

The Field of Psychology and Its Challenges

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If we consider humiliation to be an emotion, or a set of emotions, and therefore a trope that can be anchored in the field of psychology, it is time to consider how this field evolved. As I studied psychology and medicine, these disciplines affected my life very directly. Furthermore, even though the field of psychology emerged in Europe, I have met academics and therapists in the farthest corner of the planet who accept it as a universal approach more than an approach that is indigenous to Europe and its history. Allow me therefore to dedicate this section to the academic field of psychology.

Psychology was ‘a mistake waiting to happen’, we hear from psychologist Alan Costall, ‘when physical science has promoted its methodology (of atomism, mechanism, and quantification) to an exclusive ontology, psychology (so conceived) was a pretty obvious mistake just waiting to happen — an essentially derivative science modelled on physics, yet having as its subject the very realm that physics rendered utterly obscure’.¹ Philosopher Michel Foucault warned that psychology has inherited from the Enlightenment a misplaced desire to align itself with the natural sciences and to find in human beings the prolongation of the laws that govern natural phenomena.² Psychologist Anthony Marsella calls for a new psychology for the future — a global-community psychology, a ‘meta-discipline’, a ‘superordinate discipline’ characterised by ‘a set of premises, methods, and practices for psychology based on multicultural, multidisciplinary, multisectoral, and multinational foundations global in interest, scope, relevance, and applicability’.³

Philosopher David Hartley (1705–1757) was the first person known to have used the word *psychology* in English, it was in a work published in 1748 in which he developed an associationist theory of the mind. Already before him, early empiricists such as John Locke (1632–1704) and David Hume (1711–1776), even though they did not use the term psychology, responded to Isaac Newton’s mechanical physics for the ‘outer’ extended world, with what Hume thought of as a corresponding physics of the ‘inner world’ of the mind. Locke differentiated *primary* and *secondary* qualities, whereby primary qualities comprised everything that is independent of the observer, such as extension, number, and solidity, in short, the ‘objective reality’ that natural scientists like Galileo and Newton had demonstrated to be nothing but matter in motion. Locke’s secondary qualities pointed at the subjective mind, the subjective effects in an observer in the form of experienced colours, tastes, and smells.

The clarity of Newton’s mechanical physics inspired great hopes for a better society, and this had a deep influence on the notion of morality. Philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), for instance, inspired the materialist ideas of French Enlightenment philosophers to base law on science and reason, to forge an objective foundation for the promotion of a humane and egalitarian society — the hope was that this would eliminate oppressive laws informed by the prejudices of clergy and aristocrats.⁴

Unfortunately, however, the successes of Newton’s physics raised hopes too high, and the detrimental outcomes are felt until the day today. Since its inception, the academic discipline of psychology committed a scientific error, an error of blind ambition one may say, namely, it tried to present itself as if it were as purely quantitative as physics. It fell for the psychological trap also

known as ‘physics envy’, and this even though psychology’s very *raison-d’être* is to study such traps rather than fall for them.

Qualitative psychologists, even though they were around, were marginal, chronicles psychologist Sven Brinkmann, co-director of the Center for Qualitative Studies at Aalborg University in Denmark.⁵ This was ironic, because qualitative methods in psychology ‘meet the demands of the methodology of the natural sciences more truly than do the methods of mainstream quantitative methodology’.⁶

Early foundational qualitative studies in psychology were conducted, for instance, by Wilhelm Wundt, who established the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, where he studied the mind in its historical and cultural manifestations. Then there was ‘James’s study of religious experience’, Brinkmann reports, there were ‘Freud’s investigations of dreams and his clinical method more broadly’, there was ‘Gestalt psychologists’ research on perception, Piaget’s interviews with children, Bartlett’s studies of remembering, and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body’.⁷ As time went by, however, qualitative psychologists were increasingly marginalised by quantitative oriented researchers who represented the mainstream positivist view of psychology.

Only in the 1970s was qualitative psychology able to come more to the fore again, be more appreciated, and Brinkmann suspects that this was due to the arrival of ‘liquid modernity’,⁸ as this meant the ‘emergence of a new dynamic, multiperspectival, and emergent social complexity that cannot easily be captured with the use of quantitative methods’.⁹

Fast forward to present time, criticism is mounting within the field, and a critical ‘revisionist view’ of psychology opposes the mainstream positivist view of psychology. Psychologists Jeroen Jansz and Peter van Drunen summarise:

The positivist view of psychology was based on three basic assumptions: (a) Practical psychology is believed to rest on scientific knowledge developed within academic psychology, (b) this knowledge is further thought to be progressive and value-free, and (c) the application of this psychological knowledge is generally perceived as being beneficial for society and humankind.¹⁰ The opposite view, ‘the revisionist view’, holds three different basic assumptions: (a) Practical psychology originates from societal forces rather than from academic psychology, (b) psychological knowledge does not necessarily imply progress and is never value-free, and (c) psychology often represses or conceals society’s real conflicts.¹¹

If we follow the revisionist view of psychology, the positivist view is an article of faith more than an accurate reflection of the history of psychology, and ‘psychology’s utility and role in society has been oppressive just as often as it has fostered social progress’.¹²

Psychologist Jaan Valsiner has traced how psychology emerged in the post-Napoleonic era in Germany as a discipline tasked to keep order in communities and order in the minds of people, and how the notion of science emerged later.¹³ Somewhere on this path, psychology lost its subject, says Valsiner, namely, the *person*. The person was the core of developmental psychology only from the 1920s to the 1930s, then rats, pigeons, monkeys, and crowds of human beings became substitutes for persons, ‘as if they represent the intricacies of the human *psyche*’:¹⁴

The invention of the notion of correlation in the history of statistics by Francis Galton, Charles Spearman, Felix Krueger, and Karl Pearson at the end of the 19th century has done a major disservice for psychology to transpose real relationships into formal ones. Psychological generalisation becomes moot — any discovery of ‘relationships’ between ‘variable X’ and ‘variable Y’ in a correlational analysis reveals little about the actual functioning of the system in which whatever X and Y represent are systemically linked. Correlational data do not explain — they need explanation themselves! This claim has dramatic implications for the standard practices in psychology of our days where correlational evidence — generalised to discourse about ‘significant relations’ between ‘variables’ — is usually viewed as the final result of investigation.¹⁵

In the 1970s, the situation began to open up, as manifested, among others, in the establishment of the *Journal of Person-Oriented Research*, based on the Person-Oriented Approach that ‘breaks out of the confines of the practice of substituting the person by a rat, a pigeon, a well-educated bonobo, a crowd (called “a sample”), or a computer’.¹⁶

By now, twenty-first century psychology is still in need of opening up, says Valsiner. The *self* — with innumerable possible personality traits — has taken the place of the soul as scientifically acceptable causal agent, Valsiner explains, and the outcome is that ‘psychology has lost its soul in the fight against the soul — resulting in legitimisation of mechanistic terms as explanatory agents’.¹⁷ All this happened despite the fact that human beings are not marbles one can draw from an urn at one’s will, they are ‘wilful, desirous, reflective, and at times resistant individuals who are tied to their peers by kinship, friendship, and profit relationships’.¹⁸

Recent post-quantitative thinking in psychology goes along three lines, Brinkmann explains. First, *matter* (or nature) is understood as agentic and always changing, thus deconstructing the constructed opposition between a sphere of passive and inert matter on the one hand and a sphere of meaningful human experiences, discourses, and actions on the other.¹⁹ Second, *theorising* is seen as generative, with new words and concepts aiming to erode the established binaries that formed the foundation of the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research — why, Brinkmann asks, are empirical data seen as material to be coded, categorised, and analysed, using theoretical concepts supposedly on a higher level? Why should what informants say be coded and not what scholars such as Gilles Deleuze or Jacques Derrida say? Third, the *philosophy of representation* in general is being critiqued and rejected insofar as recent qualitative inquiry breaks with ‘the humanist, modernist, imperialist, representationalist, objectivist, rationalist, epistemological, ontological, and methodological assumptions of Western Enlightenment thought and practice’.²⁰

Jaan Valsiner explains that from the viewpoint of semiotics — the study of signs and symbols as elements of communicative behaviour — there is a controlling meta-sign called *scientific* that denotes the common sense legitimacy of science, and that this legitimacy is subject to historically changing social constraints, meaning that any search for attributions is a form of sign construction aiming to pass through this gate.²¹

Further down, I will report on my own experiences with my research on humiliation, and how the very phrase *humiliation* initially failed to pass the ‘controlling meta-sign of science’. Publishers did not want to have the word humiliation in the title of an academic book — it simply seemed too ‘unscientific’. After my first book came out in 2006, titled *Making enemies: Humiliation and international conflict*, critical voices in the United States of America honoured it as one of the best academic books of the year, thus illustrating how the ‘common sense legitimacy of science’ changes over time.²² I am gratified when I read that also other academics now stand up for definitions of science that are more relevant to present-day reality in the world.²³

‘Science starts from intuition’, this is Jaan Valsiner’s message. It starts from the kind of intuition that is ‘educated in the process of initiation into social practices of science’, in other words, it is not some kind of naïve or ‘pure’ intuition — ‘the educated intuition is in the very core of all science’.²⁴ Frames of reference are meta-cognitive models, they are ‘intellectual telescopes’, or windows of opportunity ‘to see some features of the object more clearly than others’.²⁵ Valsiner speaks of the *individual-socioecological frame* as the only frame of reference suitable for psychology.²⁶ This frame, even though it complicates the elaboration of methodology, fits the human condition best, because it adds the role of ‘external guidance by goals-oriented others’, persons or institutions, to the *individual-ecological frame* that fits ‘biological phenomena and the study of most nonhuman species’.²⁷

Rather than simply accumulating data, Valsiner recommends Albert Einstein’s approach to cultural psychology, namely, the search for the *experimentum crucis* — for an experiment that, if true, rules out all other hypotheses or theories.²⁸

Insights like these have guided my research since its inception, and I have drawn radical consequences even for my personal life. It is clear that the complex of phenomena that surrounds

humiliation, honour, and dignity, and how we speak about them, represents a showcase example for the role that societal forces play. This entire complex offers a prime illustration of how these forces are far from value-free, and, furthermore, to what extent society's conflicts may be exposed by psychology, but also concealed.

As mentioned before, not least the way this book is written is a consequence of the insights shared above. It is written as a painting more than as a scholarly presentation of a theory, as a painting that paints itself with the painter's humble and loving involvement²⁹ as a kaleidoscope or panorama painting,³⁰ as an associative report of my personal life journey from intuition to understanding,³¹ in its loving embeddedness in a global network of relationships with all the people and ideas who have impacted my life.³²

In other words, I enact a relational approach to psychology and method that does not reject quantitative methodologies, yet, it embeds them within qualitative frames. Similarly, I do not reject the mindset of individualism that forms an important backdrop for quantitative approaches, I only embed it in a more relational construction of the self. Sociologist George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) proposed this relational construction already long ago,³³ and I regret that his views have failed to become dominant, particularly in North America, where the stark opposite became prevalent, namely, the 'lone-hero' version of individualism. This highly individualised mindset has influenced the field of psychology and was influenced by it, and, according to my view, this went too far.

I am glad that pioneers such as Jean Baker Miller began to turn the tide in North America in the 1970s. Miller was an early leader who emphasised the role of relationships and community, and I am grateful to Linda Hartling for introducing me to Miller's relational-cultural theory.³⁴ Miller's insights helped me understand my own practice, they helped me understand what I do since I can remember, namely, enact the person-oriented approach that also Valsiner speaks of, heeding the Gestalt nature of personal encounters with the external world and appreciating the person as a Gestalt-maker. 'The basic human psychological development is centred in the personal innovation of one's unique life course. Generalisation becomes re-inserted into the never-ending particularities that are created as the person moves towards his or her future, from birth to death', formulates Valsiner.³⁵

All my life I have felt that the 'hierarchy of knowing' with the 'expert' as 'the knower' and the objects of research being 'the known' could also be reversed. Just like Kenneth Gergen, I have always been distrustful of the claim to objectivity in method that 'permits the researcher to dismiss the knowledge claims of the "objects of research" as biased and ignorant'.

I have therefore taken the standpoint of a relational being — 'I speak with others, and therefore I can know'.³⁶

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Notes

¹ Costall, 2004, p. 184, quoted in Brinkmann, 2017. See also this entertaining article on this topic, 'What quantum physics can tell you about your identity', by R. David Dixon Jr., *Medium*, 11th October 2017, <https://medium.com/the-mission/how-quantum-physics-freed-my-identity-16a96e6f4a7c>. See also Smedslund, 2021.

² See Foucault, 1957a, and Foucault, 1957b. I thank Howard Richards for reminding us of this part of Foucault's work. Richards did so in Lecture Two of Beyond Foucault: The rise of Indigenous subjugated knowledges, by Howard Richards in Pretoria, South Africa, 4th May 2013, <http://youtu.be/IcilkWWE1Y>. See for more Richards, et al., 2015. It is a privilege to have Howard Richards, Catherine Odora Hoppers, and her brother George as esteemed members in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies community.

³ Marsella, 1998, p. 1282. See also Marsella, 2012. It is a privilege to have Anthony Marsella as an esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies community. Read more about his background in note 749 in chapter 3.

⁴ Historian Jonathan Israel, 2014. Israel, 2001, offers an analysis of two distinct Enlightenments, 'moderate' and 'radical' — the mainstream Enlightenment was 'moderate', it was that of Locke, Hume, Voltaire, and Kant, while the Enlightenment of Spinoza, Pascal, d'Holbach, and Diderot was 'radical'. He argues that the radicalism of Spinoza's half-underground movement has deeply shaped modern conceptions of freedom, liberty, equality and tolerance.

See also 'Greek tragedy? The dominance in Western teaching of European thinkers such as Plato, is now being challenged', by Kenan Malik, *The Guardian*, 19th February 2017, www.theguardian.com/education/2017/feb/19/soas-philosophy-decolonise-our-minds-enlightenment-white-european-kenan-malik.

⁵ Brinkmann, 2017.

⁶ Harré, 2004, p. 13.

⁷ Brinkmann, 2017. William James (1842–1910) was the 'father' of American psychology, and the first educator to offer a psychology course in the United States. *Functionalism* was developed by James, contrasting the *structuralism* inspired by Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920). Structuralism's belief that the mind can be dissected into its individual parts, which then form conscious experience, has also been criticised by the *Gestalt* school of psychology, which argues that the mind cannot be broken down into individual elements.

⁸ Bauman, 2000.

⁹ Brinkmann, 2017, uses the term *liquid* modernity that sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, 2000, has coined. The distinctive phase of modernity that we live in has also been called *late* or *high* modernity, see Giddens, 1990 and Giddens, 1991, or *risk* society, see Beck, 1986.

¹⁰ Jansz and Drunen, 2004, in Madsen, 2014.

Notes

¹¹ Jansz and Drunen, 2004, p. 247, in Madsen, 2014, p. 610.

¹² Madsen, 2014, p. 610. The Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists was adopted by the Assembly of the International Union of Psychological Science in Berlin on 22nd July 2008. See www.iupsys.net/about/governance/universal-declaration-of-ethical-principles-for-psychologists.html:

Psychologists recognise that they carry out their activities within a larger social context. They recognise that the lives and identities of human beings both individually and collectively are connected across generations, and that there is a reciprocal relationship between human beings and their natural and social environments. Psychologists are committed to placing the welfare of society and its members above the self-interest of the discipline and its members.

¹³ Valsiner, 2012. See also the work of psychiatrist Suman Fernando, and his overview over the historic context of psychiatry and psychology, Fernando, 2017, p. 14.

¹⁴ Valsiner, 2015, p. 7. Italics in original. See also Bergman and Lundh, 2015. See also Valsiner, 2014, p. 9:

If we look at psychology from the historical viewpoint, it is the intra-individual (intra-systemic) reference frame that has been used in the emerging discipline since the 18th century. Psychology is a discipline that has focussed on the psychological functions and faculties that are projected to be inside of the persons. Our thinking, feeling, and perceiving we consider to be ‘in’ us — using the body as the boundary of the ‘in’/‘out’ distinction. Beyond that the efforts to localise different psychological functions have been widely and wildly dispersed, ending up with phrenology of localising such characteristics in the form of the skull, or in the functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) images of the brain. Starting from approximately the 1920s, psychology at large adopted the inter-individual (inter-systemic) reference frame that radically changed the social practices of research. Instead of analysing psychological phenomena within individual cases — over time (i.e. relying on comparisons within the given person), the differences between persons became the axiomatic domain for study. The hope for generalisation was now delegated to comparison of samples selected by some criteria and turned into ‘random’ ones. The belief was that through sufficiently large number and randomly selected set of subjects would warrant the treatment of the obtained differences in averages of the samples as if these would represent the generic individuals of the compared classes.

¹⁵ Valsiner, 2014, pp. 17–18.

¹⁶ Valsiner, 2015, p. 9.

¹⁷ Valsiner, 2015, p. 10.

¹⁸ Valsiner, 2014, p. 14.

¹⁹ Brinkmann, 2017, summarising the message of St. Pierre, et al., 2016.

²⁰ St. Pierre, 2011, p. 615.

²¹ Valsiner, 2015, p. 10. Italics in original. See also Smedslund, 2016, ‘Why psychology cannot be an empirical science’.

²² See also note 580 in chapter 3. *Making enemies: Humiliation and international conflict* is my first book on dignity and humiliation and how we may envision a more dignified world, and it has been characterised as a pathbreaking book and been honoured as ‘Outstanding Academic Title’ for 2007 in the U.S.A. by the journal *Choice*. *Choice* is a publication of the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL), a division of the American Library Association. See Lindner, 2006. It came out in 2006 in Praeger, with a Foreword by the father of the field of conflict resolution, Morton Deutsch. The book discusses dignity and humiliation and how we may envision a more dignified world. It first lays out a theory of the mental and social dynamics humiliation and proposes the need for ‘egalisation’ (the undoing of humiliation) for a healthy global society. It then presents chapters on the role of misunderstandings in fostering feelings of humiliation; the role of humiliation in international conflict; and the relationship of humiliation to terrorism and torture. It concludes with a discussion of how to defuse feelings of humiliation and create a dignified world. For more details, see www.humiliationstudies.org/whoweare/evelin/book/01.php.

²³ See ‘How green is my university?’ by Nick Mayo, *Times Higher Education*, 12th September 2019, www.timeshighereducation.com/features/how-green-my-university#survey-answer. We learn how Jem

Notes

Bendell's article on *deep adaptation* fared when he submitted it to the *Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal*:

While a referee had criticised him for not identifying a 'research question or gap' based on the current state of the literature, Bendell pointed out in reply that 'the article is challenging the basis of the field there are no articles in either SAMPJ or Organisation and Environment that explore implications for business practice or policy of a near-term inevitable collapse due to environmental catastrophe' There was a similar disagreement about how academic articles should be written. In arguing that 'disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change [would] bring starvation, destruction, migration, disease and war', Bendell had deliberately adopted a personal and emotional tone: 'You will become malnourished. You won't know whether to stay or go. You will fear being violently killed before starving to death'. One referee commented that 'the language used is not appropriate for a scholarly article'.

See more in note 73 in the Preface, and note 3005 in chapter 10.

²⁴ Valsiner, 2014, p. 13.

²⁵ Valsiner, 2014, p. 10.

²⁶ Valsiner, 2014, p. 10.

²⁷ Valsiner, 2014, p. 10.

²⁸ Valsiner, 2014, p. 24.

²⁹ I resonate with Georg Lohmann, 2014, and his position that, in contrast to theories that show meaning in a logical way, images and metaphors can make meaning palpable in an interpretative way, for instance, the meaning of the notion of a 'good life'. See the original in German in Lohmann, 2014, p. 11:

Auch hier muss und darf die radikale Endlichkeit nicht der Versuchung erliegen, eine absolute Konzeption des Guten Lebens zu suchen oder gar anbieten zu wollen. Sie kann stattdessen nur so etwas wie ein, man könnte sagen, 'relativ Absolutes' gewinnen und anbieten. Die frustrierenden und ambivalenten Erfahrungen des Unverfügbaren bewältigen wir durch eine mehr oder weniger angemessene, argumentative Verständigung darüber, wer wir sind, sein wollen, sein sollen und sein können. Alle diese Aspekte fassen wir wie in einem Bilde zusammen, weil, anders als in Theorien, in Bildern ein angestrebter oder explizierter Sinnzusammenhang sich nicht logisch, sondern durch ein interpretatives Zusammenspiel von unterschiedlichen Elementen verstehen lässt. Menschliches Leben ist deshalb immer, relativ zu einem Menschenbild, interpretiertes Leben, und deshalb ist die Hermeneutik, als die Kunst des Verstehens, mit ihrer 'Ehrenrettung der "schlechten Unendlichkeit"' die passende Philosophie der Endlichkeit'.

Like Amitai Etzioni, I am not a legal scholar. I focus on the generalist perspective that I have developed throughout the course of my lifetime. Etzioni, 2013, p. 334:

The discussion focusses on the normative part of the dynamic. That is, although I fully recognise that we must move on both 'legs' to proceed, currently the prevailing normative paradigms are particularly lagging behind the new international reality and hence warrant special attention. Also, I focus on the normative rather than the legal because I have no legal training and approach the subject of terrorism as a sociologist, social philosopher, and one who knows of combat first hand. Hence, that the expected review of the legal literature is not provided should not be viewed as a lack of respect for the work of legal scholars on these issues, but as an acknowledgment of my limitations.

³⁰ I very much resonate with Indigenous psychologist Louise Sundararajan when she uses the image of painting. She suggests that emotions have to be described with a 'gentle paint brush, rather than to nail discreet emotions down, if there is such a thing, with codified labels and categorisations', Sundararajan, 2015, p. 75. Sundararajan speaks about Chinese emotions in this quote, however, I would suggest that this approach is recommendable for social sciences in general.

I also appreciate the description of critical and post-structural inquiry given in 'Thinking critically about critical thinking: whose thinking, whose benefits?' by Hank Stam, professor of psychology at University of Calgary, for the Day in Qualitative Psychology, and the opening meeting of the Special Interest Group (SIG) in Critical and Poststructural Psychology at the International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry (CCQI), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Wednesday, 17th May 2017, <http://icqi.org/pre-congress-days/a-day-in-qualitative-psychology/>:

Notes

We see poststructural inquiries as moving away from attempts to provide realistic, universal, and fixed representations and from referents and answers that are not situated in historical, political, and cultural positions. In underscoring the close link between knowledge and power, and the (im)possibilities of representation, poststructural forms of inquiry explore, participate in, and deconstruct experiences and meanings as part of discursive frames, linguistic practices, and relational realities. Knowledges become non-linear, fluid, and liminal between fields and disciplines, and outside of them. Rather than finding finite answers, inquiries open up possibilities, questions, and multiplicity, with an eye towards issues and constructions of social justice, inequality, and emancipation.

Aware of the political and agentic situatedness of every form of inquiry, critical researchers seek to achieve equality and/or foster resistance, usually through collaborative and mutual approaches to an identified social issue and the knowledge/practice that may be developed or performed for its amelioration. Research is transformed into a diffractive and political practice that contributes to the empowerment of participants and to their resistance against institutionalised and hierarchical knowledge.

See also the description of the purpose and history of the Coalition for Critical Qualitative Inquiry Special Interest Group, <http://icqi.org/pre-congress-days/critical-qualitative-inquiry/>:

For some time, researchers engaging in critical qualitative scholarship have called for the construction of a critical social science that challenges disciplinary boundaries and rethinks research as construct and practice. To some extent, the broad expanse of qualitative research as a field has accomplished this reconceptualisation, especially with the extensive work of feminist, postcolonial, and poststructural scholars (to name just a few of the epistemological perspectives that address issues of power and equity). However, the contemporary imposition of neo-liberal forms of knowledge and practice broadly, but especially within higher education, is an immediate threat to qualitative research of all types, and most importantly, to a construction of higher education that would facilitate diverse ways of being and challenge social and environmental injustice and oppression in any form. From within this neo-liberal condition, critical work is of utmost importance. Additionally, as critical perspectives have brought to the forefront the anthropocentrism that dominates research, those concerned with the ‘more-than-human’ hope to challenge all forms of injustice. The main purpose of the Critical Qualitative Inquiry SIG within ICQI is to construct a Coalition of individuals from a range of fields who systematically work together to:

- Expand visibility for existing critical work, as well as newly emerging, post-human inquiry (e.g. feminisms, subaltern studies, queer theory, critical pedagogy, counter colonial critique, new materialisms, post-anthropocentric inquiry)
- Increase and maintain critical qualitative inquiry as an avenue for equity and social justice across, outside, and challenges to, disciplines
- Construct new diverse forms of critical qualitative inquiry, related forms of activism, and innovative methods for sharing that work
- Systematically support critical qualitative scholars in the changing climate that is higher education, especially under contemporary neo-liberal conditions that include the privileging of academic conservatism.

³¹ Gadamer, 1960/1989. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) grew up in Breslau (since 1945 Wrocław), where my mother was born in 1930, and he studied classics and philosophy in the University of Breslau. I thank Hroar Klempe for reminding me of Gadamer’s work in April 2016. It is a privilege to have Hroar Klempe as an esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies community.

³² See many of the people who accompany me on my life path on www.humiliationstudies.org.

³³ Mead, 1934.

³⁴ Relational-Cultural Theory (CRP) evolved from the work of Jean Baker Miller, 1976/1986, M.D., pioneer in women’s psychology. It assumes that humans have a natural drive towards relationships and it applies a growth-in-connection model of human growth and development to organisational settings. See for a recent overview, among others, Jordan, 2010. Linda Hartling is the former Associate Director of the Jean Baker Miller Training Institute, and it is a privilege to have her as the director of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies. Linda Hartling builds on relational-cultural theory as developed by her mentor Jean Baker Miller and her colleagues, see, among others, Hartling, et al., 2008. It was a privilege to have Jean Baker Miller as an esteemed member in the global advisory board of our Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies community until her passing in 2006, and we will always honour her spirit. See also note 2282 in chapter 7.

Notes

³⁵ Valsiner, 2015, p. 12.

³⁶ Gergen, 2009, p. 234. Gergen warns that the social sciences are not served by methods which reinforce the prevailing ideology of bounded being. Gergen, 2009, p. 229:

Traditional writing carries with it a hierarchical division, with the private and highly valued act of research given primacy over the secondary, social act of reporting the 'findings'. First it is important that 'I know', and then it might also be helpful if 'I would tell others'...