. Most audio or video tapings were preceded by preparatory visits or meetings, in an effort to build a relationship of mutual understanding and trust, one that would make it possible for both sides to be open, and not just deliver 'propaganda statements.' The researcher came to the conclusion that dialogue was the only ethical and valid way of approaching people that had been colonised by the researcher's own forefathers. An approach that is possible in the West, namely 'may I ask you some questions for the sake of promoting scientific knowledge,' is not only unfamiliar in other parts of the world, but would also have introduced a discourse from master to underling too reminiscent of the colonial past. Furthermore, cold and impersonal approaches to survivors of genocide would be neither valid nor ethical since they would

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[35] Scheff (1997) recommends proceeding from 'the ground,' comparing data from different locations in a 'part/whole analysis,' and, finally, developing hypotheses that can be tested quantitatively: 'Quantitative analysis leads to verification or disconfirmation of a hypothesis. But verification is the third step in part/whole morphology. Before taking the last step, it is usually necessary to take at least one of the earlier steps: exploration (conventional eyewitness field work using qualitative methods), and/or microanalysis of single specimens and comparisons of specimens' (Scheff, 1997a, 9). He describes his Part/whole analysis as follows (Scheff, 1997a, 9): 'The approach … is one that attempts to generate increasingly accurate and general hypotheses by close examination of the actual reality of social life. By grounding investigation in examination of the "minute particulars" as Blake said, the least parts of single cases, and later in the comparison of these cases with one another in the context of larger wholes. One may generate hypotheses that are general and important.'

[36] The author carried out all fieldwork alone.

[37] The researcher thanked all those who extended their hospitality by buying food and contributing to other expenses, for example by participating in the costs of weddings or educational courses, sending emails and faxes to inquire about scholarships all over the world, or trying to locate second-hand computers. This list of examples could be greatly extended.

[38] This point has been expanded in the article 'How Research Can Humiliate' (Lindner, 2001).

compound their pain and turn their contributions into superficial and irrelevant ones. Apart from incessant encounters with people, 216 full interviews were carried out, as specified in Table 1.[39] Interviews lasted from one hour to several hours. Some were completed in one sitting; others took several sittings. The outcome is over 100 hours of audio taped interviews and 10 hours of digital video film.

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Distribution of Interviews

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[39] The title of the project indicates that three groups had to be interviewed, namely both conflict parties in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi, and representatives of third intervening parties. These three groups stand in a relationship that in its minimum version is triangular. In case of more than two opponents, as is the case in most conflicts, it acquires more than three corners.

Both in Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi representatives of the "opponents" and the "third party" were interviewed. The following people were included in the "network of conversation":

- Survivors of genocide were included, that is people belonging to the group, which was targeted for genocide. In Somalia this was the Isaaq tribe, in Rwanda the Tutsis, in Burundi also the Hutus. The group of survivors consists of two parts, namely those who survived because they were not in the country when the genocide happened - some of them returned after the genocide - and those who survived the ongoing onslaught inside the country.
- Freedom fighters (only men) were interviewed. In Somalia these were the SNM (Somali National Movement) fighters who fought the troops sent by the central government in Mogadishu from the North of Somalia; in Rwanda these were the former Tutsi refugees who formed an army, the RFP (Rwandese Patriotic Front), and attacked Rwanda from the North in order to oust the Hutu government which carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; in Burundi these were also Hutu rebels.
- Somali warlords who have their retreat in Kenya.
- Politicians, among them people who were in power already before the genocide and whom survivors secretly suspected of having been collaborators or at least silent supporters of perpetrators.
- Somali and Rwandan/Burundian academicians, who study the situation of their countries.
- Representatives of national non-governmental organizations who work locally with development, peace and reconciliation.
- Third parties, namely representatives of United Nations organizations and international non-governmental organizations who work with emergency relief, long-term development, peace, and reconciliation.
- Egyptian diplomats in the foreign ministry who deal with Somalia; Egypt is a heavy weight in the OAU.
- African psychiatrists in Kenya who deal with trauma, and forensic psychiatry. In Kenya many nationals from Somalia and also Rwanda/Burundi have sought refuge, both in refugee camps, but also on the basis of private arrangements.
- Those who have not yet been interviewed are masterminds of genocide in Rwanda, those who have planned the genocide. Many of them are said to be in hiding in Kenya, and other parts of Africa, or in Brussels and other parts of Europe, or in the States and Canada. Some are in the prisons in Rwanda and in Arusha, Tanzania.

58 interviews	with Somalis in Africa and Europe
26 interviews	with third party representatives working with Somalia
45 interviews	with Rwandans and Burundians in Africa and Europe
54 interviews	with third party representatives working with Rwanda and Burundi
30 interviews	with third party representatives in general in Africa

Table 1: Distribution of interviews with respect to Somali, Rwanda and Burundi

In interpreting the evidence yielded by these accumulating encounters and relationships, and networks of communication in which they were embedded, the researcher followed the procedure of the 'hermeneutic circle.'[40] In other words, there were repeated sequences of close involvement in a string of specific situations – seeking to learn as much as possible through empathetic inquiry and observation – followed by a process of 'withdrawal' and 'rising above' those specific situations. The object of this process of self-detachment was to search for empirical generalisations that would locate distinguishing features of the specific situations within a broader cross-cultural framework. One appropriate way of presenting the understanding that was reached about the character of humiliation as an aspect of the dynamics of interpersonal relationships is in the form of a typology. This is the approach that will be taken in the core section of this present paper.

Seven types will be presented, each case with reference to an indicative utterance constructed by the author on the basis of forms of expression that repeatedly appeared in the interview data. Each utterance expresses a particular pattern of perception of the behaviour of others and the self that is relevant to humiliation as an interpersonal process. More specifically, the utterances were shaped by firstly investigating, influenced, in part at least, by the spirit of Psycho-Logic, the use of the word humiliation in the texts collected in a pilot study (1997-1998, with contributions from 52 respondents contacted within Europe). They were later examined in Africa and developed further on the basis of the African evidence. This approach is influenced by Jan Smedslund, who argues that 'it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language' (Smedslund, 1988, 5).[41]

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[40] The idea of the 'hermeneutic circle' was introduced by Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911), a philosopher and literary historian who is generally recognised as the 'father' of the modern hermeneutic enterprise in the social and human sciences. 'Dilthey argued that the human world was sufficiently different from the natural world that special methods were required for its study. Hermeneutics, the deliberate and systematic methodology of interpretation, was the approach Dilthey proposed for studying and understanding the human world' (Tappan, 2000, Abstract). Dilthey's intellectual biographer H. P. Rickman explains, 'We cannot pinpoint the precise meaning of a word unless we read it in its context, i.e. the sentence or paragraph in which it occurs. But how can we know what the sentence means unless we have first understood the individual words? Logically there is no escape from this absence of priority; in practice we solve the problem by a kind of mental shuttlecock movement' (Rickman, 1979, 130).

[41] Smedslund's work is discussed further in the final sections of this paper. Smedslund's approach is to develop theorems and test them with people from different cultures and linguistic competence. The researcher's approach in Africa was less formalised than Smedslund's and – as above described– increasingly so in the course of the fieldwork. The following quote may serve as a short introduction into Smedslund's theorems (Smedslund, 1998, 362, PL meaning Psycho-Logic): 'Consider, as an example, one of the necessary conditions of trust, according to PL, namely self-control, as expressed in Theorem 5.5.20 (If P trusts O, then P believes that O has self-control). The validity of that statement, in a slightly revised

A Typology of Humiliation

The issue of humiliation is complicated. At first sight a bewildering range of aspects of humiliation unfold. The 'humiliator' may not 'succeed' in his or her intentions. The targeted person may not feel humiliated but just laugh, turning the would-be 'humiliator' into a ridiculous fool. At the other extreme, somebody may want to be helpful but find, unexpectedly, that this help is interpreted as being humiliating: is this person a philanthropist or a humiliator? To take a third case, a husband may continually treat his submissive wife in such a way that a witnessing third-party may think that she must surely feel humiliated and rebel, and yet she does not; in this case is it the witness who is the dupe? Furthermore, some people actually enjoy being humiliated, for example in so-called 'sado-maso' sex-practices or religious self-humiliation.

All these examples suggest that a perpetrator may want to commit humiliation but not succeed, that some people may wish to be humiliated rather than wish to avoid it, that a 'do-gooder' may cause humiliation while trying to do good, and that a third party may identify 'victims' who do not see themselves as such, - or fail to see victims in those cases where they do exist. Furthermore, victims may pretend to be victims in order to blemish others' reputation, and, in the course of cycles of humiliation the victim may become the perpetrator in an attempt to counter-humiliate the humiliator. It is difficult to find words for both perpetrator and humiliated person: is the humiliated party the 'victim,' the 'perceiver,' the 're-actor,' the 'object,' or the 'targeted party'? Is the humiliator a 'perpetrator,' or even an unaware 'actor'? Because of this complexity, the following section will use the word 'humiliator' and 'victim' in inverted commas.

Klein proposes that there is a 'Triangle of Humiliation' including the 'humiliator' (who inflicts disparagement), the 'victim' (those who experience it as disparagement), and the witness (those who observe what happens and agree that it is disparagement) (Klein, 1991, 101). For the purpose of presenting a typology of humiliation this basic idea of a triangle of humiliation is developed further as follows.

The triangle consists of 'humiliator', 'victim' and observer where

- the 'humiliator' is the person who is identified (correctly or incorrectly) by the 'victim' and/or the observer as having the intention of causing humiliation and/or as someone who has actually carried out a humiliating act against the 'victim,'
- the 'victim' is the person who is identified (correctly or incorrectly) by the 'humiliator' and/or the observer as having been subject to an act that is capable of imposing humiliation and/or as having experienced that act as humiliating, and
- the observer is a third party who perceives (correctly or incorrectly) the intentions, acts and feelings of the 'humiliator' and the 'victim.'

Additionally, all three parties – 'humiliator,' 'victim' and observer – may evaluate the humiliating intention and/or act within their moral and normative framework. An important determinant of the evaluation will be whether the evaluating party holds to a hierarchical honour code or an egalitarian human-rights code. In the first case, for example, 'putting down' a rival or an inferior or asserting domination over a servant or wife may be regarded as legitimate. In the

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form, was tested by asking native speakers of the six languages mentioned above the following question (translated into their native language): 'Do you think the statement "If P trusts O in S at t, then P thinks that O has self-control in S at t in matters concerning P" is "always true" or "not always true"? In the latter case, give at least one example of when the statement is not true.'

second case, all forms of putting down, including imposing submission upon a spouse, are regarded as illegitimate attacks upon the human dignity of the 'victim.'

In the following a number of permutations of dyadic and triadic relationships within the triangle of humiliation are a presented in the form of a typology consisting of seven types, or scenarios. The presentation of each scenario begins with an utterance that characterises the particular type. Following each utterance, a more general description of the case is attempted (where the following signs are used: a plus (+) sign symbolises 'present,' a minus (-) sign 'absent'). Firstly the 'humiliator's' intentions with respect to the humiliation of the 'victim' are probed: does the 'humiliator' actually intend to humiliate the 'victim' or not? Where the intention exists, it is asked whether or not the intention to humiliate is translated into an actual act with the purpose of putting that intention into effect, in what particular way that act is expected to realise that intention, and how this realisation is supposed to contribute to the 'humiliator's' satisfaction. Subsequently, the focus switches to the 'victim.'[42] What, according to her perceptions, are the intentions of the 'humiliator'? As she sees it, does an act that is intended to be humiliating take place? If so, does she actually experience that act as humiliating? Finally, similar questions are asked from the point of view of the onlooking third party. Does this third person perceive an intention to humiliate the 'victim' on the part of the putative 'humiliator'? Does the onlooker perceive that an act with humiliating intentions has occurred, or that it has produced the intended effects? How does the third party perceive the reactions of the 'victim'? Does she appear to be humiliated? Does the 'humiliator' appear to gain satisfaction from this?

This systematisation can be compared to a camera tracking across the process of humiliation as it unfolds. The camera starts with the 'humiliator's' intentions and the act of humiliation, including what the 'humiliator' wishes to achieve with the act of humiliation and what kind of satisfaction the act shall supposedly bring. Then the camera focuses on the 'victim' and whether or not the 'victim' actually perceives humiliating intentions or acts on the part of the 'humiliator,' and whether or not the 'victim' actually feels humiliated. Since sometimes a story of humiliation only unfolds in the eyes of a third party, this perspective is also included at the end of each scenario. At that point, also, normative evaluation is discussed. The question is asked: how would a third person who observes the scenario as an independent observer evaluate what has occurred in terms of 'right' and 'wrong'?[43]

The object of the typology is to encapsulate some of the main variations that exist in the 'humiliator'-'victim'- third party triad by focusing on the interplay between the perceptions of all three actors with respect to the intentions and/or actions and/or feelings of the 'humiliator' and 'victim.' The construction of this typology marks a specific stage on the journey towards a more fully realised theoretical and empirical analysis of humiliation.[44] Its object is to identify some of the key dimensions involved and some of the main ways in which they may vary.

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[42] The 'victim's' perspective has been chosen as the main focus in this paper; the 'humiliator's' role is addressed in more depth in other papers by the author and will be probed further in future work.

[43] I thank Jan Smedslund for commenting on the differentiation of the third party and a normative evaluation.

[44] A series of papers has been written within this research project, see, for example, Lindner, 1999a; Lindner, 1999b; Lindner, 2000a; Lindner, 2000b; Lindner, 2000c; Lindner, 2000d; Lindner, 2000e; Lindner, 2000f; Lindner, 2000g; Lindner, 2000h; Lindner, 2000i; Lindner, 2000j; Lindner, 2000k; Lindner, 2000l; Lindner, 2000m; Lindner, 2000n; Lindner, 2000o; Lindner, 2000p; Lindner, 2000q; Lindner, 2001. A theory of humiliation is currently being built that draws together several academic fields. Loughborough based sociologist Dennis Smith is

These scenarios, or types unfold at the level of individuals within a single cultural context. However, 'humiliators' and 'victims' may also be found at the group level[45] and in relationships between actors from different cultural contexts. Each type will be introduced by presenting an example at the interpersonal level. Attention will then shift to the inter-cultural and inter-group level; more specifically, it is asked whether the scenario in question could also be relevant between ethnic groups, or between nations.

The following scenarios will now be presented:

1. how feelings of humiliation may be the result of lack of information,
2. how the act of humiliation may fail to touch the intended 'victim,'
3. how help may humiliate,
4. how a 'victim' may accept humiliation as just punishment,
5. how the presence of a third party may give rise to feelings of humiliation,
6. how a 'victim' may only exist in a third party's eye, and
7. how both 'humiliator' and 'victim' may only exist in a third party's eye.

Type 1: How Feelings of Humiliation May Be the Result of Lack of Information

Utterance: 'I feel humiliated by my neighbour, I feel he is looking down on me without having any right to do that; if I only knew why he does that and whether he does it intentionally. The whole thing could also be a misunderstanding.'

General description: This person is uncertain about the intentions of the neighbour, the neighbour may or may not have the intention to humiliate, the person is also uncertain whether her perception of what she perceives as a humiliating act from the neighbour is correct; she suffers, but is not sure whether she should actually suffer or not.

Systematisation: We do not know what is really happening on the 'humiliator's' side:
intention to humiliate + or -,
humiliating act + or -,
intended outcome + or -,
satisfaction stemming from neighbour's humiliating + or -.

From the 'victim's' point of view, the 'humiliator' is difficult to judge:
the 'humiliator's' intention is indiscernible by the 'victim,' intention + or -,
it is uncertain whether an act of humiliation has taken place, act + or -
the 'victim' does not know whether she should suffer or not, suffering + or -.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: This case is very relevant on the inter-cultural level, because communication between groups, especially groups with different cultural backgrounds, is even more prone to produce uncertainties than communication between individuals with the same cultural background. A German or French citizen for example, may

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collaborating on this task, see for some of his publications, Smith, 1991; Smith, 1997; Smith, 1999; Smith, 2000a; Smith, 2000b; Smith, 2000c.

[45] A further complication, already mentioned above, and one that cannot be pursued in depth here, is introduced by the question: can a collectivity such as a country, clan or ethnic group 'feel humiliated'? Also, what about the case of a leader like Hitler who has experienced deep personal humiliation and subsequently incites his followers to believe in some more or less fabricated version of history that contains supposed (real or fictitious) humiliations that 'must' be avenged with the leader's help?

perceive it as extremely humiliating if s/he is addressed with 'Du' or 'tu' instead of 'Sie' or 'vous.' A foreigner with English background, who is used to a simple 'you,' will not be able to fathom the humiliation entailed in addressing somebody inappropriately with 'you.' A police officer in France or Germany for example, who intends to humiliate a criminal, may use 'Du' or 'tu' because of its strong humiliating potential. Thus a foreigner may humiliate a German or French citizen inadvertently just by being uninformed.

The third party's evaluation is necessarily uncertain, since too many aspects of the situation are unknown. The same concerns the *normative evaluation* of the case. A process of mutual education and illumination is necessary. Globalisation, which brings cultures closer together, increases therefore the need for cross-cultural education if encounters are to be smooth and not bring about unwanted dynamics of humiliation.

Type 2: How the Act of Humiliation May Fail to Touch the Intended 'Victim'

Utterance: 'My wife tries to humiliate me constantly; as far as I understand it, she feels justified in doing so because I was having an affair with another woman; but I think that her behaviour is unjustified; she should accept me like I am, are not all men hunters by nature? All her attempts to humiliate me do not really touch me.'

General description: This man recognises the intention of his wife to humiliate him and he observes her acts of humiliation; but he does not feel humiliated, he does not suffer the pain that his wife intends to inflict on him.

Systematisation: We have reason to conclude on the 'humiliator's' side:
Humiliating intention +,
humiliating act +,
intended outcome is the suffering of the humiliated person.

On the 'victim's' side we find:
Perception of humiliating intention on the 'humiliator's' side +,
perception of humiliating acts coming from the 'humiliator' +,
however, 'victim's' suffering -.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: On the inter-group level we see examples of groups who resist feeling humiliated by acts that are aimed at humiliating them. When slavery still was part of daily life, slaves may have tried to humiliate their abusive masters many times, but in vain. Burundi, in particular, was a place that produced many examples of that kind. Hutu, traditionally the underlings, explained to the author that in their eyes many Tutsi, encouraged through their traditional socialisation to think that they are 'born to rule,' seem to be 'untouchably' proud, and blind to the suffering that Hutu have to endure. However, Tutsi on the other side would tend to contest this view and be adamant that their rule was a beneficial one for all, or that it was, at least, well intentioned.

During the fieldwork in Somalia and with Somalis in other parts of Africa (1998-1999) interviews were recorded on video, and a film was produced that later was shown to other Somalis. Some of them responded angrily because they felt that it was a rhetoric of humiliation that was by the Northern Somali participants in the film to mislead and manipulate the interviewer as a representative of the international community, believed to be naively open to accounts of feelings of humiliation. Angry commentators from the South of Somalia claimed that their Northern Somalian compatriots more or less pretended to have felt humiliated during the

quasi-genocide in the 1980s perpetrated against them by the dictatorial government based in the South. They maintained, often in a heated way, that the Northern 'Somalilanders' in the film were actually not 'victims,' but actors, actors because they defined the situation in a way that stigmatised their Southern brothers as perpetrators. This evidence shows how 'victims' may be perceived, as has been mentioned in the outset of this article, to invent a story of humiliation in order to manoeuvre another party into the role of 'loathsome perpetrator.' The Northern Somali in this case parallels the wife who, in the eyes of her husband, or the Southerner, fabricates, or at least exaggerates, the humiliating effect of the behaviour they endured.

The third party's evaluation in this case must be expected to vary widely: An abusive husband, terrorising his wife, will be seen by most third parties as being very wrong in not letting his wife's protest touch him. The main exception, it is to be supposed, will be those who hold the same beliefs as the husband. On the other side, torture victims who are humiliated by torturers will be regarded as heroic in not letting the torturer's humiliation touch them. The calm serenity of a Nelson Mandela, who refused to succumb to feelings of humiliation and retained his dignity, is widely admired. Between these extreme poles of judging intended 'victims' as being wrong in not being touched by attempts to humiliated them, or as being heroic, a continuum stretches within which a third party is unsure. The case of Somalia, for example, may contain many shades – to quote a Somali intellectual in an interview in December 1999 (Hassan Abdi Keynan, Oslo), 'In a war-torn country everything is politicised.'

The normative evaluation will depend on factors such as whether the humiliating act is seen as justifiable retaliation for wrongs suffered, as in the case of a terrorised wife, or whether the humiliating act is seen as wrong in itself, as in the case of Nelson Mandela. Culture, history and traditions play a great role in the normative evaluation of participants and third-party observers: in traditional hierarchically organised societies such as Rwanda and Burundi, and, particularly starkly, in Hitler's Germany, or under the Apartheid system, humiliation was a routine practice and thoroughly institutionalised in intricate bureaucratic procedures. In these cases, the humiliations imposed by the 'system' were regarded as highly legitimate by the elites who held control but they were regarded as profoundly illegitimate by observers within human-rights oriented societies and by those victims who espoused similar values.

Type 3: How Help May Humiliate

Utterance: 'My mother is so dominating; she only wishes the best for me, but her patronising way of treating me humiliates me.'

General description: The daughter recognises that the mother does not actually have the intention to humiliate her, but she feels humiliated anyhow.

Systematisation: On the 'humiliator's' side we find:
Humiliating intention -,
humiliating act -,
intended outcome and satisfaction is helping the daughter.

On the 'victim's' side we find:
Perception of humiliating intention -,
perception of humiliating acts +,
'victim's' suffering +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: This case shows very clearly that humiliation is a term that carries the relation between at least two persons at its heart. It cannot be described by looking at just one individual. The question which poses itself explicitly in this case is: if I want to help other people, but my arrogant way of behaving humiliates the people I want to help, do I then commit a humiliating act by trying to help them? From my point of view I am not committing a humiliating act but from the recipient's point of view I am committing such an act. At the inter-group level this case is extremely relevant in all aid situations; in situations such as humanitarian aid, peace keeping, or peace enforcing, all those involved struggle with the possibility that their actions may humiliate those who they are trying to help.[46]

The debate around 'double standards' is very relevant here, i.e. double standards concerning the contradiction between the West's human rights advocacy and its actual behaviour. During the fieldwork in Africa the author was constantly confronted with this contradiction. The former first lady of Somalia, Edna Adan, says in an interview (December 1998) about the lack of Western response to the quasi-genocide in the North of Somalia in the 1980s, 'I think the international world has different standards. It preaches human rights, and fairness, and so on, in literature, in Europe. But then when that humiliation, and that aggression, and that hurt, took place in a poor, remote, developing country like Somaliland, no one wants to be bothered, - let them stew in their own juice. And these are divided standard, and unfair standards...' She continues, 'It is a humiliation, of course. So, the international community is to blame and I hope you have very strong cupboards in which you can lock up your conscience.'

The third party's evaluation is very difficult to carry out in this case: Who is in the wrong, the donor who gives unsuitable aid with good intentions, or the receiver who thinks that donors should have studied the situation better before designing their helping strategy? After many years of failed aid programmes, most observers will probably agree that it is primarily the donors' responsibility to ensure that their help really meets the needs of the recipients. The recipients will therefore be evaluated as being 'right' in feeling humiliated by ill-considered help.[47] On the other side it cannot be excluded that help may be well intentioned and well designed, but that it meets a receiver who shows insufficient appreciation for the effort of the helper. In such a case, the receiver's reaction would be evaluated as 'wrong.'

The normative evaluation is delicate and hinges on the definition of the concept of responsibility. Is it the responsibility of the donor to do sufficient research on the recipients' needs? Where is the recipients' responsibility? What about empowerment of the recipients? Wherever the author went during the fieldwork in Africa, the War-torn Societies Project in Somalia[48] received a lot of praise for being different from the common run of NGOs or similar aid agencies. These NGOs were often described in terms of a parody (that contains elements of truth): 'These NGOs come along, build wells (or some other installations or services liable to be ecologically unsound or unmanageable in the longer run), create a few jobs for some chauffeurs, secretaries and security personnel, and then disappear again.'[49]

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[46] Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen write about the humiliating aspect of help-receiving in the mid-1970's, see their current work at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/kgergen1/text7.html. I owe this reference to Michael Bond. See also Rosen, De Paulo and et al., 1983. See also Lindner, 2000c.
[47] See the discussion at organisations as for example the World Bank, where 'empowerment' and 'good governance' currently become buzzwords after the failure of 'helping' developing countries with financial and/or technical assistance. See for example Stiglitz, 1998.
[48] See http://www.unicc.org/unrisd/wsp/index.htm.
[49] See also Maren, 1997.

The War-torn Societies Project, in contrast, concentrates on 'research' and attempts to develop an agenda for development together with the communities concerned; it thus tries to 'empower' people and turn them from 'recipients' into 'actors.' Empowerment means undoing humiliation; and 'research' means moving – intellectually and psychologically – more often and more carefully between, on one side, the 'incoming helper's perception or ideology of what people need as aid,' and the 'support that local people *really* need' on the other side. This tailor-made approach appears to be normatively right and responsible.

Type 4: How a 'Victim' May Accept Humiliation As Just Punishment

Utterance: 'My neighbours try to humiliate me whenever they meet me; I am an alcoholic and I hit my wife when I am drunk, it is terrible; I know I am a bad person; they are right to look down on me, I deserve no better; their humiliation only adds to the guilt and shame I feel myself.'

General description: This man perceives the neighbours' humiliating intentions and their acts that cause him suffering. He suffers, and accepts that as justified.

Systematisation: On the 'humiliator's' side we find:

Humiliating intention +,

humiliating act +,

intended outcome is the suffering of the 'victim,'

satisfaction is entailed in the compensation for the suffering of the wife.

The last point shows that compensation for hurt feelings through acts of humiliation (for example by neighbours) directed against an initial 'humiliator' (for example a drunken husband) can be differentiated into two parts: the hurt feelings of the 'humiliator' and the hurt feelings of an observing third party. In this case the neighbours want to let the beating husband compensate for the suffering of the beaten woman, not because the neighbours themselves have suffered beatings but because they regard it as unjust that she suffers. In all the cases previously reported the suffering of the 'victim' is meant to compensate for hurt feelings in the 'humiliator,' not in a third person.

On the 'victim's' side we find:

Perception of humiliating intention +,

perception of humiliating act +,

suffering +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Germany may serve as an example on the inter-group level. Many self-critical Germans feel responsible for the atrocities Germany committed against its neighbours during World War II, even if they are born long after World War II. They therefore tend to show understanding if they find themselves in a situation where they are being humiliated by people from European neighbours who suffered under German occupation during World War II.

In many societies, offenders against social norms are publicly shamed and humiliated. Many feel that their wrongdoing requires this punishment. Nowadays lists of performance indices, for example of employees in a company, or universities in a country, may have a similar effect, intended or not. This supposedly 'prosocial humiliation' with the potential to become 'anti-social humiliation' - is addressed by Klein (1991, 103). He argues that 'humiliating degradations …have as their final aim making a gung-ho Leatherneck out of an undisciplined, self-centered teenager.' He adds that ' there are studies which document the fact that medical

education abounds with instances of personal put-downs and ridicule used by faculty and supervisors in the teaching of medical students and residents.'

Both the third party's evaluation and the normative evaluation may agree in those cases in which even the 'victims' agree that it is 'right' to humiliate them. However, as Klein makes clear, there is a price to pay for using humiliation, even if it is meant to 'civilise' 'imperfect' beings. This price is the fact that the 'beings' that have been 'civilised' may afterwards need to look down on others, and may acquire a 'lifelong sense of vulnerability' (Klein, 1991, 103).

Type 5: How the Presence of a Third Party May Give Rise to Feelings of Humiliation

Utterance: 'My mother is humiliating me by quarrelling with me in front of my friends; if she quarrels with me when we are alone, it does not affect me, but to do this in front of others, that is humiliating.'

General description: The presence of a third party leads to humiliation. It is possible that the mother does not want to humiliate her son; however, it is also possible that she actually wants to humiliate her son.

Systematisation: On the 'humiliator's' side we find:

Humiliating intention - or +,

humiliating act - or +,

no intended outcome, just lack of sensitivity on the 'humiliator's' side,

no satisfaction sought, just lack of sensitivity on the 'humiliator's' side,

or satisfaction from suffering of the 'victim.'

On the 'victim's' side we find:

Perception of humiliating intention – or +,

perception of humiliating act +,

suffering +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: At the inter-group level many examples come to mind. Negotiations between groups are often conducted secretly in order to avoid considering third parties too early in the process. The notion of 'face-saving' is widely known, and is regarded as being especially relevant in Japan, China and other parts of South East Asia.

The third party and normative evaluations depend on as assessment of the 'humiliator's' intentions. If the mother in the example cited above really wants to humiliate her son, then most observers will consider her behaviour as showing lack of love and as even being normatively 'wrong,' leading to the conclusion that the mother should use alternative methods to express discontent with her son. If she is not aware of the fact that she is humiliating her son, her actions may be evaluated as being beyond right and wrong, since she is not intending the consequences of her actions.

Type 6: How a 'Victim' May Only Exist in a Third Party's Eye

Utterance: 'My wife sometimes has a harsh way of talking to me; my friends tell me that her behaviour humiliates me, they ask me not to accept her behaviour, but I just do not feel humiliated, I love her.'

General description: This man does not feel humiliated, his friends feel humiliated in his place. It is possible that his wife does not want to humiliate him; it is also possible that she does want to humiliate him.

Systematisation: On the 'humiliator's' side we find therefore:
Humiliating intention - or +,
humiliating act - or +,
intended outcome -, or suffering of the 'victim,'
satisfaction -, or suffering of the 'victim.'

On the 'victim's' side we find:
Perception of humiliating intention -,
perception of humiliating act -,
suffering -.

Perception of humiliating intention and act only by third persons +,
third persons suffer in the victim's place.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: On the inter-group level we find fanatical followers of sects and other extremist groups who impress non-believers with their willingness to accept humiliation and still stay loyal to the group.

A *third party* who is in favour of extremist groups will support their behaviour, while neutral third parties most probably will not. Most modern citizens of Western countries will regard this kind of dependency as both 'stupid' and *normatively* 'wrong.'

Type 7: How Both 'Humiliator' and 'Victim' May Only Exist in a Third Party's Eye

Utterance: 'This teacher of ours, he is so arrogantly convinced that he knows everything. But in fact he tells us nonsense most of the time. He is completely blind to the fact that he is humiliating himself in our eyes.'

General description: The teacher himself does not feel humiliated, and this appears in this case to be a sign of his lack of social competence; if he were a normally sensitive human being, he would feel humiliated. The teacher humiliates himself – but only in the eyes of third persons since he is non-cognisant of the whole subject of humiliation; in his eyes, it lacks relevance to himself. In the eyes of the others he humiliates himself by being blind to the fact that he has a bigger self-image than he can actually maintain through his behaviour. He humiliates himself in a passive way by being blind to the implications of the way he acts.

Systematisation: On the 'humiliator's' side we find therefore:
Humiliating intention -,
humiliating act -,
intended outcome -,
satisfaction -.

On the 'victim's' side we find blindness, lack of social competence:
Perception of humiliating intention -,
perception of humiliating act -,
suffering -.

Third persons feel the humiliation he should feel:
Perception of humiliating intention by third persons +,
perception of humiliating act by third person +,
suffering by third person +.

Inter-group and/or inter-cultural level: Michael Kimmel once explained[50] how privilege is 'invisible' and how he came to understand that he had been humiliating himself by being blind to the real facts of his own social condition: 'I got up one morning and looked into the mirror. Suddenly I understood that I was not just a "normal human being" but a "white middle class man"!'

All privileged and powerful groups and nations live with the risk of not detecting their own faults, mistakes, or misperceptions out of arrogant blindness. 'Masters' often live in the false belief that they know everything and that their underlings love them. At best they appear ridiculous in the eyes of their subordinates and are laughed about, but they run the risk of having their illusions shattered by unexpectedly hostile behaviour on the part of their 'inferiors.' 'A dictator has got that feeling that he is always right, what ever happens he is right. He is right and right' (Dr. Gaboose, personal physician of ousted and late Somali dictator Siad Barre in an interview 30th November 1998).

The third party will agree that it is not very wise to be blind to one's own weaknesses, though in this case a *normative evaluation* of 'right' or 'wrong' cannot be applied.

The cases 1 to 7 will now be summarised/ in Table 2:

Humiliation Seen From the Victim's Perspective							
	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3	Type 4	Type 5	Type 6	Type 7

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[50] At the expert group meeting on 'Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace,' Oslo, Norway, 24th – 28th September 1997. See also Kimmel, 1997 and Kimmel, 2000.

Humili-ator	Intention to humiliate:	+ or -	+	-	+	- or +	- or +	-
	Humiliating act:	+ or -	+	-	+	- or +	- or +	-
	Intended outcome of humiliating act:	- or vic-tim's suf-fering	victim's suffering	help	victim's suffering	- or +	- or victim's suffering	-
	Satisfaction from humiliating act:	+ or -	compen-sation for hurt feelings	help	compen-sation for hurt feelings of a third person	- or any kind of hurt	- or any kind of hurt	-
Victim	Victim perceives humiliator's intention to humiliate as:	+ but not sure	+	-	+	- or +	- third person +	- third person +
	Victim perceives humiliating act as:	+ but not sure	+	+	+	+	- third person +	- third person +
	Victim suffers:	+	-	+	+	+	- third person +	- third person +
Ob-server	Observers judge humiliator's and victims' behaviour:	obser-ver is un-certain	victim may be right or wrong	victim mostly right	humili-ator is right	depen-ding on humili-ator's inten-tions	victim is wrong	victim is right

Table 2: Humiliation seen from the victim's perspective (the inverted commas around the words 'humiliator' and 'victim' are omitted in this table in order to make it more readable)

Table 2 is clearly not exhaustive. Further cases could be added and many other ways of differentiating the enumerated points further are possible. However, the typology is intended to present the complexity of the subject in a systematic way.

Some Theoretical Implications
The approach to humiliation that is illustrated through the presentation of this typology is consistent with a relational understanding of emotion. It overlaps, for example, with the work of

Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky[51] on cognitive development and its embeddedness in social relations.[52] Vygotsky explains that valid results and meaningful insights may be foreclosed by methodological approaches that dissect complex psychological wholes into their elements instead of studying them as wholes. He compares such methodological orientations with the 'chemical analysis of water into hydrogen and oxygen, neither of which possesses the properties of the whole and each of which possesses properties not present in the whole' (Vygotsky, 1962, 2). He makes clear that a 'student applying this method in looking for the explanation of some property of water why it extinguishes fire, for example will find to his surprise that hydrogen burns and oxygen sustains fire. These discoveries will not help him much in solving the problem' (2). What Vygotsky addresses here is the issue of thought and language, however, the same analysis suits the study of emotions: 'Psychology winds up in the same kind of dead end when it analyses verbal thought into its components, thought and word, and studies them in isolation from each other. In the course of analysis, the original properties of verbal thought have disappeared, Nothing is left to the investigator but to search out the mechanical interaction of the two elements in the hope of reconstructing, in a purely speculative way, the vanished properties of the whole' (2).

As Kenneth Gergen (Gergen, 1995, 8) writes, 'The significance of this [Vygotskian] work is largely owing to its dislodgement of psychology's longstanding investment in autonomous, or self-contained cognitive processes, and its replacement by a profoundly more socialized conception of self. For the Vygotskian, to paraphrase John Locke, there is nothing in thought that is not first in society. Or, to extend the implications, the concept of the autonomous agent is a myth; each of us is constituted by the other; we cannot deliberate or decide without implicate otherness.' The triangle of humiliation exemplifies this.

In *Technology and the Self: From the Essential to the Sublime* Gergen states (9): 'It is from the soil of critical appraisal that new attempts now spring to life, attempts to reconstitute the psychological terrain as a social one. Such work in inspired in part by Vygotsky's thesis of higher mental processes, and in some degree by post-structural literary theory. In the former case Vygotsky makes a strong case for mental processes as being social processes simply re-located: One carries out a mental process we might call "thinking" in the terms of the community into which one is socialized. Thought, on this account, is more radically conceived as participation in relatedness - a view which Bruner, 1990, Wertsch, 1985a and many others are currently exploring.'

Kenneth Gergen's constructionism emphasises the relational nature of cognition and emotion even more than does Vygotsky's approach. In Gergen's words, '…the chief focus of interest for the constructionist is micro-social process. The constructionist rejects the dualistic premises that give rise to "the problem of mental functioning." The site of explanation for human action moves to the relational sphere' (Gergen, 1994, 69).[53] Gergen differentiates constructionism

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[51] Russian psychologist Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934): Vygotsky, 1962; Vygotsky, 1978; Vygotsky, 1987; Vygotsky, van der Veer and Valsiner, 1994; Vygotsky, 1999.
[52] See, for example Cole and Wertsch, 1996; Luria, 1976; Marti, 1996; Nicolopoulou and Weintraub, 1996; Penuel and Wertsch, 1995; Ratner, 1991; Valsiner, 1996; van der Veer, 1996; van der Veer and Valsiner, 1991; van der Veer and Valsiner, 1994; Wertsch, 1985a; Wertsch, 1985b; Wertsch, 1988; Wertsch, 1991.
[53] Gergen explains (68) that 'From a constructionist perspective neither "mind" nor "world" is granted ontological status, thus removing the very grounding assumptions of constructivism.' He continues:

from constructivism, for example from Jean Piaget's constructivist approach that describes stages of cognitive development,[54] from George Kelly's constructive alternativism,[55] that focuses on how the 'individual privately construes, cognizes, or interprets the world,' as well as from the radical constructivism of Ernst von Glasersfeld[56] who claims that 'Knowledge is not passively received either through the senses or by way of communication, but is actively built up by the cognizing subject' (Glasersfeld, 1988, 83). Gergen's constructionism is also to be differentiated from 'social constructivist' approaches that privilege the social over the personal, such as the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz[57], George Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionism,[58] and Vygotsky's school.[59] Gergen explains (68) that in contrast to these approaches 'From a constructionist perspective neither "mind" nor "world" is granted ontological status, thus removing the very grounding assumptions of constructivism.'

In another paper[60] the present author attempts to inscribe the antagonism between social constructionism and its 'adversaries,' including logical positivism, in the above-discussed historical transition from hierarchical honour societies to egalitarian human rights societies. Humiliation seems to lend itself to an epistemological stance that radically emphasises the 'relational sphere,' however, this does not mean that the debate on the epistemological rifts that may be perceived as surrounding social constructionism must necessarily be subscribed to. To link back to the above-presented deliberations on methodology, Colin Robson comments: 'There are strongly held views that the divide between qualitative and quantitative represents an ideological divide and that that particular twain should never meet. Following Bryman (1988a), the view adopted here is that many of these differences are more apparent than real and that there is in practice a considerable underlying unity of purpose' (Robson, 1993, 6, see Bryman, 1988). In the same pragmatic vein the usefulness of thoroughly relational approaches for asking radical questions concerning humiliation is what is appreciated here.[61]

'Nor do extreme forms of constructivism, which would reduce the world to mental construction, become a satisfying replacement. For the constructionist, terms for both world and mind are constituents of discursive practices; they are integers within language and thus themselves socially contested and negotiated… Finally, the constructivist view remains lodged within the tradition of Western individualism. It traces knowledge claims primarily to intrinsic processes within the individual. But social constructionism traces the sources of human action to relationships and the very understanding of "individual functioning" to communal interchange.' Gergen concludes (69): 'Constructionist arguments generally militate against fixed and final formulations, even those of their own making.'

[54] Piaget, 1955.

[55] Kelly, 1955.

[56] Glasersfeld, 1988; Glasersfeld, 1995.

[57] Schutz, 1967; Schutz, 1970; Schutz and Luckmann, 1989.

[58] Mead, 1934.

[59] Gergen explains that Schutz links action to concepts such as 'cognitive setting,' 'subjectivity,' 'attention,' 'reasons,' and 'goals,' that Mead and other symbolic interactionists focus on 'symbolisation,' 'consciousness,' 'conceptualisation,' and 'self-concept,' while Vygotsky addresses mental processes such as 'abstraction,' 'generalization,' 'volition,' 'association,' 'attention,' 'representation,' 'judgment.' Gergen states that, in contrast to constructionism these theorists 'objectified a specifically mental world' (Gergen, 1994, 68).

[60] Lindner, 2000r.

[61] I thank Nandita Chaudhary from Lady Irwin College, Delhi, India, for cautioning against 'the current trend of "bashing Western, particularly American Psychology"' (in her comments from 10th November 2000). The present author does not wish to participate in this trend; see also Lindner, 2000r.

In 'The Place of the Psyche in a Constructed World' Gergen, 2000, acknowledges the significance of Smedslund's work (2) in confronting: '…the problem of professional psychology …(which)…does not lie in its discursive commitments per se, but in its claims to objective grounding for such commitments. Truth claims, it is reasoned…(by the constructionist critic), operate to silence competing voices; the discourse of objectivity and political totalitarianism are allied. The constructionist critic thus functions to unmask the literary and rhetorical strategies responsible for the sensibility (objectivity, intelligibility, felicity) of propositions about the mental world.' Gergen continues (2) and points out that 'An early example of such unmasking is provided by Smedslund's (1978) attempt to demonstrate that most experimental hypotheses in psychology are non-falsifiable inasmuch as falsifications are linguistically incoherent.'

At the outset of the research the author became acquainted with Jan Smedslund's approach of 'Psycho-Logic' or 'structure of psychological common sense.'[62] The idea of Psycho-Logic provided a useful initial orientation to the nature of humiliation as an experience inscribed in social relationships within many different cultures. Smedslund provides one possible way of analysing certain similarities that exist in the way humiliation is spoken about in different cultures. Smedslund writes (Smedslund, 1988, 5): 'I believe that, even though ordinary words have very variable meanings, they also have a stable core meaning, and many partly overlapping words may also refer to the same core meaning. It appears to me that one may, to a considerable extent, define central concepts in ways which are acceptable and non controversial to both lay people and psychologists as long as they are speakers of the given language and members of the given culture. …In summary, it may be possible to explicate a skeleton system of important concepts underlying the complex surface of an ordinary language. … A formulation of such a system can only approximate some of the psychologically relevant features of ordinary language and must necessarily ignore others. However, one may envisage successively more complex scientific language, including an ever higher number of psychologically important distinctions.'[63]

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[62] 'Psycho-Logic is an attempt to formulate explicitly the implicit common-sense psychology embedded in everyday language and taken for granted by its users. The key concepts in this system are given definitions, and the basic assumptions are presented in the form of axioms. A number of corollaries and theorems are formally proved. The text also contains numerous notes in which the formal propositions and their broader implications are discussed. It is assumed that the relationship between psycho-logic and empirical psychology is analogous to that existing between geometry and geography. Psycho-logic and geometry both provide a formal system in terms of which one may describe and analyse respectively psychological phenomena and geographical terrains' (Book-cover text of Smedslund, 1988, Psycho-Logic). See for more publications, Smedslund, 1978; Smedslund, 1991; Smedslund, 1993; Smedslund, 1997; Smedslund, 1998.

[63] Smedslund warns against psychological research that tries to appear 'scientific' by mistaking 'scientifically looking' methods for sound science. He writes (4): 'The finding that all bachelors are in fact unmarried males cannot be said to be empirical.' Smedslund warns that a lot of research is as pointless as trying to make surveys in order to find out 'whether bachelors really are all males.' This obviously would be an inexcusable waste of time and resources, and in addition a basic confusion of 'the ontological status' (4) of psychology's research object: 'psychologists have not been able to make a clear decision about the ontological status of their subject matter. Is scientific psychology the study of phenomena which exist independently of persons, that is objectively, or is it the study of phenomena which exist for persons, that is subjectively? Objective psychology, dealing with externally defined situations and behaviors, is out of touch with what exists for people simply because …..there are no stable bridges between the objective and subjective. Subjective psychology is concerned with situations and behaviors as they exist for persons, and, therefore, has to be concerned with the understanding of meanings' (2).

Smedslund's 'Concept of Anger' is related to humiliation since this concept builds upon the idea of lack of respect (Smedslund, 1993, 13, italics in original): "The feeling of anger consists in awareness of the relationship between the *belief* that someone one cares for has been treated wrongly and the *want* to correct or undo this. Everyone has a right to, and wants to, be treated courteously and justly, that is, *respectfully*, and when this right is violated, there is anger. What exactly constitutes courtesy and justice for a given person in a given context varies both with the culture and the person involved.'[64] Humiliation may be considered as a specific sub-case of the definition of anger proposed by Smedslund. This is because feelings of humiliation entail a perception of having been put down. Anger arises as a consequence of the suffering caused by abasement. This is more specific than the distress and anger that stem from being exposed to lack of courtesy and justice in general.

Agenda for Further Research and Theory-Building

The systematisation of humiliation in this paper represents a preliminary mapping of the conceptual space it occupies. The aim is to contribute towards a better understanding of its dynamics and so improve our capacity to prevent or alleviate it. It has been shown in this paper that, in cases of humiliation, it is useful to distinguish between, on one side the active party, the 'humiliator,' the one who humiliates or is, at least, perceived as humiliating, and – on the other side – the 'victim,' the party who feels humiliated, 'rightly or wrongly.' The relationship between these two parties may vary in many ways. Furthermore, third parties may perceive cases of humiliation in several ways and may make a range of normative judgements.

This article calls upon the academic community to pay more attention to the study and analysis of acts and feelings of humiliation, including the ways that people cope with humiliation. It has been emphasised that it is not just individuals who would benefit from learning how to cope with or, better, prevent humiliation. Avishai Margalit (1996) defines a *decent society* as a society in which institutions do not humiliate people – meaning that they do not undermine a person's reasons for self-respect – and a *civilised society* as one in which citizens do not humiliate each other. Introducing these principles into the implementation of social policy in several areas including international relations is an important challenge. There is still a long way to go. Pettit, for example, deplores the current lack of attention for the notion of respect, 'we are stuck with a way of thinking about freedom that knows and cares nothing, in itself, about whether liberty comes with respect' (Pettit, 1997, 74).

Healing and preventing humiliation is a central aspect of achieving decency. Although it has not been the primary focus of this paper, it is a good topic upon which to focus in this conclusion. As Ripstein puts it, 'Forgiveness might be thought a more befitting attitude for a decent society than are punishment and denunciation. God is said to pray that His love of compassion will outweigh His demand for strict justice… Compassion and forgiveness have their place. But it is up to those who have been humiliated to forgive, not up to others. If society, through its institutions, decides to forgive one person for humiliating another, it is joining in the humiliation, rather than answering it' (Ripstein, 1997, 110).[65]

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64 Smedslund formalises the definition within the system of Psycho-Logic as follows (14): 'P in C at t is angry at Q' = df 'P in C at t believes that at least one person whom P in C at t cares for has, intentionally or through neglect, been treated without respect by Q, and P has not forgiven Q.'

[65] This discussion is urgent in countries like Rwanda, where people when walking in the street are able to point at a passer-by saying, 'this man killed my uncle.' Reconciliation is promoted by the current

Klein enumerates several approaches to the task of coping with humiliation: 'psychological immunization, refusing the role of victim by redefining one's identity, participating in self-help and mutual support groups, using healing laughter, achieving a state of transcendent humility and responding with one's capacity for appreciation to the potential humiliations that come one's way' (Klein, 1992, 255). Transcendent humility is associated with Mahatma Gandhi, the Dalai Lama, [66] and Nelson Mandela. The practical value of this approach is well summed up by Gandhi's comment that 'An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind.[67]

The Dalai Lama formulates the matter as follows: 'In human societies there will always be differences of views and interests. But the reality today is that we are all inter-dependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore, the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes of interests, whether between individuals or nations, is through dialogue. The promotion of a culture of dialogue and non-violence for the future of mankind is thus an important task of the international community. It is not enough for governments to endorse the principle of non-violence or hold it high without any appropriate action to promote it' (Dalai Lama, 1997, 4).

This paper is intended to make a contribution towards building a decent society, both globally and locally, by presenting a typology of humiliation that may improve our understanding of the workings of humiliation. This will, hopefully, be a useful tool in identifying and thus helping to prevent or heal humiliation – and also provide an orientation for the further research that is urgently needed.

Rwandan government, led by those Tutsi forces that ended the genocidal onslaught on their brothers and sisters in 1994. However, genocide survivors feel that they may not be able to reconcile, 'I may perhaps be able to co-exist with those who let my grandmother parade naked in the streets before killing her, but I cannot achieve reconciliation with them. How can I speak for my grandmother? Those responsible have to be punished.'

[66] I thank Nandita Chaudhary for her suggestion to include Gandhi and the Dalai Lama (in her comments from 10th November 2000). See, for example, Gandhi, 1940 and Dalai Lama and Lokesh Chandra, 1981 and more recent, Dalai Lama, 1999.

[67] See http://www.cyber-nation.com/victory/quotations/subjects/quotes_revenge.html.

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