Common Ground News Service
Partners in Humanity (CGNews-PiH)
for constructive & vibrant Muslim-Western relations
19 - 25 December 2006

HOLIDAY NOTICE: The next issue of CGNews-PiH will be distributed on 9 January 2007. We wish our readers a peaceful holiday season and happy New Year.

The Common Ground News Service – Partners in Humanity (CGNews-PiH) aims to promote constructive perspectives and dialogue about Muslim–Western relations. CGNews-PiH is available in Arabic, English, French and Indonesian.

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Inside this edition

1) Western aid should think again by Robert Myers
This second article in a series on economics and Muslim-Western relations is written by Robert Myers, an economist with forty years of applied experience. He compares the public-sector-focused foreign aid that Western donors most frequently provide with a relatively new aid paradigm that focuses on growing the private sector. Looking at different experiences in the Middle East and Asia, he identifies which model has succeeded and which has failed.
(Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 19 December 2006)

2) What Muslim women want by Genieve Abdo and Dalia Mogahed
Genieve Abdo and Dalia Mogahed, senior analyst and executive director, respectively, of the Center for Muslim Studies at the Gallup Organization, consider what the results of a recent Gallup poll tell us about what Muslim women from 22 predominantly Muslim countries want. Answering questions about shari‘a, women’s rights and the veil, they show the difference between what others believe they want, and what they themselves wish for.
(Source: Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2006)

3) Muslim integration in Australia: it’s not so bad by Shahram Akbarzadeh
Shahram Akbarzadeh, director of the Centre for Muslim Minorities and Islam Policy Studies at Monash University in Australia, considers the reasons why some see Australian Muslims “as some sort of a fifth column for global jihad”. Looking at the social implications of Muslim integration into broader Australian society, he considers current government strategy and highlights some areas where it falls short.
(Source: Australian, 7 December 2006)

4) It’s only “dialogue” if we talk to those who disagree by Michael Vatikiotis
Michael Vatikiotis, a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, wonders whether current interfaith dialogue efforts simply preach to the converted. He challenges governments and policy experts to “explore deeper areas of disagreement and difference that don't stem from a difference of faith, but from a difference of social and economic opportunity, or of world view.”
(Source: International Herald Tribune, 27 November 2006)

5) U.S. foreign policy once delivered – and can again by Anouar Boukhars
Anouar Boukhars, visiting professor of political science and director of the Center for Defense and Security Policy at Wilberforce University in Ohio, considers the many successful instances in which U.S. foreign policy has engaged its “enemies” in discussion and dialogue to reach common, and even selfish, goals. Boukhars questions why such proven U.S. public diplomacy tactics are not applied in the post-9/11 world, particularly when it comes to Iran and Syria.
(Source: Bitterlemons-international.org, 7 December 2006)

1) Western aid should think again
Robert Myers

Washington, D.C. - The type of aid that Western donors most frequently provide is not necessarily the most effective for developing countries. This “exogenous” approach stresses the centrality of external donor ideology, administrative involvement and aid-flows -- frequently loans -- to public sectors. This is supposed to improve governance and, through this, economic growth.

However, this type of aid seems mainly to suppress private political and economic enterprise, making countries even more aid-dependent. A relatively new (twenty-year old) “endogenous growth” paradigm of foreign aid reverses things by first aiding in the growth of private initiatives. In this schema, recipient governments become more dependent on domestic private sector growth and less on external, donor-provided aid. Adopting the new approach requires a decisive break with old aid ways: it begins with external public sector debt forgiveness, and encompasses a new government determination to significantly limit public sector external borrowing.

Dubai is an excellent example of an endogenous approach that is succeeding. The Afghan government, on the other hand, has chosen the wrong, aid-dependent path. Each year, aid to Afghanistan finances over 50% of public sector expenditure and massive balance of payments deficits. Public sector external debt, much of it unrecorded, is a large share of GDP and the government appears uninterested in reducing reliance on it. Currently the IMF-advised government badgers a few formal sector businesses to pay onerous taxes, suppressing new private investment and growth in the tax base. Prospects of increasing foreign debt service payments and hoards of cheap, aid-financed imports destroy private, domestic investment incentives.

Most donors and donor governments, predominantly from the West, are at best sceptical and at worst hostile to this endogenous approach, even though when they try to “push” development, they fail: it’s like pushing on a string. The formal private sector fails to expand and there’s no growth in private sector employment. Smaller, less intrusive governments and private sector perceptions of business and political opportunities at home and abroad liberate private political and economic initiatives. China, Chile, Hong Kong, Singapore and Mauritius are examples of this “new” approach.

A key example of differences in approach comes when donors aid public sector development of service-providing institutions, such as civil and commercial legal systems, to relatively sophisticated levels as a precursor to development. Endogenous growth advocates see such growth-necessary institutions as consisting mainly of staff and knowledge that should change and grow in size and technological sophistication along with, or as part of, private sector growth. Afghanistan, siding with donors against its own businessmen, has made this expensive, time-consuming government-first choice, thus chasing away sophisticated Afghan entrepreneurs who know it will lead to corruption and stagnation.

To be effective, the choice of an endogenous growth program must be explicit, coherent, well publicised and include a private-sector-friendly and credible initiative regarding sovereign external debt overhangs. Donors can begin by giving grants, not loans. First, they can finance non-donor-allied expertise to construct private-sector-friendly sovereign debt workouts. Second, they can finance the independent expertise needed to spell out the particulars of a coherent endogenous growth program. And finally, donors can finance the public sector’s portion of the costs of building private sector institutions and expertise to jump-start the endogenous growth program. A crucial example of this is to cover the costs of constructing the fiscal systems needed to enable tax collection and domestic borrowing in ways consistent with rapid private sector growth. Another involves the costs of fostering growth in “Economic Processing Zones”, areas where a hands-off attitude by governments allows international business and commercial legal climates to emerge. These EPZs can then serve as demonstration areas for reforming the rest of the economy.

If Western donors want to assist predominantly-Muslim countries that are aid recipients in a way that contributes to their long-term stability, they can begin reorienting themselves toward this endogenous approach by adopting two indices as prime measures of development success. One is a growing tax base and consequent expansion in levels of domestic revenue, with constant or falling tax/GDP ratios. The other is sustained expansion in formal, urban, private sector employment. Improved foreign aid policies can contribute to a better global environment in our intertwined world.

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* Robert Myers is a Ph.D. economist with forty years of applied experience, much of it in developing Muslim countries. He helped found the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce, a non-profit organisation. This article is part of a series on economics and Muslim-Western relations distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.

Source: Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 19 December 2006, www.commongroundnews.org
Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.

2) What Muslim women want
Genieve Abdo and Dalia Mogahed

Washington, D.C. - Religion and modernity are butting heads again, or so it seems -- this time in Egypt. The country's cultural minister, Farouk Hosni, touched off a fiery, mostly male-dominated debate last month when he commented to a local newspaper that the increasing number of women in his country wearing headscarves marked a "regressive" trend in society and a turn away from modernity. But do millions of Muslim women agree that embracing Islam, as expressed by wearing the hijab, is in conflict with modernity? In fact, Muslim women paint a much more complex picture of their lives and in their minds, the choice is not one between Islamic law and modernity; the two are not mutually exclusive.

Consider the recent findings of a Gallup Poll of 22 predominantly Muslim countries, including Egypt, over the last 16 months. The survey represents the views of more than 90% of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. Majorities of women in these countries say they think women should have the same rights as men. At the same time, they also say that shari‘a, the sacred law of Islam, should be a source of the nation's laws. For many Westerners who associate shari‘a with the lack of women's rights, this might appear to be a stark contradiction.

Shari‘a literally means "the road to water", and represents the moral compass of a Muslim's personal and public life. Historically, the principles of shari‘a could be used to limit the power of the sultan for after all, he would never claim he was above God's law. Therefore, when Muslims call for shari‘a and gender equality, both are calls for the rule of law and an end to inequality. In many countries, Muslims are calling for the application of shari‘a because even when the constitution states that shari‘a is the primary basis of the law, in practice this is not enforced by officially secular governments.

Among the women surveyed in our poll, Egyptian women are most likely to believe shari‘a should be the primary source of legislation: 62% say it should be the only source of law, and 28% say it should be a source, but not the only source. In nearly every country surveyed, aside from officially secular Turkey, a majority of women say Islamic law should either be the primary source of legislation or a source.

For decades, the role of women in Islamic societies has provided one of the primary battlegrounds in the cultural war between East and West. As a result, Muslim women have been placed in two artificial and mutually exclusive categories: modern and secular, or religious and traditional -- even backward. The assumption is that, although the number of women choosing to veil in Egypt and elsewhere is growing, this trend is a result of either ignorance or women surrendering to pressure from their husbands or fathers.

In contrast to the popular wisdom that women are content even if they believe they are second-class citizens, Gallup's survey found that women in the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed believe they should have equal legal rights as men, from voting rights to employment opportunities and access to the highest posts in government. Some 83% of Iranian women, for example, say women should be able to hold leadership positions in the cabinet and national council. Still, when the same Iranian women were asked the shari‘a question, 66% said Islamic law should be a source, and 14% said the sole source, of legislation.

Majorities of Muslim women also say that religion is an important part of their daily lives. When asked to associate descriptions with the Islamic world, the most often chosen statement among men and women was "attachment to their spiritual and moral values is crucial to progress". When asked an open-ended question about what they admire most about their own societies the most frequent response was "people's attachment to the teachings of Islam".

These findings muddy the oversimplified debate that posits religion against modernity, and they reflect a trend in Islamic societies that is gaining momentum: while Muslim women favour gender equality, they do not favour wholesale adoption of Western cultural values. Instead, they want to pick and choose which aspects of the West and the East will form the basis of their lives.

This trend is evident among the rich and famous Egyptian movie stars who have opted for a veiled life off the screen. Egypt's stars are powerful cultural icons, and it was their recent testimonials of embracing Islam and leaving behind their lives in the fast lane that were a factor in Farouk Hosni's remarks. As more and more prominent women in Egypt have announced publicly their desire to wear headscarves, the public debate in the country has become more heated.

As Muslim women try to reconcile religion with modernity, a few clerics are helping them along the way. Amr Khaled, arguably the most popular television preacher in the Arab world, has become the guardian for Muslim youth and educated women who are embracing Islam. With the business suits (not clerical robes) he wears for sermons and a London address, Amr Khaled has found a third way between secular liberalism and radical Islam. Through his teaching, he has attracted millions of followers much like Enas, a fashion-conscious member of Egypt's affluent class. After listening to Amr Khaled, she was "awakened spiritually" and then began wearing the hijab. "Our image of Islam used to be that it was only for poor people, old fashioned people who wore white galabyias [long traditional tunics] and had scruffy beards, not the chic upper class," says Enas. "By listening to Amr, I realised how much my life was missing without a focus on God."

The young Egyptian, who has a doctorate in pharmacy, is now pursuing a degree in shari‘a studies. "Because our laws are not based on shari‘a today, injustice and corruption are rampant. I wanted to study shari‘a," she says, "to teach young people so the next generation will be better than the current one -- so our country will progress."

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*Genieve Abdo and Dalia Mogahed are senior analyst and executive director, respectively, of the Center for Muslim Studies at the Gallup Organization. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.

Source: Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2006, www.wsj.com
Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.

3) Muslim integration in Australia: it’s not so bad
Shahram Akbarzadeh

Victoria, Australia - The furore over [Muslim cleric] Taj Din al-Hilali's shameful comments [that immodestly dressed women attract rape] has died down. But as two media reports yesterday on young Muslims behaving badly show, the issues raised in that debate about Muslim integration continue to haunt Australian Muslims.

In Victoria, two Muslim boys were expelled from East Preston Islamic College for urinating on the Bible, an act condemned in the strongest terms by the school principal. In New South Wales, meanwhile, the Muslim winner of the NSW Young Australian of the Year award had to defend herself for drinking champagne against an online backlash on a Muslim youth website.

The question of Muslim integration into the broader society, the social implications of multiculturalism and the security threat posed by home-grown extremists are themes that keep popping up in public commentary on Muslims and Islam. Coming on the heels of security alerts in Europe involving real or alleged Muslim terrorists, this conflation of issues may be understandable, albeit politically and socially unproductive.

In a way, the notion of the Muslim internal threat is not entirely new. It goes back to the conflation of dissent and disloyalty. Canberra's foreign policy choices in the Middle East have often met with disapproval among Australian Muslims. Some observers have misconstrued this political alienation from government policies as lack of loyalty to Australia.

Applied to anyone else, this presumed link between political dissent and treason would have been preposterous. When applied to Muslims, it suddenly seems less so. This misguided perspective, often promoted by the tabloid press and shock jocks, has seriously damaged mutual trust and understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Although it is not publicly admitted, most criticism against multiculturalism implies an inherent incompatibility between being Muslim and being Australian. The debate about Australian values and the presumed difficulty Muslims have in subscribing to them is based on the false premise that Muslim values are different from Australian values.

More importantly, this position assumes that this alien Muslim value system links Australian Muslims with an external threat. To put it bluntly, Australian Muslims are seen as some sort of a fifth column for global jihad.

The instinctive response among our policy-makers to this assumed problem has been to overemphasise the importance of ideas: to suggest that ideas of liberal democracy are under threat from ideas of Islamic intolerance and bigotry. Ironically, this fascination with rhetorical proclamations is shared by Islamists who argue the reverse: that democracy and liberalism are Zionist ploys to destroy Islam.

Both approaches are equally absurd and have the potential to cause enormous damage. An old Persian proverb says it takes only one fool to drop something precious into a well, but it takes a hundred wise men to retrieve it.

The obsession with ideology comes at the expense of a balanced assessment of real issues regarding Muslim integration in Australia. Last year, the Australian government formed a Muslim Community Reference Group to provide advice on the most pressing issues that adversely affect Muslims and, by extension, Australia's security, and on how radicalisation may best be averted.

The reference group came up with a list of key areas that required attention: foremost were issues of education, employment and women's support infrastructure to facilitate social integration. The group also noted the need to foster Australia-based Islamic scholarship.

The notion of training religious leaders in Australia to lead Muslims here, as opposed to the existing practice of importing religious leaders, has captured the imagination of the government to the almost total detriment of other recommendations from the reference group.

Training local imams to lead Australian Muslims is not a bad idea. But its impact is likely to be far more limited than the government is willing to acknowledge.

There are two critical flaws in this approach. For one thing, it assumes significant authority of the Islamic leadership among the 300,000-plus Australian Muslims. Yet informed estimates of mosque attendance among Muslims put the figure at about 30 per cent: most Australian Muslims do not attend mosques and, by extension, do not turn to imams for guidance. Australian Muslims constitute a heterogeneous group - and some of them drink champagne.

The second - and perhaps more significant - flaw in this approach is that it plays down the social, economic and political factors that affect Muslim integration. Unemployment among Muslim youth, for instance, is much higher than the national average, especially in Sydney's western suburbs.

It's time for a reality check. We need to acknowledge the diversity of Australian Muslims. Religious devotion is not the primary characteristic of Muslims. And we need to put the appeal of anti-social ideas for some Muslim youth in the wider context of socioeconomic dissatisfaction and political alienation.

A firmly integrated community is less likely to create potential recruits for “jihad”. Public policy should be reoriented towards lubricating the mechanisms of integration, rather than engaging in an ideological campaign for the soul of Islam.

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* Shahram Akbarzadeh is director of the Centre for Muslim Minorities and Islam Policy Studies in Monash University’s school of political and social inquiry based in Victoria, Australia. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.

Source: Australian, 7 December 2006, www.theaustralian.news.com.au
Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.

4) It’s only “dialogue” if we talk to those who disagree
Michael Vatikiotis

Singapore - In these dangerous times, with a lot of bleak talk about a clash of civilisations, one of the most popular forms of public diplomacy is interfaith dialogue, giving rise to a minor industry of seminars and conferences attended by globe-trotting mullahs, priests, rabbis and monks.

The idea is a good one: bring together leaders of different faiths and begin a dialogue on tolerance, moderation and ending violence. In a climate where extremism is seen as driving a wedge between religions, there is a natural common desire to bridge the widening gaps and promote religious harmony.

The problem is that all too often the dialogue occurs between people who, despite the difference in faiths, basically agree with one another. Rarely are dogmatic extremists invited to such gatherings. For the most part, Western governments are prohibited from being in the same room with such hard- liners. But what's the point of a dialogue without protagonists?

Policy experts at the forefront of the war against terror, obsessed as they are with building coalitions, like to think there is safety in numbers, and that such meetings empower moderates and marginalise radicals. Interfaith dialogue, they hope, will send important messages to each religious community on mutual understanding, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

For many Muslims, who feel the negative impact of the global war on terror, these gatherings are, naturally enough, about retaining respect for Islam and promoting a more positive image of the religion. "Through dialogue, Europe and the world of Islam get to understand each other better and more deeply so that there is a growth of goodwill and the capacity to work together to solve common problems," said Indonesia's foreign minister, Hassan Wirajuda, who has hosted several interfaith conferences.

But how to do you meet the challenges of terrorism without engaging with terrorists? A gathering of like-minded moderates is more like monologue. Rather there is a need to explore deeper areas of disagreement and difference that don't stem from a difference of faith, but from a difference of social and economic opportunity, or of world view.

That's why it is important to include radicals who would use their faith as a weapon to mobilise followers to commit violent acts. Understanding the need to engage with religious radicals is the key to bringing them over. Simply relying on a policy of interdiction and extermination is breeding larger numbers of misguided extremists. By not talking to them, we reinforce their prejudice and hatred. It doesn't make sense to demand an end to violence before allowing them to the table. No dialogue for peace requires combatants to lay down their arms first. Why should religious radicals feel any differently?

Europe is already hamstrung by a foolish policy that prohibits contact with influential religious movements like Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Asia, with its long tradition of open dialogue and consultation with all sides to a conflict, could end up in the same cul-de-sac, unable to talk about root problems with people who feel misunderstood and therefore driven to violence.

Why not talk to the Taliban, rather than wait for more NATO soldiers to die fighting them? Why not draw in the Pakistani Islamic movements that offer them clandestine support? In open dialogue, these ties will be hard to disguise. Dialogue tends to pull everyone involved toward the middle ground.

To some it may sound naïve or idealistic to imagine that talking will convince men mostly portrayed as full of hatred for "our way of life" to change their ways. But it would seem that as the military approach to waging war on terror is losing steam, dialogue is becoming more acceptable. The British government is urging talks with Syria and Iran as a way out of the quagmire in Iraq, as is the Iraq Study Group, led by James Baker, a former U.S. secretary of state.

This is where the form of pluralism common to Asia could be useful. In much of Asia, pluralism is more about managing differences than eliminating them. Western approaches to faith tend to be rooted in models of integration and assimilation. Asian plural societies, with their respect for difference, present a useful environment in which to engage with Shi’as from Iran, Muslim Brotherhood adherents from Egypt, and yes, perhaps even Hizbullah and Hamas.

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* Michael Vatikiotis is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and frequent writer for the International Herald Tribune. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.

Source: International Herald Tribune, 27 November 2006, www.iht.com
Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.

5) U.S. foreign policy once delivered – and can again
Anouar Boukhars

Wilberforce, Ohio - It was Yitzhak Rabin, the tough-fisted, uncompromising professional soldier, who transformed Yasser Arafat, the alleged "arch-terrorist" into a partner for peace. As difficult as Rabin found it to engage Arafat, he understood, as the Israeli writer David Grossman stated, "that life in a constant climate of violence, of occupation, of terror and fear and hopelessness, comes at a price that Israel cannot afford to pay."

When Ronald Reagan proclaimed the Soviet Union the "Evil Empire" in his own tough and undiplomatic fashion, his disdain for communism did not prevent him from negotiating agreements with it on arms control and other issues. And it was also mutual self-interest that brought Washington and Beijing together in a monumental meeting that the astute statesman and disgraced politician Richard Nixon called "the week that changed the world" back in 1972.

Nixon's diplomatic coup de maitre was an example of shrewd analysis of the great game that transformed superpower politics. By putting strategic interest ahead of ideological zeal and tactical talks, Nixon and his Machiavellian national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, pulled off a brilliant US diplomatic coup that turned out to be more important to the international balance of power than the loss of Vietnam to the communists.

Another brilliant stroke of policy was the so-called Helsinki Process that put human rights in a security framework. Launched in 1972 and culminating in the formation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, this multilateral framework between the Soviet-bloc countries and the democratic West transformed the agenda of East-West relations by providing a shrewdly comprehensive, political-military definition of security that enshrined sovereign equality, inviolability of frontiers, and respect for fundamental freedoms. Kissinger's brilliance stemmed from his realisation that acceptance of the Soviet bloc's legitimate security concerns was crucial to winning Soviet agreement to Article 7 of the Helsinki Accords on respect for human rights that ultimately undermined the communist system.

Such constructive dialogues with adversaries are a great American tradition. But much of what is said or written about such dialogues in the post 9/11 world is unfortunately grounded in ideology and/or wishful thinking. The United States won't talk to Iran and Syria until both nations alter their behaviour. The Bush administration thinks that the only time it can talk to its enemies is when it can achieve through dialogue what it could not get through military threats and other coercive policies. But it is unrealistic to expect the Syrians to abandon Hamas, Hizbullah, Iran and other groups that have been critical to the country's strategic posture unless they get credible incentives in return.

Syria's obstructionist policies and political calculations derive largely from the regime's perception of the US as an obstructionist force on Arab-Israel issues and regional stability. President Bashar Assad has hinted on many occasions that peace is his preferred strategic option but that peace will not come about unless the problem of Syria's undefined international borders is resolved. The most coveted quid pro quo Syria wants is not a reassertion of its control over Lebanon as many of its detractors trumpet incessantly but the return of the Golan Heights that Israel conquered in 1967.

The recent violent confrontations and political turmoil in the Middle East have underscored once again that a new Middle East will not emerge without the establishment of secure, just and recognised international borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The greatest contribution the Bush administration could make to the region is to create a context for a broad settlement of the Syrian-Israeli conflict in which support for radicalism and Assad's strategic interests no longer align. There is no doubt that a lasting Israeli-Syrian peace would go a long way toward de-radicalising the regional order and depriving the Syrian Baathist regime of an issue it has long used to deflect calls for democratic change. If Assad is willing to respect Lebanese sovereignty and use his influence over Hamas, Hizbullah and Sunni insurgent groups in a constructive manner, the United States and Europe should reciprocate by accommodating the country's legitimate rights and offering Assad a package of incentives he could not refuse.

The same applies to Iran. The Bush administration needs a strategic reassessment of its relations with Tehran that transcends simplistic and war-mongering rhetoric to include mutual security guarantees and arms control pacts. Engaging Iran in a manner that affirms its legitimate security concerns and right to pursue civilian nuclear power, while ensuring respect for non-proliferation and human rights norms, could provide the impetus for a settlement of the Iranian-American conflict. To pursue this agenda, the United States should adopt a broad political, cultural, and economic policy reminiscent of its engagement of the Soviet bloc in the Helsinki process which included a "security basket" that recognised the Soviet Union as a great power with legitimate global interests and a "human rights basket" that opened its domestic system to human rights norms.

It may seem repelling to engage an Iranian regime headed by a president whose absurd denials of the Holocaust and calls for the destruction of Israel clearly disqualify him from being a partner in any potential negotiations. But it is important to understand the subtle power struggle going on within Iran and the potential for a further divide of an already fragmented regime. By making a public offer to Iran that the regime cannot refuse, America's diplomatic manoeuvre would corner the regime into either refusing a deal most Iranians support or force it to compromise by opening its domestic system to democratic and human rights norms that would eventually undermine the clerical system in the same way that communism was undermined by the Helsinki accords.

Today U.S. President George W. Bush needs a grand strategy for the Middle East that deals with interrelated problems in the region. "Unless a president sets his own priorities, his priorities will be set by others -- by adversaries, or the crisis of the moment. American policy can become random and reactive--untethered to the interests of our country." These were the words of then candidate George W. Bush who ridiculed Clinton for his poor foreign policy decisions that led "our nation to move from crisis to crisis like a cork in a current." It is ironic that Bush failed to heed his own caution of drifting from crisis to crisis without clear priorities.

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* Anouar Boukhars is visiting professor of political science and director of the Center for Defense and Security Policy at Wilberforce University in Ohio. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.

Source: Bitterlemons-international.org, 7 December 2006, www.bitterlemons-international.org
Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.

Youth Views

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Posted by Evelin at December 30, 2006 06:08 PM